Signaling and Screening

Signaling and Screening: Theory and EvidenceEc 423. Labour EconomicsLent Term 2009Papers:StiglizSpenceLang and KroppSpence, QJE 1973“Job Market Signaling”The big point:If there is a heterogeneity of types and there exists a signal which has a cost that is negatively correlated with productivity then there exist an infinite number of equlibirium which produce perfect information.Spence hopes to generate a model that “a considerable variety of market and quasi-market phenomena like admissions procedures, promotion in organizations, loans and consumer credit can be usefully viewed through.”This may generally be useful in cases where the incentive for truthfully revelation is low and thus observable characteristics become the basis of decisions.The key assumptions: Signal cost must be negatively correlated with ability. This is a prerequisite for the an observable, alterable characteristic to be a persistently informative signal in the market.The model works: There is an information feedback loop. As new market information comes into an employer (through either observation, hiring, etc.) they form beliefs on productive capabilities which are related to observable signals and adjust their beliefs accordinglyAn equilibrium is when “a set of employer beliefs...generate offered wage schedules, applicant signaling decisions, hiring and ultimately new market data over time that are consistent with the initial beliefs.”To find an equilibrium: we guess a set of self-confirming beliefs and then check that they are indeed confirmed by the feedback loop.The striking features of this are that1. there are an infinite number of equilibrium for a given level of education that generates a maximum productivity that perfectly inform the employer.2. The equilibria are not equivalent in terms of welfare3. There are also equilibria that do not perfectly inform the employer.4. The assumption of negative correlation between signal cost and productivity is necessary but not sufficient for signaling. We need a significant number of signals Stigliz, AER 1975“A Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of Income”The Big Points:Education when used as a screening mechanism can actually lead to worse social conditions because if education provides information as well as skills, then it is working within a market that fails. Why does this happen?1. Social returns to education differ from private returns. Thus, while screening has productivity returns, it will decrease equality. Thus for some regions there is a tradeoff between efficiency and distributional concerns.2. There is also a region in which education expenditure may both increase inequality and decrease net national income. Overspending happens because the median voter does not pay the median share of education and thus has an incentive to overconsume—especially in publicly funded schools3. Attempts to curtail education as screening may just shift screening and actually lead to worse conditionsStigliz explicitly notes that these results are based on his highly stylized model and may not hold without these assumptions:1. The more able are better in every relevant sense, so there is an unambiguous ranking of abilities2. Labor is inelastically supplied3. Individuals have perfect information4. There is not method of on-the-job screening5. The screening is accurate6. The information acquired is “general”, i.e. not firm specificThe Model:We have a population with individuals with ability level θ , where the probability of being of typeθ is h(θ). Productivity p is defined as Lp=m θwhere m is set to unity WLOGThen make the following assumptions:1. ability is private information2. absent information, all firms (which are risk neutral) treat individuals the same.3. Productivity of a single employee cannot bet determinedThen consider the simplifications with two types 1 (high ability) and 2 (low ability) Where there is an accurate screening mechanism which costs c/individual and labor supply is inelastic. Parameterize c as follows:1. θ1 −θ2 > c > θ1 − θavg2. θavg = E(θavg)Then we get 2 equilibrium:1. Pooling:getsθavgContact—EveryoneHigh ability types have no incentive to screen because by 1 they make more than if they screened because they would only getθ -c < θavg2. Separating:Contract—If you screen you getθ1 -cIf you do not screen you getθ2Important aspects of these results:1. there may be multiple equilibria2. The equilibria can be pareto ranked3. In both equilibria the presence of the lower type decreases the wage of the higher type while the presence of the high type gives the low type at least their marginal product and maybe more4. Social returns to screening mechanisms (e.g. education) differ from private returns. Which causes a divergence between pareto optimality and equality.The separating equilibrium may not exist in the following cases:1. If there are self-employment opportunities that can realize the same returns that would have been realized by accurate screening without the screening2. If individuals are perfectly certain of their abilities and can demonstrate them on the job3. If individuals are very risk averse and not perfectly certain of their abilitiesThe Social benefits from Screening:1. If screening costs are low and labor supply is elastic then everyone can be made better off from screening by using an appropriate redistributive tax to compensate the worse off.2. If there are returns to group homogeneity, then matching with screening may produce better allocation of laborEmpirical Evidence on Signaling/ScreeningDoes the signaling model share any implications with the Human Capital model?1. People who attend additional years of schooling are more productive. YES.2. People who attend additional years of schooling receive higher wages. YES.3. The rate of return to schooling should be roughly equal to the rate of interest. NO PREDICTION.4. People will attend school while they are young, i.e., before they enter the workforce. YES.How do you empirically distinguish the human capital and signaling models?1. Measure whether more educated people are more productive? (Would be true for either model.)2. Measure people’s productivity before and after they receive education — see if it improves. (Conceptually okay, very difficult to do.)3. Test whether higher ability people go to school? (Could be true in either case—certainly true in the signaling case.)4. Find people of identical ability and randomly assign some of them to go to college. Check if the college educated ones earn more? (Both models say they would.)5. Find people of identical ability and randomly assign them a diploma. See if the ones with the diploma earn more. (A pure test of signaling.)Because their empirical implications appear so similar, many economists had begun to conclude that these models could not be empirically distinguished. The empirical papers on the syllabus by Lang and Kropp (1986) and Bedard (2001) offer some evidence. Weiss(1995) provides a survey.All of the empirical papers implement closely related indirect tests of the signaling model along the following lines. If we are initially at a separating equilibrium, how does an exogenous decline in the cost of schooling for one group affect the education choices of other worker groups who are not directly affected by the price change?Lang and Kropp look at college going as a function of school leaving laws (which primarily directly affect secondary school attendance). The General Idea: Compulsory schooling should have different effects on educational attendance depending on whether education is a tool for human capital accumulation or if it is a form of signaling. The two potential effects:In a signaling model if the lowest ability increase their educational attainment so will some higher abilities since they must do this to differentiate themselves from the lowest type. If CAL imposes a certain signal for the lowest type, then the signaling hypothesis suggests some individuals not bound by the law will still increase their educational attainment.In the human capital model, a change in the CAL will not change the return to education (by using the factor price equalization assumption). Therefore, workers for whom the return to schooling sufficiently low as to choose dropping out will be bound to stay in school if they are affected by the law. However, individuals who are not bound by the law should be unaffected.The Results:To test this, they use a SUR with time and state fixed effects for two age groups, 16 year olds (affected by the law) and 17-18 year olds (unaffected by the law). The educational attainment of non-affected groups (i.e. the 17-18 year olds for whom the law was non-binding) increased and thus Lang and Kropp conclude that this is consistent with the signaling hypothesis.Some Problems:Factor price equalization: It is not clear that that this is operable1. wages are the same across states for the same education-ability pair2. the return to education is the same in each state3. If there is correlation between ability and mobility the theorem will fall apart There may be some of both going on: There may be some value to the signal but there are also productivity gains. More broadly, this test is pretty weak because they are testing second order predictions of the signaling model without testing if there is an actual value for a “signal” which is the first order prediction of the model. The issue is we need a signal which has no impact on humancapital production and is as if randomly assigned to otherwise identical expected productivity. A clever paper by Tyler, Murnane, and Willet (TWM) does just that.TMW are interested in knowing whether the General Educational Development (GED certificate(GED) raises the subsequent earnings of recipients. This is not just interesting for the signaling model but also for public policy—there is pretty big differences in high school completion rates between states, income and race/ethnicity groups (see table 1 of the paper)Of course we cannot simply compare GED holders to High School grads because of the obvious self-selection problems: GED holders probably would have earned less than HS Diploma holders regardless. But they are also not really comparable to other high school drop outs. We can see this in the summary statistics provided by TMW where relative to other dropouts, GED holders have more years of schooling and socioeconomic/demographic characteristics associated with higher incomes.TMW use the variation in GED passing standards by U.S. states to generate random variation. Some test takers who would receive a GED in Texas with a passing score of 40 − 44 would not receive a GED in New York, Florida, Oregon or Connecticut with the identical scores. If GED score is a good measure of a person’s ability/productivity, then people with same ‘ability’ (40 − 44) are assigned a GED in Texas but not in New York. The use 3 of the 7 possible different standards in the US.(1) a minimum score of at least 40 or a mean score of at least 45(2) a minimum score of at least 35 and a mean score of at least 45(3) a minimum score of at least 40 and a mean score of at least 45Using these groups they can define 3 distinct, treatment control group? (as you read this think: who is the marginal candidate in each of these groups? This is where the identification is coming from ).In the language of the paper“Experiment 4” variation in GED status by state is in group•the treatment states are those states that award a GED in score groups 4 and higher•the comparison states are those that award a GED in score groups 5 and higher “Experiment 3” variation in GED status by state is in group 3•the treatment states are those states that award a GED in score groups 3 and higher•the comparison states are those that award a GED in score groups 5 and higher“Experiment 3*” variation in GED status by state is in group 3•the treatment states are those states that award a GED in score groups 3 and higher•the comparison states are those that award a GED in score groups 4 and higher. The identifying assumption in this quasi-experiment is that the state of taking the test is effectively randomly and thus randomly assigns the GED ‘signal’ to people with the same GED scores across different U.S. states. We’ll return to this assumption shortly. We also must assume that firms cannot observe worker ability independent of the GED. Given the quasi-experimental setup, the signaling model predicts that workers with GED scores of 40 − 44 will earn more if they receive the GED certificate than if they do not. The Human Capital model implies that since ability is comparable among these groups, wages will also be comparable.Using a difference in difference-estimate they find some signal value (though the magnitude is somewhat sensitive to the definition of the control and treatment group). Part of what makes this such an excellent paper is that TMW now take the next step of considering what might make their identifying assumption invalid. The answer is that different passing standards influence individual behavior in systematic ways. They separate this into different responses:(1) the decision to attempt the test. They can’t test this and it would likely upward bias the estimates(2) the decision to migrate to another state: They can test the effect on migration. They should observe individuals who would have been in high standard states migrating but there is not much empirical evidence of this(3) the decision about how much effort to exert on the test: There may be clumping in the values around the standard—thus we don’t observe a true distribution of abilities since workers know that the employers can’t observe their true ability. In this case, our GED level is not a good control for underlying human capital. They model this and find their results are robust.Separately they also note that the results for minorities differed dramatically from those of whites. There’s a couple of reasons for this: First, many minority men take GED while incarcerated. The stigma of incarceration may depress the post-prison earnings of dropouts, and eliminate any positive signaling value of the GED credential. Additionally, if ,any dropouts who obtained a GED while incarcerated may have zero earnings five years later because they are still in prison. Second, there is likely heterogeneity in why individuals decide to get a GED. Consider two groupsGroup 1: value on the credential or they perceive that employers place a value on the credential.Group 2: ‘‘quasi-compulsory’’ in a social program from which they are seeking benefits. In this situation, the GED may be a signal of productive attributes for group 1 and a signal of ‘‘government program participation’’ for group 2. Employers discount the value of the ‘‘incidental’’ GED (group 2) . If the distributions of groups 1 and 2 differ by raceand employers statistically discriminate blacks will tend to experience lower returns than whites. #General ConclusionsTo the disappointment of some, signaling models have not dramatically changed the way mosteconomists view education. In fact, economic interest in the efficiency of educational productionhas burgeoned in the last decade — which would not be true if economists generally believedthat schooling is about testing how long students can tolerate sitting in a chair. Nevertheless, it’s reasonably clear that signals do carry value in some markets, and that this could possibly give rise to distortions like those envisioned by Spence. It’s unclear whetherthose distortions are economically significant.The link between human capital, signaling, and wages opens up three important questions(1) Can employers “learn” about workers continuously (that is why is education thesignal?)(2) If the signal is different for different groups, what happens (is this“discrimination”)?(3) If there is sorting across different types of occupations/sectors, what is the“signal” for each sector (example: illegal markets)。

第六章委托——代理理论委托-代理理论起源于20世纪40年代，在20世纪70年代获得迅速发展，并日益受到社会各界尤其是经济学界的重视，逐渐发展成信息经济学的主要研究领域之一。

社会契约论认为，社会是一个由众多不同的个体组成的集合，个体与个体之间时刻发生着不同形式的联系，他们之间的行为靠社会契约来协调。

经济社会中的任何有组织的或需要进行组织的行动都是根据某种契约来协调组织内部人与人的行为。

当这些社会契约在经济活动中存在并发挥效用时，它们就成为经济制度的一个基本内容。

然而，这些契约如何达到，其效率如何，它们的经济效用如何得以改进和受到了怎样的限制等，这些都是委托-代理理论关心和需要探讨的问题。

6.1 委托——代理的基本概念1.委托-代理关系的概念委托-代理（principal-agent relation）的概念最先源自于法律。

在法律关系中，当A授权B代表A从事某项活动时，委托-代理关系就发生了。

A称为委托人，B即为代理人。

简单地说，就是一个人（代理人）以另一个人（委托人）的名义来承担和完成一些事情，更通俗地说，就是委托人出钱或付出相应的代价请代理人按照自己的意愿办事。

现代意义上的委托-代理关系的概念最早是由罗斯（Ross，1973）提出的：“如果当事人双方，其中代理人一方代表委托人一方的利益行使某些决策权，则委托-代理关系就随之产生了。

”如今，委托-代理被广泛应用于经济活动中，它泛指任何一种涉及不对称信息的交易，交易前后，市场参与者之间所掌握的信息是不对称的，掌握信息多，具有相对信息优势的一方称为代理人；掌握信息少，具有相对信息劣势的一方称为委托人。

经济学中的委托-代理关系就是处于信息优势与处于信息劣势的市场参与者之间的经济关系。

也可以这样说，委托-代理是起源于“专业化”的存在。

当存在专业化时，就可能出现这样一种关系：代理人（具有专业化知识的一方）因为相对信息优势而代表委托人行动（Hart and Holmstrom，1987）。

22FRONTIERS OFMICROECONOMICSWHAT’S NEW IN THE S EVENTH EDITION:A new Case Study on Left-Digit Bias has been added and a new In the News feature on "Can Brain Science Improve Economics" has been added.LEARNING OBJECTIVES:By the end of this chapter, students should understand:how to examine problems caused by asymmetric information.the market solutions to asymmetric information.why democratic voting systems may not represent the preferences of society.why people may not always behave as rational maximizers.CONTEXT AND PURPOSE:Chapter 22 is the last chapter in the microeconomics portion of the text. It is the second of two unrelated chapters that introduce students to advanced topics in microeconomics. These two chapters are intended to whet their appetites for further study in economics.The purpose of Chapter 22 is to give students a taste of three topics on the frontier of microeconomic research. The first topic addressed is asymmetric information, a situation when one person in an economic relationship has more relevant knowledge than the other person does. The second topic is political economy, the application of economic tools to the understanding of the functioning of government. The third topic addressed is behavioral economics, the introduction of psychology into the study of economic issues.KEY POINTS:In many economic transactions, information is asymmetric. When there are hidden actions, principals may be concerned that agents suffer from the problem of moral hazard. When there are hidden characteristics, buyers may be concerned about the problem of adverse selection among the sellers. Private markets sometimes deal with asymmetric information with signaling and screening.Although government policy can sometimes improve market outcomes, governments arethemselves imperfect institutions. The Condorcet paradox shows that the majority rulefails to produce transitive preferences for society, and Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that no voting system will be perfect. In many situations, democratic institutions will produce the outcome desired by the median voter, regardless of the preferences of the rest of the electorate. Moreover, the individuals who set government policy may bemotivated by self-interest rather than national interest.The study of psychology and economics reveals that human decision making is more complex than is assumed in conventional economic theory. People are not always rational, they care about the fairness of economic outcomes (even to their own detriment), and they can be inconsistent over time.CHAPTER OUTLINE:I. Asymmetric InformationA. Many times in life, one person holds more knowledge about what is going on thananother. Such a difference in access to relevant information is known as aninformation asymmetry.B. Examples1. A worker knows more than his employer about the level of his work effort. This isan example of a hidden action.2. A seller of a used car knows more than the buyer does about the car's condition.This is an example of a hidden characteristic.C. When there is asymmetric information, the party without the relevant knowledge wouldlike to have such knowledge, but the other party may have an incentive to conceal it.D. Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard1. Important Definitionsa. Definition of moral hazard: the tendency of a person who is imperfectlymonitored to engage in dishonest or otherwise undesirable behavior.b. Definition of agent: a person who is performing an act for another person,called the principal.c. Definition of principal: a person for whom another person, called the agent, isperforming some act.2. The employment relationship is the classic example.a. Workers (agents) may be tempted to shirk their work-related responsibilitiesbecause their employers (the principals) do not monitor their behavior closely.b. Employers can respond by providing better monitoring, paying higher wages, ordelaying part of the worker's pay until later in the worker's life.3. FYI: Corporate Managementa. From an economic standpoint, the most important feature of the corporate formof organization is the separation of ownership and control.b. This creates a principal–agent problem where the shareholders are theprincipals and the managers are the agents.c. Managers’ goals may not always coincide with shareholders' goal of profitmaximization.d. As a result, many managers are provided compensation packages that provideincentives to act in the best interest of corporate profits.E. Hidden Characteristics: Adverse Selection and the Lemons Problem1. Definition of adverse selection: the tendency for the mix of unobserved attributesto become undesirable from the standpoint of an uninformed party.2. Examples include the used car market, the labor market, and the market forinsurance.3. When markets suffer from adverse selection, the invisible hand does notnecessarily work well.a. In the used car market, owners of "cherry" or "plum" cars may choose to keepthem rather than sell them at a low price.b. In the labor market, wages may be stuck at a level above the equilibrium wage,resulting in unemployment.c. In insurance markets, buyers with low risk may decline to purchase insurancebecause the price is too high.F. Signaling to Convey Private Information1. Definition of signaling: an action taken by an informed party to reveal privateinformation to an uninformed party.2. Examples of Signalinga. Firms may spend money on advertising to signal the high quality of theirproducts.b. Students may spend time in school to signal that they are high-abilityindividuals.3. For a signal to be effective, it must be costly. However, it must be less costly(or more beneficial) to the person or firm with the higher-quality product.4. Case Study: Gifts as Signalsa. Because people know their own preferences better than anyone else, we wouldexpect that they would prefer cash gifts.b. However, the ability to choose the right gift for someone may serve as a signalof an individual's love.c. Note that choosing the right gift is costly and the cost depends on how wellthe giver knows the recipient (which may be determined as a measure of thegiver's level of interest in the recipient).G. Screening to Uncover Private Information1. Definition of screening: an action taken by an uninformed party to induce aninformed party to reveal information.2. Examples of Screeninga. A buyer of a used car may ask to have the car examined by a mechanic prior topurchase.b. An insurance company may offer different policies that would lead safe or riskydrivers to reveal themselves. Safe drivers are likely to prefer policies withlow premiums and high deductibles. Risky drivers are more likely to preferpolicies with higher premiums and low deductibles.H. Asymmetric Information and Public Policy1. Market failures such as externalities, public goods, imperfect competition, andpoverty show that governments can sometimes improve market outcomes.2. Asymmetric information is another reason why market outcomes may be inefficient.3. However, three factors make it difficult for the government to improve the outcomein some cases.a. The private market can sometimes deal with information asymmetries on its ownusing a combination of signaling and screening.b. The government rarely has more information than the private parties do.c. The government is itself an imperfect institution.II. Political EconomyA. Definition of political economy: the study of government using the analytic methods ofeconomics.B. The Condorcet Voting Paradox1. Most advanced societies rely on democratic principles, allowing the majority toset government policy.2. For most policy issues, the number of possible outcomes exceeds two.3. Example: Three possible outcomes (A, B, and C) and three voter types (Type 1, Type2, and Type 3). The mayor of a town wishes to aggregate the individual preferences into preferences for society as a whole.a. In pairwise majority voting, A would beat B, B would beat C, and C would beat A.b. This violates transitivity. We generally expect that if A is preferred to B andB is preferred to C, then A would be preferred to C.c. Definition of Condorcet paradox: the failure of majority rule to producetransitive preferences for society.d. This implies that the order on which things are voted can determine the result.C. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem1. In a 1951 book, economist Kenneth Arrow examined if a perfect voting system exists.2. He assumes that society wants a voting scheme that satisfies social properties.a. Unanimity.b. Transitivity.c. Independence of irrelevant alternatives.d. No dictators.3. Arrow proved that no voting system could have all of these properties.4. Definition of Arrow impossibility theorem: a mathematical result showing that,under certain assumed conditions, there is no scheme for aggregating individual preferences into a valid set of social preferences.5. Arrow’s impossibility theorem implies that no matter what voting scheme societyadopts for aggregating the preferences of its members, in some way it will be flawed as a mechanism for social choice.D. The Median Voter Is King1. Example: A society is deciding how much money to spend on a public good. Eachvoter has a most-preferred budget and prefers outcomes closer to his preferredbudget.Figure 12. Definition of median voter theorem: a mathematical result showing that if votersare choosing a point along a line and each voter wants the point closest to his preferred point, then majority rule will pick the most preferred point of themedian voter.a. The median voter is the voter exactly in the middle of the distribution.b. On Figure 1, the median voter wants a budget of $10 billion.3. One implication of the median voter theorem is that if two political candidatesare each trying to maximize their chance of election, they will both move their positions toward the median voter.4. Another implication of the median voter theorem is that minority views are notgiven much weight.E. Politicians Are People Too1. Politicians may be self-interested.2. Some politicians may be motivated by desire for reelection and others may bemotivated by greed.III. Behavioral EconomicsA. Definition of behavioral economics: the subfield of economics that integrates theinsights of psychology..B. Behavioral economics is a relatively new field in economics where economists make useof basic psychological insights into human behavior.C. People Aren’t Always Rational1. Economists assume that human beings are always rational.a. Firm owners maximize profit.b. Consumers maximize utility.c. Given constraints that they face, these individuals make decisions byrationally weighing all costs and benefits.2. Real people are often more complex than economists assume.a. They can be forgetful, impulsive, confused, emotional, and shortsighted.b. These imperfections suggest that humans should not be viewed as rationalmaximizers but as “satisficers,” where they choose options that are simply“good enough.”3. Studies of human decision making have found several systematic mistakes thatpeople make.a. People are overconfident.b. People give too much weight to a small number of vivid observations.c. People are reluctant to change their minds.4. Case Study: Left-Digit Biasa. Studies suggest that buyers are excessively sensitive to a price's left-mostdigit.b. An irrational focus on the left-most digit is called left-digit bias.D. People Care about Fairness1. Example: the ultimatum game.a. Two volunteers are told they are going to play a game and could win a total of$100.b. The game begins with a coin toss, which is used to assign the volunteers to theroles of Player A and Player B.c. Player A’s job is to propose a division of the prize between himself and theother player.d. After Player A makes his proposal, Player B decides whether to accept or rejectit.e. If Player B accepts the proposal, both players are paid according to theproposal. If Player B rejects the proposal, both players receive nothing.2. Conventional economic theory suggests that Player A should know that if he offers$1 to Player B and keeps $99 for himself, Player B should accept it ($1 is greater than $0).3. In reality, when the offer made to Player B is small, Player B often rejects it.4. Knowing this, people in the role of Player A often offer a more substantialportion of the money to Player B.5. This implies that people may be driven by a sense of fairness.E. People Are Inconsistent over Time1. Many times in life, people make plans for themselves but then fail to followthrough.2. The desire for instant gratification can induce a decisionmaker to abandon hispast plan.3. An important implication is that people will try to find ways to commit theirfuture selves to following through on their plans.F. In the News: Can Brain Science Improve Economics1. A new branch of economics examines the biology of the brain to understand economicbehavior.2. This article from Project Syndicate discusses neuroeconomics, the study of how thephysical structures that underlie brain functioning affect economic decision-making.SOLUTIONS TO TEXT PROBLEMS:Quick Quizzes1. Buyers of life insurance will likely have higher than the average death rates.Two reasons for this are moral hazard and adverse selection.Moral hazard is the tendency of a person who is imperfectly monitored to engage indishonest or otherwise undesirable behavior. After purchasing insurance, aninsured person may engage in riskier behavior than do people who are not insured.Adverse selection is the tendency for the mix of unobserved attributes to becomeundesirable from the standpoint of an uninformed party. In this case, those withhigher risk of death are more likely to want to buy insurance. As a result, theprice of life insurance will reflect the costs of a riskier-than-average person.Buyers with low risk of death may find the price of life insurance too high andmay choose not to purchase it.A life insurance company can mitigate moral hazard by trying to monitor behaviorbetter and charging higher rates to those who engage in risky behavior (such assmoking). It can mitigate adverse selection by trying to collect betterinformation on applicants; for example, it may require that all applicants submitto a medical examination before issuing insurance.2. According to the median voter theorem, if each voter chooses a point closest tohis preferred point, the district vote will reflect the preferences of the medianvoter. Therefore, the district will end up with a student-teacher ratio of 11:1.3. Human decision making can differ from the rational human being of conventionaleconomic theory in three important ways: (1) people aren’t always rational, (2)people care about fairness, and (3) people are inconsistent over time.Questions for Review1. Moral hazard is the tendency of a person who is imperfectly monitored to engage indishonest or otherwise undesirable behavior. To reduce the severity of thisproblem, an employer may respond with (1) better monitoring, (2) paying efficiencywages, or (3) delaying part of a worker’s compensation to later in his work life.2. Adverse selection is the tendency for the mix of unobserved attributes to becomeundesirable from the standpoint of an uninformed party. Examples of markets inwhich adverse selection might be a problem include the market for used cars andthe market for insurance.3. Signaling is an action taken by an informed party to reveal private information toan uninformed party. Job applicants may use a college diploma as a signal ofability. Screening is an action taken by an uninformed party to induce an informedparty to reveal information. A life insurance company may require applicants tosubmit to a health examination so that the company will have more information onthe person’s risk of death.4. Condorcet noticed that the majority rule will fail to produce transitiveproperties for society.5. The median voter’s preferences will beat out any other proposal in a two-way racebecause the median voter will have more than half of the voters on his side.6. Two volunteers are chosen and a coin toss determines which volunteer is Player Aand which is Player B. Player A proposes a split of a sum of money and then PlayerB decides whether to accept or reject the proposal. If Player B accepts, the sumof money is divided as outlined in the proposal. If Player B rejects the proposal,each player gets nothing.Conventional economic theory predicts that Player A will offer only $1 to Player Band keep the remainder for himself. This is predicted to occur because Player Aknows that Player B will be better off with $1 than with $0. However, in reality,Player B generally rejects small proposals that he considers unfair. If Player Aconsiders this, he will likely offer Player B a more substantial amount.Quick Check Multiple Choice1. b2. a3. d4. b5. a6. cProblems and Applications1. a. The landlord is the principal and the tenant is the agent. There is asymmetricinformation because the landlord does not know how well the tenant will takecare of the property. Having a tenant pay a security deposit increases thelikelihood that the tenant will take care of the property in order to receivehis deposit back when he vacates the property.b. The stockholders of the firm (the owners) are the principals and the topexecutives are the agents. The firm’s owners do not know in advance how wellthe top executives will perform their duties. Tying some of the executives’compensation to the value of the firm provides incentive for the executives towork hard to increase the value of the firm.c. The insurance company is the principal and the customer is the agent. Insurancecompanies do not know whether the car owner is likely to leave the vehicleparked with the keys in it or park it in a high crime area. Individuals whowill go to the trouble of installing anti-theft equipment are more likely totake good care of their vehicles. Offering a discount on insurance premiumswill induce car owners to install such devices.2. Individuals who are relatively healthy may decide to forgo purchasing the policyif the premium rises. Thus, the insurance company is left with only thosepolicyholders who are relatively unhealthy. This means that the firm’s revenue smay in fact fall, but its costs could remain the same. Therefore, the firm’sprofits could fall.3. Saying "I love you" is likely not a good signal. To be an effective signal, thesignal must be costly. In fact, the signal must be less costly, or more beneficial, to the person with the higher-quality product. Simply professing one's love does not meet this requirement.4. If insurance companies were not allowed to determine if applicants are HIV-positive, more individuals who are HIV-positive would be able to purchaseinsurance, but that insurance would be very expensive. Covering these individuals would raise the cost of providing health insurance and the company would have to raise premiums for all. Thus, individuals who are not HIV-positive would be forced to pay more for health insurance and may drop coverage. Insurance companies would be left insuring only those who are ill (including those who are HIV-positive), increasing the adverse selection problem. The number of individuals without health insurance would likely rise as a result.5. Ken is violating the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Adding achoice of strawberry after he chooses vanilla over chocolate should not induce him to change his mind and prefer chocolate.6. a. If the three friends use a Borda count, the Chinese restaurant gets the mostvotes (10); the Italian restaurant gets 9 votes; the Mexican restaurant gets 7votes; and the French restaurant gets 4 votes.b. In this scenario, the Italian restaurant gets 5 votes and the Chineserestaurant gets 4 votes. Thus, they will choose to eat at the Italianrestaurant.c. This voting violates the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives.The presence of the Mexican and French restaurants should not alter thegroup’s preferences between the Italian and Chinese restaurants.7. a. There would be a tie between the three television shows, with 6 votes each.b. In a vote between NCIS and Glee, NCIS would win. In a vote between NCIS andHomeland, Homeland would wi n. Thus, Monica’s first choice (Homeland) would win.c. No. He will want to vote between Glee and Homeland first, with the winner thencompeting in a second vote with NCIS. That way, his preferred choice (NCIS)would win.d. If Chandler says he prefers Glee over NCIS, Glee will then compete in a voteagainst Homeland (which it will win). This way, Chandler will not have to watch his least preferred show (Homeland).8. a. The efficient number of DVDs is three. Total surplus would be the sum of theroommat es’ willingness to pay (38 + 26 + 18 = 82) minus the cost of the DVDs(15 + 15 + 15 = 45) which is 37.b. Quentin would want 4 DVDs; Spike would prefer 3; Ridley wants 2; Martin wants 1;and Steven does not want to buy a DVD.c. The preference of the median roommate (Ridley) is 2 DVDs.d. Quentin and Spike would vote for 3 DVDs, but the other three roommates wouldvote for 2 DVDs.e. No. Any other option besides 2 DVDs would get fewer votes.f. No. The provision of the public good will likely be determined by thepreferences of the median voter. This may or may not be the efficient outcome.9. More than likely, the two stands will locate at the center of the beach. Thus,they will always be closest for at least half of the beach goers. This is related to the median voter theorem.10. a. Assuming the needy person is a rational consumer, he would use the cash tomaximize his utility and purchase what he needs most.b. The soup kitchen may be better than the cash handout if the government does nothave complete information about how the needy person will spend the cash. That is, rather than the possibility of the needy person spending the cash on drugs or alcohol, the government can be certain the needy person is getting food from the soup kitchen.c. The soup kitchen may be better than the cash handout based on behavioraleconomics because people aren't always rational and the needy person may spend the cash on something he doesn't need as much as food.。

SOSC523Human Resource and EconomicsLi HanFall2010September1,2010Course overviewHow tofind the right people?How to keep the right people?How to give the right incentives?While the traditional answer to these questions is“it all depends”, we will introduce in this class a simple and powerful approach to give detailed and unambiguous answers to these questions.This approach,sometimes called personnel economics,reflects one of the most exciting development in modern economics in the past thirty years.It highlights the importance of information and incentive in the modern economy and gives useful insights to a wide range of questions.This course has three central themes:(1)How to think analytically about as-pects of managing afirm’s human assets;(2)How to apply the analytical tools to other types of organizations and relevant labor market phenomena;and(3)How should we use data to optimize our human resource practices and to explore the implications for various types of organizations and labor market.This course is designed for students who like to think analytically about human resource man-agement and those who are interested in new development in labor,organization theory and contract design.Topics in this class include sorting,self-selection,discrimination,asymmetric information,signaling,human capital,incentive,multitask,efficiency wage and tournaments.Methods developed in this course will help you uncover the ratio-nale behind the seemingly complicated and constantly changing process of human resource management infirms.These methods can also be applied to diverse issues such as bureaucracy,discrimination,education investment,religious organizations, and so on.Since this course is an economic approach to human resource questions,we rely on the analytical framework of microeconomics and some basic statistical tools. Prior training in economics and statistics is preferred but not required.We will1teach the basic analytical tools along the way.Although complex calculation is not required,students are expected to understand the intuition behind theories. SOSC509(Statistics in Social Science)is recommended.Teaching methodThis course relies on both lectures and brief case discussion to develop the key learning points.Some lectures will start with a brief case discussion,and key concepts that emerge from the case then be developed by formal lectures.There will also be4problem sets to solidify your knowledge.Web pageOur course web page is on the LMES.Readings and handoutsThis class uses a collection of readings from various sources,including textbooks, academic journals,and the popular press,to provide a broad spectrum of infor-mation from which to work.There is one required textbook for the class.Personnel Economics in Practice,2nd Edition,by Edward zear and Michael Gibbs,2009.Additional required readings,supplementary readings,and handouts including overheads and answers to problem sets will be posted on the course web page regularly.GradingGrades will be based on class participation and discussion questions(10%),prob-lem sets(40%)andfinal paper(50%).•Class participation(10%of grade)You should participate actively in the class discussion,answer questions and come up with your own questions.The grading is based upon peer reviews.It is also at the discretion of the instructor.2•Problem sets(40%of grade)There will be4problem sets in total.A large part of questions will be em-pirical te problem sets will not be accepted.Group discussion is encouraged(maximum3persons in each group)but you should always WRITE SEPARATELY.Problem sets dates(approximately):Sept13,Oct4,Oct25,Nov15.•Final paper(50%of grade)You will write a research paper on any topic related to the course.Case projects are also acceptable but you need to get my approval by Oct15.Please hand in a two-page double-spaced research prospectus in class on Oct25.I will give you feedbacks by November5.You are welcome and encouraged to discuss with me about the selection of topics or other problems in research all along the way.Presentations of research projects will be scheduled in the last lecture(Dec6).Classroom etiquettesStudents are expected to adhere to the general principles of classroom etiquette. These principles ask that students focus on in-class lectures and discussions during class time.In particular,please do not use laptop or personal digital assistants during class sessions,and turn the cell phone off.Absenteeism and tardiness will adversely affect your grade,and the negative impact increases with each instance.Plagiarism will be severely punished. Contact information•Professor Han Li(lihan@ust.hk)-office hours:Mondays1:30-2:30pm@rm2351•Teaching assistant:Xie Jiaxin(xiejiaxin@ust.hk)-office hours:Fridays3-4pm@rm30013Course outlineSession1(Sept6):Overview of the ClassOverview:course organization and methodologyReading:*Case:instead of cases,read the following articles in New York Times.Saul Hansell,“Google Answer to Filling Jobs Is an Algorithm,”January3, 2007.Miguel Helft,“In Fierce Competition,Google Finds Novel Ways to Feed Hiring Machine,”May28,2007.•“Overview of the Labor Market,”Chapter2in Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy.(10th edition)Ehrenberg,R.G.and Robert S.Smith,2009.•Lazear,E.P.(1999)“Personnel Economics:Past Lessons and Future Direc-tions.”Journal of Labor Economics,17(2),199-236.-Ichniowski,C.and Kathryn Shaw(2003).“Beyond Incentive Pay:Insiders’Estimates of the Value of Complementary Human Resource Management Practices.”Journal of Economic Perspective,17(1),155-180.-Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I.Sutton,“Evidence-Based Management”,Har-vard Business Review,January2006Session2(Sept13):How to Avoid Getting a Lemon? Adverse Selection and ScreeningReading:•“Screening Job Applicants,”part of Chapter2in Personnel Economics in Practice,2nd Edition,by Edward zear and Michael Gibbs,2009.(Or “Hiring the Right People,”Chapter3in Personnel Economics for Managers, by Edward zear,1998.)•“Employment,Bakery’s‘Open Hiring’Offers Anyone a Chance,”New York Times,November26th2006.4-“Pay,Your Own Way:Firm Lets Workers Pick Salary–Big Bonus?None at All?”In Throwback to’80s,Employees Make Call.”Wall Street Journal, July7th,2007.Session3(Sept20):Whom to Hire?Sorting,Self-Selection and Wage StructureReading:•Borjas,G.(1987)“Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants.”American Economic Review77(4),531-553.•Borjas,G.(2000)“The Wage Structure and the Sorting of Workings into the Public Sector.”NBER working paper.-Gabaix,X.and A Landier(2008).“Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?”Quarterly Journal of Economics,Feb2008.-Autor,D.H.,F.Levy,R.J.Murnane(2003).“The Skill Content of Re-cent Technological Change:An empirical exploration.”Quarterly Journal of Economics.Session4(Sept27):How to Convince Potential Buyers? The Theory of SignalingReading:•“Signaling,”part of Chapter2in Personnel Economics in Practice,2nd Edition,by Edward zear and Michael Gibbs,2009.(Or“Signaling Productivity,”Chapter8in Personnel Economics for Managers,by Edward zear,1998.)•Tyler,Murnane and Willett(2000)“Estimating The Labor Market Signaling Value of The GED.”Quarterly Journal of Economics.-Kelly,Bedard.(2001)“Human Capital versus Signaling Models:University Access and High School Dropouts.”Journal of Political Economy109(4): 749-775.-Riley,J.(2001)“Silver Signals:Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signal-ing.”Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.XXXIX,pp.432478.-“Signal Failure?”The Economist,May1,2003.5Session5(Oct4):Equal Pay for Equal Work?The Theory of DiscriminationReading:•“Gender,Race,and Ethnicity in the Labor Market,”Chapter12in Modern Labor Economics:Theory and Public Policy.(10th edition)Ehrenberg,R.G.and Robert S.Smith,2009.•Oyer,Paul and Scott Shaefer.“The Unintended Consequences of the1991 Civil Rights Act,”Regulation,Summer2003.•Bertrand and Mullainathan.(2004)“Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimina-tion”American Economic Review.-Kewin,Charles and Jonathan Guryan.(2008).“Prejudice and Wages:An Empirical Assessment of Becker’s The Economics of Discrimination.”Jour-nal of Political Economy116(5).-Heckman,J.,and B.Payner.“Determining the Impact of Federal Anti-discrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks:A Study of South Carolina.”American Economic Review79:138-177.-Angrist,J.,and D.Acemoglu.“Consequences of Employment Protection?The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act.”Journal of Political Econ-omy(October2001).Session6(Oct11):When(and if)to Train Your Employees? The Theory of Human CapitalReading:•“Investment in Skills,”Chapter3in Personnel Economics in Practice,2nd Edition,by Edward zear and Michael Gibbs,2009.(Or“The Theory of Human Capital,”Chapter6in Personnel Economics for Managers,by Edward P.Lazear,1998.)•Autor,D.(2001)“Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?”Quarterly Journal of Economics.-Acemoglu,D.and Steve Pischke.(1998)“Why Do Firms Train?Theory and Evidence.”Quarterly Journal of Economics113(1).6Session7(Oct18):When to Make and When to Buy?The Theory of Firm Specific Human CapitalReading:*Case:Motorola U.:When Training Becomes an Education•Jacobson,Louise S.,Robert Lalonde and Daniel G.Sullivan,“Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers.American Economic Review,83(4),1993,685-709.-Lazear,Edward,“Firm-Specific Human Capital:A Skill Weights Approach.”NBER Working Paper No.9679,May2003.Session8(Oct25):How to Motivate Workers?Basic Incentive ModelsReading:*Case:Lincoln electric in China•“Rewarding Performance,”Chapter2,9,10in Personnel Economics in Prac-tice,2nd Edition,by Edward zear and Michael Gibbs,2009.(Or“Vari-able Pay of Straight”Chapter5in Personnel Economics for Managers,by Edward zear,1998.)•Ichniowski,Casey,Kathryn Shaw,and Giovanna Prennushi.(1997)“The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity:A Study of Steel Finishing Lines.”American Economic Review87(3)291-313.-Lazear,Edward P.(2000)“Pay,Performance and Productivity.”American Economic Review90(5),1346-1361.Research Prospectus Due in ClassSession9(Nov1):Why Not Cut Wages during Recessions? Efficiency WageReading:•“US Probe Nearly Wipe Out Police in Ford Heights.”The Chicago Tribune.October11,1996.7•“Singapore Boosts Pay for Officials,Again.”Asian Sentinel,December18th, 2007.-DMG Raff,LH Summers.“Did Henry Ford pay efficiency wages?”Journal of Labor Economics.1987.-Shapiro, C.and Joseph Stiglitz.(1984)“Equilibrium Unemployment as Worker Discipline Device.”American Economic Review74,433-444.-Campbell III,Carl M.,and Kunal S.Kamlani.(1997)“The Reasons for Wage Rigidity:Evidence from a Survey of Firms.”Quarterly Journal of Economics112(3),759-789.-Fehr,Ernst and Simon Gachter.(2000)“Fairness and Retaliation:The Economics of Reciprocity.”Journal of Economic Perspectives14(3),159-81. Session10(Nov8):Should My Pay Depends on Your Per-formanceTeam productionReading:•“Teams,”part of Chapter8in Personnel Economics in Practice,2nd Edition, by Edward zear and Michael Gibbs,2009.-Hamilton Barton,Jack A.Nickerson,and Hideo Owan(2003).“Team In-centives and Worker Hetergeneity:An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation.”Journal of Political Economy, 111:465-497.Session11(Nov15):When to Use Promotions?Career-Based IncentivesReading:•“Career-Based Incentives,”Chapter11in Personnel Economics in Practice, 2nd Edition,by Edward zear and Michael Gibbs,2009.(Or“Promotions as Motivators,”Chapter9in Personnel Economics for Managers,by Edward P.Lazear,1998.)8Session12(Nov22):How Do you Allocate Decisions? Centralization vs.DecentralizationReading:•“Decision Making Process.”Chapter5in Personnel Economics in Practice, 2nd Edition,by Edward zear and Michael Gibbs,2009.Session13(Nov29):How to Design Jobs?The Theory of MultitaskReading:•“Job Design.”Chapter7in Personnel Economics in Practice,2nd Edition, by Edward zear and Michael Gibbs,2009.•Baker,George and Thomas N.Hubbard.(2003)“Make Versus Buy in Truck-ing:Asset Ownership,Job Design,and Information.”American Economic Review,93(3),551-572.-Slade,M(1996)“Multi-task agency and organisational form:An empirical exploration.”International Economic Review,pp.465-86.-“Teachers Give Poor Grades to Merit Pay,”The Chicago Tribune,April23, 2000-“19,000Kids Seek New Schools,”The Chicago Tribune,August28th,2003 Session14(Dec6):Term Paper PresentationNote:•required reading;-supplementary reading;*cases.9。

经济学专业术语（中英文对照）目录1. 经济学原理 (2)2. 像经济学家一样思考 (2)3. 相互依存性与贸易的好处 (3)4. 供给与需求的市场力量 (3)5. 弹性及其应用 (4)6. 供给需求与政策 (4)7. 消费者、生产者与市场效率 (4)8. 赋税的应用 (4)9. 国际贸易 (5)10. 外部性 (5)11. 公共物品和公共资源 (5)12. 税制设计 (5)13. 生产成本 (6)14. 竞争市场上的企业 (7)15. 垄断 (7)16. 垄断竞争 (7)17. 寡头 (7)18. 生产要素市场 (8)19. 收入与歧视 (8)20. 收入不平等与贫困 (8)21. 消费者选择理论 (9)22. 微观经济学前沿 (9)23. 一国收入的衡量 (10)24. 生活费用的衡量 (10)25. 生产与增长 (10)26. 储蓄、投资和金融体系 (11)27. 金融学的基本工具 (11)28. 失业 (12)29. 货币制度 (12)30. 货币增长与通货膨胀 (13)31. 开放经济的宏观经济学 (14)32. 开放经济的宏观经济理论 (14)33. 总需求与总供给 (14)34. 货币政策和财政政策对总需求影响 (15)35. 通胀与失业之间的短期权衡取舍 (15)1.经济学原理经济:(economy)稀缺性:(scarcity)经济学:(economics)效率:(efficiency)平等:(equality)机会成本:(opporyunity cost)理性人:(rational people)边际变动:(marginal change)边际收益:(marginal benefit)边际成本:(marginal cost)激励:(incentive)市场经济:(market economy)产权:(property rights)市场失灵:(market failure)外部性:(externality)市场势力:(market power)生产率:(productivity)通货膨胀:(inflation)经济周期:(business cycle)2.像经济学家一样思考循环流量图:(circular-flow diagram)生产可能性边界:(production possibilities)微观经济学:(microeconomics)宏观经济学:(macroeconomics)实证表述:(positive statements)规范表述:(normative statements)有序数对:(ordered pair)3.相互依存性与贸易的好处绝对优势:(absolute advantage)机会成本:(apportunity cost)比较优势:(comparative advantage)进口品:(imports)出口品:(exports)4.供给与需求的市场力量市场:(market)竞争市场:(competitive market)需求量:(quantity demand)需求定理:(law of demand)需求表:(demand schedule)需求曲线:(demand curve)正常物品:(normal good)低档物品:(inferior good)替代品:(substitutes)互补品:(complements)供给量:(quantity supplied)供给定理:(law of supply)供给表:(supply schedule)供给曲线:(supply curve)均衡:(equilibrium)均衡价格:(equilibrium price)均衡数量:(equilibrium quantity)过剩:(surplus)短缺:(shortage)供求定理:(law of supply and demand)5.弹性及其应用弹性:(elasticity)需求价格弹性:(price elasticity of demand)总收益:(total revenue)需求收入弹性:(income elasticity)需求的交叉价格弹性:(cross-price elasticity)供给价格弹性:(price elasticity of supply)6.供给需求与政策价格上限:(price ceiling)价格下限:(price floor)税收归宿:(tax incidence)7.消费者、生产者与市场效率福利经济学:(welfare economics)支付意愿:(willingness to pay)消费者剩余:(consumer surplus)成本:(cost)生产者剩余:(producer surplus)效率:(efficiency)平等:(equality)8.赋税的应用无谓损失:(deadweight loss)9.国际贸易世界价格:(world price)关税:(tariff)10.外部性外部性:(externality)外部性内在化:(internalizing the externality)矫正税:(corrective taxes)科斯定理:(coase theorem)交易成本:(transaction cost)11.公共物品和公共资源排他性:(excludability)消费中的竞争性:(rivalry in consumption)私人物品:(private goods)公共物品:(public goods)公共资源:(common resources)俱乐部物品:(club goods)搭便车者:(free rider)成本-收益分析:(cost-benefit analysis)公地悲剧:(tragedy of commons)12.税制设计纳税义务:(tax lianility)预算赤字:(budget defict)预算盈余:(budget surplus)平均税率:(average tax rate)边际税率:(marginal tax rate)定额税:(lump-sum tax)受益原则:(benefits principle)支付能力原则:(ability-to-pay principle)纵向平等:(vertical equity)横向平等:(horizontal equity)比例税:(proportional tax)累退税:(regressive tax)累进税:(progressive tax)13.生产成本总收益:(total revenue)总成本:(total cost)利润:(profit)显性成本:(explicit costs)隐性成本:(implicit costs)经济利润:(economic profit)会计利润:(counting profit)生产函数:(production function)边际产量:(marginal product)边际产量递减:(diminishing marginal product)固定成本:(fixed costs)可变成本:(variable costs)平均总成本:(average total cost)平均固定成本:(average fixed costs)平均可变成本:(average variable costs)边际成本:(marginal cost)有效规模:(efficient scale)规模经济:(economies of scale)规模不经济:(diseconomies of scale)规模收益不变:(constant returns to scale) 14.竞争市场上的企业竞争市场:(competitive market)平均收益:(average revenue)边际收益:(marginal revenue)沉没成本:(sunk revenue)15.垄断垄断企业:(monopoly)自然垄断:(natural monopoly)价格歧视:(price discrimination)16.垄断竞争寡头:(oligopoly)垄断竞争:(monopolistic competition) 17.寡头博弈论:(game theory)勾结:(collusion)卡特尔:(cartel)纳什均衡:(Nash equilibrium)囚徒困境:(prisoners’ dilemma)占优策略:(dominant strategy)18.生产要素市场生产要素:(factors of production)生产函数:(production function)劳动的边际产量:(marginal product of labor)边际产量递减:(diminishing marginal product)边际产量值:(value of the marginal product)资本:(capital)19.收入与歧视补偿性工资差别:(compensating differential)人力资本:(human capital)工会:(union)罢工:(strike)效率工资:(efficiency)歧视:(discrimination)20.收入不平等与贫困贫困率:(poverty rate)贫困率:(poverty line)实物转移支付:(in-kind transfers)生命周期:(life cycle)持久收入:(permanent income)功利主义:(utilitariansm)效用:(utilitariansm)自由主义:(liberalism)最大最小准则:(maximin criterion)负所得税:(negative income tax)福利:(welfare)社会保险:(social insurance)自由至上主义:(libertarianism)21.消费者选择理论预算约束线:(budget constraint)无差异曲线:(indiffernnce curve)边际替代率:(marginal rate of subtitution)完全替代品:(perfect substitudes)完全互补品:(perfect complements)正常物品:(normal good)低档物品:(inferior good)收入效应:(income effect)替代效应:(substitution effect)吉芬物品:(Giffen good)22.微观经济学前沿道德风险:(moral hazard)代理人:(agent)委托人:(principal)逆向选择:(adverse selection)发信号:(signaling)筛选:(screening)政治经济学:(political economy)康多塞悖论:(condorcet paradox)阿罗不可能性定理:(Arrow’s impossibility)中值选民定理:(median vater theorem)行为经济学:(behavioral economics)23.一国收入的衡量微观经济学:(microeconomics)宏观经济学:(macroeconomics)国内生产总值:(gross domestic product,GDP)消费:(consumption)投资:(investment)政府购买:(government purchase)净出口:(net export)名义GDP:(nominal GDP)真实GDP:(real GDP)GDP平减指数:(GDP deflator)24.生活费用的衡量消费物价指数:(consumer price index,CPI)通货膨胀率:(inflation rate)生产物价指数:(produer price index,PPI)指数化:(indexation)生活费用津贴:(cost-of-living allowance,COLA)名义利率:(nominal interest rate)25.生产与增长生产率:(productivity)物质资本:(physical capital)人力资本:(human capital)自然资源:(natural resources)技术知识:(technological knoeledge)收益递减:(diminishing returns)追赶效应:(catch-up effect)26.储蓄、投资和金融体系金融体系:(financial system)金融市场:(financial markets)债券:(bond)股票:(stock)金融中介机构:(financial intermediaries)共同基金:(mutual fund)国民储蓄:(national saving)私人储蓄:(private saving)公共储蓄:(public saving)预算盈余:(budget surplus)预算赤字:(budget deficit)可贷资金市场:(market for loanable funds)挤出:(crowding out)27.金融学的基本工具金融学:(finance)现值:(present value)终值:(future value)复利:(compounding)风险厌恶:(risk aversion)多元化:(diversification)企业特有风险:(firm-specific risk)市场风险:(market risk)基本面风险:(fundamental analysis)有效市场假说:(efficient markets by pothesis)信息有效:(informational efficiency)随机游走:(random walk)28.失业劳动力:(laborforce)失业率:(unemployment rate)劳动力参与率:(labor-force participation rate)自然失业率:(natural rate of unemployment)周期性失业:(cyclical unemployment)失去信心的工人:(discouraged workers)摩擦性失业:(frictional unemployment)结构性失业:(structural unemployment)寻找工作:(job search)失业保险:(unemployment insurance)工会:(union)集体谈判:(collective bargaining)罢工:(strike)效率工资:(essiciency wages)29.货币制度货币:(money)交换媒介:(medium of exchange)计价单位:(unit of account)价值储藏手段:(store of value)流动性:(liquidity)商品货币:(commodity money)法定货币:(fiat money)通货:(currency)活期存款:(demand deposits)联邦储备局:(Federal Reserve)中央银行:(central bank)货币供给:(money supply)货币政策:(monetary policy)准备金:(reserves)部分准备金银行:(fractional-reserve banking)准备金率:(reserve ratio)货币乘数:(money multiplier)银行资本:(bank capital)杠杆:(leverage)杠杆率:(leverage ratio)资本需要量:(capital requirement)公开市场操作:(open-market operations)贴现率:(discount rate)法定准备金:(reserve requirements)补充金融计划:(supplementary financing program)联邦基金利率:(federal funds rate)30.货币增长与通货膨胀铲除通胀:(whip Inflation Now)货币数量论:(quantity theory of money)名义变量:(nominal variables)真实变量:(real variables)古典二分法:(classiacl dichotomy)货币中性:(monetary neutrality)货币流通速度:(velocity of money)数量方程式:(quantity equation)通货膨胀税:(inflation tax)费雪效应:(Fisher effect)皮鞋成本:(shoeleather cost)菜单成本:(menu costs)31.开放经济的宏观经济学封闭经济:(closed economy)开放经济:(open economy)出口:(exports)净出口:(net exports)贸易余额:(trade balance)贸易盈余:(trade surplus)贸易平衡:(balanced trade)贸易赤字:(trade deficit)资本净流出:(net capital outflow)名义汇率:(nominal exchange rate)升值:(appreciation)贬值:(depreciation)真实汇率:(real exchange rate)购买力平价:(purchasing-power parity)32.开放经济的宏观经济理论贸易政策:(trade policy)资本外逃:(capital flight)33.总需求与总供给衰退:(recession)萧条:(depression)总需求与总供给模型:(model of aggregate demand and aggregate supply)总需求曲线:(aggregate-demand curve)总供给曲线:(aggregate-supply curve)自然产出水平:(natural level of output)滞胀:(stagflation)34.货币政策和财政政策对总需求影响流动性偏好理论:(theory of liquidity)财政政策:(fisical policy)乘数效应:(multiplier effect)挤出效应:(crowding-out effect)自动稳定器:(automatic stabilizers)35.通胀与失业之间的短期权衡取舍菲利普斯曲线:(phillips curve)自然率假说:(natural-rate hypothesis)供给冲击:(supply shock)牺牲率:(sacrifice ratio)理性预期:(rational expectations)。