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2010年9月，《信托公司净资本管理办法》（以下简称“《办法》”）颁布并实施；2011年，银监会印发净资本计算标准，根据监管要求，2011年底前各信托公司净资本风险控制指标需达标。
《办法》的颁布标志着我国确立了以资本约束为核心的新的信托行业监管体系，此举完善了监管手段，逐步引导信托公司加快业务转型，提高运营效率和稳健性。
2013年，《办法》实施进入第三个年头，信托公司加强了净资本管理信息披露力度，有36家信托公司年报披露了净资本风险控制指标，20余家公司披露了净资本管理举措，这为研究我国信托公司净资本管理实践提供一定线索。
一、信托公司净资本实力及运用效率比较分析根据《办法》，净资本是根据信托公司的业务范围和公司固有资产结构的特点，在净资产的基础上对固有业务项下各资产项目、表外项目和有关业务进行风险调整后得出的综合性风险控制指标。
《办法》旨在将净资本与信托公司业务规模相联系，避免信托公司过度扩张和膨胀，以此促进其稳健发展。
因而，净资本的多寡也成为衡量信托公司未来发展空间大小的重要参考。
从36家信托公司净资本情况看，所有信托公司都满足净资本大于2亿元的监管要求。
其中，1家信托公司净资本超过100亿元，4家信托公司净资本在50~100亿元区间内，7家信托公司净资本在30~50亿元区间内，21家信托公司净资本在10~30亿元区间内，3家信托公司净资本小于10亿元，67%的信托公司净资本在30亿元以下。
36家信托公司平均净资本为31.45亿元，中位数为23.57亿元，这表明36家信托公司间净资本差距比较大。
其中，平安信托净资本最收稿日期:2013-07-04作者简介：袁吉伟，男，山东汶上人，硕士研究生，经济师，供职于华融国际信托有限责任公司信托管理部，研究方向为金融风险管理。
我国信托公司净资本管理实践和评价——基于2012年信托公司年报数据袁吉伟（华融国际信托有限责任公司，北京100045）摘要：2012年，36家信托公司披露了净资本风险控制指标及净资本管理现状，有助于研究我国信托行业净资本管理和应用的进展情况。
董事会治理与公司绩效实证研究作者：赵远杨锡春来源：《财经界·学术版》2011年第03期摘要：董事会是公司治理的重要组成部分，也是公司治理的核心。
本文运用2009年的沪市A股的截面数据，从董事会规模、独立董事比例和董事会行为特征三个方面来研究董事会治理与公司绩效的关系。
研究结果表明，仅一年的董事会治理与公司绩效之间不存在显著的相关性。
关键词：董事会规模独立董事公司绩效一、引言公司董事会制度是伴随着现代公司的产生与发展而不断完善的，董事会是公司治理的核心。
在公司治理体系中，董事会起着承上启下的枢纽作用：对上董事会受股东的委托对公司行使管理权和控制权；对下董事会对经理层实施监督和激励，从而将产权所有者和公司经营者联系起来。
二、理论分析与研究假设（一）董事会规模与公司绩效董事会规模是指董事会中的董事成员人数，目前有关公司治理的研究文献中，董事会规模被视为影响董事会效率的关键因素，而公司公司绩效通常被用作董事会治理效率的度量指标。
关于董事会规模与公司绩效有三种观点，第一个是规模大的董事会效率也会大；第二个是规模大的董事会不如规模小的董事会更有效率；第三个是董事会规模与公司绩效之间不存在显著相关性。
本文提出的研究假设：假设1 ：董事会规模与公司绩效之间存在显著的负相关关系。
（二）独立董事比例与公司绩效独立董事又称外部独立董事，是指除了董事身份以外与公司没有任何其他契约关系的董事，不受其他董事的控制和影响。
独立董事作为改进公司治理的重要举措，其主要职能在于维护公司的整体利益，在选派经理、制定报酬等重大决策中能独立地发表意见。
独立董事是否对公司绩效有显著作用有三种观点：一是独立董事制度与公司绩效正相关；二是独立董事制度与公司绩效负相关；三是独立董事制度与公司绩效不相关。
本文提出的研究假设为：假设2 ：独立董事比例与公司绩效之间存在显著正相关关系。
（三）董事会年度会议次数与公司绩效以董事会会议次数描述董事会行为非常直观，它直接反映了董事会行为的强度。
独立董事制度与公司绩效的实证研究20世纪30年代,独立董事制度起源于美国。
因为上市公司中两权分离,即所有权和控制权分离,产生了内部人控制的问题。
在两权分离的情况下,公司的所有者与经营者可能不一致。
在早期,管理者还可能是大股东,但随着股东的分散,绝对控股的股东变得越来越少；并且为了满足经营专业化的要求,也需要有专业的经理人来管理企业。
公司的股东大会选取小部分人组成了董事会。
股东大会将公司管理权授权给董事会,董事会再将公司管理权授权给职业经理人。
这也就是公司的一元治理模式。
股东大会召开的时间隔得比较久,一般是一年一次,在此期间,公司的事务都是由董事会负责。
为了保护所有股东的权益,增强董事会的独立性,美国引入了独立董事制度。
90年代以后,世界各国也纷纷引入独立董事制度,这项新制度在世界范围内得到推广。
我国的上市公司不仅存在内部人控制问题,在发展社会主义市场经济中,又产生了一些特有的中国特色的问题。
比如：一股独大,非流通股与流通股等。
我国公司实行的是二元治理模式,除了董事会之外还设立了监事会。
但监事会成员大多还是来自企业内部,有时并不能发挥强有力的监督作用。
种种上市公司丑闻还是持续不断出现,比如：财务数据造假、大股东侵占公司资产、非法关联方交易等。
所有者的权益未得到有效保护,也很大地打击了投资者的信心。
2001年,《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》发布,标志着独立董事制度正式进入我国。
希望可以通过引进这一新制度,解决我国上市公司治理中存在的问题。
从正式引入到现在,独立董事制度已经经历了快10年的时间。
但理论界对独立董事制度的讨论一直没有停息。
国际上一些公司的丑闻令学者们对独立董事的独立性产生质疑。
在中国,也有很多花瓶董事的现象。
但不可否认的是,独立董事制度对改善我国公司治理也起到了积极的作用。
比如,独立董事制度可以防止非法关联方交易或内幕交易。
在这10年里,我国独立董事的现状如何、独立董事制度是否对公司绩效产生了影响、产生怎样的影响是学者们关注的问题。
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文二：Board Composition, Executive Remuneration,And CorporatePerformance: The Case Of ReitsIntroductionStockholders in modern corporations are the residual risk bearers. As they don't have the expertise to run their firms, stockholders must rely on the firm'smanagement team. Jensen and Ruback (1983) defined the management team as the top managers as well as the board of directors of the firm. The separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation creates the incentives for managers to pursue their self-interest goals and not to maximize the shareholders’ wealth in what is termed in the literature as the agency conflict.Researchers have suggested many mechanismsby which managers are curbed from maximizingsolely their own utilities.These mechanisms (seeAgarwal and Knoeber 1996) can be either externalones, such as market for corporate control or internalones, such as the board of directors. The board ofdirectors is a basic element of corporate governance.The main functions of corporate boards are evaluating and approving strategies formulated by managers, providing an appropriate vehicle for stock holders desiring representation in company boards, and performing vigorous monitoring of managers’ actions to make sure that d ecisions by top managers come in line with shareholders’ interests. The literature is rich with studies that have shown the positive effect of the outside board members on firm value .The theory says that the way a board of directors is formed is intended to minimize the agency conflict costs. Also, some studies have shown how the size of the board affects corporate value (Yermack 1996; Zahra et al. 1989; Eisenberg et al. 1998). Consequently, the board of directors is an important governance mechanism that ensures that the interests ofshareholders and management are closely aligned, which would have its effects on corporate performance.In addition to the internal mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts, managerial remuneration is an important device that can be used effectively to align the interests of stockholders and managers. The extent to which the remuneration package can achieve that alignment of interests is an empirical question. From a theoretical point of view, managerial remuneration should correlate weakly with corporate performance. The annual bonus usually is given in good as well as bad performance times. Good performance pushes the bonus up while bad performance does not depress the bonus. However, empirically, the relationship between management remuneration and corporate performance was detected and shown to exist. Generally, studies have found that there is a positive relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance (Hamid 1995; Davis et al. 1994; Finnerty et al. 1993). Managerial remuneration and corporate performanceThe issue of managerial incentives has been heavily researched in financial economics. Managerial incentives, at least from a theoretical point of view, have an energetic effect on mitigating the moral hazard problem inherited in individual contracts. This would have a major impact upon firm's financial performance. Hamid (1995) examined the relationship between CEO compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. He mainly focused upon the equity type of compensation not the cash compensation. His results confirmed a significant positive relationship between CEO equity compensation and firm Performance.Other types of compensation also have a positive effect on corporate performance even after considering some control variables. Davis and Shelor (1995) also documented a significant relationship between executive total compensation, firm size, and firm performance. Cannon and V ogt (1995) used Jensen’s measure to proxy for REITs financial performance and examined how severe the agency costs in REITs are. They find that advisor REITs with lowdirector ownership tend to underperform and pay higher advisor payments than do their counterparts with high ownership. They find no such relationship for self-administered REITs. These results show thatself-administered REITs make better use of marketbased performance compensation than do advisor REITs. Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum (1992) found that there is a significant relationship between managerial compensation and firm economic performance. Their results confirmed that compensation packages are designed to mitigate the agency conflict costs. In most previous studies, the relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance was examined and shown to be positive when using total remuneration package, which includes usually (1) base cash remuneration, (2) incentive cash remuneration, (3) stock options, and (4) relative performance remuneration. This study, however, is concerned only with cash remuneration since it represents about 80% of total remuneration package.Board composition and financial performanceThe issue of board composition has deep roots in financial economics literature. Whether the way board of directors is formed can affect the economic value and performance of a firm has been investigated by a lot of researchers.The empirical evidence not solidly convincing regarding this issue when considering the entire literature, although many empirical studies support a positive relationship between boards dominated by outside directors and corporate performance. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) documented evidence showing the positive effect of the outside directors on corporate performance as they found that shareholders’ gains fro m tender offers would be greater for targets with independent board members than for other targets. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) examined the wealth effects when an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another corporation. They find that the nonfinancial sending firms experience negative returns while the receiving firms do not gain from these appointments. This suggests that when executives join boards of other corporations, they become distracted from shareholders wealth maximization objective. The financial sending firms experience positive returns when sending their officers to other firms. Barnhart et al. (1994) investigated the effect of board composition on company performance. When they do not control for variables that have effects on company performance, the relationship between corporate performance, proxied by market-to-book ratio of equity, and board composition issignificant. When they account for managerial ownership and variation across industries, board composition is found to be related to market-to-book ratio in a nonlinear fashion. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) revealed the effectiveness of the board of directors in enhancing firm performance by showing that stock prices of firms whose boards are dominated by independent directors are associated with larger abnormal returns than those of companies whose boards are dominated by less independent directors. Byrd and Hickman (1992) reviewed the literature and supported the conjecture of the positive relationship between corporate profitability and boards dominated by outside independent directors. Gilson (1990) also confirmed the idea that board composition is related to financial performance of firms as he documented an evidense that after company default, board composition is altered significantly by creditors who tend to appoint their representatives to the board. Byrd and Hickman (1990) showed that the stocks of firms whose at least 50% of their board members are independent are associated with higher returns for stockholders in case of acquisitions. They noted, however, that these results are sensitive to the method used to classify directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) also showed that the addition of an outside director increased corporate value. In a theoretical paper, Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed a theoretical integrative model which specifies important relationships between board variables and company performance. They noted that these relationships depend on several internal (industry factors, legal aspects, etc.) and external (ownership structure, company life cycle, complexity of operation, etc.) contingencies identified in their model. All these attributes play an important role in determining directors’ success in executing their contro l and monitoring roles, which is a prerequisite for a glamourous company performance.Molz’s (1988) findings do not support the association between firm performance and the managerial dominated boards.Weisbach (1988) shows that companies with outside-dominated boards are more likely to replace a CEO based on performance than companies with insider-dominated boards. The bulk of the previous literature shows a positive relationship between outside directors and corporate performance. The premise that is brought up by this study is that effective monitoring does notcome from all outside directors as hypothesized by some previous studies in the literature, but it comes only from that group of directors that is able to ask the hard questions. Previous literature in corporate governance classifies outside directors into two categories: gray outsiders and pure (independent) outsiders. The gray outsiders have some type of affiliation with the company on whose board they sit, which could limit their capability to exercise effective monitoring on management. These affiliations include legal, banking, consultancy, and other relationships. Pure outside directors, on the other hand, have no relationship with the company other than their directorship and, hence, bear no costs from challenging managers. Byrd and Hichman (1990) showed that the method of classifying board of directors causes the relationship between board composition and corporate performance to change. Board size and corporate performanceTheoretically, it is expected that coordination and communication will be more effective and decisionmaking problems will be less in relatively small boards, which might positively affect board performance. On the other hand, large boards have the tendency to include directors with diverse expertise and skills. These two contradicted premises deserve more inspection in the REITs industry due to their different control system. On top of that, there is a scarcity in the literature regarding studies of the relation between board size and corporate performance. This study conjectures that, in general, the ideal board size varies with firm size. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) used accounting figures to measure firm performance. They found evidence that small boards had positive effects on corporate performance. Yermack (1996) adopted the point of view of a negative association between board size and performance. He founds an inverse relationship between the two variables. This suggests that the small size of a board of directors helps to improve the efficiency of the decision making process and, hence, promotes shareholders, interests. Brown and Maloney (1992) also found that smaller boards of directors are associated with better firm performance. Given that the previous studies have cross-sectionally examined many industries, the documented relationship might be altered when studying one industry with unique features regarding the control system.Performance measureThe literature is filled with different types of financial performance measures. All these measures can be categorized as either accounting-based measures or market-oriented measures. Usually, accounting measures that are constructed from financial statements data are highly criticized in the finance community. Also, these measures usually do not account for differences in systematic risk; hence, they diverge from the economic market value of firms (see Benston 1985). That is why financial analysts sometimes reclassify some balance sheet items in order to judge the precise liquidity of a firm.On the other hand, the market-based performance measures are determined solely and collectively by the market participants who interpret managers’ signals correctly, assuming efficient financial markets, and usually firm managers have no discretion over these measures. Based upon that, and because the sample firms are publicly owned companies and hence their securities are priced in financial markets, this study will use a market-based financial performance measure to measure REI Ts’ financial performance. Tobin’s Q, as a market-based performance measure, represents a sharp measure of corporate value. Since it incorporates the value of all assets, it is supposed to reflect both the quality of monitoring practiced by pure directors and the degree to which shareholders’ interests and those of managers are aligned, assuming that REITs’ securities are priced in efficient capital markets. Tobin’s Q can be defined as the ratio of the firm value to its assets replacement costs. The literature is filled with different versions of Tobin’s Q. Since no consensus is reached as to the best Tobin’s Q ratio, three different ratios of Tobin’s Q will be used in this study. This procedure serves two purposes. The first is to test the sensitivity of the results to different definitions of corporate performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. Second, the effect of employing different versions of Tobin’s Q on the results of many different studies in the literature is partly resolved. The three versions of Tobin’s Q employed in this study are as follows:Q1=(MVE+TA-EQ1)/TAwhere MVE is the product of stock price (year close) by the common stocksoutstanding .TA is total asset, and EQ is the book value of equity.Q2=(MVE/ book value of Net Assets)^2Q3=((MVE+LTD+STE+ PSALV)/TA)^3Where LTD is the book value of long term debt.STD is the book value of the short-term debt, and PSALV is the preferred stock at liquidation value. For the sake of illustration, the correlation among the three versions of Tobin’s Q was calculat ed and was shown to be very high. Therefore, it is expected to have similar results as far as our analysis is concerned.ConclusionThis study has investigated the effect of the composition of the board of directors (a monitoring mechanism) and managerial remuneration (bonding mechanism) on the corporate performance of REITs. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between cash managerial remuneration and firm performance. Also, unlike some previous studies, this paper shows that only pure directors are able to practice effective monitoring and gray directors have no significant effect on firm performance. The outside directors, both gray and pure, have no impact upon finance performance in the REITs industry. Moreover, this paper tackled the board size effect investigated previously in the literature. The findings of this study confirm a nonlinear relationship between board size and firm performance. The relationship is negative when board size is small, and it turns positive when board size grows.Source:Turki Alshimmiri,2004.“Board Composition, Executive Remuneration, And Corporate Performance: The Case Of Reits”.Corporate Ownership & Control August.pp.104-112.译文：董事会结构，高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例简介股东是现代公司的的剩余风险承担者。
董事会特征与企业绩效关系的实证研究【摘要】本文通过实证研究探讨了董事会特征与企业绩效之间的关系。
在董事会特征方面，研究发现董事会规模、独立性、多样性以及薪酬等因素都对企业绩效产生了影响。
董事会规模较小的企业倾向于表现出更好的绩效，而董事会独立性和多样性对企业绩效也有显著影响。
董事会薪酬水平与企业绩效呈现出一定的正向关系。
结论部分总结了董事会特征对企业绩效的影响，并提出了相关启示和建议。
展望未来研究方向包括进一步探讨董事会特征与企业绩效之间的机制，以及发展更多有效的董事会治理实践。
通过本文的研究，可以为企业董事会的建设和改进提供一定的参考和借鉴。
【关键词】董事会特征、企业绩效、实证研究、董事会规模、董事会独立性、董事会多样性、董事会薪酬、背景介绍、研究意义、研究目的、董事会特征对企业绩效的影响、董事会特征对企业绩效的影响总结、启示与建议、展望未来研究方向.1. 引言1.1 背景介绍董事会在公司治理中扮演着重要的角色，其特征对企业绩效有着显著的影响。
随着全球经济的不断发展和公司规模的不断扩大，对董事会特征与企业绩效之间关系的研究也日益引起学者和实践者的关注。
董事会作为公司治理结构的核心，其构成、规模、独立性、多样性和薪酬等方面的特征，都可能影响着公司的经营绩效、财务表现和长期发展。
深入探讨董事会特征与企业绩效之间的关系，对于提高公司治理水平、优化资源配置、增强市场竞争力具有重要意义。
随着全球经济环境的不断变化，企业在日益激烈的竞争中需要不断提升自身的绩效表现以适应市场需求。
优秀的董事会可以提供有效的监督和指导，帮助公司制定明智的决策，提高经营绩效。
深入研究董事会特征与企业绩效之间的关系，可以为企业提供有效的治理建议，促进企业可持续发展。
本研究旨在探讨董事会特征与企业绩效之间的实证关系，为公司治理实践和学术研究提供有益的启示。
1.2 研究意义研究董事会特征与企业绩效关系的实证研究在当下具有重要的意义。
信托公司绩效考核篇一：信托公司绩效制度薪酬设计方案目录第一章总则...1第二章薪酬结构 (2)第三章高管人员的薪酬体制...6第四章职能部门的薪酬体制...7第五章市场发展部的薪酬体制...8第六章个人信托部薪酬体制...9第七章投资银行部薪酬体制...11第八章其他业务部门薪酬体制...12第九章其他奖励...17第十章岗贴调整...17第十一章其他...18第十二章附则...19附件一岗位评估分值表 (20)附件二管理职系岗位等级分布图...22附件三业务职系岗位等级分布图...23附件四研发职系岗位等级分布图...24附件五岗位津贴试算表 (25)第一章总则第一条适用范围凡aB公司（以下简称为aB）的各级从业人员，除人力资源部另行的专案方式处理者外均依本方案实施。
第二条新制度的特点为适应公司发展的需要，本制度打破原有行政级别工资，员工档案工资实行封存式管理，并按照市场化运作的要求重新制定公司薪酬体系，使员工的薪酬与岗位和业绩紧密结合。
第三条目的制定本方案的目的在于充分发挥薪酬的作用，对员工为公司付出的劳动和做出的绩效给予合理补偿和激励。
即：（一）使薪酬与岗位价值紧密结合；（二）使薪酬与员工业绩紧密结合；（三）使薪酬与公司发展的短期收益、中期收益与长期收益有效结合起来。
第四条原则薪酬作为分配价值形式之一，遵循按劳分配、效率优先、兼顾公平及可持续发展的原则。
公平性原则：薪酬以体现工资的外部公平、内部公平和个人公平为导向。
竞争性原则：薪酬以提高市场竞争力和对人才的吸引力为导向。
激励性原则：薪酬以增强工资的激励性为导向，通过活性工资和奖金等激励性工资单元的设计激发员工工作积极性。
经济性原则：薪酬水平须与公司的经济效益和承受能力保持一致。
第五条依据薪酬分配的主要依据是：贡献、能力和责任，并参考太原市社会平均工资水平和行业平均水平。
第六条薪酬体系根据公司各业务的特点，公司的薪酬体系分为六种不同的薪酬体制：高层管理人员的薪酬体制、职能部门的薪酬体制、市场发展部的薪酬体制、个人信托部的薪酬体制、投资银行部的薪酬体制以及其他业务类部门的薪酬体制等。
106702 企业研究论文董事会结构与企业盈利能力的实证研究一、前言作为国际著名的金融中心，香港证券市场对于中国内地企业上市来说具有很多其他证券市场无法比拟的优势。
其一，大陆企业一直选择香港为海外上市的第一证券市场，因为它是一个符合专业标准的国际资本市场，而又符合内地企业在本土市场上市。
其二，内地与香港的贸易非常方便，可以很容易地通过深圳关口进行水运和陆运运输，并在中国的领土包含大陆和香港，可以便于管理者和发行人、投资者进行通信和交流。
其三，在香港资本市场交易也有一系列符合国际标准的措施，且有再融资条件更加简单和健全的法律制度，使得香港赢得内地企业的普遍青睐。
鉴于香港证券市场较国内证券市场发达，各种监管制度比较完善，同时香港证券市场董事会成员组成具有国际化特色，上市公司投资者来源多样化，因此本文选择香港证券市场来研究董事会成员结构对公司治理的绩效分析。
香港红筹股本身具有中国大陆企业的特色，股东成员组成背景差异较大，其中一部分来源于中国国内，因此董事会成员组成具有中国投资者特点又兼具国际化标准。
本文选择香港证券市场中红筹股上市公司作为研究样本，对于研究上市公司董事会成员结构与其公司治理的实证关系，可以使得研究结果更具有说服力，更重要的是对完善我国国内上市公司董事会治理公司的能力提供借鉴。
二、数据收集方法（一）样本选取本文选取香港联合交易所上市的红筹股145家和145家的H股上市公司进行研究，共有上市公司290家，这些公司的数据进行收集是从从20xx年。
上市公司数据来自于深圳国泰安公司CSMAR的公司数据库，从上市公司财务数据库的每年年报取得的财务数据，从CSMAR治理结构数据库和企业年报获得董事会特征数据。
从香港证券交易所选择的290 家上市公司所选用的标准是：第一，由于香港证券交易所股价与国内上市公司的股价不同，为方便起见，只考虑在香港证券交易所发行股票的红筹股公司和H股公司；第二，剔除20xx年间被ST、PT（五年来中的某一年被ST、PT，意味着被去除），这些公司有可能有特别的损失，有可能有连续的财务状况损失，如果这样的公司被纳入研究对象对研究的结论造成影响；最后，排除20xx年度董事会次数、执行董事比例；此外为了控制其他公司特征对绩效表现的影响，本文选取公司资产负债率、成长机会和托宾Q值作为控制变量。
我国信托业市场结构与绩效关系研究王燕,彭阳（安徽财经大学金融学院,安徽蚌埠233041）摘要：研究发现，我国信托业的经营绩效与市场份额之间存在显著的正相关关系，与市场集中度存在弱性的负相关关系，这一结论在一定程度上支持了“相对市场力量”假说。
同时，研究还发现，我国信托业现阶段还处于垄断程度较低的低中占寡型市场，信托业绩效水平的提升有赖于市场份额、营业费用率、资产负债率等影响因素的进一步优化。
关键词：信托业；市场结构；绩效文章编号：1003-4625（2011）03-0080-04中图分类号：F832.49文献标识码：AAbstract:The paper examined the relationship between the market structure and performance of the Trust industry in China based on the panel data of 2006-2009.In the study,we found significant positive relationship between market share and performance,and insignificant negative relationship between market concentration and performance.This supported the "relative market power"hypothesis in some extent.In addition,we also found that the Trust industry in China now is in a lower degree of monopoly-type market.It depends on market share,operating expenses,asset liability ratio and other factors’further optimization to improve the level of performance.Key Words:Trust Industry;Market Structure;Performance收稿日期：2010-12基金项目：本文受到安徽财经大学研究生创新基金项目支持。
中信信托有限责任公司 CITIC TRUST CO., LTD.二○○九年年度报告2009 Annual Report二○一○年四月目录1．重要提示 (4)2．公司概况 (4)2.1 公司简介 (4)2.2 公司组织结构图 (5)3. 公司治理 (7)3.1 公司治理结构 (7)3.2公司治理信息 (10)4. 经营管理 (14)4.1 经营目标、方针、战略规划 (14)4.2 所经营业务的主要内容 (15)4.3市场分析 (20)4.4 内部控制 (21)4.5 风险管理 (24)4.6 企业社会责任 (42)5．报告期末及上一年度末的比较式会计报表 (45)5.1 固有资产 (45)5.2 信托资产 (52)6. 会计报表附注 (53)6.1 会计报表编制基准不符合会计核算基本前提的说明 (53)6.2重要会计政策和会计估计说明 (53)6.3或有事项说明 (57)6.4重要资产转让及其出售的说明 (57)6.5 会计报表中重要项目的明细资料 (57)6.6 关联方关系及其交易的披露 (64)6.7 会计制度的披露 (66)7．财务情况说明书 (66)7.1利润实现和分配情况 (66)7.2主要财务指标 (66)7.3对本公司财务状况、经营成果有重大影响的其他事项 (66)8．特别事项揭示 (67)8.1 股东报告期内变动情况及原因 (67)8.2 董事、监事及高级管理人员变动情况及原因 (67)8.3 变更注册资本、注册地或公司名称、公司分立合并事项.67 8.4 公司的重大诉讼事项 (67)8.5 公司及其董事、监事和高级管理人员受到处罚情况 (67)8.6 对银监会提出的整改意见简要说明整改情况 (67)8.7 重大事项临时报告情况 (68)8.8 其他有必要让客户及相关利益人了解的重要信息 (68)9. 备查文件 (69)9.1 载有公司印章的年度报告正本 (69)9.2 载有董事会决议的报告正本 (69)9.3 载有监事会独立意见的报告正本 (69)9.4 载有会计师事务所盖章的审计报告正本 (69)1．重要提示1.1 本公司董事会及董事保证本报告所载资料不存在任何虚假记载、误导性陈述或者重大遗漏，并对其内容的真实性、准确性和完整性承担个别及连带责任。
2021年5期总第938期一、引言在我国经济发展历程中，银行业提供了重要的资金来源。
经济的健康、持续发展，有赖于银行业的稳健发展。
我国金融业对外开放程度逐步加深，资本雄厚、管理经验丰富的外资银行不断涌入，对我国银行业造成了一定的冲击。
同时，市场主体的金融需求呈现多元化的趋势，推动了包括保险、证券、信托、基金等除银行传统融资形式的融资方式的发展，进一步使得金融领域的竞争加剧。
此外我国银行业面临的经营环境也在日趋复杂。
国民经济整体增速逐渐放缓，银行业务不能再只依靠传统的存贷业务。
伴随着云计算、大数据、区块链等大力发展，银行业受到了强势崛起的互联网金融的大力冲击。
互联网金融依靠网络、技术等方面的优势，采用高效、低成本的运营模式与传统银行业务竞争市场份额，在影响全球金融业发展的同时倒逼传统银行业务进行创新改革。
为促进银行业的发展，国家监管政策也在不断调整，允许民间资本按照法律法规参与设立中小型银行；对互联网金融加强整治管理，控制金融风险。
在金融市场化改革不断深化的大环境下，银行经营绩效是衡量银行发展的重要因素，银行需在治理过程中制定目标，合理配置各项资源、降低成本、提高绩效。
而股权集中度、股权制衡度是公司治理的关键因素，影响着企业的经营效率和公司业绩。
因此，分析股权集中度、股权制衡度对银行经营绩效的影响，在丰富以往学者作出相关研究，完善公司治理理论、提升银行竞争力的同时，维护、促进国民经济平稳、健康发展。
二、文献研究综述国外学者对股权结构对公司经营绩效的影响关注较早，并展开了很多研究。
在股权集中度方面，Meckling 、Jensen （1976）在实证研究中发现，随着第一大股东持股比例的上升，企业财务绩效会呈现上升的趋势。
Perrini （2008）引入前五大股东持股比例作为其中一个解释变量，在研究中设立回归模型，发现若前五大股东持股比重越高，则公司经营绩效越高。
Massis （2013）在对家族企业进行实证研究时发现，股权集中度和公司财务绩效存在“U ”型关系。
