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Rating MethodologyA Guide to Moody's Sovereign Ratings 1Summary The purpose of this guide is to provide a map of Moody's sovereign ratings. It presents the main analytical consider-ations that contribute to the various ratings and explains how these combine with each other. The guide seeks to answer questions concerning the definition of concepts, their rationale and interaction, rather than providing quantita-tive and qualitative rating criteria - which will be outlined in a forthcoming rating methodology.A sovereign entity exercises total authority within its territory. What makes sovereign credits distinctive is pre-cisely that governments - whatever their source of legitimacy - have the capacity to alter the "internal" rules that apply to private agents within their jurisdiction (risk of interference) and cannot be compelled to respect "outside" rules unless they have specifically agreed to do so (risk of indifference).There are two types of sovereign ratings:•Government Bond Rating: Aims at measuring the risk that a government may default on its own obligations ineither local or foreign currency. It takes into account both the ability and willingness of a government to repay its debt in a timely manner.•Foreign and local currency ceilings: Aim at assessing possible governmental interference on the capacity of othereconomic agents to repay debt. Foreign currency country ceilings assess transfer risk - the risk that foreign cur-rency debt payments and deposits may be restricted by the government. The local currency deposit ceiling reflects the risk of a disruption or shutdown of the domestic payments system as well as the ability of monetary authorities to support banks during possible banking crises. The local currency ceiling indicates - on the basis of economic,financial and structural criteria - the highest rating for an issuer domiciled within a given country. These ceilings cap, under certain conditions, the ratings of specific securities and/or issuers.The guide begins with an overview of Moody's sovereign ratings. It then defines the main concepts along with their analytical underpinnings. Finally, it outlines how these different concepts interact with each other.1.This report, originally published in August 2006 as a Special Comment, is being republished as a Rating Methodology . The content of the publication has not been changed or updated.LondonPierre Cailleteau44.20.7772.5454New YorkGuido Cipriani 1.212.553.1658Kristin LindowSingaporeTom Byrne 65.6398.8300ContactPhoneDecember 2008*Table of contentsMoody's Sovereign Ratings: An Overview (3)Government Local and Foreign Currency Bond Ratings (4)What do sovereign ratings mean? (4)Local currency and foreign currency bond ratings (4)Foreign and Local Currency Ceilings (5)Foreign currency ceilings for bonds and notes (6)Foreign currency ceilings for bank deposits (7)Local currency bank deposit ceilings (7)Local currency ceilings (8)Moody’s Sovereign Ratings: a schematic (9)2Moody’s Rating MethodologyMoody's Sovereign Ratings: An OverviewGENERAL PRESENTATIONThere are two major approaches to Moody's sovereign ratings:1.Local currency vs. foreign currency2.Creditworthiness of the government vs. the risk of sovereign interferenceDEFINITIONSMoody’s Rating Methodology3Government Local Currency and Foreign Currency Bond RatingsWHAT DO GOVERNMENT BOND RATINGS MEAN?Moody's bond ratings are opinions about creditworthiness. When applied to a given government, they reflect the credit risk facing an investor who holds debt securities issued by that government.Expected credit loss (EL) is the product of a probability of default (PD) and a hypothesis concerning the loss-given-default (LGD).While Moody's sovereign bond ratings process takes into consideration a number of economic, financial, social and political parameters that may affect a government's creditworthiness, the outcome - the rating - is strictly con-strued as assessing credit risk. Therefore, one cannot directly infer general assessments about a country's economic prosperity, dynamism, competitiveness or governance from Moody's government bond ratings. Note, however, that the local currency ceiling (see below) addresses more directly issues pertaining to general level country risk.The meaning of defaultMoody's defines default as any missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal.We include as defaults distressed exchanges in which: (1) the issuer offers bondholders or depositors a new security or package of securities that amount to a diminished financial obligation (debt with a lower coupon or par amount, or a less liquid deposit either because of a change in maturity or currency of denomination or required credit mainte-nance facilities); and, (2) the exchange has the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default.Moody's also classifies as a default event those situations in which an issuer delays payment for credit reasons even when payment is ultimately made within the grace period provided for in an indenture or deposit agreement.Why governments default on their debtThe probability of default for a government depends on both the ability and willingness to repay. In contrast to non-governmental economic agents that are forced to default because they no longer have the resources to repay debt, gov-ernments, by the distinctive nature of possessing sovereignty - i.e. freedom from a higher authority - can make the deliberate choice to not repay their debt. A point might be reached in which a government may decide that the eco-nomic, social and political cost of repaying the debt is higher than the economic, social and political cost of not repay-ing it according to the terms of the original contract.Another issue is that government default risk should not be confused with generic economic, political or financial risks, although they are often related. For instance, a large exchange rate depreciation may precipitate the default of one country (justifying an outright rating change), erode the shock-absorption capacity of another (justifying some downward rating pressure) or have no impact on still another government's credit metrics.LOCAL CURRENCY AND FOREIGN CURRENCY BOND RATINGSLocal currency bond ratingsLocal currency government bond ratings reflect Moody's opinion of the ability and willingness of a government to raise resources in its own currency to repay its debt to bond holders on a timely basis. The key question is the extent to which a government is able and willing to alter - if and when necessary - domestic income distribution in order to gen-erate enough resources to repay its debt on time.T wo implications can be drawn from this: assessing default risk first relies on a cost-benefit analysis to repay the debt, and, second, requires an evaluation of the government's resources (solvency risk), as well as its ability to mobilize resources in a timely fashion (liquidity risk). T o determine whether a government will punctually face debt payment streams, it is necessary to assess the possibility and associated costs of (1) raising additional taxes or cutting spending, which both expose the sovereign to the risk of dampening growth and fueling social discontent; (2) liquidating assets, risking depletion of productive national resources; or (3) obtaining monetary financing from the central bank, with the risk of undermining the monetary authority's credibility and fueling inflation.Foreign currency bond ratingsForeign currency sovereign bond ratings reflect the capacity of a government to mobilize foreign currency to repay its debt on a timely basis.4Moody’s Rating MethodologyThere is one important analytical difference between local and foreign currency government ratings. While local currency creditworthiness depends exclusively on the government's capacity and willingness to raise finance in its own currency to repay its debt, a government's default in foreign currency can also be precipitated by strains in the capacity of a non-sovereign to service its foreign currency debts.Until the late 1980's, emerging market governments were very often the main or exclusive borrowers of foreign currencies. This created a direct link between a balance of payment crisis - triggered by a current account deficit diffi-cult to finance - and a government's default in foreign currency. This link has weakened with financial liberalization and the move towards currency convertibility.In a country in which a high current account deficit would be associated with a high level of private sector foreign debt, a confidence crisis - fueling further capital outflows - might well lead to a currency crisis. A currency crisis would impact the government's creditworthiness in two possible ways: the government's own foreign currency denominated debt burden will mechanically increase, and the foreign currency resources it could mobilize - for instance the foreign exchange reserves - may have already been depleted.It follows that in the assessment of a government's foreign currency credit risk, the strength of the whole country's external position must be taken into account.The question of the possible rating gapShould government foreign currency bond ratings be lower than, identical to, or higher than local currency bond rat-ings for any given country? T wo arguments may justify local currency bond ratings being higher than foreign currency bond ratings. First, one could argue that it is easier for a government to raise finance in local currency rather than mobilize foreign currency resources. Second, it would seem prima facie that governments should be more wary of defaulting on their local currency debt rather than on their foreign currency debt - presumably held by foreigners.However, it has appeared over time that these two arguments were not always compelling in practice, and this for three principal reasons.First, financial liberalization - and especially currency convertibility - has opened the possibility that domestically generated confidence crises spill over to foreign currency debt through capital outflows and exchange rate crises. This powerful factor pleads for aligning the foreign currency and the local currency ratings in financially open countries with similar levels of local currency and foreign currency debts.Second, some countries have accumulated massive foreign reserve cushions as compared to their external debt lev-els. Naturally, experience shows that foreign reserves can be rapidly lost in times of crises. However, there may be a point in terms of foreign currency accumulation beyond which the "external" creditworthiness becomes materially stronger than the ability and willingness to service domestic currency debt.Third, as to the alleged relative reluctance to impose a burden on local currency creditors, history suggests a more nuanced view. Local currency defaults do happen, sometimes independently of foreign currency bond defaults. This may be related to the fact that a government may believe that nationals will not see a default in local currency bonds as significantly different as an additional tax - i.e. just another manifestation of sovereignty.Foreign and Local Currency CeilingsT o capture the risk of governmental interference in private agents' creditworthiness - the best example being the imposition by a government of a moratorium on foreign currency debt - Moody's has devised various analytically based rating practices.These practices, based on historical evidence and economic and financial analysis, serve either as an absolute con-straint (the foreign currency bank deposit ceiling) or as a sometimes permeable constraint (the foreign currency coun-try ceiling for bonds and notes) or simply as a prime reference (the local currency country ceiling) for the determination of non-sovereign ratings in local or foreign currency.Local Currency Foreign CurrencyBonds and Notes Local Currency Ceiling Foreign Currency Country CeilingBank Deposits Local Currency Deposit Ceiling Foreign Currency Deposit CeilingMoody’s Rating Methodology5FOREIGN CURRENCY COUNTRY CEILINGS FOR BONDS AND NOTESThe "country ceiling" generally indicates the highest ratings that can be assigned to the foreign-currency issuer rating of an entity subject to the monetary sovereignty of that country or area. This is a critical parameter for assigning for-eign currency ratings to securities in a particular country. It reflects the degree of interference that sovereign action can impose on the capacity of a non-sovereign to meet contractual obligations. The lower the ceiling, the larger the poten-tial gap between a company's local currency rating - which reflects its intrinsic economic and financial strength - and its foreign currency issuer rating. The higher the ceiling, the lower its potential influence on private sector foreign cur-rency securities' ratings, with the extreme case of a Aaa ceiling effectively indicating there is no ceiling.The nature of Moody's foreign currency ceiling has changed over time, reflecting changes in the world economy and the structure of financial markets. The analytic rationale for the existence of a ceiling was that all domestic issuers are potentially subject to foreign currency "transfer" risk - i.e., the inability to convert local currency into foreign cur-rency in order to meet external payment obligations in a timely manner. In other words, the ceiling accounts for the fact that a government confronted by an external payments crisis has the power to limit foreign currency outflows, including debt payments, of all issuers domiciled within a country, be they public sector or private sector.However, the broadening and deepening of international capital markets since the 1990s and the avoidance of a generalized moratorium by most governments facing external payments difficulties in recent years have led us to be more flexible in the application of country ceilings. Since June 2001, we have looked at each situation individually to determine if certain securities are eligible to pierce the country ceiling.The ceiling is now defined by the probability that a government would resort to a moratorium should it default. T o determine the foreign currency country ceiling, we therefore multiply the implied default risk associated with exist-ing foreign-currency government bond ratings by the risk that a moratorium would be used as a public policy tool for each country.Note that although issuer ratings cannot pierce the ceiling, bonds sold under foreign law may be rated higher than the risk of a general moratorium. The likelihood that an obligation may pierce the country ceiling depends on two fac-tors: the fundamental credit strength of the issuer (as indicated by its local currency bond rating), and the risk of sover-eign interference in times of stress. In turn, we can characterize the risk of sovereign interference as a function of three parameters: (1) the government's probability of default in foreign currency (i.e. its foreign currency bond rating); (2) the probability that, confronted with a crisis, the government will impose a moratorium; and, (3) the probability that, given a moratorium, an issuer's foreign currency debt service may be included in such a moratorium. Note that the combination of (1) and (2) provides the foreign currency ceiling.6Moody’s Rating MethodologyFOREIGN CURRENCY CEILING ON BANK DEPOSITSThe foreign currency ceiling on bank deposits specifies the highest rating that can be assigned to foreign-currency denominated deposit obligations of (1) domestic and foreign branches of banks headquartered in that domicile (even if subsidiaries of foreign banks), and (2) domestic branches of foreign banks.Moody's maintains foreign currency bank deposit ceilings that are distinct from foreign currency country ceilings for bonds and notes. While foreign currency deposit ceilings reflect the same kind of governmental interference as the Foreign Currency Ceiling for Bonds and Notes - i.e. foreign currency risk transfer - for emerging market countries, these two ceilings have been typically placed at different levels on the rating spectrum.The reason is that our experience since 1998, the year we saw our first rated foreign currency bond default, shows that when sovereigns have defaulted on any of their foreign currency obligations, in nearly 40% of the cases, there was a simultaneous default on foreign currency bank deposits (three out of eight rated defaults). At the same time, we have two instances where foreign currency bank deposits have been frozen or where there was a forced exchange absent a government default. Since slightly less than half the time FC deposit defaults were cotemporaneous with a govern-ment default, and in some cases, such deposit defaults occurred even without a government default, it is clear that FC deposit ceilings are either nearly as risky or perhaps even riskier than a FC government bond. On the other hand, out of 8 rated government bond defaults, in only one instance, Argentina, did we see an across-the-board FC payments moratorium. Therefore, we can conclude that, in general, the risk of a payments moratorium on non-sovereign FC bonds is significantly less than the risk of a government bond default. In addition, unlike FC bank deposits, we have no examples of a payments moratorium on bonds absent a government default.In about two-thirds of rated countries, the FC bank deposit ceiling is at least equal to the FC government bond rating. In about one-third of the countries, the FC deposit ceiling is one notch lower than the government bond rat-ing. This notching practice attempts to take into account the fact that it is often legally, logistically and politically eas-ier for governments to impose FC bank deposit restrictions than it is for those same government to default on their own foreign currency debt. Although there are numerous exceptions, these factors have been given greater weight for countries where the government is rated Baa3 or lower, where the risk of a sovereign credit event is by definition higher.Because, in Moody's view, in an external payments crisis, foreign currency bank deposits are the most likely instru-ments to be affected by a payments freeze (or "voluntary" rescheduling or forced exchange) foreign currency deposits cannot pierce the deposit ceiling.LOCAL CURRENCY DEPOSIT CEILINGMoody's local currency deposit ceiling is the highest rating that can be assigned to the local currency deposits of a bank domiciled within the rated jurisdiction. It reflects the risk that an important bank would be allowed to default uponMoody’s Rating Methodology7local currency deposits either due to limited local currency resources or to the imposition of a domestic deposit freeze.As such, it reflects: (1) the degree to which the authorities' ability to support an important bank may be limited due to a monetary regime that does not permit the creation of unlimited quantities of local currency; and (2) the risk of a local currency deposit freeze.The rationale is that in countries where the central bank can issue emergency liquidity – i.e. fiat currency coun-tries – the deposits in local currency at systemically important banks will be assigned the highest possible rating, which is determined by the local currency ceiling. Indeed, cases of too important to fail banks that have defaulted on local currency deposits are exceedingly rare. In countries whose central bank, for institutional or, more rarely, operational reasons, may not be able to extend emergency liquidity assistance on time – this is in particular the case of currency boards – the local currency deposit ceiling will be placed below the local currency ceiling.LOCAL CURRENCY CEILINGSThe local currency ceiling summarizes the general country-level risk (excluding foreign-currency transfer risk) that should be taken into account in assigning local currency ratings to locally-domiciled obligors or locally-originated structured transactions. It indicates the rating level that will generally be assigned to the financially strongest obliga-tions in the country with the proviso that obligations benefiting from support mechanisms based outside the country (or area) may on occasion be rated higher.As a result, local currency ceilings are typically high, and sometimes much higher than the government's local cur-rency bond rating. For instance, as indicated above, local currency deposits at a bank deemed too big to fail by mone-tary and financial authorities in a country may be less risky than claims on the government itself. The reason is that if the central bank is not prevented in practice or by statute (currency board), to offer emergency liquidity, it may well be easier for it to help a bank honor its obligations in local currency vis-à-vis depositors than for the government to mobi-lize the resources it needs to remain current on its own debt.In establishing this type of "country risk ceiling", both quantifiable and non-quantifiable criteria are relevant: (1) Is there a substantial risk of political regime change that could lead to a general repudiation of debt? (2) Does the country have a well-established system of contract law, which allows for successful suits for collection of unpaid debts, seizure of collateral etc.? (3) Does the country have a deep financial system which is effective in making payments and avoiding technical breakdowns? (4) Is the regulatory/legal environment malleable, corrupt, or unpredictable? (5) Is there a ten-dency towards hyperinflation?8Moody’s Rating MethodologyMoody’s Sovereign Ratings: a SchematicMoody’s Rating Methodology9Related ResearchRating Methodologies:Revised Foreign-Currency Ceilings to Better Reflect Reduced Risk of a Payments Moratorium in Wake of Government Default, May 2005 (97555)Revised Policy with Respect to Country Ceilings, November 2005 (95051)The Local Currency Deposit Ceiling, August 2006 (98554)Piercing the Country Ceiling: An Update, January 2005 (91215)T o access any of these reports, click on the entry above. Note that these references are current as of the date of publication of this report and that more recent reports may be available. All research may not be available to all clients.10Moody’s Rating MethodologyPAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK© Copyright 2008, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. and/or its licensors and affiliates (together, “MOODY’S ”). All rights reserved. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT LAW AND NONE OF S UCH INFORMATION MAY BE COPIED OR OTHERWIS E REPRODUCED, REPACKAGED, FURTHER TRANS MITTED, TRANS FERRED,DISSEMINATED, REDISTRIBUTED OR RESOLD, OR STORED FOR SUBSEQUENT USE FOR ANY SUCH PURPOSE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN ANY FORM OR MANNER OR BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER, BY ANY PERSON WITHOUT MOODY’S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT . All information contained herein is obtained by MOODY’S from sources believed by it to be accurate and reliable. Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error as well as other factors, however, such information is provided “as is” without warranty of any kind and MOODY’S , in particular, makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose of any such information. Under no circumstances shall MOODY’S have any liability to any person or entity for (a) any loss or damage in whole or in part caused by, resulting from, or relating to, any error (negligent or otherwise) or other circumstance or contingency within or outside the control of MOODY’S or any of its directors, officers, employees or agents in connection with the procurement, collection, compilation, analysis, interpretation, communication, publication or delivery of any such information, or (b) any direct, indirect, special, consequential,compensatory or incidental damages whatsoever (including without limitation, lost profits), even if MOODY’S is advised in advance of the possibility of such damages, resulting from the use of or inability to use, any such information. The credit ratings and financial reporting analysis observations, if any, constituting part of the information contained herein are, and must be construed solely as, statements of opinion and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, sell or hold any securities. NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY SUCH RATING OR OTHER OPINION OR INFORMATION IS GIVEN OR MADE BY MOODY’S IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATSOEVER. Each rating or other opinion must be weighed solely as one factor in any investment decision made by or on behalf of any user of the information contained herein, and each such user must accordingly make its own study and evaluation of each security and of each issuer and guarantor of, and each provider of credit support for, each security that it may consider purchasing, holding or selling. MOODY’S hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by MOODY’S have, prior to assignment of any rating, agreed to pay to MOODY’S for appraisal and rating services rendered by it fees ranging from $1,500 to approximately $2,400,000.Moody’s Corporation (MCO) and its wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary, Moody’s Investors Service (MIS), also maintain policies and procedures to address the independence of MIS’s ratings and rating processes. Information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold ratings from MIS and have also publicly reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%, is posted annually on Moody’s website at under the heading “Shareholder Relations — Corporate Governance — Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy.”T o order reprints of this report (100 copies minimum), please call 1.212.553.1658.Report Number: 98177AuthorProduction Associate Pierre Cailleteau Yelena Ponirovskaya。
三大评级机构评级标准一、穆迪评级等级含义(一)长期评级Aaa级债务的信用质量最高，信用风险最低。
Aa级债务的信用质量很高，只有极低的信用风险。
A级债务为中上等级，有低信用风险。
Baa级债务有中等信用风险。
这些债务属于中等评级，因此有某些投机特征。
Ba级债务有投机成分，信用风险较高。
B级债务为投机性债务，信用风险高。
Caa级债务信用状况很差，信用风险极高。
Ca级债务投机性很高，可能或极有可能违约，只有些许收回本金及利息的希望。
C级债务为最低债券等级，通常都是违约，收回本金及利息的机会微乎其微。
附注:修正数字1、2及3可用于Aa至Caa各级评级。
修正数字1表示该债务在所属同类评级中排位较高;修正数字2表示排位在中间;修正数字3则表示该债务在所属同类评级中排位较低。
二、标准普尔评级(一)长期信用评级AAA 偿还债务能力极强，为标准普尔给予的最高评级。
AA 偿还债务能力很强，与最高评级差别很小。
A 偿还债务能力较强，但相对于较高评级的债务/发债人，其偿债能力较易受外在环境及经济状况变动的不利因素的影响。
BBB 目前有足够偿债能力，但若在恶劣的经济条件或外在环境下其偿债能力可能较脆弱。
获得'BB'级、'B'级' CCC'级或' CC'级的债务或发债人一般被认为具有投机成份。
其中'BB'级的投机程度最低，'CC'级的投机程度最高。
这类债务也可能有一定的投资保障，但重大的不明朗因素或恶劣情况可能削弱这些保障作用。
BB 相对于其它投机级评级，违约的可能性最低。
但持续的重大不稳定情况或恶劣的商业、金融、经济条件可能令发债人没有足够能力偿还债务。
违约可能性较'BB'级高，发债人目前仍有能力偿还债务，但恶劣的商业、金融或经济B情况可能削弱发债人偿还债务的能力和意愿。
CCC 目前有可能违约，发债人须依赖良好的商业、金融或经济条件才有能力偿还债务。
资产证券化在国外，尤其在美国，经过多年的运作已相对成熟。
资产证券化资信评级，从其评级指标、评级程序、评级内容看，都在实践中趋于完善。
标准普尔（S&P ）、穆迪（Moody ）在债券信用评级方面积累了近百年的历史，在资信评估市场上占据绝对优势地位。
本文主要通过对标准普尔和穆迪对资产证券化评级方法的研究，比较二者评级过程方法运用的异同。
一、S&P 和Moody 的资产证券化评级框架标准普尔金融资产证券化评级框架主要包括：证券化资产的信用质量分析、法律和监管体系风险分析、支付结构和现金流机制分析、业务运营行政风险分析和交易对手分析五个关键领域的分析，总体上与惠誉的资产证券化的评级体系较为相似。
而穆迪金融资产证券化评级框架主要包括四个方面：资产质量分析、法律和监管体系分析、结构分析、运营和管理分析，对抵押债务凭证（CDO ）的风险分析也包括交易对手的风险分析。
图表1. 标准普尔和穆迪对资产证券化的评级框架标准普尔和穆迪对金融资产证券化的评级框架均涵盖了资产证券化评级的关键要素，尤其在资产证券化评级标的资产多元化的背景下，针对各个标的资产的特色，又做了相关改进和完善，形成了一整套评级方法，如CDO 、设备融资担保证券、汽车贷款、交易应收款、信用卡贷款、标普和穆迪资产证券化评级方法比较周美玲/文出口应收帐款担保证券、不动产担保证券等。
二、S&P和Moody的资产证券化评级方法比较（一）对证券化资产的信用质量分析标准普尔对证券化资产信用质量的分析侧重于确定在情景压力测试下的评级：●证券存续期间资产池中的基础资产出现违约或损失的比例；●如果有资产出现违约或损失，可以通过抵押、担保以及其他方式覆盖的比例；●最大债务人违约压力测试；●最大行业违约压力测试。
前两项决定了债务问题最终潜在的损失比例，而后两项决定了交易中的事件风险和模型风险。
在此基础上标准普尔采用各种分析方法和定量工具对来自内部和外部的信息进行评价，包括使用违约和现金流模型。
穆迪esg评分方法
穆迪（Moody's）ESG评分方法是指穆迪公司对企业的环境、社会和治理（ESG）表现进行评估和打分的方法。
ESG评分是指对企业在环境、社会和治理方面的表现进行评价，并给予相应的分数。
穆迪公司的ESG评分方法主要包括以下几个方面：
1. 数据收集，穆迪公司会收集关于企业ESG表现的数据，包括企业的环境管理、社会责任和治理结构等方面的信息。
2. 评分标准，穆迪公司根据一系列的评分标准对企业的ESG表现进行评价，这些标准可能涵盖环境保护、碳排放、劳工关系、董事会结构等多个方面。
3. 评分方法，穆迪公司可能采用定量和定性相结合的方法对企业的ESG表现进行评分，以确保评价的客观性和全面性。
4. 综合评定，穆迪公司会综合考虑企业在环境、社会和治理方面的表现，给出相应的ESG评分，这个评分可以帮助投资者和其他利益相关方更好地了解企业的可持续发展能力和风险。
总的来说，穆迪公司的ESG评分方法是通过收集数据、制定评
分标准、采用多种评分方法并进行综合评定，来评价企业在环境、
社会和治理方面的表现，为投资者和利益相关方提供全面的ESG信息。
这种评分方法有助于推动企业改善ESG表现，促进可持续发展。
穆迪esg评分方法摘要：一、穆迪ESG 评分的介绍- 穆迪ESG 评分的背景和重要性- 穆迪ESG 评分的发展历程二、穆迪ESG 评分的计算方法- 环境、社会和治理三个方面的评估- 信息披露和数据收集- 评分范围和等级三、穆迪ESG 评分的影响因素- 公司规模和行业类型- 国家和地区的政治、经济和社会环境- 企业的经营策略和风险管理四、穆迪ESG 评分的应用和价值- 对投资者的决策影响- 对企业的可持续发展和社会责任的影响- 对整个市场的规范和引导作用正文：穆迪ESG 评分是一种对公司在环境、社会和治理方面表现的评估体系，其目的是为投资者提供更加全面和深入的公司分析，帮助他们更好地把握投资风险和机遇。
穆迪ESG 评分的发展历程可以追溯到2007 年，当时穆迪首次推出了ESG 评估工具，并在2010 年对其进行了修订和完善。
目前，穆迪ESG 评分已经成为全球范围内最具影响力和权威性的ESG 评估体系之一。
在计算方法方面，穆迪ESG 评分首先对公司在环境、社会和治理三个方面的表现进行评估，每个方面分别包括多个细分指标。
然后，根据公司的信息披露和数据收集情况，对每个指标进行打分，并计算出公司在每个方面的平均得分。
最后，将三个方面的得分加权平均，得到公司的总体ESG 得分。
穆迪ESG 评分的影响因素包括公司规模和行业类型、国家和地区的政治、经济和社会环境，以及企业的经营策略和风险管理等方面。
其中，公司规模和行业类型是影响ESG 评分的重要因素，因为不同规模和行业的企业在环境、社会和治理方面的表现存在差异。
此外，国家和地区的政治、经济和社会环境也会对ESG 评分产生影响，因为这些因素会对企业在环境、社会和治理方面的表现产生影响。
穆迪ESG 评分的应用和价值主要体现在对投资者的决策影响、对企业的可持续发展和社会责任的影响，以及对整个市场的规范和引导作用。
首先，穆迪ESG 评分可以帮助投资者更好地了解公司在环境、社会和治理方面的表现，从而做出更加全面和准确的决策。
穆迪内部评级系统介绍由世界上最大的资信评级公司之一穆迪公司所研发设计的信用风险评估系统，是在欧美多家跨国银行被广泛应用的电子化信用风险管理系统。
该系统完全依据欧美银行的需求设计，因此在违约概率的测量、公司情况的评估、抵押物抵押价值的确定及信贷额度等级划分等方面并不一定适合于我国的实际情况。
但这一系统吸收了欧美银行多年来的信用风险控制经验，同时贯彻了新巴塞尔协议的相关要求，其内在的风险控制理念对我国商业银行信用风险控制体系的设计与完善具有相当强的借鉴意义。
故本文即对该系统作以下介绍。
穆迪系统的核心为如下公式：EL％=PD×LGD公式一这个公式涵盖了信用风险控制的全部内容。
EL％指预计损失率，PD指违约概率，LGD指违约损失率。
一、违约损失率(LGD)违约损失率（LGD）用于衡量银行在每一单位的名义风险敞口下，当借款人违约时所实际暴露的风险敞口。
它是一种与借款工具因素（即债项）相关的违约比率，其大小完全只与银行信贷额度所安排的借款工具相关，而与借款人的信用等级没有任何关系。
即对于任何一个借款人而言，如果使用的借款工具是完全相同的，那么计算出的违约损失率也必然相同；对于同一借款人而言，当其使用不同的借款工具时，违约损失率也可能会不同。
其计算公式是：违约损失率=违约敞口/名义风险敞口公式二其中，名义风险敞口指银行某一融资项目总的信贷额度风险敞口；违约敞口则是指扣除了抵押物的价值因素后的风险敞口，即当借款人出现违约时，银行实际风险暴露的数量。
违约损失率的计算步骤如下：（一）确定名义风险敞口的大小。
穆迪系统将名义风险敞口划分为表内金额和表外金额两种作区别对待。
前者即被视为实际借出的金额；后者则只是可能借出的金额，是一种或有风险。
对于表内金额，穆迪系统将其全额计算为名义风险敞口；对于不同种类的表外金额，则按照不同的比例（100％、75％、50％、20％）确定其名义风险敞口。
比如：银行保函和备用信用证等，将按照100％全额计算，因为一旦被要求，银行就必须无条件地进行全额偿付；而开立信用证等，则按照20％计算，因为银行拥有货权凭证，从而大大降低了损失可能性。
穆迪评级是全球知名的信用评级机构之一，其评级标准主要用于评估发行债券的债务人的信用质量和违约风险。
穆迪评级一般以字母代号表示，如Aaa、Aa1、Baa2等，代表不同的信用等级和评级分类。
以下是穆迪评级的标准概述：
1. 公司信用风险评级：穆迪对债务人进行评级，主要考虑其偿债能力、财务状况、经营稳定性、行业地位和市场前景等因素。
评级等级分为投资级（投资级别）和非投资级（垃圾级别）两大类，每个类别又细分为多个等级。
2. 主权评级：穆迪对国家的信用状况进行评级，主要考虑国家的经济发展、财政状况、政治稳定性、法制环境等因素。
3. 债券评级：穆迪对债券的信用质量进行评级。
评级考虑债券的发行人信用状况、债券产生的收益能力和债券偿还能力等因素。
4. 抵押贷款评级：穆迪对抵押贷款的信用风险进行评级，通常用于评价抵押贷款支持的债券或证券产品。
穆迪评级的具体评级标准比较复杂，涉及多个维度和因素的评估，包括财务状况、风险管理、市场地位、竞争力、行业前景等。
评级结果影响债务人的信用形象和融资成本。
需要注意的是，不同评级机构可能存在略微的差异，因此，对于特定的评级需求，最好查阅具体的穆迪评级标准和公告文件，以获取准确和最新的相关信息。
穆迪对中国银行的评级摘要：一、穆迪简介1.穆迪的背景与地位2.穆迪的评级方法和标准二、穆迪对中国银行的评级1.穆迪对中国银行的基本情况介绍2.穆迪对中国银行的评级过程3.穆迪对中国银行的评级结果三、评级结果的影响1.对银行业的影响2.对我国经济的影响3.对投资者和市场的启示四、我国对穆迪评级的回应1.我国官方的态度2.我国金融市场的反应正文：穆迪作为全球著名的信用评级机构，一直以其独立、公正的评级服务于全球金融市场。
穆迪的评级方法和标准以严格著称，被各国政府、金融机构以及投资者广泛认可。
近期，穆迪对中国银行进行了信用评级。
中国银行作为我国五大国有商业银行之一，拥有广泛的业务网络和客户群体。
穆迪在对中国银行的评级过程中，全面评估了中行的资本实力、盈利能力、资产质量、流动性等因素。
最终，穆迪给予中国银行较高的信用评级，反映了中行在银行业内的较高地位和良好信誉。
这一评级结果对我国银行业以及整体经济产生了一定的影响。
首先，对中国银行而言，获得较高评级意味着其在国际金融市场上将具有更强的竞争力和信誉，有利于拓展业务、降低融资成本。
其次，对整个银行业来说，穆迪的评级结果再次证明了我国银行业的实力和稳定性，有助于增强市场信心。
然而，这一评级结果也提醒银行业要警惕潜在的风险，加强风险管理和内部控制。
我国政府对穆迪的评级结果表示关注，并呼吁国内外投资者在评价我国金融机构时，要全面、客观地看待各种因素。
我国金融市场对穆迪的评级结果反应较为积极，认为穆迪的评级结果在一定程度上反映了我国金融市场的稳健性和发展潜力。
总之，穆迪对中国银行的评级结果体现了我国银行业在国内外市场的较高信誉和实力。
在未来的发展中，我国银行业应继续加强风险管理，提高经营效益，为我国经济的持续发展提供有力支持。
穆迪esg评分方法（原创版3篇）目录（篇1）1.穆迪 ESG 评分方法的背景和意义2.穆迪 ESG 评分方法的主要评价维度3.穆迪 ESG 评分方法的评级结果及其影响4.穆迪 ESG 评分方法的优点和不足正文（篇1）穆迪 ESG 评分方法是由穆迪公司开发的一种评估企业环境、社会和治理（ESG）表现的方法。
随着全球对可持续发展和企业社会责任的关注不断增加，ESG 评分方法应运而生，帮助投资者更好地理解企业的长期价值潜力，同时为企业提供改进的参考方向。
穆迪 ESG 评分方法主要从三个维度进行评价：环境、社会和治理。
其中，环境维度主要考察企业的能源消耗、碳排放、水资源管理和环境保护等方面；社会维度主要关注企业的劳动条件、员工福利、健康与安全、人权和社区参与等议题；治理维度则着眼于企业的公司治理、风险管理、董事会结构和股东权益等层面。
穆迪根据评分结果将企业分为 A、B、C、D 四个等级，评级越高，企业在 ESG 方面的表现越优秀。
评级结果不仅可供投资者参考，还可能影响企业在资本市场的表现，从而促使企业改进其 ESG 表现。
穆迪 ESG 评分方法具有以下优点：首先，该方法具有较强的系统性和全面性，覆盖了企业 ESG 的各个方面；其次，评分结果有助于投资者进行决策，为企业融资和投资提供了有益的信息；最后，该方法有助于企业了解自身在 ESG 方面的优势和不足，从而制定相应的改进措施。
然而，穆迪 ESG 评分方法也存在一些不足。
首先，由于 ESG 评分标准尚未完全统一，不同评级机构可能会得出不同的评分结果；其次，ESG 评分可能受企业所在行业和地区的影响，导致评分结果不够客观；最后，企业 ESG 表现的改善需要时间和投入，评分方法可能未能充分体现企业的改进意愿和实际成效。
总之，穆迪 ESG 评分方法作为一种评估企业 ESG 表现的工具，具有一定的参考价值。
目录（篇2）1.穆迪 ESG 评分方法的背景和意义2.穆迪 ESG 评分方法的主要评价指标3.穆迪 ESG 评分方法的评级体系和标准4.穆迪 ESG 评分方法的影响和应用5.我国企业在穆迪 ESG 评分方法中的表现和应对策略正文（篇2）一、穆迪 ESG 评分方法的背景和意义随着全球环保、社会责任和公司治理问题日益严重，投资者对企业的ESG（环境、社会和治理）表现越来越关注。
Rating Methodology Request for CommentBank Financial Strength Ratings: Revised MethodologySummaryThis report details Moody’s proposal to revise our rating methodology for assigning Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSRs) globally.1 This revision does not change the main factors that Moody’s considers in rating banks. However,the revised approach provides a single, global methodology instead of separate methodologies for mature and develop-ing markets. It also establishes specific ranges for each factor that relate to different rating categories. The updated methodology is intended to provide investors and issuers with a transparent set of guidelines allowing them to better understand our rating process and how we reach our decisions.T o this end, we have developed a rating scorecard that uses a common set of globally available financial metrics together with key qualitative factors that Moody’s analysts consider critical in evaluating a bank’s intrinsic financial strength and specific weights for each factor. This scorecard will be used by Moody’s analysts as the first step in deter-mining BFSRs. It should also enable investors and issuers to independently estimate a BFSR for most banks within two notches. This report describes the scorecard and discusses some of its limitations as well as some of the further adjust-ments that Moody’s analysts may employ in assigning BFSRs.The revised methodology is also intended to improve the consistency of Moody’s BFSRs. As previously announced, Moody’s intends to incorporate joint-default analysis (JDA) into our assessment of external support for banks later this year.2 We believe the updated BFSR methodology will help ensure that existing BFSRs are indeed “pure” measures of stand-alone financial strength and do not include external support. This is important in order to avoid double counting external support when we implement JDA for banks. We are requesting comments because we believe that the implementation of this methodology could lead to changes in the BFSRs for a significant number of banks, although we do not expect most of those to exceed 2 notches.Readers should note that this methodology is not an exhaustive treatment of every factor considered by Moody’s in assigning bank financial strength ratings, but it should enable our constituents to better understand how and why we arrive at a BFSR. Moody’s welcomes comments or suggestions on this proposal from market participants. Comments should be sent to cpc@ by September 29, 2006.1.Moody's current approach is outlined in the following Rating Methodology reports: "Bank Credit Risk -- An Analytical Framework for Banks in Developed Markets," April 1999 and "Bank Credit Risk in Emerging Markets -- An Analytical Framework," July 1999.2.Please see "Request for Comment: Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis for Systemic Support into Moody's Bank Rating Methodology ," October 2005; "Update to Proposal to Incorporate Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Rating Methodology ," April 2006; and "Bank Joint Default Analysis: Rating Methodology Update," August 2006.New YorkDavid Fanger 1.212.553.1653Rosemarie Conforte Jeanne Del Casino Greg Bauer Laura Levenstein LondonLynn Exton 44.20.7772.5454Adel Satel Antonio Carballo MadridMaria Cabanyes 34.91.310.14.54TokyoMutsuo Suzuki 81.3.5408.4000Yasunobu Doi SingaporeDeborah Schuler 65.6398.8300Hong KongJerry Chien 852.2916.1121 Contact PhoneSeptember 2006About Moody’s Bank Financial Strength RatingsBank credit risk is a function of a bank’s (i) intrinsic financial strength, (ii) the likelihood that it would benefit from external support in the case of need, and (iii) the risk that it would fail to make payments owing to the actions of a sov-ereign. Moody’s assigns credit risk ratings to banks and their debt obligations using a multi-step process that incorpo-rates both a bank’s intrinsic risk profile and specific external support and risk elements that can affect its overall credit risk.Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSRs) represent Moody’s opinion of a bank’s intrinsic safety and soundness. Assigning a BFSR is the first step in Moody’s bank credit rating process.Unlike Moody’s deposit and debt ratings, BFSRs do not address either the probability of timely payment (i.e. default risk) or the loss that an investor may suffer in the event of a missed payment (i.e. severity of loss). Instead, BFSRs are a measure of the likelihood that a bank will require assistance from third parties such as its owners, its industry group, or official institutions, in order to avoid a default. BFSRs do not take into account the probability that the bank will receive such external support, nor do they address the external risk that sovereign actions may interfere with a bank’s ability to honor its domestic or foreign currency obligations.In order to differentiate Moody’s BFSRs from our bank deposit and debt ratings, we use different rating symbols. Moody’s BFSRs range from A to E, with “A” for banks with the greatest intrinsic financial strength and “E” for banks with the least intrinsic financial strength. A “+” modifier may be appended to ratings below the “A” category and a “-”modifier may be appended to ratings above the “E” category to identify those banks which are placed higher (+) or lower (-) in a rating category.Moody’s introduced BFSRs in 1995, and currently assigns them to almost a thousand banks and deposit-taking financial institutions worldwide. The factors considered in the assignment of BFSRs were described in Moody’s last bank rating methodologies published in 1999, and continue to form the basis of our updated approach as described in this report. These include bank-specific elements such as financial fundamentals, franchise value, and business and asset diversification, as well as risk factors in the bank’s operating environment, such as the strength and prospective performance of the economy, the structure and relative fragility of the financial system, and the quality of banking reg-ulation and supervision.The following diagram shows how BFSRs fit into Moody’s overall approach to assigning bank credit ratings. The left side shows the principal factors that are used to determine a bank’s BFSR. This report describes how these are measured and analyzed to derive a BFSR.2Moody’s Rating MethodologyThe right side of the diagram summarizes the specific external support and risk elements that are combined with the BFSR to determine Moody’s local currency and foreign currency deposit and debt ratings. In October 2005 Moody’s proposed to incorporate joint-default analysis (JDA) into how it evaluates external support factors for banks; we published updates on this proposal in April and August 2006. We expect to publish and implement a final method-ology incorporating JDA into Moody’s bank credit ratings later this year.The BFSR will be mapped directly to the baseline credit assessment in Moody’s JDA framework. Like the BFSR, a baseline credit assessment is a measure of an issuer’s stand-alone default risk assuming there is no systemic or other external support. For banks, the baseline credit assessment reflects what the local currency deposit rating would be without any assumed external support from a government or other third party. In the October 2005 request for com-ment we published a mapping showing how Moody’s BFSRs translate into a baseline credit assessment for banks using Moody’s traditional alphanumeric rating scale.A more detailed discussion of how Moody’s evaluates the risk elements that affect foreign currency ratings for banks can be found in the 1999 bank rating methodologies, as well as in more recent publications.3About the Rated UniverseMoody’s currently assigns BFSRs to 959 financial institutions globally (as of August 21, 2006). These financial institu-tions generally fall under the category of deposit-taking institutions, including commercial banks, savings banks, build-ing societies, cooperative banks, thrifts, and government-owned banks. Moody’s BFSRs may also be assigned to other types of financial institutions such as multilateral development banks, government-sponsored financial institutions and national development financial institutions.In a number of countries Moody’s also assigns BFSRs to a variety of other financial institutions (such as mortgage banks or other specialized banks) that, although they do not take deposits, are still chartered and regulated as banks and usually obtain some funding from the interbank market.BFSRs are generally assigned to individual banks, including those that are subsidiaries or affiliates of another bank. Therefore, there are some banking groups that have a number of banks with different BFSRs.The rated universe is spread throughout the world, with the highest concentrations in Europe, followed by the Americas, Asia (excluding Japan), Japan and the Middle East. Rated banks range in size from over $1 trillion in total assets to as small as $150 million. Some may be truly diversified global institutions, while others may operate on an extremely limited scale in a small local market.Distribution of Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings3.Please see "Revised Country Ceiling Policy," June 2001; "Emerging Market Bank Ratings in Local and Foreign Currency: The Implications of Country Risk and Insti-tutional Support," December 2001; "The Implications of Highly Dollarized Banking Systems for Sovereign Credit Risk," March 2003; and "Piercing the Country Ceil-ing: An Update," January 2005.Moody’s Rating Methodology3The inherent riskiness of the banking business – as characterized by high leverage (equity capital of only 5-10% of total assets), illiquid assets (loans) financed by short-term liabilities (deposits), and a cyclical business environment –makes it difficult for all but a select number of banks that are generally extremely large and diversified to achieve and maintain a BFSR in the range from A to a high B. Solid, diversified and sustainable franchises and excellent manage-ment are also necessary attributes of A and B BFSRs.However, barring systemic stress and provided there is reasonable client confidence, banking, if conservatively managed without excessive risk-taking, is also a business allowing a stable generation of interest and fee income, albeit perhaps at a lower level of overall profitability. Therefore, BFSRs in the C category are generally available to a large number of banks even if they have limited scale and franchises, and average financials. Many institutions fall under this category. BFSRs of D are generally assigned to those that either are exhibiting modest capital, earnings, or business franchise, thus limiting their ability to deal with asset quality problems or other potential balance sheet risks, or are subject to unpredictable and unstable operating environments. BFSRs of E are typically restricted to those institutions that are under pressure to maintain their capital due to external and internal factors such as a highly volatile operating environment, recurring losses and asset quality problems, or a very high risk profile. However, regulatory forbearance can allow even insolvent banks to operate for an extended period of time, until the regulatory authorities arrange for either a rescue or a restructuring, or place the bank into liquidation.Industry Overview and Current Risk CharacteristicsThe global banking industry is made up of a highly varied group of firms offering a wide range of products and pursu-ing a wide range of business models and customers. While most banks face the same fundamental risks -- credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, interest rate risk, and operational risk -- the extent of such risks vary considerably depending upon the products sold, the bank’s funding profile, and the markets in which it operates.General vs. Specific RisksBanking risk can be broadly divided into general risks, which apply to all banks within a system and derive to a large extent from a country’s economic strength, and specific risks, which are the product of the bank itself. In mature mar-kets, it is rare for serious difficulties experienced by a bank to be solely attributable to general risks, even though such risks certainly do have an impact on the bank’s performance. In most cases, bank failure in mature markets is the result of factors such as mismanagement, risky strategies, structurally poor performance, and franchise collapse. It is, in gen-eral, the weak banks and the highly risky banks that are the first to suffer in a shrinking or increasingly competitive market.In developing markets, general risks loom larger. Not only can general risks be more severe, but it may also be dif-ficult for any bank to avoid the consequences of a severe economic shock (such as a massive currency devaluation) or a deep economic recession. Clearly, banks which are better managed and have stronger earnings, franchises, and balance sheets are better placed to cope with general risks. However, in cases where general risks present a significant threat to the banking system of the country in question, it may well be that no bank can be assigned a BFSR at the upper end of the scale.4Moody’s Rating MethodologyFive Broad Categories of BankingOverall, the diversity of the sector can be broken down into five broad categories of banking institutions. Many banks may actually pursue a combination of these models, but we believe it is useful to address each of them separately to clarify the different risks that different banks can face.1. Wholesale banks: These banks focus on serving large corporate or institutional customers. While many wholesale banks have traditionally focused primarily on lending (and, in some countries, making equity investments), they fre-quently offer a much broader array of services to their customers, including not just loans but also treasury manage-ment and transaction services, foreign exchange services, trade finance, derivatives, debt and equity underwriting and market-making, and insurance. Because their customers are often very large entities, wholesale banks, especially smaller ones, can have significant customer concentration risks; they may also have industry concentration risks, espe-cially if they operate primarily within a particular region or market. Also, while a portion of their activities may be funded with corporate customer deposits, typically such banks are heavily reliant upon wholesale funding from both the interbank and capital markets. Such funding can be highly confidence-sensitive, exposing the bank to substantial liquidity risk if it is not conservatively managed.4Since their customers tend to be concentrated in larger cities and economic regions, wholesale banks generally do not require as substantial a physical presence as most retail banks. With fewer fixed costs, this often means a more flex-ible cost structure. However, customers can develop strong relationships with individual bankers (instead of with the bank itself), making retention of personnel a critical element to long-term success.As discussed below, both globalization and the growth of local capital markets can pose significant challenges for wholesale banks, as more of their customers have the ability to tap the capital markets directly for funding. This can lead to greater earnings volatility, as wholesale banks increase their capital markets activities in order to retain their customers, and also expand into potentially riskier lending businesses to replace lost lending opportunities.2. Retail banks: These banks focus primarily on serving individuals and/or small and middle market businesses. They may offer a wide array of products, including deposit-taking and lending, asset management and insurance, cash man-agement and transaction services, and even trade finance and foreign exchange services. A defining feature of such banks is that they are often locally or regionally focused. This reflects the retail nature of the customer base. While some functions may be centralized, direct customer interaction remains an important part of the service most retail banks provide. Given the wide dispersion of potential customers (both individuals and businesses), and their preference for local interaction, this requires a physical presence in the form of retail branches. Many retail banks also site their branches in clusters to benefit from classic network economies, although this is not always the case. (This is especially true for retail banks serving individuals; retail banks serving only small and middle market businesses may have less need for clusters of branches, but are still likely to require more branches than a wholesale bank.) As retail banks grow, they may develop more and more clusters of branches, growing from merely a local or regional presence into a national or even international one. Nonetheless, even an international retail bank can usually best be thought of as a combination of local retail banks.Given the need to have a significant physical infrastructure and to support significant daily customer transaction volumes, most retail banks have fairly inflexible cost structures. This makes stable revenue generation critical. T o address this need, most retail banks focus on generating recurring business with relationship customers and increasing the level of cross-selling of products including insurance products. Because their customers are small, retail banks do not usually have significant customer concentration risks; however, they may still have industry concentration risks since they frequently operate within a particular region.5Retail banks are often funded primarily with customer deposits. However, pressure to grow assets and earnings, especially in more mature markets, can lead to loan growth that far outstrips deposit growth. Such banks must rely more heavily upon wholesale funding, which can pressure net interest margins, reducing the bank’s profitability, while at the same time also exposing it to greater liquidity risk and interest rate risk.As discussed below, both de-regulation and technological innovation can pose a significant threat to retail banks because they provide their customers with greater access to competing products through alternative distribution chan-nels, and may also reduce competitors’ costs to provide those products. While retail banking has not traditionally pos-sessed much in the way of economies of scale, to the extent that such technological innovations create economies of scale, it may pose even greater challenges to the smaller retail providers.4.Please see discussion of Liquidity Management under Rating Factor 2.5.Please see discussion on Credit Risk Concentrations under Rating Factor 2.Moody’s Rating Methodology53. Universal banks: These banks are not so much a separate business model from either retail banks or wholesale banks, but rather are usually characterized by a combination of retail banking and wholesale banking, frequently also combined with activities such as private banking, asset management, or insurance. Universal banks often rank among the largest banks in a country. Universal banking can potentially provide greater earnings diversification as well as a more stable funding profile (to the extent that the more deposit-rich retail banking activities provide funding for some of the wholesale activities) than either retail banking or wholesale banking can provide on their own. However, the complexity of managing a universal bank can require considerable managerial resources. Furthermore, the disparate activities of a universal bank can at times pose conflicts of interest which, if not carefully managed, can cause reputation damage, harming the franchise. In some jurisdictions, the complexity of a universal bank also raises questions about the depth or effectiveness of regulatory oversight over such disparate activities.4. Policy banks: Moody’s defines policy banks as state-owned institutions that have explicit or implicit public policy mandates. Some state-owned banks have specific public policy mandates. These banks are often heavily dependent on government-directed business, which may or may not be profitable. Other state-owned banks, while not subject to specific public policy mandates, may still have to contend with bureaucratic controls and pressure from politicians that forces them to lend to certain favored industries or regions. Even though such banks may have substantial market shares, they frequently have weak earnings, lack strong management, and suffer from poor asset quality and controls. This usually translates into low BFSRs, although such banks also usually benefit from regulatory forbearance or other forms of government assistance, providing support to their deposit and debt ratings. Even when well run, policy banks usually still have substantial industry concentrations, reflecting their reason for being or the limitations of their char-ters.5. Specialized banks: These are niche players, most often specialized lenders such as mortgage banks, development banks, public-sector lenders, credit card banks, or export-finance entities. Some are the legacy of past government pol-icies and regulatory barriers that disappeared following deregulation and liberalization, while others were formed as a direct result of deregulation and technological innovation. Because they often have limited product offerings and/or a limited customer base, specialized banks can be more vulnerable to competitive pressures or changing economic con-ditions. However, some specialized banks, either by virtue of still-strong regulatory barriers or through substantial economies of scale and a dominant market share, usually combined with a focus on less volatile loan products such as public sector lending or mortgages, can still support high BFSRs. As with wholesale banks, specialized banks are typi-cally heavily reliant upon wholesale funding. Such funding can be highly confidence-sensitive, exposing the bank to substantial liquidity risk if it is not conservatively managed.Although the risks are somewhat different, we also include captive banks in this category. Captives are usually owned or controlled by an industrial corporation and are used to provide financing for customers purchasing products sold by the corporation, and/or to provide internal financing to the corporate and its affiliates, serving in essence as the corporate’s treasury function. Similar to other specialized banks, captives tend to have limited product offerings and a limited customer base. Even when they are lending to customers rather than to the corporate itself, their performance can still be significantly affected by the performance of the corporate.Key Industry Risks: Transformation Will Continue, Whether Banks are Ready or NotThe global banking industry is in the midst of a significant transformation, driven by substantial changes in the busi-ness environment. This transformation, begun in some countries well over a decade ago, is now occurring at different rates of change in most countries around the world. While much of the change is occurring in mature markets, devel-oping markets are also affected. These developments pose significant challenges and risks for all banks. Many banks are struggling to adjust to the substantial changes already underway. Moody’s expects that many banks will not succeed in making the transformation, and will either be driven to consolidate with a more successful competitor or will gradu-ally weaken as its franchise and earnings power are eroded away. Six major catalysts are driving this transformation. •Deregulation – is breaking down barriers within the banking industry in many countries and enabling banks to adopt diversification strategies and to compete against each other on a level playing field. In some countries it is also allowing for the entrance of new specialized competitors.•Disintermediation – a byproduct of deregulation, it is brought about by financial liberalization and the expansion of capital markets, allowing both borrowers and investors to bypass banks in favor of capital market products. The growing trend towards privatization of pension funds is also creating a growing pool of funds managed by invest-ment professionals, helping to fuel this trend.•Technological Innovation – is reducing transaction and information costs, facilitating the creation of new distri-bution channels, and allowing for innovation in retail lending (data mining), funding (securitization), and risk management (derivatives). At the same time, such technologies may also be creating potential economies of scale where none previously existed.6Moody’s Rating Methodology•Globalization – pressures banks to follow their business customers around the world, and forces them to compete with other banks globally for those customers’ business. Globalization gives banks in developing markets access to growing pools of funding due to the growth of global capital markets. However, many banks obtaining first-time access to wholesale funding have shown themselves to be ill-equipped for the liquidity risks such funding can pose. •Privatization – Governments are increasingly seeking to get out of the business of banking. While this is clearly not universal, and in some cases is being done with great reluctance, nonetheless the privatization of formerly state-owned banks could potentially reduce subsidized competition, benefiting all banks competing in the same market. However, the social or political costs of such actions may be more than some governments are willing to tolerate. And for the management of formerly state-owned banks it can be a considerable challenge to develop a credit culture based on analyzing a client’s ability to repay loans, as opposed to relying on imputed state guaran-tees.•Increased shareholder power – with more banks being owned by private investors and with more investment funds being managed by professional investors, banks globally are facing increasing pressure from powerful insti-tutional shareholders for higher returns. T o remain competitive in this more unforgiving market, banks are increasingly shifting to shareholder value-creation strategies, which may not always benefit bondholders. Framework for Assigning Bank Financial Strength RatingsMoody’s bank ratings reflect our opinion of long-term relative risk and are, of necessity, forward-looking in nature because they apply to liabilities that may pay out over long periods of time. Historical experience has shown that look-ing only at the current financial condition of a bank is not always an accurate predictor of its future financial perfor-mance and financial strength. We believe there are significant qualitative factors which play an important role in determining the stability and predictability of a bank’s financial performance over time. Thus Moody’s analytical approach includes significant qualitative analysis in addition to quantitative analysis, and incorporates the opinions and judgments of experienced analysts.As noted above, the factors considered in the assignment of Bank Financial Strength Ratings were described in Moody’s last bank rating methodologies published in 1999, and remain at the basis of the updated methodology. We focus on five key rating factors that we believe are critical to understanding a bank’s financial strength and risk pro-file. They are:1. Franchise Value2. Risk Positioning3. Regulatory Environment4. Operating Environment5. Financial FundamentalsIn the following sections we review the five key rating factors, discuss why each factor is important to our BFSRs, and explain the relevant metrics or “sub-factors” that we use to measure performance for each key rating factor. Some of the metrics that we consider important are purely quantitative, while others include elements of qualitative judg-ment or – where hard data is not reasonably accessible — educated estimates. For those involving a qualitative assess-ment, we have provided qualitative descriptions that we believe help to differentiate among risk profiles at different banks. T o dampen the cyclical nature of the industry, most of the financial metrics we use are three-year averages.For each of these factors, the methodology outlines in a summary mapping table either the range of financial met-rics or the qualitative description that would typically correspond with a given BFSR level, ranging from A to E. Evaluating OutliersIt is unlikely that every bank’s BFSR will be consistent with the rating level guidelines for every rating factor. This is because a bank typically has a variety of strengths and weaknesses which combine to reflect its overall financial risk profile. For those banks that show up as frequent outliers for their respective rating category, there could be several different explanations. The most obvious one would be that there is likely pressure on its BFSR, either up or down. But there also may be unique characteristics of the bank’s accounting, regulatory or market environment that limit the comparability of certain key factors and metrics. And finally, some elements of the bank’s business or financial profile may receive greater weight in our analysis.Moody’s Rating Methodology7。
