下载文档原格式
约翰·穆勒《功利主义》目录第一章绪论第二章功利主义的含义第三章论功利原则的最终约束力第四章论功利原则能够得到何种证明第五章论功利与正义的联系术语对照表第一章绪论行为对错的标准究竟是什么，这个问题虽然争议不断，却始终没有取得多少实质性的进展。
就目前的人类知识状况来看，没有什么比这种情形更加出乎人的意料之外了，也没有什么比这种情形更加能够表明，自哲学诞生以来，“至善”[1]的问题或者说是道德基础的问题，始终被认为是思辨领域中的主要问题，使得多少聪明才俊为它苦思冥想，因它而分成各个门派，相互攻讦，争论不休。
两千多年以前，青年苏格拉底在倾听了老年普罗塔哥拉[2]的见解之后，就主张功利主义的理论而反对当时所谓智者的流行道德（假如柏拉图所著的“对话”是根据真实的谈话撰写的），可是到了两千多年之后的今天，同样的讨论却仍在继续，哲学家们仍然分列于同样的战斗旗帜之下，无论是思想家还是一般人，在这个问题上看来都仍然没有更加接近于取得一致意见。
[1] 原文为拉丁文summum bonum，英文的意思是“highest good”或“good at the top”。
——译者注[2] Protagoras（前485一前410），古希腊哲学家，智者学派的代表人物，名言为“人是万物的尺度”。
——译者注诚然，各门科学的第一原理都存在着这类混乱的情形和不确定性，有时还存在着类似的争议，哪怕是它们之中最确定无疑的科学亦即数学也不例外；然而，这种情形并没有严重地损害各门科学的结论的可信性，一般来说确实毫无损害。
这看来有悖常理，其实道理很简单，因为一门科学的详细学说通常并不是从它的所谓第一原理推演出来的，其证据也并不依赖于它的所谓第一原理。
假如科学的详细学说都是从它的所谓第一原理推演出来的，其证据都要依赖于它的所谓第一原理，那么就没有比代数更不可靠的科学了，也没有比代数的结论更不充分的科学结论了；因为那些由最杰出的教师写下来的代数基本原理，就像英国法律一样充满了随意性，并且像神学一样神秘，而代数的可靠无疑，没有一点是来自平时教给学生的代数基本原理的。
边沁式的功利主义穆勒的功利主义哲学是对边沁的功利主义哲学的一种改良。
边沁首次对近代功利主义进行了一个比较全面的阐述。
边沁认为，感觉经验是道德知识在内的一切知识的最根本而又真实的基础，因此，伦理道德也不能不建立在为人类经验所认可的人的趋乐避苦的本性和自我利益的追求的基础上。
简而言之，边沁认为我们追求的是幸福或者快乐的最大化。
边沁认为道德的最高原则就是幸福最大化。
这种最大化来源于人的两种感受，快乐与痛苦，当快乐减去痛苦就是我们追求的幸福。
这种边沁式功利主义的最好例证，就是被人们广泛应用于生活各个方面的得失分析。
得失分析将花费与带来的利益进行金钱的价值衡量。
如果获得的收益高于损失，那么这种方案就被认为是可以给人们带来利益的。
利益的多少是之后考虑的事情，总体带来利益的结果本身就符合边沁功利主义的思想。
边沁的功利最大化思想简洁明了容易被人接受，但是这种思想却受到了一种观点的强烈批评：假使承认功利最大化的思想，但是，我们并不能将每一种快乐或者痛苦都转化成价值来进行衡量。
换言之，我们不能在同一尺度上比较和衡量所有的价值和物品。
边沁将所有的价值都纳入一个衡量尺度。
快乐就是快乐，痛苦就是痛苦。
评判一种体验与其他相比是更好还是更坏的唯一基础，就是它所产生的快乐或痛苦的强度和持久度。
换言之，快乐或者痛苦并没有质的区别，唯一的区别就是量的区别。
图片高级快乐和低级快乐针对边沁将所有快乐和痛苦都纳入一个衡量尺度的批评。
穆勒在《功利主义》中对边沁的功利主义进行了修正。
穆勒认为我们可以区分高级快乐和低级快乐，即我们不仅仅评估快乐的数量和强度还评估快乐的质量。
可是如何在两种快乐之间进行区分呢？换句话说，高级快乐与低级快乐的衡量标准是什么？穆勒在《功利主义》中解释为：对于两种快乐而言，如果所有或几乎所有体验过这两种快乐的人，都对其中某一种表现出明确的偏好，而不顾及任何道德责任感去偏爱它，那么这种快乐就是更加值得追求的快乐。
这种衡量方式是对边沁功利主义哲学的修正，同时这种修正是以边沁功利主义的欲望为基础，按欲望的偏好来区分高级快乐和低级快乐。
从《功利主义》看穆勒之幸福论摘要：围绕穆勒《功利主义》关于幸福的论证，论文对功利主义幸福论之逻辑进行了系统的解读，揭示了功利主义视域下幸福论的内涵。
穆勒之幸福论从功利主义的价值准则即追求最大多数人的最大幸福、幸福是可得的、幸福是作为一个整体而被欲求这三个方面展开铺陈。
笔者认为，《功利主义》对人类社会的发展产生过积极作用，但其幸福论在一定程度上对人类社会的继续发展产生了负面影响。
对此我们必须进行深刻的探讨和反思。
关键词：儒家；幸福；穆勒；功利主义穆勒在《功利主义》中，围绕着“功利”构筑了一个关于幸福的逻辑整体，从三个层面展开：其一，功利主义的价值准则是追求最大多数人的最大幸福；其二，幸福是可得的；其三，幸福是作为一个整体而被欲求的，其他一切或是幸福的组成部分，或是达到幸福的手段。
一、最多数人的最大幸福探究人类思想史上的道德标准为何难以定论，不可忽视的是相较于以客观存在为研究对象的自然科学具有一种确定性，人文学科却是以人的目的为标准，故人类所有行为均屈从于目的，由于人类的行为目的往往出于各自不同的利益，使得是非善恶标准差异化、多元化、不确定化。
由此，穆勒认为，唯有找到人类共同追寻的目的，才能为人类的行为提供是非善恶标准。
“最大幸福原则”就是穆勒为人类行为找到的终极目的。
“这一终极目标在功利主义理论中被视为人类行为的目的，它必然也是整个道德的标准，故也可以将其定义为人类行为的准则。
”①为了证明最大幸福原则，他将“幸福”进行分类，并认为公共幸福的实现高于个人幸福的实现。
穆勒主张“功利”为最大幸福之根本，“最大幸福原理：需要坚持旨在促进幸福的行为即为‘是’，与幸福背道而驰的行为即为‘非’。
幸福意味着预期中的快乐，意味着痛苦的远离；不幸福则代表了痛苦，代表了快乐的缺失”。
②快乐和痛苦就像硬币的两个面一样构成了最大幸福。
“追求快乐，摆脱痛苦是人唯一渴望达到的目的。
”③减少或避免痛苦是实现幸福的途径之一，也是最大限度地增加幸福净余额的重要手段。
约翰斯图尔特密尔（John Stuart Mill，1806年5月20日—1873年5月8日），也译作约翰斯图亚特穆勒，英国著名哲学家和经济学家，19世纪影响力很大的古典自由主义思想家。
他支持边沁的功利主义。
边沁的功利主义对穆勒的思想的影响也是不容忽视的一个重要方面。
边沁同穆勒之父是知交,穆勒从小就常常拜访边沁,逐渐接受了边沁的功利主义学说,这对穆勒的经济思想的形成和发展有深远影响。
穆勒从法国返回后,其父曾打算让他学习法律,以便日后从事律师工作,一方面指导他学习罗马法,一方面让他阅读介绍边沁学说的书籍。
这使他的思想产生了很大变化,据穆勒自己说,边沁的功利主义立法原理将此前的道德立法理论完全推翻了。
在穆勒看来,边沁功利主义关于“最大多数人的最大利益”的原理尤其具有重要意义,因为它既表明了人类道德行为的动力不是个人的自私利益,而是最大多数人的最大幸福；也表明道德伦理的是非标准应是效果,而不是动机,这效果就是最大多数人的最大利益。
功利主义的这些原理成为穆勒观察问题的根本观念和哲学思想。
1823年穆勒发起组织了一个研讨边沁功利主义的学会。
约翰.穆勒（1806——1873），他倒是个非常务实的人，在他的作品中大多是以经验主义立场来论述他的功利主义思想，我们看不出他有任何形而上的困惑，只求行之有效，所以他本身的这种特性让他的学说在近代产生了无比重要的影响，使得功利主义学说有力地渗透到各个领域，我在这里只是简单介绍一下奠定他近代功利主义创始人之一的伦理学名著《功利主义》中的部分重要思想。
他立论的根据是“最大幸福原理”即人生的终极目的，就是在数量和质量上尽可能多的满足大多数人的幸福（难怪尼采要不厌其烦的骂他）。
他的所有论述都是根据这一原理展开的。
可以想到，他本人并不承认道德原则是先验自明的，“一切第一原理，我们知识的第一前提以及我们行为的第一前提，都是无法得到推理证明。
”（*第四章论功利原则能够得到何种证明）他所注重的是道德的社会功用，并且强调个人要在什么样情况下考虑自己或他人的利益，“任何人（百分之九十九点九的人）只有在例外时，才有能力大规模地增加幸福，换言之，才有能力成为一个公众的施主；唯有在这样的时刻，才能要求他考虑公众的功利；而在任何其他的情况下，他必须加以考虑的只是私人的功利，只是少数几个人的利益或幸福。
UTILITARIANISMBy John Stuart Mill 1863Chapter 1General Remarks.THERE ARE few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human knowledge, more unlike what might have been expected, or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the most important subjects still lingers, than the little progress which has been made in the decision of the controversy respecting the criterion of right and wrong. From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought, has occupied the most gifted intellects, and divided them into sects and schools, carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another. And after more than two thousand years the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject, than when the youth Socrates listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato's dialogue be grounded on a real conversation) the theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality of the so-called sophist.It is true that similar confusion and uncertainty, and in some cases similar discordance, exist respecting the first principles of all the sciences, not excepting that which is deemed the most certain of them, mathematics; without much impairing, generally indeed without impairing at all, the trustworthiness of the conclusions of those sciences. An apparent anomaly, the explanation of which is, that the detailed doctrines of a science are not usually deduced from, nor depend for their evidence upon, what are called its first principles. Were it not so, there would be no science more precarious, or whose conclusions were more insufficiently made out, than algebra; which derives none of its certainty from what are commonly taught to learners as its elements, since these, as laid down by some of its most eminent teachers, are as full of fictions as English law, and of mysteries as theology. The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the lastresults of metaphysical analysis, practised on the elementary notions with which the science is conversant; and their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed to light. But though in science the particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary might be expected to be the case with a practical art, such as morals or legislation. All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient. When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained it.The difficulty is not avoided by having recourse to the popular theory of a natural faculty, a sense or instinct, informing us of right and wrong. For- besides that the existence of such- a moral instinct is itself one of the matters in dispute- those believers in it who have any pretensions to philosophy, have been obliged to abandon the idea that it discerns what is right or wrong in the particular case in hand, as our other senses discern the sight or sound actually present. Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments; it is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in the concrete. The intuitive, no less than what may be termed the inductive, school of ethics, insists on the necessity of general laws. They both agree that the morality of an individual action is not a question of direct perception, but of the application of a law to an individual case. They recognise also, to a great extent, the same moral laws; but differ as to their evidence, and the source from which they derive their authority. According to the one opinion, the principles of morals are evident a priori, requiring nothing to command assent, except that the meaning of the terms be understood. According to the other doctrine, right and wrong, as well as truth and falsehood, are questions of observation and experience. But both hold equally that morality must be deduced from principles; and the intuitive school affirm as strongly as the inductive, that there is a science of morals. Yet they seldom attempt to make out a list of the a priori principles which are toserve as the premises of the science; still more rarely do they make any effort to reduce those various principles to one first principle, or common ground of obligation. They either assume the ordinary precepts of morals as of a priori authority, or they lay down as the common groundwork of those maxims, some generality much less obviously authoritative than the maxims themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining popular acceptance. Yet to support their pretensions there ought either to be some one fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality, or if there be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence among them; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to be self-evident.To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency have been mitigated in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of mankind have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of any distinct recognition of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete survey and criticism, of past and present ethical doctrine. It would, however, be easy to show that whatever steadiness or consistency these moral beliefs have, attained, has been mainly due to the tacit influence of a standard not recognised. Although the non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of men's actual sentiments, still, as men's sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility, or as Bentham latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority. Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material and even predominant consideration in many of the details of morals, however unwilling to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of morality, and the source of moral obligation. I might go much further, and say that to all those a priori moralists who deem it necessary to argue at all, utilitarian arguments are indispensable. It is not my present purpose to criticise these thinkers; but I cannot help referring, for illustration, to a systematic treatise by one of the most illustrious of them, the Metaphysics of Ethics, by Kant. This remarkable man, whose system of thought will long remain one of the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, does, in the treatise in question, lay down a universal first principle as the origin and ground of moral obligation; it is this: "So act, thatthe rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational beings." But when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur.On the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of the other theories, attempt to contribute something towards the understanding and appreciation of the Utilitarian or Happiness theory, and towards such proof as it is susceptible of. It is evident that this cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. The medical art is proved to be good by its conducing to health; but how is it possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good, for the reason, among others, that it produces pleasure; but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good? If, then, it is asserted that there is a comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a mean, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof. We are not, however, to infer that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognisance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof.We shall examine presently of what nature are these considerations; in what manner they apply to the case, and what rational grounds, therefore, can be given for accepting or rejecting the utilitarian formula. But it is a preliminary condition of rational acceptance or rejection, that the formula should be correctlyunderstood. I believe that the very imperfect notion ordinarily formed of its meaning, is the chief obstacle which impedes its reception; and that could it be cleared, even from only the grosser misconceptions, the question would be greatlysimplified, and a large proportion of its difficulties removed. Before, therefore, I attempt to enter into the philosophical grounds which can be given for assenting to the utilitarian standard, I shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine itself; with the view of showing more clearly what it is, distinguishing it from what it is not, and disposing of such of the practical objections to it as either originate in, or are closely connected with, mistaken interpretations of its meaning. Having thus prepared the ground, I shall afterwards endeavour to throw such light as I can upon the question, considered as one of philosophical theory.Chapter 2What Utilitarianism Is.A PASSING remark is all that needs be given to the ignorant blunder of supposing that those who stand up for utility as the test of right and wrong, use the term in that restricted and merely colloquial sense in which utility is opposed to pleasure. An apology is due to the philosophical opponents of utilitarianism, for even the momentary appearance of confounding them with any one capable of so absurd a misconception; which is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the contrary accusation, of referring everything to pleasure, and that too in its grossest form, is another of the common charges against utilitarianism: and, as has been pointedly remarked by an able writer, the same sort of persons, and often the very same persons, denounce the theory "as impracticably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and as too practicably voluptuous when the word pleasure precedes the word utility." Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the useful means these, among other things. Yet the common herd, including the herd of writers, not only in newspapers and periodicals, but in books of weight and pretension, are perpetually falling into this shallow mistake. Having caught up the word utilitarian, while knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they habitually express by it the rejection, or the neglect, of pleasure in some of its forms; of beauty, of ornament, or of amusement. Nor is the term thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparagement, but occasionally in compliment;as though it implied superiority to frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment. And this perverted use is the only one in which the word is popularly known, and the one from which the new generation are acquiring their sole notion of its meaning. Those who introduced the word, but who had for many years discontinued it as a distinctive appellation, may well feel themselves called upon to resume it, if by doing so they can hope to contribute anything towards rescuing it from this utter degradation.** The author of this essay has reason for believing himself to be the first person who brought the word utilitarian into use. He did not invent it, but adopted it from a passing expression in Mr. Galt's Annals of the Parish. After using it as a designation for several years, he and others abandoned it from a growing dislike to anything resembling a badge or watchword of sectarian distinction. But as a name for one single opinion, not a set of opinions- to denote the recognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of applying it- the term supplies a want in the language, and offers, in many cases, a convenient mode of avoiding tiresome circumlocution.The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded- namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit- they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modernholders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former- that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moralobligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable: we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness- that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior- confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good.It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not becausethey deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is suspectible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutationsuperfluous.According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.Against this doctrine, however, arises another class of objectors, who say that happiness, in any form, cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action; because, in the first place, it is unattainable: and they contemptuously ask, what right hast thou to be happy? a question which Mr. Carlyle clenches by the addition, What right, a short time ago, hadst thou even to be? Next, they say, that men can do without happiness; that all noble human beings have felt this, and could not have become noble but by learning the lesson of Entsagen, or renunciation; which lesson, thoroughly learnt and submitted to, they affirm to be the beginning and necessary condition of all virtue.The first of these objections would go to the root of the matter were it well founded; for if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings, the attainment of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational conduct. Though, even in that case, something might still be said for the utilitarian theory; since utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness, but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness; and if the former aim be chimerical, there will be all the greater scope and more imperative need for the latter, so long at least as mankind think fit to live, and do not take refuge in the simultaneous act of suicide recommended under certain conditions by Novalis. When, however, it is thus positively asserted to be impossible that human life should be happy, the assertion, if not something like a verbal quibble, is at least an。
《功利主义》读书报告一、书名：《功利主义》（徐大建译）出版社：上海人民出版社，2008年版二、种类：专著三、作者：[英]约翰·斯图加特·穆勒（1806—1873）又译作密尔翻译：徐大建四、主要内容：分两大部分本书，序言和正文，下面是本书的主要内容：（一）译者序：作者对功利主义的起源与发展做了主要概括，包括近现代西方学者对古典功利主义的批判和发展，如西季威克、黑尔、罗斯特等。
除此之外，作者还重点对正文内容做了分章概括，并提出来自己的观点。
（二）正文：正文主要分四章内容：1、“功利主义的含义”首先对功利主义的基本观点做了全面的澄清。
穆勒指出，“行为的对于错，与它们增进幸福或造成不行的倾向成正比。
所谓幸福，是指幸福和免除痛苦；所谓不幸，是指痛苦和丧失快乐”。
即判定行为对错的唯一最终道德标准是看行为是否能够增进认得幸福或快乐。
并提出“唯有快乐和免除痛苦是值得欲求的目的”。
在此基础上，对“幸福”或“快乐”的概念做了进一步澄清。
穆勒认为，功利主义所谓的幸福或快乐不是指动物的幸福或快乐，而是指人的幸福或快乐，即在经验基础上的理智快乐，而非单纯的感官的快乐。
关于功利主义与传统道德之间的关系，穆勒指出判断行为的正当与否的标准，不是行为者自己的幸福，而是一切相关的人们的幸福，所以他说功利主义不反对自我牺牲，但反对把自我牺牲看作善事。
因为“一种幸福如果没有增进或不会增进幸福的总量，那么就是浪费。
”2、功利主义的道德标准这一章中，穆勒提出功利主义的道德标准对人们的约束力既有外在的，又有内在的。
他意识到边沁过分强调外在的道德制裁，而他则提出内在的即良心这种感情，并指出良心是在做出违反行为后，由感情转化成的一种悔恨的特殊感情。
3、功利主义道德标准的证明关于功利主义道德标准的证明问题，穆勒的大致思路是要么根据原理推理，要么是诉诸实施，而功利主义的原理只能依靠后者，即“我认为，要证明任何东西值得欲求，唯一可能的证据是人们实际上欲求它。
《功利主义》读书报告20141303031 广告1401 林曼纯一、《功利主义》的结构从《功利主义》的目录来看，这本书包含6个部分，绪论、功利主义的含义、论功利主义的最终约束力、论功利主义原则能够得到何种证明、论功利与正义的联系、术语对照表。
二、《功利主义》的作者《功利主义》是19世纪英国著名哲学家，经济学家，政治评论家约翰·穆勒撰写的伦理学名著。
于1861年在《弗雷泽杂志》发表，1863年以单性本出版。
晚清末年，穆勒的政治学著作《论自由》（严复翻译为《群己权界论》）1859年出版。
方法学名著《逻辑学体系》（严复翻译《穆勒名学》）1843年出版。
20世纪初就开始影响中国的思想界。
还有其他方面的著作如《政治经济学原理》（1848，商务印书馆）《代议制政府》（1861，商务印书馆）。
可见穆勒是一个百科全书式的人才，在伦理学，经济学，社会学等领域皆有所研究。
让我最惊讶的是，穆勒既没有受过正规教育，更没有上过大学，他的全部教育都是在家里（父亲教导）完成的。
他的学习经历让人惊叹。
3岁，古希腊文8岁，拉丁文，欧几里得几何学，代数学12岁，经院逻辑学13岁，政治经济学（亚当斯密，李嘉图）14-15岁，化学和植物学，探讨高深的数学问题，精通法语所以他比一般的同龄人早熟25年。
除此之外，他的工作经历及学术研究经历也让人惊叹。
17岁，东印度公司高级职员；52岁退休。
工作35年。
他在35年的工作时间里，利用空闲的时间，取得了很大的学术研究成果。
读《功利主义》这本书的理由读这本书，了解现代西方文明。
三、其他的思想流派自由主义的三种派别：自由平等主义；自由至上主义和功利主义。
从方法论的角度：两个思想流派：契约论学派；功利主义学派。
1.（思想流派）契约论学派：合乎道德和制度就是合乎正义。
尊重和不侵犯他人的基本人权。
为什么呢？因为处于平等地位的人都会同意这一点。
每个人的理性是相同的。
学派代表是：罗尔斯《正义论》，洛克，康德。
《功利主义》带给我的【本文概述】功利主义是影响很广的观点，在法律、政治、经济中都有着重要的影响力。
然而现在的人们对于功利主义的理解却有着极大的偏差，见“功利”二字便心生不屑（曾经我也属于这一类人），本是带着批判的目的选择这本书，但在读了《功利主义》之后我发现功利主义具有极大的价值，其中也包含着丰富的智慧，因此本文中多为体会感悟，并没有强烈的批判色彩。
功利主义众多代表人物的著作中我选择了约翰·穆勒（也译为密尔）的版本，穆勒的功利主义是对边沁功利主义的发展与完善，更加讲求自我牺牲而不是自利，提出了快乐的质量划分方式，让我对功利主义学说有了更顺利的接受。
接下来本文将就功利主义的主要观点及读后感受进行阐述。
【主要观点】《功利主义》主要由三点构成，第一点是所谓的“苦乐原理”，这其中包括两点。
一，终极目的。
人生的终极目的，就是尽可能多地免除痛苦，并且在数量和质量两个方面尽可能多地享有快乐（p14）；二，是对于快乐的对比。
将心灵的快乐置于肉体的快乐之上（p10）。
第二点，是自我牺牲。
这种自我牺牲必定是为了某种目的。
功利主义的道德承认，人具有一种力量，能够为了他人的福利而牺牲自己的最大福利。
一种牺牲如果没有增进或不会增进幸福的总量，那么就是浪费。
（p20）第三点，是约束功利主义的力量。
一是内在的良心的情感，（p35）二是外在的奖励和惩罚，再加上人类天性能够容许的为上帝和同胞所做的一切无私奉献。
（p34）标准：功利主义认为促进幸福便是判定一切人类行为的检验标准，（p47）此处所说的构成功利主义的行为对错标准的幸福，不是行为者本人的幸福，而是所有相关人员的幸福。
（p21）【个人读后感受】第一次去读伦理学原著，给我最大的印象就是，《功利主义》这本书有着很完备的逻辑体系，每一个问题的字词解释，程度区别都进行了阐明；还有一点是它改变了我之前对于哲学类书籍的误解即空泛无用，在书中我体会到了很多可以被称之为智慧的东西，也让我对生活有了新的认识，对我看待世界的方式也产生了一些影响。
人文经典读书报告（2）——穆勒《功利主义》读书报告【摘要】功利主义是道德哲学（伦理学）中的一个理论，提倡追求“最大幸福”。
约翰·穆勒在《功利主义》一书中对这一理论进行了系统的阐述，论述了功利主义的含义、功利原则的最终约束力、功利主义能得到何种证明以及功利与正义的联系。
本文旨在通过对《功利主义》一书主要内容加以梳理的基础上，对功利主义的内涵和局限作进一步探讨。
【关键词】功利主义；边沁；穆勒；最大幸福功利主义（Utilitarianism）道德哲学理论在西方影响巨大，其原则是“大多数人的最大幸福”，以行为的实际功效作为判断行为正当与否的标准。
功利主义哲学家的代表约翰·穆勒所著的《功利主义》一书，虽然篇幅不大，但是对功利主义的基本精神做了一个相当完备而又清晰的阐述，并对道德哲学的一些根本问题作了功利主义的说明。
本文将首先对功利主义稍作介绍，然后对《功利主义》一书的脉络和主要内容加以梳理。
一、功利主义的渊源在古代西方，影响比较大的是自然法学派思想，认为在人的自然本性中存在着一个理性的秩序，这种秩序的根源是上帝颁布的自然法，人类的这些认识通过天启理性得到。
这种论证使自然法带上了某种神秘色彩。
随着近代西方自然科学和经验主义认识论学派的兴起，宗教权威逐渐下降，为功利主义学派的兴起扫除了信仰障碍并奠定了认识论的基础：一切知识的取舍最后都要诉诸于人的日常经验而不是诉诸人的理性或上帝，伦理道德的论证也不例外。
功利主义正是建立在这种经验主义认识论的基础上的，因而功利主义更符合常人的经验理性，能够对当代的人类思想产生更大的影响。
功利主义的兴起过程中，18世纪苏格兰学派起了开创性的作用。
苏格兰学派的核心人物休谟，对自然法学派进行了彻底的批判，认为自然法学派所宣称的出于理性的自然法原则，其实不过是由经验判断为正当的行为标准，休谟的论证为功利主义奠定了认识论和伦理学基础。
苏格兰学派的另一重要人物亚当·斯密从政治经济学的角度发扬了功利主义的精神，用经济学中“国民财富最大化”解释了“最大多数人的最大幸福”这一功利主义的终极目的，并说明在自利的人性基础上通过公平竞争来获得效率的市场经济体制是达到“最大幸福”的根本途径。
质疑与回应：穆勒的功利主义作者：聂诗琪李然来源：《法制与社会》2020年第18期关键词穆勒功利主义社会成本作者简介：聂诗琪，新疆农业大学管理学院硕士研究生;李然，新疆农业大学马克思主义学院讲师，博士。
中图分类号：B5 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;文献标识码：A ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;DOI：10.19387/ki.1009-0592.2020.06.351功利主義学说由边沁创立，后被约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒（1806-1873）第一次系统的论证和阐述。
此后，功利主义在道德和政治哲学甚至经济学等其他社会科学领域产生了重大影响，功利主义思想框架在人们的哲学思维、价值判断，乃至政策的制定中都起过主导作用。
当然，功利主义在产生如此巨大影响力的同时，也招来了其他学派的各种质疑和批判。
而其中批判的最多的也正是穆勒本人在其《功利主义》中第五章提到的来自“正义”的质疑。
穆勒用第五章回应了正义与功利主义的关系，后来的功利主义者们也在竭力完善功利主义以回应对于功利主义的质疑。
穆勒从边沁那里继承并进一步发展了功利主义学说。
1861年出版的《功利主义》系统的阐述了穆勒关于功利主义的论证。
全书共分为五章：在绪论中，穆勒提出功利主义是最大幸福原则，是道德的根本原则，是判断行为对错的标准。
而各学科的第一原理是什么，或者你是否知道什么是第一原理都不重要，因为即便不能发现第一原理人们也会很好的履行自己的职责;在第二章中穆勒主要通过对不同反对意见或者可能的反对意见的回应来阐述功利主义的含义。
穆勒认为功利或者最大幸福原则，就是追求快乐和免除痛苦，并首次将快乐区分为高级快乐和低级快乐，使快乐有了量和质的分别;在第三章穆勒论证了功利主义的约束力，即外在约束力和内在约束力共同作用。
然而无论是外在约束力还是内在约束力，“功利主义道德标准的约束力还是处于良心的感情，强度越强，道德义务感也就会越强。
《功利主义》读后感功利主义在我国文化中倾向于贬义词，一个人功利被说功利，更多是在被讽刺这个人追求功名利禄这些世俗不高尚的东西，缺乏远大理想。
事实上，在西方的文化里，功利主义是一种相当崇高的道德理想，它主张，我们评价一种行为好不好，要看它是否能给最大多数人带来最大幸福。
功利主义是一种严肃的哲学立场，因此不少学者建议把功利主义翻译成功效主义或效用主义。
我选择的阅读的书是约翰穆勒的《功利主义》，其所呈现功利主义中所追求的唯一目标就是幸福，而且不是单纯的个人的利己主义。
在绪论中，穆勒指出了善是不能用数理逻辑硬生生的推理证明出来的，同时也否定了绝对的道德原理的存在。
书中引用了康德在《道德形而上学》的一句话：“你的行为，要让它所根据的行为规则可以被所有的理性人接纳为一条法则。
”作者提出善的标准是不确定的、因各种因素而异的。
从苏格拉底到现在，哲学家们一直在争论什么是“至善”，从没有哪个观点得到一致认可。
“至善”是道德思考必不可少的第一原则，是道德领域的基石。
因为，人的行为是有目的的：我赚钱是为了吃饭，吃饭是为了活着，那活着是为了什么呢？只有弄清楚至高的善是什么，我们才能分析自己的具体行为是对是错，所谓对错，要看是否有助于实现最终目的，所以绝对的道德律是不存在的。
第二章是功利主义是什么。
当时的人对功利主义有许多非议，所以在这一章穆勒要先澄清功利主义究竟是什么。
其中一个非议是将功利主义所追求的快乐与动物的快乐画上了等号。
穆勒说，这种批评显然把快乐这个词理解得太狭隘了。
动物只追求肉体快乐，人类还会追求心灵快乐，我们没有理由认为只有肉体快乐才是快乐。
但穆勒也指出，以前的功利主义者认为心灵和肉体两种快乐没有性质上的差别，唯一的区别是心灵快乐成本更低、产出更高是错误的。
肉体快乐依赖于有限的资源，有限的资源必然是竞争性的，而精神上的快乐是自足的并不会和别人产生冲突。
另外，穆勒认为不同的快乐存在性质上的差别。
这种差别使快乐的数量大小变得不重要了。
《功利主义》读书笔记简介：功利主义是一种在西方影响巨大的伦理学说，其原则是“最大多数人的最大幸福”，以行为的实际功效或利益为判断行为正当与否的标准。
本书系统地阐述了这一学说，分绪论、何谓功利主义、论功利主义最后制裁力、功利主义可以得到什么样的证明、论公道与功利主义之关系。
功利主义，即每个人都在追求自身的最大幸福。
作者约翰•斯图尔特•穆勒，英国思想家、哲学家、经济学家、哲学心理学家，实证主义和功利主义代表人物，经济学的古典学派的最后代表人物，也是心理化学理论的创始人，是被公认有史以来智商最高者之一。
穆勒醉心于功利主义，不仅是功利主义的宣传者，还是功力学社的组织者。
他把功利主义叫做最大幸福主义，既包括对幸福的追求，也包括对不幸福的避免和减轻。
他认为每一个人做任何事情都要看他是否具有某种功利和效用，也就是说能否达到“避苦求乐”的目的穆勒认为，快乐除了量的差别以外，还有质的不同。
理性的快乐比感性的快乐有高得多的价值，精神的享受要远比肉体享受为高，做一个不满足的苏格拉底比作一个满足的傻子要好。
最大幸福主义的目的在于实现一种尽量免除痛苦，尽量多多享受质和量两方面快乐的生活。
这种生活就是人类行为的目的，也是道德标准。
“所谓的幸福不是指一种狂欢的生活，而是指生活中痛苦少而短暂。
”穆勒在本书的最大观点就是最大的幸福。
这一学说起源于希腊的伊壁鸠鲁学派的快乐主义, 在培根和霍布斯的伦理学说中也有体现, 18 世纪的哈里森·孟德威尔和斯密对其都有一定的发展, 至18 世纪末和19 世纪初, 由边沁和穆勒最终将其建立成一种系统的有严格论证的伦理思想体系。
要深刻地从学理上剖析功用主义思想, 就必须从功用主义嬗变过程中把握其脉络, 从边沁到穆勒的思想演进是这一过程的重要阶段。
第一章（绪论）作者指出了善是不能用数理逻辑硬生生的推理证明出来的，同时也否定了绝对的道德原理的存在。
书中引用了康德在《道德形而上学》的一句话：“你的行为，要让它所根据的行为规则可以被所有的理性人接纳为一条法则。
约翰·穆勒《功利主义》中的美德伦理摘要：功利主义在伦理学上占有极其重要的位置，至今影响着当代伦理学的发展。
约翰·穆勒作为西方早期功利主义主要奠基人物，在论述自己的功利主义的过程中，却将美德伦理的思想纳入功利主义之中。
约翰·穆勒的功利主义在丰富着伦理思想的同时，也对我国的社会发展有一定的重要意义。
关键词：功利主义；美德伦理；约翰·穆勒功利主义是伦理学中一个重要分支，自诞生之初，就不停地受到外部的攻讦，至今仍被很多人认为是不道德的，甚至可鄙的。
而约翰·穆勒作为早期功利主义的先驱性人物，为对功利主义进行辩护，发展批判边沁功利主义所做的理论，极大地影响着后世的功利主义，也推动着伦理学的发展。
一、约翰·穆勒的功利主义的主要思想功利主义的伦理学思想发端于晚期希腊哲学家伊壁鸠鲁。
伊壁鸠鲁发挥和改造了小苏格拉底学派中的昔兰尼学派的“善即快乐”的思想，认为“快乐是幸福生活的始点和终点”，人们的最终目的就是要去追求和获得快乐。
而早期功利主义的奠基人物，如边沁，约翰·穆勒等，都从伊壁鸠鲁的伦理学中汲取了思想，认为幸福与快乐相关，幸福就是获得快乐，因此具有快乐主义的倾向。
边沁认为人类都是追求快乐、逃避痛苦的，所以快乐是全体人类所应当欲求的，而人们的义务就是使行为功利最大化，使最多的人获得最大的幸福。
当一个行为能产生最大化的快乐或减少最大化的痛苦时，那这个行为就是正确的。
同时边沁认为快乐和痛苦是可量化的，边沁从快乐和痛苦的强度、幅度、纯粹性、持续时间等进行了分析，理论化地为功利主义提出辩护。
作为边沁学生的约翰·穆勒，沿袭了边沁功利主义的思想，并发展扬弃了边沁的伦理学中的一些思想，对功利主义进行了修正。
约翰·穆勒同边沁一样，将“功利”同“幸福”结合起来，认为幸福就是快乐的得到和痛苦的丧失，不幸就是快乐的丧失和痛苦的得到，[1][1]而人都是追求幸福的，人们应当按照“最大幸福原理”办事，使人们的幸福得到最大化，使最大多数人获得最大的幸福。
穆勒的功利主义思想研究开题：众所周知，自然科学和社会科学在很多方面都存在着不同点，像研究的对象等。
除此之外，关于其正确与否及其判断的标准上也有着显著的不同。
自然科学在正确与否的问题上有着比较大的确定性，真理为对与错的领域划分了一条明显的界限。
但是在人文科学领域中，对错标准远远不会来的这么简单，真理也不会那么清楚，是非标准似乎也难以确定。
换言之，在“是非”之争上，人们对于那些至关重要问题的探求一直处于踌躇徘徊之中，自哲学问世以来，何为“至善”这一根本的道德问题，便成了推论思想的主题，困扰着诸多天才的哲学家，并因此造就了五花八门的学术流派，相互之间不断发生口诛笔伐。
功利主义和义务论正是在这样的情境下发展起来的，功利主义有一个比较悠久的历史，在古希腊的哲人们在爱琴海旁思索人生意义的时候，便有了功利主义的构想。
而义务论，则是由康德和罗尔斯等人在对功利主义的批判的过程中发展起来的，当然，这也进一步促使功利主义者们进行了自我调整和理论完善。
本文主要陈述在此种发展情况下的功利主义，即穆勒的功利主义。
总体来说，穆勒的功利主义是一种调和式的道德观，这也给我们提供了看待这个问题的新的角度。
要阐述穆勒的功利主义，首先我们需要明白功利主义的发展历史。
功利主义（utilitarianism），是一种以实际功效或者利益作为其道德标准的伦理学说。
功利主义思想作为目前最具影响力的伦理理论体系之一，其萌芽可追溯至古希腊时期伊壁鸠鲁的快乐主义学说。
其后，经由十七、十八世纪资产阶级的反封建运动，资本主义经济的迅速发展，功利主义思想逐步形成于资本主义社会发展的基础之上。
这个时期，持有功利观点并且比较有代表性的思想家，如，英国哲学家霍布斯、洛克、孟德威尔、哈奇森、休谟和亚当•斯密等人，以及法国哲学家卢梭、爱尔维修、霍尔巴赫等人，提出了功利在伦理道德思考中的重要作用，并对于功利主义内涵的各种理论要素进行了多方面的论证，对于功利主义理论的形成奠定了基础。
《功利主义》读后感一直以来我对“功利主义”的理解或多或少地与“利己主义”划上了约等号，认为功利主义应该是一种个人追求利益最大化的伦理学，并且以为在这追求的过程中行为动机和手段都并不处于十分重要的位置。
但是前不久看罢穆勒的《功利主义》一书，基本了解穆勒对功利主义所作的阐述后，才发现，不论我是否认同或信服穆勒对功利主义伦理学的定义和阐述，至少我是理解错了功利主义。
从古希腊哲学家伊壁鸠鲁(Epicurus)提出“快乐主义伦理学”，到功利论创始人，英国哲学家边沁提出的更具条理性的“最大幸福原理”，至我所读到的这本由穆勒所著的《功利主义》，功利主义伦理学被不断完善，并且在穆勒笔下成为了看着接近完美的伦理学说。
归纳书中第二章“功利主义的含义”中穆勒对于功利主义的定义，功利主义即为“达到最大善”，即得到最大的（或尽可能大的）幸福，又或者，“达到最大恶”，即减缓或预防最大的（或尽可能大的）痛苦和不幸。
这样的初步定义是非常make sense的，作为理性人规避痛苦追求幸福是毫无疑问的，但接下来穆勒对于功利主义的更深一层含义则是如下：“功利主义的标准不是指行为者自身的最大幸福，而是指最大多数人的最大幸福。
”由此便产生了我阅读本书的第一个与我以往认识不同的疑问，就是功利主义中对幸福的最大是强调个人，抑或最大多数？当然，假若每个人都强调的是个人幸福的最大化，如此一来必将达到最大多数人的幸福最大化，但是，在行为者作出自身行为选择的时候，是要站在最大化行为者幸福的角度，还是最大化最大多数人（即当他人幸福比自身幸福更容易达到时）幸福的角度。
而穆勒写道，“一个人的高尚使他人感到更为幸福，使广泛意义上的世界成为巨大的受益者……功利主义唯有普遍培养人们的高尚情操方能实现其最终目标，哪怕每个个体只能通过他人的高尚而受益，哪怕自身的幸福在泽被众人的过程中受到眼中的削弱。
”如此一来，穆勒对功利主义的定义则是站在最大多数人的角度最大化最大多数人的幸福。
功利主义、Utilitarianism英、约翰斯图亚特穆勒（叶建新译）1、一门学科中的具体原理通常并非从该学科的基本原理推断而来，也不依赖基本原理来加以印证。
The detailed doctrines of a science are not usually deduced from, nor depend for their evidence upon ,what are called its first principles.2、一切行为均出于某种目的，故行为准则势必屈从于行为目的并完全体现出目的的种种特性。
All actions is for the shake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient.3、将功利置于快乐面前时显得不切实际的枯燥乏味，而将快乐置于功利面前时又显得过于现实的奢靡享乐。
As impracticably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and as too practically voluptuous when the word pleasure precedes the word utility.4、接受功利原理或最大幸福原理为道德根本，就需要坚持旨在促进幸福的行为即为“是”，与幸福背道而驰的行为即为“非”这一信条。
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ,utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, hold that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.5、比起动物的欲望，人有着更高一级的官能，当人意识到自己的这些官能之后，就不会把什么东西都当作幸福。
Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them ,do not regard anything as happiness.6、拥有更高官能的人比之其他人需要更多的东西才能获得幸福感，因而更容易遭受痛苦，而且痛苦的程度往往更加剧烈。
A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and is certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type.7、一种令人满足的生活，其构成要素有二：宁静和兴奋。
The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two, either of which by itself is often found sufficient for the purpose: tranquility, and excitement.8、有些人外在的运命相对不如人意，无法发现足够的乐趣来使他们的生活富有意义，但个中原因通常是他们只专注于自我而不在乎他人。
When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it valuable to them, the cause generally is, caring for nobody but themselves.9、人类发展的内在要求绝不是让人成为自私自利之徒，只专注于可怜的自我存在而对其他一切麻木不仁，而是在于某种更高的追求，即充分体现人何以为人的实质。
As little is there an inherent necessity that any human being shouldbe a selfish egotist, devoid of every feeling or care but those which centre in his own miserable individuality.10、除了自私，另一个令生活乏善可陈的重要原因便是缺乏智力层面的开发。
Next to selfishness, the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory, is want of mental cultivation.11、伦理告诉我们什么是我们的义务以及通过何种检验标准来知道我们的义务，但没有一种伦理体系要求我们一切行为的唯一动机都必须出于一种义务感。
It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them, but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty.12、关于行为的节制——即人们出于道德的考虑而克制自己不去做某些事，尽管在特定情况下做这些事的结果反而可能是有益的——作为一个有才智的行为者，应当清醒地意识到行为是分层次的，倘若在实践中一概而论，则一般而言是有害的，而这正是对行为进行克制的义务所在。
In the case of abstinences indeed——of things which people forbear to do, from moral consideration, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial——it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practiced generally, would be generally injurious, and that is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it.13、毫无疑问，在已知的伦理标准中没有哪一种标准对行为善恶的评判是基于行为者的善恶，更不会建立在考虑行为者是和蔼、勇敢、仁慈之人还是相反之徒的基础之上——这样的考虑与对行为的评价无关，而是与对人的评价有关。
For certainly no known ethical standard decides an action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or a bad man, still less because done by an amiable, a brave, or a benevolent man, or the contrary.14、任何一种行为准则都不可能完善到将所有行为一网打尽的程度，任何一种行为都不可能被界定为永远符合道德义务或者始终应当遭到谴责。
Which all doctrines do, that have been believed by sane persons.15、唯有被教育和舆论所崇尚的习惯性道德，才会在人们的头脑里形成一种本身带有强制性的情感。
For the customary morality, that which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory.16、当我们追求一件事物时，我们似乎首先就要对该物心中有个明确清晰的概念，而不是最后才想到。
When we engage id a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to.17、情感消失时，义务也随之消失。
When the feeling ceases the obligation ceases.18、幸福是值得渴望的，也是唯一作为目的值得渴望的东西，其他任何东西如果说值得渴望那也仅仅是作为实现幸福这一目的的手段。
The happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end.19、每个人的幸福对他自己而言是一种善，普遍幸福则是所有人整体上的一种善。
Each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.20、幸福的成分多种多样，每一种本身都值得渴望，而不仅仅是作为一个整体时才值得渴望。
The ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate.21、金钱的价值完全存在于它所购买的商品身上。
Its worth is solely that the things which it will buy.22、除了幸福，事实上不存在其他任何被渴望的东西。
