自由现金流下的过度投资外文翻译

自由现金流名词解释
自由现金流(Free cash flow)是指企业在一定期间内,可以自由支配的现金流量,即企业没有依赖于外部融资的情况下,能够直接用于业务运营和资本支出的现金流。

它是企业财务分析中非常重要的概念,反映了企业的真实财务状况和盈利能力。

自由现金流的定义如下:
- 自由现金流=净经营现金流-净资本支出
- 净经营现金流是指企业的经营现金流,包括收入现金流和成本现金流,而净资本支出是指企业的资本支出,包括折旧、摊销等资本性支出。

自由现金流与企业的盈利能力和财务状况密切相关。

如果一个企业拥有大量自由现金流,说明它的业务运营效率高,盈利能力强,具有广阔的市场前景。

相反,如果一个企业的自由现金流很少,说明它的业务运营效率不高,盈利能力不强,市场前景也会受到影响。

自由现金流的拓展:
- 自由现金流与企业的规模密切相关。

如果企业规模很大,它的自由现金流可能会相对较少,因为企业需要依赖外部融资来支持业务运营和资本支出。

相反,如果企业规模较小,它的自由现金流可能会相对较多,因为企业可以通过自我积累来支持业务运营和资本支出。

- 自由现金流与企业的竞争环境密切相关。

如果企业所处的市场竞争环境激烈,它的自由现金流可能会相对较少,因为企业需要投入大量资金来争夺市场份额。

相反,如果企业所处的市场竞争环境较为宽松,它的自由现金流可能会相对较多,因为企业可以通过降低成本和提高生产效率来争夺市场份额。

- 自由现金流与企业的运营效率密切相关。

如果企业的运营效率较高,它的自由现金流可能会相对较多,因为企业可以通过提高生产效率和降低成本来增加收益。

自由现金流量理论综述作者：杨倩来源：《企业文化·中旬刊》2014年第04期摘要：自由现金流量理论在资本市场和公司财务理论与实践中有着广泛的应用。

本文首先介绍了自由现金流的涵义，介绍了与自由现金流量相关的理论，探讨了研究自由现金流的理论意义和实践应用。

关键词：自由现金流量；企业价值；绩效评价1.自由现金流量概述1.1自由现金流量的提出及定义自由现金流量是近年来最为流行的公司财务理论的核心概念之一，最早是由美国西北大学拉巴波特、哈佛大学詹森等学者于20世纪80年代提出的。

詹森认为自由现金流量指满足所有具有正的净现值的投资项目所需资金后多余的那部分现金流量。

詹森的定义更多的从经济学的角度来考察现金流量，他关心的是如何支配自由现金流量。

企业的自由现金流量是指扣除税收、必要资本性支出和营运资本增加后能够支付给所有清偿权者的现金流量。

所谓“自由”体现为管理当局可以在不影响企业持续增长的前提下，将这部分现金流量自由地分派给企业所有的索偿权持有人，包括短期、长期债权人以及股权持有人等。

1.2与自由现金流量相关的概念1.2.1现金根据会计准则现金，是指企业库存现金以及可以随时用于支付的存款；现金等价物，是指企业持有的期限短、流动性强、易于转换为已知金额现金、价值变动风险很小的投资。

并指出没有特殊说明，现金一般指现金和现金等价物。

1.2.2现金流量现金流量是指现金及现金等价物的流入量与流出量。

在会计上，按其来源、性质不同分为三类：经营活动产生的现金流量、投资活动产生的现金流量、筹资活动产生的现金流量。

1.2.3现金净流量现金净流量是企业在一定期间的现金净流入量与净流出量的差额。

现金净流量是公司财务资金运转最直接的表现过程，对企业的偿债能力、营运能力和盈利能力有重要的影响。

1.2.4净自由现金流量净自由现金流量等于自由现金流量减去利息、其他融资成本以及税费。

1.2.5自由现金流量假说及其两个推论自由现金流量假说将由现金资源支配权引起的代理问题称作自由现金流量代理问题。

自由现金流与过度投资——基于融资约束和所有制的考察刘银国【摘要】自由现金流量是企业高管可以自由支配的现金流量.在信息不对称和利益不一致的情况下,企业过度持有现金流可能产生代理成本,如出现过度投资和低效并购等行为,损害企业所有者的利益.融资约束是企业财务行为的重要决定因素,对自由现金流的代理成本会起到决定性的影响.文章实证检验了在不同的融资约束程度和所有制结构下,企业自由现金流代理成本的差异,为合理约束代理人行为,降低代理成本提供一条可行的渠道,也为完善公司治理结构提供一种可行的方案.【期刊名称】《会计之友》【年(卷),期】2012(000)010【总页数】5页(P4-8)【关键词】自由现金流;过度投资;融资约束;公司治理【作者】刘银国【作者单位】安徽财经大学国有企业公司治理研究中心【正文语种】中文自由现金流量（Free Cash Flow，简称FCF）是指企业生产经营活动所产生的，在满足了净现值大于零的所有项目所需资金后的那部分现金流量（Jensen，1986）。

现代企业所有权与经营权相分离，存在委托代理问题，由于股东和经理人的信息不对称、利益不一致，导致企业不完备契约的存在，经理人往往从自身的利益出发从事企业日常的经营管理活动，若企业存在大量自由现金流，就给委托代理成本的产生提供了前提条件，经理人就会将现金流最大化自身收益，从而与企业价值最大化背道而驰，其中最典型的形式就是利用自由现金流进行过度投资，建立自己的商业帝国（Shleifer et al，1989；Hart，1995）。

由于资本市场的不完善，信息的不对称，外部投资者会降低购买风险证券的价格，从而会增加外部融资的成本，引起内外部资金的成本差异。

那么在内部资金短缺的情况下，外部融资约束可能会使得企业的投资不足，经理层受制于高成本的外部融资，即使拥有正NPV的投资机会，也可能被迫放弃，造成投资不足（Myers&Majluf，1984；Fazzari et al，1988）。

自由现金流量与企业过度投资的关系研究自由现金流量是企业财务管理中重要的指标之一，它表示企业可以用于支付股息、偿还债务、投资新项目等活动的现金流量。

自由现金流量的大小反映出企业的可持续性，也是衡量企业综合实力的重要指标之一。

企业过度投资是指企业过度倾向于投资项目，使得投资比率超过了实际需要的水平。

自由现金流量与企业过度投资之间存在着关系。

从理论上讲，自由现金流量越大，企业过度投资的机会就越小。

因为自由现金流量大意味着企业拥有更多的现金可以支配，不必过度依赖外部资金进行投资。

同时，自由现金流量的增加也意味着企业有更多的现金可以用于股息分配和债务偿还，从而提高了投资者的信任度。

这会吸引更多的投资者投资到该企业中，使得企业获得更稳定的资本来源。

然而，在实际情况中，企业如果存在过度投资的现象，自由现金流量很可能会受到影响。

一方面，如果企业过度倾向于投资项目而忽略了自由现金流量的管理，可能会导致自由现金流量减少。

这时企业可能会陷入借债支撑投资的陷阱，从而加重了企业的财务压力。

另一方面，企业高投资比例可能会增加资产负债率，使得企业在融资方面面临更大的风险。

因此，企业需要看重自由现金流量与投资之间的平衡关系。

企业应该在充分考虑自由现金流量的情况下进行投资决策，以避免出现投资过度、自由现金流量不足和资产负债率上升等问题。

同时，企业也需要注意自由现金流量多少适合自己进行投资，避免陷入“自由现金流量过大过小都不好”的困境。

总之，自由现金流量与企业过度投资之间的关系需谨慎处理。

企业要通过科学的管理和良好的财务策略，在充分考虑自由现金流量的情况下进行投资，以实现稳健的财务增长和长期可持续发展。

自由现金流公式自由现金流(FCF)是投资者在购买股票时考虑的一个重要指标，它可以帮助投资者进行股票价格估算和决策。

自由现金流是指企业在扣除非经营活动的费用和负债支付后，剩余的现金流到其股东的现金流。

自由现金流可以通过以下公式进行计算：FCF=Net income+Depreciation+Amortization-Increasein working capital-Investment in fixed assetsNet income是指报告期结束时企业的净利润，其中包括公司的普通收入、利息收入、股权收入以及其他收入。

Depreciation和Amortization指报告期期间资产贬值或专利商标被削减的总额，其包括折旧、摊销及其他，例如固定资产折旧、存货折旧等。

Increase in working capital是指报告期期间发生的现金流累计增加的总额，包括存货的增加、未完工产品、预付款的减少、应收账款的增加等。

Investment in fixed assets指报告期期间发生的固定资产投资总额，包括土地、建筑物、机器设备、汽车等固定资产投资。

自由现金流公式可以帮助投资者评估公司的盈利状况及财务健康状况。

如果公司自由现金流负值，说明公司经营非常糟糕，投资者应该考虑离场；如果公司自由现金流正值，说明公司经营良好和财务稳定，投资者可以考虑买入。

此外，自由现金流也可以用来衡量一家公司的现金流动性和未来发展潜力，从而帮助企业计划资金投资和确定未来发展路径。

自由现金流越高，说明公司的现金流动性越强，未来发展潜力也越大。

自由现金流不仅可以帮助投资者进行价格估算及决策，也可以帮助企业管理现金流和未来发展，是一个重要的财务指标。

自由现金流的计算并不复杂，理解其公式及计算方法后，投资者及企业可以从中获取重要的信息，从而进行更明智的资产配置及发展规划。

华南理工大学广州学院本科生毕业设计（论文）翻译外文原文名Agency Cost under the Restriction of Free Cash Flow中文译名自由现金流量的限制下的代理成本学院管理学院专业班级会计学3班学生姓名陈洁玉学生学号200930191100指导教师余勍讲师填写日期2015年5月11日外文原文版出处：译文成绩：指导教师（导师组长）签名：译文：自由现金流量的限制下的代理成本摘要代理成本理论是资本结构理论的一个重要分支。

自由现金流代理成本有显着的影响。

在这两个领域相结合的研究，将有助于建立和扩大理论体系。

代理成本理论基础上，本研究首先分类自由现金流以及统计方法的特点。

此外，投资自由现金流代理成本的存在证明了模型。

自由现金流代理成本理论引入限制，分析表明，它会改变代理成本，进而将影响代理成本和资本结构之间的关系，最后，都会影响到最优资本结构点，以保持平衡。

具体地说，自由现金流增加，相应地，债务比例会降低。

关键词：资本结构，现金流，代理成本，非金钱利益1、介绍代理成本理论，金融契约理论，信号模型和新的啄食顺序理论，新的资本结构理论的主要分支。

财务con-道的理论侧重于限制股东的合同行为，解决股东和债权人之间的冲突。

信令模式和新的啄食顺序理论中心解决投资者和管理者之间的冲突。

这两种类型的冲突是在商业组织中的主要冲突。

代理成本理论认为，如何达到平衡这两种类型的冲突，资本结构是如何形成的，这是比前两次在一定程度上更多的理论更全面。

……Agency Cost under the Restriction of Free Cash FlowAbstractAgency cost theory is an important branch of capital structural theory. Free cash flow has significant impact on agency cost. The combination of research on these two fields would help to build and extend the theoretical system. Based on agency cost theory, the present study firstly categorized the characteristics of free cash flow as well as the statistical methodologies. Furthermore, the existence of investing free cash flow in agency cost was proved by a model. Then free cash flow was introduced into agency cost theory as restriction, the analysis shows that it will change agency cost, in turn, will have an impact on the relationship between agency cost and capital structure, finally, will influence the optimal capital structure point to maintain the equilibrium. Concretely, with the increasing free cash flow, correspondingly, debt proportion will decrease.Keywords:Capital Structure,Free Cash Flow,Agency Cost,Non-Pecuniary Benefit1. IntroductionAgency cost theory, financial contract theory, signaling model and new pecking order theory are the main branches of new capital structure theory. Financial con-tract theory focuses on restricting stockholders’ behavior by contract and solving the conflict between stockholders and creditors. Signaling model and new pecking order theory center on solving the conflict between investors and managers. These two types of conflict are the main conflict in business organizations. Agency cost theory considers how equilibrium is reached in both types of conflict and how capital structure is formed, which is more theory is more comprehensive than the previous two to some degree.……。

自由现金流量与企业过度投资的关系研究自由现金流量是企业经营活动中非常重要的一个指标，它代表着企业真正可以自由运用的资金。

而企业的投资决策则直接影响到企业的未来发展和经营状况。

研究自由现金流量与企业过度投资的关系对于企业的经营管理和投资决策具有重要意义。

一、自由现金流量与企业过度投资的定义自由现金流量是指企业在一定时期内所产生的净现金流量减去了所有的投资现金流量后剩余的现金，它代表着企业可用于发展、分红和偿付债务的自由资金。

而企业的过度投资则是指企业在投资决策中过度扩大投资规模，导致投资项目的收益率不高，从而影响企业的经营和发展。

二、自由现金流量与企业过度投资的关系1. 自由现金流量越大，企业越有发展空间自由现金流量代表了企业真正可以自由运用的资金，它直接影响着企业的发展空间。

如果企业的自由现金流量较大，意味着企业可以更加灵活地运用资金进行投资和发展，而不至于陷入过度投资的困境。

2. 过度投资将影响自由现金流量企业如果在投资过程中过度扩大投资规模，可能导致投资项目的回报率不高，从而影响企业的现金流量。

过度投资可能会导致企业资金占用过多，难以为企业带来实际的价值和收益，进而影响了自由现金流量的增加。

3. 自由现金流量和过度投资的平衡企业需要在投资决策中平衡考虑自由现金流量和投资规模之间的关系，确保企业在投资活动中既可以获得足够的自由现金流量，又不至于过度投资。

只有在自由现金流量和投资规模之间取得平衡，企业才能实现持续稳健的增长。

三、影响自由现金流量和过度投资的因素1. 经营管理水平企业的经营管理水平直接影响着企业的自由现金流量和投资决策。

如果企业的管理水平较高，能够合理配置资金，控制投资规模，就能够更好地保障自由现金流量的增长。

2. 行业发展环境不同行业的发展环境也会对企业的自由现金流量和投资决策产生影响。

在行业竞争激烈、市场饱和的情况下，企业更容易因为过度投资而导致自由现金流量不足。

四、自由现金流量与企业过度投资的案例分析以奥美电商公司为例，该公司曾因为追求规模扩张而过度投资，导致自由现金流量减少，给企业带来了一定的风险。

债务异质性与自由现金流导致的过度投资随着市场的竞争日益激烈，许多企业为了保持或扩大市场份额，减少成本等原因往往会采取过度投资的行为。

其中债务异质性和自由现金流是导致过度投资的两个重要原因。

债务异质性指的是不同企业的债务架构和债务性质存在差异，这也就意味着企业的融资成本也存在差异。

对于高质量的企业来说，他们可以通过发行低成本债券来获得资金，而对于财务状况不佳或信用风险较高的企业，他们则只能通过高成本贷款等方式获得融资。

如果企业的债务成本过高，从而导致投资回报率低于债务成本，那么企业就可能会陷入债务危机，从而导致资不抵债。

为了摆脱这种困境，许多企业会选择过度投资，从而增加收入，以支付债务利息和本金。

然而，由于过度投资的回报率并不稳定，企业可能会陷入恶性循环，导致整个企业的财务状况进一步恶化。

自由现金流是企业在扣除固定支出后剩余的现金流量。

这些资金可以用于投资、发放股息等方面，并且也可以用于还债。

然而，在财务状况不稳定的企业中，这些资金往往会被用于过度投资。

这种情况往往会导致企业的债务负担增大，进而会降低企业的信誉和股票价格，造成股权贬值和流通性下降。

过度投资对企业来说无论是长期还是短期都会带来负面影响。

短期来看，过度投资可能会导致企业的财务状况恶化，融资困难。

同时，由于一些长期投资的日益走向过时或者市场供需改变，那么企业的投资可能会遭遇到严峻的风险和损失。

长期来看，过度投资也会导致企业的利润率下降，从而会导致股票价格下滑，股权贬值，流通性进一步降低。

这种情况会波及到社会各个方面，包括股东、员工、供应商等等，从而形成整个经济体系的巨大风险。

因此，要避免过度投资，企业需要深入分析自身的财务状况，并根据不同的财务指标来决定是否进行投资。

同时，为了降低债务成本，企业可以采用多元化的融资来源，如发行债券、发行股票等。

企业也可以通过合理的资本结构来优化债务异质性，降低债务风险，优化企业财务状况，以此来避免过度投资带来的负面影响。

自由现金流下的过度投资【外文翻译】本科毕业论文(设计)文翻译外原文:Over-investment of free cash flowAbstractThis paper examines the extent of firm level over-investment of fre cash flow. Using an accounting-based framework to measure over-investment and free cash flow, I find evidence that, consistent with agencycost explanations, over-investment is concentrated in firms with the highest levels of free cash flow. Further tests examine whether firms’ governance structures are associated with over-investment of free cashflow. The evidence suggests that certain governance structures, such as the presence of activist shareholders, appear to mitigate over-investment.IntroductionThis paper examines firm investing decisions in the presence of free cash flow. In theory, firm level investment should not be related to internally generated cash flows (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). However, prior research has docu-mented a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow (e.g., Hubbard, 1998). There are two interpretations for this positive relation. First, the positive relationis a manifestation of an agency problem, where managers in firms with free cash flow engage in wasteful expenditure (e.g., Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990). When managers’objectives differ from those of sh areholders, the presence of internallygenerated cash flow in excess of that required to maintain existing assets in place and finance new positive NPV projects creates the potential for those funds to be squandered. Second, the positiverelation reflects capital market imperfections, where costly externalfinancing creates the potential for internally generated cash flows to expand the feasible investment opportunity set (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen,1988; Hubbard, 1998).This paper focuses on utilizing accounting information to better measure the constructs of free cash flow and over-investment, thereby allowing a more powerful test of the agency-based explanation for why firm level investment is related to internally generated cash flows. In doing so, this paper is the first to offer large sample evidence ofover-investment of free cash flow. Prior research, such as Blanchard, Lopez-di-Silanes, and Vishny (1994), document excessive investment and acquisition activity for eleven firms that experience a large cash windfall due to a legal settlement, Harford (1999) finds using a sample of 487 takeover bids, that cash-rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions that subsequently experience abnormal declines in operating performance, and Bates (2005) finds for a sample of 400 subsidiary salesfrom 1990 to 1998 that firms who retain cash tend to invest more, relative to industry peers. This paper extends these small sample findings by showing that over-investment of free cash flow is a systematic phenomenon across all types of investment expenditure.The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the paper uses an accounting-based framework to measure both free cash flow and over-investment. Free cash flow is defined as cash flow beyond what is necessary to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments. Over-investment is defined as investment expenditure beyond that required to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments in positive NPV projects. To measure over-investment, I decompose total investment expenditure into two components: (i) required investmentexpenditure to maintain assets in place, and (ii) new investment expenditure. I then decompose new investment expenditure into over-investment in negative NPV projects and expected investment expenditure, where the latter varies with the firm’s growth opportunities, financing constraints, industry affiliation and other factors.Under the agency cost explanation, management has the potential to squander free cash flow only when free cash flow is positive. At the other end of the spectrum, firms with negative free cash flow can only squander cash if they are able to raise “cheap” capital. This is less likely to occur because these firms need to be able to raise financing and thereby place themselves under the scrutiny of external markets(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2004; Jensen, 1986). Consistent withthe agency cost explanation, I find a positive association between over-investment and free cash flow for firms with positive free cash flow.For a sample of 58,053 firm-years during theperiod 1988–2002, I find that for firms with positive free cashflow the average firm over-invests 20% of its free cash flow. Furthermore, I document that the majority of free cash flow is retainedin the form of financial assets. The average firm in my sample retains 41% of its free cash flow as either cash or marketable securities. There is little evidence that free cash flow is distributed to externaldebt holders or shareholders.Finding an association between over-investment and free cash flow is consistent with recent research documenting poor future performance following firm level investment activity. For example, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003) show that firmswith extensive capital investmentactivity and growth in net operating assets respectively, experience inferior futurestock returns. Furthermore, Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2005)find that cashflows retained within the firm (either capitalized through accrualsor “invested” infinancial assets) are associated with lower future operating performance and future stock returns. This performance relation isconsistent with the over-investment of free cash flows documented inthis paper.The second set of empirical analyses examine whether governance structures are effective in mitigating over-investment. Prior research has examined the impact of a variety of governance structures on firm valuation and the quality of managerial decision making (see Brown & Caylor, 2004; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2005 for detailed summaries). Collectively, the ability of cross-sectional variation in governance structures to explain firm valueand/or firm decision making is relatively weak. Consistent with this, I find evidence that out of a large set of governance measures only a few are related to over-investment. For example, firms with activist shareholders and certain anti-takeover provisions are less likely to over-invest their free cash flow.1. Free cash flow and over-investmentThis section describes in detail the various theories supporting a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow and then develops measures of free cash flow and over-investment that can be used to test the agency based explanation. 1.1. Explanations for a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow .In a world of perfect capital markets there would be no association between firm level investing activities and internally generated cash flows.If a firm needed additional cash to finance an investment activity it would simply raise that cash from external capital markets.If thefirm had excess cash beyond that needed to fund available positive NPV projects (including options on future investment) it would distribute free cash flow to external markets. Firms do not, however, operate in such a world.There are a variety of capital market frictions that impede the ability of management to raise cash from external capital markets. In addition,there are significant transaction costs associated with monitoring management to ensure that free cash flow is indeeddistributed to external capital markets.In equilibrium,these capital market frictions can serve as a support for a positive association between firm investing activities and internally generated cash flow.The agency cost explanation introduced by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) suggests that monitoring difficulty creates the potential for management to spend internally generated cash flow on projects that are beneficial from a management perspective but costly from a shareholder perspective(the free cash flow hypothesis).Several papers have investigated the implications of the free cash flow hypothesis on firm investment activity. For example, Lamont (1997) and Berger and Hann (2003) find evidence consistent with cash rich segments cross-subsidizing more poorly performing segments in diversified firms. However, the evidence in thesepapers could also be consistent with market frictions inhibiting the ability of the firm to raise capital externally and not necessarily an indication of over-investment.Related evidence can also be found in Harford (1999) and Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999, 2001). Harford uses a sample of 487 takeover bids todocument that cash rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions and these “cash rich” acquisitions are followed by abnormal declinesin operating performance. Opler et al.(1999) find some evidence that companies with excess cash (measured using balance sheet cash information) have higher capital expenditures, and spend more on acquisitions,even when they appear to have poor investment opportunities (as measured by Tobin’s Q). Perhaps the most direct evidence on the over-investment offree cash flow is the analysis in Blanchard et al. (1994). They find that eleven firms with windfall legal settlements appear to engage in wasteful expenditure.Collectively,prior research is suggestive of an agency-based explanation supporting the positive relation between investment and internally generated cash flow. However, these papers are based on relatively small samples and do not measure over-investment or free cash flow directly.Thus,the findings of earlier work may not be generalizable to larger samples nor is it directly attributable to the agency cost explanation. More generally, a criticism of the literature examining the relation between investment and cash flow is that finding a positive association may merely indicate that cash flows serve as an effective proxy for investment opportunities (e.g., Alti, 2003).My aim is tobetter measure the constructs of free cash flow and over-investment by incorporating an accounting-based measure of growth opportunities, and test whether the relation is evident in a large sample of firms.Some early work in this area examined the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for high versus low dividend paying firms (Fazzari et al., 1988),comparing differing organizational structures where the ability to raise external financing was easier/harder (Hoshi,Kashyap and Scharfstein,1991,with Japanes keiretsu firms) and debt constraints (Whited, 1992).These papers find evidence of greater sensitivity of investment to cash flow for sets of firms which appeared to befinancially constrained(e.g., low dividend paying firms, high debt firms and firms with limited access to banks). However, more recent research casts doubt on the earlier results. Specifically, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000),find that the sensitivity of investment to cash flowpersists even for firms who do not face financing constraints. They construct a measure of ex ante financing constraints for a small sample of firms and find that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for firms is negatively associated with this measure,thereby casting doubt on the financing constraint hypothesis. Nonetheless the investment expectation model described in Section 1.4 includes a variety of measures designed to capture financing constraints.ConclusionThis paper presents evidence on firm level over-investment of free cash flow. The empirical analysis utilizes an accounting based framework to measure the constructs of free cash flow and over-investment.A comparative advantage of theaccounting researcher is in measuring critical constructs from the financial economics literature.The analysis of over-investment and free cash flow is but one example of how accounting information can be better utilized in academic research. The evidence in this paper suggests that over-investment is a common problem for publicly traded US firms. Fornon-financial firms during the period 1988–2002, the average firm over-invests 20 percent of its available free cash flow. Furthermore, the majority of free cash flow is retained in the form of financial assets. For each additional dollar of free cash flow the average firm in the sample retains 41 cents as either cash or marketable securities. There is little evidence that free cash flow is distributed to external stakeholders, thereby creating the potential for retained free cash flow to be over-invested in the future. Supplemental analysis found only weak evidence that governance structures are effective in mitigating the extent of over-investment.These findings corroborate recent work that has found significant negative future stock returns from capital investment and significant growth in net operating assets (e.g.,Fairfield et al.,2003;Titman et al., 2004).Indeed,Li (2004) finds that future operating performance is lower for firms engaging in investment expenditure and that this negativerelation is increasing in contemporaneous free cash flow.A natural explanation for this poor future performance is free cash flow related agency costs.The framework developed in the paper to measure over-investment and free cash flow can easily be extended to consider abnormal investment more generally. Indeed, some recent research has started to use this framework to examine the impact of accounting information systems on investment decisions and the efficient allocation of capital (e.g., Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2005; Goodman, 2005; Wang, 2003).Source: Scott Richardson,2006.“Over-investment of free cashflow” .Review ofAccount Studies,vol.11, june,pp.159-189.译文:自由现金流下的过度投资摘要本文调查了公司水平范围内的自由现金流的过度投资问题。