小额贷款公司信用风险研究外文文献翻译

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：CREDIT RISK IN FINANCING SME IN ROMANIA AbstractRomania’s integration in the European Union brought about some major changes in our banking system. One of the direct consequences is the fierce competition between banks for supremacy on the market. According to this, the Romanian banks saw in the SMEs sector a true potential for reaching their goal and they proceeded to conquer it by conceiving unique products, specially designed to reach the financial needs of this segment. Moreover, banks often come up with new attractive offers and cost reductions for the SMEs (Small and Mediu Sized Enterprises) sector. In this context, some answers need to be done: the effective risk banks accept to take by providing the offers, specific risks in financing this sector, the problem of the balance between risk and profit return (or market share increase).Keywords: credit risk, risk management, financing SME, bank policiesThe Romanian banking sector has been lately the victim of some profound structural changes, generated by the perspective of integration in the European Union. This resulted in a monetary instability manifested through an increased volatility of the exchanges rates and of the capital flows as well as in a tough concurrence between financial institutions. This fierce competition between banks determined them to launch themselves in a real course of financing, by accepting more and more risky transactions.The target segment of the credit institutions seems to be recently the SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) for some well-established reasons. Thus, SMEs represent one of the major sectors of all economies both from a market share point of view and from the fact that these firms contribute definitively to the creation of GDP(Gross Domestic Product) and engage a great part of the existent working force. Moreover, as the majority of the powerful corporations have already decided which financial institution they prefer to work with, the SMEs sector looks in this situation, as the cornerstone for the future development of the credit market, a field unexplored yet at its full potential.Therefore, it is no doubt that, in order to attract an important share of the credit market, banks initiated an aggressive campaign of conceiving some products specially designed to meet the particular financing needs of the SMEs’ sector.Specific risks associated to SMEs financingSMEs represent an important sector for all economies. In spite of the dynamics and of the importance of this segment for the economic development, SMEs continue to be faced with different problems linked to their access to credits. According to a study of the European Commission, concerning the SME sector in E.U., between 18% and 35% of the firms which asked for a credit were refused. Meanwhile, the same study shows that in Romania, the main source of financing new projects is represented by firms’ own funds.One of the reasons of SMEs difficult access to borrowed funds is the fact that these firms are perceived as being more risky than big companies. They present a high sensitivity to economic shocks while disposing of an inferior capacity to absorb variations. From this perspective, allotting medium and long time credits to these firms becomes problematic. Moreover, even short time credits are hard to be granted because of the monthly payment obligations risking to overpass the accepted debt capacity. In addition, in many of these cases, the monitoring costs reach unacceptable high levels as compared to the value of the granted credit.On the other side, many SMEs are faced with the lack of some adequate collateral necessary to sustain a credit requirement while, in the meantime, banks feel reluctant in accepting personal guarantees. And finally, the Romanian legislation concerning debt recovery in the case of bankruptcy of SMEs is much more bureaucratic than in that of 1 SMEs in Europe, 2003, Report for SMEs of the România in Europe.Despite all risks related to SMEs financing, banks cannot ignore anymore this sector if they want to gain a comfortable share of the credit market. In this respect, financial institutions proceeded to develop new credit tools specially conceived to meet the financial needs of this segment. However, even these new products present their own associated risks - generated by the peculiarities they present – which finally add to the final risk banks accept to take when financing SMEs.One way to cut the total risk is to analyze the specific risks born by these latest financing policies and then, to try to reduce them by appealing to some specific risk management tools, in order to establish a profitable balance between the risks accepted and the income brought by this extensive financing activity.New credit products for SMEs and their associated risksA great part of banks’ profits comes from their financing activity. Actually, the credit segment represents a central concern for any financial institution and many of them are trying to develop and implement efficient policies in order to enhance the credit activity and thus, to increase profits.If we are to also take into account the potential presented by the SME sector, we can understand the reasons which determined banks to launch themselves into a fierce campaign of conceiving new, quite permissive credit policies for SMEs. Moreover, the great concurrence between banks in allocating the attracted funds, determined them to overlook some of the risks incurred by the new financing tools.A short introspective into the new credit products launched on the market by different Romanian banks proves some common features. One important aspect is for example, the non-bureaucratic formula of documentation analysis and credit allotment. The answer is given in maximum 24 hours in response to SMEs pressing needs for short time, accessible funds, in order to cover their temporary account overdrafts. The analysis is based on some basic financial and nonfinancial indicators. In the first category we can include: a minimum existence period of the company on the market (which might vary from six months to up to one or two years) or the requirement of not figuring in CIP (The Office of Payment Incidents) with payment delays for a certain period of time. As concerns the financial indicators took into account inestablishing the eligibility of a SME for a credit granting, these are: a positive turnover trend, a positive operating profit and financial stability – the company must be classified in the A or B risk class according to the bank’s internal policies concerning the evaluation of the financial performance of firms.The schematic analysis helps in gaining accessibility and improves the volume of the granted credit. The new slogan seems to be: “quantity before quality”. And in many instances this is true, in the sense that banks rely on allocating an important volume of credit with the thought that these profits – resulted from volume – might compensate for some damages occurred in the case of any default payment. Anyway, as many might observe, the probability of risk occurrence is quite small. Even tough, such permissive conditions bear many risks and banks should balance the need for diversifying their credit portfolio with the risks they assume. Among the risks inherent to the allocation of credits we would only mention: the risk of adopting a wrong financing decision. The pressure for a rapid analysis of the credit documentation and the scarcity of the indicators taken into account during this study, do not allow for a better knowledge of the firm and of its risk profile. Consequently, it is quite probable that the bank’s exposure to risk might increase by accepting such a financial request and this might lead in turn to a future increase in the banks costs of monitoring and provisioning.The advantages granted by the new credit products are countless. Actually, the variety of credit tools available on the market is meant to satisfy any of the customers’ needs in terms of: accessibility, rapidity, payment flows, etc. In this respect we would mention another product, the “0 Interest Rate Credit” specially conceived to cover for some of the firm’s short term, temporary needs. For example, a company has to pay for a cheque in three days time but it will receive the money in two weeks. Or, an industrial equipment is expected to arrive at the customs but the importer is confronted with a temporary illiquidity, lets say for four days. In this case, both debtors can access a rapid credit like the “0 Interest Rate Credit” which effectively answers their temporary needs and which is really cost efficient.The new product seems to be of real interest because SMEs can get the financing in real time and more importantly, they will not be obliged to pay any interest rate, just a monthly commission. For firms confronted with temporary illiquidity this is cost efficient as they can better manage their cash flows while avoiding the payment of some high interest rates. Moreover, if they succeed to cover their debt on a monthly basis, the commission will drop significantly.From the banks’ standpoint however, this type of credit bears many risks. Funds do not necessarily have a certain destination, fact that prevents banks from controlling their use. If the credit is allocated to an inefficient activity or if they are used for purposes not serving the real interest of the firm, the risk of that company’s default payment is much higher. This adds to the risks associated to granting a rapid credit and generates an increase of the overall risk taken by the financial institution.Other methods of financing offered by the Romanian banks are factoring and the procedure of discounting financial instruments. As for discounting, risks are that the financial instruments (for example cheques, promissory notes) are post-dated or that they present some restrictive clauses like the right to protest or to initiate regression actions. If these financial instruments are offered to the bank in blank to serve as a guarantee and the bank does not pay enough attention to such clauses, the risk is that the debtor will default sooner or later in its payment obligations.Besides these risks, which are inherent to any credit activity, banks are also confronted with some specific risks, generated by the new credit products they offer to different categories of firms: like the credit tools specially conceived for the SME sector. The risks associated with these products are determined by the financing facilities that banks offer to this particular sector, in their efforts to attract an important share of a yet unexplored market.The new credit tools present the great advantage of being very flexible. Thus, the rapidity of documentation analysis (24 hours in most of the cases), the full financing of the project - without any initial own contribution from the part of the debtor - , the existence of credits which do not require mentioning a certain initial destination or the possibility of presenting as credit guarantees some promissory notes in blank, are justas many opportunities of risk enhancing. In this context, a question remains to be answered: which are the management techniques used by the banks in protecting themselves against such risks?The promptitude in granting a credit might bring banks many risks related to a deficient knowledge of their clients, of their capacity and their willingness to pay back their debts. The reduced number of the analyzed financial indicators represents another reason of the default risk of the counterparty. In this situation banks should pay an increased attention to the preliminary discussions with the client. The credit analyst must question the history of the client’s relationship with the bank – actually old clients whose financial and payment record is already known should be preferred to a new client.In conclusion, a good policy in this sense could be represented by the cross-selling products or by the marketing policies trying to attract clients which act on specific markets on which the bank has an important presence or which develop affair relationships with the old clients of the bank. This way, the analyst can keep a track on the new client by disposing of supplementary information about their financial capacity and their character. Moreover, the analysts should maintain a climate of mutual trust and understanding for their clients; they should periodically monitor the debtors’ activity and announce their superiors of any changes that might appear. Thus, any worsening of the economic and social conditions of the debtors will be handled in real time and the probability of default is substantially reduced.Source: Brindusa Covaci,“Credit Risk In Financing SME In Romania”.Report for România - Observatory of the SMEs in Europe.2008(7).pp.56-74.译文：罗马尼亚中小企业融资信用风险研究摘要罗马尼亚加入欧洲一体化进程之后，给其银行系统带来了一些显著的变化。

文献出处：Worthington C. The research of small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee agency [J]. International Journal of Business and Management, 2015, 8(5): 35-45.原文The research of small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee agencyWorthington CAbstractIntroduced in the process of small and medium-sized enterprise financing, credit guarantee, mortgage can weaken the small and medium-sized enterprises, credit records are congruent caused by financing obstacles, and then improve the small and medium-sized enterprise's credit rating, share the loan risk of financial institutions. In practice, the credit guarantee is also proved to be one of the effective means of government support for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Sme credit guarantee institutions in system, management and environment appear a series of problems, and the nature of these problems is small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee institutions of sustainable management ability. But few scholars from the view point of sustainable management of small and medium-sized enterprise development of guarantee agencies. So the thesis on the characteristics of small business credit guarantee institutions, influence factors, ability evaluation and path selection are discussed in this paper.Keywords: Credit guarantee institutions; Risk management; Sustainable management1 IntroductionThe role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMES) in economic and social general has the following aspects: first, the small and medium-sized enterprises to absorb a large number of employment, to realize social full employment huge; Second, the small and medium-sized enterprises in promoting economic growth effect can not be ignored; Third, the small and medium-sized enterprises is the main force of technology innovation; Finally, the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMES) play the role of the unique social stabilizer. Small and medium-sized enterprises in socialproductivity growth, in terms of access to technology and the contribution of technology application, has become the most active in the system of market economy, the most potential enterprise groups. However, in the process of rapid development of small and medium-sized enterprises are faced with the difficult, especially since 2008 is affected by the global financial crisis, financing difficulties more become a common obstacles in the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. The importance of small and medium-sized enterprises has been generally recognized by the world, governments have taken various measures to support the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. At present, the government to support the development of small and medium-sized enterprises at home and abroad practice is the implementation of small and medium-sized enterprises credit guarantee system (project or program).Through the government guidance, a combination of market mechanism and macro-control to establish small and medium-sized enterprises credit guarantee system, and can pass on, lower part of the bank risk, improve the enthusiasm of bank financing for small and medium enterprises, improve the financing environment of small and medium-sized enterprises.2 Literature reviewAlvaro Ruiz (2010) by analyzing the national credit guarantees scheme that although their characteristics and different types, the reason of its existence is the same: to alleviate the difficulty in small and medium-sized enterprises in financing, while ensuring that reduce the bank's loan losses. Him through the comparative analysis of the characteristics of different credit guarantee project case and guarantee the problem of asymmetric information, find out the theoretical foundation of the credit guarantee program, at the same time, for those who either for or against the two researchers provides a new thinking of the plan.Haines, Canada, the United States, were comparatively studied, and the British government's small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee project, analysis the default cost and guarantees the project for the benefits of small and medium-sized enterprises; they think that the welfare of the loan guarantee project has a positive effect. Lee (2002) and its background of Southeast Asia financial crisis, analyzes theguarantee amplification mechanism of financial crisis on developing countries. Due to the development of China's household with high government subsidies for high investment and high growth, the growth of the real estate and the price level is often at a higher level, this makes the economy is sensitive to fluctuations in reverse. And reverse wave once appear, in under the action of amplification mechanism, would trigger assets shrink. Sharply and collateral value, the desired secured loan ratio increased rapidly, leading to foreign investment withdraw loans, the economic crisis.Marc and Nick (2009) through the study, driven by the government loan guarantee program in the early 80 s to 90 s of the 20th century was successful, greatly solve the financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises. Nigrini and Andrie in the study also concluded that a credit guarantee plan although there is a problem, but for the government is still an effective way to reduce the risk of bank lending, and you can use this way to force them to better serve small and medium-sized enterprises.Kang and Almas (2008) through to the "credit guarantee policy impact on South Korea's small and medium-sized enterprise survival and development of" the research suggests that in general, often use credit guarantee makes effective way, and you can use this way to force them to better serve small and medium-sized enterprises to the insured enterprises can achieve good results. As long as the credit guarantee system of reasonable design is based on its national conditions, to solve the difficulty of a country's small and medium-sized enterprise financing credit guarantee can play effective role. As countries in practice, there exists some well-run credit guarantee system, the majority in favor of the view of scholars.To sum up, research mainly from the financing guarantee role in solving the problem of incentive conflict, from the perspective of debt contract, etc, in order to bank financing guarantee problem for mediation. The object of study is mostly mortgage problems, study of credit guarantee. Due to the small and medium-sized enterprise financing problem is mainly set by the government guarantee program, the concrete execution policy guarantee agencies to solve, the commercial guarantee agencies mainly engaged in the financing guarantee business, mutual guaranteeinstitutions is less, which leads to the comparative study of three kinds of guarantee agencies dedicated is less.3 Related theoretical analysis3.1 The asymmetric information theoryClassical economics theory, information symmetry can ensure the price on the market spontaneous adjustment mechanism, financial markets, too. According to the new Keynesian view, due to the unbalance of market information distribution, the achievement of market equilibrium can only be based on the balance of the incomplete information, And points out that because of the spread of information, and receiving is going to cost, plus the limitations of market information system itself and the interference of market participants, these factors have led to the market information is not always effective. In addition, the specialization and division of labor, making the different areas of the economy of the participants on the master information in a different position, because the ability of obtaining information is different between the economic subject and information are not equal. In reality, capital supply and demand both sides of the distribution is often in a state of asymmetric information. In the credit markets, borrowers due to better understand their own reimbursement ability and the risk of project investment, so as to have more information, and lenders are often an information disadvantage. At this time, with the introduction of a third party credit, set up the bridge of information communication, is a way to solve this problem. Credit guarantee agencies to use their information processing and further capital demanders of advantage, can effective questions don't make the right guarantee enterprise, this process also for bank hoof pick the suitable borrowers; Passed the available information about borrowers from the bank, the realization of the creditor's rights guarantee of bank. This process at the same time, improve enterprise credit guarantee agencies corresponding fee, belong to a special kind of credit intermediary service, its produce to a certain extent, information asymmetry problem between fixed borrowing.3.2 The financial intermediary theoryNew financial intermediation theory mainly from the perspective of informationeconomics and transaction cost, the financial intermediary services provided, and the function are analyzed. As the market transaction cost and information cost factors such as the existence of in information acquisition and transaction supervision has a comparative advantage in aspects of financial intermediation is able to produce. Financial intermediation is using its specialization, can achieve economies of scale and scope economy bring beneficial effect, achieve the result of the lower transaction costs; And transaction cost generated from a variety of reasons, including information asymmetry is one of them, the main brought to collect information, supervision and so on various aspects of the cost. Direction of credit guarantee institutions as a third party guarantee for debt creditors to provide credit guarantee, guarantee borrowers would fulfill the responsibility and obligation of contract or other agreement. In the process of financing guarantee business, credit guarantee institutions will be the demand side of funds for credit assessment, using their own professional advantages, through to the information collection and processing, select suitable guarantor. At the same time, the lenders needed to provide your own reference. As a kind of credit intermediary, the existence of credit guarantees to promote the deal.3.3 Risk shifting theoryEconomic activity because of the existence of various uncertainty factors in the economic activity participation main body often face all kinds of uncertainty in the market brings the risk of loss, and this kind of risk is objective existence. In order to control and transfer the risk, economic subject to explore every avenue, hope to be able to put manageable and manage risk, the risk transfer is one of them. Because the risk is objective existence, so the economic subject consciously will risky activities in advance or possible consequences of risk are transferred to other economic subject, through the risk to pass on that might reduce their losses. But that is just convert the risk takers, and did not completely eliminate risk. In the credit guarantee institutions to provide guarantees for bank loans, in the original simple relationship of creditor's rights debt, because of the guaranty contract concluded, introduced the third party guarantor, as sub prime borrowers share the credit risk of the bank. Banks outside of the main debt contract, and obtain the guarantee agencies to compensate the guaranteeof the debt, debt default risk and rearranged distribution between them. Therefore, after the introduction of credit guarantee, financial institutions lending risk transfer, the original risk according to the agreement of guaranty contract ratio between them from the distribution; And guarantee agencies as a specialized management agencies, can further through professional internal control and risk management to diversify its business risk.3.4 Market failure theoryThe existence of information asymmetry and market transaction cost, could affect the play of the role of the market, resulting in the allocation of resources appear defects. Search guarantee object and guarantee agencies to provide credit guarantee is the process of financial resource allocation process. Guarantee agencies with its special ability in information collection, information processing, can choose the suitable guarantees, reduced lending both sides information asymmetry problem, dredge the blocked trade channel. In this process, the credit guarantee institutions not only reflects the role of credit enhancement, and is the key to guarantee object through its further hoof pick, don't to guide credit supply towards to the direction of optimizing the allocation of financial resources, and finally promote the improvement of the social economic benefits.译文中小企业信用担保机构问题研究Worthington C摘要在中小企业融资过程中，引入信用担保，可以弱化中小企业抵押不足、信用记录不全等造成的融资障碍，进而提高中小企业的信用等级，分担金融机构的贷款风险。

小额贷款公司信用风险及其对策1、国外文献综述研究1.1小额贷款公司信用风险的影响因素研究综述Jose. A. G. Baptista, Joaquim. J. S. Ramalho, J. Vidigalda. Silva (2006)⑶运用多元回归的方法,分析得出小额贷款信用风险的影响因素:贷款数额的大小、贷款期限长短、贷款用途、贷款利率、贷款人经营理念、贷款人个人能力、贷款人拥有土地面积、贷款人的诚信记录。

James Copestake(2007广]通过对金融机构进行问卷调查,发现贷款人年龄、贷款人性别、贷款人健康状况、贷款人家庭劳动力数量、贷款人家庭净资产均对是小额贷款风险有影响。

S.Jha,K.S.Bawa(2007)对印度的小额贷款进行了实证研究,他们从农户的角度分析了小额贷款风险的影响因素有:贷款人文化程度、贷款人家庭收支状况、贷款人固定资产合计、贷款人耐用消费品合计、贷款人信用状况、对贷款人的法律约束力。

V. Hartarska (2007) 等应用面板数据分析法,对世界银行1998到2002年各国发放小额贷款的风险情况进行了分析。

研究结果表明:贷款有无扣保、产品市场现状、产品发展潜力、产品市场进入难度、贷款人技术和能力、产品的产业政策、政府对小额贷款的支持力度对小额贷款风险有重要影响。

1.2小额贷款公司信用风险管理研究综述小额贷款公司可持续发展的关键是在不同于传统的商业银行合约设计的方向上,重新整合各种要素,不断创新金融产品和风险控制手段,克服小额信贷市场借贷双方的信息不对称和交易成本高等问题,提高信贷市场的效率。

综合文献,国内外学者主要也是从小额贷款的信用机制设计、信贷产品创新、内部管理控制提出了小额贷款风险管理的创新机制。

1.3信用机制设计Schreiner (1999) 人为信用评分模型可以帮助信贷员进行判断决策,从而更加科学的对客户的信用进行评估。

Buchenau (2003) 人为发展中国家,特别是农村地区的信用评分模型对农户的还款能力的预测作用十分冇限,信用评分不应作为评估农村地区客户贷款申请的唯一决策工具,否则小额贷款机构将面临重大风险。

中英文资料外文翻译文献Managing Credit Risks with Knowledge Management forFinancial BanksAbstract-Nowadays,financial banks are operating in a knowledge society and there are more and more credit risks breaking out in banks.So,this paper first discusses the implications of knowledge and knowledge management, and then analyzes credit risks of financial banks with knowledge management. Finally, the paper studies ways for banks to manage credit risks with knowledge management. With the application of knowledge management in financial banks, customers will acquire better service and banks will acquire more rewards.Index Terms–knowledge management; credit risk; risk management; incentive mechanism; financial banksI.INTRODUCTIONNowadays,banks are operating i n a“knowledge society”.So, what is knowledge? Davenport(1996)[1]thinks knowledge is professional intellect, such as know-what, know-how, know-why, and self-motivated creativity, or experience, concepts, values, beliefs and ways of working that can be shared and communicated. The awareness of the importance of knowledge results in the critical issue of “knowledge management”. So, what is knowledge management? According to Malhothra(2001)[2], knowledge management(KM)caters to the critical issues of organizational adaptation, survival and competence in face of increasingly discontinuous environmental change. Essentially it embodies organizational processes that seek synergistic combination of data and information processing capacity of information technologies and the creative and innovative capacity of human beings. Through the processes of creating,sustaining, applying, sharing and renewing knowledge, we can enhance organizational performance and create value.Many dissertations have studied knowledge managementapplications in some special fields. Aybübe Aurum(2004)[3] analyzes knowledge management in software engineering and D.J.Harvey＆R.Holdsworth(2005)[4]study knowledge management in the aerospace industry. Li Yang(2007)[5] studies knowledge management in information-based education and Jayasundara＆Chaminda Chiran(2008)[6] review the prevailing literature on knowledge management in banking industries. Liang ping and Wu Kebao(2010)[7]study the incentive mechanism of knowledge management inBanking.There are also many papers about risks analysis and risks management. Before the 1980s, the dominant mathematical theory of risks analysis was to describe a pair of random vectors.But,the simplification assumptions and methods used by classical competing risks analysis caused controversy and criticism.Starting around the 1980s, an alternative formulation of risk analysis was developed,with the hope to better resolve the issues of failure dependency and distribution identifiability. The new formulation is univariate risk analysis.According to Crowder(2001)[8], David＆Moeschberger(1978)[9]and Hougaard(2000)[10],univariate survival risk analysis has been dominantly, which is based on the i.i.d assumptions(independent and identically distributed) or, at least, based on the independent failure assumption.Distribution-free regression modeling allows one to investigate the influences of multiple covariates on the failure, and it relaxes the assumption of identical failure distribution and to some extent, it also relaxes the single failure risk restriction. However, the independent failures as well as single failure events are still assumed in the univariate survival analysis. Of course,these deficiencies do not invalidate univariate analysis, and indeed, in many applications, those assumptions are realistically valid.Based on the above mentioned studies, Ma and Krings(2008a, 2008b)[11]discuss the relationship and difference of univariate and multivariate analysis in calculating risks.As for the papers on managing the risks in banks, Lawrence J.White(2008)[12]studies the risks of financial innovations and takes out some countermeasures to regulate financial innovations. Shao Baiquan(2010)[13]studies the ways to manage the risks in banks.From the above papers, we can see that few scholars have studied the way to manage credit risks with knowledge management. So this paper will discuss using knowledgemanagement to manage credit risks for financial banks.This paper is organized as follows: SectionⅠis introduction. SectionⅡanalyzes credit risks in banks with knowledge management. SectionⅢstudies ways for banks to manage credit risks with knowledge management. SectionⅣconcludes.II.ANALYZING CREDIT RISKS IN BANKS WITHKNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENTA.Implication of Credit RiskCredit ris k is the risk of loss due to a debtor’s non-payment of a loan or other line of credit, which may be the principal or interest or both.Because there are many types of loans and counterparties-from individuals to sovereign governments-and many different types of obligations-from auto loans to derivatives transactions-credit risk may take many forms.Credit risk is common in our daily life and we can not cover it completely,for example,the American subprime lending crisis is caused by credit risk,which is that the poor lenders do not pay principal and interest back to the banks and the banks do not pay the investors who buy the securities based on the loans.From the example,we can find that there are still credit risks,though banks have developed many financial innovations to manage risks.B.Sharing KnowledgeKnowledge in banks includes tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge,which is scattered in different fields.For example, the information about the customers’income, asset and credit is controlled by different departments and different staffs and the information can’t be communicated with others. So it is necessary for banks to set up a whole system to communicate and share the information and knowledge to manage the risks.C.Setting up Incentive Mechanism and Encouraging Knowledge InnovationThe warning mechanism of credit risks depends on how bank’s staffs use the knowledge of customers and how the staffs use the knowledge creatively.The abilities of staffs to innovate depend on the incentive mechanism in banks,so, banks should take out incentive mechanism to urge staffs to learn more knowledge and work creatively to manage credit risks.We can show the incentive mechanism as Fig.1:Fig.1 The model of incentive mechanism with knowledge management From Fig.1,we can see there are both stimulative and punitive measures in the incentive model of knowledge management for financial banks.With the incentive mechanism of knowledge management in financial banks,the staffs will work harder to manage risks and to acquire both material returns and spiritual encouragement.III.MANAGING CREDIT RISKS IN BANKS WITH KNOWLEDGEMANAGEMENTThere are four blocks in managing credit risks with knowledge management.We can show them in Fig.2:Fig.2 The blocks of managing credit risksA.Distinguishing Credit RiskDistinguishing credit risks is the basis of risk management.If we can’t recognize the risks,we are unable to find appropriate solutions to manage risks.For example,the United States subprime crisis in 2007 was partly caused by that the financial institutions and regulators didn’t recognize the mortgage securitization risks timely.With knowledge management,we can make out some rules to distinguish credit risks,which are establishing one personal credit rating system for customers and setting up the data warehouse.We can use the system to analyze customers’credit index, customers’credit history and the possible changes which may incur risks.At the same time,we should also watch on the changes of customers’property and income to recognize potential risks.B.Assessing and Calculating Credit RiskAfter distinguishing the credit risks,we should assess the risk exposure,risk factors and potential losses and risks, and we should make out the clear links.The knowledgeable staffs in banking should use statistical methods and historical data to develop specific credit risks evaluation model and the regulators should establish credit assessment system and then set up one national credit assessment system.With the system and the model of risk assessment,the managers can evaluate the existing and emerging risk factors,such as they prepare credit ratings for internal use.Other firms,including Standard ＆Poor’s,Moody’s and Fitch,are in the business of developing credit rating for use by investors or other third parties.Table Ⅰshows the credit ratings of Standard ＆Poor’s.TABLE ISTANDARD ＆POOR’S CREDITT RATINGSAfter assessing credit risks,we can use Standardized Approach and Internal Rating-Based Approach to calculate the risks.And in this article,we will analyze how Internal Rating-Based Approach calculates credit risk of an uncovered loan.To calculate credit risk of an uncovered loan,firstly,we will acquire the borrower’s Probability of Default(PD),Loss Given Default(LGD),Exposure at Default(EAD)and Remaining Maturity(M).Secondly,we calculate the simple risk(SR)of the uncovered loan,using the formula as following:SR=Min{BSR(PD)*[1+b(PD)*(M-3)]*LGD／50,LGD*12.5} (1)Where BSR is the basic risk weight and b(PD)is the adjusting factor for remaining maturity(M).Finally,we can calculate the weighted risk(WR)of the uncovered loan,using the following formula:WR=SR*EAD (2)From(1)and(2),we can acquire the simple and weighted credit risk of an uncovered loan,and then we can take some measures to hedge the credit risk.C.Reducing Credit RiskAfter assessing and calculating credit risks,banks should make out countermeasures to reduce the risks.These measures include：(1)Completing security system of loans. The banks should require customers to use the collateral and guarantees as the security for the repayment,and at the same time,banks should foster collateral market.(2)Combining loanswith insurance.Banks may require customers to buy a specific insurance or insurance portfolio.If the borrower doesn’t repay the loans,banks can get the compensation from the insurance company.(3)Loans Securitization. Banks can change the loans into security portfolio,according to the different interest rate and term of the loans,and then banks can sell the security portfolio to the special organizations or trust companies.D.Managing Credit Risk and Feeding backA customer may have housing loans,car loans and other loans,so the banks can acquire the customer’s credit information,credit history,credit status and economic background from assessing the risks of the customer based on the data the banks get.By assessing and calculating the risks of the customer,banks can expect the future behavior of the customers and provides different service for different customers. Banks can provide more value-added service to the customers who have high credit rates and restrict some business to the customers who have low credit rates.At the same time, banks should refuse to provide service to the customers who are blacklisted. Banks should set up the pre-warning and management mechanism and change the traditional ways,which just rely on remedial after the risks broke out.In order to set up the warning and feeding back mechanism,banks should score credit of the customers comprehensively and then test the effectiveness and suitability of the measures,which banks use to mitigate risks.Finally, banks should update the data of the customers timely and keep the credit risk management system operating smoothly.IV.CONCLUSIONIn this paper,we first discuss the implications of knowledge and knowledge management.Then we analyze the credit risks of financial banks with knowledge management. Finally,we put forward ways for banks to manage credit risks with knowledge management.We think banks should set up data warehouse o f customers’credit to assess and calculate the credit risks,and at the same time,banks should train knowledgeable staffs to construct a whole system to reduce risks and feed back.With knowledge management,banks can take out systemic measures to manage cust omers’credit risks and gain sustainable profits.ACKNOWLEDGMENTIt is financed by the humanities and social sciences project of the Ministry of Educationof China(NO.06JC790032).REFERENCES[1]Davenport,T.H.et al,“Improving knowledge work processes,”Sl oan Management Review,MIT,USA,1996,V ol.38,pp.53-65.[2]Malhothra,“Knowledge management for the new world of business,”New York BRINT Institute,2001,lkm/whatis.htm.[3]Aybübe Aurum,“Knowledge management in software engineering education,”Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies,2004,pp.370-374.[4]D.J.Harvey＆R.Holdsworth,“Knowledge management in the aerospace industry,”Proceedings of the IEEE International Professional Communication Conference,2005,pp.237-243.[5]Li Yang,“Thinking about knowledge management applications in information-based education,”IEEE International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies,2007,pp.27-33.[6]Jayasundara＆Chaminda Chiran,“Knowledge management in banking industries:uses and opportunities,”Journal of the University Librarians Association of Sri Lanka,2008,V ol.12,pp.68-84.[7]Liang Ping,Wu Kebao,“Knowledge management in banking,”The Conference on Engineering and Business Management,2010, pp.4719-4722.[8]Crowder,M.J.Classical Competing Risks,British:Chapman&Hall, 2001,pp.200.[9]David,H.A.&M.L.Moeschberger,The Theory of Competing Risks, Scotland,Macmillan Publishing,1978,pp.103.金融银行信用风险管理与知识管理摘要：目前，金融银行经营在一个知识型社会中，而且越来越多的信用风险在在银行中爆发。

文献出处：M Swan. The study on the operating risk prevention of small Loan Companies [J]. Decision Support Systems, 2015，12(4): 828-838.原文原文The study on the operating risk prevention of small Loan CompaniesM SwanAbstractSmall Loan Company is still in its infancy. Just in the process of its establishment and continuously explore, suffered a lot from themselves and the environment problems. As the regulators in the financial markets and relevant scholars, on how to locate small loan companies, how to make small loan companies play a real role in the national economy is full of concern. Small loan company capital source channel is narrow. Mechanisms involved in microfinance planning period is not long, after internal personnel practice survey, random diffusion time or disturbing both inside and outside conditions. Whether internal standard units or departments, professional analysis for such enterprises in the financial markets of rapid infiltration and perpetuate problems have been attached great importance to. As folk further liberalization of the capital market, therefore, small loan companies the management risk and financial risk is increasingly highlighted.Keywords: Small loan companies; Risk management; Control to prevent1 IntroductionIn the operation of small loan companies in the various risk, especially in its operation risk management tends to bring to the company a lot of difficult to estimate the trouble, so how to discover, to summarize these appear in running the root cause of the risk management, it is more important, after find out root cause, according to the scientific and effective methods for these problems existing in the management risk of classified division, to make small loans in the operation of the company's future operation and management of risks for effective, systematic, scientific prevention. Most scholars, according to the theory of small loan companies run the risk and prevention countermeasures of research, mainly concentrated in all kinds of risk and risk analysis is put forward, put small loan companies this new industrycompared with other financial industry environment, in the concrete for small loan companies on risk management in the operation of the fundamental problems, andhow to guard against these problems has not conducted detailed discussed andcountermeasures, and only in small loans risk aspects of problems in the operation ofthe company in theory emphasizes the overall risk of small loan companies andprevention. In the operation of small loan companies in the various risk, especially inits operation risk management tends to bring to the company a lot of difficult to estimate the trouble, so how to discover, summed up in these. The root cause of the risk management in the operation of, is all the more important, after find out root cause, according to the scientific and effective means to these problems existing in the management risk of classified division, to make small loans in the operation of the company's future operation and management of risks for effective, systematic, scientific prevention.2 Risk and risk managementSo-called hidden risks in small loan companies operating activities, mainly in thespecific planning period internal profit performance on derivatives with the defaultindex of conflicting phenomenon, especially given risk loss of effect. Combiningnormative power relatively broad regulatory body Angle of observation, the symptoms mainly joint mechanism disorders, loss events and the concrete performance of the amount of loss data. Under the background of this kind of developing system management, strategic planning can be established targets more completely, which along with all the fluctuations of will appropriate to eliminate, or make the disturbing factors have condition remains inside the company can accept the reasonable space structure, so as to strengthen the organization interest charge ability. Set of small loan companies, this article mainly emphasized by supervision, legalperson or organization in the society structure transition to reverse the operation, one for the public deposits were rejected, hope to be able to operate in microfinance project implement profit motive for a long time under the control indicators. Need special attention is, the need to accept the country specific regulatory legal department, under the premise that the arrangement of all business, profit and loss or risk ofconflict will be borne by the company leadership comprehensive, and any shareholder will direct retain significant asset management personnel selection and accuratemaintenance right content such as earnings results. After all these there is essentialdifference between companies and Banks, not synchronous open deposit business,will therefore shall be regarded as more formal financial management unit.The so-called risk management problem, that is, any enterprise during the period ofForeign Service accordingly to keep conflict prediction results and the prevention and control means, excluding the above factors still excessive crisis situation. Now comprehensive perfect the internal financial market regulation system in our country, but such risks does not2.1 Market riskIn its depth of stress is that when a specific enterprise marketing mode hidden conflicts hidden premise for market competition, the core area and actual occupy the share of late will produce certain gap preset indexes and as a result, under this background, a specific commodity technology innovation preparation procedure will breed a disorder or scale effect, which is difficult to cause the public recognition. Question on this part of the risk detailed analysis the following contents: first, the demand for consumer self satisfaction biased forecast results. Actually in such trouble enterprise product styles are different, but the late consumer activity development would be struggling, as for when to break free from the shackles of established the shackles of thinking is much more difficult to provide accurate answers. Second, the distortion of market core competitive power. In this kind of technology challenges of the corporate sector are often consumers and market regulators to double review, including the internal capital adequacy, executive’s comprehensive technical ability and moral quality level and finally improve the quality of our products means. At a particular stage based on enterprise competitive potential certification is trouble until trouble troubles you. Finally, the market demand curve from time to time. Market and product structure change activities must maintain synchronization effect, through heterogeneous mechanism connotation lap joint debugging, technical personnel will be left arbitrary cope with habits problem because of the weak.2.2 Technical riskRelative technical risk problems during the implementation of product shape transition depth, if you don't on any technical content cohesion, can make innovation activities. Such technical achievement to run from the initial transmission process through three levels, including scientific research experiments, quality testing and industrial structure promotion and so on, but the legacy of the potential risks will be more severe. During scientific research projects, the unit can content to cater to thepreset standards are often difficult to conclude that negligence often because the operation subject facing failure situation. Mid-term test link, even the innovation product has production, but the public response to the information collection is not comprehensive, including side effects or ecosystem destruction in the planning process, etc. On this basis, to realize commercialization of research results will not be so easy. And large-scale production and sales stage, because the high-tech content in succession process has rough surface, make the products within the market to gain a foothold, especially under the condition of life is not long by the rest of the technology to replace the possibility is very high. So any a product no matter from the initial development stage for internal promotion is to the market and involving internal process is filled with all kinds of risk. In particular, technical risk mainly covers the detailed aspects: first, technology research and development activities extend range is not accurate verification; Second, the late in response to population fluctuations from time to time. Third, the market competition activity is participating in the lack of persistence.2.3 The financial riskIs mainly refers to project funding cannot achieve reasonable dredge out and make the result of the failure mechanism of innovation activities. Information fundsfor the financial position at risk enterprise how important, but in reality such enterprise expansion fund tends to have the following characteristics. First of all, the capital demand range is larger; Second, the concrete financing way too narrow. Late for venture enterprises economic benefits inherent fluctuation, makes any unit in to invest in its early after a long period of psychological war, so, its implementingoverall financing is still not enough reality. Financial control activities related to performance of the risk elements as follows: first, the financing sources and thenumber are difficult to textual research. Fortunately when such companies to adapt tothe development stage, especially along with the expansion of business scope, makeinternal capital demand quantity full boom, if still can not get money as it should bewithin the prescribed period of time the number of support, will lose industrycompetitive advantage, eventually be eliminated by times. Second, money supply timeliness position shakes. Risk enterprises need to rely on money supply mechanism transition reform task, especially in well-funded, aging characteristics influence premise, despite the results spectacular gains phase, but may also be because cash shortage and make both industrial chain break, enabling enterprises to edge back intoa rout.2.4 Manage riskSpecific enterprise due to the default response mechanism in the process ofimplementation of the project planning result error and influence departmentreputation foundation, makes the development prospect of the late of blank, this kindof phenomenon also is late investment risk control activities need to focus on the coreof the comprehensive technical problems. Combined with the morphology of risk enterprises, mismanagement signs are spreading, for enterprise management in the future bring depth limit crisis. Specific breeds reasons are: first, the enterprise established imbalance effect management organization structure design, especially with the field of technology transition entrepreneurial subject, often because under the background of knowledge management lack of license enterprises effect diffusion mechanism shortcomings; Secondly, the enterprise cohesion cooperation organizations cannot complete and enterprises in a task, even if is the size of thebusiness situation is good, but neglected will derive more prominent contradiction, further into the root cause of risk management. About this part of the risk situation presents the following rules: (1) specific management thinking innovation main body is not strong enough, most of the internal rectification technology innovation risk firms simply focus on details, for the daily work of team quality form and technicalapplication ability almost unnoticed, makes the process structure, management content is difficult to meet the demand of era, it is bound to make enterprise strategypresents simplification feature in the future.(2) management experience is inadequate.In Chinese with the innovation of technology to realize the development of thelack of personal ability makes it hard formanager’s lack of personal ability makes it hard for corporate sector, will be because manager’sbusiness activities smoothly. (3) The personnel position structure arrangement conflict.Retain risk disadvantages enterprise position and corresponding matching, alwaysinvoluntarily handover odds and enterprise development, has repeatedly let will only make the internal structure of high quality talents to pieces, make the business activities in the future as well as usual.3 Management risk control and prevention3.1 Strengthen the internal controlprofessional’s scarce status, becausescarce status, because Most of the small loan companies will face professional’ssmall loans company belongs to the emerging of financial industry, industry system is not perfect. Therefore, the company's employees determine the small loan company can survive in the fierce market, and can be continuous development. Small loan company first to employ the persons with specialized knowledge and rich experience as executives, make financial institutions work and rich management experience of personnel to conduct regular training, less experienced practitioners organization personnel system to study the laws and regulations, familiar with financial knowledge of business and finance case, improve the staff's work ability and business level, strengthen the awareness of risk prevention.3.2 Open up the financing channels, the realization of diversified sources of fundingFirst of all, for subsequent insufficient funds become the greatest threat to the large-scale promotion in the future. At present, the company can only by theshareholders of a company constantly additional investment or developing new east and solve the problem of loan able funds, this makes the how to develop and maintain business steadily to become the biggest challenge. Second, countries to promote small loan credit, be in namely to promote the development of "agriculture, rural areas and farmers", small enterprises. Let go of small loan companies financing channels, togive financial institutions such as identity, fiscal and tax reduction policy support to process, small companies have the funds to solve legal channels, which naturally willnot desperate to go "deposits" and off-balance-sheet financing illegally, this is thefundamental problem of small loan company funds source, as well as the developmentof basic problem, but as a small loan companies this is not the short-term investors,operators may change the status.3.3 Optimize the company's internal and external environment, strengthen the management of loansFirst of all, on the premise of guarantee its own environmental benign circulation,with the deepening of the company's business do more big, can slowly to such asBanks and other financial industry such as type of organization, benchmarking learning successful case of financial institutions, to further clear the requirement of the mortgaged property and improve the mortgaged property to accept mortgage threshold, so that we can effectively control the mortgaged property depreciation causes losses to the company. Secondly, establish and perfect the restraint mechanism with capital management as the core, and the traditional mainly denotation expansion of extensive growth mode to give priority to with connotation improve gradually intensive growth mode transformation. At the same time, small loans companies should adhere to market-oriented, commercial orientation, by high interest rates to reduce transaction risk and transaction costs, ensure that the company's earnings and normal operation. In risk control department and business department can through the establishment of "firewall system", strengthen the monitoring of loan risk, to timely feedback of loan quality deterioration, the loan provision for risk provisions for bad enough value. Give full play to the functions of small loan company's industry association, improve the industry self-discipline consciousness, and strengthen the financial accounting system, management personnel, registered capital of supervision and management, promoting its healthy development. Positive use of internal ratings and small credit has more mature technology, and through the way of market research, analysis of the demand for loans, and thus to develop a business strategy, so can make small loan co., LTD for the issuance of loans more tend to be more reasonable, and ismore practical and effective to control the loan risk.译文译文小额贷款公司经营风险防范小额贷款公司经营风险防范M Swan摘要摘要小额贷款公司目前仍处于起步阶段。

文献信息文献标题：An empirical investigation of the interplay between microcredit, institutional context, and entrepreneurial capabilities （小额信贷、制度环境与创业能力之间相互作用的实证研究）文献作者：Jonathan Kimmitt， Mariarosa Scarlata，Dimo Dimov文献出处：《Venture Capital》 ,2016,18(3):257–276字数统计：英文3661单词，21609字符；中文6504汉字外文文献An empirical investigation of the interplay between microcredit, institutional context, and entrepreneurial capabilities Abstract Understanding under which conditions microcredit is used by new, growing ventures is becoming increasingly pertinent to scholars. This paper investigates the interplay of the use of microcredit with entrepreneurial capabilities and the moderating role of institutional development in sub-Saharan Africa. Our findings show that higher constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities are associated with higher use of microcredit. In addition, we find that new, growing ventures use microcredit more where either economic or political institutions are less developed. Our findings suggest the importance of the existence of some type of institutional strength that must be in place to form the basis for microcredit activity. This allows for speculation as to whether microcredit works as the literature currently assumes.KEYWORDS: Capabilities; entrepreneurial finance; institutions; microfinance1.IntroductionEntrepreneurial activity is strongly influenced by the context it is embedded in (Baumol 1990, 1993; Autio and Acs 2010; Welter 2011). Particularly in emerging markets, entrepreneurs face a number of challenges, such as the mixed success ofinnovation (Bradley et al. 2012), weak institutions (Acemoglu 2003), and low human capital levels (Acs and Virgill 2010). One particular challenge for these entrepreneurs is access to finance (Honohan 2007) which can lead them into “poverty traps” (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996), ultimately undermining their ability to freely choose among options (Gries and Naudé 2011) and pursue the goals they value (Alkire 2005). A financial sector that is well developed, on the contrary, would give them the instrumental capability to more adequately participate in economic exchange (Sen 1999; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007).To respond to funding challenges that particularly characterize developing economies, the provision of microfinance to entrepreneurs has been regarded as an important part of the strategy through which livelihoods could be improved (Mair and Marti 2006; Peredo and Mclean 2006; Khavul 2010). Microfinance institutions (MFIs) pursue profit-making strategies that facilitate and support the ongoing activity of capital provision to entrepreneurs while also trying to extend their services and drive outreach (Morduch 1999; Fernando 2006). By providing microcredit, savings, insurance, and retirement plans, individuals are able to obtain capital which can be used to finance the creation and the survival of new ventures (Campbell 2010; Khavul 2010). As such, microcredit allows entrepreneurs to build assets and economic resources, while creating employment opportunities and services for local communities (Helms 2006). This can ultimately have an effect on individuals’ capabilities and the contexts entrepreneurs operate in (Mair and Marti 2009).Current debates in the microcredit and microfinance literature have focused on the dynamics through which microcredit is deployed, particularly to women, as well as its effectiveness (cfr. among others Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Milanov, Justo, and Bradley 2015; Chliova, Brinckmann, and Rosenbusch 2015), how microfinance institutions function (cfr. among others, Morduch 1999; Armendariz and Morduch 2007) as well as their level of sustainability (cfr. among others, Gonzalez-Vega 1994; Morduch 2000), and their ability to shape the context they operate in (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti 2006; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013). Research has also indicated that institutional quality determines theperformance of MFIs in periods of financial crisis (Silva and Chávez 2015) and that institutions influence how entrepreneurial finance is channeled to entrepreneurs in developing economies (Eid 2005). However, Beck (2007) and McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) indicate that small and medium-sized businesses, often called “missing middle,” offer high returns on investments in these contexts. Yet, they remain underserved financially and overlooked by researchers. We also know that empirical access to finance is a critical issue for firms in developing economies and microcredit is a particular type of high-risk debt which may not always be sought after (Hulme 2000; George 2005).In addition, if context shapes entrepreneurship and sets the boundaries for entrepreneurial action (Welter 2011), it is not clear (a) whether ventures using microcredit are those whose capabilities are constrained the most by the environment they operate in and (b) under which institutional conditions these ventures actually use microfinance to fund their business needs. The question about when and where entrepreneurs decide to pursue or forgo the option of using microfinance loans still remains unanswered (Khavul 2010). In this paper, we ask the following question: How do formal institutions shape the use of microcredit by firms with varying entrepreneurial capabilities? To answer these questions, our empirical analysis focuses on the use of microcredit by firms in sub-Saharan Africa, characterized as a context with a high level of constrained capabilities. Often viewed as institutionally homogenous (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015), we highlight the institutional heterogeneity of this context and the varying capabilities associated with it. We test predictions using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, the Economic Freedom of the World Report index (2011), as well as the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (2008). Our findings indicate that microcredit is indeed used in areas where individuals’ entrepreneurial capabilities are more constrained. At the same time, in these contexts, microcredit tends to be mostly used where there is either a well-developed market or a well-functioning political–judicial system which guarantee a minimal“rule of game”. It is only under those institutional conditions that firms, constrained by their capabilities, are prone to/can use microcredit to financetheir business activities.2.Theoretical backgroundSen’s (1999, 2005) “capabilities approach” introduced the notion that development should be conceptualized as freedoms, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their ability to act. Because individuals have ideas about the type of lives they want to live, they act in accordance with such aims (Sen 1999). Following the capabilities approach, antecedents and consequences of individual circumstances can be highlighted using non-monetary indicators: Capability constraints need to be understood with respect to the individual’s freedom, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their abilities to do or to be (Alkire 2005). In the capabilities approach, a person’s freedom refers to the genuine opportunity to realize whatever it is that they are trying to achieve (Alkire 2005). This, in turn, determines“what they do” (Anand et al. 2009). Building on Sen’s (1999) argument, Nambiar (2013) further reports that capabilities are synonymous with individuals feeling constrained or enabled by their immediate circumstances, whereas Robeyns (2005), Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) indicate that it is an individual’s environment which creates heterogeneities in capabilities. Severely restricted capabilities are therefore associated with an inability to act in accordance with ones’ aims.Prior work shows that context is particularly important in shaping entrepreneurial capabilities: By setting boundaries, it can be the space for the emergence of opportunities while also placing limitations upon them (Welter 2011; Estrin, Korostelevab, and Mickiewiczc 2013). Context influences enterprising activities at the intersection of different levels of analysis, situating theories, and empirical patterns within their natural settings (Zahra, Wright, and Abdelgawad 2014). Evans (2002) and Sen (1999), among others, indicate that the institutional context indeed influences capability development. Both Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) explain that expanding individual freedoms are central to advancing capabilities; this expansion is guided by institutional frameworks. The proposition here is thatinstitutional development impacts freedoms, such as those related to economic opportunities, property, finance, and other basic services (Stiglitz 1998; Nussbaum 2000), and this impacts capability development. On the one hand, as Robeyns (2005) reports, the capabilities of entrepreneurs require appreciating that there are heterogeneities in their abilities to achieve their aims. On the other hand, institutional failure can increase transaction costs which limit the appropriability of entrepreneurial rents, reducing the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities and leading to suppression of entrepreneurial activity (Baker, Gedajlovic, and Lubatkin 2005).The development of financial institutions, which provide adequate financial services, is categorized by Sen (1999) as an instrumental capability. Contexts where financial institutions are underdeveloped contribute to the creation of“poverty traps” (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996) as it reduces the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities. This, in turn, hinders the ability of individuals to adequately participate in economic exchange and overall capabilities (Sen 1999). Microcredit developed in contexts characterized by limited access to resources (Peredo and Chrisman 2006) as a solution for individuals who are constrained by the environment, which inhibits the pursuit of lucrative opportunities (Sen 2005). As such, microcredit acts as a means toward the expansion of entrepreneurs’ capabilities (Ansari, Munir, and Gregg 2012) who can incrementally improve their capabilities of achieving small-scale solutions to macro social problems (Moyo 2009). This leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis:Hypothesis 1. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where capabilities are constrained.Hypothesis 2. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where economic institutions are less developed.Hypothesis 3. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where political-judicial institutions are less developed.Hypothesis 4. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit in environments characterized by high constrained capabilities where economic institutions are more(less) developed and political-judicial institutions less (more) developed.3.MethodologyTo test our hypotheses, we used data by the World Bank through its annual Enterprise Survey. We focused on countries in sub-Saharan Africa since this has been consistently depicted as one of the areas with seriously restricted capabilities. In particular, the World Bank (2012) reports an increase in sub-Saharan urban population by 114% between 1990 and 2009, and an increase in people living with less than $1 a day by 183%; also, the average life expectancy at birth results to be 52.5 years, compared with 71.5 years for North Africa and 69.2 years for the world. Still, the prevalence of HIV for people aged 15–49 is nearly 7 times the world’s average (World Bank 2012).Twenty-seven sub-Saharan countries were included in the survey. The enterprise surveys collect firm level information on the business environment, how it is perceived by individual firms, how it changes over time, and the various constraints to firm performance and growth (World Bank 2011). Firm-level data are available from 2002; however, since data prior to 2006 were collected by different units within the World Bank and employed different survey questions for different countries, our analysis focuses on data collected from 2006. In addition, the enterprise survey is addressed to operating businesses that employ a minimum of five employees; this eliminates most of the subsistence-driven and self-employment forms of entrepreneurship, something that Karnani (2007) has defined as “misguiding” in that the focus on subsistence entrepreneurship does not help us in understanding and/or explaining economic development. Similarly, Mead and Liedholm (1998) have shown that within an African context, small and medium-sized enterprises generate significantly more jobs than larger scale enterprises yet remain chronically underfunded. By concentrating on ventures with five or more employees, we are able to focus on the“missing middle” of the microfinance sector which have the greatest potential for driving economic growth and is consistently under-researched (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 2002). To date, this is a group of entrepreneurs who havereceived sparse attention within the microfinance literature, which has heavily focused on microfinance institutions themselves rather than on recipients of their services (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti 2006; Moss, Neubam, and Meyskens 2015; Silva and Chávez 2015).For what concerns our conceptualization of entrepreneurship as new ventures, consistent with prior research in both developed and developing countries, we limited our analysis to those firms that were not part of larger firms and were less than 10 years old (Benson 2001; Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002; Reuber and Fischer 2002; Barnir, Gallaugher, and Auger 2003; Park and Bae 2004; Bhagavatula et al. 2010). Based on these parameters, our sample size for analysis was 5255 of the 16847 firms in the original Enterprise Survey data set.4.Discussion, limitations, and future researchScholars have consistently linked entrepreneurial activity with economic growth. However, in developing countries, individuals often lack the capabilities to access the market and obtain capital to fund new business opportunities. Acknowledging these challenges, microcredit developed to provide small amount of loans to allow such individuals to efficiently engage in economic exchange and build their ventures, thus making wider economic contributions (Mcmullen 2011). However, entrepreneurship researchers have argued that contextual factors, both at the individual and institutional level, augment entrepreneurial activity (Baumol 1990; Estrin, Korostelevab, and Mickiewiczc 2013).This paper highlights the contextual conditions under which new, growing ventures use microcredit. These ventures are classified as the“missing middle” and have been overlooked by mainstream academic research and practitioners’ work, where a focus has been on individuals receiving microcredit for subsistence purposes and/or to develop micro-enterprises (Beck 2007). Yet, we know that microcredit developed as a solution to offer individuals the necessary financial instruments that would enable building entrepreneurial capabilities by developing new businesses. As such, this “missing middle” represents smaller firms within developing economiesthat have limited financial options even though they may offer returns on investments in these contexts (McKenzie and Woodruff 2008) and potentially provide much more significant economic externalities in terms of job and wealth creation (Karnani 2007). Although the term “missing middle” has been used for some time, there is very little research on this group of firms even though they are becoming a more prominent part of the microfinance picture and have a more significant economic impact than their micro counterparts (Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013).Because sub-Saharan Africa is a region characterized by high constraints to individual capabilities and little attention has been paid to heterogeneity of capabilities across the continent (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015), our empirical analysis focuses on the use of microcredit in“missing middle” ventures in such countries. Specifically, we examine the degree to which microcredit is utilized by new ventures as a function of the country’s institutional environment, measured as the development of economic and political institutions, and of the degree of constraints to a firm’s capabilities, measured by the fruitfulness of the commercial environment. We then argue that microcredit is more likely to be used by those ventures that have higher restrictions to their capabilities only when there is some institutional arrangement, either at an economic or political–judicial level that sets “the rules of the game.”Our empirical results suggest that microcredit is indeed used by these new, missing middle ventures in contexts that present challenges both at the firm and institutional level of analysis. The identification of a positive effect between the use of microcredit and the constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities reinforces Sen’s (1999) view and the notion that microcredit facilitates access to capital for those entrepreneurs that operate in regions with the most restricted capabilities. However, our results also show this happens only when there are appropriate supporting institutional mechanisms, further suggesting that contextual features of the institutional environment shape microfinance activity. Particularly, the use of microcredit by the“missing middle” increases in contexts characterized by restricted capabilities and either (a) well (less) developed economic (political–judicial) institutions or (b) less (well) developed economic (political–judicial) institutions. Theunderdevelopment of economic institutions can prevent entrepreneurs from forming contracts, ultimately increasing business uncertainty and compounding their ability to create wealth (Seelos and Mair 2007). This is theoretically consistent with the Mair and Marti (2009) argument who assert that MFIs act as institutional entrepreneurs in contexts of institutional weakness left open by underdeveloped economic institutions. Similarly, contexts where political–judicial institutions are characterized by high levels of corruption raise the fundamental threat of rent and asset expropriation, generating uncertainty in the business environment. This uncertainty undermines entrepreneurial aspirations of individuals and has a stronger effect on new ventures than on established ones (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In such contexts, institutions in charge of transferring resources to one party to another, and designed to serve on behalf of the government or the people (including, thus, the government itself ), may not be answerable to their principals.However, our results also do show that we should consider the interaction between development of economic and political institutions to fully understand the use of microcredit by new, growing firms and that heterogeneity of capabilities drives such relationship. Particularly, microcredit may help shape institutional contexts characterized by heterogeneous capabilities, but foundational institutional support is needed in order to tackle such capability problems. Whereas prior work (Mair and Marti 2006; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013) has indicated that microcredit is used in contexts where only economic institutions are to be developed, our work shows that there must be some formal institutional political framework in place for entrepreneurs to use microcredit in such contexts. Without it, the developmental role of microcredit may be overstated.At the same time, we also show that microcredit is used in contexts where there is development of economic institutions. Yet, we identify that the use of microcredit is to be found in contexts with stronger economic institutions and weak political ones. It is precisely this interaction between developed economic institutions and underdevelopment of political ones that the literature has not addressed this far. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) draw the distinction between extractive and inclusiveinstitutions, arguing that extractive contexts (e.g., autocratic rule/weak governance) can have strong economic institutions. However, because these are less open politically, they may deter potentially novel businesses that spur economic growth. If microcredit is utilized by capability-constrained firms in potentially extractive contexts, this suggests that the entrepreneurial activity being stimulated, even within the “missing middle”, may be less productive for economic development (Baumol 1990). Our work, therefore, highlights the institutional conditions within which microcredit is used to fund the development of new entrepreneurial opportunities: if less favorable political contexts may lead entrepreneurs to capture opportunities which are less conducive to the overall development of the economy, the impact of microcredit in these nations may be somehow minimalistic. Conversely, in more politically inclusive economies, microcredit may help spur the creation of more competitive and innovative markets which can help diversify markets beyond the basic services (e.g., food goods, provisions) often provided (Banerjee 2007). As such, the relationship between the nature of the institutional environment and the type of business opportunity pursued in the microfinance industry would be an interesting avenue for further study. Indeed, further study needs to dig deeper into the role of informal institutions in this process.Overall, this encourages us to consider whether the relationship between microcredit, entrepreneurship, and capabilities works as the literature currently assumes – microcredit is used by entrepreneurs in the most resource constrained environments where only economic institutions are to be shaped. As such, our findings suggest a more complex picture than extant research currently suggests and contribute to a better understanding of the use of microcredit at the level of the firm receiving it (Silva and Chávez 2015), with a need to consider institutional heterogeneities both within and across developing countries (Roth and Kostova 2003) and the interaction between a complex constellation of factors of institutions and capabilities (Nambiar 2013). It is therefore of key importance for future work to understand the dynamics through which microcredit is developed in contexts characterized by political institutional weakness. From a political perspective, mostresearch has focused on the role of regulation in the microfinance sector (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2011) without considering the other aspects of political institutions we have theorized, and empirically identified, here. This would help scholars and practitioners alike in gaining a better understanding how microcredit works in varying political environments.From a policy perspective, our findings which suggest that new ventures need some level of institutional support to be able to pursue and fulfill their entrepreneurial aspirations, something that has strong implications given the recent political upheaval in North Africa, the Middle East, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In post-conflict contexts, often characterized by the lowest level of capability development, and where political institutions (or economic ones) are still in the process of being redefined and shaped, the intervention of MFIs may be of key importance in stimulating entrepreneurial activity and the economy in some of the most challenging contexts. Emerging evidence suggests that many nations in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond are developing the appropriate institutions through which financial institutions can stimulate the private sector (Naudé 2010). Microcredit could be an appropriate tool for augmenting entrepreneurial activity in those environments where individuals lack the basic individual and institutional infrastructure to fulfill their aspirations. As such, the ability of entrepreneurs to have access to improved instrumental capabilities is likely to be shaped by how varying institutional arrangements support them, determining where investors see scalable operations and therefore the diversity of financial services at the disposal of entrepreneurs.Aside from the contribution and further reflection that our results stimulate, there are limitations to our study that need to be considered in any further extrapolation from our results. First, the study was cross sectional in nature and, as such, cannot make a reliable inference on the direction of the interplay between the effectiveness of the provision of microcredit on capabilities or on the institutional development over time. The nature of our data enabled us to study only the use of microcredit as a function of capability constraints, but a promising and much needed extension of the work concerns the reverse relationship, i.e., how the use of microcredit helps inimproving entrepreneurial capabilities. Second, while large-scale data are difficult to collect on this topic, the availability of the enterprise survey has enabled us to throw a glimpse at the use of microcredit across a large group of African countries. At the same time, as is true for any secondary data set, the data offer limited insight into the conditions and rationale under which microcredit was (or was not) obtained. We hope that our insights can stimulate further research that would seek to elucidate this mechanism through more suitable research designs.中文译文小额信贷、制度环境与创业能力之间相互作用的实证研究摘要学者们越来越多关注，在哪种条件下，小额信贷才会被新的、成长中的企业所使用。

农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)RURAL FINANCE: MAINSTREAMING INFORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSBy Hans Dieter SeibelAbstractInformal financial institutions (IFIs), among them the ubiquitous rotating savings and credit associations, are of ancient origin. Owned and self-managed by local people, poor and non-poor, they are self-help organizations which mobilize their own resources, cover their costs and finance their growth from their profits. With the expansion of the money economy, they have spread into new areas and grown in numbers, size and diversity; but ultimately, most have remained restricted in size, outreach and duration. Are they best left alone, or should they be helped to upgradetheir operations and be integrated into the wider financial market? Under conducive policy conditions, some have spontaneously taken the opportunity of evolving into semiformal or formal microfinance institutions (MFIs). This has usually yielded great benefits in terms of financial deepening, sustainability and outreach. Donors may build on these indigenous foundations and provide support for various options of institutional development, among them: incentives-driven mainstreaming through networking; encouraging the establishment of new IFIs in areas devoid of financial services; linking IFIs/MFIs to banks; strengthening Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as promoters of good practices; and, in a nonrepressive policy environment, promoting appropriate legal forms, prudential regulation and delegated supervision. Key words: Microfinance, microcredit, microsavings。

外文翻译原文Efficiency of Microfinance InstitutionsMaterial Source: Springer Science+ Business Media, LLC.Author: Mamiza, Haq · Michael, Skully · ShamsMicrofinance institutions (MFIs) provide a range of financial services to poor households. Their worldwide growth in numbers has had a positive impact by providing the poor with loans, savings pro ducts, fund transfers and insurance facilities. This has helped create an encouraging socio-economic environment for many of these developing countries households. The nature of these institutions is quite different from traditional financial institutions (such as commercial banks). MFIs are significantly smaller in size, limit their services towards poor households and often provide small collateral-free group loans. Most MFIs depend on donor funds and are not-for-profit oriented organizations that share a common bond among the members. They also differ in their two main operational objectives. First, as mentioned they act as financial intermediaries to poor households. This is known as the ‘institution is paradigm’ which affirms that MFIs should generate enough revenue to meet their operating and financing costs. Second, they have a social goal. This can be defined as the ‘welfarists’ paradigm’ which includes a focus on poverty alleviation and depth of outreach along with achieving financial sustainability. An efficient MFI management should promote these two objectives. The formal MFI institutions (bank MFIs, non bank financial institution MFIs and cooperative MFIs) are subject to prudential regulation and their activities licensed; mainly delivering credit facilities to their members. Some of these also mobilize savings from non-members. In contrast, semiformal MFI institutions, typically non-government organization MFIs (NGO-MFIs), are usually unregulated but registered under some society legislation. Table shows the range of products and funding sources each type entail. Finally, the informal MFI institutions include money lenders, shop keepers and pawn brokers. Unfortunately, their small size and often lack of licensing make them difficult to identify and so they are excluded from our study. The question, though, among the remaining four MFI types is whether one category may provemore efficient than the others. MFIs with the largest asset size are found in Asia. Asia also has the most efficient MFIs due to large population densities and lower wages. Other factors such as strong outreach and preservation of low operating expenses have also helped Asian MFIs to be efficient. However, South Asian MFIs are relatively more efficient than their counterparts in East Asian MFIs. This differences in efficiency may be the result of various lending methodology applied by the Asian MFIs. Many Indian MFIs, for example, reduce their staffing costs by lending to self-help groups rather than to the individual borrower. Our findings show that bank-MFIs are the most efficient under intermediation approach while NGO-MFIs are the most efficient under production approach. Our study chose to apply the DEA model for several reasons. First, the DEA model is able to incorporate multiple inputs and outputs easily. Thus, DEA is particularly well-suited for efficiency analysis of MFIs as it consider smultiple inputs and produces multiple outputs such as alleviating poverty and achieving sustainability. Second a parametric functional form does not have to be specified for the production function. Third, DEA does not require any price information for dual cost function as is required for parametric approaches. Fourth, DEA has the potential to provide information to the supervisors in improving the productive efficiency of the organization. Finally, DEA presents a generalization approach because other assumptions than constant return to scale can be accommodated within a convex piecewise linear best practice frontier. DEA has traditionally been used for the study of non-profit organization (such as hospital) efficiency and bank efficiency. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section covers a brief literature on efficiency measurement of MFIs. Section discusses the methodology used to analyze MFI efficiency. Section presents the results. Section provides a summary and finally draws the conclusion on the MFI efficiency across the regions.The pure technical efficient frontier is dominated by South Asian NGO-MFIs. Large bank-MFIs like BRI, Banco Solidario and Grameen Bank, which were efficient under intermediation approach, are now inefficient under production approach. Yet, bank-MFIs such as Ruhuna, DECSI, and NGO-MFIs such as CEP and Wilgamuwa are all efficient under production approach. Under the input oriented VRS measure, FINCOMUN is the least efficient. In order to be efficient, these MFIs should reduce their inputs by 98% as done by DECSI and Wilgamuwa.Similarly, the output-oriented measure shows that ACLEDA in Cambodia is the least efficient MFI. As shown on the data, the NGO-MFIs have the highestoverall mean efficiency score followed by the cooperative-MFIs. The bank-MFIs, however, are better than the NBFI-MFIs. Among the bank-MFIs and NGO-MFIs, there is at least one efficient MFI under both CRS and VRS measures. There is highest dispersion in the bank-MFIs’ efficiency score. Data also shows that NGO-MFIs are the most productive under all measures followed by the cooperative-MFIs. The least efficient are the non-bank MFIs.There are two main types of Microfinance institutions. Data behind this paragraph present efficiency scores and their rank ordering from the model, in which both controllable and uncontrollable inputs are incorporated. Our findings show that the magnitudes of the efficiency scores are higher in Model 2 compared to Model 1. Our uncontrollable variable is the percentage of rural population to total population. This may also represent the urbanization rate for each region.Data 1 presents the result of the efficiency scores under intermediation approach. The mean score of technical efficiency under constant return to scale is approximately 50%, however since we consider that MFIs do not operate in optimal level so we also report the variable return to scale results for the pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency under both output and input oriented and the mean score ranges between 0.65 and 0.86.The rank orderings are quite similar to those based on residual values ∧μ in Model 1. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 84%, indicates that the two rank ordering are positively correlated at 1%significance level. Comparing individual rankings between model 1 and model 2 we find remarkable difference which is the change in ranking for ASA, BRI, Grameen Bank, and CMAC. These are now ranked as 1 or the most efficient. However, the peer summary reflects that these DMUs are efficient by default which means that each DMU uses a unique combination of inputs and outputs such that it is compared only to itself when the efficiency score is calculated. Thus we cannot consider them to be the role model for the inefficient DMUs.Data 2 presents the result of the efficiency scores under production approach. The mean score of technical efficiency under constant return to scale is approximately 64%, however the mean efficiency score for pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency under variable return to scale, both output and input oriented; ranges between 0.73 and 0.88. The rank orderings are quite similar to those based on residual values ∧μ in Model 1. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 76%, indicates that the two rank ordering are positively correlated at 1%significance level.Comparing individual rankings between Model 1 and Model 2, there appears to be some differences. Bank Rakyat Indonesia, CMAC, CMF and COAC have improved in their efficiency rankings. They are now the most efficient with a score of 1. However, based on the peer analysis we find that these MFIs cannot be identified as the role model for the inefficient MFIs as they utilize a unique combination of input and output such that it is only compared to itself.This study investigated the cost efficiency of MFIs (bank-MFIs, NBFI-MFIs, cooperative-MFIs and NGO-MFIs) in Africa, Asia, and the Latin America using the data envelopment analysis (DEA). The MFIs were compared using the intermediation and production approaches to identify which MFI type is the most efficient in minimizing costs and providing financial services to poor households. Our findings show that under the intermediation approach four out of thirteen bank-MFIs are both input and output oriented, pure technical efficient and scale efficient. Under production approach, six out of twelve NGO- MFIs are found to be the most efficient. We find more MFIs show VRS pure technical efficiency than either CRS technical efficiency or VRS pure technical efficiency under both the intermediation and production approach. Five out of twelve NGO-MFIs are pure technical efficient under production approach while three out of thirteen bank-MFIs are pure technical efficient under intermediation approach. Only one bank-MFI and one cooperative-MFI under intermediation approach and two bank-MFIs and one NGO-MFI under production approach are CRS technical efficient and VRS pure technical efficient. The results discussed above may suggest that high level of cost efficiency may have decreased due to the amount of non-performing loans specifically for bank-MFIs under the intermediation approach. In other words, cost efficient managers are better managing their loan customers and properly monitoring MFIs’ operating costs. Furthermore, the levels of efficiency have much more to do with efficient utilization of resources rather than scale of production. In conclusion, we can suggest NGO-MFIs may be promoted in developing regions as these MFIs are found to be the most efficient under production approach. This result is not surprising given the NGO-MFIs’ dual objectives of alleviating poverty through increased out reach and simultaneously achieving financial sustainability. Over the years NGO-MFIs have learnt to develop staff productivity, to increase branching and distribution system, to build outstanding portfolio quality and to extend relationship banking culture to the poor. As these institutions are mostly either unregulated or less regulated than other MFIs, policymakers should approach furtherNGO-MFI regulation with care so that this efficiency is not hampered. Nevertheless, some bank-MFIs are quite efficient in providing microfinance particularly DECSI in Africa. As more bank-MFIs are established they may have the competitive advantage as financial intermediaries in areas like access to local capital as well as the global financial markets. So while bank-MFIs are the most efficient type of MFI at present under intermediation approach, NGO-MFIs may eventually perform better as an intermediary in the long–run if proper regulation and supervision are in place.译文小额信贷机构的有效性研究资料来源:科学与商业媒体作者：马米扎，哈克· 迈克尔，思科力· 山姆小额信贷机构（即MFIs）为贫困家庭提供金融服务。

企业风险投资外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Petreski M. The Role of Venture Capital in Financing Small Businesses[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2006.英文原文The Role of Venture Capital in Financing Small BusinessesMarjan PetreskiAbstractVenture capital is an important alternative for companies that have difficulties accessing more traditional financing sources and it is a strong financial injection for early-stage companies that do not have evidence for persistent profitability yet. Firstly, deep prescreening process should be performed before investing in small, start-up business because of the information asymmetries, which in turn are the main cause for adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Well performed initial scan ensures good investment. Seed capital provided than enables the firm's set off.But what is more important is the conclusion that there is much more than just capital that flows from the investors to the organizations in which they invest. Indeed, fresh capital inflow is accompanied with the process of value-adding which provides the company with monitoring, skills, expertise, help and, basically, reputation for attracting furtherfinance. Consequently, the role of the venture capital in financing small business is tremendous. The paper sheds light on these issues. Keywords: Venture Capital, Small Business, Entrepreneurship, Financing IntroductionFinancing opportunities for small businesses have grown in the last few decades. On the other hand, entrepreneurships are crucial for the development of every national economy. Therefore, financing a small business is an issue which continuously captures academic interests.Great part of the literature acknowledges that entrepreneurship is the fundament of the economic growth and productivity performance (OECD, 2004) and, as such, it triggers creating innovative small firms, which in turn add huge “blocks” in bu ilding the national competitiveness (Pandey et al, 2003). But, on the other hand, because of the high start-up risk and informational inconsistency, small firms are often highly vulnerable (Berger and Udell, 2002) and face with a harsh financing issues due to the investors’ refusal to “feed” the earlystage business (Gans and Stern, 2003). In other words, “the problem is that once yo u have bled your friends and family dry of cash, sold the cat and remortgaged the house, where do you go in order to get the wad of cash needed to progress your get-rich idea further?” (Reynolds, 2000, p.52).This is the point where the role of venture capital becomes important in financing small businesses. Moreover, economists agree that venturecapital “provide[s] a boost of ad renaline” (O'Brien, 2001, p.9) for small start-up, innovative and dynamic firms, especially in the high-tech industry (Bottazzi and Rin, 2002). Therefore, it is said that venture capital fuels the growth and development of entrepreneurships. This paper aims to evaluate the contribution of venture capital for such entities and critically evaluate its role in financing small businesses.This is achieved by emphasizing the basic role of the venture capital in financing small business in section one. Than, venture capital is viewed as a box of services which are also important as the very capital provided is. Moreover, this is acknowledged as a main contributor toward the firm’s professionalization. Finally, in the last part, certain space is devoted to the less attractive side of the venture capital.Why small start-up firms (must) choose venture capital financing? Venture capital primary roleEven though the process of brainstorming could be really productive and endless, entrepreneurs must often think about the financial side of their idea. Indeed, one could have brilliant idea for starting up a smart business, but launching that idea needs fuel –this makes him troubles. Therefore, such “poor” entrepreneurs must rely on external financing in order to start their business (Lulfesmann, 2000). Indeed, young, especially innovative and fast growing businesses find it very difficult the access to traditional ways of financing (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; citedin Giudici and Paleari, 2000). The latter is due to the fact that these start-up firms are too small to be fed by public debt and equity markets, than, because of their infancy, they can not collateralise eventually offered bank loans (Repullo and Suarez, 1998) and they are associated with a “significant levels of business uncertainty” (Giudici and Paleari, 2000, p.154), arising from the persistent information asymmetries and high risk associated with the opportunity to cease. But, this does not mean that the majority of innovative ideas must go away. A brilliant chance arises for such cases – venture capital.“Venture capital is thought to be an important alternative for companies that have difficulties accessing more traditional financing sources” (Manigart et al, 2002, p.103-104) and it (venture capital) is a strong financial injection for early-stage companies that do not have evidence for persistent profitability yet (Kleberg, 1998). In other words, venture capital is needed to trigger, maintain and to speed up the small enterprise’s growth and its performance, and therefore to result in improved profitability. That is its primary role: it is the main contributor in getting rid of the most financial impediments that occur in the establishing phase of a new business. (Reynolds, 2000). In other words, it is “seed money” for the small business; it helps smart ideas to rise up. However, on the other hand, venture capital financing is associated with high levels of risk, which refers to the uncertainty of the positive returnsthat may occur even after a number of years or never (Mason and Harrison, 2004; Klofsten et al, 1999). Not only this, but venture capitalist may also embark on a new business strategy which defers from entrepreneur’s one; the former can even throw the entrepreneur out of the firm. These aspects are discussed later.What is sure, once it has been agreed, venture capital flows in the company and enables its start-up. This is the point when the idea becomes reality. But, not only providing the capital, venture capital injection brings more benefits for the venture-backed company than one could think of. Manigart and Sapienza (1999; cited in Manigart et al, 2002) point out “its roles of pre-investment screening, post-investment monitoring and value-adding” (p.104). Critically said, venture capitalist becomes active entrepreneur’s mentor, because, from now on, firm’s destiny turns out to be his concern too. Having this on mind, the result should be higher future returns for the investor and, of course, enhanced performance for the venture capital backed company. Consequently, when the role of the venture capital in financing small businesses is discussed, it can be inferred that it is multiple. Therefore, more attention to the latter is devoted in the following sections.Why invest in promising business? – Venture capitalist perspective It is vast agreed and practically proven that venture capitalists invest only in promising projects. At the very beginning, investors are deeplysceptical, bad mood reasoning with more answers “no”, rather than “yes” (Mason and Rogers, 1997; cited in Mason and Harrison, 2004). Furthermore, venture capitalists screen potential investments in regards to the collecting information about business, its market approach, management team or entrepreneur (Berger and Udel, 1998; cited in Baeyens and Manigart, 2003), all in order to reduce the initial information asymmetry and potential problems with entrepreneurs. In other words, before final contracting, venture capitalist spends much of his time and efforts in assessing and observing the opportunity, in terms of its market size, strategies, customer adoption etc. (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001b). This, in turn, should eliminate the possibility to access a non-quality project (adverse selection problem) and “... [should] ensure that the funds will not be diverted to fund an alternative project (moral hazard problem)” (Berger and Udell, 2002, p.32). In this phase of initial scanning, investor should be convinced that his money will not simply “evaporate”. Instead of that, it should make future value for him.Pre-screening phase, accordingly, enables platform for contracting on a sustainable basis. This means that the investment will surely bear fruit later. Thus, venture capitalists provide the capital and begin with creating new value, which they can extract benefits for themselves from. Consequently, the role of the venture capitalist is dual: careful selection of promising firms or projects and than close observation over time(Kaplan and Str mberg, 2001a; cited in Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). The latter constitutes the next phase of the process of venture capital financing accompanied with creating new value.Venture capital –“rich services package” and innovation stimulator Even though the main role of venture capital is feeding small, innovative and fast growing firms with fresh capital, many articles (Giudici and Paleari, 2000; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Bottazzi and Rin, 2002; Hellmann and Puri, 2002a; S tre, 2003; Wilson, 2005) suggest that venture capital backed firms receive many other services from venture capitalist which are as much important for the entrepreneur, as the very capital infused is In their article, Giudici and Paleari (2000) argue that as the capital is introduced in the firm, venture capitalist gains power to dynamically impinge on the management process in the firm in many different ways. Vast literature recognizes the last as a process of adding new value to the venture capital backed company. Indeed, the process of pre-investment screening discussed above, aims to provide stabile platform for investing in a company where the venture capitalist is convinced that he can add value to (Reynolds, 2000).The mission of the venture capitalist is to raise the business and not just to get reward, because as the business is raised, the rewards will come automatically (Pandey et al, 2003). Instead of that, “riding” together with the entrepreneur is more crucial for being rewarded. Broadlyspeaking, raising a business means that venture capitalist provides complete oversight to the firm, in terms of provided services, help and guidance for the entrepreneur (Lerner, 1995). Indeed, venture capitalist introduces a package of services in the firm in order to enhance its performance and its value.One of the most important services for the venture capital backed firm is the expert advice that venture capitalist offers to the entrepreneur. Indeed, investor acts as entrepreneur’s mentor, because, investing in nearby located start-up firms, means that he has sufficient knowledge for the industry, and therefore he can be involved in designing strategies, hiring the best executives and enhancing the network of contracts with suppliers and costumers (Bottazzi and Rin, 2002; Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). According to Jungwirth and Moog (2004), this specific knowledge establishes basis for advanced assessment of the project: will it be successful or not and allows it “to be mo nitored at lower agency costs” (p.111).Moreover, value-add process facilitates the venture capitalist as a firm’s promoter and consultant (Repullo and Suarez, 1998), because of his richness of expertise, competencies, experience and reputation (S tre, 2003; Wilson, 2005). In the same line of thinking, Fried and Hirish (1995) also agree that venture capitalists create value by providing “networks, moral support, general business knowledge and discipline” (p.106).Kaplan and Strmberg (2001b) further broaden the areas where the investor could be contributable: “developing a business plan, assisting with acquisitions, facilitating strategic relationships with other companies, or designing employee compensation” (p.429). It can be inferred that, once the investor introduces its money in a business, he must devote much of his time in helping the business to succeed, structuring internal organization and appropriate human resources management (Hellmann and Puri, 2002b). In other words, venture capitalist’s help and adding-value are decanted in professionalization of the firm. Generally, it seems that firm’s professionalization is the major benefit from the venture capital financing.The “dark side” of the venture capital fundingOnce venture capitalists and entrepreneurs conclude the initial negotiations, and the former introduces his funds, joint efforts at this time will improve the company's performance and expected return. Both parties jointly develop and provide various types of knowledge and skills, “Allow each part to develop their comparative advantage” (Cable and Shane, 1997, p.143). In addition, confidence is crucial for entrepreneurs—risk capitalist relationships and compliance with certain levels of certainty and trust. These can increase the benefits of coexistence with each other, so that dedication is by no means for the implementation of opportunism (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). This isnot surprising. For a time, a prisoner's dilemma emerged: Although both parties knew that common success required concessions from both sides, each side showed selfishness (Cable and Shane, 1997), and therefore conflicts of interest were created. Now. At that time or earlier, investors accelerated the process of monitoring the company. Now he not only provides value-added services, but also actively participates in the operation of the company (Lerner, 1995) in order to limit or eliminate potential opportunistic behaviors originating from entrepreneurs, forcing him to perform effectively.As a result, agency problems of ten occur. “Conflicts in this context may be that entrepreneurs may not know anything about venture capitalists, leading them to avoid or overinvest and generate agency costs” (Barry, 1994, p. 6). However, Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) describe venture capitalists well-informed, so it is very likely to avoid agency issues in such venture capital investments.Regardless of whether this is the case, balancing the transaction itself is the investment strategy that venture capitalists use most often. Stage financing is the most suitable monitoring and control device and acts as a buffer against entrepreneurial opportunistic behavior. Therefore, each time a new capital is introduced into the company, it is inevitable that the contract will be renewed (Giudici and Paleari, 2000). The re-agreement will summarize what has been done so far, as well as thebasis for further company operations. Instalment financing is generated after the re-agreement and achieves certain goals at this time (such as increasing interest rate and approaching additional market share); at this time, venture capitalists collect information, and if the company is wrong, they always have the right to choose. Abandoning the influence (Gompers, 1995; quoted from Bottazzi and Rin, 2002), these notes are the longest cited in the book, and why the ideal contract between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs should not be a liability (Bergemann and Hege, 1998 Quoted from Bottazzi and Rin, 2002). In order to trigger the effective behavior of entrepreneurs, fluctuating securities should be placed on the basis of such relations rather than liabilities (Repulo and Suarez, 1998). In addition, “a changeable …… contractual assignee risk capitalist has the right to obtain a pre-defined equal part, after which he decides to convert the liability into an equal part” (Lulfesmann, 2000, p. 3) when The latter often happens when the agreement and the new large stakes fill the company.Conflicts of interest often lead to another form, ie, the way the company's founder deals with it is the most controversial part of venture capital (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). Although there are many possibilities, some entrepreneurs claim that venture capitalists are "notorious for removing founders from the CEO's position and bringing in foreigners" (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a, p. 21)" to venture capital investment. Thefamily counts these changes as a contribution to the corporatization of the company. Some books often point out that CEO turnover takes place after the crisis of mature companies, and that corresponding enhanced monitoring is necessary (Lerner, 1995). Hellmann and Puri (2002b) did a survey. The sample was 170 high-tech companies in Silicon V alley, USA. The survey found that if the company's venture capital financing is over, the foreign general manager will usually replace the founder. In addition, they also found that these companies can even quickly adapt to this change in leadership because, most importantly, the latter can make the company more professional.The above findings support Barry's (1994) perception in his article that venture capitalists actively discover and recruit new members of the management team and support the company in financing. In other words, they usually restructure management. In addition, investors tend to be in charge of the board of directors or in the position of the managers of the companies they invest in, as well as in order to better supervise and reduce agency problems (such as controlling the situation in the event of a crisis) (Lerner, 1995). In the end, Kaplan and Strömberg (2001b) found that venture capitalists “don’t plan to get too involved” even though there are many controls that are often used by venture capitalists to enhance their performance and minimize potential crises. P.429). All in all, although venture capital has its significant drawbacks, it is not too bad: itis only a control tool and it can be implemented better. However, considering the bad side, in any case, the role of venture capital in the financing of SMEs should not be underestimated. Try to avoid the potential conflicts between investors and entrepreneurs. In exchange for trust and trust, the roles of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists tend to be in the same direction. In order to maximize the benefits of the company, it is also for their own development.ConclusionSeveral conclusions could be extracted from the arguments supplied above. Firstly, deep pre-screening process should be performed before investing in small, start-up business because of the information asymmetries, which in turn are the main cause for adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Well performed initial scan ensures good investment. Seed capital provided than enables the firm’s set off.But what is more important for the purpose of this paper is the conclusion that “there is much more than just capital that flows from the investor to the organizations in which they invest” (Stre, 2003, p.85). Indeed, fresh capital inflow is accompanied with the process of value-adding which provides the company with monitoring, skills, expertise, help and, basically, reputation for attracting further finance. Consequently, the role of the venture capital in financing small business is tremendous. Even though findings in the last section show that venturecapital funding is related with strengthened control, potential conflict of interests and founder replacement from the top manager’s seat, venture capital remains crucial factor for spurring innovations, enhancing growth opportunities, especially for the small and medium-sized enterprises and therefore, creating new jobs. The latter are enough reasons for every national economy to take care for the venture capital financing as proven chance for the realization of smart ideas.中文译文风险投资对小型企业的作用作者：马佳恩·皮特斯基摘要对于那些难以获得更多传统融资来源的公司来说，风险投资是一个重要的选择，对于那些没有持续盈利证据的早期阶段的公司来说，风险资本是一个强有力的财务投入。

Establishing an Effective Credit Risk Management System for Small andMedium-sized Commercial Banks Small and medium-sized commercial banks play a crucial role in stimulating economic growth by providing credit to small businesses and individuals. However, lending involves inherent risks, and poor management of credit risk can lead to significant financial losses. In order to establish an effective credit risk management system, small and medium-sized commercial banks should focus on the following key areas:1. Risk Identification and Assessment: Banks should conduct a comprehensive analysis of potential credit risks, including borrower-specific risks, industry risks, economic risks, and structural risks. This analysis should be conducted on a regular basis, and the results should be used to develop a risk profile for each borrower.2. Risk Mitigation: After identifying potential credit risks, banks should take steps to mitigate these risks. This may involve setting appropriate lending limits, insisting oncollateral, or requiring personal guarantees. It's importantto strike a balance between risk management and profitability.3. Credit Monitoring and Control: Banks should closely monitor the borrower's credit status throughout the life ofthe loan. They should also have systems in place to immediately identify any changes to the borrower's financial situation that could increase the risk of default.4. Credit Documentation and Administration: Banks should maintain accurate and up-to-date documentation of each loan. They should also establish clear policies and procedures for approving, disbursing, and servicing loans.5. Staff Training and Education: Finally, banks should provide ongoing training and education to their staff to ensure that they have the knowledge and skills required to identify, assess, and manage credit risk effectively.By focusing on these key areas, small and medium-sized commercial banks can establish an effective credit risk management system that will help them to mitigate credit risk, while still providing much-needed credit to small businesses and individuals. This, in turn, will support economic growth and development in their communities.。