外文翻译--资本结构影响因素的分析研究

资本结构外文文献翻译外文资料翻译—英文原文How Important is Financial Risk?IntroductionThe financial crisis of 2008 has brought significant attention tothe effects of financial leverage. There is no doubt that the highlevels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis. Indeed, evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks (e.g., through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations) and the so-called “shadowbanking system” may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financialdislocation. Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms. To date, problems in the U.S. non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example, non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the 1930s. In fact, bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S. industries (e.g., automotive manufacturing, newspapers, and real estate) that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis.This surprising fact begs the question, “How important is financialrisk for non-financial firms?” At the heart of this issue is the uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firm risk.StudyRecent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance has rekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk. A current strand of the asset pricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al. (2001) that firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk has tended to increase over the last 40 years. Other work suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor (see Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003, among others). Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi (2003) showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinant of idiosyncratic risk and firm value. Other research has examined the role of equity volatility in bond pricing (e.g., Dichev, 1998, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008).However, much of the empirical work examining equity price risktakes the risk of assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, this外文资料翻译—英文原文paper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk. First, we seek to understand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering total risk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations (i.e., economic or business risks) andrisks associated with financing the firms operations (i.e., financial risks). Second, we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risks and the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggests thatfinancial policy may be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate many financial decisions by the firm at a low cost (i.e., via homemade leverage) and well-functioningcapital markets should be able to distinguish between financial and economic distress. Nonetheless, financial policies, such as adding debt to the capital structure, can magnify the risk of equity. In contrast, recent research on corporate risk management suggests that firms mayalso be able to reduce risks and increase value with financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives. However, this research is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated withfinancial distress or other market imperfections associated withfinancial leverage. Empirical research provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for a typical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financialrisk by examining determinants of total firm risk. In our analysis we utilize a large sample of non-financial firms in the United States. Our goal of identifying the most important determinants of equity price risk (volatility) relies on viewing financial policy as transforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage. Thus, throughout the paper, we consider financial leverage as the wedgebetween asset volatility and equity volatility. For example, in a static setting, debt provides financial leverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility. Because financial policy is determined by owners (and managers), we are careful to examine the effects of firms? asset and operating characteristics on financial policy. Specifically, we examine a variety of characteristics suggested by previous research and, as clearly as possible, distinguish between those associated with the operations of the company (i.e. factors determining economic risk) and those associated with financing the firm (i.e. factors determining financial risk). We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft (1996), or alternatively,外文资料翻译—英文原文in a reduced form model of financial leverage. An advantage of the structural model approach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implications of some factors (e.g., dividends), as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volatility of common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daily equity returns. Our proxies for economic risk are designed to capture the essential characteristics of the firms? operations andassets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm. For example, firm size and age provide measures of line of- businessmaturity; tangible assets (plant, property, and equipment) serve as ap roxy for the …hardness? of a firm?s assets;capital expenditures measure capital intensity as well as growth potential. Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows. To understand how financial factors affect firm risk, we examine total debt, debt maturity, dividend payouts, and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary result of our analysis is surprising: factorsdetermining economic risk for a typical company explain the vastmajority of the variation in equity volatility.Correspondingly, measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios. Specifically, in our sample covering 1964-2008 average actual net financial (market) leverage is about 1.50 compared to our estimates of between 1.03 and 1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique). This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policies to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels. These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels, debt maturity, or cash holdings (see, for example, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007). In addition, many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial derivatives, contractual arrangements with investors (e.g. lines of credit, call provisions in debt contracts, or contingencies insupplier contracts), special purpose vehicles (SPVs), or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our economic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statistically significant, with predicted signs. In addition, the magnitudes of the effects are substantial. We find that volatility of equity decreases with the size and age of the firm. Thisis intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of英文原文外文资料翻译—business, which should be reflected in the volatility of equity returns. Equity volatility tends to decrease with capital expenditures though the effect is weak. Consistent with the predictions of Pástor and Veronesi (2003), we find that firms with higher profitability and lower profit volatility have lower equity volatility. This suggests that companies with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt, and therefore are potentially less risky. Among economic risk variables, the effects of firm size, profit volatility, and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies, our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leverage increases total firm risk. Otherwise, financial risk factors are not reliably related to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy, it is no surprise that financial variables are,at least in part, determined by the economic risks firms take. However, some of the specific findings areunexpected. For example, in a simple model of capital structure, dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm (i.e., increase net debt). We find that dividends are associated with lower risk. This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm?s operations (e.g., a maturecompany with limited growth opportunities). We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time. Our results indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to 1983 tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consistently negatively related to risk. This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadia (2007) that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.Perhaps the most interesting result from our analysis is that our measures of implied financial leverage have declined over the last 30 years at the same time that measures of equity price risk (such as idiosyncratic risk) appear to have been increasing. In fact, measures of implied financial leverage from our structural model settle near 1.0 (i.e., no leverage) by the end of our sample. There are several possible reasons for this. First, total debt ratios for non-financial firms have declined steadily over the last 30 years, so our measure of implied leverage should also decline. Second, firms have significantly increased cash holdings, so measures of net debt (debtminus cash and short-term investments) have also declined. Third, the composition of publicly traded firms has changed with more risky (especially technology-oriented)英文原文外文资料翻译—firms becoming publicly listed. These firms tend to have less debtin their capital structure. Fourth, as mentioned above, firms can undertake a variety of financial risk management activities. To the extent that these activities have increased over the last few decades, firms will have become less exposed to financial risk factors.We conduct some additional tests to provide a reality check of our results. First, we repeat our analysis with a reduced form model that imposes minimum structural rigidity on our estimation and find very similar results. This indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by model misspecification. We also compare our results with trends in aggregate debt levels for all U.S. non-financial firms andfind evidence consistent with our conclusions. Finally, we look at characteristics of publicly traded non-financial firms that file for bankruptcy around the last three recessions and find evidence suggesting that these firms are increasingly being affected by economic distress as opposed to financial distress.ConclusionIn short, our results suggest that, as a practical matter, residual financial risk is now relatively unimportant for the typical U.S. firm. This raises questions about the level of expected financial distresscosts since the probability of financial distress is likely to be lower than commonly thought for most companies. For example, our results suggest that estimates of the level of systematic risk in bond pricing may be biased if they do not take into account the trend in implied financial leverage (e.g., Dichev, 1998). Our results also bring into question the appropriateness of financial models used to estimatedefault probabilities, since financial policies that may be difficult to observe appear to significantly reduce risk. Lastly, our results imply that the fundamental risks born by shareholders are primarily related to underlying economic risks which should lead to a relatively efficient allocation of capital.Some readers may be tempted to interpret our results as indicating that financial risk does not matter. This is not the proper interpretation. Instead, our results suggest that firms are able to manage financial risk so that the resulting exposure to shareholders is low compared to economic risks. Of course, financial risk is important to firms that choose to take on such risks either through high debt levels or a lack of risk management. In contrast, our study suggeststhat the typical non-financial firm chooses not to take these risks. In short, gross financial risk may be important, but firms can manage it. This contrasts with fundamental economic and business risks that 外文资料翻译—英文原文are more difficult (or undesirable) to hedge because they represent the mechanism by which the firm earns economic profits.References[1]Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and Control[J].An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.2005[2]Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A. Rom Stomchastic Dominance to Mean-Risk Models:Semide-Viations as Risk Measures[J].European Journal of Operational Research.[3] Borowski, D.M., and P.J. Elmer. An Expert System Approach to Financial Analysis: the Case of S&L Bankruptcy [J].Financial Management, Autumn.2004;[4] Casey, C.and N. Bartczak. Using Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict Financial Distress: Some Extensions[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,Spring.2005;[5] John M.Mulvey,HafizeGErkan.Applying CVaR for decentralized risk management of financialcompanies[J].Journal of Banking&Finanee.2006;[6] Altman. Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and DefaultRisk[M](RiskBooks,London.译文:财务风险的重要性引言2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。

资本结构决定因素以中国企业为案例【外文翻译】XXX titled "XXX Structure: Evidence from XXX's n-making process in regards to their capital structure。

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lodging companies出处：International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management 作者：Erdinc Karadeniz, Serkan Yilmaz Kandir, Mehmet Balcilar andYildirim Beyazit Onal原文Determinants of capital structure:evidence from Turkish lodging companiesBy Erdinc Karadeniz, Serkan Yilmaz Kandir, Mehmet Balcilar and Yildirim BeyazitOnalIntroductionCap ital structure refers to the composition of a firm’s liabilities and owners’ equity. Capital structure decisions are related to the magnitudes of liabilities and owners’equity. Capital structure decisions are one of the three financing decisions –investment, financing, and dividend decisions – finance managers have to make (Van Horne and Wachowicz, 1995).Capital structure of a firm determines the weighted average cost of capital (WACC).WACC is the minimum rate of return required on a firm’s investments an d used as the discount rate in determining the value of a firm. A firm can create value for its shareholders as long as earnings exceed the costs of investments (Damodaran, 2000).A number of theoretical and empirical studies investigated the optimal capital structure of a firm. These studies pointed out the importance of the relationships among capital structure, cost of capital, capital budgeting decisions, and firm value.Lodging companies are capital intensive, as they require huge capital at both investment and operating stages. Since assets of lodging companies mostly consist of fixed assets share of long-term debt and owners’ equity becomes rather high. Furthermore, because of the structure of the industry, lodging companies are highly sensitive to systematic risks. Therefore, lodging companies face high operating andfinancial risks (Andrew and Schmidgall, 1993). All these make it important to determine the composition of capital structure and the factors affecting leverage decisions and debt ratio.The trade-off and pecking order theoriesThe relationship between capital structure decisions and firm value has been extensively investigated in the past few decades. Over the years, alternative capital structure theories have been developed in order to determine the factors that affect capital structure decisions. Modigliani and Miller (1958) is a milestone among capital structure studies. In their first proposition, Modigliani and Miller (1958) state that market is fully efficient when there are no taxes. Thus, capital structure and financing decisions affect neither cost of capital nor market value of a firm. In their second proposition, they maintain that interest payments of debt decrease the tax base, thus cost of debt is less than the cost of equity. The tax advantage of debt motivates the optimal capital structure theory, which implies that firms may attain optimal capital structure and increase firm value by altering their capital structures. Bankruptcy and financial distress costs (Myers, 1977) and agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) constitute the basics of trade-off theory. Trade-off theory asserts that firms set a target debt to value ratio and gradually move towards it. According to this theory, any increase in the level of debt causes an increase in bankruptcy, financial distress and agency costs, and hence decreases firm value. Thus, an optimal capital structure may be reached by establishing equilibrium between advantages (tax advantages) and disadvantages (financial distress and bankruptcy costs) of debt. In order to establish this equilibrium firms should seek debt levels at which the costs of possible financial distress offset the tax advantages of additional debt.Data and methodologyWe investigate the determinants of capital structure decisions of lodging companies using a panel data on five companies traded in the ISE. Although there are eight lodging companies traded in the ISE, there of these companies are excluded from the study since these are traded only after 2000 and including would substantially reduce the number of observations. The sample period of the data set spans the period1994-2006. There are totally 65 observations and all data are expressed in local currency (Turkish lira). We specify a dynamic fixed effects panel data model to investigate the factors that affect the capital structure of lodging companies. Various estimation techniques, including the Arellano-Bond System GMM method, are used for the estimation. In the theoretical model specified to test the capital structure decisions of the lodging companies in Turkey the dependent variable is specified as the debt ratio. The debt ratio is defined as the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. This variable measures the share of liabilities in total assets of a company and is widely used in capital structure studies. Explanatory variables are specified as follows:. growth opportunities defined as the market value divided by the book value of the firm, often referred as market-to-book ratio;. share of fixed assets (tangibility) defined as the net fixed tangible assets divided by total assets;. effective tax rates defined as the corporate tax divided by taxable income;. non-debt tax shields defined as the depreciation divided by total assets;. firm size defined as the net sales adjusted by the inflation rate, where the inflation rate is computed as the annual percentage change in the wholesale price index;. profitability (return on assets-ROA) calculated by dividing net profit by total assets; . free cash flows computed by adding interest payments and depreciation to earnings before taxes;. net commercial trade position (inter-enterprise debt) defined as the difference between commercial receivables and liabilities divided by total assets.Empirical findingsIn this section, we present the various estimation results and discuss the implications of the empirical findings. The specification of the debt ratio equation introduces correlation between the errors and the lagged first-differenced endogenous variable. This correlation is handled using instrumental variables (IVs). Anderson and Hsiao (1982) proposed using lagged past differences or levels of endogenous variables as instruments (Anderson-Hsiao IV approach). These IVs are proposedwithin the framework of the GMM, since they may not be highly correlated with the first-differenced dependent variable. Alternatively, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested that first differences of the endogenous variable be instrumented with lags of its own levels. This is known as the Arellano-Bond GMM approach. Blundell and Bond (1998) pointed out that lagged levels are often poor instruments for first differences. They proposed using all information on both endogenous and exogenous variables. This is known as the Arellano and Bond system (Arellano-Bond System GMM approach) method and provides more efficient and unbiased estimates in small Samples。

中文3160字1 外文翻译原文Capital structure influencing factor analysis research Material Source:Theory of Optimal Capital StructureAuthor : R. BareaSince the Modigliani and Miller (1958) since the academic structure of the capital a large number of theoretical and empirical research, trying to identify the potential impact of capital structure choice factors. A lot of literature suggests that the choice of capital structure by the asset structure, firm size, non-debt tax shields, growth, volatility, product uniqueness, profitability and other firm characteristics factors. In addition, the choice of capital structure is also affected by industry characteristics, macroeconomic and institutional environment factors. Harris and Raviv (1991) from the experience of many U.S. companies to sum up: "leverage ratio of fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, growth and company size increases, with the volatility, advertising costs, bankruptcy the possibility of profitability and product uniqueness increases less. "Chinese listed companies due to the particularity of the system, what factors determine the choice of capital structure? Characteristics of institutional factors influenced how the company capital structure choice? Experiences and things like that to be the model and empirical test. In recent years, researchers began to affect the capital structure of listed companies in an empirical study of factors, such as Lu Zhengfei, and Xin Yu (1998), Lishan Min and Su Yun (1999), Xiaozuo Ping and Wu Shinong (2002), and achieved certain results, However, most studies are using a simple regression technique factors on capital structure for empirical analysis. Titman and Wessels (1988) pointed out the shortcomings of this approach: First, there is no wish to measure the sole representative of the property; Second, it is difficult to find and other relevant property is not related to the measurement of a particular property; third, As can be observed variable is not perfectly representative of its properties should be measured, they are used in the regression analysis will lead to errors in variable problem; fourth, the agent variables and measurement error 2 may be explained by variables related to measurement error will produce false (Spurious) related. In this paper, two-stage multiple procedures, application of factor analysis-based model to reduce measurement error, to expand the capital structure of Chinese listed companies Empirical Study.Capital StructureTo build the empirical model, the author according to the capital structure theory and relevant empirical research on factors affecting capital structure analysis, and gives a proxy variable to capture these factors.I, the asset structure Agency theory, balance theory and the theory of asymmetric information are considered assets for capital structure choice. According to agency theory, high-leverage the company's shareholders tend to sub-optimal investment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). The assets of the company secured an opportunity to limit such behavior. Therefore, the value of assets and leverage are related to security. Another problem comes from a proxy service managers tend to consumption. Assets can be secured with fewer companies more vulnerable to such agency costs, because these companies on the capital expenditure monitoring more difficult (Grossman and Hart, 1982). Companies can increase the level of debt as a monitoring tool to mitigate this problem. Therefore, security assets and leverage can be negative. Theory from the balance with debt secured creditors to reduce the potential loss of the debtor's insolvency and, therefore, limit the amount of shareholder wealth, occupation of the debtor. Meanwhile, in bankruptcy the value of tangible assets higher than the value of intangible assets. Therefore, the value of assets and leverage are related to security. Under asymmetric information theory, tangible assets, more businesses will face less information asymmetry, therefore, should issue equity rather than debt. And the existence of asymmetric information, to the sale of secured debt had a negative because it reduces information premium. For asset structure, we use stock / total assets (INV) and fixed assets / total assets (FIX) two proxy variables.II, firm size Many studies suggest that large companies tend to diversify, with more stable cash flow, so low probability of bankruptcy. Warner (1997), Angclua and Meconnel (1982) study found that direct costs of financial distress and negatively related to firm size. Fama and Jensen (1983) that large corporations to smaller companies tend to provide more information on lenders. Therefore, less monitoring costs of large 3 companies, large companies than small companies with high borrowing capacity. Therefore, firm size should be positively correlated with leverage. And Rajan and Zingales (1995) that the large companies than small companies tend to provide more information to the public, may be related to internal investment company size and level of external investment in human negative correlation of asymmetric information. Under asymmetric information theory, large companies should be inclined to equity financing and therefore havelower leverage. The size of the company, we use the natural logarithm of total assets (LN (TA)) and the main business income of the natural logarithm (LN (S)) of two proxy variables.III, the tax That the use of tax-based model of the main benefits of debt financing is tax credits. According to tax-based theory, companies with higher marginal tax rates should use more debt to get the tax shield benefits. Therefore, the effective marginal tax rates should be positively correlated with leverage. Unable to obtain relevant data to calculate the marginal tax rate, we use the average tax rate (TAX) to analyze the tax impact of capital structure choice.IV, non-debt tax shield DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) that non-debt tax shield can be used as an alternative to debt financing, tax benefits, the same as in other cases, the non-debt tax shields have more companies should use less debt. Barton et al (1989), Prowse (1990), Wald (1999), Kim and Sorensen (1986) research shows that non-debt tax shields and leverage negative. In this paper, depreciation / total assets as non-debt tax shield (DEP) of the proxy variables.V. Growth According to agency theory, equity-controlled companies tend to sub-optimal investment will be deprived of their wealth came from the hands of creditors. For high growth companies, because of its future investment opportunities in the choice of greater flexibility, these companies may be more serious agency problems. Myers (1977) that high growth companies lower the future investment in growth companies have more options. If the high-growth companies need external equity financing options to implement in the future, then the company has a large debt may give up this opportunity, because such investment will transfer wealth from shareholders to creditors of the body, which produces the problem of insufficient investment. Therefore, growth should be negatively correlated with leverage. For growth, this growth rate with total assets (GRTA) and the equity value-added rate (GREQ) two 4 proxy variables.VI, volatility Regular payment of debt obligations involved, the highly leveraged company is more vulnerable to financial distress costs. Finance theory suggests that the risk of the company or bankrupt companies should not have a high probability of higher leverage. Therefore, the main business income volatility or commercial risk as the possibility of occurrence of financial distress proxy variables, which should be negatively correlated with leverage. Bradley et al (1984), Titman and Wesssels (1988), Wald (1999) and Booth et al (2001) and other studies have shown that volatility negatively correlated with leverage. In this paper, the main business of the standards slip ((VOL) as a proxy for volatility.VII ability to generate internal resources Trade-off theory is that ability to generate internal resources to leverage a positive correlation, because a strong ability to generate internal resources, companies choose higher leverage to get more debt tax shield. Jensen (1986) pointed out that instead of borrowing to pay dividends to ensure that the management discipline empire method. The benefits of debt "can improve the efficiency of managers and their organizations", which act as a "control effect" role. Therefore, the company has a large free cash flow should have higher debt to limit management's discretion. According to the Theory of Optimal Financing (Pecking order theory), because the existence of asymmetric information, the company follows the financial pecking order model: companies prefer internal resources, internal resources have been exhausted if the company was to issue debt, and finally the issue of equity. Therefore, the ability to generate internal resources, negatively correlated with leverage. The ability to generate internal resources, this paper, the cash rate of sale (NOCFS) and total assets of cash recovery rate (NOCFA) two proxy variables, but to test the Jensen (1986) free cash flow hypothesis proposed in this paper with a cash rate of sales / total Asset growth rate (FCFS) and total assets of cash recovery rate / total assets growth rate (FCFA), as free cash flow (Note: free cash flow is difficult to quantify, can not be obtained directly from the financial data, must be used in other empirical research cash flow concept, and in line with the growth of the company (such as Tobin'Q, growth rate of total assets), investment opportunities, free cash flow and other indicators in order to explain the problem.) proxy variables.VIII, product uniqueness 5 From the stakeholder theory of capital structure and product / factor market theory perspective, the company has a unique product should have less leverage. Titman and Wessels (1988) that, in liquidation, the production of unique or specialized products company, its customers, suppliers, workers will suffer from higher costs. Their workers and suppliers may have the skills and capital, job characteristics, and the customer service more difficult to find a replacement phase. From the agency cost perspective, the expected cost of employees looking for work products and services depends on whether there is unique. Employees working on the implementation of mass-specific work with respect to employees engaged in the former expected to find lower cost. Therefore, when other conditions being equal, and human-related costs for the agency to provide specialized products and services relative to the companies higher. Due to higher leverage will have higher agency costs and bankruptcy costs, sothe uniqueness of products and services will affect the degree of capital structure choice. These companies promote their unique products will suffer more sales costs and advertising costs. In this paper, operating expenses / Income from principal operations (SEXP) as a proxy for product uniqueness.IX liquidity Current ratio of capital structure choice is mixed. On the one hand, high flow rate paid by the company short-term debt due ability. Therefore, liquidity should be positively correlated with leverage. On the other hand, companies with more liquid assets may use these assets to finance its investments. Therefore, the flow of state assets would negatively affect leverage. And, as Prowse (1990) points out, can be used to indicate the liquidity of the assets to creditors, the interests of shareholders to manipulate the expense of the extent of these assets. In this paper, the current ratio (CR) and the quick ratio (QR) as a proxy for liquidity.Ten, industry characteristics The asset risk, asset type, and the demand for external funds vary by industry, the average leverage will vary with the industry. Industry characteristics and capital structure characteristics of the fact that the leverage within the same industry in different sectors of the lever more than the similar, leverage levels to remain relatively the same industry (Bowen et al, 1982; Bradley et al 1984). Bradley et al (1984) studies have shown that regulated industries (telecommunications, electronics, utilities and aviation industry) with higher leverage. This article uses the industry dummy variables to control the impact of industry factors on the lever.2、译文资本结构影响因素的分析研究资料来源: 最优资本结构原理作者: 巴里亚自Modigliani 和Miller(1958) 以来，学术界对资本结构进行了大量的理论和实证研究，试图辨别影响资本结构选择的潜在因素。

本科毕业设计（论文）中英文对照翻译(此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!)文献出处:Ashkanasy N M. The study on capital structure theory and the optimization of enterprise capital [J]. Journal of Management, 2016, 5(3): 235-254.原文The study on capital structure theory and the optimization ofenterprise capital structureAshkanasy N MAbstractIn this paper, corporate finance is an important content of modern enterprise management decision. Around the existence of optimal capitalstructure has been a lot of controversy. Given investment decisions, whether an enterprise to change its value by changing the capital structure and the cost of capital, namely whether there is a market make the enterprise value maximization, or make the enterprise capital structure of minimizing the cost of capital? To this problem has different answers in different stages of development, has formed many theory of capital structure.Key words: Capital structure; financial structure; Optimization; Financial leverage1 IntroductionIn financial theory, capital structure due to the different understanding of "capital" in the broad sense and narrow sense two explanations: one explanation is that the "capital" as all funding sources, the structure of the generalized capital structure refers to the entire capital, the relationship between the contrast of their own capital and debt capital, as the American scholar Alan c. Shapiro points out that "the company's capital structure - all the debt and equity financing; an alternative explanation is that if the" capital "is defined as a long-term funding sources, capital structure refers to the narrow sense of their own capital and long-term debt capital, and the tension and the short-term debt capital as the business capital management. Whether it is a broad concept ornarrow understanding of the capital structure is to discuss the proportion of equity capital and debt capital relations. 2 The capital structure theory Capital structure theory has experienced a process of gradually forming, developing and perfecting. First proposed the theory of American economist David Durand (David Durand) thinks that enterprise's capital structure is in accordance with the method of net income, net operating income method and traditional method, in 1958 di Gayle Anne (Franco Modigliani and Miller (Mertor Miller) and put forward the famous MM theory, created the modern capital structure theory, on this basis, the later generations and further put forward many new theory: 2.1 Net Income Theory (Net Income going) Net income theory on the premise of two assumptions --, investors with a fixed proportion of investment valuation or enterprise's net income. Enterprises to raise debt funds needed for a fixed rate. Therefore, the theory is that: the enterprise use of debt financing is always beneficial, can reduce the comprehensive cost of capital of enterprise. This is because the debt financing in the whole capital of enterprise, the bigger the share, the comprehensive cost of capital is more c lose to the cost of debt, and because the cost of debt is generally low, so, the higher the debt level, comprehensive capital cost is lower, the greater the enterprise value. When the debt ratio reached 100%, the firm will achieve maximum value.2.2 Theory of Net Operating Income (Net Operating Income going) Netoperating income theory is that, regardless of financial leverage, debt interest rates are fixed. If enterprises increase the lower cost of debt capital, but even if the cost of debt remains unchanged, but due to the increased the enterprise risk, can also lead to the rising cost of equity capital, it a liter of a fall, just offset, the enterprise cost of capital remain unchanged. Is derived as a result, the theory "" does not exist an optimal capital structure of the conclusion.2.3 Traditional Theory (Traditional going) Traditional theory is that the net income and net operating income method of compromise. It thinks, the enterprise use of financial leverage although will lead to rising cost of equity, but within limits does not completely offset the benefits of using the low cost of debt, so can make comprehensive capital cost reduction, increase enterprise value. But once exceed this limit, rights and interests of the rising cost of no longer can be offset by the low cost of debt, the comprehensive cost of capital will rise again. Since then, the cost of debt will rise, leading to a comprehensive capital costs rise more rapidly. Comprehensive cost of capital from falling into a turning point, is the lowest, at this point, to achieve the optimal capital structure. The above three kinds of capital structure theory is referred to as "early capital structure theory", their common features are: three theories are in corporate and personal income tax rate is zero under the condition of the proposed. Three theories and considering the capital structure of the dual effects of the cost of capital and enterprise value.Three theories are prior to 1958. Many scholars believe that the theory is not based on thorough analysis.3 Related theories3.1 Balance TheoryIt centered on the MM theory of modern capital structure theory development to peak after tradeoff theory. Trade-off theory is based on corporate MM model and miller, revised to reflect the financial pinch cost (also known as the financial crisis cost) and a model of agent cost.(1) the cost of financial constraints. Many enterprises always experience of financial constraints, some of them will be forced to go bankrupt. When the financial constraints but also not bankruptcy occurs, may appear the following situation: disputes between owners and creditors often leads to inventory and fixed assets on the material damaged or obsolete. Attorney fees, court fees and administrative costs to devour enterprise wealth, material loss and plus the legal and administrative expenses referred to as the "direct costs" of bankruptcy. Financial pinch will only occur in business with debt, no liability companies won't get into the mud. So with more debt, the fixed interest rate, and the greater the profitability of the probability of large leading to financial constraints and the cost of the higher the probability of occurrence. Financial pinch probability high will reduce the present value of the enterprise, to improve the cost ofcapital.(2) the agency cost. Because shareholders exists the possibility of using a variety of ways from the bondholders who benefit, bonds must have a number of protective constraint clauses. These terms and conditions in a certain extent constrained the legal management of the enterprise. Also must supervise the enterprise to ensure compliance with these terms and conditions, the cost of supervision and also upon the shareholders with higher debt costs. Supervise cost that agency cost is will raise the cost of debt to reduce debt interest. When the tax benefits and liabilities of financial constraints and agency costs when balance each other, namely the costs and benefits offset each other, determine the optimal capital structure. Equilibrium theory emphasizes the liabilities increase will cause the risk of bankruptcy and rising costs, so as to restrict the enterprise infinite pursuit of the behavior of tax preferential policies. In this sense, the enterprise the best capital structure is the balance of tax revenue and financial constraints caused by all kinds of costs as a result, when the marginal debt tax shield benefit is equal to the marginal cost of financial constraints, the enterprise value maximum, to achieve the optimal capital structure.3.2 Asymmetric Information TheoryAsymmetric Information and found)Due to the trade-off theory has long been limited to bankruptcy cost and tax benefit both conceptual framework, to the late 1970 s, the theory is centered on asymmetricinformation theory of new capital structure theory. So-called asymmetric information is in the information management and investors are not equal, managers than investors have more and more accurate information, and managers try to existing shareholders rather than new seeks the best interests of shareholders, so if business prospect is good, the manager will not issue new shares, but if the prospects, will make the cost of issuing new shares to raise too much, this factor must be considered in the capital structure decision. The significance of these findings to the enterprise's financial policy lies in: first it prompted enterprise reserve a certain debt capacity so as to internal lack of funding for new investment projects in the future debt financing. In addition, in order to avoid falling stock prices, managers often don't have to equity financing, and prefer to use external funding. The central idea is: internal financing preference, if you need external finance, preferences of creditor's rights financing. Can in order to save the ability to issue new debt at any time, the number of managers to borrow is usually less than the number of enterprises can take, in order to keep some reserves. Ross (s. Ross) first systematically introduce the theory of asymmetric information from general economics enterprise capital structure analysis, then, tal (e. Talmon), haeckel (Heikel) development from various aspects, such as the theory. After the 1980 s, thanks to the new institutional economics, and gradually formed a financial contract theory, corporate governance structure theory of capitalstructure theory, both of which emphasize enterprise contractual and incomplete contract, financial contract theory focuses on the design of optimal financial contract, and the arrangement of enterprise governance structure theory focuses on the right, focuses on the analysis of the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance.4 the capital structure theory of adaptability analysis On the one hand, capital structure theory especially the theory of modern capital structure is the important contribution is not only put forward "the existence of the optimal capital structure" this financial proposition, and that the optimal combination of the capital structure, objectively and make us on capital structure and its influence on the enterprise value have a clear understanding. The essence of these theories has direct influence and infiltrate into our country financial theory, and gives us enlightenment in many aspects: Because of various financing way, channel in financing costs, risks, benefits, constraints, as well as differences, seeking suitable capital structure is the enterprise financial management, especially the important content of financing management, must cause our country attaches great importance to the financial theory and financial practice. Capital structure decision despite the enterprise internal and external relationships and factor of restriction and influence, but its decision-making is the enterprise, the enterprise to the factors related to capital structure and the relationship between the quantitativeand qualitative analysis, discusses some principles and methods of enterprise capital structure optimization decision. Any enterprise capital structure in the design, all should leave room, maintain appropriate maneuver ability of financing, the financing environment in order to cope with the volatility and deal with unexpected events occur at any time. In general, businesses leverage ratio is high, has an adverse effect on the whole social and economic development, easily led to the decrease of the enterprise itself the economic benefits and losses and bankruptcies, deepen the entire social and economic development is not stable, increase the financial burden, cause inflation, not conducive to the transformation of industrial structure, and lower investment efficiency. Therefore, the enterprise capital structure should be in accordance with the business owners, creditors, and the public can bear the risk of the society in different aspects.译文资本结构理论与企业资本结构优化Ashkanasy N M摘要企业融资是现代企业经营决策的一项重要内容。

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。

外文文献翻译译文原文：Capital Structure around the World: The Roles of FirmandCountry-Specific DeterminantsWe analyze the importance of firm-specific and country-specific factors in the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries around the world. Our analysis yields two new results. First, we find that firm-specific determinants of leverage differ across countries, while prior studies implicitly assume equal impact of firm-specific factors. Second, although we concur with the conventional direct impact of country-specific factors on the capital structure of firms, we show that there is an indirect impact because country-specific factors also influence the roles of firm-specific determinants of leverage.Prior research (e.g. Demirgüç-Kuntand Maksimovic, 1999; Booth, Demirgüç-Kunt andMaksimovic, 2001; Claessens, Djankov and Nenova, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004) finds thata firm’s capital structure is not only influenced by firm-specific factors but also by country specificfactors. In this study, we demonstrate that country-specific factors can affect corporateleverage in two ways. On the one hand, these factors can influence leverage directly. Forexample, a more developed bond market facilitating issue and trading of public bonds may leadto the use of higher leverage in a country, while a developed stock market has theoppositeeffect. On the other hand, we show that country-specific factors can also influence corporateleverage indirectly through their impact on firm-specific factors’ roles. For example, althoughthe dev eloped bond market of a country stimulates the use of debt, the role of asset tangibility ascollateral in borrowing will be rather limited for firms in the same country. In other words,country-characteristics may explain why in one country a firm’s tangibi lity affects leverage, butnot in another country. Previous studies have not systematically investigated these indirecteffects.International studies comparing differences in the capital structure between countriesstarted to appear only during the last decade. An early investigation of seven advancedindustrialized countries is performed by Rajan and Zingales (1995). They argue that althoughcommon firm-specific factors significantly influence the capital structure of firms acrosscountries, several country-specific factors also play an important role. Demirgüç-Kunt andMaksimovic (1999) compare capital structure of firms from 19 developed countries and 11developing countries. They find that institutional differences between developed and developingcountries explain a large portion of the variation in the use of long-term debt. They also observethat some institutional factors in developing countries influence the leverage of large and smallfirms differently. Several recent studies on the field have indicated that even amongdevelopedeconomies like the U.S. and European countries, the financing policies and managers’ behaviorare influenced by the institutional environment and international operations (see, for example, Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; and Brounen, De Jong and Koedijk,2006).The literature specifically discusses only the direct impact of country characteristics onleverage. In an analysis of ten developing countries, Booth et al. (2001) find that capitalstructure decisions of firms in these countries are affected by the same firm-specific factors as indeveloped countries. However, they find that there are differences in the way leverage isaffected by country-specific factors such as GDP growth and capital market development. Theyconclude that more research needs to be done to understand the impact of institutional factors onfirms’ capital structure choices. The importance of country-specific factors in determining crosscountrycapital structure choice of firms is also acknowledged by Fan et al. (2006) who analyzea larger sample of 39 countries. They find a significant impact of a few additional country-specificfactors such as the degree of development in the banking sector, and equity and bondmarkets. In another study of 30 OECD countries, Song and Philippatos (2004) report that mostcross-sectional variation in international capital structure is caused by the heterogeneity of firm-,industry-, and country-specific determinants. However, they do notfind evidence to support theimportance of cross-country legal institutional differences in affecting corporate leverage.Giannetti (2003) argues that the failure to find a significant impact of country-specific variablesmay be due to the bias induced in many studies by including only large listed companies. Sheanalyzes a large sample of unlisted firms from eight European countries and finds a significantinfluence on the leverage of individual firms of a few institutional variables such as creditorprotection, stock market development and legal enforcement. Similarly, Hall et al. (2004) analyze a large sample of unlisted firms from eight European countries. They observe crosscountryvariation in the determinants of capital structure and suggest that this variation could bedue to different country-specific variables.A remarkable feature of existing studies on international capital structure is the implicitassumption that the impact of firm-specific factors on leverage is equal across countries (see forexample Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Song and Philippatos, 2004; and Fan et al., 2006). By reporting the estimated coefficients for firm-specificdeterminants of leverage per country, these papers, on the one hand, acknowledge that theimpact of firm-level determinants does differ in terms of signs, magnitudes and significancelevels. On the other hand, in the analysis of country-specific determinants of corporateleverage,these papers also make use of country dummies in pooled firm-year regressions, thus forcing thefirm-specific coefficients to have the same value. With an extremely large number of firm-yearobservations, it is more likely for this procedure to produce statistically significant results formany country-specific variables. But, utilizing an alternative regression framework where asingle average capital structure for each country is used as an observation, one hardly findsstrong evidence on this issue. As an additional contribution of our paper, we show the invalidity of this implicit assumption. Our analysis without imposing such restriction thus provides a more reliable analysis on theimportance of country-specific variables.The study encompasses a large number of countries (42 in total) from every continent forthe period 1997-2001. We construct a database of nearly 12,000 firms (about 60,000 firm-yearobservations). All types of firms –large and small – are included as long as a reasonable amountof data is available. We analyze the standard firm-specific determinants of leverage like firmsize, asset tangibility, profitability, firm risk and growth opportunities. Besides, we incorporate alarge number of country-specific variables in our analysis, including legal enforcement,shareholder/creditor right protection, market/bank-based financial system, stock/bond marketdevelopment and growth rate in a country’s gross domestic product (GDP).Firm-specific and country-specific determinants are the two major types of variables thatwe take into account when analyzing the impacts on firms’ leverage choice.The firms in our sample cover 42 countries that are equally divided between developedand developing countries. Data for leverage and firm-specific variables are collected fromCOMPUSTAT Global database. We exclude financial firms and utilities. Data on country-specificvariables are collected from a variety of sources, mainly World Development Indicatorsfiles and Financial Structure Database of the World Bank. Few country-specific variables aretaken from previous studies including La Porta et al. (1998), Claessens and Klapper (2002) andBerkowitz et al. (2003).Our sample period covers the years 1997-2001. The selection of a time-period involves atrade-off between the number of countries that can be included in the study and the availabilityof enough firm-specific data. Whenever needed, we resort to some other sources to collect anymissing data. It is still impossible to obtain data for each and every variable from all 42countries during this time period. The final sample consists of 59,225 observations on 11,845firms. Even though we aim to keep the number of countries high enough and also maintain a reasonable number of firms, our dataset has unavoidably a limited number of firms in a fewcountries.Analyzing the direct impact of country-specific factors on leverage, the evidencesuggests that creditor right protection, bond market development,and GDP growth rate have asignificant influence on corporate capital structure. In measuring the impact indirectly, we findevidence for the importance of legal enforcement, creditor/shareholder right protection, andmacro-economic measures such as capital formation and GDP growth rate. It implies that incountries with a better legal environment and more stable and healthier economic conditions, firms are not only likely to take more debt, but also the effects of firm-level determinants of leverageare also reinforced. Overall, the evidence provided here highlights the importance of country-specificfactors in corporate capital structure decisions. Our conclusion is that country-specificfactors do matter in determining and affecting the leverage choice around the world, and it isuseful to take into account these factors in the analysis of a country’s capital structure. If thelimitations of data, especially the number of countries, can be overcome, one might find evenmore significant results with respect to the impact of country-specificfactors.We first make a detailed comparative analysis of the impact of various firm-specificfactors. We find across a large number of countries that the impact of some factors liketangibility, firm size, risk, and profitability and growth opportunities is strong and consistent withstandard capital structure theories. Our study shows that, in terms of firm-specific determinantsof leverage, capital structure theories doexplain the corporate leverage choice in a large numberof countries. Using a model with several firm-specific explanatory variables, we find a relativelylarge explanatory power of leverage regressions in most countries. However, a few determinantsremain insignificant, and in some countries one or two coefficients are significant with anunexpected sign. Performing a simple statistical test, we reject the hypothesis that firm-specificcoefficients across countries are equal. It indicates that the often-made implicit assumption ofequal firm-level determinants of leverage across countries does not hold.In the analysis of the direct impact of country-specific factors, we observe that certainfactors like GDP growth rate, bond market development and creditor rightprotectionsignificantly explain the variation in capital structure across countries. Moreover, we findconsiderable explanatory power of country-specific variables beyond firm-specific factors. Wethen proceed to measure the indirect impact of country-specific variables. The resultsconsistently show the importance of country factors as we document significant effects of thesevia firm-specific determinants. For example, we observe that in countries with a better lawenforcement system and a more healthy economy, firms are not only likely to take more debt,but the effects of some firm-level determinants of leverage such as growth opportunities,profitability and liquidity are also reinforced. Our findings indicate that theconventionaltheories on capitalstructure developed using listed firms in the United States as a role model,work well in similar economies with developed legal environment and high level of economicdevelopment. The indirect impact analysis also indicates that firm-specific variables aresignificantly influenced by several country-specific variables but in different ways.Capital structure theories have been mostly developed and tested in the single-countrycontext. Researchers have identified several firm-specific determinants of a firm’s leverage,based on the three most accepted theoretical models of capital structure, i.e. the static trade-offtheory, the agency theory and the pecking-order theory. A large number of studies have beenconducted to date investigating to what extent these factors influence capital structures of firmsoperating within a specific country. In this paper, we examine the role of firm-specificdeterminants of corporate leverage choice around the world. We analyze a large sample of 42countries, divided equally between developed and developing countries. Our main objective isto verify the role of various country-specific factors in determining corporate capital structure.We distinguish two types of effects: the direct effect on leverage and the indirect effect throughthe influence on firm-specific determinants of corporate leverage.We find that the impact of several firm-specific factors liketangibility, firm size, risk,growth and profitability on cross-country capital structure is significant and consistent with theprediction of conventional capital structure theories. On the other hand, we also observe that ineach country one or more firm-specific factors are not significantly related to leverage. Forsome countries, we find results that are inconsistent with theoretical predictions.Several studies analyzing international capital structure assume cross-country equality offirm-level determinants. We show that this assumption is unfounded. Rather, it is necessary toconduct an analysis of country-specific factors by including countries as observations and avoida specification using a pooled regression method. We conduct regressions using country-specificfactors to explain coefficients of country dummies as well as firm-specificdeterminants.Source:Abede Jong, RezaulK abir, 2007.9 “Capital Structure around the World: The Roles of FirmandCountry-Specific Determinants”. ERIM Report Series Reach in Management.September.pp.58-63.译文：世界各地的资本结构：公司和国家因素在其中的影响我们从世界42个国家中分析了公司在选择财务杠杆所需要考虑的公司特有因素和国家因素的重要性。

资本结构层次因素甲，乙爱德华光加代？，赫伯特木村一Universidade圣保罗，圣保罗，巴西bUniversidade Presbiteriana麦肯齐，圣保罗，巴西文章资讯摘要：文章历史：我们分析了时间，固件，行业和国家一级的资本结构决定因素的影响。

收到2019年2月3日第一，我们使用阶层线性模式，以评估这些水平的相对重要性。

接受2019年8月16日我们发现，时间和企业一级公司的杠杆解释78％。

第二，我们包括随机拦截可在线二○一○年八月二十日和随机系数以分析公司的直接和间接的影响力/行业/国家characteristicsonfirmleverage.Wedocumentseveralimportantindirectinfluences ofvariablesatindus - JEL分类：尝试和国家层面的杠杆公司决定因素，以及在一些结构上的差异F30金融行为与发达国家和新兴国家的公司。

G32 2019埃尔塞维尔B.诉保留所有权利。

关键词：资本结构层次分析企业层面的决定因素行业水平的决定因素国家一级的决定因素1。

导言等，2019;。

曼西和里布，2019年;。

德赛等，2019）的比较与跨国公司的国内企业融资政策这些研究对资本结构的优势主要basedontheargumentthatglobalfactorsmightinfluencefinancial重点是分析某些公司特征- 例如，利润杠杆。

如果，一方面，它很容易找到研究，分析能力，有形性，大小等- 作为杠杆的决定因素。

在阿迪，公司/作为国家的资本结构影响因素的特点，tion，资本结构可能各不相同的时间（例如，Korajczyk和ontheotherhand，theliteratureoftenneglectstheroleofindustry。

利维，2019年），尽管常常相对稳定云集帽虽然大多数研究包括资本结构虚拟需求面实证结构（莱蒙等。

资本结构影响因素研究综述Document serial number【UU89WT-UU98YT-UU8CB-UUUT-UUT108】上市公司资本结构影响因素研究综述【摘要】资本结构是公司理财活动的核心组成部分,涉及到企业筹资、经营、利益分配等各个方面,是反映企业资金实力的重要指标。

本文通过对资本结构影响因素的理论分析和实证研究的回顾，分析了现有研究的成果。

【关键词】资本结构；实证研究；文献综述Abstract: Capital structure is the core part of corporate finance activities, which is related to the financing, management, profit distribution and other aspects, and is an important index of reflectsing the enterprise's financial strength. Based on the influencing factors of the capital structure theory analysis and empirical study review, the article analyses the existing study results.Key words: capital structure empirical study literature review一、引言资本结构系指长期负债与权益(普通股、特别股、保留盈余)的分配情况。

最佳资本结构便是使股东财富最大或股价最大的资本结构，亦即使公司资金成本最小的资本结构。

资本结构是指企业各种资本的价值构成及其比例。

企业融资结构，或称资本结构，反映的是企业债务与股权的比例关系，它在很大程度上决定着企业的偿债和再融资能力，决定着企业未来的盈利能力，是企业财务状况的一项重要指标。

How Important is Financial Risk?IntroductionThe financial crisis of2008has brought significant attention to the effects of financial leverage.There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis.Indeed,evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks(e.g.,through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations)and the so-called“shadow banking system”may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financial dislocation.Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms.To date,problems in the U.S.non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example,non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the1930s.In fact,bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S.industries(e.g.,automotive manufacturing,newspapers,and real estate)that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis.This surprising fact begs the question,“How important is financial risk for non-financial firms?”At the heart of this issue is the uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firm risk.StudyRecent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance has rekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk.A current strand of the asset pricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al.(2001)that firm-specific(idiosyncratic)risk has tended to increase over the last40years.Other work suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor(see Goyal and Santa-Clara,2003,among others).Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi(2003)showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinant of idiosyncratic risk and firm value.Other research has examined the role of equity volatility in bond pricing (e.g.,Dichev,1998,Campbell,Hilscher,and Szilagyi,2008).However,much of the empirical work examining equity price risk takes the risk of assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk.In contrast,this paper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk.First,we seek tounderstand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering total risk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations(i.e.,economic or business risks)and risks associated with financing the firms operations(i.e.,financial risks). Second,we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risks and the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller(1958)suggests that financial policy may be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate many financial decisions by the firm at a low cost(i.e.,via homemade leverage)and well-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between financial and economic distress. Nonetheless,financial policies,such as adding debt to the capital structure,can magnify the risk of equity.In contrast,recent research on corporate risk management suggests that firms may also be able to reduce risks and increase value with financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives.However,this research is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated with financial distress or other market imperfections associated with financial leverage.Empirical research provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for a typical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financial risk by examining determinants of total firm risk.In our analysis we utilize a large sample of non-financial firms in the United States.Our goal of identifying the most important determinants of equity price risk(volatility)relies on viewing financial policy as transforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage.Thus, throughout the paper,we consider financial leverage as the wedge between asset volatility and equity volatility.For example,in a static setting,debt provides financial leverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility.Because financial policy is determined by owners(and managers),we are careful to examine the effects of firms’asset and operating characteristics on financial policy.Specifically,we examine a variety of characteristics suggested by previous research and,as clearly as possible, distinguish between those associated with the operations of the company(i.e.factors determining economic risk)and those associated with financing the firm(i.e.factors determining financial risk).We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft(1996),or alternatively, in a reduced form model of financial leverage.An advantage of the structural modelapproach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implications of some factors(e.g.,dividends),as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volatility of common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daily equity returns.Our proxies for economic risk are designed to capture the essential characteristics of the firms’operations and assets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm.For example,firm size and age provide measures of line of-business maturity;tangible assets(plant,property,and equipment)serve as a proxy for the‘hardness’of a firm’s assets;capital expenditures measure capital intensity as well as growth potential.Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows. To understand how financial factors affect firm risk,we examine total debt,debt maturity,dividend payouts,and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary result of our analysis is surprising:factors determining economic risk for a typical company explain the vast majority of the variation in equity volatility. Correspondingly,measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios.Specifically,in our sample covering1964-2008average actual net financial (market)leverage is about1.50compared to our estimates of between1.03and1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique).This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policies to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels.These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels,debt maturity,or cash holdings(see,for example, Acharya,Almeida,and Campello,2007).In addition,many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial derivatives, contractual arrangements with investors(e.g.lines of credit,call provisions in debt contracts,or contingencies in supplier contracts),special purpose vehicles(SPVs),or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our economic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statistically significant,with predicted signs.In addition,the magnitudes of the effects are substantial.We find that volatility of equity decreases with the size and age of the firm.This is intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of business,which should be reflected in the volatility of equity returns.Equity volatility tends to decrease with capital expenditures though the effect is weak.Consistent withthe predictions of Pástor and Veronesi(2003),we find that firms with higher profitability and lower profit volatility have lower equity volatility.This suggests that companies with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt,and therefore are potentially less risky.Among economic risk variables,the effects of firm size,profit volatility,and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies,our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leverage increases total firm risk.Otherwise,financial risk factors are not reliably related to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy,it is no surprise that financial variables are,at least in part,determined by the economic risks firms take.However, some of the specific findings are unexpected.For example,in a simple model of capital structure,dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm(i.e.,increase net debt).We find that dividends are associated with lower risk.This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm’s operations(e.g.,a mature company with limited growth opportunities).We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time.Our results indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to1983tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consistently negatively related to risk.This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadia(2007)that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.Perhaps the most interesting result from our analysis is that our measures of implied financial leverage have declined over the last30years at the same time that measures of equity price risk(such as idiosyncratic risk)appear to have been increasing. In fact,measures of implied financial leverage from our structural model settle near1.0 (i.e.,no leverage)by the end of our sample.There are several possible reasons for this. First,total debt ratios for non-financial firms have declined steadily over the last30 years,so our measure of implied leverage should also decline.Second,firms have significantly increased cash holdings,so measures of net debt(debt minus cash and short-term investments)have also declined.Third,the composition of publicly traded firms has changed with more risky(especially technology-oriented)firms becoming publicly listed.These firms tend to have less debt in their capital structure.Fourth,as mentioned above,firms can undertake a variety of financial risk management activities.To the extent that these activities have increased over the last few decades,firms will have become less exposed to financial risk factors.We conduct some additional tests to provide a reality check of our results.First,we repeat our analysis with a reduced form model that imposes minimum structural rigidity on our estimation and find very similar results.This indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by model misspecification.We also compare our results with trends in aggregate debt levels for all U.S.non-financial firms and find evidence consistent with our conclusions.Finally,we look at characteristics of publicly traded non-financial firms that file for bankruptcy around the last three recessions and find evidence suggesting that these firms are increasingly being affected by economic distress as opposed to financial distress.ConclusionIn short,our results suggest that,as a practical matter,residual financial risk is now relatively unimportant for the typical U.S.firm.This raises questions about the level of expected financial distress costs since the probability of financial distress is likely to be lower than commonly thought for most companies.For example,our results suggest that estimates of the level of systematic risk in bond pricing may be biased if they do not take into account the trend in implied financial leverage(e.g.,Dichev,1998).Our results also bring into question the appropriateness of financial models used to estimate default probabilities,since financial policies that may be difficult to observe appear to significantly reduce stly,our results imply that the fundamental risks born by shareholders are primarily related to underlying economic risks which should lead to a relatively efficient allocation of capital.Some readers may be tempted to interpret our results as indicating that financial risk does not matter.This is not the proper interpretation.Instead,our results suggest that firms are able to manage financial risk so that the resulting exposure to shareholders is low compared to economic risks.Of course,financial risk is important to firms that choose to take on such risks either through high debt levels or a lack of risk management.In contrast,our study suggests that the typical non-financial firm chooses not to take these risks.In short,gross financial risk may be important,but firms can manage it.This contrasts with fundamental economic and business risks that are more difficult(or undesirable)to hedge because they represent the mechanism by which the firm earns economic profits.References[1]Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and Control[J].An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.2005[2]Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A.Rom Stomchastic Dominance to Mean-Risk Models:Semide-Viations as Risk Measures[J].European Journal of Operational Research.[3]Borowski,D.M.,and P.J.Elmer.An Expert System Approach to Financial Analysis:the Case of S&L Bankruptcy[J].Financial Management,Autumn.2004;[4]Casey, C.and ing Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict Financial Distress:Some Extensions[J].Journal of Accounting Research,Spring.2005;[5]John M.Mulvey,HafizeGErkan.Applying CVaR for decentralized risk management of financialcompanies[J].Journal of Banking&Finanee.2006;[6]Altman.Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and Default Risk[M]．Risk Books,London.译文：财务风险的重要性引言2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。