Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Are They Inefficient
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在国有企业好,还是合资企业号英语作文全文共3篇示例,供读者参考篇1Is It Better to Work for a State-Owned or Joint Venture Company?As a soon-to-be college graduate, one of the biggest decisions I face is what kind of company I want to work for after leaving university. Two major options that have caught my attention are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and joint venture companies. Both have their own unique pros and cons that I have been carefully weighing.To begin, I think it's important to understand the fundamental differences between SOEs and joint ventures. State-owned enterprises are companies that are fully owned and controlled by the government. In my country, these are huge corporations that operate in crucial industries like energy, telecommunications, banking, transportation and more. The government appoints the top leadership and has a very heavy influence over operations, strategy and staffing.Joint ventures, on the other hand, are companies formed through a partnership between two or more parties, at least one of which is a foreign entity. So you might have a Chinese company partnering with an American, Japanese or German firm for example. The ownership and control is split based on the equity stakes involved. Joint venture companies aim to leverage complementary strengths that the different partners bring to be competitive globally.So those are the basic definitions, but what do they really mean for someone like me looking to start my career? Let me dive into some of the key factors I'm evaluating:Compensation and BenefitsOne of the biggest advantages that SOEs are perceived to have is the pay and benefits they offer employees. Salaries at major state-owned firms tend to be quite competitive, especially for new graduates. And the benefits like health insurance, housing subsidies, pensions etc. are also very generous compared to the private sector. However, joint ventures can also pay well, perhaps even better than SOEs depending on the specific company and role. But the benefits may not be as comprehensive. This is definitely an important consideration given my current stage of life.Stability and Job SecurityThere's a common perception, and to be honest myself and many of my classmates believe this, that state-owned enterprises offer more stability and job security than other companies. We figure that since the government controls them, our jobs are essentially guaranteed for life as long as we perform well. Layoffs are extremely rare. Joint ventures on the other hand could be impacted by the weighing factors and sometimes tenuous relations between the partner companies from different countries. If the joint venture sours, it could put our jobs at risk. For security-minded young professionals, this could make SOEs attractive.Career Growth and DevelopmentHowever, when it comes to long-term career growth opportunities, I feel that joint ventures have a clear upper hand over SOEs. Because of their dynamic nature combining diverse strengths, perspectives and corporate cultures, joint ventures tend to have a more entrepreneurial environment that rewards creativity, innovation and agility. There are simply more paths available for fast career growth compared to slow-moving, bureaucratic state-owned firms. If I want to really spread mywings, challenge myself and maximize my potential, a joint venture seems like the better place.Corporate CultureRelated to the above point about career growth, joint ventures also generally have more modern, open and progressive corporate cultures that are conducive to fostering things like innovation, diversity and work-life balance. SOEs can be rather rigid, hierarchical and have an older, entrenched mentality that is resistant to change. As a member of the younger generation, I may feel more at home in the culture of a joint venture between a Chinese partner and a Western company for instance. The work environment and values are also factors to consider.Political ImplicationsSomething else I have to keep in mind is that working for a major SOE is not just an economic decision, but also has some political implications whether I like it or not. SOEs are a key pillar and legacy of China's socialist system. Taking a job at one means, at least to some extent, throwing my lot in with that system and its ideology despite its embrace of market economics. There could potentially be requirements or expectations when it comes to things like joining the Communist Party, attending politicalstudies sessions, or displaying ideological obedience. A joint venture between companies from different countries would be somewhat more insulated from these political undercurrents.Global ExposureFinally, in this age of globalization, getting international exposure and experience is extremely valuable for one'slong-term career prospects. Joint ventures are inherently globally-oriented since they combine stakeholders and operate across countries and markets. Many of them use English as a working language. There are more opportunities to travel abroad, interact with foreign colleagues, learn best practices from around the world and expand one's horizons. While China's SOEs are powerful players domestically, they can tend to have a rather insular, domestic focus. For an ambitious young person like myself who hopes to thrive in the global arena, this is a drawback compared to joint ventures.So in conclusion, while state-owned enterprises have their advantages when it comes to compensation, benefits and perceived stability, I am leaning towards preferring a joint venture company, at least for the start of my career. The potential for faster career growth, a more progressive culture,less political baggage and greater global exposure seem to outweigh the security offered by SOEs.Of course, not all joint ventures are made equal and I would thoroughly evaluate the specific companies, roles, partners involved and opportunities. It's ultimately a personal decision based on one's priorities, ambitions and life situation. But for someone young with an international,entrepreneurial mindset who wants to maximise their potential, a joint venture is looking like the more attractive option for me at this stage. Perhaps further down the road when I'm older and prioritize stability more, a SOE could become appealing. But for now, it's joint venture companies that are capturing my attention.篇2Is It Better to Work for a State-Owned or Joint Venture Company?As a student about to graduate and enter the workforce, one of the biggest decisions I'm facing is what type of company to work for. Two major options in China are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and joint ventures between Chinese and foreign companies. Both have their pros and cons, and I've been weighing them carefully as I search for job opportunities.On the one hand, SOEs have been around for decades and are deeply rooted in China's economy and culture. They are seen as stable, secure employers that typically offer good benefits, pensions, and work-life balance. My parents' generation frequently expresses nostalgia for the "iron rice bowl" way of life that SOEs used to represent - a job for life with a decent salary and financial security.However, SOEs also have a reputation for being bloated, inefficient bureaucracies where promotions are based more on connections and tenure than merit. There are widespread jokes about the "9-9-6" work culture of SOEs, meaning staff only work from 9am to 9pm, six days a week. While the hours may be better than ruthlessly competitive private companies, a lack of drive and innovation is a common criticism.On the other hand, joint ventures give me the opportunity to work for multinational companies and be exposed to international business practices and ways of thinking. This could be really valuable experience and give me a competitive edge over my peers who only work for domestic companies. The compensation packages also tend to be much higher at joint ventures.That said, joint ventures can be pressure cookers where I'd likely have to work grueling hours in a fiercely competitive environment. There is also the perpetual fear of being replaced or having the operation moved elsewhere due to the inherent insecurity of foreign investment. Work-life balance may benon-existent, and there could be significant cultural clashes between the Chinese and foreign management teams.Another factor is the industry and type of role. For certain sectors like energy, telecoms, and banking that are dominated by a handful of powerful SOEs, those government-linked companies are essentially the only game in town for those fields. Whereas for other industries like tech, manufacturing, and consumer goods, joint ventures with foreign investment may provide better opportunities.Personally, I am quite torn. Part of me craves the stability, dependability, and relatively relaxed lifestyle of an SOE. After the intense pressure cooker of exams and academic performance we endure as students, it could be nice to have a job where I can coast a bit and enjoy some work-life balance. SOEs also align more with traditional Chinese values of hard work, consistency, and maintaining harmonious relations - qualities I resonate with.However, another part of me feels excited by the prospect of being part of something new, innovative, andinternationally-minded at a joint venture. The higher salaries are also very appealing given the soaring cost of living, particularly the property prices that make buying an apartment in any major city seem like an impossible dream without a high-paying job. If I want to achieve financial freedom and a foothold on the property ladder, a joint venture may be necessary.There are also concerns about the long-term viability and relevance of SOEs. Aren't they lumbering government bureaucracies destined to fall behind in our rapidly changing, globalized world? Perhaps it's better to learn the ways of modern, efficient multinational corporations. Joint ventures could position me for roles overseas or at least roles dealing with international partners and clients. With China's integration into the world economy, those global skills and perspectives will only become more valuable over time.Ultimately, I don't think there is necessarily a "correct" answer - it depends on one's personal priorities, values, skills, and life situation. If I wanted to work in a sector dominated by SOEs, or if work-life balance and stability were my top priorities, or if I aimed for a traditional career path like my parents', then anSOE may be preferable. The lack of career mobility could be a drawback, but there is comfort and security too.On the other hand, if I wanted maximum earnings potential, to build globally transferable skills, and to be part of an innovative, fast-paced environment, then a joint venture would likely be more appealing despite the added stress and uncertainty. It could set me up for entrepreneurship down the road too.Perhaps the ideal scenario would be to start my career at a joint venture to get great training, experience, and an internationally competitive salary. Then after 5-10 years, I could transition to a senior role at an SOE to enjoy the slower pace of life in my prime working years when work-life balance becomes more important. Or vice versa - join an SOE first for stability and basics, then jump to a joint venture later for accelerated career growth.For now, as a fresh graduate, I am leaning towards pursuing joint venture opportunities first. The chance to learn global best practices and get genuinely world-class work experience seems too valuable to pass up, even if it means making some sacrifices in my 20s. An SOE may make more sense for me down the road once I have a solid financial base and professional backbone.It's a tough decision with many factors to weigh. But that's a common challenge we face as students getting ready to fully join the working world. I'm grateful to have some good options to choose from after years of hard work in school. Both SOEs and joint ventures carry prestige and represent exciting pathways. Whichever route I go, I'm sure it will be an enriching learning experience that will help shape my future career.篇3Is it Better to Work in a State-Owned Enterprise or a Joint Venture?As a fresh graduate stepping into the professional world, one of the biggest decisions I face is choosing where to start my career. In China, two major types of companies often catch the eye of job seekers: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and joint ventures. While both options present unique advantages and challenges, the decision ultimately depends on personal priorities and career goals.State-Owned Enterprises: Stability and BenefitsState-owned enterprises, or government-owned companies, have long been a cornerstone of China's economy. These organizations, often large and influential, offer a sense ofstability and security that appeals to many. One of the primary advantages of working for an SOE is the comprehensive benefits package, including generous retirement plans, medical insurance, and housing subsidies.Additionally, SOEs tend to have well-established hierarchies and clear career paths, providing a structured environment for professional growth. Employees can expect regular promotions and salary increments based on seniority and performance, which can be appealing for those seeking long-term career stability.However, SOEs are not without their drawbacks. Bureaucracy and rigid hierarchies can sometimes stifle innovation and creativity, making it challenging for ambitious individuals to thrive. Furthermore, SOEs may be perceived as less dynamic and competitive compared to private enterprises, potentially limiting opportunities for rapid career advancement or exposure to cutting-edge technologies and practices.Joint Ventures: Dynamism and Global ExposureJoint ventures, on the other hand, are formed through partnerships between Chinese and foreign companies, combining resources, expertise, and cultural perspectives. Working for a joint venture can be an exciting and enrichingexperience, offering exposure to diverse business practices, management styles, and international networks.One of the key advantages of joint ventures is the potential for professional growth and skill development. These companies often prioritize talent development, providing opportunities for training, mentorship, and exposure to global best practices. Employees may have the chance to work on projects with international teams, fostering cross-cultural communication and problem-solving abilities.Additionally, joint ventures tend to be more agile and responsive to market changes, creating a dynamic and stimulating work environment. Employees may have greater autonomy and opportunities to contribute to decision-making processes, fostering a sense of ownership and personal growth.However, joint ventures also come with their own set of challenges. Cultural differences and potential communication barriers can arise, requiring adaptability and effectivecross-cultural communication skills. Additionally, job security may be perceived as less stable compared to SOEs, as joint ventures are subject to market forces and the success of the partnership.Striking a Balance: Personal Priorities and Career GoalsUltimately, the decision to pursue a career in a state-owned enterprise or a joint venture depends on individual priorities and career goals. Those seeking long-term stability, comprehensive benefits, and a structured career path may find SOEs more appealing. On the other hand, individuals driven by dynamism, global exposure, and opportunities for rapid professional growth may be better suited to joint ventures.It is also important to consider the specific industry, company culture, and job responsibilities when making this decision. For example, a career in a cutting-edge technology field may align better with the agility and innovation often found in joint ventures, while a career in traditional manufacturing or infrastructure sectors may be more compatible with the stability and scale of SOEs.Personally, I find the prospect of working in a joint venture exciting and aligned with my desire for continuous learning and exposure to diverse perspectives. The opportunity to collaborate with international teams and contribute to innovative projects appeals to my entrepreneurial spirit and thirst for personal and professional growth.However, I also recognize the value of stability and the comprehensive benefits offered by SOEs, which could provide asolid foundation for long-term career development and work-life balance.Perhaps the ideal solution lies in striking a balance between the two. One approach could be to start my career in a joint venture, leveraging the dynamic environment and global exposure to accelerate my professional growth. As I gain experience and establish a strong foundation, transitioning to an SOE later in my career could provide the stability and benefits needed for a fulfilling work-life balance.Ultimately, the decision to pursue a career in a state-owned enterprise or a joint venture is a highly personal one, shaped by individual priorities, aspirations, and life circumstances. By carefully evaluating these factors and remaining open to new opportunities, I am confident that I can chart a fulfilling and rewarding career path, regardless of the organizational structure I choose.。
Frontiers of International Accounting 国际会计前沿, 2023, 12(2), 245-249 Published Online June 2023 in Hans. https:///journal/fia https:///10.12677/fia.2023.122033国企审计失败分析——以永煤控股为例潘玉林西北政法大学管理学院,陕西 西安收稿日期:2023年5月12日;录用日期:2023年6月19日;发布日期:2023年6月28日摘要 我国国有企业是国民经济的重要支柱,国企的管理与审计都是企业运行的重中之重,近年来,国内证券市场上市公司审计失败事件频发,不仅使国内资本市场遭受损失,也影响了投资者的信心。
无论是审计师还是管理者都应该在审计失败的案例中吸取教训,学习经验。
本文以永煤控股为例来研究国企审计过程中存在的问题和审计失败的原因,并在案例分析的基础上为之后审计工作提出提升审计人员职业素养、保持职业怀疑和国企管理者加强国企内部审计的工作建议,希望可以为防止审计失败的发生提出一些建议,降低审计失败的可能。
关键词国企审计,财务造假,审计失败,永煤控股,上市公司Analysis of Audit Failure of State-Owned Enterprises—Taking Yong Coal Holdings as an ExampleYulin PanManagement School, Northwest University of Political Science and Law, Xi’an Shaanxi Received: May 12th , 2023; accepted: Jun. 19th , 2023; published: Jun. 28th , 2023AbstractChinese state-owned enterprises are an important pillar of the national economy, management and auditing of state-owned enterprises are among the top priorities of enterprise operation. In recent years, audit failures of listed companies in the domestic securities market have occurred潘玉林frequently, which not only makes the domestic capital market suffer losses, but also affects the confidence of investors. Both auditors and managers should learn lessons and experience in the case of audit failure. This paper takes Yong Coal Holdings as an example to study the problems ex-isting in the audit process of state-owned enterprises and the reasons for audit failure. Based on the case analysis, this paper proposes suggestions for the future audit work to improve the pro-fessional quality of auditors, maintain professional doubts and strengthen the internal audit of state-owned enterprises by the managers, hoping to put forward some suggestions to prevent the occurrence of audit failure and reduce the possibility of audit failure.KeywordsState-Owned Enterprise Audit, Financial Fraud, Audit Failure, Yong Coal Holdings,Listed Companies Array Copyright © 2023 by author(s) and Hans Publishers Inc.This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY 4.0)./licenses/by/4.0/1. 案例背景永城煤电控股集团有限公司(以下简称“永煤控股”)是一家大型煤炭国企,其经营范围为煤炭、铁路、化工及矿业的投资与管理等。
Analysis of Merger and Acquisition Strategy of Multinationals in China and ChineseEnterprises CountermeasuresAbstractMergers and acquisitions of transnational corporations in China presents the strategic trends in recent years. Merger and acquisition strategy of multinationals in China to successfully implement, not only objective necessity of political reform and economic development in China, there are also accidental by Chinese enterprises and government of the subjective errors caused. To prevent risk of multinational merger and acquisition in China, Chinese enterprises should raise awareness of multinational merger and acquisition, carefully chosen joint venture partners, build complete learning system in joint venture/cooperative, enhanced learning capabilities, and enhanced management of merger and acquisition strategies.Key words: Multinational corporations; Merger and acquisition strategy; Joint venture; CooperationIn the late 1990 of 20th century, multinational companies merger and acquisition activity in China is increasing, from all indications, merger and acquisition of multinational corporations in China in recent years had a profound international background, this is a strategic merger behaviors. Grasping the nature of multinationals merger and acquisition strategy in China, it is the important basis for understanding transnational corporation mergers and acquisitions in China.1.THE NATURE OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONALS IN CHINADifferent from the previous financial mergers and acquisitions or buy shells of mergers and acquisitions, merger and acquisition motives of multinational corporations in China in recent years, not for implementation of speculative gains, but through the merger and monopoly of the world markets for goods and investment, to seize the material and technical and human resources, successful implementation of global management strategy. It can be said that mergers and acquisitions of strategic motives of transnational corporations presents the strategic trends. To multinational recently on China equipment manufacturing enterprise for multiple mergers and acquisitions as cases, although so far, multinational only respectively on some backbone Enterprise for mergers and acquisitions, under effect in domestic various forces, has not been to implement overall of strategic, and systematic of mergers and acquisitions (is on domestic different area, and same industry several backbone enterprise ofmergers and acquisitions), has not been constitute of threat on China entire equipment manufacturing of key industry, and main area. But the trend of mergers and acquisitions to systematic, high specification, such as, after the United States Caterpillar company mergers and acquisitions in Shandong engineering machinery company, seek merging domestic construction machinery industry of key enterprises, such as Xiamen engineering machinery company, Weifang diesel power company,and Shanghai diesel power company of, reflects this trend.2. COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONALS IN CHINA2.1 Charctristics of Mergers and Acquisitions IndustryMultinational merger and acquisition in China in recent years mainly concentrated in three main areas: first, the area of production and supply of electric power and other energy; the second is basic materials area, such as steel, chemical raw materials industries; the third is consumer goods production area of beers, soft drinks, skin care products and so on. These industries have the following in common: with foreign investment in these sectors are relatively mature industry, foreign capital has formed a certain scale of production and capital accumulation in the domestic; these are industries that has been or is being lifted; Mergers and acquisitions industry has the characteristics of potential of large scale and high growth potential. In recent years, as China’s economy continues to grow, rising standards of living, potential size and growth potential in the consumer goods industry began to emerge, so as to drive the demand for energy and basic materials industry rapidly rising, making it difficult to meet the market demand for the production capacity of these industries. In order to quickly dominate the market, transnational corporations have used mergers and acquisitions or expansion of investment into China.2.2 Acquisition ways characteristicsIn General, mergers of transnational corporations in China in the following three ways: first, the restructured holdings acquisition, that is, through participation in the restructuring of domestic enterprises, acquisition of 50% per cent of its equity, to achieve control of enterprise management purposes. For example,In March 2001, China tire industry leading enterprise --China Tire and Rubber Compa ny and the world’s largest tire manufacturer-Michelin formed a joint venture company, Michelin 70% stocks, venture companies invest US $ 320 million reverse takeover of tire rubber company’s core business and assets. Second, increased capital holdings acquisition, that is, in the original on the basis of China-foreign joint ventures, foreign capital increase and share, Chinese does not participate in the capital increase, lower the shares, so that the foreign share holdings. For example,In April 1994, Dalian Motor factory and Singapore Wester motor company established a joint venture of Wester (Dalian) Motor Co., Ltd. In April 2004, Wester further mergers and acquisitions the shares held by the Chinese side of Dalian motor company. Third, the share acquisition, that is, foreign companies at the same time offering a-shares and b-shares, or h-shares, acquired not circulation of legal person shares by agreement or holdings of a large number of b-shares, or h-shares, achieve the purpose of shares or holdings. Such as Beijing wagon limited companyand Japan Isuzu motors and Itochu Shoji Corporation signed a cooperation agreement, Isuzu and Itochu joint agreements to purchase, one-time purchase of North brigade not listing circulation of legal person shares 4 20,000 shares of the company, 25% per cent of total share capital of Beijing wagon limited company, become the largest shareholder of Beijing wagon limited company.Characteristics of Acquired EnterpriseAcquired enterprise general is State or State holding enterprise has development years in domestic, has popularity high of brand, sound of market sales network, more advanced of technology, but due to management system does not perfect, history causes, has into business dilemma, enterprise was forced to overall sold or transfer part quality assets, such as: Dalian Motor Factory, Jiamusi Combine Harvester Factory, and Northwest Bearing Factory, and Shenyang Chisel Rock Machinery Company and so on, these enterprises are industry of leader or challenger, but into cash flow problems due to various reasons, shrinking sales, business difficult to continue, in order to enliven the State-owned assets, resolve some of the workers’ employment, enterprises are forced to overall sold or transfer some good assets and joint venture with multinationals. Or for promoting the progress of technology and management need to seek foreign investment.2.4 Characteristics of Merger and Acquisition StrategyIn recent years, merger and acquisition strategy of multinationals in China is clear, they tend to choose the establishment of China-foreign joint ventures and foreign-controlled, final adoption of the foreign capital merger and acquisition, to a wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Even some multinational corporations seeking holding status when they established joint ventures. Then, in the business course of China-foreign joint venture enterprise, marketing channels is controlled by foreign enterprises, implementation of “high and low” strategy, transfer of profits, or do not want to put in new technology, numerous contradictions with China,Cause in fact of business losses, forcing the Chinese transfer of ownership to the foreign, foreign acquisitions China shares, desire for realization of wholly-owned .For example, Fu Anjie railway bearing (Ningxia) Ltd., Wester (Dalian) Motors Ltd., Dalian Burton Motors Ltd , such these joint ventures were turned into a wholly foreign-owned enterprises by foreign merger and acquisition of Chinese shares .3. ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE MERGER AND ACQUISITION STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONALS IN CHINAMerger and acquisition of multinationals in China has an obvious strategic, but why the merger and acquisition strategy of multinationals in Chinacan be successfully implemented? There are the objective inevitability of both political and economic reform and development in China,also with Chinese enterprises and Government error led to the contingency subjective.3.1 the objective necessity of transnational companies successfully implement the strategy of Merger and Acquisition in china3.1.1 Reform of State-Owned Enterprises Offers a Number of Opportunities to Multinational Mergers and Acquisitions Strategy in ChinaReform of State-owned enterprises had a high demand on foreign funds. There are nearly 400,000 State-owned enterprises in China, many companies will need restructuring or reorganization, there are three areas of funding gap in restructuring or reorganization process: first, the social security funds; the second is the restitution of fun ds banks ‘ bad loans in State-owned enterprises; The third is the sale of State-owned assets of the funding gap in a competitive business. There are three ways to cover the financing gap: country financial; absorbing domestic and foreign investment; State can no longer provide huge amounts of money for the reform of State-owned enterprises, absorbing domestic investments, because lack of non-State-owned investment capacity and willingness and impossible to large-scale implementation domestic investment, which provides opportunities for transnational corporation mergers and acquisitions of State-owned enterprises in China.3.1.2 Conversion from Joint Venture and Cooperation Mode to Wholly-Owned Mode is the Inevitable of Chinese Economic Reform and DevelopmentCooperative and owned is two patterns of internationalization of multinational companies. Due to transnational corporations initial entry into the host country, transnational corporations did not familiar on host country policies, culture, market environment, host country governments development of a number of barriers to entry, sole risk higher than joint venture and cooperation. However, as changes in the he host country environment caused location advantage of enhancements, transnational corporations increases experience through studying, enhancements and strengthened ownership advantage strategic motives of transnational corporations, risk and return of the wholly-owned and joint venture and cooperation mode has changed, wholly-owned gradually replaced so that joint venture and cooperation, replacing a variety of ways, merger and acquisition is one of the most important way. There are three reasons promoting the successful implementation of a merger and acquisition strategy of multinationals in China. First, the rapid development of China’s economy for many years, China’s growing importance in the world economy, the world’s largest potential market is gradually maturing and Chinese market position gradually growing in the global strategy of transnational corporations in China, thus increasing the multinationals take sole mode of income. Second, after joining the WTO, China gradually open industries, lowering the barrier to entry of multinational merger and acquisition enterprises in China, thereby reversing the multinational joint ventures and wholly-owned of risk and return ratio. Third, the multinational companies operating in China for a period of time, get to know China and Chinese markets, which reduces the investment risk.3.2 THE SUBJECTIVE CONTINGENCIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION MERGER AND ACQUISITION STRATEGY IN CHINA3.2.1 Failure of Chinese Enterprises Implementation Joint Venture and Cooperation StrategyMore important reason of Multinational companies from the joint venture and cooperation to the holding and to a wholly-owned strategy success is Chinese joint-venture, cooperation strategy failed.First, the Chinese enterprises lack of knowledge on the complexity of the joint venture and cooperation. Joint venture and cooperation is a wide range of more complex problems ona variety of cultural, enterprises and strategies. To achieve the strategic purpose of the joint venture and cooperation, joint ventures, cooperation between the two sides have to properly address issues such as cultural conflict, distribution and disposal of the proceeds, technology learning and protection. China business knowledge on the complexity of the joint venture and cooperation is often not enough, more attention to possible benefits brought by joint venture and cooperation, ignoring the risk of joint venture and cooperation, results to run some of the poor handling of the conflict, affecting the normal operation of the joint venture and cooperative enterprises, or foreign opportunism of inadequate preparations, finally was forced to participate in mergers and acquisitions.Second, Selected not appropriate for joint ventures and cooperation partners.When choosing a partner for Chinese enterprises are often too look at the size of the transnational corporations, technology and management of advanced degrees, and ignore the foreign joint venture of mind, ignored the two parties on the cultural fit, complementary capabilities and resources, as well as position in the joint venture and cooperative enterprises, and many other issues. Making some multinational companies not only to low cost entry into the Chinese market, and dominate in the joint venture and cooperative enterprises, for further mergers and acquisitions Chinese companies with an opportunity.Third, the failure of joint ventures and cooperative learning mechanism in the process. Learning advanced technology and management experience is the main causes of Chinese enterprises and multinational companies to form joint ventures and cooperative enterprises, but Chinese enterprises often do not have to establish a learning mechanism in the process of joint-venture and cooperation. Learning mechanism failure caused results of China enterprise joint venture and cooperation loss of marke t, but haven’t learned skills and experience.3.2.2 Failure of The Merger and Acquisition of Chinese Enterprises StrategyFirst, goals of participating in transnational merger and acquisition is fuzzy and negotiation failure. When Chinese enterprises participating in transnational merger and acquisition, have only good intentions, there is a lack of long-term strategic objectives and effective negotiating routes design, eager to reorganization of assets, high quality assets on multinational mergers and acquisitions, bad assets, debt and the burden of bureaucracy has left China’s parent company. High quality assets are joint ventures with transnational corporations and have not good grasped of commercial negotiation conditions and patterns, and give up control of a joint venture, parent company lost its core competitiveness, lost technology, brand and marketing, enterprise techniques and technology research and development in the future depends on the strategy arrangements of transnational corporation. Second, choosing the merger and acquisition of foreign investors misconduct. Different types of merger and acquisition of foreign investors, determine the effect of mergers and acquisitions different. International multinational consortium with strong financial strength, can easily mobilize huge amounts of money, holding and acquisitions of Chinese companies, and asset consolidation, packing, then go to the foreign or domestic capital markets for cash, earn high profits. China to introduce such investors, although can avoid to be controlled on the technology and production, access to financial support for the time being, are unable to obtain knowledge of manufacturing technologies and production, marketing, does not help enterprises to raise the level of technology and management, and even lose the basis forlong-term development. When many Chinese companies involved in mergers and acquisitions, without carefully assessing and weighing the introduction of different foreign investor to bring effects and interest and blindly participating in transnational mergers and acquisitions, resulting in counterproductive.4. COUNTERMEASURES OF CHINESE ENTERPRISE FACES MULTINATIONALS MERGER AND ACQUISITION STRATEGY IN CHINA4.1 Increasing Awareness of Multinational Merger and Acquisition strategyFirst, clear understanding of the nature of merger and acquisition strategy of multinationals in China. Multinational merger and acquisition in China has not only access to markets, but sought trade monopolies and globally integrated supply chain. Second, fully understand the risks of joint venture/cooperative, understand the advantages and disadvantages of mergers and acquisitions, raising awareness of risk prevention. Joint venture, cooperation and mergers and acquisitions has a double-edged sword effect, to fully assess the risks of losing markets, brands and core technology in the process of joint-venture, cooperation and mergers and acquisitions, and increased awareness of risk prevention, to take effective measures to prevent risks to organization structure design, patent protection, and other aspects. Thirdly, recognizing the importance that keep own business brand and core technology for sustainable development. Brand and core technology is the key source of enterprise’s core competitiveness, loss of brand and core technology will reduce the bargaining power of competition and cooperation of Chinese enterprises and transnational corporations, eventually reduced to matching supply of vendors of multinational corporations has a core competence .4.2 carefully choosing a foreign joint Venture PartnersWhen select partners in joint ventures, to thoroughly understand and analysis the strategic intent the foreign, final judgment goal of foreign joint ventures take acquisitions as a strategy only get into the Chinese market in the early days, aimed at bypassing the Chinese industry control, or for long-term business cooperation with Chinese enterprises. If the foreigner is for long-term business cooperation, Chinese companies should identify own real needs, maintain their unique resources and advantages, from the practical needs of enterprises and the advantages complementary between the two sides, carefully chosen joint venture partners.4.3. strengthening strategic Management capabilities of Mergers and Acquisitions4.3.1 Enhanced Ability to Develop Rational Merger and Acquisition StrategyAt the time of acquisition, Chinese enterprises should have clear targets and strategies of merger and acquisition. As backbone enterprise, to research itself market status, confirmed whether needs participate in transnational mergers and acquisitions; if must by assets restructuring out dilemma, whether must by multinational mergers and acquisitions; if had to looking for multinational mergers and acquisitions, to clear the target by mergers and acquisitions, and developed specific programme of mergers and acquisitions negotiations, using itself of resources, keep on joint venture enterprise of control right, especially to clear Enterprise for technology route of led right; if mergers and acquisitions must to gave upindependent development for premise, seeking borne the original debt and redundant staff placement by multinational enterprises. Otherwise, the value involved in mergers and acquisitions will be greatly reduced.4.3.2 Enhanced Ability to Identify Qualified Acquisition Investor based on reasonable estimation of the enterprise’s own development bottleneck is shortage of technology, shortage of funds, or the shortage of market-oriented, Chinese enterprise careful comparison and calculation of industrial investors and financial investors, commercial investors to enterprise resources and benefits, conditions and cost of the enterprise delivered, choose different types of mergers and acquisitions investors.4.3.3 Strengthen The Capacity of Protection Brand and Technology in Mergers and Acquisitions Process First, before implement mergers and acquisitions, should correctly awareness and assessment brand assets value, China enterprise should hired authority assessment institutions, used advanced of brand value assessment system to assessment brand assets, to prevent the local brand value of loss in foreign and joint venture enterprise mergers and acquisitions process; on the other hand, when mergers and acquisitions, high popularity and reputation of brand must to keep more independence, not easily is controlled by multinationals, this is key involved brand life .。
Mr. Zhang is a professor of economics at Peking University. This article is adapted from the introduction to his latest book, 'What Is Changing China,' and was translated by Jude Blanchette. (本文作者张维迎北京大学经济学教授。
本文是作者《什么改变中国》一书的序言节选,该书由中信出版社2012年出版。
)Even as China's economy gallops ahead, its society is facing increasingly sharp contradictions. Income and regional inequalities are expanding, official corruption is rampant, access to medical care and education are uneven, and environmental degradation is worsening. As a result, discontent among the Chinese people has increased even as their living standards have improved. 伴随中国经济的高速增长,中国社会的各种矛盾也越来越突出,越来越尖锐,诸如收入分配不均,地区差异扩大,官场腐败严重,医疗和教育不公平,生态环境恶化,等等这些问题,使得人们的不满情绪不仅没有随生活条件的改善而减少,反而有所上升。
As we come to grips with these problems, two opposing viewpoints have emerged among China's intellectual community: the 'China model' theory and the 'failure of reform' theory. But in a sign of how impoverished Beijing's intellectual debate has become, the two theories aren't all that different from each other and the both entirely miss the point about what troubles China.在如何评价过去的改革和指导未来的改革上,中国知识界出现了两种我不认同的思潮:中国模式论和改革失败论。
浅谈国有企业人工成本控制作者:黄微来源:《中小企业管理与科技·上旬刊》2021年第03期【摘要】现如今,一提起国有企业,大多数人会认为其是一个“铁饭碗”。
国企是什么?国企是一个国家的经济命脉,其与国家的安全与发展息息相关,涵盖通信、石油、军工、天然气等重要领域,国企成为越来越多求职者梦寐以求的“天堂”。
基于此,国有企业的问题日渐凸显,其中人工成本问题十分突出。
论文从人工成本控制的作用、国有企业人工成本控制的问题以及相应的解决措施三方面展开论述。
【Abstract】Nowadays, when mentioning state-owned enterprises, most people would think of them as a "stable job". What is a state-owned enterprise? State-owned enterprises are the economic lifeline of a country, and are closely related to the security and development of the country, covering communications, oil, military, natural gas and other important areas. State-owned enterprises have become the dream "paradise" for an increasing number of job seekers. Based on this, the problems of state-owned enterprises are becoming more and more prominent, among which the problem of labor cost is very prominent. The paper discusses three aspects, namely, the role of labor cost control, the problems of labor cost control in state-owned enterprises and the corresponding measures to solve them.【關键词】国有企业;人工成本;成本控制【Keywords】state-owned enterprises; labor cost; cost control【中图分类号】F272.92;F276.1 【文献标志码】A 【文章编号】1673-1069(2021)03-0009-021 引言“工作长期稳定”“名誉好、福利多”……这些都是国有企业的代名词,也是数以百万计的就业人员争先恐后的目标。
翻译技巧一.翻译的基本技巧1. 词性转换法A well-dressed man, who looked and talked like an American, got into the car. (一个穿着讲究的人上了车。
他的外表和谈吐都像个美国人。
)Securities laws require companies to treat all shareholders reasonably equally.(证券法要求公司给所有持股人既合理又平等的待遇。
)Time Warner will pay TCI 360 million for Southern Satellite company.(时代华纳愿会给TCI三亿六千万美元购买南方卫星这家公司。
)2. 增减重复法She was more royal than the royals.(她比皇家成员更有皇家气质。
)You must come back before nine. Period!(你必须九点前回来,没有什么可商量的余地。
)There are scenes of all sorts, some dreadful combats, some grand and lofty horse-riding, some scenes of high life, and some of very middling indeed; some lovemaking for the sentimental, and some light comic business.(……看看各种表演,像激烈的格斗,精彩的骑术,上流社会的形形色色,普通人家生活的情形,专为多情的看客预备的恋爱场面,轻松滑稽的穿插等等。
)He shouldn’t have t aken advantage of her sexually.(他本不应该占她的便宜。
)There had been too much publicity about their relationship.(他们的关系已经闹得满城风雨,人人皆知了。
今天是你的生日,我的祖国(英文版)Today is your birthday, my dear motherland. In the morning when I opened the window, I found the bright five-star red flag fluttering in the wind, signifying the brilliant achievements made in the last 60 years. I was suddenly overwhelmed by a strong feeling of patriotism. After more than a century’s wind and storm, you are still standing on the east of the world, calling upon millions of descendants of the Yellow Emperor to march forward. Today, on the occasion of your 59 th anniversary, we all set aside our jobs and hold various celebrations as a gift for you. 2008 is an extraordinary year in the course of the development of our motherland. At the beginning of this year, the frozen rain and snow disaster as well as the May 12 earthquake posed a great threat to people’s lives and property. A number of central enterprises, including a few state-owned enterprises, suffered huge losses. Under the serious situation, the majority of state-owned enterprises have always put the country and its people’s interests first. The CPC central committee and the State Council played a special role in the disaster relief work, sparing no effort to get the tasks done, whatever the cost.On the eve of National Day, together with the central business wisdom and hard work, the Shenzhou Seven spacecraft took off successfully, fully demonstrating the powerful strength of the Republic and its ability of independent innovation and research in the space field.With the 59 th anniversary of People’s Republic of China, we must stand on a new historical starting point, hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and stride forward at a steady pace in an effort to build a well-off society and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In the greatchanges of the world economy, we are facing more and more serious challenges, which make a higher demand for the reform. and development of the central enterprises. We should further implement the scientific concept of development and fully carry out the spirit of the 17 th National Congress and speed up the reform. of state-owned enterprises to achieve fast and good development of our socialist economy. Bearing in mind our mission and creeds of trust and truth and hard work, we are sure to win the great victory of building a well-off society.。
第1篇一、自我介绍及个人素质评估1. 请简要介绍一下您的个人情况,包括教育背景、工作经历和翻译技能。
解答指南:面试官希望通过自我介绍了解应聘者的基本信息,考察其表达能力和自我认知。
2. 您认为成为一名优秀的翻译需要具备哪些素质?解答指南:考察应聘者对翻译工作的理解以及对自身素质的认知。
3. 请谈谈您在团队合作中的角色和优势。
解答指南:考察应聘者的人际交往能力和团队协作精神。
二、专业知识与技能评估1. 请用英语翻译以下句子:“我国政府高度重视环境保护,致力于实现可持续发展。
”解答指南:考察应聘者对翻译技巧的掌握程度。
2. 请用汉语翻译以下句子:“The company has achieved significant progress in the past few years and has won numerous awards for its excellent performance.”解答指南:考察应聘者对汉语表达能力的掌握。
3. 请谈谈您在翻译过程中遇到的最大困难以及如何克服的。
解答指南:考察应聘者对翻译工作的理解和解决问题的能力。
4. 请列举三种常见的翻译技巧,并简要说明其应用场景。
解答指南:考察应聘者对翻译技巧的掌握程度。
5. 请谈谈您对“信、达、雅”翻译标准的理解。
解答指南:考察应聘者对翻译理论知识的掌握。
三、实际工作能力评估1. 假设您作为翻译,参与了一次国际会议,请您谈谈如何确保翻译质量?解答指南:考察应聘者对实际工作场景的应对能力和翻译技巧的运用。
2. 请谈谈您在翻译过程中如何处理文化差异?解答指南:考察应聘者对文化差异的认识和应对能力。
3. 请谈谈您在翻译过程中如何确保翻译的时效性?解答指南:考察应聘者对时间管理和翻译效率的认识。
4. 请举例说明您在实际工作中如何处理客户的需求?解答指南:考察应聘者对客户需求的关注和满足能力。
5. 请谈谈您在翻译过程中如何保持与客户的良好沟通?解答指南:考察应聘者的人际交往能力和沟通技巧。
Speech to American Chamber of Commerce14th Leadership Series LuncheonDr Fu YuningPresident of China Merchants GroupWednesday, July 9, 2003The Logistics Industry in China: From Dawn to SunriseGood afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen, It’s my pleasure to be here with all of you. The title of my speech is “the Logistics Industry in China”. However, before I share with you some thoughts on such a macro-economic topic, I’d like firstly to talk about a little bit history of China Merchants Group; then to introduce the Group’s development strategies and you will see that under the new strategy, we have positioned logistics as one of our core businesses; and finally I will elaborate why we made such choice, and hopefully that will fits the title of my speech today.China Merchants: 130 Years of HistoryChina Merchants was founded in 1872. Last year, we commemorated its 130th anniversary. The founder was Mr. Li Hongzhong(李鴻章), a senior minister of Qing Dynasty.It was the first truly commercial enterprise in China’s history. From the beginning, China Merchants was known as “official-supervised, merchants-run” (guandu shangban,官督商办), in today’s terminology, it means that the government supervises over the managers at arm’s length.In 1950, China Merchants became a Hong Kong-based state-owned shipping company under the direct control of Ministry of Communications. In the year of 1978, China Merchants began to develop the Shekou Industrial Zone(蛇口工 区), China’s first industrial zone open to the outside world and the “seed” of China’s special economic zones. Later, China Merchants successively set up China Merchants Bank and China Pingan Insurance Company; the first incorporated bank and the first incorporated insurance company in socialist China.Over the last two decades, China Merchants has developed form a traditional shipping company into a diversified business group and now is included as one of the 42 key state-owned corporations under the direct supervision of the State Council.Group Restructuring: Redefining our Core BusinessesOne of the lessons learned from the Asian financial crisis was that over-borrowing and over-diversified conglomerates were vulnerable to the attack of financial crisis. China Merchants Group, used to invest in over 16 different business sectors, including shipping, transportation, finance, real estate, trading, ship repairing, manufacturing, hotel, tourism and many others.After the financial crisis, one of the real challenges for Asian businesses was whether or not they can refocuses on their core competencies. China Merchants started its own restructuring process three years ago and redefined its core businesses, which are logistics infrastructures (with ports as its focus), real estate, financial service and logistics (third party logistics).-Today, our infrastructure investments (ports and expressways) have been consolidated into our Hong Kong-listed flagship – China Merchants Holdings (International) (144.hk). That includes container ports in Hong Kong, Shekou and Chiwan of Shenzhen, Zhanzhou of Fujian, and planned investments in Ningbo of Zhejiang, Qingdao of Shandong and Tianjin. Besides, the Group owns and manages one tenth of the toll roads in China’s expressway system.-Four real estate subsidiaries have been consolidated into one business unit – a Shenzhen-listed company, China Merchants Shekou Holdings (000024).-In the financial service area, last year we have successfully listed our China Merchants Bank on Shanghai stock market (600036).-In 2001 and 2002, we restructured our logistics business and consolidated more than 20 transportation and warehousing subsidiaries and related operations into a newly set-up logistics group, under the brand name of China Merchants Logistics.The new strategy is to list our four core business units either in Hong Kong or China stock markets.As you may notice, two of our four core businesses are logistics-related; they are logistics infrastructures – mainly ports business; and third party logistics.China’s Logistics: OverviewChina’s economy has been enjoying high and stable growth in the last two decades. The Foreign direct investment had reached a record high in 2002 to US$52.7 billion, thanks to China’s competitive costs and vast market potentials. Foreign direct investment and multinationals have brought new manufacturing capacity to China and help China become one of the world major workshops.As a significant component of GDP, logistics affects every aspect of economy. Some experts estimate that China’s logistics costs – both outsourcing spending and corporate in-house logistics expenditures – were approximately US$245 billion, or 20% of its GDP.With that in mind, if China’s logistics expenditures could be lowered by 10%, or US$24.5 billion would have been translated into lower prices for consumers, better profit margins for businesses, and even to the extent of uplifting overall standard of living. It is so obvious that we emphasize the need of improving the efficiency of logistics in China.The high GDP proportion of logistics is due to the high costs associated with moving cargo in China. As we understand, the logistics costs could be 40~50% higher than that in developed countries.However, things are clearly improving in China; we also observed significant logistics cost savings during the last 5 years, thanks to the rapid development of third party logistics and the huge investment into logistics infrastructures.China’s logistics is a quite macro-topic and covers many areas. Today, I choose to discuss China’s logistics infrastructures and third party logistics.China’s Logistics Infrastructures: PortsAccording to WTO, in term of value, China accounts for about 4% of world trade. However, as China emerges as a major manufacturing powerhouse, in terms of container traffic, China contributes 20~25% of global volumes, while for certain products such as toys and garment, China has a 50% to 60% market share.As container traffic volumes from/to China have increased, the number of the direct calls at China’s Ports by ocean carriers has also increased.The major obstacles in maritime logistics, as I observed, are not the shipping capacity, but rather the infrastructure capacity. In the past years, we have witnessed amounting pressure on port infrastructures in the mainland. Last year, China’s container throughput posted 37% growth and reached 33.8 million teu. Eight ports in China handed in excess of one million teu a year. This figure has, once again, put all the previous forecasts, even the most aggressive one, on the conservative side.This year, we are witnessing some rising congestions in China’s major ports. China’s ports as a whole, is working at more than 120% of its design capacity, while some busiest ports this figure is over 150%.China’s Third Party Logistics BusinessThe rationale for outsourcing logistics is to achieve cost saving through economics of scale. China’s market for third-party logistics is still in its early stages. Business China magazine estimated the third party logistics have penetrated only 2% of China’s total logistics activities. That means China’s market of outsourcing logistics accounts for only US$5 billion in 2002.How many third party logistics companies in China? Some say more than 10,000. Others say about 15,000. However, of these, the vast majority focus on a single function in the supply chain – such as traditional transportation. Currently, No one accounts for more than 2% of the market share.I trust, nobody in this room will deny the potential of China’s logistics business. With all the excitement, it’s easy to overlook the fact that China is already critical to the globalized supply chains.Multinationals have sophisticated logistics needs and lack of experience in managing local logistics. Globalization has increased the length and complexity of the corporate supply chain. Pressures on corporate margins and capital expenditures are the major factors that are forcing companies to focus more on their core competency and to outsource non-core activities such as logistics operations.In contrast, many Chinese traditional state owned enterprises are the least likely tooutsource logistics, as they normally have the in-house assets and people. Another barrier to greater outsourcing for most Chinese companies is they didn’t track their total logistics costs, and this makes it difficult for them to understand the value of third party logistics can offer.That could explain why most of the demands for third party logistics services in China today come from multinational corporations. About 70% of foreign companies in Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta outsourced part or all their logistics needs, but only 15% of domestic companies are doing so.China’s Logistics Development: the 10th Five Year planAs China emerges as a manufacturing powerhouse, the demands of logistics infrastructures and the third party logistics services will increase rapidly. China released its Tenth Five Year Plan in Late 2001 and planned to invest some US$ 85 billion to improve China’s transportation infrastructure in that 5 years period. In February, 2003, as declared by Minister of Communications, Mr. Zhang Chunxian ( 春 ), by the end of 2010, China will triple its current container ports throughput capacity (37m TEUS in 2002) to 100m TEUs, and double its current expressway mileage (25,130 kilometers in 2002) to 50,000 kilometers.In March 2001, six ministries of central government jointly issued a policy report which encouraged the growth of logistics business through (1) deregulating the market; (2) permitting more foreign investments; (3) developing logistics infrastructure; and (4) facilitating the application of information technology and the standardization of logistics products and services.Now, let me summarize the key driving forces lie behind the growth of logistics business in China:1.China’s stable and health economic Growth2.Increasing foreign direct investment and their outsourcing demands of logisticsservices3.Increasing trade coupled with larger increment of freight volumeernment policies – to encourage the development of China’s logisticsmarkets5.Outsourcing trend – outsourcing of transportation and warehousing functionswill increase for domestic companies6.Regional Integration – several logistics centres will emerge within China’s threeimportant economic regions: Bohai Bay, Yangzi River Delta, and Pearl River Delta. CEPA will secure Hong Kong’s role as an international logistics hub.7.IT technology – new technology is enabling more complex solutions,contributing to increased demand for value-added services.Therefore, I predict that over the next 5 years, China’s logistics outsourcing is expected to grow at 30% per year at least. In fact, several of the major players, including China Merchants Logistics, have experienced annual doubling of revenues in the past couple of years.China Merchants’ Logistics BusinessesChina Merchants, as a leading terminal operator in mainland, are investing in newports facilities in Shekou, Chiwan, Mawan, Zhangzhou and Ningbo, and planning to invest in Qingdao, Tianjin and Shanghai. In addition to investment in port infrastructures, we introduced last year an electronic Customs clearance system in our Shenzhen ports. This system has smoothened the Customs procedures and improved efficiency; the clearance cost has then been reduced by 30~40%, while the clearance waiting period has been shortened from 2~3 days to 0.5~1 day.China Merchants is a pioneer in China’s third party logistics markets. We partnered with Singapore Technology in 1995 to set up a joint venture – ST Anda, which is, I believe, the first non-asset based third party logistics company in China. Today, we are one of the largest third party logistics companies, operating through a network of 26 regional distribution centers and able to provide full logistics services and supply chain solutions to customers covers some 650 cities nationwide.To stimulate local companies in China to adopt modern solutions of their logistics needs, China Merchants Logistics formed a JV with Tsingtao Brewery Group to manage its in-house logistics assets. The first-year experience has provided significant costs savings for this Brewery group.This model creates longer customer relationships and locks in volume.The Gross revenue of our logistics business in 2002 was about RMB900 million. Compared with our other three core businesses (ports, real estate and financial service); the Logistics company is still a baby brother in term of size, revenue and profits. However, as we are optimistic for the growth of China’s logistics market, and I feel very confident that our logistics business will have a promising future, and become the fastest growing business division of China Merchants Group.Thank you.。
英语二级口译真题及答案英语二级口译真题及答案翻译专业人才在我国经济发展和社会进步中起着非常重要的作用,特别是在吸收引进外国的先进科技知识和加强国际交流与合作方面,翻译是桥梁和纽带。
下面是店铺分享的英语二级口译考试试题及答案,希望能帮到大家!Part 2 Chinese to English InterpretingPassage 1最近几年来,中国经济增长速度放慢,为了解决这一问题,2015年,中国政府推行了供给侧改革,国际社会对此十分关注,但是也出现了一些的误解,中国为什么会推出这一政策。
In recent years, the Chinese economy is slowing down. To address this issue, the Chinese government rolled out the reform on the supplying side in 2015. The reform, while receiving much attention from the international community, also aroused some misunderstandings. Why did China enforce this policy?知识点:rolled out是一个比较口语的说法,也可以说enforce.在这里我想强调,中国政府推行的供给侧改革和上个世纪80年代,美国和英国搞的供济侧经济学是完全不一样的。
美国推行供给测经济学的主要作法是大规律减税,英国的供给测经济学的作法是对国有企业进行私有化。
而中国推行的供给测改革,所要解决的问题和手段完全不同。
Here I want to emphasize that the current reform China takes on its supplying side is completely different from the supplying side economics carried out in U.S and Great Britain in the 1980s. One of the major measures for American reform is to have great tax reductions, while Britain is privatizing the state-owned enterprises. For China, however, the goals and measures of thereform are totally different.知识点:文中出现了很多“供给侧改革”或者与之相关的说法,翻译时需要注意,如果上下文指代清楚,可以省略或者简化为““改革”或者“措施”,既可以提高效率,又能使译文简练,可听性高。
81Shaomin Li is a professor of International Business, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, V A; e-mail: sli@. Ying Chou Lin is an assistant professor of Finance, Southeastern Oklahoma State University, Durant, OK; e-mail: ylin@. David D. Selover is an as-sociate professor of economics, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, V A; e-mail: dselover@. The authors would like to thank Lan Cao, Berna Demiralp, Meng Li, Yingxue Li, Cheryl Long, Michael Stein, Harris Wu, Zhao Yang, Ray Chou, and Haiwen Zhou for their help and discussions related to this article. The authors would also like to thank the Old Dominion University, College of Business and Public Administration, for providing funds for data and software support. They would like to thank seminar participants at Academia Sinica and Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan for their helpful suggestions.the chinese economy , vol. 47, nos. 5–6,September–October/November–December 2014, pp. 81–115.© 2014 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. Permissions: ISSN 1097–1475 (print)/ISSN 1558–0954 (online)DOI: 10.2753/CES1097-1475470504S haomin L i , Y ing C hou L in , and d a vid d. S eLoverChinese State-Owned Enterprises: Are They Inefficient?Abstract: Using a panel data set of 200,000+ chinese firms constructed by merg-ing the chinese census of manufacturing firms for 2000–2005, we compare the performance of chinese state-owned enterprises (soes) and private firms in terms of rates of return, productivity, growth, costs, and investment. Using panel regres-sions, we find that chinese industrial state-owned enterprises are, indeed, less efficient than private firms and pay less attention to costs, inventories, accounts receivables, investment, employee welfare, financing, and administration. We find that this adversely affects their performance. the findings are consistent with the soft-budget constraint hypothesis.The claim is often made that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less ef-ficient than nonstate-owned enterprises in terms of profits, productivity, and growth (see Zhang 2004; Dougherty, Herd, and He 2007; and Zhang, Tang, and He 2012 for recent examples). So the question is, are they inefficient? If so, in what ways are they inefficient? Could it be that the legacy and the psychology of having the support of the government actually lead to suboptimal behavior? Such state own-ership may have profound effects on the operation, behavior, and performance ofD o w n l o a d e d b y [m o u n i k a i n d u p r i y a l ] a t 03:37 11 M a y 2015the firm. What types of behavior are behind the inefficiency of the state-owned enterprise?Kornai (1980) wrote about such effects when he described Eastern European, state-owned socialist enterprises as being supported by their government trea-suries and, therefore, being subject to what he called a “soft-budget constraint.” Under a soft-budget constraint, he observed, state-owned enterprises did not have to worry about competition and survival and were, therefore, subject to various moral hazard problems, thus, becoming lax about firm costs, sales, revenues, and ultimately profits.In this paper we find that Chinese SOEs are less efficient than privately owned firms in terms of rates of return, productivity, and growth. We find that Chinese SOEs are less efficient than private firms along a number of dimensions, including the holding of inventories, the carrying of accounts receivable, and the paying of high administrative costs.In China, a significant proportion of the enterprises are “state-owned enterprises” or “SOEs,” which are owned by the national, provincial, or local governments. As recently as 1978, the Chinese economy was almost entirely a socialist economy with nearly 100 percent of the firms owned and operated by the state, urban col-lectives, and townships and villages. Since that time, China has made tremendous reforms and has opened up its economy to the international market, encouraged private business, privatized some state-owned and collectively owned firms, invited in foreign investment and enterprises, and corporatized the remaining state-owned enterprises under the Company Law of 1993 (Fung, Kummer, and Shen 2006). However, for the most part, many of the corporatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still remain under the control of the state, where they have the implicit support of the government, remain exposed to the incentive problem of the soft-budget constraint, and are still subject to the explicit or implicit command of the state to help fulfill government policy goals—the so-called policy burden.We begin the analysis by comparing state-owned enterprises and privately owned enterprises on the basis of the averages of performance variables, such as profits, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), labor productivity, and firm growth. However, such a comparison might be misleading because there are many confounding factors that may affect the performance of firms. State-owned enterprises and privately owned enterprises are often in different industries, are of different sizes, display different economies of scale, have different degrees of market power, operate in different markets, have different production technologies, receive different treatment by the government, receive different tax treatment, and get different loan terms from the banks. Thus, the performance of the two ownership groups is affected by many factors. Therefore, we control for these variables as much as possible. Moreover, by using fixed effects models on a panel data set, we are able to control for many of the unobserved variables (see Wooldridge 2002; Baltagi 1995). We find that state-owned enterprises are, indeed, less efficient than privately owned firms in terms of ROA, ROE, ROS, labor productivity, andD o w n l o a d e d b y [m o u n i k a i n d u p r i y a l ] a t 03:37 11 M a y 2015sales growth, even when we control for several confounding factors, including size of firm, industry, age of firm, location, and industry concentration.The present research is unique because we are using a new dataset, constructed by the merging of firm data from six years of the Chinese national census of manufacturing firms. We look at the data in a different way by analyzing various possible effects of state ownership upon different dimensions of firm behavior. This research is important because Chinese firms will be better off if they are more efficient and thus more able to compete in the global economy. There are potential policy implications as to whether Chinese firms can become truly efficient while under state-ownership, or whether China will have to privatize its SOEs for the firms to achieve efficiency. The issue is also potentially important for policy toward state-owned enterprises in other countries.We investigate the question of the differences in the underlying behavior of SOEs and privately owned firms. How do the different ownership types of firms compare on the basis of state support policies such as subsidies, debt-equity ratios, interest rates, and tax rates, and on the basis of firm behavior such as investment, inventories, accounts receivable, administrative costs, employee compensation, and employee benefits? We find that SOEs and private firms differ in their behavior in ways predicted by the soft-budget constraint hypothesis and that this behavior matters for firm performance.Section 2 reviews the literature regarding Chinese SOE efficiency and perfor-mance. Section 3 discusses the economic theory relevant to state-owned enterprises and the soft-budget constraint. Section 4 describes the data, the construction of the panel data set, the methods of estimation, and the models used in the analysis. Section 5 discusses the results of the statistical analysis, and section 6 summarizes the findings and concludes.Literature ReviewThere is a large and growing literature on the performance of Chinese state-owned enterprises (see, for example, Perkins 1994; Jefferson and Rawski 1994; Jefferson, Rawski, Wang, and Zheng 2000; Lin, Cai, and Li 2001; Chang and Wong 2004; Dougherty, Herd, and He 2007; and many others). Perkins (1994) gave an over-view of the early Chinese industrial reforms between 1978 and the early 1990s. He described a process of gradual reform during which the government reduced its central planning, but in which the state-owned enterprises continued to exist, often making use of government support for the pursuit of social and political goals. Jefferson and Rawski (1994) described the Chinese industrial reforms as “slow, evolutionary, and exploratory,” and they noted that the most difficult reforms, the reforms of the SOEs and financial institutions, were yet to come. They noted an increase in competition, an increase in total factor productivity, and progress toward the development of a market system, but they also observed a continued lack of private property and a weak financial system.D o w n l o a d e d b y [m o u n i k a i n d u p r i y a l ] a t 03:37 11 M a y 2015Jefferson, Rawski, Wang, and Zheng (2000) employed the Chinese Industrial Census data for the years 1980–1996 to evaluate firm performance for different own-ership structures on the basis of single factor productivity, total factor productivity, and firm profitability. While they found that SOEs lagged in terms of profitability, they also found that the SOEs did not perform badly in terms of productivity growth and performance relative to the privately owned and foreign-owned firms.Chang and Wong (2004) investigated a cross-section of firms listed on the Shang-hai stock exchange and found that political control and connections have a negative impact on profitability measured in terms of return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on sales (ROS). The article suggested that SOEs were inefficient and performed badly, even under corporatization. Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton (1994) have found that increased firm autonomy in output decisions, profit retention, and labor personnel decisions has led to increased efficiency since the institution of the industrial reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.Lin and Rowe (2006) used aggregated provincial panel statistics to explore the determinants of profitability of China’s regional SOEs. They found that the profit-ability of firms within a province was positively related to the prevalence of nonstate enterprise investment, openness to exports, and location on the east coast, and was negatively related to the debt ratio and the proportion of unhealthy assets.In an article most closely related to the present study, Dougherty, Herd, and He (2007) constructed a panel dataset of individual Chinese firms over six years (1998–2003) using older data from the Chinese industrial census. Estimating pro-duction functions, they investigated the differences in productivity, profitability, and concentration between the state-owned firms (SOEs) and nonstate-owned firms. They found that SOEs were less efficient and less profitable than privately owned firms.McMillan and Naughton (1992) argued that the introduction of competition was crucial to the reforms of the various industries and that the privatization of the SOEs was not essential. In this view, Naughton (1995, 2007) saw an economy in which the privately owned sector was growing much faster than the state-owned sector, which meant that China was gradually becoming a largely privately owned economy, even without privatizing its major state-owned enterprises. Naughton (1995, 2007) calls this development “growing out of the plan.” In his view, the industrial reform was successful largely because of the introduction of competition into the economy. At the same time, the large SOEs served as a social and economic safety net for their workers. Nonetheless, the Chinese central government has chosen to retain control over the largest and the most strategic of the state-owned enterprises. Smaller and less strategic SOEs were devolved to lower levels of government or privatized.Other researchers view the privatization of the SOEs as crucial to the develop-ment of the economy. Zhang (2004) pointed out that the state, even while corpo-ratizing the SOEs, still holds close control of these firms. While acknowledging the progress that corporatization has meant for the SOEs, Zhang (2004) and Chi, Wang, and Young (2010) concluded that corporatization has failed to improve theD o w n l o a d e d b y [m o u n i k a i n d u p r i y a l ] a t 03:37 11 M a y 2015performance of the SOEs fundamentally. Zhang (2004) noted that even after corpo-ratization, the firm managers were not changed, firms still had public burden obliga-tions, minority shareholder rights were violated, a soft-budget constraint continued, SOEs encountered greater losses than other firms, and the performance of the firms did not improve. She found that there was still a large performance gap between the SOEs and the other firms. She concluded, therefore, that China will eventually have to embrace large-scale privatization, as has been done in other countries.Economic TheoryState-owned enterprises (SOEs) have some advantages and some disadvantages relative to privately owned firms. SOEs not only have the apparent advantage of the financial backing of the state in the form of subsidies, but also often have advantages in licensing, tax breaks, low-interest loans, grants of land, low-priced raw materials, monopoly rights, and exclusive government contracts. This was particularly true during the socialist period in China.However, government support leads to certain problems in the performance of state-owned enterprises that Kornai called the “the soft-budget constraint” (SBC) (Kornai, 1980a, 1980b, 1986; Kornai, Maskin, and Roland 2003). According to the soft-budget constraint hypothesis, state-owned enterprises receive various forms of support from the state. As a consequence, the state-owned enterprise (SOE) does not depend upon making profits for its own survival, growth, or investment. This creates a distortion of its incentive structure. The SOE does not bear risk alone, and, consequently, there is a moral hazard risk that the firm will become lax in terms of controlling costs, marketing its products, and promoting innovation, and that the SOE will have a propensity to engage in highly risky investment (see Kornai 1980b, 1986). Not only does the soft-budget constraint loosen the financial limitations on the SOE firms, but it also affects the psychology and ultimately the behavior of the stakeholders of the firm. The effects can be blatant or subtle, af-fecting the psychology of the decision-makers and making them less aggressive in cost-cutting, innovating, and marketing. Managers do not have to strive as hard to ensure the survival of the firm (see Kornai 1980b, 1986). Typically, state-owned enterprise managers have little incentive to improve their business or work hard to improve profits. There also may be a tendency for managers to engage in over-investing, empire building , and rent-seeking behavior. SOEs often have to engage in rent-seeking behavior in order to get more resources from the state. Managers may demand more perks for themselves and their employees, a problem in market economies sometimes referred to as “x-inefficiencies.” General employees may feel that their jobs are secure and guaranteed by the state, and, therefore, feel less pres-sure to work hard. Hence, it is not necessary for there to be government subsidies for the soft-budget constraint problem to exist; it is merely sufficient for there to be an expectation or a perception that government support is available to support the firm, and that will affect stakeholder behavior.D o w n l o a d e d b y [m o u n i k a i n d u p r i y a l ] a t 03:37 11 M a y 2015This suboptimal performance often occurs when the government has special social or political goals, policy burdens . Because the SOEs are owned by the state, the government may require the SOE to deviate from the goal of profit maximiza-tion in order to fulfill the goals of the state (see Lin and Li 2008). For example, in China, SOEs have often been required to retain a surplus of employees in order to help maintain high employment, provide a high level of benefits for their employees, and are often required to supply goods to the state at a low price. Lin and Li (2008) suggest that the soft-budget constraint problem is due to the policy burdens placed on the SOEs by the state. If the state places a policy burden upon the firm, it carries an implicit guarantee by the state to help out if things go badly for the firm. As a result, Lin and Li (2008) posit that as long as the state places policy burdens on firms, even privatization will not eliminate the soft-budget constraint problem. Li (2008) tested Lin and Li’s (2008) policy burden soft-budget constraint hypothesis using panel financial data and survey data from Chinese firms between 1995 and 2001 and found support for the policy burden hypothesis.There has been some study of the soft-budget constraint phenomenon with respect to Chinese firms. A number of articles specifically study the soft-budget constraint in China, including Bai and Wang (1998), Qian and Roland (1996, 1998), Lin and Tan (1999), Tong (2002), Lin and Li (2008), and Eggleston et al. (2009). Most of these papers are descriptive or theoretical in nature and do not employ empirical analysis.Because of both the policy burden and state support, we do not expect SOEs to perform as well as private firms in terms of profitability and productivity, even while controlling for such factors as government subsidies, monopoly power, industry, and size and experience of the firm. Because of the policy burden of the SOEs, we expect SOE firms to have more workers, lower productivity, higher worker welfare costs, and higher amounts of investment. Because of the state support, we also expect a greater laxness regarding costs. In general we expect that SOEs will tend to have more government subsidies, more employees, more investment, higher inventories, greater accounts receivable, higher debt-equity ratios, greater financial expenditures, higher employee welfare expenditures, and higher administrative costs than do private firms.Data and Method of AnalysisThe dataset used in this study is firm level data from the annual 2000 to 2005 Chinese National Industrial Census (NBS 2000–2005) merged together to form a unique panel dataset of large- and medium-size Chinese industrial firms.1 The census data consists of all manufacturing firms in China with sales of 5,000,000 RMB per year or greater, collected by China’s central government National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). All enterprises in China are required by law to report accurate information about their ownership, performance, assets, and employees. This is one of the most complete and comprehensive datasets available for Chinese manufac-D o w n l o a d e d b y [m o u n i k a i n d u p r i y a l ] a t 03:37 11 M a y 2015turing firms and, as such, offers an unparalleled opportunity to research Chinese industry. Dougherty, Herd, and He (2007) used earlier versions of the industrial census data in their study.2The purpose of this investigation is to examine the behavior and performance of Chinese firms to learn if SOEs perform as well as private firms and why. We expect that the state-owned enterprises do not perform as well as private firms in terms of profitability, productivity, and sales growth. In addition, we expect that state-owned enterprises operate with more slackness than privately owned firms. First, we compare the means of firm performance for different firm ownership structures. Second, we use fixed effects panel regressions to compare the per-formance of firms while controlling for potential confounding factors. Third, we compare various firms of different ownership structures along the dimensions of firm behavior, again by comparing means and using panel regressions. Fourth, we evaluate the effects of the different types of firm behavior upon firm performance using panel regressions.To organize our analysis, we visualize this phenomenon as a structure in which ownership determines government support and firm behavior, which, in turn, de-termines firm performance. In order to evaluate the effects of firm ownership on firm productivity, growth, investment, and subsidies correctly, we need to be able to specify the regressions as completely as possible in order to avoid a potentially omitted variables bias problem. To control for unobserved omitted variables, we estimate fixed-effects panel regressions (Baltagi 1995; Wooldridge 2002).What determines a firm’s profits? To begin with, the profits of a firm depend upon the size of a firm, the industry, the market power in the industry, firm market share, sales, subsidies, interest costs, costs of raw materials, labor costs, age or experience of the firm, location, and ownership type. However, profits also depend upon many variables for which there is no data, including management style and competence; manufacturing proficiency; design, style, and quality of the products; quality of decision-making; key products; innovations; marketing; timing; and luck. Many of these variables are firm-specific variables and are not available. However, because we have a panel of firms, by using a fixed effects model, we can, to a certain extent, control for these unobserved firm-specific variables.The size of the firm and market share should matter because of economies of scale in production, marketing, and distribution. Location should matter because firms located on the coast should find it cheaper to market, transport, and export their goods, and cheaper to buy inputs. In addition, profitability should be positively affected by firm concentration (HHI), due to increasing market power, and by the age of the firm, due to increasing experience of the management. Furthermore, profitability often depends upon the type of industry.The analysis focuses on the comparisons of means and panel regressions in an effort to discover the differences between state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective-owned enterprises (COEs), and private enterprises in profitability, productivity, and sales growth while controlling for the other factors. We test theD o w n l o a d e d b y [m o u n i k a i n d u p r i y a l ] a t 03:37 11 M a y 2015hypothesis here by looking at the effect of ownership on firm performance, using performance regressed on the main determinants of performance, including dummy variables for ownership. We use dummy variables for SOE, COE, JS (joint stock), JV (joint venture), HKMT (Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan), and FOREIGN firms, keeping domestic Chinese private firms as the base case. We control for location with the dummy variable, “coast,” taking the value of 1 for location in a coastal province and 0 otherwise. We run firm performance regressions for each of five performance variables: ROA is return on assets (profit/assets); ROE is return on equity (profit/equity); ROS is return on sales (profit/sales); Productivity is labor productivity (value-added/number of employees); and Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales.The first set of panel regressions for evaluating firm performance are specified as follows:Performance sales revenue HHI sales shar it it it=++ββββ1234 e age age SOE COE JS JV it it itit it it it ++++++ββββββ56278910 ++++∑=βββσ111213139HKMT FOREIGN coast industry it it it j j jit tk k kit ityear +∑+=20012005γε (1)where Performance is ROE, ROS, Productivity, and Sales Growth.3 The independent variables are as follows: sales revenue is sales revenue in RMB (size of firm); HHI is the Hirfindahl Index measure of industrial concentration;4 sales share is sales revenue as a share of the total 4-digit CIC industry category sales revenue; age is the age of firm in years; age2 is the age of firm squared (to account for a nonlin-ear relationship); SOE is a dummy variable for state-owned enterprises; COE isFigure 1. Firm Ownership Determines Government Support and Firm Behavior which in T urn Determine Firm PerformanceD o w n l o a d e d b y [m o u n i k a i n d u p r i y a l ] a t 03:37 11 M a y 2015a dummy variable for collectively owned enterprises; JS is a dummy variable for joint stock companies; JV is a dummy variable for joint venture companies; HKMT is a dummy variable for Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan firms; FOREIGN is a dummy variable for foreign firms from other countries. The base case is domestic privately owned firms. Coast is a dummy variable for being located in a coastal province (coastal = 1); Industry stands for a group of dummy variables for differ-ent specific 2-digit CIC industries; Year stands for a group of dummy variables for each particular year (2000 is the base case). Firms are indexed i ; t indexes years; j indexes the broad industry dummy variables (39); and k indexes the year dummy variables (5).The second set of panel regressions are specified for analyzing firm behavior:Behavior sales revenue HHI sales share it it it it =+++ββββ1234 βββββββ5627891011 age age SOE COE JS JV it it it it it it ++++++ HKMT FOREIGN coast industry it it it j j jit k +++∑+∑=ββσ1213139=+20012005γεk kit ityear (2)where the dependent variable behavior represents a series of different firm behavior variables, including the following: investment is the long-term investments/sales ratio; inventories is the inventories/sales ratio; inventories is the inventories/sales ratio; accounts receivable is the accounts receivable/sales ratio; administrative costs is the administrative costs/sales ratio; finance costs is the finance costs/sales ratio; wages are average wages; welfare is the employee welfare expenditure/employee ratio; and exports is the exports/sales ratio.Finally, the third set of panel regressions are for analyzing the effects of firm behavior and government policy upon firm performance:Performance sales revenue HHI sales shar it it it=++ββββ1234 e age age SOE COE JS JV it it itit it it it ++++++ββββββ56278910 +++++βββββ1112131415 HKMT FOREIGN coast subsidies it it it it inventories invest rec welfare wa it it it it ββββ16171819+++g es debt Equity exports tax tax it it it it it ++++ββββ20212223 /+++∑∑==ββσ24251392001200 fincost interest industryit it j j k 5γεk kit ityear +(3)where, once again, performance is ROA, ROE, ROS, Productivity, and Sales Growth, respectively. Government policy variables include the following: subsidies is the subsidy/assets ratio; debt/equity is the debt/equity ratio; tax is the incomeD o w n l o a d e d b y [m o u n i k a i n d u p r i y a l ] a t 03:37 11 M a y 2015tax/profit ratio; and interest is the interest expenses/debt ratio (as a proxy for the interest rate). This regression includes the government policy variables, the firm behavior variables, and the ownership dummies to gauge the effects of these vari-ables upon firm performance. ResultsIn this section we examine for the effects of ownership and the possible exis-tence of the soft-budget constraint in Chinese manufacturing industries. Our hypothesis is that state-owned enterprises receive more forms of support and aid from the state than do privately and foreign-owned firms. The state-owned enterprises will, therefore, have a tendency to behave with more slackness, will pay less attention to costs, tend to overinvest, and, as a result, will not perform as well as private enterprises in terms of profits, productivity, and growth. We examine these hypotheses using descriptive statistics and panel data regressions. It should be kept in mind that for medium and large enterprises, these industrial census data represent a large portion of the entire population of enterprises with annual sales of 5,000,000 RMB and greater.5 The number of firms in the data set is, therefore, relatively large. We can see the relative importance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the Chinese economy in Table 1. Table 1 reports the number of firms and the percentage of firms in the various ownership categories for the years 2000 and 2005. It also presents several measures for the relative importance of the different ownership categories, including number of firms, total sales rev-enues, industrial value-added, and the number of employees in each ownership category. In our sample, we have seven categories of ownership of firms: (1) state-owned enterprises (SOE); (2) collectively owned enterprises (COE); (3) joint-stock enterprises (JS); (4) joint-venture enterprises (JV); (5) domestic privately owned enterprises; (6) Hong Kong-, Macao-, and Taiwan-owned enterprises (HKMT); and (7) foreign-owned enterprises. Because joint stock and joint ven-ture firms include a significant amount of state ownership, we view these types of firms as similar to the SOEs.Strikingly, in all measures, we can see a rapid and clear decrease in the impor-tance of the SOEs and the growing importance of the privately owned enterprises in the economy. For example, in terms of the number of firms, in 2000 we see that SOEs make up fully 31.7 percent of the enterprises in the dataset, but by 2005 that number falls to 8.5 percent. In terms of sales revenues, in 2000 SOEs account for 39.4 percent, falling to 21.5 percent by 2005. The same pattern is true for value-added and number of employees, all pointing to the declining importance of SOEs in the economy. These statistics are supportive of Naughton’s (1995, 2007) “grow-ing out of the plan” hypothesis. However, the state still maintains control over the largest enterprises and the most strategic industries, including utilities, energy, natural resources, metals, and certain high tech industries.6D o w n l o a d e d b y [m o u n i k a i n d u p r i y a l ] a t 03:37 11 M a y 2015。