Mathematical Models Game Theory 博弈论数学模型

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Mathematical Models: Game Theory
Mark Fey
University of Rochester
This course is designed to teach graduate students in political science the tools of game theory. The course will cover the standard group of essential concepts and some additional topics that are particularly important in formal theory. In addition, we will cover some specific applications of game theory in political science.
Students should have, at a minimum, a mathematical background of algebra (solving equations, graphing functions, etc.) and a basic knowledge of probability. Development of the theory does not require calculus, although some applications will be presented that utilize basic calculus (i.e., derivatives). A very brief summary of the necessary mathematics is in Appendix One of Morrow.
Game theory, as with most mathematical topics, is best learned by doing, rather than reading. Thus, an important part of the course will be the problem sets covering the lecture material and readings. These problem sets will count for 60% of the final grade, and a take-home exam at the end of the course will count for 40% of the final grade. Solutions to the problem sets will be covered in class. Auditors are welcome, and those who complete the problem sets and keep up with the lectures and reading will be entitled to seek help with problems and with the material. There are two required texts for the course:
James Morrow, 1995. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton University Press.
Robert Gibbons, 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press. Other readings will be made available to you for photocopying.
Schedule
June 27Introduction, Basic Assumptions of Rational Choice
Morrow: Chs. 1-2
June 28 Decision Theory, Optimization
June 29 Representing Games, Strategic Form Games
Morrow: Chs. 3-4
June 30 Strategic Form Games
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July 3 & 4 No class, but lots of fireworks!
July 5 Strategic Form Games, Dominance
Gibbons: Sec. 1.1
July 6 Nash Equilibrium, Mixed Strategies
Gibbons: Sec. 1.3
July 7 Zero-sum Games, Applications
July 10 Extensive Form Games, Backwards Induction Morrow: Ch. 5
July 11 Subgame Perfection, Forward Induction
Gibbons: Ch. 2
July 12 Bayesian Games, Bayesian Equilibrium
Morrow: Ch. 6
July 13 Bayesian Equilibrium
Gibbons: Ch. 3
July 14 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium Morrow: Ch. 7
Gibbons: Sec. 4.1
July 17 Sequential Equilibrium
July 18 Signaling Games
Morrow: Ch. 8
Gibbons: Sec. 4.2
July 19 Cheap Talk Games
Gibbons: Sec. 4.3
July 20 Repeated Games
Morrow: Ch. 9
July 21 Applications, Wrap-up
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