2005-A global Malmquist productivity index

第37卷第4期2023年8月水土保持学报J o u r n a l o f S o i l a n d W a t e rC o n s e r v a t i o nV o l .37N o .4A u g.,2023收稿日期:2023-01-19资助项目:国家自然科学基金项目(4217450);四川省重点研发项目(22Z D Y F 2490) 第一作者:鲁仕宝(1975 ),男,教授,博导, 天府学者 特聘专家,主要从事水资源与水环境研究㊂E -m a i l :346402642@q q.c o m 通信作者:尚毅梓(1983-),男,教高,博导,主要从事水资源与水环境研究㊂E -m a i l :y z s h a n g@f o x m a i l .c o m 王浩(1953-),男,教高,博导,院士,主要从事水资源与水环境研究㊂E -m a i l :w a n gh a o @i w h .c o m 黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效评估及其提升路径鲁仕宝1,2,尚毅梓3,王浩3,廉志端1(1.甘肃农业大学财经学院,兰州730070;2.云南大学生态资源保护与利用国家重点实验室,昆明650000;3.中国水利水电科学研究院流域水循环与模拟国家重点实验室,北京100038)摘要:黄河流域经济带是我国北方重要的经济走廊,科学评估黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效水平,提高黄河流域沿线9省生态环境质量是实现黄河流域经济带的高质量发展重要举措之一㊂运用生态环境质量评估㊁生态效率评估等研究方法,开展2012 2017年的生态环境质量㊁生态效率和绿色全要素生产率评估㊂结果表明:黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效水平总体呈现由较低水平不断提升的趋势;黄河沿线九省在生态环境质量和生态效率系统层中有明显差异,生态环境质量系统层中,上游地区的最优;生态效率系统层中,中下游地区的生态效率最优且稳定㊂研究结果从生态系统修复功能㊁产业绿色发展和完善生态环境顶层制度设计3个方面提出加快推进黄河战略的实施,提升黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效㊂关键词:黄河流域经济带;环境绩效;评价体系;提升路径中图分类号:X 171.1 文献标识码:A 文章编号:1009-2242(2023)04-0235-08D O I :10.13870/j.c n k i .s t b c x b .2023.04.029E c o l o g i c a l E n v i r o n m e n t P e r f o r m a n c eA s s e s s m e n t a n d I m pr o v e m e n t P a t ho f t h eY e l l o wR i v e rB a s i nE c o n o m i cB e l tL US h i b a o 1,2,S H A N G Y i z i 3,WA N G H a o 3,L I A NZ h i d u a n1(1.C o l l e g e o f F i n a n c e a n dE c o n o m i c s ,G a n s uA g r i c u l t u r a lU n i v e r s i t y ,L a n z h o u 730070;2.S t a t eK e y L a b o r a t o r yo f E c o l o g i c a lR e s o u r c e sC o n s e r v a t i o na n dU t i l i z a t i o n ,Y u n n a nU n i v e r s i t y ,K u n m i n g 650000;3.S t a t eK e y L a b o r a t o r y o fW a t e r s h e d W a t e rC y c l e a n dS i m u l a t i o n ,C h i n aI n s t i t u t e o f W a t e rR e s o u r c e s a n d H y d r o p o w e rR e s e a r c h ,B e i j i n g 100038)A b s t r a c t :T h eY e l l o w R i v e rB a s i nE c o n o m i cB e l t i sa n i m po r t a n t e c o n o m i cc o r r i d o r i nt h en o r t ho fC h i n a .S c i e n t i f i ca s s e s s m e n to ft h e p e r f o r m a n c el e v e lo ft h ee c o l o gi c a le n v i r o n m e n to ft h e Y e l l o w R i v e r B a s i n E c o n o m i c b e l t a n d i m p r o v e m e n t o f t h ee c o l o g i c a l a n de n v i r o n m e n t a l q u a l i t y o f t h en i n e p r o v i n c e s a l o n g t h e Y e l l o w R i v e rB a s i n w e r eo n eo ft h ei m p o r t a n t m e a s u r e st oa c h i e v et h eh i g h -q u a l i t y d e v e l o p m e n to ft h e Y e l l o w R i v e rB a s i ne c o n o m i cb e l t .I nt h i s p a p e r ,e c o l o g i c a le n v i r o n m e n t q u a l i t y a s s e s s m e n t ,e c o l o gi c a l e f f i c i e n c y a s s e s s m e n t a n d o t h e r r e s e a r c hm e t h o d sw e r e u s e d t o e v a l u a t e t h e a s s e s s m e n t o f e c o l o gi c a l e n v i r o n m e n t q u a l i t y ,e c o l o g i c a l e f f i c i e n c y a n d g r e e n t o t a l f a c t o r p r o d u c t i v i t y fr o m2012t o2017.T h e r e s u l t s s h o w e d t h a t t h e e c o l o g i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t p e r f o r m a n c e l e v e l o f t h eY e l l o w R i v e rB a s i ne c o n o m i cb e l t p r e s e n t e da t r e n do f i n c r e a s i n g f r o m al o w l e v e l .T h e n i n e p r o v i n c e s a l o n g th e Y e l l o w R i v e r h a d o b v i o u s d i f f e r e n c e si n e c o -e n v i r o n m e n t a l q u a l i t y a n de c o -e f f i c i e n c y s y s t e m l a y e r ,a n dt h eu p s t r e a m r e g i o n w a st h eb e s t .I nt h e e c o l o g i c a l e f f i c i e n c y s y s t e ml a y e r ,t h e e c o l o g i c a l e f f i c i e n c yi n t h em i d d l e a n d l o w e r r e a c h e sw a s t h eb e s t a n d s t a b l e .T h e r e s e a r c h r e s u l t s p r o p o s e d t o a c c e l e r a t e t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o no f t h eY e l l o wR i v e r S t r a t e g yf r o mt h e t h r e e a s p e c t so fe c o s y s t e mr e s t o r a t i o nf u n c t i o n ,i n d u s t r i a lg r e e nd e v e l o p m e n ta n dth ei m pr o v e m e n to f t h e t o p -l e v e ls y s t e m d e s i g n o fe c o l o g i c a le n v i r o n m e n t ,s o a st oi m p r o v et h ee c o l o g i c a la n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l pe rf o r m a n c e o f t h eY e l l o w R i v e rB a s i ne c o n o m i c b e l t .K e yw o r d s :Y e l l o wR i v e r B a s i nE c o n o m i c B e l t ;e n v i r o n m e n t a l p e r f o r m a n c e ;e v a l u a t i o n s y s t e m ;i m p r o v e m e n t pa t h Copyright ©博看网. All Rights Reserved.生态环境绩效是对当前生物所处的生存和发展环境的整体态势的具体反映[1]㊂生态环境绩效是一种能够有效测算和评估政府实施环境政策效果的工具,是利用指标说明经济社会活动对环境的作用,进而分析环境现状㊁变化趋势和检验环境管理工作的效率及效果,使管理者对不同层面的环境治理工作有较为全面㊁客观的认识和了解,能够为环境管理工作提供更加有效的意见[2]㊂国内外学者针对生态环境绩效,无论是从区域选择还是研究方法上都取得了丰富的研究成果㊂其中,吴传清等[3]㊁杨开忠等[4]运用改进熵值法,从资源利用㊁环境治理㊁增长质量和绿色生活4个维度对2005 2015年长江中游城市群的绿色发展建立绩效评估指标并进行评估;杨先明等[5]基于生态效力和经济增长生态指数理论,从社会发展㊁经济增长㊁资源利用㊁生态建设和环境保护5大维度建立指标体系,分析2016年黄河沿线11省生态经济质量差异和空间变化;文广超等[6]建立综合自然地理㊁气象㊁土地利用/覆盖和社会经济4个方面的生态环境质量评估体系,运用因子分析和熵值法对2005年㊁2010年㊁2015年的可鲁克湖生态环境质量的变化进行分析㊂王俊能等[7]和徐勇等[8]采用S B M模型和M a l m q u i s t指数模型对福建省2004 2013年的环境效率评价指标进行分析和评价㊂康丽婷等[9]运用M L指数测度城市绿色全要素生产率动态变化情况并综合考虑区位㊁时空㊁时期差异,分析外商直接投资(F D I)和环境规制对城市绿色全要素生产率的影响;L u等[10]基于S F A-M a l m q u i s t测算2001 2014年我国省级绿色全要素生产率,得出资源环境在受到约束的情况下,全要素生产率的省级协调度受城市化进程以及产业结构影响较大㊂根据前期学者的研究成果不难看出,绝大多数有关于生态环境的研究是依靠建立环境绩效评估体系和运用数据包络分析方法进行评价,针对长江流域经济带㊁行业和区域层面的研究较为丰富,而对于黄河流域经济带的相关研究较少㊂本文以提高黄河流域经济带生态环境为目标从农业㊁工业㊁生活生态环境以及自然环境等维度对黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效进行综合评估㊂遵循科学性㊁代表性㊁完备性㊁可操作性等原则,基于生态环境保护综合评价的指导思想㊁基本原则和评价目的,结合当地实际情况,将研究维度定为生态环境发展水平㊁环境效率及绿色全要素生产率构建一套生态环境绩效评估体系㊂将层次分析法与熵权法结合,解决了主观赋权法主观性太强㊁客观赋权法结果与实际差别较大等问题,最终得出黄河经济带生态环境质量得分与排名㊂1研究方法与数据来源1.1研究方法(1)生态环境质量评估方法㊂本文选取21个指标层对黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效进行评估㊂其中,正向指标有13项,其值越大表明项目的评价结果越优;负向指标有8项,其值越大则表明项目的评价结果越差㊂选用熵权 T O P S I S模型作为评价黄河流域经济带生态环境质量水平和指标权重的确定工具,指标体系见表1㊂熵权法是基于信息熵值对指标进行客观赋权的方法,当某指标信息熵值(E j)越小,说明该指标值离散程度越大,所含信息量越多,权重越大㊂原T O P S I S是一种综合评价方法,其原理是利用原始数据信息,得出评价对象与理想化目标之间差距并排序,以此确定不同方案的优劣程度㊂熵权 T O P-S I S模型将上述2种方法优点进行综合,基于指标客观权重,计算各评价对象与理想目标的欧氏距离及相对接近度,接近度趋于1,说明评价对象表现越好,反之说明评价对象越差[11]㊂评价步骤为:第1,指标标准化处理㊂其中,i为年份(i=1,2, ,n),j为指标(j=1,2, ,m),x i j'为规范化值, x i j为第i个指标第j年的原始值㊂正向指标:X'i j=X i j-m i n X i jm a x X i j-m i n X i j(1)负向指标:X'i j=m a x X i j-X i jm a x X i j-m i n X i j(2)第2,确定第i个指标在第j年的比重(X i j)㊂X i j=X i jðni-1x'i j(3)第3,计算信息熵(e j)㊁差异系数(g j)和指标权重(w j)㊂e j=-1l n nðn j-1(X i jˑl n X'i j),(0ɤe jɤ1)(4)g j=1-e j(5)w j=g jðmj-1g j(6)第4,加权算数平均模型㊂D j=ðm j-1d i j w j(7)熵权 T O P S I S模型评价步骤为:第1,熵值法对指标进行赋权,构建规范化决策矩阵Z=(Z i j)mˑn㊂Z i j=X i jðm i-1X2i jj=(1,2, ,n)(8)加权规范化决策矩阵V,其中元素V i j=W j Z i j632水土保持学报第37卷Copyright©博看网. All Rights Reserved.第2,确定理想解V +和负理想解V -㊂V +=(V +1,V +2, ,V +m )=m a x V i j|j =1,2, ,m {}(9)V -=(V -1,V -2, ,V -m )=m i n V i j|j =1,2, ,m {}(10)第3,计算每个方案到理想解的距离S +i 和到负理想解的距离S -i ㊂S +i =ðmj -1(V +j -V i j )2(11)S -i =ðmj -1(V -j -V i j )2(12)第4,计算求得相对接近度C ㊂C =S iS +i +S -i(13)表1 黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效评估指标体系系统层准则层指标层属性单位工业生产环境万元工业增加值工业废水排放量负t /万元万元工业增加值工业废气排放量负亿m 3/万元工业生态环境万元工业增加值工业固体废物产生量负t/万元工业治理环境工业废水治理设施处理能力正万t/日工业废气治理设施处理能力正万m 3/h 工业固体废物处理率正%农业生态环境农业生产环境每公顷耕地面积化肥施用量负t /h m2每公顷耕地面积农药使用量负t /h m2农业治理环境有效灌溉面积占耕地面积比重正%节水灌溉面积占耕地面积比重正%生活消费环境人均城镇生活污水排放量负t/人每吨生活污水排放量中化学需氧量含量负k g /人生活生态环境每吨生活污水中氨氮含量负k g /人生活宜居环境建成区绿化覆盖面积正%城市生活污水处理率正%生活垃圾无害化处理率正%自然环境状态草原面积占国土面积比重正%湿地面积占国土面积比重正%自然环境森林覆盖率正%自然环境修复自然保护区占国土面积比重正%水土流失治理面积占国土面积比重正%(2)生态效率评估方法㊂生态效率是生产活动中增加的经济价值与带来的环境负荷的比值[12]㊂分别从生产与消费角度测度不同产业部门绿色高质量发展水平,评估体系见表2㊂本文运用非径向㊁非角度S B M 模型,相较于传统D E A 模型,S B M 模型目标函数在原有的基础上加入投入㊁产出2项弛豫变量,进而能够避免由于弛豫所产生的无效率问题㊂除此之外,非径向㊁非角度的S B M 模型具有无量纲性和非角度的特点,能够有效避免量纲不同和角度选择偏差对最终测算结果产生的不利影响,因此该模型比其他模型能好地体现出生态效率评估的实质,结果更加科学合理[13]㊂文中假设共有n 个决策单元(D MU ),每个决策单元均使用m 种投入,获得q 1种期望和q 2种非期望产出㊂其中,投入指标向量为x =(x 1,x 2, ,x m )ɪR +m ㊁期望产出投入指标向量为y =(y 1,y 2, ,y q 1)ɪR +q 1㊁非期望产出指标向量为b =(b 1,b 2, ,b q2)ɪR +q 2,且x >0,y >0和b >0㊂则规模报酬不变情况下的生产可能即为[14]:P (x )=(y ,b )|x 产出(y ,b ),x ȡλX ,y ɤλY ,b ȡλB ,λȡ0{}(14)式中:X =[x 1,x 2, ,x n ]ɪR m ˑn ;Y =[y 1,y 2, ,yn ]ɪR q1ˑn ;B =b ,b 2, ,b n []ɪR q 2ˑn 为投入㊁期望产出和非期望产出的S B M 模型:S B M=m i n ρ=1-1m ðm i =1(S -i x i k)1+1q 1+q 2(ðq 1r =1S +ry r k +ðq 2z =1S b -z b z k )s .t .x i k =ðm i =1x i j λj +S -i y r k =ðq 1r =1y r j λj -S +r b z k =ðq 2z =1b z j λj +S b -z λj ȡ0,j =1,2, ,n ;S -i ȡ0,i =1,2, ,m S +r ȡ0,r =1,2, ,q 1;S b -z ȡ0,z =1,2, ,q2ìîíïïïïïïïïïïïïïïïï(15)式中:ρ为效率值;S -i ㊁S +r 和S b -z 分别为投入㊁期望产出和非期望产出的弛豫变量㊂732第4期 鲁仕宝等:黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效评估及其提升路径Copyright ©博看网. All Rights Reserved.表2 黄河流域经济带生态效率评估体系要素指标单位一般投入年末就业人口万人固定资产投资额亿元能源消费总量(煤)万t 期望产出地区生产总值亿元非期望产出废水排放总量万t 二氧化硫排放量万t 一般工业固体废物产生量万t(3)绿色全要素生产率评估㊂绿色全要素生产率是衡量黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效评估的重要指标㊂G l o b a lM a l m q u i s t -L u e n b e r ge r (G M L )指数属于数据包络分析中的一种较好的方法㊂假设有n 个决策单元,每个决策单元均使用m 种投入,获得q 1种期望和q 2种非期望产出㊂其中,投入指标向量为x =(x 1,x 2,,x m )ɪR +m ㊁期望产出投入指标向量为y =(y 1,y 2, ,y q1)ɪR +q 1㊁非期望产出指标向量为b =(b 1,b 2, ,b q2)ɪR +q 2㊂则当期生产可能集表示为[15]:P t (x )=(y t ,b t )|x t 产出(yt ,b t ),t =1,2, ,T {}(16)此时,可将全局生产可能集定义为[17]:P G (x )=P 1(x 1)ɣP 2(x 2)ɣ ɣP T (x T )(17)因此,基于全局生产可能集的GM L 指数计算公式为:GM L t ,t +1(x t ,y t ,b t ,x t +1,yt +1,b t +1)=1+D G (x t ,y t ,b t )1+D G (x t +1,yt +1,b t +1)=1+D t (x t ,y t ,b t )1+D t +1(x t +1,yt +1,b t +1)ˑ1+D G (x t ,y t ,b t )1+D t (x t ,yt ,b t )1+D G (x t +1,y t +1,b t +1)1+D t +1(x t +1,y t +1,b t +1)=T E t +1T E tˑB P G t ,t +1t +1B P G t ,t +1t éëêêùûúú=E C t ,t +1ˑB P C t ,t +1(18)式中:D G (x ,y ,b )=m a x {β|(y +βy ,b -βb )ɪP G (x )}表示全局方向距离函数;GM L t ,t +1指数值表示t +1时期相对于t 时期的全要素生产率变动,可以进一步分解为有效变化指数(E C t ,t +1)和技术进步指数(B P C t ,t +1)㊂其中,GM L t ,t +1指数取值>1㊁<1㊁=1时,分别表示从t 时期到t +1时期的效率提高或降低以及技术进步或退步的情况[14]㊂1.2 研究周期选择与数据来源由于原始数据需要具备准确㊁真实㊁可靠等特征,因此本文将研究起点定为2012年,2012 2017年为研究周期,探索重大战略确定前后黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效的变化情况㊂本文指标数据来源于‘中国工业统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[16]㊁‘中国环境统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[17]㊁‘青海统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[18]㊁‘四川统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[19]㊁‘甘肃统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[20]㊁‘宁夏统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[21]㊁‘内蒙古统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[22]㊁‘陕西统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[23]㊁‘山西统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[24]㊁‘河南统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[25]㊁‘山东统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[26]㊁‘中国农村统计年鉴“(2013 2018)[27]等㊂其中,部分数据需要对原始数据进行简单计算后得出㊂2 结果与分析2.1 黄河流域经济带生态环境质量评估方法由图1可知,对比黄河经济带不同区域生态环境质量,上游区域生态环境质量相较于中下游区域最优,下游区域次之,中游区域最差㊂从2016年开始黄河经济带上游区域生态环境质量开始下降,中游区域以及下游区域进步较为缓慢㊂整体来看,黄河经济带上中下游地区生态环境质量之间的差距正在逐步缩小,上游区域依靠自身高质量的生态环境质量优势可以带动中下游区域不断提高生态环境绩效㊂图1 2012-2017年黄河流域经济带上中下游综合生态环境质量由表3可知,就黄河流域经济带沿线9个省份而言,黄河流域经济带各个省份之间的生态环境质量差异较大,仅有山西和山东2省份整体属于增长态势,其余省份的生态环境质量有不同程度的下滑㊂内蒙古综合生态环境相较于其他8个省份有较大优势,一直处于黄河流域经济带沿线省份首位㊂青海㊁四川㊁甘肃㊁宁夏㊁陕西㊁山西㊁河南和山东8省为同一梯队,与内蒙古相比属于较为靠后水平㊂青海省生态环境质量下降得最为严重,由2012年的0.5852下降到2017年的0.2929㊂总体来说,黄河流域经济带沿线省份综合生态环境绩效仍然需要不断提升,从而进一步提高自然生态环境状况,缩小黄河沿线9省之间的差距,促使其均衡发展㊂832水土保持学报 第37卷Copyright ©博看网. All Rights Reserved.表3 2012-2017年黄河流域经济带9省综合生态环境质量区域2012年得分排名2013年得分排名2014年得分排名2015年得分排名2016年得分排名2017年得分排名青海0.585220.584520.603620.594720.345130.29293四川0.351230.368730.312340.318940.178550.15195甘肃0.231150.247950.257050.273350.145960.12596宁夏0.127990.133490.134990.134990.085470.08438内蒙古0.670210.655810.629110.645810.546620.63961陕西0.194760.181980.218780.170880.094490.07449山西0.170880.187670.222470.188870.082380.20794河南0.184070.214560.242560.221360.433710.11367山东0.304440.301840.340230.326230.155140.325822.2 黄河流域经济带生态效率水平由图2可知,就黄河流域经济带上中下游生态效率水平比较而言,总体来看黄河中游地区和下游地区生态效率水平几乎相同,是黄河流域经济带生态效率最高且最为稳定的地区,起到示范作用,引领黄河流域经济带低碳发展㊂2012 2014年上游地区生态效率水平较中游和下游地区较低,在随后2年内有较为明显的进步,上升0.4个百分点,上中下游地区生态效率水平趋于一致,但又在2017年有所下降,下降0.46个百分点㊂由表4可知,就黄河流域经济带沿线9个省份的生态效率水平而言,黄河流域经济带各省份之间的差异显著,极化差异明显㊂四川㊁山东为第1梯队,生态效率水平稳居首位,处于黄河流域经济带的较高水平且非常稳定,经济社会发展的环境代价较小,是黄河流域静待生态效率增长的核心地区㊂青海㊁甘肃的生态效率水平处于靠后水平,整体水平偏低,山西和河南在2012 2016年的生态效率水平一直处于黄河流域经济带中下水平,但在2017年实现巨大飞跃,位居首位㊂其余省份生态效率水平波动较大,宁夏㊁内蒙古㊁陕西在2012年生态效率水平均位于9省首位,但在之后几年生态效率水平均有不同程度的下降,2017年宁夏和内蒙古的生态效率水平又重归首位,但陕西的生态效率水平下降明显,较为落后㊂图2 2012-2017年黄河流域经济带上中下游生态效率水平表4 2012-2017年黄河流域经济带9省生态效率水平区域2012年得分排名2013年得分排名2014年得分排名2015年得分排名2016年得分排名2017年得分排名青海0.398590.384890.347190.346890.361480.34349四川1.000011.000011.000011.000011.000011.00001甘肃0.492680.501470.385580.360980.355390.41348宁夏1.000011.000010.398070.395260.472661.00001内蒙古1.000010.509460.484951.000011.000011.00001陕西1.000011.000011.000011.000011.000010.55267山西0.551870.477580.435560.383870.366171.00001河南0.813660.758850.687840.644251.000051.00001山东1.000011.000011.000011.000011.000011.000012.3 黄河流域经济带绿色全要素生产率评估由图3可知,就黄河流域经济带上中下游生态效率水平比较而言,整体而言,黄河流域上中下游地区的绿色全要素生态效率自2012年到2017年呈现波动上升趋势,上游地区的绿色全要素生态效率较优,在2017年达到1.8353,平均每年进步0.123个百分点,绿色发展成效显著㊂中游地区和下游地区的绿色全要素生产率差别不大,分别在6年间以年均增长0.049和0.042个百分点的速度提升㊂总体来看,黄河沿线上中下游地区绿色全要素生产率差距逐渐增大,中下游绿色发展成效相较于上游地区还有一定距离,需要不断增强绿色技术推广和应用的力度,宣传932第4期 鲁仕宝等:黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效评估及其提升路径Copyright ©博看网. All Rights Reserved.绿色低碳生活方式㊂由表5可知,就黄河流域经济带沿线9个省份的生态效率水平而言,四川㊁陕西和河南3个省份的绿色全要素生产率十分稳定,黄河流域经济带其余沿线省份绿色全要素生产率整体上呈现出上升趋势㊂总体而言,绿色发展成效分化较小,不同省份间差异不明显㊂3 提升黄河流域生态环境绩效经济带生态环境绩效的路径与方略3.1 强化生态系统修复功能3.1.1 维护生物多样性 加强湿地保护,维护生物多样性㊂黄河流域经济带地区农业生产中农药㊁化肥的过量使用,加之流域水土流失,黄河流域的生物多样性被污染的黄河水所严重影响,据统计[28],黄河流域内的水生生物近,每年黄河水污染问题所造成的直接经济损失可达百亿元㊂图3 2012-2017年黄河流域经济带9省绿色全要素生产率变动表5 2012-2017年黄河流域经济带9省绿色全要素生产率变动区域2013年得分排名2014年得分排名2015年得分排名2016年得分排名2017年得分排名青海1.000011.125011.000011.113221.38471四川1.000011.000021.000011.000031.00006甘肃1.000011.000020.742290.758691.02014宁夏1.000011.000021.000011.000031.12862内蒙古1.000011.000021.000011.000031.02273陕西1.000011.000021.000011.000031.00006山西0.951390.856890.874581.472711.00006河南0.980780.999981.000011.000031.00006山东1.000011.000021.000011.000031.00395首先,建立生态多样性保护的考核机制㊂采用自评和外部评价相结合的方式,将黄河流域内生态多样性指标纳入政府官员绩效考评,采取 考绩+问责 的模式㊂其次,稳定自然岸线㊂生态保护与修复工作是最为重要的环节,因此要注重河口三角洲自然湿地的保护与修复,采用生态流量过程优化管理或者水量调度等方法修复河口生态系统㊂最后,加强监测生物多样性㊂全方位㊁全时段有效监控可能对黄河流域生物多样性产生威胁的各项因素,对生物多样性的变化趋势进行分析,进而掌握生物多样性保护工作的实施情况以便根据实际情况及时调整,洞察生物多样性的潜在威胁因素,建立和优化黄河流域重点物种栖息地和保护区,加强对生物保护,抵御外来物种入侵㊂3.1.2 防治水土流失 防治水土流失和改善黄河流域地区生产条件,对黄河流域的绿色发展来说,二者相辅相成,应当齐头并进㊂根据黄河上中下游㊁干支流等具体生态环境,因地制宜地制定更加适合黄河流域的整体规划,更高效㊁全面地促进黄河流域经济带绿色发展㊂对于粗泥沙集中来源区可通过建设水土保持植物资源基地,进一步防治水土流失,此外配置符合该地区特征的植物资源加工产业㊂对于地下化石能源日渐衰竭的能源化工基地,除了紧抓植被恢复工作,还可以通过建设以植物资源为核心的地上绿色能源基地,促进植被体系的完善㊂对于黄河流域东北部的沙地㊁盖沙地和黄河流域东南部的高原沟壑地应分别推动长梗扁核桃和翅果油树生态产业基地的建设㊂促进黄河流域风沙区的畜牧业稳定长效健康发展,应加大该区域植被恢复和草场管理工作,积极种植红豆草㊁沙打旺等优质牧草㊂陕西㊁甘肃㊁宁夏地区治理的重中之重应放在建设特色经济林上,围绕极具当地特色的核桃㊁枣㊁苹果等进行建设[29]㊂以保障黄河流域经济带居民安全为前提,采用防治水土流失等一系列生态保护措施,最终目的是要贯彻落实黄河经济带经济生态协同高质量发展㊂3.1.3 保护修复森林植被 森林孕育了人类文明,是人类生态文明发展的见证者和载体,是提高黄河流域经济带生态环境的关键点和纽带㊂黄河自西向东流经9省,流域面积广,冬夏季节温差大,中上游多山地,中下游多平原和丘陵,黄河流域内气候和地理特征差异悬殊,显著的空间地域性是其生态环境表象的一大特点[30]㊂首先,对植被恢复困难的地区实行植被重建工作㊂将黄河流域水土流失严重的地区作为植被恢复的重点区域,凝聚强大科研力量,增加资金042水土保持学报 第37卷Copyright ©博看网. All Rights Reserved.投入,专门立项分析该区域在生态环境脆弱㊁地形破碎等不良条件下植被恢复工作的难点并进行攻关,充分发挥创造性思维,突破常规造林模式的思维定式,将生物与工程措施有机结合,利用现代生产技术,由点及面地向该区域示范防沙治沙㊁水土保持㊁挂网喷浆造林等新型造林技术并积极推广,促进区域生态系统趋于完善,最终达到生态系统正向演替的目标[31]㊂其次,对植被低质地区进行植被修复㊂对黄河流域地区植被评估为低质量地区,在遵循自然规律的前提下,因地制宜提高植被质量,不断增强植被治理生态环境的功效,构建黄河绿色生态屏障㊂最后,对生态健康地区进行植被保护㊂黄河流域植被健康发展的地区,根据黄河流域的环境㊁经济发展等建立一套特殊的自然保护地体系,对植被进行实时监控,实时评估其健康状况,把森林㊁湿地㊁物种这三大生态红线牢牢守住㊂3.2促进产业绿色发展3.2.1推动工业绿色发展推动黄河流域发展需要将保护环境㊁节约资源作为发展前提,同时要确保经济㊁社会以及生态环境的均衡㊁和谐㊁可持续发展㊂在积极引进国外先进资源节约技术的同时,创新研发适合黄河流域产业的资源节约技术,并且加快资源的回收体系建设以实现资源的循环利用㊂溯源污染源头,全面开展企业风险源筛查,确定污染物类别㊁污染强度等,并制定黄河流域内生态环境 黑名单 ,对污染超标企业进行整改㊂需要有规划地进行工业建设与生态恢复工程建设,大力开发新型节能环保类产业,尽可能减少高污染高能耗的落后产业,实现黄河资源合理利用的同时提升各类资源的利用效率[32]㊂实现以黄河经济带生态化工业建设为工业发展的核心的高质量发展目标㊂3.2.2优化升级产业结构黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效提升的抓手在于实现产业向荣发展㊁经济又好又快增长和生态环境绩效进步三者共同飞跃,帮助当地居民从依靠生态资源消耗高的传统落后产业才能生存的困境中解救出来㊂首先,要求各区域能够分析黄河流域自然环境㊁人文资源和民风习俗等特点,运用生态型产业替换高污染的传统工业,推进生态环境高质量建设与保护,从而实现增加生态型产业数量㊁减少高污染传统工业的发展目标[33]㊂其次,优化产业结构㊁改善能源利用结构㊂对工业产业进行改造升级,提高煤炭等传统高能耗产业的生态保护能力,提高各类资源循环利用效率㊂最后,积极建设黄河流域生态工业园区㊂将多种经济㊁政策等手段有机结合,推动陕西㊁山西㊁内蒙古西部以及宁夏宁东地区的煤炭㊁天然气生㊁新型煤化工等能源化工基地向优发展,该基地已经具备显著规模优势,能够有效维护国家能源安全㊂宁夏宁东㊁鄂尔多斯和陕西榆林三地的能源化工产业已经形成集聚区,对黄河流域的经济㊁生态环境有重大影响,因此加强对该集聚区的环境保护和管理工作显得尤为重要能够有效促进产业的可持续绿色发展[22]㊂3.2.3促进农业绿色发展发展绿色农业不能只是单纯地将大棚建造于戈壁之上,更重要的是运用先进的设备㊁集成水平高的科学技术,在实现高水平生产能力的同时,有效保护生态环境[23]㊂黄河流域应以生态保护为前提,充分发挥自然资源丰富的优势,优先修复生态环境㊂充分利用高效节水技术㊁改进施肥方式等措施打造黄河流域经济带绿色农业新招牌[24-25]㊂3.3完善生态环境顶层制度设计3.3.1健全生态补偿机制生态补偿机制是利用政府与市场2种工具对生态建设工程的投资者进行补偿,并采用一系列政策将保护生态环境纳入到经济发展综合评价指标体系中,以此实现生态保护与经济发展的协同进步,鼓励人们对生态环境保护事业的投资热情,从而实现生态资本的增值[33]㊂生态补偿机制的建立健全有利于保护黄河经济带的生态安全,提高生态绩效㊂健全生态补偿机制就要以生态优先为基准,在绿色发展过程中秉持以人为本的发展理念,首先需要相关法律法规的确立与完善,因此要求政府根据不同区域的经济发展水平以及不同地域的地理区位和环境条件设立不同标准的生态保护考核指标㊂在经济高速发展过程中,受益的地区应当对因承担环境保护成本而导致经济发展落后的地区进行补偿㊂其次,除资金㊁技术补偿等常规补偿方式外,要探索市场化补偿方式,例如跨区域排污权等㊂生态补偿资金需要重点流向经济发展较为薄弱的地区,同时要推动上游地区旅游业等环境友好型产业的发展,给予下游地区生态拆迁合并㊁湿地维护得等建设工程必要的资金㊁技术以及人力帮助㊂最后,政府要强化对社会生态环境保护意识的宣传教育,促进社会由以前的 先污染㊁后治理 的观念转变为 生态优先 的观念㊂3.3.2注重协同发展协同发展是提高黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效的重要环节㊂首先,要实现目标协同,即保护生态环境与经济高质量发展2项目标的协同进步㊂要科学设计并实施国家战略,统筹兼顾生态环境与经济发展,既要保障黄河流域生态安全,还要实现黄河流域经济带各区域经济社会协同发展㊂其次,实现河江联动㊂地方政府要向长江经济带等先发地区学习生态保护和经济绿色发展的先发经验,提高142第4期鲁仕宝等:黄河流域经济带生态环境绩效评估及其提升路径Copyright©博看网. 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BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.2005 ANNUAL REPORTTABLE OF CONTENTSBusiness Activities.................................................... Inside Front Cover Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 (2)Chairman’s Letter* (3)“The Security I Like Best” – An Article About GEICO from 1951 (24)Acquisition Criteria (25)Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm (25)Consolidated Financial Statements (26)Management’s Report on Internal ControlOver Financial Reporting (54)Selected Financial Data For ThePast Five Years (55)Management’s Discussion (56)Owner’s Manual (74)Common Stock Data and Corporate Governance Matters (79)Operating Companies (80)Directors and Officers of the Company.........................Inside Back Cover *Copyright © 2006 By Warren E. BuffettAll Rights ReservedBusiness ActivitiesBerkshire Hathaway Inc. is a holding company owning subsidiaries engaged in a number of diverse business activities. The most important of these is the property and casualty insurance business conducted on both a direct and reinsurance basis through a number of subsidiaries. Included in this group of subsidiaries is GEICO, one of the four largest auto insurers in the United States and two of the largest reinsurers in the world, General Re and the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group.Numerous business activities are conducted through non-insurance subsidiaries. Included in the non-insurance subsidiaries are several large manufacturing businesses. Shaw Industries is the world’s largest manufacturer of tufted broadloom carpet. Benjamin Moore is a formulator, manufacturer and retailer of architectural and industrial coatings. Johns Manville is a leading manufacturer of insulation and building products. Acme Building Brands is a manufacturer of face brick and concrete masonry products. MiTek Inc. produces steel connector products and engineering software for the building components market. Fruit of the Loom, Garan, Fechheimer, H.H. Brown Shoe Group and Justin Brands manufacture, license and distribute apparel and footwear under a variety of brand names. McLane Company is a wholesale distributor of groceries and nonfood items to convenience stores, wholesale clubs, mass merchandisers, quick service restaurants and others.FlightSafety International provides training of aircraft and ship operators. NetJets provides fractional ownership programs for general aviation aircraft. Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey Home Furnishings, Star Furniture and Jordan’s Furniture are retailers of home furnishings. Borsheim’s, Helzberg Diamond Shops and Ben Bridge Jeweler are retailers of fine jewelry. Berkshire’s finance and financial products businesses primarily engage in proprietary investing strategies (BH Finance), commercial and consumer lending (Berkshire Hathaway Credit Corporation and Clayton Homes) and transportation equipment and furniture leasing (XTRA and CORT).In addition, Berkshire’s other non-insurance business activities include: Buffalo News, a publisher of a daily and Sunday newspaper; See’s Candies, a manufacturer and seller of boxed chocolates and other confectionery products; Scott Fetzer, a diversified manufacturer and distributor of commercial and industrial products, the principal products are sold under the Kirby and Campbell Hausfeld brand names; Albecca,a designer, manufacturer, and distributor of high-quality picture framing products; CTB International,a manufacturer of equipment for the livestock and agricultural industries; International Dairy Queen, a licensor and service provider to about 6,000 stores that offer prepared dairy treats and food; The Pampered Chef, the premier direct seller of kitchen tools in the U.S.; and Forest River, a leading manufacturer of leisure vehicles in the U.S.Operating decisions for the various Berkshire businesses are made by managers of the business units. Investment decisions and all other capital allocation decisions are made for Berkshire and its subsidiaries by Warren E. Buffett, in consultation with Charles T. Munger. Mr. Buffett is Chairman and Mr. Munger is Vice Chairman of Berkshire’s Board of Directors.************Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman's Letter Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500Annual Percentage Changein Per-Share in S&P 500Book Value of with Dividends RelativeBerkshire Included Results Year (1) (2) (1)-(2)1965 .................................................. 23.8 10.0 13.81966 .................................................. 20.3 (11.7) 32.01967 .................................................. 11.0 30.9 (19.9)1968 .................................................. 19.0 11.0 8.01969 .................................................. 16.2 (8.4) 24.61970 .................................................. 12.0 3.9 8.11971 .................................................. 16.4 14.6 1.81972 .................................................. 21.7 18.9 2.81973 .................................................. 4.7 (14.8) 19.51974 .................................................. 5.5 (26.4) 31.91975 .................................................. 21.9 37.2 (15.3)1976 .................................................. 59.3 23.6 35.71977 .................................................. 31.9 (7.4) 39.31978 .................................................. 24.0 6.4 17.61979 .................................................. 35.7 18.2 17.51980 .................................................. 19.3 32.3 (13.0)1981 .................................................. 31.4 (5.0) 36.41982 .................................................. 40.0 21.4 18.61983 .................................................. 32.3 22.4 9.91984 .................................................. 13.6 6.1 7.51985 .................................................. 48.2 31.6 16.61986 .................................................. 26.1 18.6 7.51987 .................................................. 19.5 5.1 14.41988 .................................................. 20.1 16.6 3.51989 .................................................. 44.4 31.7 12.71990 .................................................. 7.4 (3.1) 10.51991 .................................................. 39.6 30.5 9.11992 .................................................. 20.3 7.6 12.71993 .................................................. 14.3 10.1 4.21994 .................................................. 13.9 1.3 12.61995 .................................................. 43.1 37.6 5.51996 .................................................. 31.8 23.0 8.81997 .................................................. 34.1 33.4 .71998 .................................................. 48.3 28.6 19.71999 .................................................. .5 21.0 (20.5)2000 .................................................. 6.5 (9.1) 15.62001 .................................................. (6.2) (11.9) 5.72002 .................................................. 10.0 (22.1) 32.12003 .................................................. 21.0 28.7 (7.7)2004 .................................................. 10.5 10.9 (.4)2005 .................................................. 6.4 4.9 1.5 Average Annual Gain — 1965-2005 21.5 10.3 11.2Overall Gain — 1964-2005 305,134 5,583Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:Our gain in net worth during 2005 was $5.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 41 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $59,377, a rate of 21.5% compounded annually.* Berkshire had a decent year in 2005. We initiated five acquisitions (two of which have yet to close) and most of our operating subsidiaries prospered. Even our insurance business in its entirety did well, though Hurricane Katrina inflicted record losses on both Berkshire and the industry. We estimate our loss from Katrina at $2.5 billion – and her ugly sisters, Rita and Wilma, cost us an additional $.9 billion.Credit GEICO – and its brilliant CEO, Tony Nicely – for our stellar insurance results in a disaster-ridden year. One statistic stands out: In just two years, GEICO improved its productivity by 32%. Remarkably, employment fell by 4% even as policy count grew by 26% – and more gains are in store. When we drive unit costs down in such a dramatic manner, we can offer ever-greater value to our customers. The payoff: Last year, GEICO gained market-share, earned commendable profits and strengthened its brand. If you have a new son or grandson in 2006, name him Tony.* * * * * * * * * * * *My goal in writing this report is to give you the information you need to estimate Berkshire’s intrinsic value. I say “estimate” because calculations of intrinsic value, though all-important, are necessarily imprecise and often seriously wrong. The more uncertain the future of a business, the more possibility there is that the calculation will be wildly off-base. (For an explanation of intrinsic value, see pages 77 – 78.) Here Berkshire has some advantages: a wide variety of relatively-stable earnings streams, combined with great liquidity and minimum debt. These factors mean that Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be more precisely calculated than can the intrinsic value of most companies.Yet if precision is aided by Berkshire’s financial characteristics, the job of calculating intrinsic value has been made more complex by the mere presence of so many earnings streams. Back in 1965, when we owned only a small textile operation, the task of calculating intrinsic value was a snap. Now we own 68 distinct businesses with widely disparate operating and financial characteristics. This array of unrelated enterprises, coupled with our massive investment holdings, makes it impossible for you to simply examine our consolidated financial statements and arrive at an informed estimate of intrinsic value.We have attempted to ease this problem by clustering our businesses into four logical groups, each of which we discuss later in this report. In these discussions, we will provide the key figures for both the group and its important components. Of course, the value of Berkshire may be either greater or less than the sum of these four parts. The outcome depends on whether our many units function better or worse by being part of a larger enterprise and whether capital allocation improves or deteriorates when it is under the direction of a holding company. In other words, does Berkshire ownership bring anything to the party, or would our shareholders be better off if they directly owned shares in each of our 68 businesses? These are important questions but ones that you will have to answer for yourself.Before we look at our individual businesses, however, let’s review two sets of figures that show where we’ve come from and where we are now. The first set is the amount of investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) we own on a per-share basis. In making this calculation, we exclude investments held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings:*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.Year Per-Share Investments*1965..................................................................... $ 41975 (159)1985..................................................................... 2,4071995..................................................................... 21,8172005..................................................................... $74,129Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005.................... 28.0%Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005.................... 13.0%minorityinterests*NetofIn addition to these marketable securities, which with minor exceptions are held in our insurance companies, we own a wide variety of non-insurance businesses. Below, we show the pre-tax earnings (excluding goodwill amortization) of these businesses, again on a per-share basis:Year Per-Share Earnings*1965..................................................................... $ 41975 (4)1985 (52)1995 (175)2005..................................................................... $2,441Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005.................... 17.2%Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005.................... 30.2%*Pre-tax and net of minority interestsWhen growth rates are under discussion, it will pay you to be suspicious as to why the beginning and terminal years have been selected. If either year was aberrational, any calculation of growth will be distorted. In particular, a base year in which earnings were poor can produce a breathtaking, but meaningless, growth rate. In the table above, however, the base year of 1965 was abnormally good; Berkshire earned more money in that year than it did in all but one of the previous ten.As you can see from the two tables, the comparative growth rates of Berkshire’s two elements of value have changed in the last decade, a result reflecting our ever-increasing emphasis on business acquisitions. Nevertheless, Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to increase the figures in both tables. In this ambition, we hope – metaphorically – to avoid the fate of the elderly couple who had been romantically challenged for some time. As they finished dinner on their 50th anniversary, however, the wife – stimulated by soft music, wine and candlelight – felt a long-absent tickle and demurely suggested to her husband that they go upstairs and make love. He agonized for a moment and then replied, “I can do one or the other, but not both.”AcquisitionsOver the years, our current businesses, in aggregate, should deliver modest growth in operating earnings. But they will not in themselves produce truly satisfactory gains. We will need major acquisitions to get that job done.In this quest, 2005 was encouraging. We agreed to five purchases: two that were completed last year, one that closed after yearend and two others that we expect to close soon. None of the deals involve the issuance of Berkshire shares. That’s a crucial, but often ignored, point: When a management proudly acquires another company for stock, the shareholders of the acquirer are concurrently selling part of their interest in everything they own. I’ve made this kind of deal a few times myself – and, on balance, my actions have cost you money.Here are last year’s purchases:•On June 30 we bought Medical Protective Company (“MedPro”), a 106-year-old medical malpractice insurer based in Fort Wayne. Malpractice insurance is tough to underwrite and has proved to be a graveyard for many insurers. MedPro nevertheless should do well. It will have the attitudinal advantage that all Berkshire insurers share, wherein underwriting discipline trumps all other goals. Additionally, as part of Berkshire, MedPro has financial strength far exceeding that of its competitors, a quality assuring doctors that long-to-settle claims will not end up back on their doorstep because their insurer failed. Finally, the company has a smart and energetic CEO, Tim Kenesey, who instinctively thinks like a Berkshire manager.•Forest River, our second acquisition, closed on August 31. A couple of months earlier, on June 21, I received a two-page fax telling me – point by point – why Forest River met the acquisition criteria we set forth on page 25 of this report. I had not before heard of the company, a recreational vehicle manufacturer with $1.6 billion of sales, nor of Pete Liegl, its owner and manager. But the fax made sense, and I immediately asked for more figures. These came the next morning, and that afternoon I made Pete an offer. On June 28, we shook hands on a deal.Pete is a remarkable entrepreneur. Some years back, he sold his business, then far smaller than today, to an LBO operator who promptly began telling him how to run the place. Before long, Pete left, and the business soon sunk into bankruptcy. Pete then repurchased it. You can be sure that I won’t be telling Pete how to manage his operation.Forest River has 60 plants, 5,400 employees and has consistently gained share in the RV business, while also expanding into other areas such as boats. Pete is 61 – and definitely in an acceleration mode. Read the piece from RV Business that accompanies this report, and you’ll see why Pete and Berkshire are made for each other.•On November 12, 2005, an article ran in The Wall Street Journal dealing with Berkshire’s unusual acquisition and managerial practices. In it Pete declared, “It was easier to sell my business than to renew my driver’s license.”In New York, Cathy Baron Tamraz read the article, and it struck a chord. On November 21, she sent me a letter that began, “As president of Business Wire, I’d like to introduce you to my company, as I believe it fits the profile of Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary companies as detailed ina recent Wall Street Journal article.”By the time I finished Cathy’s two-page letter, I felt Business Wire and Berkshire were a fit. I particularly liked her penultimate paragraph: “We run a tight ship and keep unnecessary spending under wraps. No secretaries or management layers here. Yet we’ll invest big dollars to gain a technological advantage and move the business forward.”I promptly gave Cathy a call, and before long Berkshire had reached agreement with BusinessWire’s controlling shareholder, Lorry Lokey, who founded the company in 1961 (and who had just made Cathy CEO). I love success stories like Lorry’s. Today 78, he has built a company that disseminates information in 150 countries for 25,000 clients. His story, like those of many entrepreneurs who have selected Berkshire as a home for their life’s work, is an example of what can happen when a good idea, a talented individual and hard work converge.•In December we agreed to buy 81% of Applied Underwriters, a company that offers a combination of payroll services and workers’ compensation insurance to small businesses. A majority of Applied’s customers are located in California.In 1998, though, when the company had 12 employees, it acquired an Omaha-based operation with 24 employees that offered a somewhat-similar service. Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies, who have built Applied’s remarkable business, concluded that Omaha had many advantages as an operational base – a brilliant insight, I might add – and today 400 of the company’s 479 employees are located here.Less than a year ago, Applied entered into a large reinsurance contract with Ajit Jain, the extraordinary manager of National Indemnity’s reinsurance division. Ajit was impressed by Sid and Steve, and they liked Berkshire’s method of operation. So we decided to join forces. We are pleased that Sid and Steve retain 19% of Applied. They started on a shoestring only 12 years ago, and it will be fun to see what they can accomplish with Berkshire’s backing.•Last spring, MidAmerican Energy, our 80.5% owned subsidiary, agreed to buy PacifiCorp, a major electric utility serving six Western states. An acquisition of this sort requires many regulatory approvals, but we’ve now obtained these and expect to close this transaction soon.Berkshire will then buy $3.4 billion of MidAmerican’s common stock, which MidAmerican will supplement with $1.7 billion of borrowing to complete the purchase. You can’t expect to earn outsized profits in regulated utilities, but the industry offers owners the opportunity to deploy large sums at fair returns – and therefore, it makes good sense for Berkshire. A few years back, I said that we hoped to make some very large purchases in the utility field. Note the plural – we’ll be looking for more.In addition to buying these new operations, we continue to make “bolt-on” acquisitions. Some aren’t so small: Shaw, our carpet operation, spent about $550 million last year on two purchases that furthered its vertical integration and should improve its profit margin in the future. XTRA and Clayton Homes also made value-enhancing acquisitions.Unlike many business buyers, Berkshire has no “exit strategy.” We buy to keep. We do, though, have an entrance strategy, looking for businesses in this country or abroad that meet our six criteria and are available at a price that will produce a reasonable return. If you have a business that fits, give me a call. Like a hopeful teenage girl, I’ll be waiting by the phone.InsuranceLet’s now talk about our four sectors and start with insurance, our core business. What counts here is the amount of “float” and its cost over time.For new readers, let me explain. “Float” is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide – insurance protection – is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, because it sometimes takes many years for losses to be reported (asbestos losses would be an example), negotiated and settled. The $20 million of float that came with our 1967 entry into insurance has now increased – both by way of internal growth and acquisitions – to $49 billion.Float is wonderful – if it doesn’t come at a high price. Its cost is determined by underwriting results, meaning how the expenses and losses we will ultimately pay compare with the premiums we have received. When an insurer earns an underwriting profit – as has been the case at Berkshire in about half of the 39 years we have been in the insurance business – float is better than free. In such years, we are actually paid for holding other people’s money. For most insurers, however, life has been far more difficult: In aggregate, the property-casualty industry almost invariably operates at an underwriting loss. When that loss is large, float becomes expensive, sometimes devastatingly so.In 2004 our float cost us less than nothing, and I told you that we had a chance – absent a mega-catastrophe – of no-cost float in 2005. But we had the mega-cat, and as a specialist in that coverage, Berkshire suffered hurricane losses of $3.4 billion. Nevertheless, our float was costless in 2005 because of the superb results we had in our other insurance activities, particularly at GEICO.* * * * * * * * * * * *Auto policies in force grew by 12.1% at GEICO, a gain increasing its market share of U.S. private passenger auto business from about 5.6% to about 6.1%. Auto insurance is a big business: Each share-point equates to $1.6 billion in sales.While our brand strength is not quantifiable, I believe it also grew significantly. When Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its annual advertising expenditures were $31 million. Last year we were up to $502 million. And I can’t wait to spend more.Our advertising works because we have a great story to tell: More people can save money by insuring with us than is the case with any other national carrier offering policies to all comers. (Some specialized auto insurers do particularly well for applicants fitting into their niches; also, because our national competitors use rating systems that differ from ours, they will sometimes beat our price.) Last year, we achieved by far the highest conversion rate – the percentage of internet and phone quotes turned into sales – in our history. This is powerful evidence that our prices are more attractive relative to the competition than ever before. Test us by going to or by calling 800-847-7536. Be sure to indicate you are a shareholder because that fact will often qualify you for a discount.I told you last year about GEICO’s entry into New Jersey in August, 2004. Drivers in that state love us. Our retention rate there for new policyholders is running higher than in any other state, and by sometime in 2007, GEICO is likely to become the third largest auto insurer in New Jersey. There, as elsewhere, our low costs allow low prices that lead to steady gains in profitable business.That simple formula immediately impressed me 55 years ago when I first discovered GEICO. Indeed, at age 21, I wrote an article about the company – it’s reproduced on page 24 – when its market value was $7 million. As you can see, I called GEICO “The Security I Like Best.” And that’s what I still call it.* * * * * * * * * * * *We have major reinsurance operations at General Re and National Indemnity. The former is run by Joe Brandon and Tad Montross, the latter by Ajit Jain. Both units performed well in 2005 considering the extraordinary hurricane losses that battered the industry.It’s an open question whether atmospheric, oceanic or other causal factors have dramatically changed the frequency or intensity of hurricanes. Recent experience is worrisome. We know, for instance, that in the 100 years before 2004, about 59 hurricanes of Category 3 strength, or greater, hit the Southeastern and Gulf Coast states, and that only three of these were Category 5s. We further know that in 2004 there were three Category 3 storms that hammered those areas and that these were followed by four more in 2005, one of them, Katrina, the most destructive hurricane in industry history. Moreover, there were three Category 5s near the coast last year that fortunately weakened before landfall.Was this onslaught of more frequent and more intense storms merely an anomaly? Or was it caused by changes in climate, water temperature or other variables we don’t fully understand? And could these factors be developing in a manner that will soon produce disasters dwarfing Katrina?Joe, Ajit and I don’t know the answer to these all-important questions. What we do know is that our ignorance means we must follow the course prescribed by Pascal in his famous wager about the existence of God. As you may recall, he concluded that since he didn’t know the answer, his personal gain/loss ratio dictated an affirmative conclusion.So guided, we’ve concluded that we should now write mega-cat policies only at prices far higher than prevailed last year – and then only with an aggregate exposure that would not cause us distress if shiftsin some important variable produce far more costly storms in the near future. To a lesser degree, we feltthis way after 2004 – and cut back our writings when prices didn’t move. Now our caution has intensified.If prices seem appropriate, however, we continue to have both the ability and the appetite to be the largest writer of mega-cat coverage in the world.* * * * * * * * * * * *Our smaller insurers, with MedPro added to the fold, delivered truly outstanding results last year. However, what you see in the table below does not do full justice to their performance. That’s because we increased the loss reserves of MedPro by about $125 million immediately after our purchase.No one knows with any precision what amount will be required to pay the claims we inherited. Medical malpractice insurance is a “long-tail” line, meaning that claims often take many years to settle. In addition, there are other losses that have occurred, but that we won’t even hear about for some time. One thing, though, we have learned – the hard way – after many years in the business: Surprises in insurance arefar from symmetrical. You are lucky if you get one that is pleasant for every ten that go the other way. Too often, however, insurers react to looming loss problems with optimism. They behave like the fellow ina switchblade fight who, after his opponent has taken a mighty swipe at his throat, exclaimed, “You never touched me.” His adversary’s reply: “Just wait until you try to shake your head.”Excluding the reserves we added for prior periods, MedPro wrote at an underwriting profit. Andour other primary companies, in aggregate, had an underwriting profit of $324 million on $1,270 million of volume. This is an extraordinary result, and our thanks go to Rod Eldred of Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies, John Kizer of Central States Indemnity, Tom Nerney of U. S. Liability, Don Towleof Kansas Bankers Surety and Don Wurster of National Indemnity.Here’s the overall tally on our underwriting and float for each major sector of insurance:millions)$(inFloat(Loss) YearendUnderwritingProfitInsurance Operations20052004 20052004General Re....................... $( 334) $ 3 $22,920 $23,120B-H Reinsurance.............. (1,069) 417 16,233 15,278GEICO............................. 1,221 970 6,692 5,960Other Primary................... 235* 161 3,442 1,736Total................................. $ 53 $1,551 $49,287 $46,094*Includes MedPro from June 30, 2005.Regulated Utility BusinessWe have an 80.5% (fully diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 706,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; and (3) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry 7.8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S. When our PacifiCorp acquisition closes, we will add 1.6 million electric customers in six Western states, with Oregon and Utah providing us the most business. This transaction will increase MidAmerican’s revenues by $3.3 billion andits assets by $14.1 billion.。

DOI:10.13546/ki.tjyjc.2019.22.019r法區用j基于M a lmquist指数法的农地利用效率测算丁涛,武祯妮（太原科技大学经济与管理学院，太原030024）摘要：文章采用非参数DEA的Malmquist指数法，对山西省2006—2017年农业土地资源的利用效率进行了测算，并对其所辖的11个地市进行了区域比较。

结果表明：研究期内山西省农地利用效率处于适度增长的态势，全要素生产率指数的变化呈现出一定的波动性，整体呈现“U”型的变化轨迹;从Malmquist生产率指数分解结果来看，引起农地利用效率提高的主要因素是技术进步；从各区域土地利用效率餉空间演化情况看，各地市农地利用效率存在空间差异，且这种差异在研究期内呈现不断缩小的趋势。

关键词：农业土地利用；Malmquist指数法；效率评价中图分类号:F301.24文献标识码:A文章编号:1002-6487（2019）22-0082-030引言标体系，进一步探讨不同时期、不同空间农地利用效率的差异及其原因。

近年来，中国经济快速增长的同时土地资源极度短缺、土地低效粗放利用等问题日益凸显。

然而，农村土地利用方面存在诸多问题，主要表现为:农民收入水平不断提高,许多农村涌现出“建新房新建房”的热潮，不少农户不放弃老宅基地,在原宅基地建新房，同时又在新的宅基地建房，致使耕地占用严重浪费;大量的农村劳动力转移,农民弃耕地摇荒现彖严重;农业结构不合理，农业资源未优化配置导致耕地严重浪费;特别是城市化的快速推进，基础设施建设占用了大量的农业耕地.致使全国乃至各区域的耕地数量急剧减少。

因此，面对日益减少的耕地面积,如何协调经济发展与农业用地保护间的关系，如何在有限的土地资源下提高土地资源的配置效率，如何提高非农建设用地的效率等问题至关重要。

学术界对于农业土地资源利用的研究主要有:一是农业土地资源的属性问题，特别是农地的产权不明确一定程度上影响了农地的利用效率;二是市场经济的发育程度以及市场机制的完善程度对农地的利用的影响,研究表明，市场发育程度不高及市场机制不完善，农民的非农就业机会就少，这必然影响农民的收入水平较低，土地的集约化利用效率不高。

Value Engineering0引言党的二十大报告进一步提出深化中国式现代化和绿色低碳发展的战略要求，为了追求高质量发展，工业绿色全要素生产率的提升有利于兼顾经济发展与环境保护，转变原有的高投入高污染，但是低效益的不利局面，因此加快绿色全要素生产率创业，可以更好地实现双碳目标，实现经济社会和人的高质量可持续发展。

绿色全要素生产率的研究是建立在全要素生产率的基础上，具体体现为绿色发展这一绿色的本质特征，反映在工业绿色全要素生产率的研究中，需要在柯布-道格拉斯生产函数的基础上，考虑资本和劳动等投入要素的绿色特征，同时由于以往的研究在绿色全要素生产率的生产函数设定中忽略了空间溢出性，因此本文设定的模型也考虑了空间溢出性和空间权重矩阵的情形[1，2]。

1理论机制与命题假说1.1绿色全要素生产率的相关研究学术界对绿色全要素生产率的关注始于劳动生产率的研究，郭爱君和范巧（2022）认为，绿色全要素生产率与工业部门综合要素生产率并无特别大的差别。

对绿色全要素生产率的研究包括前沿面与非前沿面的测度方法，前沿测试主要包括DEA 模型和随机前沿分析等方法，当前对绿色全要素生产率和绿色全要素生产率及其增长率的研究，主要采用DEA 和SBM 模型，同时采用ML 模型，考虑非期望产出下的工业资源配置效率和技术进步效率两个方面，当前绿色全要素生产率的非前沿方法主要基于代数箱指数核算方法，同时基于生产函数法随着现代计量经济学以及空间计量经济学的发展，基于生产函数以测度绿色全要素生产率尤其是引入空间计量方法成为一种新的选择[3-6]。

1.2基于SBM-GML 绿色全要素生产率研究为了实现经济的可持续发展，改变单纯依靠生产要素投入驱动当地经济发展的模型，转向产业转型升级，实现所谓“结构红利”，产业结构优化的动力来源于碳中和政策的压力，以及工业企业为了应对碳中和战略而主动进行绿色全要素生产率效率的提升，工业企业通过产业结构的优化并在产业结构转型升级中进行资源有效配置并提升技术进步水平。

共同邊界Malmquist生產力指數的延伸:跨國總體資料的實證分析陳谷劦．楊浩彥∗本文針對Rao(2006)的共同邊界Malmquist生產力指數(MMPI),進行二個層面的延伸:首先,考量生產力指數衡量的完全性,嚐試透過距離函數的推導,在參數法下,提供一般化共同邊界Malmquist 生產力指數(gMMPI)的拆解,與可行估計架構;另外,亦針對MMPI 構成項目中的「追趕」,進一步再拆解為純粹技術追趕(PTCU)與潛在技術相對變動(PTRC)二項,以獲得更為明確的意涵。

實證上,利用1980–2003年間,26個高所得國家(DCs),以及40個中所得與低所得國家(LDCs)的總體資料,進行參數法的生產力推估與拆解。

結果發現,在MMPI的架構下,LDCs的生產力高於DCs,而在gMMPI的架構下,LDCs的生產力則低於DCs,此反轉的結果,說明了未考量規模效率變動的MMPI,所潛藏的衡量不完全的風險。

其次,將焦點轉向亞洲國家的比較,可更清楚了解PTCU所捕捉的,為個別國家的技術追趕,而PTRC則反應出潛在技術發展空間的變化,其意涵與可應用的範圍不同。

最後,本文亦對純粹技術追趕過程進行一簡單的實證,結果發現,技術水準較低的國家,技術追趕的速度較快,推論原因,主要可能與技術取得的差異有關。

關鍵詞:共同邊界,Malmquist指數,總要素生產力,規模效率,技術追趕JEL分類代號:C23,C51,C63,D24,L6552陳谷劦．楊浩彥1緒論近年來,運用經濟學的生產理論與數理統計工具進行生產邊界的推估,來衡量廠商生產效率的方法論,受到跨學門的廣泛引用。

概念上,屬於同一技術集合的廠商,面對相同的生產邊界,依Farrell(1957)的原始觀點,生產效率可用實際產出水準與生產邊界上潛在產出水準的半徑(radial)距離比值來衡量,並允許跨廠商的比較。

然而,當廠商在先驗或理論上,因分屬不同的技術集合,而面對不同的生產邊界,運用距離比值所表示的效率,將因衡量基準的不一致,而無法進行相互的比較。

基于Malmquist指数的江苏创新资源整合共享效率评价戚湧;张明;李太生【摘要】创新资源整合共享是时代的要求.加强创新资源整合共享和高效配置,将创新资源优势转化为创业创新优势,是实施创新驱动战略,提高创新主体能力,从而形成良性的区域创新体系的重要任务.江苏一直走在区域创新体系建设的前沿.本文以江苏为例,研究创新资源整合共享的评价体系,运用DEA模型测算江苏全省、苏南、苏中和苏北及13个市创新资源整合共享的Malmquist指数及其分解情况,以期获得有借鉴价值的经验,推动江苏创新资源整合共享.【期刊名称】《中国软科学》【年(卷),期】2013(000)010【总页数】10页(P101-110)【关键词】创新资源;整合共享;效率;Malmquist指数【作者】戚湧;张明;李太生【作者单位】南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210094;南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210094;南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210094【正文语种】中文【中图分类】F204创新资源日益成为国家的重要战略资源，显示出在国家竞争中的战略地位。

加强创新资源整合共享和高效配置，将创新资源优势转化为创业创新优势，是实施创新驱动发展战略，建设创新型国家的重要任务。

江苏拥有强大的科技、教育、智力和信息资源优势，具有丰富的创新资源，正大力加强科技创新，推动区域创新体系建设，力争在2015年在全国率先基本建成创新型省份，实现创新资源优化配置和开放共享是江苏经济发展的根本需要。

国外高度重视创新资源整合共享工作，美、日、英、德等国形成一套规范的整合共享制度体系。

美国成立地区性文献共享联盟，制定《信息自由法》，建立以“完全与开放(full and open)”共享为核心的法律和制度体系，成为全球数据和信息中心。

欧盟制定“跨国使用研究基础设施计划”，规定欧盟范围内政府投资形成的科学仪器和设施允许其他国家使用。

日本规定政府投入的科学设备接受企业和社会试验委托开放使用。

中国区域环境效率与环境全要素生产率增长*王 兵 吴延瑞 颜鹏飞内容提要:本文运用SB M 方向性距离函数和卢恩伯格生产率指标测度了考虑资源环境因素下中国30个省份1998)2007年的环境效率、环境全要素生产率及其成分,并对影响环境效率和环境全要素生产率增长的因素进行了实证研究。

本文主要的结论有:能源的过多使用以及SO 2和COD 的过度排放是环境无效率的主要来源,环境效率较高的省份均集中在东部地区;环境全要素生产率增长率平均高于市场全要素生产率增长率,中西部地区无论是市场全要素生产率还是环境全要素生产率增长率均低于东部地区,资源环境因素对各省份全要素生产率的排名有显著的影响;人均GRP 、FDI 、结构因素、政府和企业的环境管理能力、公众的环保意识对环境效率和环境全要素生产率有不同程度的影响。

关键词:环境效率 环境全要素生产率 方向性距离函数 卢恩伯格生产率指标* 王兵,暨南大学经济学院经济学系,规制与增长研究中心,邮政编码:510632,电子邮箱:twangb @.c n;吴延瑞,澳大利亚西澳大学商学院,邮政编码:6009,电子邮箱:ywu@.au;颜鹏飞,武汉大学经济与管理学院,邮政编码:430072,电子邮箱:yanpengfei1023@1631com 。

本文为教育部人文社科项目/节能减排约束下中国经济绩效研究:基于全要素生产率的视角0(08J C790047)的阶段性成果,并获得国家自然科学基金(70873051)和(70703015)、国家社会科学基金(08CJL018)和(07AJL009)及国家211工程第三期重点学科建设项目/暨南大学产业经济与区域发展0的资助(Cjyyxm09002)。

作者感谢匿名审稿人对本文提出的富有启发性的修改意见。

当然,文责自负。

一、引 言改革开放以来,中国经济保持了三十年的高速增长,取得了巨大的成就,同时也集中遇到了发达国家上百年工业化进程中分阶段出现的种种环境问题。

malmquist指数距离函数-回复什么是Malmquist指数(Malmquist Index)？Malmquist指数又称为Malmquist Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 指数，是一种衡量生产效率或者生产率的指标。

它是由瑞典经济学家Staffan B. Malmquist提出的，并被广泛应用于经济学和管理学中。

Malmquist指数的计算方式是通过比较两个时间点的技术效率差异来度量生产效率或者生产率的变化情况。

它主要基于生产函数的参数估计和效率前沿的计算。

通过分解技术进步、技术效率变化和规模收益变化三个因素的影响，Malmquist指数能够提供更全面的分析和判断。

在什么情况下使用Malmquist指数？Malmquist指数在许多领域中被广泛应用，尤其是在评估企业、区域或国家的生产率和效率方面。

它可以用于比较不同组织、企业或国家的生产绩效，并找出差异所在，从而提供改进和优化的方向。

此外，Malmquist 指数还可用于评估不同时间点的生产效率的变化，有助于更好地理解生产力的发展趋势。

如何计算Malmquist指数？Malmquist指数的计算基于距离函数。

距离函数描述了一个特定时间点的生产情况和效率水平。

通过计算两个时间点的距离函数的差异，我们可以得出Malmquist指数。

首先，我们需要确定一个合适的距离函数来表示生产过程的效率。

一种常用的距离函数是Cobb-Douglas生产函数。

这个函数可以表示为：Y = A * (K^α) * (L^β)其中，Y是输出，A是总生产率，K是资本投入，L是劳动力投入，α和β是技术因素。

然后，我们需要计算两个时间点的距离函数的差异。

这可以通过计算两个时间点的技术效率和规模效率的变化来实现。

技术效率变化可以通过计算各时间点的生产函数取对数得到。

规模效率变化则可以通过计算各时间点的资本和劳动力投入量的变化来实现。

最后，将技术效率变化和规模效率变化综合考虑，就可以得到Malmquist指数。

77--农业经济与管理　引用格式：刘娜，李陇东，陈耀.甘肃省农业绿色全要素生产率测算及收敛性分析[J]. 湖南农业科学，2024（3）：77-84.　DOI:10.16498/ki.hnnykx.2024.003.017党的二十大报告指出：“推动经济社会发展绿色化、低碳化是实现高质量发展的关键环节”。

目前中国经济正处于由高速增长转向高质量发展的重要阶段，提高全要素生产率对中国经济发展方式以及经济结构转变具有重要意义。

近年来，随着科技进步与社会发展，我国的主要矛盾已经转变为人民日益增长的美好生活需要和不平衡不充分的发展之间的矛盾，迫切需要加快转变农业发展方式，提高全要素生产率，推进农业供给侧结构性改革和绿色农业发展。

甘肃省处于欠发达的西部内陆地区，优质资源稀缺，生态环境脆弱，农业经济发展受外部条件的约束较大。

依靠各类要素投入来促进经济发展已不适合于当前甘肃省经济发展的实际情况，提高农业技术水平，重视农业生产效率，是实现农业高质量发展的必由之路。

而农业绿色全要素生产率（Green Total Factor Productivity ，GTFP ）是衡量农业绿色发展和高质量发展的重要依据。

关于农业GTFP 的研究，国外学者Chung 等[1] 甘肃省农业绿色全要素生产率测算及收敛性分析  刘娜1, 2，李陇东3，陈耀1 （1. 甘肃农业大学财经学院，甘肃 兰州 730070；2. 枫港建设有限公司，陕西 西安 710021；3. 静宁县应急管理局，甘肃 静宁 743400）摘要：运用SBM 模型和GML 生产率指数法，对2005—2020年甘肃省14个市州农业绿色全要素生产率（GTFP）进行测算，并分析其区域差异性和收敛性，为促进农业资源配置优化、区域协调发展以及实现农业高质量发展提供依据。

结果表明：就整体而言，2005—2020年甘肃省农业GTFP 年均增长0.33%，技术进步指数年均增长1.67%，技术进步是推动农业GTFP 增长的主导力量；就变化趋势和区域差异性而言，2005—2020年甘肃省农业GTFP 的阶段波动性明显，且各个市州的农业GTFP 呈现出较大的差异性，呈现出中间高、两边低的特征；从收敛性来看，2005—2020年甘肃省农业GTFP 不存在显著的σ收敛，但存在绝对β收敛和条件β收敛趋势。