穆迪评级[最新]

Rating Methodology Request for CommentBank Financial Strength Ratings: Revised MethodologySummaryThis report details Moody’s proposal to revise our rating methodology for assigning Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSRs) globally.1 This revision does not change the main factors that Moody’s considers in rating banks. However,the revised approach provides a single, global methodology instead of separate methodologies for mature and develop-ing markets. It also establishes specific ranges for each factor that relate to different rating categories. The updated methodology is intended to provide investors and issuers with a transparent set of guidelines allowing them to better understand our rating process and how we reach our decisions.T o this end, we have developed a rating scorecard that uses a common set of globally available financial metrics together with key qualitative factors that Moody’s analysts consider critical in evaluating a bank’s intrinsic financial strength and specific weights for each factor. This scorecard will be used by Moody’s analysts as the first step in deter-mining BFSRs. It should also enable investors and issuers to independently estimate a BFSR for most banks within two notches. This report describes the scorecard and discusses some of its limitations as well as some of the further adjust-ments that Moody’s analysts may employ in assigning BFSRs.The revised methodology is also intended to improve the consistency of Moody’s BFSRs. As previously announced, Moody’s intends to incorporate joint-default analysis (JDA) into our assessment of external support for banks later this year.2 We believe the updated BFSR methodology will help ensure that existing BFSRs are indeed “pure” measures of stand-alone financial strength and do not include external support. This is important in order to avoid double counting external support when we implement JDA for banks. We are requesting comments because we believe that the implementation of this methodology could lead to changes in the BFSRs for a significant number of banks, although we do not expect most of those to exceed 2 notches.Readers should note that this methodology is not an exhaustive treatment of every factor considered by Moody’s in assigning bank financial strength ratings, but it should enable our constituents to better understand how and why we arrive at a BFSR. Moody’s welcomes comments or suggestions on this proposal from market participants. Comments should be sent to cpc@ by September 29, 2006.1.Moody's current approach is outlined in the following Rating Methodology reports: "Bank Credit Risk -- An Analytical Framework for Banks in Developed Markets," April 1999 and "Bank Credit Risk in Emerging Markets -- An Analytical Framework," July 1999.2.Please see "Request for Comment: Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis for Systemic Support into Moody's Bank Rating Methodology ," October 2005; "Update to Proposal to Incorporate Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Rating Methodology ," April 2006; and "Bank Joint Default Analysis: Rating Methodology Update," August 2006.New YorkDavid Fanger 1.212.553.1653Rosemarie Conforte Jeanne Del Casino Greg Bauer Laura Levenstein LondonLynn Exton 44.20.7772.5454Adel Satel Antonio Carballo MadridMaria Cabanyes 34.91.310.14.54TokyoMutsuo Suzuki 81.3.5408.4000Yasunobu Doi SingaporeDeborah Schuler 65.6398.8300Hong KongJerry Chien 852.2916.1121 Contact PhoneSeptember 2006About Moody’s Bank Financial Strength RatingsBank credit risk is a function of a bank’s (i) intrinsic financial strength, (ii) the likelihood that it would benefit from external support in the case of need, and (iii) the risk that it would fail to make payments owing to the actions of a sov-ereign. Moody’s assigns credit risk ratings to banks and their debt obligations using a multi-step process that incorpo-rates both a bank’s intrinsic risk profile and specific external support and risk elements that can affect its overall credit risk.Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSRs) represent Moody’s opinion of a bank’s intrinsic safety and soundness. Assigning a BFSR is the first step in Moody’s bank credit rating process.Unlike Moody’s deposit and debt ratings, BFSRs do not address either the probability of timely payment (i.e. default risk) or the loss that an investor may suffer in the event of a missed payment (i.e. severity of loss). Instead, BFSRs are a measure of the likelihood that a bank will require assistance from third parties such as its owners, its industry group, or official institutions, in order to avoid a default. BFSRs do not take into account the probability that the bank will receive such external support, nor do they address the external risk that sovereign actions may interfere with a bank’s ability to honor its domestic or foreign currency obligations.In order to differentiate Moody’s BFSRs from our bank deposit and debt ratings, we use different rating symbols. Moody’s BFSRs range from A to E, with “A” for banks with the greatest intrinsic financial strength and “E” for banks with the least intrinsic financial strength. A “+” modifier may be appended to ratings below the “A” category and a “-”modifier may be appended to ratings above the “E” category to identify those banks which are placed higher (+) or lower (-) in a rating category.Moody’s introduced BFSRs in 1995, and currently assigns them to almost a thousand banks and deposit-taking financial institutions worldwide. The factors considered in the assignment of BFSRs were described in Moody’s last bank rating methodologies published in 1999, and continue to form the basis of our updated approach as described in this report. These include bank-specific elements such as financial fundamentals, franchise value, and business and asset diversification, as well as risk factors in the bank’s operating environment, such as the strength and prospective performance of the economy, the structure and relative fragility of the financial system, and the quality of banking reg-ulation and supervision.The following diagram shows how BFSRs fit into Moody’s overall approach to assigning bank credit ratings. The left side shows the principal factors that are used to determine a bank’s BFSR. This report describes how these are measured and analyzed to derive a BFSR.2Moody’s Rating MethodologyThe right side of the diagram summarizes the specific external support and risk elements that are combined with the BFSR to determine Moody’s local currency and foreign currency deposit and debt ratings. In October 2005 Moody’s proposed to incorporate joint-default analysis (JDA) into how it evaluates external support factors for banks; we published updates on this proposal in April and August 2006. We expect to publish and implement a final method-ology incorporating JDA into Moody’s bank credit ratings later this year.The BFSR will be mapped directly to the baseline credit assessment in Moody’s JDA framework. Like the BFSR, a baseline credit assessment is a measure of an issuer’s stand-alone default risk assuming there is no systemic or other external support. For banks, the baseline credit assessment reflects what the local currency deposit rating would be without any assumed external support from a government or other third party. In the October 2005 request for com-ment we published a mapping showing how Moody’s BFSRs translate into a baseline credit assessment for banks using Moody’s traditional alphanumeric rating scale.A more detailed discussion of how Moody’s evaluates the risk elements that affect foreign currency ratings for banks can be found in the 1999 bank rating methodologies, as well as in more recent publications.3About the Rated UniverseMoody’s currently assigns BFSRs to 959 financial institutions globally (as of August 21, 2006). These financial institu-tions generally fall under the category of deposit-taking institutions, including commercial banks, savings banks, build-ing societies, cooperative banks, thrifts, and government-owned banks. Moody’s BFSRs may also be assigned to other types of financial institutions such as multilateral development banks, government-sponsored financial institutions and national development financial institutions.In a number of countries Moody’s also assigns BFSRs to a variety of other financial institutions (such as mortgage banks or other specialized banks) that, although they do not take deposits, are still chartered and regulated as banks and usually obtain some funding from the interbank market.BFSRs are generally assigned to individual banks, including those that are subsidiaries or affiliates of another bank. Therefore, there are some banking groups that have a number of banks with different BFSRs.The rated universe is spread throughout the world, with the highest concentrations in Europe, followed by the Americas, Asia (excluding Japan), Japan and the Middle East. Rated banks range in size from over $1 trillion in total assets to as small as $150 million. Some may be truly diversified global institutions, while others may operate on an extremely limited scale in a small local market.Distribution of Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings3.Please see "Revised Country Ceiling Policy," June 2001; "Emerging Market Bank Ratings in Local and Foreign Currency: The Implications of Country Risk and Insti-tutional Support," December 2001; "The Implications of Highly Dollarized Banking Systems for Sovereign Credit Risk," March 2003; and "Piercing the Country Ceil-ing: An Update," January 2005.Moody’s Rating Methodology3The inherent riskiness of the banking business – as characterized by high leverage (equity capital of only 5-10% of total assets), illiquid assets (loans) financed by short-term liabilities (deposits), and a cyclical business environment –makes it difficult for all but a select number of banks that are generally extremely large and diversified to achieve and maintain a BFSR in the range from A to a high B. Solid, diversified and sustainable franchises and excellent manage-ment are also necessary attributes of A and B BFSRs.However, barring systemic stress and provided there is reasonable client confidence, banking, if conservatively managed without excessive risk-taking, is also a business allowing a stable generation of interest and fee income, albeit perhaps at a lower level of overall profitability. Therefore, BFSRs in the C category are generally available to a large number of banks even if they have limited scale and franchises, and average financials. Many institutions fall under this category. BFSRs of D are generally assigned to those that either are exhibiting modest capital, earnings, or business franchise, thus limiting their ability to deal with asset quality problems or other potential balance sheet risks, or are subject to unpredictable and unstable operating environments. BFSRs of E are typically restricted to those institutions that are under pressure to maintain their capital due to external and internal factors such as a highly volatile operating environment, recurring losses and asset quality problems, or a very high risk profile. However, regulatory forbearance can allow even insolvent banks to operate for an extended period of time, until the regulatory authorities arrange for either a rescue or a restructuring, or place the bank into liquidation.Industry Overview and Current Risk CharacteristicsThe global banking industry is made up of a highly varied group of firms offering a wide range of products and pursu-ing a wide range of business models and customers. While most banks face the same fundamental risks -- credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, interest rate risk, and operational risk -- the extent of such risks vary considerably depending upon the products sold, the bank’s funding profile, and the markets in which it operates.General vs. Specific RisksBanking risk can be broadly divided into general risks, which apply to all banks within a system and derive to a large extent from a country’s economic strength, and specific risks, which are the product of the bank itself. In mature mar-kets, it is rare for serious difficulties experienced by a bank to be solely attributable to general risks, even though such risks certainly do have an impact on the bank’s performance. In most cases, bank failure in mature markets is the result of factors such as mismanagement, risky strategies, structurally poor performance, and franchise collapse. It is, in gen-eral, the weak banks and the highly risky banks that are the first to suffer in a shrinking or increasingly competitive market.In developing markets, general risks loom larger. Not only can general risks be more severe, but it may also be dif-ficult for any bank to avoid the consequences of a severe economic shock (such as a massive currency devaluation) or a deep economic recession. Clearly, banks which are better managed and have stronger earnings, franchises, and balance sheets are better placed to cope with general risks. However, in cases where general risks present a significant threat to the banking system of the country in question, it may well be that no bank can be assigned a BFSR at the upper end of the scale.4Moody’s Rating MethodologyFive Broad Categories of BankingOverall, the diversity of the sector can be broken down into five broad categories of banking institutions. Many banks may actually pursue a combination of these models, but we believe it is useful to address each of them separately to clarify the different risks that different banks can face.1. Wholesale banks: These banks focus on serving large corporate or institutional customers. While many wholesale banks have traditionally focused primarily on lending (and, in some countries, making equity investments), they fre-quently offer a much broader array of services to their customers, including not just loans but also treasury manage-ment and transaction services, foreign exchange services, trade finance, derivatives, debt and equity underwriting and market-making, and insurance. Because their customers are often very large entities, wholesale banks, especially smaller ones, can have significant customer concentration risks; they may also have industry concentration risks, espe-cially if they operate primarily within a particular region or market. Also, while a portion of their activities may be funded with corporate customer deposits, typically such banks are heavily reliant upon wholesale funding from both the interbank and capital markets. Such funding can be highly confidence-sensitive, exposing the bank to substantial liquidity risk if it is not conservatively managed.4Since their customers tend to be concentrated in larger cities and economic regions, wholesale banks generally do not require as substantial a physical presence as most retail banks. With fewer fixed costs, this often means a more flex-ible cost structure. However, customers can develop strong relationships with individual bankers (instead of with the bank itself), making retention of personnel a critical element to long-term success.As discussed below, both globalization and the growth of local capital markets can pose significant challenges for wholesale banks, as more of their customers have the ability to tap the capital markets directly for funding. This can lead to greater earnings volatility, as wholesale banks increase their capital markets activities in order to retain their customers, and also expand into potentially riskier lending businesses to replace lost lending opportunities.2. Retail banks: These banks focus primarily on serving individuals and/or small and middle market businesses. They may offer a wide array of products, including deposit-taking and lending, asset management and insurance, cash man-agement and transaction services, and even trade finance and foreign exchange services. A defining feature of such banks is that they are often locally or regionally focused. This reflects the retail nature of the customer base. While some functions may be centralized, direct customer interaction remains an important part of the service most retail banks provide. Given the wide dispersion of potential customers (both individuals and businesses), and their preference for local interaction, this requires a physical presence in the form of retail branches. Many retail banks also site their branches in clusters to benefit from classic network economies, although this is not always the case. (This is especially true for retail banks serving individuals; retail banks serving only small and middle market businesses may have less need for clusters of branches, but are still likely to require more branches than a wholesale bank.) As retail banks grow, they may develop more and more clusters of branches, growing from merely a local or regional presence into a national or even international one. Nonetheless, even an international retail bank can usually best be thought of as a combination of local retail banks.Given the need to have a significant physical infrastructure and to support significant daily customer transaction volumes, most retail banks have fairly inflexible cost structures. This makes stable revenue generation critical. T o address this need, most retail banks focus on generating recurring business with relationship customers and increasing the level of cross-selling of products including insurance products. Because their customers are small, retail banks do not usually have significant customer concentration risks; however, they may still have industry concentration risks since they frequently operate within a particular region.5Retail banks are often funded primarily with customer deposits. However, pressure to grow assets and earnings, especially in more mature markets, can lead to loan growth that far outstrips deposit growth. Such banks must rely more heavily upon wholesale funding, which can pressure net interest margins, reducing the bank’s profitability, while at the same time also exposing it to greater liquidity risk and interest rate risk.As discussed below, both de-regulation and technological innovation can pose a significant threat to retail banks because they provide their customers with greater access to competing products through alternative distribution chan-nels, and may also reduce competitors’ costs to provide those products. While retail banking has not traditionally pos-sessed much in the way of economies of scale, to the extent that such technological innovations create economies of scale, it may pose even greater challenges to the smaller retail providers.4.Please see discussion of Liquidity Management under Rating Factor 2.5.Please see discussion on Credit Risk Concentrations under Rating Factor 2.Moody’s Rating Methodology53. Universal banks: These banks are not so much a separate business model from either retail banks or wholesale banks, but rather are usually characterized by a combination of retail banking and wholesale banking, frequently also combined with activities such as private banking, asset management, or insurance. Universal banks often rank among the largest banks in a country. Universal banking can potentially provide greater earnings diversification as well as a more stable funding profile (to the extent that the more deposit-rich retail banking activities provide funding for some of the wholesale activities) than either retail banking or wholesale banking can provide on their own. However, the complexity of managing a universal bank can require considerable managerial resources. Furthermore, the disparate activities of a universal bank can at times pose conflicts of interest which, if not carefully managed, can cause reputation damage, harming the franchise. In some jurisdictions, the complexity of a universal bank also raises questions about the depth or effectiveness of regulatory oversight over such disparate activities.4. Policy banks: Moody’s defines policy banks as state-owned institutions that have explicit or implicit public policy mandates. Some state-owned banks have specific public policy mandates. These banks are often heavily dependent on government-directed business, which may or may not be profitable. Other state-owned banks, while not subject to specific public policy mandates, may still have to contend with bureaucratic controls and pressure from politicians that forces them to lend to certain favored industries or regions. Even though such banks may have substantial market shares, they frequently have weak earnings, lack strong management, and suffer from poor asset quality and controls. This usually translates into low BFSRs, although such banks also usually benefit from regulatory forbearance or other forms of government assistance, providing support to their deposit and debt ratings. Even when well run, policy banks usually still have substantial industry concentrations, reflecting their reason for being or the limitations of their char-ters.5. Specialized banks: These are niche players, most often specialized lenders such as mortgage banks, development banks, public-sector lenders, credit card banks, or export-finance entities. Some are the legacy of past government pol-icies and regulatory barriers that disappeared following deregulation and liberalization, while others were formed as a direct result of deregulation and technological innovation. Because they often have limited product offerings and/or a limited customer base, specialized banks can be more vulnerable to competitive pressures or changing economic con-ditions. However, some specialized banks, either by virtue of still-strong regulatory barriers or through substantial economies of scale and a dominant market share, usually combined with a focus on less volatile loan products such as public sector lending or mortgages, can still support high BFSRs. As with wholesale banks, specialized banks are typi-cally heavily reliant upon wholesale funding. Such funding can be highly confidence-sensitive, exposing the bank to substantial liquidity risk if it is not conservatively managed.Although the risks are somewhat different, we also include captive banks in this category. Captives are usually owned or controlled by an industrial corporation and are used to provide financing for customers purchasing products sold by the corporation, and/or to provide internal financing to the corporate and its affiliates, serving in essence as the corporate’s treasury function. Similar to other specialized banks, captives tend to have limited product offerings and a limited customer base. Even when they are lending to customers rather than to the corporate itself, their performance can still be significantly affected by the performance of the corporate.Key Industry Risks: Transformation Will Continue, Whether Banks are Ready or NotThe global banking industry is in the midst of a significant transformation, driven by substantial changes in the busi-ness environment. This transformation, begun in some countries well over a decade ago, is now occurring at different rates of change in most countries around the world. While much of the change is occurring in mature markets, devel-oping markets are also affected. These developments pose significant challenges and risks for all banks. Many banks are struggling to adjust to the substantial changes already underway. Moody’s expects that many banks will not succeed in making the transformation, and will either be driven to consolidate with a more successful competitor or will gradu-ally weaken as its franchise and earnings power are eroded away. Six major catalysts are driving this transformation. •Deregulation – is breaking down barriers within the banking industry in many countries and enabling banks to adopt diversification strategies and to compete against each other on a level playing field. In some countries it is also allowing for the entrance of new specialized competitors.•Disintermediation – a byproduct of deregulation, it is brought about by financial liberalization and the expansion of capital markets, allowing both borrowers and investors to bypass banks in favor of capital market products. The growing trend towards privatization of pension funds is also creating a growing pool of funds managed by invest-ment professionals, helping to fuel this trend.•Technological Innovation – is reducing transaction and information costs, facilitating the creation of new distri-bution channels, and allowing for innovation in retail lending (data mining), funding (securitization), and risk management (derivatives). At the same time, such technologies may also be creating potential economies of scale where none previously existed.6Moody’s Rating Methodology•Globalization – pressures banks to follow their business customers around the world, and forces them to compete with other banks globally for those customers’ business. Globalization gives banks in developing markets access to growing pools of funding due to the growth of global capital markets. However, many banks obtaining first-time access to wholesale funding have shown themselves to be ill-equipped for the liquidity risks such funding can pose. •Privatization – Governments are increasingly seeking to get out of the business of banking. While this is clearly not universal, and in some cases is being done with great reluctance, nonetheless the privatization of formerly state-owned banks could potentially reduce subsidized competition, benefiting all banks competing in the same market. However, the social or political costs of such actions may be more than some governments are willing to tolerate. And for the management of formerly state-owned banks it can be a considerable challenge to develop a credit culture based on analyzing a client’s ability to repay loans, as opposed to relying on imputed state guaran-tees.•Increased shareholder power – with more banks being owned by private investors and with more investment funds being managed by professional investors, banks globally are facing increasing pressure from powerful insti-tutional shareholders for higher returns. T o remain competitive in this more unforgiving market, banks are increasingly shifting to shareholder value-creation strategies, which may not always benefit bondholders. Framework for Assigning Bank Financial Strength RatingsMoody’s bank ratings reflect our opinion of long-term relative risk and are, of necessity, forward-looking in nature because they apply to liabilities that may pay out over long periods of time. Historical experience has shown that look-ing only at the current financial condition of a bank is not always an accurate predictor of its future financial perfor-mance and financial strength. We believe there are significant qualitative factors which play an important role in determining the stability and predictability of a bank’s financial performance over time. Thus Moody’s analytical approach includes significant qualitative analysis in addition to quantitative analysis, and incorporates the opinions and judgments of experienced analysts.As noted above, the factors considered in the assignment of Bank Financial Strength Ratings were described in Moody’s last bank rating methodologies published in 1999, and remain at the basis of the updated methodology. We focus on five key rating factors that we believe are critical to understanding a bank’s financial strength and risk pro-file. They are:1. Franchise Value2. Risk Positioning3. Regulatory Environment4. Operating Environment5. Financial FundamentalsIn the following sections we review the five key rating factors, discuss why each factor is important to our BFSRs, and explain the relevant metrics or “sub-factors” that we use to measure performance for each key rating factor. Some of the metrics that we consider important are purely quantitative, while others include elements of qualitative judg-ment or – where hard data is not reasonably accessible — educated estimates. For those involving a qualitative assess-ment, we have provided qualitative descriptions that we believe help to differentiate among risk profiles at different banks. T o dampen the cyclical nature of the industry, most of the financial metrics we use are three-year averages.For each of these factors, the methodology outlines in a summary mapping table either the range of financial met-rics or the qualitative description that would typically correspond with a given BFSR level, ranging from A to E. Evaluating OutliersIt is unlikely that every bank’s BFSR will be consistent with the rating level guidelines for every rating factor. This is because a bank typically has a variety of strengths and weaknesses which combine to reflect its overall financial risk profile. For those banks that show up as frequent outliers for their respective rating category, there could be several different explanations. The most obvious one would be that there is likely pressure on its BFSR, either up or down. But there also may be unique characteristics of the bank’s accounting, regulatory or market environment that limit the comparability of certain key factors and metrics. And finally, some elements of the bank’s business or financial profile may receive greater weight in our analysis.Moody’s Rating Methodology7。

世界三大信用评级机构包括标准普尔（S&P）、穆迪（Moody's）和惠誉（Fitch）。

它们的评级标准有一些相似之处，但也各有侧重。

总体而言，这些评级机构的评级标准通常包括以下几个方面：1. 财务实力：信用评级机构会评估公司的财务实力，包括其资产、负债、盈利和现金流状况。

这些指标能够反映公司的偿债能力和稳定性，是信用评级的重要依据。

2. 商业模式和竞争力：信用评级机构还会评估公司的商业模式、竞争力以及管理层的能力和经验。

这些因素决定了公司未来的盈利能力和风险水平。

3. 行业前景：对于特定行业的公司，信用评级机构会考虑该行业的市场前景、增长潜力以及公司在行业中的地位。

4. 宏观经济环境：信用评级机构还会评估国家或地区的宏观经济环境，包括经济增长、通货膨胀、利率、政策稳定性等方面。

这些因素对公司的经营和偿债能力产生重要影响。

5. 监管环境：对于涉及特定行业的公司，信用评级机构还会评估相关监管政策、法规环境以及合规性等因素。

6. 信用记录和违约风险：信用评级机构会考虑公司过去的信用记录、违约历史以及债务偿还情况。

这些因素能够反映公司的信用意识和风险管理能力。

7. 债务结构和管理：信用评级机构还会评估公司的债务结构、债务到期情况以及债务管理策略。

这些因素对公司的偿债能力和流动性产生重要影响。

8. 政治风险：对于跨国公司或涉及国际业务的企业，信用评级机构会评估相关国家的政治风险、政策稳定性和法律环境等因素。

这些因素可能对公司的经营和偿债能力产生重要影响。

总体而言，世界三大信用评级机构的评级标准都是基于上述因素进行综合评估的。

虽然各家机构的评级标准略有不同，但它们都致力于为客户提供客观、公正的信用评级服务，以帮助投资者做出明智的投资决策。

信用评级标准信用评级是指对一个债务人或者发行人进行信用状况评估的过程，以评定其能否按时履行债务并偿还本金和利息。

信用评级标准是根据一系列的指标和评估方法，对债务人的信用风险水平进行判定的依据。

下面将介绍一些常用的信用评级标准。

一、国际国际上常用的信用评级标准主要有三家评级机构，分别是标准普尔（S&P）、穆迪（Moody's）和惠誉（Fitch Ratings）。

这三家评级机构评级的标准较为类似，都是采用字母等级表示，以及相应的正负符号和数字修饰。

1. 高级投资级最高级别的投资级别是AAA，表示债务人非常有能力按时履行债务，并且有很高的偿债能力。

其次是AA+、AA、AA-，依次递减。

这些级别通常被认为是低风险的，投资者普遍愿意购买这些债券。

2. 低级投资级低级投资级别（也称为垃圾级别）包括BBB+、BBB、BBB-，及以下的等级。

这些级别表示债务人的偿债能力较弱，存在一定的违约风险，投资者在购买这些债券时需要承担更高的风险。

3. 非投资级非投资级别包括BB+、BB、BB-，及以下的等级。

这些级别表示债务人的违约风险非常高，投资者在购买这些债券时需要非常谨慎，并承担高风险和高利率。

二、国内国内信用评级机构比较常见的有中国大陆的大公国际、联合资信和上海新世纪等。

这些机构以字母等级和相应的正负符号表示信用评级。

1. 优秀级最高级别是AAA，表示债务人的信用状况非常好，具备极强的偿债能力。

其次是AA+、AA、AA-等级，依次递减。

这些级别表示债务人的信用状况较好，风险较低。

2. 良好级良好级别包括A+、A、A-等级，表示债务人的信用状况良好，能够履行债务，但相比优秀级别，可能存在一定的风险。

3. 一般级一般级别包括BBB+、BBB、BBB-等级，表示债务人的信用状况一般，存在较高的风险，需要投资者谨慎考虑。

4. 较差级较差级别包括BB+、BB、BB-等级，表示债务人的信用状况较差，存在较高的违约风险，投资者需谨慎对待。

穆迪（Moody's）是全球知名的信用评级机构之一，其公布的各等级债券历史违约率情况一直备受关注。

了解和分析这些历史数据对投资者和市场参与者来说非常重要，因为它们能够提供对不同债券等级的违约风险有一个更清晰的认识。

在本文中，我将对穆迪公布的各等级债券历史违约率情况进行全面评估，并就此撰写一篇有价值的文章。

让我们从最基础的概念开始，了解一下什么是债券违约率。

债券违约率是指某一时期内债券发行人未能按时偿还债券本金或利息的比率。

穆迪将债券按照其信用风险分为不同等级，在不同等级债券的违约率会有所差异。

而了解这些违约率的历史情况能够帮助投资者更好地评估债券的违约风险，从而做出更为明智的投资决策。

让我们具体了解一下穆迪公布的各等级债券历史违约率情况。

根据穆迪公布的数据，不同等级债券的违约率存在明显差异。

一般来说，投资级债券（即评级为Baa3及以上）的违约率较低，而垃圾级债券（即评级为Ba1及以下）的违约率较高。

然而，并非所有投资级债券都是安全的，而并非所有垃圾级债券都是高风险的。

投资者在进行债券投资时，需要根据具体情况和市场环境综合考虑各种因素。

接下来，让我们来分析一下这些历史数据对投资者的意义。

对于长期投资者而言，了解不同等级债券的违约率可以帮助他们更好地选择适合自己投资组合的债券品种。

对于短期投机者或者交易员而言，了解违约率的历史情况能够帮助他们更好地把握市场波动，获得更好的交易机会。

对于整个市场而言，了解这些数据能够帮助监管机构更好地监管市场，防范风险。

总结回顾，通过评估穆迪公布的各等级债券历史违约率情况，我们了解到不同等级债券的违约率存在明显差异，投资者应该根据具体情况和市场环境综合考虑各种因素进行投资决策。

在我看来，违约率数据只是投资决策的一个参考因素，投资者还需要综合考虑经济环境、行业前景、发行人信用状况等多方面因素，以做出明智的投资决策。

了解穆迪公布的各等级债券历史违约率情况对投资者和市场参与者来说至关重要。

中国农业发展银行穆迪评级我国农业发展银行（以下简称“农发行”）是我国国家重点支持的农村金融机构，其使命是为农村经济和农民生活提供全方位、多层次、宽领域的金融服务。

农发行一直在不断优化服务体系，拓展服务领域，加大信贷支持力度，助推我国农村经济的繁荣发展。

最近，穆迪国际信用评级机构对我国农业发展银行的长期外币存款和发行人评级进行了评定，给予了Aa3的评级，在评级报告中认为，农发行具有良好的资本充足位置、成熟的风险管理能力、稳定的盈利能力和强劲的市场地位。

这无疑是对农发行多年来稳健经营的肯定，也意味着农发行在国际金融市场上的信用水平得到了提升，更好地服务于我国农村经济和农民生活的发展。

我们来看农发行的资本充足情况。

穆迪评级报告指出，农发行的资本充足水平高于同业平均水平，资产质量良好，拥有强大的风险抵御能力。

这意味着农发行在面对各种风险和挑战时，有着良好的应对能力，能够保障客户的资金安全，为农村经济的发展提供坚实的金融支持。

农发行的风险管理能力值得让人信赖。

穆迪评级报告指出，农发行建立了完善的风险管理体系，对信贷管理流程、监控和评价过程进行了有效规范，保障了信贷业务的质量和安全。

这也意味着农发行在扩大信贷规模的严格控制了信贷风险，实现了风险与规模的有效匹配。

农发行的盈利能力稳定可靠。

农发行凭借稳健的经营模式和良好的资产质量，不断提升盈利水平。

穆迪评级报告认为，农发行的盈利水平在同业中保持领先地位，表现出了良好的盈利能力和盈利稳定性。

这也为农发行未来的发展奠定了坚实的基础。

农发行在市场上拥有强劲的地位。

作为我国国家重点支持的金融机构，农发行在国内外市场上享有良好的声誉和信誉，其在农村金融服务方面的经验和实力得到了国际市场的认可。

穆迪评级报告也指出，农发行在金融行业中拥有强大的竞争力和市场地位，对经济社会发展具有重要支撑作用。

在此背景下，国际信用评级机构穆迪对我国农业发展银行的Aa3评级充分体现了农发行多年来在资本充足、风险管理、盈利能力和市场地位等方面的稳健经营和卓越表现。

穆迪内部评级系统介绍由世界上最大的资信评级公司之一穆迪公司所研发设计的信用风险评估系统，是在欧美多家跨国银行被广泛应用的电子化信用风险管理系统。

该系统完全依据欧美银行的需求设计，因此在违约概率的测量、公司情况的评估、抵押物抵押价值的确定及信贷额度等级划分等方面并不一定适合于我国的实际情况。

但这一系统吸收了欧美银行多年来的信用风险控制经验，同时贯彻了新巴塞尔协议的相关要求，其内在的风险控制理念对我国商业银行信用风险控制体系的设计与完善具有相当强的借鉴意义。

故本文即对该系统作以下介绍。

穆迪系统的核心为如下公式：EL％=PD×LGD公式一这个公式涵盖了信用风险控制的全部内容。

EL％指预计损失率，PD指违约概率，LGD指违约损失率。

一、违约损失率(LGD)违约损失率（LGD）用于衡量银行在每一单位的名义风险敞口下，当借款人违约时所实际暴露的风险敞口。

它是一种与借款工具因素（即债项）相关的违约比率，其大小完全只与银行信贷额度所安排的借款工具相关，而与借款人的信用等级没有任何关系。

即对于任何一个借款人而言，如果使用的借款工具是完全相同的，那么计算出的违约损失率也必然相同；对于同一借款人而言，当其使用不同的借款工具时，违约损失率也可能会不同。

其计算公式是：违约损失率=违约敞口/名义风险敞口公式二其中，名义风险敞口指银行某一融资项目总的信贷额度风险敞口；违约敞口则是指扣除了抵押物的价值因素后的风险敞口，即当借款人出现违约时，银行实际风险暴露的数量。

违约损失率的计算步骤如下：（一）确定名义风险敞口的大小。

穆迪系统将名义风险敞口划分为表内金额和表外金额两种作区别对待。

前者即被视为实际借出的金额；后者则只是可能借出的金额，是一种或有风险。

对于表内金额，穆迪系统将其全额计算为名义风险敞口；对于不同种类的表外金额，则按照不同的比例（100％、75％、50％、20％）确定其名义风险敞口。

比如：银行保函和备用信用证等，将按照100％全额计算，因为一旦被要求，银行就必须无条件地进行全额偿付；而开立信用证等，则按照20％计算，因为银行拥有货权凭证，从而大大降低了损失可能性。

穆迪评级等级分类
好呀，以下是 8 条关于穆迪评级等级分类的内容：
1. 嘿，你知道穆迪评级有好几个等级呢！就像咱们上学时候的成绩分级一样。

比如说，最高的等级那可是超级厉害的呀，就像学霸拿到全优！那些能获得最高等级的公司或国家，哇塞，那真的是实力超强啊！
2. 哇哦，穆迪评级的等级可不是随便分的呢！有点像游戏里的关卡等级。

低等级的就像是还在新手村努力的玩家，得加油升级呀！就像有的公司可能还需要不断提升实力来提高评级呢，你说是不是？
3. 嘿呀，穆迪评级的各个等级之间差别可大啦！这就好比是不同级别的运动员，顶级的那是世界冠军水平呀！企业要是能拿到高级别的评级，那不就相当于在市场这个大赛场上闪闪发光嘛！
4. 哎呀呀，穆迪评级的等级分类那可是很重要的呢！就像给人分三六九等似的。

等级高的就好像是贵族，备受青睐；等级低的可就得加把劲啦，难道不是吗？
5. 哟呵，穆迪评级等级划分可精细啦！就像把一个大蛋糕切成好几块。

每一块都有它不同的意义呀！比如高等级的那一块是最甜的，谁不想尝尝呢？
6. 嘿，穆迪评级的等级分类可有意思了！好比是不同的交通工具，高级别的就像飞机，速度超快；低级别的也许就是自行车啦，得慢慢骑呢！你想想看是不是这样？
7. 哇，穆迪评级的每个等级都代表着不同的情况啊！这跟天气似的，晴天、阴天、雨天。

高等级就是大晴天，一切都那么美好；低等级可能就是雨天，得撑把伞挺过去呀！
8. 哎呀，穆迪评级等级分类不简单呀！就如同爬山，越往上等级越高，风景也越美。

大家都想往高处爬，去享受那更好的风光。

所以啊，一定要重视穆迪评级等级分类，它真的很关键呢！
总之，穆迪评级等级分类很重要，会对很多方面产生影响，大家一定要好好了解呀！。

标准普尔、穆迪评级分类表(2007-03-25 18:02:22)转载风险程度穆迪标准普尔还本付息能力极强,有可靠保证,承担风险最小Aaa AAA 还本付息能力很强,但风险性比前者略高Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 AA+ AA AA- 安全性良好，还本付息能力一般，有潜在的导致风险恶化的可能性A1 A2 A3 A+ A A-安全性中等，短期内还本付息无问题，但在经济不景气时风险增大Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 BBB+ BBB BBB-有投机因素，不能确保投资安全，情况变化时还本付息能力波动大，不可靠Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 BB+ BB BB-不适合作为投资对象，在还本付息及遵守契约条件方面都不可靠B1 B2 B3 B+ B B- 安全性极低，随时有无法还本付息的危险Caa CCC 极具投机性，目前正处于违约状态中，或有严重缺陷Ca CC最低等级，完全投机性 C C债务违约 D D穆迪从A至B的分类评级都缀以数字(1.2和3)。

如缀以l即表示该银行信用属于该级别的高档次级别，如缀以2即表示属于该级别的中档次级别，如缀以3即表示属于该级别的低档次级别。

标准普尔使用加号(十)或减号(一)表示评级类别的相对档次。

评级符号后标有‘pi’表示该等评级是利用已公开的财务资料或其它公开信息作分析的依据，即标准普尔并未与该等机构的管理层进行深入的讨论或全面考虑其重要的非公开资料，所以这类评级所依据的资料不及全面的评级全面。

标普评级标普的长期评级分为投资级和投机级两大类，投资级的评级具有信誉高和投资价值高的特点，投机级的评级则信用程度较低。

投资级包括AAA、AA、A和BBB，投机级则分为BB、B、CCC、CC、C和D。

AA A级为最高信用等级；D级最低，视为对条款的违约。

从AA至CC C级，每个级别都可通过添加“+”或“-”来显示信用高低程度。

例如，在AA序列中，信用级别由高到低依次为AA+、AA、AA-。

标普的短期评级共设6个级别，依次为A-1、A-2、A-3、B、C和D。

中国版本的穆迪手册
穆迪手册是一套用于评估债券信用质量的国际标准。

它由穆迪投
资者服务公司（Moody's Investors Service，以下简称穆迪）开发，
旨在为投资者提供信用评级和信用风险管理的依据。

穆迪手册评估的主要对象是发行债券的企业和政府，通过对其财
务状况、运营情况、管理水平等多维度的评估，为投资者提供评级建
议和风险提示。

穆迪手册评级体系分为21级，分别从最高级别的Aaa到最低级
别的C，其中Aaa、Aa、A和Baa级被认为是投资级别，而Ba、B、Caa
和Ca级则被认为是非投资级别。

每个评级级别又分为三个子级别：高、中、低。

评级级别的划分基于穆迪对债券违约风险的评估。

穆迪手册的评级对债券市场具有重要意义，影响着债券价格和投
资者信心。

同时，穆迪手册的评级也成为了银行、保险公司等金融机
构对借款人的信用评估的参考依据。

值得注意的是，投资者在使用穆迪手册评级时需要综合考虑评级
结果以及其他相关因素，谨慎进行投资决策。

穆迪评级分类全文共四篇示例，供读者参考第一篇示例：穆迪评级是全球著名的信用评级公司之一，成立于1909年。

穆迪评级对各种金融产品和实体进行信用评级，帮助投资者更好地了解风险和回报。

穆迪评级主要根据债务人的偿债能力和风险来对其进行评级，评级范围从高到低依次为Aaa、Aa、A、Baa、Ba、B、Caa、Ca、C。

Aaa级为最高评级，表示债务人的偿债能力非常强，风险非常低。

一般来说，具有Aaa评级的债务证券属于最安全的投资品种，投资者购买这类债务证券一般来说不会面临太大的风险。

Aa级和A级则依次降低，Baa级为中等评级，表示债务人的偿债能力一般，风险较低。

Ba级、B级和C级则是高风险的评级，投资者购买这类债务证券可能面临债务人不履行还款承诺的风险。

C级为最低评级，表示债务人已经违约或者即将违约，投资者购买这类债务证券基本上已经不存在回收本金的可能性。

穆迪评级对于投资者来说非常重要，因为它可以帮助投资者更好地理解债务证券的风险和回报，从而做出更明智的投资决策。

穆迪评级也可以为债务人提供一个参考，帮助债务人提高债务信用质量，从而降低融资成本。

除了单项评级之外，穆迪评级还提供组合评级，即将不同债务证券组合在一起进行综合评级。

这种评级方法可以更好地反映债务人整体的偿债能力和风险水平，对于投资组合管理和风险控制非常有帮助。

最近几年，随着全球金融市场的不断发展和变化，穆迪评级也在不断创新和完善评级体系，例如引入ESG（环境、社会和治理）因素进行评级，以更好地反映债务人的全面风险。

穆迪评级还在不断加强与监管机构、投资者和债务人之间的沟通和合作，确保评级工作更加公正和透明。

穆迪评级在全球金融市场中扮演着重要的角色，为投资者提供了全面、专业的信用评级服务，帮助他们更好地管理风险、把握机会。

在未来，随着全球金融市场的不断发展和变化，穆迪评级将继续发挥其重要作用，为金融市场的稳健发展贡献力量。

第二篇示例：穆迪评级分类是指由国际知名的信用评级机构穆迪投资者服务（Moody's Investors Service）所进行的对各种金融产品、企业和政府的信用评级分类。