本科毕业论文（设计）
外文翻译
原文：
Optimal Capital Structure
Reflections on Economic and Other Values
Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stake holders’ interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control 1 and, related, the issue of corporate governance , receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions.
From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather ,the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the maximization of the ?rm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two bro adly de?ned situations. The ?rst is the traditional case of the ?rm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the ?rm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating ?nance literature. An example of the latter is the cooperation, a legal entity which can be found, in among others, many European countries. For a discussion on why ?rms are facing
multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk 。
According to the neoclassical view on the role of the ?rm, the ?rm has one single objective: maximization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property rights of the ?rm and are thus entitled to decide what the ?rm should aim for. Since shareholders only have one objective in mind - wealth maximization - the goal of the ?rm is maximization of the ?rm’s contribution to the ?nancial wealth of its share-holders. The ?rm can accompli sh this by investing in projects with a positive net present value. Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate ?nancing decision. Two theories about the capital structure of the ?rm - the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory - assume shareholder wealth maximization as the one and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteria that is relevant for the corporate ?nancing decision in this essentially neoclassical view.
The original proposition I of Modigliani and Miller tates that in a perfect capital market the equilibrium market value of a ?rm is independent of its capital structure, i.e. the debt-equity ratio. If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will take place. Investors will buy shares of the undervalued ?rm and sell shares of the overvalued ?rm in such a way that identical income streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal.
When corporate taxes are introduced , proposition I changes dramatically. Modigliani and Miller show that in a world with corporate tax the v alue of ?rms is among others a function of leverage. When interest payments become tax deductible and payments to shareholders are not, the capital structure that maximizes ?rm value involves a hundred percent debt ?nancing. By increasing leverage, the pay ments to the government are reduced with a higher cash ?ow for the providers of capital as a result. The difference between the present value of the taxes paid by an unlevered ?rm and an identical levered ?rm is the present value of tax shields .
In the traditional trade-off models of optimal capital structure it is assumed that ?rms balance the marginal present value of interest tax shields against the marginal
direct costs of ?nancial distress or direct bankruptcy costs. Additional factors can be included in this trade-off framework. Other costs than direct costs of ?nancial distress are agency costs of debt . Often cited examples of agency costs of debt are the underinvestment problem, the asset substitution problem ，the “play for time” game by managers, the “unexpected increase of leverage (combined with an equivalent pay out to stockholders to make to increase the impact),” the “refusal to contribute equity capital” and the “cash in and run” game . These problems are caused by the difference of interest between equity and debt holders and could be seen as part of the indirect costs of ?nancial distress. Another bene?t of debt - besides the PVTS - is the reduction of agency costs between managers and external holders of equity. Jensen and Meckling argue that debt, by allowing larger managerial residual claims because the need for external equity is reduced by the use of debt, increases managerial effort to work. In addition, Jensen [23] argues that high leverage reduces free cash (?ow) with less resources to waste on unpro?table investments as a result.The agency costs between management and external equity are often left out the trade-off theory since it assumes managers not acting on behalf of the shareholders (only) which is an assumption of the traditional trade-off theory.
In Myers’ and Myers and Majluf’s pecking order model there is no optimal capital structure. Instead, because of asymmetric information and signaling problems associated with external ?nancing, ?rm’s ?nancing policies follow a hierar chy, with a preference for internal over external ?nance, and for debt over equity. A strict interpretation of this model suggests that ?rms do not aim at a target debt ratio. Instead, the debt ratio is just the cumulative result of hierarchical ?nancing o ver time. . Original examples of signaling models are the models of Ross and Leland and Pyle. Ross suggests that higher ?nancial leverage can be used by managers to signal an optimistic future for the ?rm and that these signals cannot be mimicked by unsucc essful ?rms. Leland and Pyle [30] focus on owners instead of managers. They assume that entrepreneurs have better information on the expected cash ?ows than outsiders have. The inside information held by an entrepreneur can be transferred to suppliers of c apital because it is in the owner’s interest to invest a greater fraction of
his wealth in successful projects. Thus the owner’s willingness to invest in his own projects can serve as a signal of p roject quality. The value of the ?rm increases with the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur relative to the percentage he would have held in case of a lower quality project.
The stakeholder theory formulated by Grinblatt and Titman [19] suggests that the way in which a ?rm and its non-?nancial stakehold ers interact is an important determinant of the ?rm’s optimal capital structure. Non-?nancial stakeholders are those parties other than the debt and equity holders. Non-?nancial stakeholders include ?rm’s customers, employees, suppliers and the overall com munity in which the ?rm operates. These stakeholders can be hurt by a ?rm’s ?nancial difficulties. For example customers may receive inferior products that are difficult to service, suppliers may lose business, employees may lose jobs and the economy can be disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a ?rm’s ?nancial distress, non-?nancial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing business with a ?rm having a high(er) potential for ?nancial difficulties. This understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed ?rm creates a cost that can deter a ?rm from undertaking excessive debt ?nancing even when lenders are willing to provide it on favorable terms. These considerations by non-?nancial stake-holders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the trade-off theory ，since these stakeholders in?uence the indirect costs of ?nancial distress.
As the trade-off theory (excluding agency costs between managers and shareholders) and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and Titman assumes shareholder wealth maximization as the single corporate objective.
Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies have been produced. See e.g. Harris and Raviv or a systematic overview of this literature. More recent studies are e.g. Sunder and Myers, testing the trade-off theory against the pecking order theory, Kemsley and Nissim estimating the present value of tax shields, Andrade and Kaplan estimating the costs of ?nancial distress and Rajan and Zingales investigating the determinants of capital structure in the G-7 countries. Rajan and
Zingales explain differences in leverage of individual ?rms with ?rm chara cteristics. In their study leverage is a function of tangibility of assets, market-to-book ratio, ?rm size and pro?tability. Barclay and Smith provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity.
Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels , Rajan and Zingales ,Barclay and Smith and Wald model capital structure mainly in terms of leverage and then leverage as a function of different ?rm (and market) characteristics as suggested by capital structure theory. We do the opposite. We do not analyze the effect of several ?rm characteristics on capital structure, but we analy ze the effect of capital structure on variables that co-determine shareholder value. In several decisions, including capital structure decisions, these variables may get the role of decision criteria.
14.3 Other Objectives and Considerations
A lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in the interest of the shareholders. Neither the static trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers [41] (p.82) states that “Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these ?rms ?nancing choices is limited.”Results of several surveys reveal that CFOs do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth maximizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not come as a surprise.
The survey by Graham and Harvey ?nds only moderate evidence for the trade-off theory. Around 70% have a ?exible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 10% have a strict target ratio. Around 20% of the ?rms declare not to have an optimal or target debt-equity ratio at all.
In general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated and dividend paying ?rms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the U.S. is fairly important in issuing foreign debt decisions. Little evidence is found that personal taxes in?uence the capital structure. In general potential costs of ?nancial distress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to Graham and Harvey this last ?nding could be viewed as an (indirect) indicati on of
concern with distress. Earnings volatility also seems to be a determinant of leverage, which is consistent with the prediction that ?rms reduce leverage when the probability of bankruptcy is high. Firms do not declare directly that (the present value of the expected) costs of ?nancial distress are an important determinant of capital structure, although indirect evidence seems to exist. Graham and Harvey ?nd little evidence that ?rms discipline managers by increasing leverage. Graham and Harvey explic itly note that “1) managers might be unwilling to admit to using debt in this manner, or 2) perhaps a low rating on this question re?ects an unwillingness of ?rms to adopt Jensen’s solution more than a weakness in Jensen’s argument.
The most important issu e affecting corporate debt decisions is management’s desire for ?nancial ?exibility (excess cash or preservation of debt capacity). Further more, managers are reluctant to issue common stock when they perceive the market is undervalued (most CFOs think their shares are undervalued). Because asymmetric information variables have no power to predict the issue of new debt or equity, Harvey and Graham conclude that the pecking order model is not the true model of the security choice.
The fact that neoclassical models do not (fully) explain ?nancial behavior could be explained in several ways. First, it could be that managers do strive for creating shareholder value but at the same time also pay attention to variables other than the variables. Variables of which managers think, that they are (justi?ably or not) relevant for creating shareholder value. Second, it could be that managers do not (only) serve the interest of the shareholders but of other stakeholders as well. As a result, managers integrate variables that are relevant for them and or other stakeholders in the process of managing the ?rm’s capital structure. The impact of these variables on the ?nancing decision is not per de?nition negative for shareholder value. For example if “value of ?nancial rewards for managers” is one of the goals that is maximized by managers - which may not be excluded - and if the rewards of managers consists of a large fraction of call options, managers could decide to increase leverage to lever the volatility of the shares with an increase in the value of the options as a result. The increase of leverage could have a positive effect on shareholder wealth (e.g. the
agency costs between equity and management could be lower) but the criterion “value of ?nancial rewards” could (bu t does not have to) be leading. Third, shareholders themselves do possibly have other goals than shareholder wealth creation alone. Fourth, managers rely on certain (different) rules of thumb or heuristics that do not harm shareholder value but can not be explained by neoclassical models either. Fifth, the neoclassical models are not complete or not tested correctly.
Source: Marc B.J. Schauten and Jaap Spronk，2010. “Handbook of Multicriteria Analysis”. Applied Optimization, Part 4. pp. 405-423.
译文：
最优资本结构对经济及其它价值的作用
在过去几十年的研究中已经产生了其他股权持有人权益对资本结构的影响的理论研究。著名的例子是那些购买本公司产品或服务并拥有担保的客户的利益。另一项受到重视的领域是管理激励机制和资本结构（同上）的关系。此外，公司控制权一问题，以及与此相关的公司治理的问题，管理者参考研究相关经济学家的较近期的关于资本结构决策的学术界部分研究结果。
从这些问题的研究中，有个结论是很清楚的：资本结构决策(更确切地说,随时间变化的资本结构管理)涉及到包括实现企业市场价值最大化在内的更多的问题。在本文中,我们将针对不同的观点以及以前相关文献中提到的理论做出不同见解和总结归纳。我们从广义上对这两方面加以区分。第一个是在传统公司价值观情况下争取现有股东权益所有者的价值最大化。当其他的考虑比价值最大化进入资本结构决策,这些参考量必须用以实现企业价值最大化的目标。第二种情况是那些不仅以实现公司价值最大化为目标并且明确地选择多个实现目标的公司。这可能是因为股东采用多个利益相关者的方式，或因为相对于正常的公司控制金融结构而采取不同的所有制结构。后者的一个例子是企业合作，不难看出其具有独立法人资格，在其他情况中，许多欧洲国家的公司是这样的情况。根据海尔布奇和斯布朗克的结论，讨论为何公司正面临着多重目标。
根据新古典主义的角度观察公司，公司有一个单纯经营目标:实现股东价值最大化。股东拥有该公司财产权，也有权决定公司拥有怎样的经营目标。因为在
股东观念中只有一个目标——价值最大化——公司价值最大化的目标是实现股东财富价值最大化。公司通过本身具有的净现值进行积极投资以完成这个目标。部分股东价值取决于企业的融资决策。两个公司的资本结构理论——平衡理论和啄食次序理论：假设公司只以股东财富最大化作为目标。我们将讨论这两种理论包括几个相关市场价值延伸。在此讨论的基础上，我们从以后的的新古典主义的理论出发制定了与企业融资决策有关的标准。
莫迪利亚尼和米勒的早期的观点认为，在一个完善的资本市场下的平衡稳固的市场价值和企业的资本结构是无关的，即债务权益比率。如果命题一不成立，套利观点就会取而代之。投资者将购买价值被低估公司的股票并出售价值被高估的公司股票，在这种方式下就能得到稳定的收入来源。由于投资者利用这些套利的机会以获利，高估股票的价格就会下降，而被低估的股票价格将上涨，直到两个价格都是平等的。
当引入公司所得税的时候，观点一发生了显著的变化。莫迪利亚尼和米勒表明，在有税收的情况下，企业价值会随财务杠杆系数的提高而增加。当企业引入企业所得税后，负债企业的价值会超过无负债企业的价值。负债越多，这个差异越大，所以，当负债最后达到100%时企业价值最大。通过增加杠杆作用，向政府支付的降低，因此，作为一种资本将会提供更高的现金流。因此可以增加企业的净收益，从而提高企业的价值。随着企业负债比例的提高，企业的价值也会提高。
在传统的平衡理论模型下，最优资本结构假定公司平衡抵税收益和资本成本以及破产成本之间的收益冲突。平衡理论也包含了其他的影响因素。除了资本成本外还有代理成本。常常被引用的代理成本的例子是投资不足问题以及资产替代问题，“为时间付款”的管理问题，“意想不到的增长杠杆(结合等效付出来减低对股东支付增加的影响)”，“拒绝贡献股份资本”和“现金流运行”问题。这些问题可以由股东权益者和债权人之间的利益不平衡引起，间接成本的一部分的金融压力可以从中显现出来。另一个债务的好处——除了核查技术研究计划——就是管理者和外部股权持有人代理成本的降低。杰森和麦克林认为债务,通过允许更大的管理的剩余索取权，因为需要外部资产是减少了运用内部资金量，会相应地提高管理层努力的效果。此外，杰森认为,高杠杆操作减少自由现金流动，同
时在无收益的投资中将减少资源浪费。由于平衡理论的一个假设是代理人不仅仅以权益所有者的价值最大化为目标，因此管理层和外部权益者的代理成本往往背离平衡理论。
在斯·梅尔斯和麦鲁夫的啄食顺序模型中没有最优资本结构。相反，由于信息不对称和信号传导有关的问题，与外部融资、公司的融资政策以及资金层次结构,特别是在外来资金、内部债券和股票。这个模型的严格解释表明公司并不只对准目标负债比率。相反，负债比率累积的结果就是层次融资。原始信号模型是来自罗斯.派尔、利兰的模型。罗斯表明企业经理可以用高财务杠杆率为本公司的前景发出乐观的信号，而业绩不好的公司是无法模仿发出这样的乐观信号的。派尔和利兰关注的是业主而不是经理。他们认为，相对于外部信息者，内部经理人对于现金流量拥有更多有效信息。持有内幕信息的企业家可以将信息转移到持有资金的供应，因为资金持有者将资产的一部分用于有效投资将获得更多利益。因此业主愿意用他们自己的资金投资到内部项目以作为一个工程质量好坏的信号。资本结构杠杆比率上升时一个积极的信号，它是向投资者表明经营者对企业未来收益的期望较高，有利于企业价值的提高。
格林布拉特和蒂特慢主张的利益相关者理论认为的公司与其财务利益相关者之间的相互作用方式是决定公司最佳资本结构的重要因素之一。非财务利益相关者是那些除债权人和股权持有人的利益相关者。非财务利益相关群体包括公司的顾客、员工、供应商和整个公司运营范围涉及的社会领域。这些利益相关者会因为公司的财务困境收到影响。例如客户可能买到劣质产品，恶劣的服务，供应商可能失去业务,雇员会失去工作，社会经济遭到破坏。由于在公司的财务困境中负担潜在的成本，在其他条件不变的情况下，非财务利益相关者就不会对存在更大财务风险的公司感兴趣。这种可以理解的不情愿会使公司因此避免承担过多债务融资，即使贷款者愿意向它提供优惠条款。正是由于这些考虑因素，使得非利益相关者成为企业最有资本结构的决定因素。由于这些利益相关者影响公司财务危机中的间接成本，利益相关者理论可视为平衡理论的一部分。
如同权衡理论（不包括管理者和股权持有人间的代理成本）和啄食顺序理论，格林布莱特和蒂特慢的利益相关者理论假设股东财富最大化作为企业唯一的经营目标。
在此理论的基础上，人们进行了大量的实证研究。将哈里斯和雷维夫的理论作一个系统性理论的概述。近来有更多的研究理论，例如桑德和迈尔斯基于啄食理论的平衡理论研究，凯姆斯利和尼斯将抵税价值考虑在内，安德拉德和卡普兰将财务困境的成本计算在内，拉詹和津加莱斯调查了七大工业国公司最优资本结构的决定影响因素。根据不同企业的不同特点解释了财务杠杆在不同企业中的作用。在他们的研究显示杠杆作用是一个涉及有形资产、市价净值率、公司规模和收益的函数。巴克莱的和史密斯提供了实证以检查公司债务期限的决定因素。
在蒂特曼和韦塞尔斯，拉詹和津加莱斯，巴克利和史密斯和瓦尔德的资本结构模型中主要根据资本结构理论原理研究杠杆因素以及其在不同公司（或市场）中的作用特点。我们正好相反。我们不分析几个公司资本结构特征影响，但我们分析有关变量共同确定股东价值对资本结构的影响。在几项决策中，包括资本结构决策，这些因素可能得到决策标准的作用。
14.3其他目标和注意事项
很多证据表明管理者不仅仅以股东权益最大化为目标。无论是静态权衡理论还是优序融资理论都无法完全解释资本结构的差异。迈尔斯）指出，“即使莫迪利亚尼和米勒的MM理论的研究到如今以及有40年了，我们对于这些公司的融资方式的理解仍然是有限的。”多个调查结果显示，首席财务官对于与股东财富最大化的相关因素并没有多大兴趣。鉴于实证研究的结果，这并不令人感到惊讶。
哈维·格雷厄姆和所作的调查发现仅有中度证据理论的平衡。大约70%有灵活的目标或一个有点紧目标或范围。只有10%有严格的目标的比例。约有20%的企业没有申报的最优或目标转率。
一般来说，企业税收优势对于资本结构决策的重要性比较中性。税债的务务优势对于规模大的法定付息和分配股利的公司才显得很重要。此外，与美国相关的有利的国际税收处理方式对于发行国际债券的决策也是很重要的。有证据表明，个人所得税会对资本结构产生影响。一般来说虽然没有信用评级金融衰退的潜在成本并不重要。根据格雷厄姆和哈维最新发现可以被看作是(间接)考虑到财务危机在内的决定性因素。收入波动也似乎是影响杠杆作用的决定因素，当公司预测到破产的可能性较高时将降低杠杆作用，这同收入波动时一致的。虽然似乎存在间接证据，公司并不直接宣布（预测值的现值）财务风险费用是影响资本结
构的重要决定因素。格雷厄姆和哈维通过实证认为公司通过增加杠杆作用来规范管理者行为。格雷厄姆和明确指出，1)经理可能会不愿意接受在这样的方式下利用贷款；2)也许在这个问题上，低利率反映了公司相对采用杰森指数的方法更乐意讨论其弱点。
影响公司财务决策的最重要的因素是企业管理者对于财务弹性的预期（超额现金或保守的债务承担能力）。此外，当经理们认为市场价值被低估（大多数首席财务官认为他们的股票被低估）时，他们大多不愿发行普通股。由于不对称信息的变量无法有效预测新的债务或股权的问题，哈维和格雷厄姆得出这样的结论：啄食顺序模式是不是有效选择的准确模型。
新古典主义模型不能解释财务行为的事实都可以从几个方面来阐述。首先，它可以使经理做争取为股东创造更多的价值，但同时也注意到变量以外的其他变量。经理思考的因素，与创造股东价值有关的合理的或者不合理的因素。第二，它可能是管理者而不仅仅是股权所有者。因此,经理或其他利益相关者管理公司的资本结构过程中致力于整合相关的变量。对于影响财务决策变量对于股东权益的作用并不仅仅是负面的。例如，如果”经理的财务价值回报”是其最大目标，如果此目标不被排斥、经理可能决定增加财务杠杆的波动性增加股票期权的价值。杠杆的增加对于股东财富可能会有积极的影响(例如代理成本和管理成本会降低)，而财务回报”的价值标准"可以(但不是必须)得以延伸。第三，股东除财富最大化的目标外还有其他目的，而不愿意与别人合住持有人财富的创造孤独。第四，经理都依靠某些(不同)拇指规则(或试探法)避免损害股东价值，但也不能解释新古典模型。第五，新古典主义的模型是不完全的或不能够被准确证明的。
出处：[美]马克 B.J.斯其顿.捷普斯普朗克，《综合分析手册》，优化应用，第四部分，2010：405-423．
经济学文献综述写作 一、文献综述的含义 文献综述（以下简称综述），不同于学术论文或科研论文。学术论文或科研论文是作者亲自对某一具体课题进行研究后所做的文章。综述是一种综合性或专题性的情报资料，属于三次文献。具体地说，是指对某一专题的近期文献，经过阅读、摘选、融会贯通、分析、对比、归纳、加工、整理而成的综合评述。文献综述有两大特点，一是“综”，即收集“百家”之言，综合分析整理；二是“述”，即结合作者的观点和实践经验对文献的观点、结论进行叙述和评论。 文献综述虽不是科学论著，但在科学研究中的作用却不容低估。通过阅读近期原始文献而写成的综述，可以反映某一领域或某一专题的新动态、新进展、新水平、新发现、新趋向以及未来展望。因此，综述被看作是新知识突破和新技术推广应用的开始。毕业论文文献综述的写作是毕业论文写作过程中的重要一环，毕业生在进入毕业论文写作之前，应该先写一篇有关的综述，以便掌握该专题的最新信息，从而为选定研究论题和修订研究计划提供有益的信息和依据。 二、收集资料：文献综述写作的基础 收集文献资料是写作文献综述的基础。因此，收集的文献资料力求广泛与全面，且尽可能收集与研究论题有关的原始文献，同时也应收集相关的权威的综述性文章。 一般地，收集文献的方法有两种：一是通过各种检索工具，如文献索引、文摘杂志进行检索。选择文献时，应由近及远，主要应用近2～3年内的文献，这样才能体现出文献综述的新观点、新水平。二是从其它文章的参考文献追溯。即从一篇或数篇最新发表、有权威性的论著或综述，及这些文章所附的参考文献中寻找所需资料，这是一种较为快速而方便的方法。 收集到的文献如何阅读取舍?通常，阅读文献大致有三个步骤：
An Analysis of Working Capital Management Results Across Industries Greg Filbeck. Schweser Study Program Thomas M. Krueger. University of Wisconsin-La Crosse Abstract Firms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied up in current assets. We provide insights into the performance of surveyed firms across key components of working capital management by using the CFO magazine’s annual Working Capital Management Survey. We discover that significant differences exist between industries in working capital measures across time. In addition. we discover that these measures for working capital change significantly within industries across time. Introduction The importance of efficient working capital management is indisputable. Working capital is the difference between resources in cash or readily convertible into cash (Current Assets) and organizational commitments for which cash will soon be required (Current Liabilities). The objective of working capital management is to maintain the optimum balance of each of the working capital components. Business viability relies on the ability to effectively manage receivables. inventory. and payables. Firms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied up in current assets. Much managerial effort is expended in bringing non-optimal levels of current assets and liabilities back toward optimal levels. An optimal level would be one in which a balance is achieved between risk and efficiency. A recent example of business attempting to maximize working capital management is the recurrent attention being given to the application of Six Sigma? methodology. Six Sigma? methodologies help companies measure and ensure quality in all areas of the enterprise. When used to identify and rectify discrepancies. inefficiencies and erroneous transactions in the financial supply chain. Six Sigma? reduces Days Sales Outstanding (DSO). accelerates the payment cycle. improves customer satisfaction and reduces the necessary amount and cost of working capital needs. There appear to be many success stories. including Jennifer Towne’s (2002) report of a 15 percent decrease in days that sales are outstanding. resulting in an increased cash flow of approximately $2 million at Thibodaux Regional Medical Center. Furthermore. bad debts declined from $3.4 million to $600.000. However. Waxer’s (2003) study of multiple firms employing Six Sigma? finds that it is really a “get rich slow” technique with a rate of return hovering in the 1.2 – 4.5 percent range. Even in a business using Six Sigma? methodology. an “optimal” level of working capital management needs to be identified. Even in a business using Six Sigma? methodology. an “optimal” level of working capital management needs to be identified. Industry factors may impact firm
①It is universally acknowledged that the sharing economy means that people sell or purchase the unoccupied resources via online transaction. Having been a new trend, the sharing economy is playing a more and more crucial part in our modern life. ②There is no doubt that a large number of people benefit a lot from the sharing economy. Above all, it contributes to making good use of the resources. People, who own available stuff and don’t use it for the moment, can sell or rent it to others who need it. Thus, it’s beneficial for both of them, for not only the seller or renter can make money but the purchaser can save money. Moreover, it can make sure that things can be used as many times as possible instead of being abandoned. In addition, it helps to build up trust between each other. ③However, the rise of the sharing economy leads to the difficult management. For instance, the sharing bikes bring convenience for people, but people place the bikes at random and even occupy the room of the sidewalk. Therefore, how to manage the sharing things is worth considering 众所周知，共享经济意味着人们通过在线交易出售或购买未被占用的资源。在现代生活中，分享经济是一种新的趋势，它正在发挥着越来越重要的作用。 毫无疑问，许多人从分享经济中获益良多。最重要的是，它有助于充
China's economy, one of the fastest-growing economies in the world and the biggest contributor to global growth, grew 9.9 percent year-on-year in the first three quarters of this year, according to official figures released on Monday, showing a trend of a slowdown amid the current global financial crisis. In the third quarter, the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate slowed down to 9 percent, the lowest in five years, from 10.6 percent in the first quarter, 10.1 percent for the second quarter and 10.4 percent in the first half of 2008. China's economic growth has been on a steady decline since peaking in the second quarter of 2007. The slowing world economy pummeled by the global financial crisis and weaker demand for Chinese exports on international markets heavily weighted on the Chinese economy, according to Li Xiaochao, spokesperson for the National Bureau of Statistics. Another widely watched indicator, the consumer price index (CPI) -- an important measure of inflation -- rose 4.6 percent in September, over the same period last year. The figure, coupled with 7.1 percent in June, 6.3 percent in July, 4.9 percent in August and a nearly 12-year-high of 8.7 percent in February, shows the CPI in a downward spiral. Analysts mainly attribute the decline in the CPI to ample grain supply and lower-than-expected income growth of Chinese residents, as the housing and stock markets take heavy toll, which dented residents' desire to consume. Chinese stocks have shed nearly 70 percent of their value from the last year's peak at 6,124 points due to weak investor confidence. The stock market rose more than two percent on Monday amid expectation the government would unveil more measures to stimulate economy. The benchmark Shanghai Composite Index gained 43.36 points to close at 1,974.01 points. Exports, one of the three major drivers of the Chinese economy along with investment and consumption, are taking hit from the global financial turmoil and economic slowdown. In the first three quarters exports grew 22.3 percent, 4.8 percent points lower than the same period last year. Fixed assets investment totaled 11.6246 trillion yuan ($1.66 trillion) in the first three
Key Terms of International Economics Chapter3 Labor Productivity and Comparative Advantage Comparative advantage 比较优势 Absolute advantage 绝对优势 Opportunity cost 机会成本 Production possibility frontier 生产可能性边界 Unit labor requirement 单位产品劳动投入 Relative price 相对价格 Relative demand curve相对需求曲线 Relative supply curve 相对供给曲线 Relative wage 相对工资 Relative quantity 相对产量 Ricardian model 李嘉图模型 Pauper labor argument 贫民劳动论 Nontraded goods 非贸易商品 Chapter 4 Resources and Trade: the Heckscher-Ohlin Model Abundant factor 丰裕要素 Biased expansion of production 偏向性生产扩张 Equalization of factor prices 要素价格均等化 Factor abundance 要素丰裕度 Factor intensity 要素密集度 Scarce factor 稀缺要素 Leontief paradox 里昂惕夫悖论 land-intensive 土地密集型 Labor-intensive劳动密集型 the ratio of 2 factor prices 要素价格比 Wage-rental ratio 工资-租金比 Land-labor ratio ，the ratio of land to labor 土地劳动比 Chapter 5 The standard Trade Model Biased growth 偏向性增长 Export-biased growth 出口偏向性增长
期末论文 院系 专业班级 学号 学生姓名 成绩评定
管理原则 也许在那些关于管理者这门学科的书中有许多关于管理的定义。许多定义是相对扼要和简单化的。一位早期的学者将它定义为“清楚地知道你想让人们去做什么，然后看着他们以最好最廉价的方式去完成它”。管理实际上是一个非常复杂的过程——远远比那些定义让我们知道的要复杂得多。因此，我们要建立一种管理的定义，从而能更好地了解这过程的实质。 管理是在一定的环境条件下通过对人员技术和资金等资源的利用和协调去设立和完成某一个组织目标的过程。这个过程有若干个核心包括计划和决策，组织，人员，领导，管理和控制。所有从事于这些工作的负责人在更大或更小的程度上都依赖于他们所承担的特殊的责任。当谈论管理的定义时，我们不应该忽略管理的原则。 管理的最基本原则在文明诞生时就存在了。当人们第一次开始群居生活和首次提高他们的生活质量时它就存在了。2500年前，巴比伦国王尼布甲尼撒二世决定把他的沙漠王国变成绿洲去取悦他的妻子。在公元前6世纪，尼布甲尼撒二世耗尽了国家财政部的金钱，雇佣劳动者和技术人员利用有限的资源建造一个宫殿，建造了完善的管网系统，把当地河流的水输送到皇宫里。当工程完成后，他在平台上种植漂亮稀有的花草树木。巴比伦的空中花园改变了这座城市。 尼布甲尼撒二世制定了一个目标。他要把沙漠中的主要城市变成绿洲。他利用和协调人员，技术和金钱去完成这一目标。他从王室金库中获得的资金去雇佣民工和技师并从附近地区购买材料。他在这种只能提供原始水管装置，建筑技术以及只能从茫茫沙漠中取得有限的材料的环境下完成了目标。最终，每个人在这个工程商所付出的努力创造了世界七大奇观之一。 2500年前，人们完成某项巨大的任务所运用的管理过程与如今运用的基本原理相似，管理者在执行这个过程是将它分成了5个部分。 这篇文章的主旨在于表达有关管理过程的一些观点和如何将它运用到我们所面临的不同的情况中去。你们所要学习的管理原则是指指导管理者的宗旨，原则或者是组织规范。他们会提供一个行动框架，为了有效的使用他们，一个人必须培养和使用技能的决策。理智决策是识别某个问题或机会，找到可行的方法去处理它并选择最好的方法的过程。因此，决策是最重要的管理活动。管理者必须决定去实施管理的每个功能以及每种情况所需要采取的相应的原则。 在这一点上，我们对于管理必须有两点最基本的理解。首先，在特定的环境下运用各种资源设立完成目标。第二，为了确保组织的成功，组织者必须满足他的技术要求，行政要求和责任制度。尽管这听起来很简单，但这两个原则却经过了几个世纪的发展才形成的。之后将要提到的所有原则都是随着时间的推移从各种来源中汲取的。一些原则来源于各人的直觉，然而其他的则反映了组织中那些成功企业家，著名商业巨子或者是富有创新精神的工作者的经验。直到十九世纪，直觉和经验仍是管理原则的基本来源 尽管本能和直觉曾经是商业管理的基础，但现在创业者创立新的企业经常以他们的直觉进行管理。在十九世纪70年代至80年代的电脑产业中，对技术很精通，但对管理知之甚少的企业家成立了数以百计的硬件和软件公司，一些存活下来，更多的则不是。许多公司开始发展得好是得益于创
文献信息： 文献标题：Putting the sharing economy into perspective（透视共享经济） 国外作者：Koen Frenken，Juliet Schor 文献出处：《Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions》, 2017, 23:3-10 字数统计：英文3345单词，18027字符；中文5823汉字 外文文献： Putting the sharing economy into perspective Abstract We develop a conceptual framework that allows us to define the sharing economy and its close cousins and we understand its sudden rise from an economic-historic perspective. We then assess the sharing economy platforms in terms of the economic, social and environmental impacts. We end with reflections on current regulations and future alternatives, and suggest a number of future research questions. Keywords:Sharing; Platform; Sustainability; Reverse technology assessment; Regulation 1.Introduction In the Spring of 2014, the sharing economy held an unusual gathering in San Francisco, a sort of “coming out” party. Entitled “SHARE,” the conference included not only founders, funders and fans of the sharing economy, but also harsh critics. Politically progressive insiders and outsiders raised questions about access, exclusion and the distribution of value in the sector. They discussed their vision of a fairer, lower-carbon, more transparent, participatory and socially-connected economy, and whether those goals are consistent with the actions of the large, moneyed players—the successful platforms and the venture capitalists who are backing them with vast sums
本科毕业论文（设计） 外文翻译 外文题目Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS 外文出处 European Accounting Review 外文作者 Tendeloo, B.V., and Vanstraelen, A 原文： Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS Abstract This paper addresses the question whether voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with lower earnings management. Ball et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3), pp. 235–270, 2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. In Germany, a code-law country with low investor protection rights, a relatively large number of companies have chosen to voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to 2005. We investigate whether German companies that have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in earnings management compared to German companies reporting under German generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), while controlling for other differences in earnings management incentives. Our sample, consisting of German listed companies, contains 636 firm-year observations relating to the period 1999–2001. Our results suggest that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. These findings contribute to the current debate on whether high quality standards are sufficient and effective in countries with weak investor protection rights. They indicate that voluntary adopters of IFRS in Germany cannot be associated with lower earnings management. 1. Introduction The International Accounting Standards (IAS), now renamed as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), have been developed to harmonize corporate accounting practice and to answer the need for high quality standards to be adopted in
经济学基础文献选目（暂定） 第一单元：现代经济学方法论 1、弗里德曼：“实证经济学的方法论” 2、周其仁：“研究真实世界的经济学：科斯研究经济学的方法及其在中国的实践”。 3、阿尔钦：“不确定性、进化与经济学” 4、丹尼尔.贝尔：“经济论述中的模型与现实” 第二单元：经济运行的一般过程 5、里德：“铅笔的故事” 6、雷德福德：“战俘营的经济组织”。 第三单元：知识、信息与人类行为 7、哈耶克：“知识在社会中的利用”。 8、斯蒂格勒：“信息经济学”。 9、阿伦.杨“递增报酬与经济进步” 10、亚当.斯密：《国富论（节选）》。 第四单元：新制度经济学 11、张五常：“关于新制度经济学” 12、科斯：“生产的制度结构”。 13、科斯：“企业的性质” 14、科斯：“社会成本问题” 15、德姆塞茨：“关于产权的理论” 16、阿尔钦、德姆塞茨：“生产、信息费用与经济组织” 第五单元：经济学的性质、范围和边界 17、凯恩斯：“我们孙辈的经济学”。 18、兰格：“马克思经济学与现代经济理论”。 19、赫什拉弗：“扩张中的经济学领域”。 20、贝克尔：“观察生活的经济方式”。 经济学基础教材简介 一、入门教材：人大版《经济科学译丛系列》 1、曼昆《经济学原理》上下册，88元。梁小民教授翻译。曼昆为哈佛高才生，天才横溢，属新古典凯恩斯主义学派，研究范围偏重宏观经济分析。 该书为大学一年级学生而写，主要特点是行文简单、说理浅显、语言有趣。界面相当友好，引用大量的案例和报刊文摘，与生活极其贴近，诸如美联储为何存在，如何运作，Greenspan 如何降息以应付经济低迷等措施背后的经济学道理。该书几乎没有用到数学，而且自创归纳出“经济学10大原理”，为初学者解说，极其便利完全没有接触过经济学的人阅读。学此书，可了解经济学的基本思维，常用的基本原理，用于看待生活中的经济现象。可知经济学之功用及有趣，远超一般想象之
A FIELD STUDY:SMALL MANUFACTURING COMPANIES In this section, the implementation of the proposed Integrated ABC-EVA System at two small manufacturing companies is presented. The managers of the companies wished for their company names to remain anonymous. T herefore, they will be referred to as “Company X” and “Company Y” from here on. Prior to the field study, both companies were using traditional costing systems. The overhead was allocated to product lines based on direct labor hours. In both companies, managers felt that their traditional costing systems were not able to provide reliable cost information. 1 Company X Company X, located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was a small manufacturing company with approximately 30 employees. Company X’s main products l ines were Overlays、Membranes、Laser、Roll Labels and N’Caps. In the mid 1990’s, a group of investors purchased the company from the previous owner-manager who had retired. At the time of the study, the company was managed by its former vice-president, who was supported by a three-person management group. Investors were primarily concerned with financial performance rather than daily decision-making. The management group was very eager to participate in the field study for two reasons. First, the management was under pressure from their new investors who were not satisfied with the current return from existing product lines; Second, management was trying to identify the most lucrative product line in order to initiate a marketing campaign with the biggest impact on overall profits. 2 Company Y Company Y, also located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was owned and managed by three owner-managers who bought the company from a large corporation in the mid 1990’s, Company Y employed approximately 40 people. The majority of this compa ny’s business was in the area of manufacturing electrical devices and their main product lines were Motors and Motor Parts、Breakers、and Control Parts. Company Y sold its products in the domestic market as well as abroad. A portion of the company’s output was sold directly to end-users, while the remainder was sold with the help of independent distributors. The management of Company Y was
企业会计准则外文翻译文献 (文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 外文： On February 15, 2006, the Ministry of Finance issued 1 item of basic accounting standards and 38 specific guidelines, the new set of accounting standards system. Standards issued, the community gave wide attention, the securities industry, business circles, academic circles gave height the opinion, think this is the second in 1993 accounting reform after another is of great significance to the accounting reform, marking China's convergence with international financial reporting standards of enterprise accounting standards system formally established, to improve the China's socialist market economic system, improve the level of opening up and accelerate China's integration into the global economy has important significance. Also expressed their concerns and worries, mainly reflected in the following aspects: a fair value is difficult to "fair", and is very likely to become the profit manipulation tools; two is the enterprise may to adjust earnings manipulation debt restructuring, debt restructuring will once again become the darling of the securities market; three is the new standard published may induce "fair" phenomenon, which
外文原文 The green barrier to free trade C. P. Chandrasekhar Jayati Ghosh As the March 31 deadline for completing the "modalities" stage of the proposed new round of negotiations on global agricultural trade nears, hopes of an agreement are increasingly waning. In this edition of Macroscan, C. P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh examine the factors and the players constraining the realisation of such an agreement. AT THE END of the latest round of meetings of the agricultural negotiations committee of the WTO, the optimism that negotiators would meet the March 31 deadline for working out numerical targets, formulas and other "modalities" through which countries can frame their liberalisation commitments in a new full-fledged round of trade negotiations has almost disappeared. That target was important for two reasons. First, it is now becoming clear, that even more than was true during the Uruguay Round, forging an agreement in the agricultural area is bound to prove extremely difficult. Progress in the agricultural negotiations was key to persuading the unconvinced that a new 'Doha Round' of trade n egotiatio ns is useful and feasible. Second, the Doha declarati on made agricultural n egotiati ons one part of a 'si ngle undertaking' to be completed by January 1, 2005. That is, in a take 'all-or-nothing' scheme, countries had to arrive at, and be bound by, agreements in all areas in which negotiations were to be initiated in the new round. This means that if agreement is not worked out with regard to agriculture, there would be no change in the multilateral trade regime governing industry, services or related areas and no progress in new areas, such as competition policy, foreign investment and public procurement, all of which are crucial to the economic agenda of the developed countries. The factors making agriculture the sticking point on this occasion are numerous. As in the last Round, there is little agreement among the developed countries themselves on the appropriate shape of the global agricultural trade regime. There are substantial differences in the agenda of the US, the EU and the developed countries within the Cairns group of agricultural exporters. When the rich