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文献、资料中文题目：关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响文献、资料英文题目：The Impact of Capital Structure on Agency Costs 文献、资料来源：
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翻译日期： 2017.02.14
The Impact of Capital Structure on Agency Costs
[Abstract] This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the agency costs hypothesis which suggests that increase of leverage may reduce agency costs. Both multivariate tests and univariate tests are employed in this study. The multivariate tests reveal that general relationship between leverage and agency costs is significantly negative. Univariate tests are further used to assess whether agency costs are significantly different when a firm has a relatively higher debt to asset ratio from when it is less leveraged. Similar supporting evidence is found for the agency costs hypothesis. Moreover, results from the univariate tests also indicate that this general negative relationship no longer holds when an extremely high level of leverage is present.
[Keywords] Agency costs, Leverage, Agency costs hypothesis, and Opposite effect
1. Introduction
In their seminal work, Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency costs occur due to incomplete alignment of the agent’s and the owner’s interests. The separation of ownership and control may generate agency costs. Two types of agency costs are identified in the paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976): agency costs derived from conflicts between outside equity holders and owner-managers, and conflicts between equity holders and debt holders. From then on, a great amount of research has been devoted to demonstrate the interaction between agency costs and financial decisions, governance decisions, dividend policy, and capital structure decisions.
Much empirical evidence collected by researchers, for example, Ang et al. (2000), and Fleming et al. (2005), shows that agency costs generated from the conflicts between outside equity holders and owner-manager could be reduced by increasing the owner-managers’ proportion in equity, i.e., agency costs vary inversely with the manager’s ownership. However, the conflicts between equity holders and debt holders would be more complicated. Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that there should be an optimal capital structure, under which the lowest agency costs of a firm can be deduced from an independent variable --- “the ratio of outside equity to the whole outside financing”. The locus of agency costs, which is equal to agency costs of outside equity and the ones of debt, would be a convex curve. This implies that agency costs should not be monotonic any more.
Some researchers such as Grossman and Hart (1982); Williams (1987), argue that high leverage reduces agency costs and increases firm value by encouraging managers to act more in the interests of equity holders. This argument is known as the agency costs hypothesis. Higher leverage may reduce agency costs through the monitoring activities by debt holders (Ang et al., 2000), the threat of liquidation which may cause managers to lose reputation, salaries, etc. (William, 1987), pressure to generate cash flow for the payment of interest expenses (Jensen 1986), and curtailment of overinvestment (Harvey et al., 2004).
However, as the proportion of debt in the capital structure increases beyond a certain point, the opposite effect of leverage on agency costs may occur (Altman, 1984 and Titman, 1984). When leverage becomes relatively high, further increases may generate significant agency costs. Three reasons are identified in the literature which can cause this opposite effect: first reason is the increase of bankruptcy costs (Titman 1984). Second reason is that managers may reduce their effort to control risk which result in higher expected costs of financial distress, bankruptcy, or liquidation (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2005). Finally, inefficient use of excessive cash used by managers for empire building would also increase agency costs (Jensen, 1986).
2. Literature Review
Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify agency costs derived from conflicts between equity holders and owner-managers as “residual loss” which means agent consumes various pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from the firm to maximize his own utility. Related to this issue, Harris & Raviv (1990), Childs et al. (2005) and Lee et al. (2004) argue that managers always want to continue firm’s current operations even if liquidation of the firm is preferred by investors. Also, Stulz (1990), Alvarez et al. (2006) and Kent et al. (2004) suggest the manager always want to invest all available funds even if paying out cash is better for outside shareholders, and conflict between the manager and equity holders cannot be resolved through contracts based on cash flows and investment expenditures.
Agency theory becomes more complicated when debt holders’ interest is considered. As a financing strategy, debt is widely discussed in capital structure literatures. Modigliani and Miller (1963) demonstrate that in order to raise the value of a firm, the amount of debt financing should be as big as possible for tax subsidyii. However, their theory ignores the agency costs of debt. Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that the optimal utilization of debt is when the debt is utilized to the point where marginal wealth benefits of the tax subsidy are just equal to the marginal wealth effects of agency costs.
A number of researchers focus on the issue of improvement of firm efficiency by reducing agency costs. Some of them focus on t he methods to control managers’ behaviors. For instance, Fama (1980) conducts a discussion of how the pressure from managerial labor markets helps to discipline managers. He points out that the key condition to acquire absolute control of managerial behavior through wage adjustments is that the weight of the wage revision process is sufficient enough to resolve any potential managerial incentives problems. Another example is Chance’s (1997) argument on a derivate substitution of executive compensation. He suggests giving the manager stocks without right to vote, which could be beneficial in preventing an executive from wielding too much control. Other researchers are interested in the optimal capital structure under which value of firms could be maximized while agency costs could be minimized. Based on these observations, the agency costs
hypothesis stating that the leverage affects agency costs is put forward.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that monitoring activities by debt holders will tend to increase the optimal level of monitoring and therefore will increase the marginal benefits. What’s more, banks which are one of the major sources of external funds especially for small firms also play a crucial role in monitoring the activities of managers.
However, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the effect of leverage on total agency costs could not be monotoniciii. When the proportion of debt in total capital increases beyond a certain point, the loss would increase due to negative net present value projects, and the firm will not be able to meet current payments on a debt obligation, thus bankruptcy will occur (Terje et al. 2006). Although Haugen and Senbet (1978) argue that bankruptcy costs are an insignificant determinant of a firm’s capital structure, Altman (1984) finds that indirect costs associated with bankruptcy are not insignificant when these costs are accounted for the first time. Titman (1984) gives a possible theoretical link between liquidation and capital structure. It links the potentially substantial costs associated with liquidation with the event of bankruptcy. Furthermore, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2005) suggest that in highly leveraged firms, managers may shift risk or reduce effort to control risk which would also result in expected costs of financial stress, bankruptcy, or liquidation. Additionally, inefficient use of excessive cash which is derived from higher than normal leverage level for empire building would also increase agency costs (Jensen, 1986).
Therefore, at low level of leverage, increases of leverage will produce positive incentives for managers and reduce total agency costs by reducing the counterpart of external equity. However, after reaching a certain point, where bankruptcy and distress become more likely and the agency costs of outside debt overwhelm the agency costs of outside equity, any further increases in leverage will then result in higher total agency costs.
The subject of the measurements of the agency costs magnitude and firm performance has been widely discussed in the literature. These measurements are usually taken by using ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market data. Ang et al. (2000) made one of the first attempts to measure the magnitude of agency costs by two ratios from financial statements. First ratio is a proxy for the so-called direct agency costs. In order to facilitate comparisons, it is standardized as operating expenses to sales ratio. Second ratio is a proxy for the loss in revenues attributable to inefficient asset utilization. This type of agency costs is derived from management’s shirking or from poor investment decisions. This ratio is calculated by annual sales to total assets. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) take a different approach and employ profit efficiency as the performance measure. They use profit efficiency, rather than cost efficiency to evaluate the performance of managers, since profit efficiency explains how well managers raise revenues while reduce costs and it processes tighter relationship with the
concept of value maximization. Additionally, Saunders et al. (1990); Cole and Mehran (1998) use stock market returns and their volatility to measure agency costs and firm performance.
3. Data and Methodology
Data used in this study are drawn from Datastream. 323 UK companies are selected from FTSE ALL SHARE index. We choose UK public companies in this study because of three reasons: First, The UK is a country with mature money and capital markets where debt financing is relatively easy to cond uct by companies. Second, maximization of shareholders’ wealth is the dominant goal of management in the Anglo-American world which is consistent with the theory this study is based on. Third, data of public companies could reflect the effect of leverage on agency costs more accurately and sensitively especially in the efficient markets like the UK.
There are five variables used in this study. Table 1 provides a summary of these variables along with definitions. Following Ang et al. (2000)’s study, we focu s on measuring the direct agency costs which is the ratio of operating expenses to sales. This ratio indicates how effectively the firm’s management controls operating expenses and it tends to capture the impact of agency costs such as excessive perquisite consumption. Operating expenses variable here excludes corporate wages, salaries and other labor-related items, interest expense, rent, leasing and hiring expenses, purchases, depreciation and bad assets written off. A series of checks and filters on the data have been conducted to reduce the sample from a maximum of approximately 400iv firms to a final sample of 323 firms for Year 2004 to Year 2005. The top and bottom 5%v are also removed to avoid the possible outlier effect.
The measurements of leverage and agency costs are critical. Debt to asset ratio is employed which is total debts divided by total assets. However, we do not differentiate between long-term or short-term debt. Three other variables are considered to control other confounding effects: performance (proxied by return on asset), firm size (proxied by log of sales), and industry classification (13 industry dummies). Note that we include 13 industry dummy variables in this study because the ratio of operating expenses to sales varies across industries due to the varying importance of inventory and fixed assets.
关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响
[导言] 本文旨在提供经验证据对代理成本假说这表明增加的杠杆可以减少代理成本。两个多元测试和单变量测试用于这项研究。多变量测试显示,一般关系和代理成本显著杠杆消极。单变量的测试是用来评估是否进一步代理成本有明显的不同,当一家公司有一个相对更高的债务资产比率从当它是更少的杠杆。类似的证据被发现为代理成本假说。此外,结果从单变量测试还表明这一普遍的负面关系不再适用,当一个非常高水平的杠杆是礼物。
[关键词] 代理成本、杠杆、代理成本假说,相反的效果
1．介绍
在他们的开创性工作,詹森和梅克林(1976)指出,代理成本发生由于不完全对齐的代理和业主的利益。所有权与控制权的分离可能产生代理成本。两种类型的代理成本中确定论文詹森和梅克林(1976):代理成本之间的冲突源于股权持有人和负责人,外与矛盾,股权持有人和债务持有人。从那以后,大量的研究一直致力于证明代理成本之间的交互和财务决策、治理决策,股利政策和资本结构决策。
很多实证研究人员搜集的证据,例如,Ang et al. (2000),弗莱明et al.(2005)表明,代理成本之间产生的冲突外,股权持有人和老总可以减少通过增加所有者和管理者的比例股权,即代理成本成反比的变化与经理的所有权。然而,股权持有人之间的冲突和债券持有者将更为复杂。从理论上讲,詹森和梅克林(1976)认为应该存在一个最优的资本结构,即代理成本最低的一个公司可以推断,从一个独立的变量- - - - -“比外部股权整个外部融资”。这个轨迹的代理成本,这等于外部股权代理成本,那些债务,将是一个凸曲线。这意味着代理成本不应该单调更多。
一些研究人员如格罗斯曼和哈特(1982);威廉姆斯(1987),认为高杠杆降低代理成本,增加公司价值,鼓励管理者行为的利益,股权持有人。这个论点是被称为代理成本假说。高杠杆可能减少代理成本通过监测活动由债券持有者(Ang et al.,2000),这可能导致威胁清算经理失去声誉,工资,等等。(威廉姆,1987)、压力产生的现金流支付利息费用(詹森1986),和缩减的过度投资(Harvey等人,2004)。
然而,随着比例的债务资本结构增加到一定程度,相反的效果,利用代理成本可能发生(奥特曼,1984年Titman)。当杠杆变得相对较高,进一步增加可能产生重要的代理成本。三个原因中确定文学会导致该相反的效果:第一个原因是破产成本的增加
中英文对照外文翻译 (文档含英文原文和中文翻译) Create and comprehensive technology in the structure global design of the building The 21st century will be the era that many kinds of disciplines technology coexists , it will form the enormous motive force of promoting the development of building , the building is more and more important too in global design, the architect must seize the opportunity , give full play to the architect's leading role, preside over every building engineering design well. Building there is the global design concept not new of architectural design,characteristic of it for in an all-round way each element not correlated with building- there aren't external environment condition, building , technical equipment,etc. work in coordination with, and create the premium building with the comprehensive new technology to combine together. The premium building is created, must consider sustainable development , namely future requirement , in other words, how save natural resources as much as possible, how about protect the environment that the mankind depends on for existence, how construct through high-quality between architectural design and building, in order to reduce building equipment use quantity and
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成本管理外文文献 China's Enterprise Cost Management Analysis and Countermeasures Abstract: With the progress and China's traditional Cost Management model difficult to adapt to an increasingly competitive market environment. This paper exists in our country a number of Cost Management and finally put forward to address these issues a number of measures to strengthen Cost Management. Keywords:: Cost Management measures In a market economy conditions, as the global economic integration, the development of increasingly fierce market competition, corporate profit margins shrinking. In this case, the level of high and low business costs directly determines the size of an enterprise profitability and competitive strength. Therefore, strengthen enterprise Cost Management business has become an inevitable choice for the survival and development. First, the reality of China's Enterprise Cost Management Analysis Cost Management in our country after years of development, has made many achievements, but now faces a new environment, China's Cost Management has also exposed some new problems, mainly in the following aspects: (A) Cost Management concept behind the Chinese enterprises lag behind the concept of Cost Management in pervasive phenomenon, mainly in Cost Management of the scope, purpose and means from time to biased. Many enterprises will continue to limit the scope of Cost Management within the enterprise or even only the production process at the expense of other related companies and related fields cost behavior management. We supply side, for example. The supply side of the price of the product cost of doing business, one of the most important motives. As the supply side of the price of the product and its cost plus profit, so the supply side of price in the form of its own costs to the enterprise. However, some enterprises to the supply side too much rock bottom price, as their source of high profits, without considering each other's interests, resulting in supply-side to conceal their true costs, price increase in disguise. This increase in procurement costs, thereby increasing commodity costs, making goods less competitive. The purpose of Cost Management from the point of view, many enterprises confined to lower costs, but less from the perspective of cost-effectiveness of the effectiveness of the means of cost reduction mainly rely on savings, can not be cost-effective. In traditional Cost Management, Cost Management purposes has been reduced to cut costs, saving has become the basic means to reduce costs. From the perspective of Cost Management to analyze the Cost Management of this goal, not difficult to find cost-reduction is conditional and limits, and in some cases, control of costs, could lead to product quality and enterprise efficiency decline. In addition, the vast majority of enterprises in the overall concept of lack of Cost
Why do Internet commerce firms incorporate logistics service providers in their distribution channels?: The role of transaction costs and network strength Abstract The Internet has redefined information-sharing boundaries in distribution channels and opened new avenues for managing logistics services. In the process, firms have started to incorporate new service providers in their commercial interactions with customers over the Internet. This paper studies conceptually and empirically why Internet commerce firms (ICFs) have established relationships with these providers. Focusing on logistics services in outbound distribution channels, we rely on transaction cost theory to reveal that low levels of asset specificity and uncertainty drive Internet commerce firms to establish these relationships. Moreover, we apply strategic network theory to show that Internet commerce firms seek these providers because they offer access to relationship networks that bundle many complementary logistics services. In addition, logistics service providers make these services available across new and existing relationships between the Internet commerce firms, their customers, and their vendors. 1. Introduction The growth of electronic commerce has driven Internet commerce firms (ICFs) –retailers and other organizations that market products over the Web – to increasingly share market demand data with other firms so as to enrich the order fulfillment services they offer to customers (Frohlich and Westbrook, 2002). Along these efforts, ICFs have started seeking logistics service providers to tap into resources and skills that could improve their fulfillment capabilities (Dutta and Segev, 1999). These logistics service providers are not simply variants of transportation companies, and as such, they are not to be confused with what are known nowadays as third party logistics (3PL) firms. They offer logistics services, of course, but they could also enable ICFs to leverage other distribution parties’ logistical resources and skills in order to fulfill their customer orders more
The future of the tall building and structure of buildings Zoning effects on the density of tall buildings and solar design may raise ethical challenge. A combined project of old and new buildings may bring back human scale to our cities. Owners and conceptual designers will be challenged in the 1980s to produce economically sound, people-oriented buildings. In 1980 the Level House, designed by Skidmore, Owings and Merril1 (SOM) received the 25-year award from the American Institute of Architects “in recogn ition of architectural design of enduring significance”. This award is given once a year for a building between 25and 35 years old .Lewis Mumford described the Lever House as “the first office building in which modern materials, modern construction, modern functions have been combined with a modern plan”. At the time, this daring concept could only be achieved by visionary men like Gordon Bunshaft, the designer , and Charles Luckman , the owner and then-president of Lever Brothers . The project also include d a few “first” : (1) it was the first sealed glass tower ever built ; (2) it was the first office building designed by SOM ;and (3) it was the first office building on Park Avenue to omit retail space on the first floor. Today, after hundreds of look-alike and variations on the grid design, we have reached what may be the epitome of tall building design: the nondescript building. Except for a few recently completed buildings that seem to be people-oriented in their lower floors, most tall buildings seem to be arepletion of the dull, graph-paper-like monoliths in many of our cities. Can this be the end of the design-line for tall buildings? Probably cannot. There are definite signs that are most encouraging. Architects and owners have recently begun to discuss the design problem publicly. Perhaps we are at the threshold of a new era. The 1980s may bring forth some new visionaries like Bunshaft and Luckman. If so, what kinds of restrictions or challenges do they face? Zoning Indications are strong that cities may restrict the density of tall buildings, that is, reduce the number of tall buildings per square mile. In 1980 the term
Positioning in Practice Strategic Role of Marketing For large firms that have two or more strategic business units (SBUs), there are generally three levels of strategy: corporate-level strategy, strategic-business-unit-level (or business-level) strategy, and marketing strategy. A corporate strategy provides direction on the company's mission, the kinds of businesses it should be in, and its growth policies. A business-level strategy addresses the way a strategic business unit will compete within its industry. Finally, a marketing strategy provides a plan for pursuing the company's objectives within a specific market segment. Note that the higher level of strategy provides both the objectives and guidelines for the lower level of strategy. At corporate level, management must coordinate the activities of multiple strategic business units. Thus the decisions about the organization's scope and appropriate resource deployments/allocation across its various divisions or businesses are the primary focus of corporate strategy.Attempts to develop and maintain distinctive competencies tend to focus on generating superior financial, capital, and human resources; designing effective organizational structures and processes; and seeking synergy among the firm's various businesses. At business-level strategy, managers focus on how the SBU will compete within its industry. A major issue addressed in business strategy is how to achieve and sustain a competitive advantage. Synergy for the unit is sought across product-markets and across functional department within the unit. The primary purpose of a marketing strategy is to effectively allocate and coordinate marketing resources and activities to accomplish the firm's objectives within a specific product-market. The decisions about the scope of a marketing strategy involve specifying the target market segment(s) to pursue and the breadth of the product line to offered. At this level of strategy, firms seek competitive advantage and synergy through a well-integrated program of marketing mix elements tailored to the needs and wants of customers in the target segment(s). Strategic Role of Positioning Based on the above discussion, it is clear that marketing strategy consists of two parts: target market strategy and marketing mix strategy. Target market strategy consists of three processes: market segmentation, targeting (or target market selection), and positioning. Marketing mix strategy refers to the process of creating a unique
企业成本控制外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
译文： 在价值链的成本控制下减少费用和获得更多的利润 摘要： 根据基于价值链的成本管理理念和基于价值的重要因素是必要的。首先，必须有足够的资源，必须创造了有利的价值投资，同时还需要基于客户价值活动链，以确定他们的成本管理优势的价值链。其次，消耗的资源必须尽量减少，使最小的运营成本价值链和确保成本优势是基于最大商业价值或利润，这是一种成本控制系统内部整个视图的创建和供应的具实践，它也是一种成本控制制度基于价值链，包括足够的控制和必要的资源投资价值的观点，创建和保持消费的资源到合理的水平，具有价值的观点主要对象的第一个因素是构造有利的价值链，从创造顾客价值开始；第二个因素是加强有利的价值链，从供应或生产客户价值开始。因此它是一个新型的理念，去探索成本控制从整个视图的创建和供应的商品更盈利企业获得可持续的竞争优势。 关键词：成本控制，价值链，收益，支出，收入，成本会计 1、介绍 根据价值链理论，企业的目的是创造最大的顾客价值；和企业的竞争优势在于尽可能提供尽可能多的价值给他们的客户，作为低成本可能的。这要求企业必须首先考虑他们是否能为顾客创造价值，和然后考虑在很长一段时间内如何创造它。然而，竞争一直以“商品”（或“产品”）作为最直接的载体，因此，传统的成本控制方法主要集中在对“产品”和生产流程的过程。很显然，这不能解决企业的问题，企业是否或如何能为客户创造价值。换句话说，这至少不能从根本上解决它。 因此，企业必须首先投入足够的资源，以便他们能够创建客户值取向，然后提供它以最少的资源费用。所以在整个视图中对价值创造和提供整体的观点来控制成本，它可以为客户提供完美的动力和操作运行机制运行成本的控制，也可以从根本上彻底克服了传统的成本控制方法的缺点，解决了无法控制的创造和供应不足的真正价值。基于此，本文试图从创作的整体观讨论成本控制提供价值并探讨实现良性循环的策略，也就是说，“创造价值投资成本供应价值创造价值”。 2、成本及其控制的基于价值链理念 2.1基于价值链的成本观念 根据价值链理论，如果企业是要被客户接受，它必须创造和提供能满足其客户的价值。因此，成本（价值或资源支付费用）这不离为创造和提供顾客价值的活动，其活动的价值链。因此，我们应该从价值链角度看成本的重要。
我国第三方物流中存在的问题、原因及战略选择 熊卫 【摘要】我国物流业发展刚刚起步，第三方物流的理论和实践等方面都比较薄弱。本文指出我国第三方物流存在的问题在于国内外第三方物流企业差距、物流效率不高、缺乏系统性管理、物流平台构筑滞后、物流管理观念落后等。分析了产生上述问题的原因，并提出了精益物流、中小型第三方物流企业价值链联盟、大型第三方物流企业虚拟化战略等三种可供选择的第三方物流企业发展战略。 【关键词】第三方物流；精益物流战略；价值链联盟；虚拟化战略 1引言 长期以来，我国国内企业对采购、运输、仓储、代理、包装、加工、配送等环节控制能力不强，在“采购黑洞”、“物流陷井”中造成的损失浪费难以计算。因此，对第三方物流的研究，对于促进我国经济整体效益的提高有着非常重要的理论和实践意义。本文试图对我国策三方物流存在的问题及原因进行分析探讨，并提出第三方物流几种可行的战略选择。 2我国第三方物流业存在的主要问题 (一)我国策三方物流企业与国外第三方物流企业的差距较大，具体表现在以下几个方面： 1、规模经济及资本差距明显。由于国外的大型第三方物流企业从全球经营的战略出发，其规模和资本优势是毫无疑问的，尤其初创时期的我国策三方物流业，本身的规模就很小，国外巨头雄厚的资本令国内企业相形见绌。 2、我国策三方物流业企业提供的物流服务水准及质量控制远不如国外同行。当国内一些企业还在把物流理解成“卡车加仓库“的时候，国外的物流企业早已完成了一系列标准化的改造。同时，国外的物流组织能力非常强大，例如德国一家第三方物流公司，公司各方面的物流专家遍布欧洲各地。如果有客户的货物需要经达不同的国家，那么欧洲各地的这些专家就在网上设计出一个最佳的物流解决方案。这种提供解决方案的能力就是这第三方物流公司的核心能力，而不像国内公司号称拥有多少条船，多少辆车。 3、我国加入WTO后物流产业的门槛降低。在物流服务业方面：我国承诺所有的服务行业，在经过合理过渡期后，取消大部分外国股权限制，不限制外国服务供应商进入
专业资料 学院： 专业：土木工程 姓名： 学号： 外文出处：Structural Systems to resist (用外文写) Lateral loads 附件：1.外文资料翻译译文；2.外文原文。
附件1：外文资料翻译译文 抗侧向荷载的结构体系 常用的结构体系 若已测出荷载量达数千万磅重，那么在高层建筑设计中就没有多少可以进行极其复杂的构思余地了。确实，较好的高层建筑普遍具有构思简单、表现明晰的特点。 这并不是说没有进行宏观构思的余地。实际上，正是因为有了这种宏观的构思，新奇的高层建筑体系才得以发展，可能更重要的是：几年以前才出现的一些新概念在今天的技术中已经变得平常了。 如果忽略一些与建筑材料密切相关的概念不谈，高层建筑里最为常用的结构体系便可分为如下几类： 1.抗弯矩框架。 2.支撑框架，包括偏心支撑框架。 3.剪力墙，包括钢板剪力墙。 4.筒中框架。 5.筒中筒结构。 6.核心交互结构。 7. 框格体系或束筒体系。 特别是由于最近趋向于更复杂的建筑形式，同时也需要增加刚度以抵抗几力和地震力，大多数高层建筑都具有由框架、支撑构架、剪力墙和相关体系相结合而构成的体系。而且，就较高的建筑物而言，大多数都是由交互式构件组成三维陈列。 将这些构件结合起来的方法正是高层建筑设计方法的本质。其结合方式需要在考虑环境、功能和费用后再发展，以便提供促使建筑发展达到新高度的有效结构。这并
不是说富于想象力的结构设计就能够创造出伟大建筑。正相反，有许多例优美的建筑仅得到结构工程师适当的支持就被创造出来了，然而，如果没有天赋甚厚的建筑师的创造力的指导，那么，得以发展的就只能是好的结构，并非是伟大的建筑。无论如何，要想创造出高层建筑真正非凡的设计，两者都需要最好的。 虽然在文献中通常可以见到有关这七种体系的全面性讨论，但是在这里还值得进一步讨论。设计方法的本质贯穿于整个讨论。设计方法的本质贯穿于整个讨论中。 抗弯矩框架 抗弯矩框架也许是低，中高度的建筑中常用的体系，它具有线性水平构件和垂直构件在接头处基本刚接之特点。这种框架用作独立的体系，或者和其他体系结合起来使用，以便提供所需要水平荷载抵抗力。对于较高的高层建筑，可能会发现该本系不宜作为独立体系，这是因为在侧向力的作用下难以调动足够的刚度。 我们可以利用STRESS，STRUDL 或者其他大量合适的计算机程序进行结构分析。所谓的门架法分析或悬臂法分析在当今的技术中无一席之地，由于柱梁节点固有柔性，并且由于初步设计应该力求突出体系的弱点，所以在初析中使用框架的中心距尺寸设计是司空惯的。当然，在设计的后期阶段，实际地评价结点的变形很有必要。 支撑框架 支撑框架实际上刚度比抗弯矩框架强，在高层建筑中也得到更广泛的应用。这种体系以其结点处铰接或则接的线性水平构件、垂直构件和斜撑构件而具特色，它通常与其他体系共同用于较高的建筑，并且作为一种独立的体系用在低、中高度的建筑中。
跨境电商外文文献综述 (文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 译文: 本地化跨境电子商务的模型 摘要 通过对国际供应链的B2B电子商务交易量的快速增长和伊朗快速增加的跨境交易业务，跨境电商过程的有效管理对B2B电子商务系统十分重要。本文对局部模型的结构是基于B2B电子商务的基础设施三大层，消息层、业务流程层和内容层。由于伊朗的电子商务的要求，每一层的需要适当的标准和合适的方案的选择。当电子文件需要移动顺利向伊朗，建议文件的标准为文件内容支持纸质和电子文件阅读。验证提出的模型是通过案例研究方法呈现一到四阶段的情景。本文试图通过交换商业文件在贸易过程中这一局部模型，实现在全球电子贸易供应链更接近区域单一窗口建设的关键目标。 关键词：电子商务;跨境贸易;电子文档管理;国际供应链
1.简介 电子商务是关于在互联网或其他网络电子系统购买和销售产品或服务。术语B2B（企业对企业），描述了企业间的电子商务交易，如制造商和批发商，或批发商和零售商之间。本文的研究目标是上两个不同国家贸易商之间的通信。今天的世界贸易组织的主要目标之一是建立区域单一窗口，可以提高世界各地的贸易便利化。建立区域单一窗口需要跨境海关，可以有效地交换贸易文件。因此，首先，简化跨境贸易文件的关键在于朝着国家单一窗口移动。然后，区域单一窗口可以授权国家之间的通信。电子商务模型是基于三个主要逻辑层的研究。这三个层消息传输层，业务处理层和内容层。本文的局部模型是一种能够自动交换读取文件的过程。通过与东亚和中东国家的建立区域单一窗口可以在将来得到改善的更多的互操作性，从而建立伊朗国家单一窗口 在本文的第二部分讨论引进国际供应链中的跨境B2B模式所需的基本概念和标准。第三部分介绍在大的模型中引入的组件功能和范围。第四部分讨论了B2B交易层模型的定位，最后结束本文。 2.背景 在本节中，除了了解B2B电子商务在伊朗的情况，还有参考模型的背景等概念以及讨论B2B电子商务跨境模式的本土化。 2.1 B2B电子商务在伊朗 如今伊朗在贸易进程的变现是一个关键的贸易成功点。伊朗和许多其他国家接壤，它的进口和出口过程可以通过公路，铁路，海上和空中的方式来完成。因此，这个国家的中部和战略作用，使得它在亚洲和中东地区货物运输的主要贸易点。今天，在伊朗海关几乎所有的贸易过程通过纸质表格完成，由商务部提供的电子服务仅限于谁该国境内交易的商人。今天，伊朗海关几乎所有的贸易流程都是通过纸质表格来完成的，商务部给出的电子服务只限于该国的商人。介绍了模型试图简化在伊朗交易的跨境电子商务供应链交换电子文件的过程。这里提到的一些系统，由商务部在伊朗的电子服务被提及：进口订单管理系统。贸易统计制度。伊朗法典伊朗。这些电子系统的主要使用，以促进在伊朗贸易过程。这里提到的系统作为独立的贸易者可与建议本文模型在未来的作用。在亚洲的区域性单
毕业设计（论文） 外文文献翻译 文献、资料中文题目：研究建设项目的工程造价 文献、资料英文题目： 文献、资料来源： 文献、资料发表（出版）日期： 院（部）： 专业：工程管理 班级： 姓名： 学号： 指导教师： 翻译日期： 2017.02.14
科技文献翻译 题目：研究建设项目的工程造价 研究建设项目的工程造价 摘要 在工程建设中，中国是拥有世界最大投资金额和具有最多建设项目的国家。它是一 项在建设项目管理上可以为广泛的工程管理人员进行有效的工程造价管理，并合理 确定和保证施工质量和工期的条件控制施工成本的重要课题。 在失去了中国建筑的投资和技术经济工程，分离的控制现状的基础上，通过建设成 本控制的基本理论为指导，探讨控制方法和施工成本的应用，阐述了存在的问题在 施工成本控制和对决心和施工成本的控制这些问题的影响，提出了建设成本控制应 体现在施工前期，整个施工过程中的成本控制，然后介绍了一些程序和应用价值工 程造价的方法在控制建设项目的所有阶段。 关键词：建设成本，成本控制，项目 1.研究的意义 在中国，现有的工程造价管理体系是20世纪50年代制定的，并在1980s.Traditional 施工成本管理方法改进是根据国家统一的配额，从原苏联引进的一种方法。它的特 点是建设成本的计划经济的管理方法，这决定了它无法适应当前市场经济的要求。 在中国传统建筑成本管理方法主要包括两个方面，即建设成本和施工成本控制方法 的测定方法。工程造价的确定传统的主要做法生搬硬套国家或地方统一的配额数量 来确定一个建设项目的成本。虽然这种方法已经历了20多年的改革，到现在为止，计划经济管理模式的影响仍然有已经存在在许多地区。我们传统的工程造价控制的
中英文翻译 (文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 摘要：自从―一万村‖市场项目开展以来，连锁超市就开始在农村地区发展起来。物流和分配是连锁超市运作过程中的纽带，在超市的平稳运作中起到重要作用。本土超市涌现出的很多问题，现在逐渐成为超市发展的瓶颈。在这篇论文中，作者将会分析现今存在于中国农村超市的物流和分配方面的问题，然后提供一些相应策略解决这个问题。 关键词：农村地区，货品分配，策略规划，物流，连锁超市。 1 介绍 自从―一万村‖市场项目开展以来，连锁超市作为一个新的运作系统及销售模式，开始在广阔的农村地区发展。这些连锁超市带领农民提高消费水平、缩小城乡差异、提升农村地区和农村市场现代流通的发展。连锁超市在农民中很受欢迎。然而，物流和分配是连锁超市的核心，却仍非常薄弱。分配的优势是超市运作成本、利润及相关合伙人附加利润的关键。在当前经济危机的形势下，解决农村超市物流及分配方面的问题，对农村市场的发展、经济的发展以及建设一个社会主义新农村都非常关键。 1.1农村连锁超市物流及分配的一些概念和特点
分配是一个经济活动，是企业家基于消费者需求，用最有效的方式在分配中心或其它地点储存货物，并且把这些货物运送到在合理经济框架内的其他客户。它包含购买、储存、分类、货物处理、递送及其它活动。它是一个物流活动的方式，结合了特别的、完整的业务流程。在农村地区，农民和农产品独特，所以，与城市物流分配相比，有着一些不同的特点。 1.2农村地区的主要物流和分配问题 A．低均匀分布率和高运作成本 根据商务部调查，自从―一万村‖市场项目开展以来，农村连锁超市的覆盖率已经达到超过60%，但是分配率却只有40%。这个数字不仅低于国内连锁超市60%的平均运送率，也大大低于国外连锁超市高于80%的运送率。均匀分配有利于统一采购。商店不能得益于连锁。这就会导致高物流成本。 B．不合理的物流和分配模式，导致信息读取效率不高 最近，农村连锁超市的物流和分配渠道主要由分配中心、农产品和供应市场合作社、第三方物流和分配系统组成。事实上，这三种分配方式也同样面临着高物流成本的问题。许多连锁超市没有建立自己的分配中心，因而不能满足分配服务的需求。即使一些连锁超市建立了自己的分配中心，也仍然存在很大问题。大多数农村超市规模较小，缺少建立分配中心的资金，因此，一些分配中心不能满足超市分配的需求。农村连锁商店分布较广，单个的连锁超市分配还是比较有限。收入比分配中心的建立和运作成本还要低。 C．分配中心的延后建立、低下技术水平、低分配水平 农村连锁超市的分配中心改造和扩大都是基于原来的仓库，这并不能满足连锁超市的服务需求。这些分配中心只能用来当仓库、储存及运输，缺少了深层的货品加工容量、信息加工以及反馈功能。这些基础设施不够，也缺少了机械化的检测、加工、冰冻、冷藏、包装及其它设备。电脑信息管理系统也远远不够，导致了不能及时进行与供应商、总部以及分部的数据交换。很难有效地管理物流信息，所以所有功能的协作及整合程度仍然非常低。 D．不充分的信息共享系统 农村连锁超市的信息系统构建是相对落后的。电子订货系统、电子数据互换系统以及增值网络系统都还没有使用。决策和信息管理系统也远远不够。很难在