2020年-基于融资结构的农业上市公司公司治理问题的研究综述-文献综述和外文翻译

《公司治理机制理论研究文献综述》-郑志刚公司治理机制是解决现代公司由于控制权和所有权分离所导致的代理问题的各种机制的总称,它既包括公司治理的法律和政治途径、产品和要素市场竞争、公司控制权市场、职业关注等外部控制系统,同时包括激励合约设计、董事会、大股东治理、债务融资等内部控制系统。

研究意义公司治理所要研究和解决的问题是如何使资金的提供者按时收回投资并获得合理的回报。

它构成建立在高度专业化分工基础上的现代公司制度运行的核心。

对公司治理问题的研究显然对于提高中国现代公司的治理效率,从而最终推进企业改革不仅具有重要的理论意义,同时还具有重要的现实意义。

一、外部控制系统外部控制系统指的是尽管机制的实际实施超出了公司资源计划的范围,仍然可以用来实现公司治理目标的各种公司治理机制总称,它包括公司治理的法律和政治途径、产品和要素市场竞争、公司控制权市场、声誉市场等。

1.公司治理的法律和政治途径①公司治理的法律途径在公司治理机制中处于基础性地位。

②此外,政治因素的考虑对一国法律的制定产生深刻的影响。

由于对于大多数国家的法律而言,对雇员的保护与对投资者的保护负相关,因而,法律规定是谋求高投资者保护程度的企业家与谋求高雇员保护程度的雇员的政治妥协。

③公司治理体系的不同更多的是意识形态的因素,而不是单纯由经济因素造成的。

2.产品和要素市场竞争①产品(要素)市场竞争不仅是市场经济条件下,改善整体经济效率十分强大的力量,同时,它在公司治理方面也发挥重要作用②产品和要素市场的监督力量对于新的和存在因量经济租或准租的活动而言十分微弱。

3.公司控制权市场所谓的公司控制权市场是指建立在现代放熟的资本市场的有效运作基础之上,通过包括公司舞管、杠杆收购以及公司重组等在内的公司战略而实现的公司资产控制权力转移的各种市场行为的总称。

这里的接管包括兼并、敌意和友好要约收购以及代理权竞争等。

接管实际发生的另一个必要条件是,接管者能够战胜目标公司经理人的“反接管”措施。

股权结构与盈利能力关系研究国内外文献综述目录股权结构与盈利能力关系研究国内外文献综述 (1)（一）国外文献综述 (1)1.资本结构与盈利能力的关系。

(1)2.股权结构和盈利能力的关系 (1)（二）国内文献综述 (2)（三）文献述评 (3)参考文献 (4)（一）国外文献综述1.资本结构与盈利能力的关系。

Titman(2009)根据400多家制造业上市公司的相关数据，分析企业在不同负债阶段下的盈利能力，得出如果公司负债过高，将影响公司的盈利能力[1]。

S. Ouchene等(2013)主要分析了美国银行优化资本结构的途径是提高二级资本，并提高了盈利能力2]。

Lepetit L等(2014)在研究影响银行盈利能力的因素时，深入分析了股东控制和美国次贷危机的影响。

研究发现，当股东控制相对集中时，银行的利润最大。

风险也较高，在一定程度上会影响公司的盈利能力[3]。

Daskalakis N等(2017)重点研究了外部环境、内部流动性和中小企业长期债务负债率的变化。

短期负债随外部环境的变化变化更为明显，而本案例中短期负债变化不大[4]。

Vecchiato M等(2018)以美国金融业为研究对象。

基于美国金融业的相关金融数据，将研究对象限定在金融业。

了解行业不同变化下的资本结构将影响其盈利能力，最终发现在美国金融行业资产收益率越低，公司经营业绩越好的研究结论[5]。

2.股权结构和盈利能力的关系Welch(2003)为了研究股权结构与盈利能力的关系，选取澳大利亚上市公司作为研究样本，同时选取了股权结构作为内生变量，实证结果表明，公司股权结构与盈利能力相关，且内部人持股与盈利能力有着非线性相关的关系[6]。

Andersson等(2004)选取了瑞典87家上市公司，以1999-2003年的数据为样本，以资产收益率和产权净利率为盈利能力指标，对公司的股权结构与盈利能力之间的关系进行实证研究。

研究结果表明，当内部股东表决权为5%、10%和20%时，表决权对盈利能力的影响也各不相同[7]。

企业财务管理问题研究国内外文献综述（一）国内文献回顾陈吉龙(2020)在《中小企业财务管理中的问题与对策》一书中指出企业财务管理工作是中小企业经营管理的重要一个组成环节部分，中小企业应当充分合理分析资本市场，正确合理配置投资，提高企业信用等级，拓宽企业融资服务渠道，加强企业应急吸收账外贷款财务管理和企业存货存款管理，夯实企业财务管理中的基础设施工作1。

孙娟(2020)在《中小企业在财务管理中存在的问题与对策研究》中指出企业的投资者就是管理者，决策随意性大，投资缺乏科学性，在资金使用上缺乏科学合理的安排，没有编制现金收支计划，缺乏资金周转，存在现金闲置，造成现金浪费，在存货方面缺乏监督管理机制，在应收账款方面管理落后，没有建立信用标准，急于发展，没有对市场调研，盲目促销2。

朱明华(2020)在《中小企业财务管理内部控制中存在的问题与对策研究》中指出健全企业的内部控制制度，重视内部监督管理，合理设置岗位，企业应从自身实际出发，提升财务风险控制能力，针对企业发展现状，对未来可能遇到的风险进行控制，树立风险管理意识3。

李晶(2020)在《中小企业在财务管理中存在的问题与对策研究》中指出科学设立管理机构，培养高素质人才，根据自身情况设置财务管理机构，实现财务管理的科学高效，吸收高素质复合型人才从事财务管理工作，具备全局观，公平公正的看待经营问题，在工作过程中做好分析反馈4。

郭瑞敏(2020)在《中小企业财务管理问题与对策研究》中指出中小企业应积极进行自我创新，政府部门应为其打造专门的会计技术平台，为中小企业提供贷款优惠政策，中小企业内部进行财务管理创新，完善奖励补偿机制5。

（二）国外文献回顾Halis Kıral;Tekin Akdemir（2020）在《Public Financial Management Reforms in Turkey:Progress and Challenges，V olume1》中提出企业融资和企业规模有关，一般以自有资金作为主要来源，同时银行借贷成为中小企业最常见的融资手段6。

关于融资约束的文献综述与启发融资约束是指企业在融资过程中由于内外部原因而受到的制约和限制。

融资约束会影响企业的融资能力和融资成本，对企业的发展产生重要影响。

本文将综述相关文献，并从中得出启发，以供读者参考。

在融资约束方面的文献研究主要从两个角度展开，一是从融资需求的角度，探讨企业为何存在融资约束，二是从融资供给的角度，研究融资约束对企业融资选择和成本的影响。

在融资需求的研究中，很多研究者将融资约束归因于信息不对称问题。

Fazzari、Hubbard和Petersen (1988)的研究发现，由于企业内部信息不对称，融资市场上的外部资金供应商对企业的信息不完全可信，从而导致企业面临融资约束。

Jensen和Meckling(1976)的代理成本理论认为，企业的融资约束还与代理问题有关，管理者可能会为了自身利益而选择不融资或者选择不适宜的融资方式，从而造成融资约束。

从融资供给的研究来看，研究者主要关注银行信贷市场中的融资约束。

Holmström和Tirole (1997)的研究指出，企业融资约束的一个重要原因是银行存在贷款保护费的机制，企业需要支付一定费用保证贷款得到批准。

银行扩张性的融资供给也会受到宏观经济环境的影响，如金融危机等。

融资约束对企业的融资选择和成本产生重要影响。

Meyer和George (2000)的研究发现，处于融资约束的企业更倾向于选择内部融资和权益性融资，而对于债务性融资持谨慎态度。

他们还指出，融资约束会增加企业的融资成本，包括利率的提高和融资难度的加剧。

Bates、Kahle和Stulz (2009)的研究表明，融资约束会影响企业的投资决策，减少企业的投资活动，进而影响企业的价值。

从文献综述中可以看出，融资约束是企业实际发展中常见的问题，同时也是一个复杂的研究课题。

了解融资约束对企业的影响，对企业管理和决策具有重要意义。

进一步研究融资约束的形成机制，可以帮助企业更好地理解融资约束的本质，从而采取相应的应对策略。

毕业设计（论文）文献综述系别：财务与会计系年级专业：10级财务管理专业姓名：刘玲玲学号：102048211题目名称：企业关于财务管理制度的研究文献综述企业关于财务管理制度的研究文献综述【内容摘要】：一个国家的企业是整个国民经济的重要组成部分。

自企业在如今时代的发展趋势下，财务管理制度愈发成为一个企业成长的重要形态，扮演着重要的角色。

但由于受到传统体制、宏观环境、资产结构等诸多方面的影响，使得企业在财务管理制度方面的运用存在着与自身发展不协调、与市场经济不适应的问题。

需要强化推进财务管理作为企业发展的重要内容。

本文针对国内外对企业财务管理在企业中产生的弊端进行剖析和研究，旨在研究出完善和创新现代企业财务管理制度的对策。

【关键词】：财务管理；现代企业一、国内外学者对企业财务管理的研究最早开始研究企业工作的学术年代和国家是1952年的德国，相继之后，美国、加拿大和其他国家也陆续开始研究企业的发展工作史，并刊登一系列的刊物文章。

美国波士顿会议上和瑞士的小企业周和国际世界年会理事会上都发表过较有影响力的学术演说，1965年Soltow对英格兰小规模金属制造企业和机械制造企业最早解释了为什么有的小企业能够成长，1970年Vatter研究了大小企业之间关系及演进后得出：大企业形成美国工业的垄断核心，而“工业的剩余部分则分散在中小企业部门”的结论。

在国内，如马云凤、易民斌等学者也在《中小企业财务管理现存问题原因透视》中提出对企业在财务管理观念上的完善对策，提出应该从观念上调整融资，在投资、融资及其他方面积极创新，从而进一步提升企业核心竞争力，不断增强自身实力。

大部分国内学者都认为企业发展的薄弱环节源于企业自身内部的财务管理环节，并且已经成为其发展的关键所在，因此企业必须更加重视财务管理在企业成长过程的重要作用，在人员队伍建设，强化内部控制、监督管理制度建设，意识观念等方面的完善改进。

杨光学者的观点中称企业任何财务风险都有一个逐步呈现，不断恶化的过程，应对中小企业的生产经营的全过程进行监督，根据实际情况找到解决财务风险的方法，使得企业能够回归正道，逐步成长。

关于融资约束的文献综述与启发融资约束蕴含着不同层面的行为限制和财务限制，是企业为了维护其财务健康而制定的一系列规则和约束，也是针对利益冲突的应对性管理措施之一。

本文旨在通过对融资约束的文献综述，探讨其理论构成、影响因素、测量方法以及启迪意义。

一、理论构成融资约束理论的起源可以追溯到20世纪60年代。

早期的研究主要关注于财务限制，认为企业资产规模、财务状况和盈利能力等因素影响着企业的债务融资能力和资本结构。

进入21世纪，众多学者开始从行为限制、约定限制、法律制约等不同角度构建融资约束理论框架。

具体来说，融资约束可分为内部融资约束和外部融资约束。

内部融资约束指企业内部因素的所致限制，如管理者的贪 rent-seeking 行为、信息不对称等。

外部融资约束则主要来自于资本市场的运作制度、审计、评级等第三方制度安排。

二、影响因素融资约束的影响因素涉及企业自身以及外部环境。

具体可分为以下几点：1.企业自身因素。

资产负债率、盈利能力等财务指标会影响企业融资的能力和成本。

此外，企业规模、成长阶段等也会影响债务融资的难易程度。

2.商业环境因素。

宏观经济环境、产业竞争程度以及市场需求等因素均会对企业融资产生影响。

行业景气程度、政策环境等也会影响企业的融资渠道、成本，进而影响其融资决策。

3.法律政策因素。

外部融资约束包括法定限制、市场制度安排等，如企业法律地位、政策环境等因素会对企业的融资产生重要的影响。

三、测量方法测量融资约束主要可从两个方面入手：一个是观察试图融资但失败的企业的比例；另一个是使用主观问卷收集数据，并基于特定的模型框架下来进行回归分析。

下面列举了几种常见的测量方法：1.试图融资但失败的企业比例。

这是最常见的测量方法。

通常采用债务融资比例、流动资产比率、营运资本比率或现金比率来评估企业是否面临融资约束。

2.问卷调查。

该方法通过制定特定的问题或问卷调查来获取企业从业者对融资约束的主观认知和评估。

3.面板数据回归分析。

机构投资者与公司治理国外文献综述摘要:特定类型机构投资者对公司特殊事件的影响是研究机构投资者在公司治理中角色的视角之一。

基于机构投资者类型,从反接管提案、经理人薪酬、并购与研发支出等方面,分析机构投资者对公司治理的影响,探究机构投资者参与公司治理的内外部条件,旨在对我国机构投资者的理论研究和实务操作提供参考。

关键词:机构投资者;公司治理;经理人薪酬机构投资者是否影响公司治理,引起了西方学者的极大兴趣,但研究视角和结论并不统一。

由于机构投资者对上市公司的监督作用难以直接衡量,有一大批学者在研究过程中通过公司特殊事件,比如反接管提案、经理人薪酬设计、并购与研发支出等进行深入研究。

与之前的“短期主义和股东消极主义”不同,这种研究更加关注机构投资者的异质性,更加关注股东积极主义及其效果。

本文在机构投资者类型划分的基础上,综述了不同类型机构投资者对公司特殊事件的影响;结合有关机构投资者参与公司治理的内外部条件,构建了基于事件视角的机构投资者与公司治理研究的逻辑框架,旨在刻画西方已有研究成果和局限性的基础上,为我国机构投资者研究提供参考。

一、机构投资者类型目前,基于机构投资者类型来研究其对公司治理的影响,即重视机构投资者的异质性,是该领域研究的一个显着特点。

事实上并不是所有的机构投资者都愿意并有能力发挥监督作用,不同类型的机构投资者由于自身特点和投资理念的差异,其投资偏好和对公司治理的影响可能不同。

因此,合理区分机构投资者类型是进一步检验机构投资者参与公司治理的效果的研究基础。

机构投资者与被投资公司是否存在现有或潜在的商业关系往往影响其监督效力,Brickley et al. (1988) 据此将机构投资者划分为两种类型:一类是那些与上市公司只存在投资关系的机构投资者,即压力不敏感型(也被称作压力抵制型)机构投资者。

通常认为只有他们才能够坚持自己的投资理念,不受短期目标影响,着眼于长期回报,有动机参与公司治理,监督管理层,并从公司治理活动中得到更大的收益;另一类是那些对公司业务存在依赖关系的机构投资者,即压力敏感型机构投资者。

公司治理理论研究国内外文献综述目录公司治理理论研究国内外文献综述 (1)（一）国内文献综述 (1)（二）国外文献综述 (2)一、公司治理理论概述 (3)（一）公司治理的概念 (3)（二）公司治理理论的分类 (3)（三）基于新古典资源配置观的公司治理理论概述 (4)（四）20世纪末新兴的公司治理理论概述 (5)参考文献： (6)（一）国内文献综述1、公司治理的内涵。

李粮（2020）认为首先应当将公司治理和内部控制这两个概念明确区分开来。

对于公司治理而言，他认为公司治理关注的是一个企业的经营策略该如何制定，且如何确保该经营策略的合理性。

内部控制则关注的是企业如何在经营活动中贯彻该策略[1]。

任丽英（2019）对各个学者对公司治理所作的定义进行研究，她认为公司治理就是指公司的所有者为解决其与管理者之间的“代理问题”而从各个方面对公司全局的运作与经营所做的一种体系化、常态化的安排。

它既包括企业组织结构的框架设计，也包括外部治理的安排[2]。

赵烜一(2017）将公司治理简要概括为一种为公司进行的各项活动提供运行方案并对其运行过程进行监督的管理系统。

它的重要内容包括：所有者的权利、管理者的职责以及公司各项活动的公开性[3]。

安彬彬（2010）认为公司治理的本质是一种多个要素的分配方法，而公司治理的存在意义便是依托于这种分配的原则和方法，根据具体情况配置权、责、利[4]。

2、古典管家理论以及委托代理理论。

周金泉和何文晋（2014）指出在古典管家理论的框架下面，毫无疑问，企业是不存在代理问题的，因为公司本身已经处在一个完全信息的市场中，自然，这种假设里公司治理也没有任何意义，不再成为公司所需要的控制经营的工具[5]。

张雅（2021）认为委托代理理论的意图在于降低代理人与企业所有者因双方可能的利益不一致以及彼此间信息的不同步而带来的“代理成本”。

基于此，他认为应当从改善内部监督机制以及建立“心灵契约”等方法解决这个问题[6]。

企业融资理论文献综述（5篇）第一篇：企业融资理论文献综述融资就是是企业对资金的筹集行为。

一个企业,在初期资本注入后,后期的资金投入都将会是相对巨大的。

下面是关于企业融资理论文献综述，欢迎阅读。

企业融资理论文献综述资金是企业生存与发展的前提条件。

充足的资金有利于企业降低营运风险，更好的拓展业务，追求利润最大化。

企业的资金来源包括内源融资和外源融资两个渠道，外源融资又有直接融资和间接融资两种方式。

随着经济技术的进步和生产规模的扩大，单纯依靠内源筹资已很难满足企业的资金需求，外源筹资已逐渐成为企业筹资的主要方式。

改革开放30年来，中国经济有了质的飞跃，法制、税收、监管等方面有显著的改善,为企业筹资提供了各式各样的渠道，但是总体而言，我国企业筹资仍存在许多问题。

目前，许多学者对企业筹资存在的问题进行了研究总结，并对影响企业筹资的各种环境因素进行了详细分析，探索出当前形势下企业进行筹资的创新方式，并指出了中国企业有效融资的途径。

关于企业筹资过程中存在的一些问题，诸多学者提出了自己的见解。

赵艳荣（2010）指出企业筹资过程中存在的问题有：主要依赖银行贷款；重视股权筹资，轻视债权筹资；盲目追求筹资数额，忽视资金保值增值。

杨琦（2010）认为中小企业由于信用意识不强，内部管理水平落后导致间接融资渠道不畅，筹资难成为发展的极大障碍。

曲立峰（2010）认为从20世纪80年代开始，中国经济发展进入了一个迅速成长阶段，企业筹资难成为一个普遍现象，并且直接制约着中国经济的进一步发展。

而实际上，随着国家经济的发展，民间储蓄、企业资本和国家财政的规模不断的扩大，这就意味着筹资难并非真正意义上的资金供应不足，而是资金管理缺乏科学指导，企业选择筹资渠道不正确。

许多学者对影响企业筹资的各种环境因素进行了详细的分析。

杨帆（2010）认为自2009年以来，由于人民币升值预期、外汇储备过多等诸多因素的影响，我国境内资产价格不断上涨。

同时，在全球范围，随着主要经济体逐渐摆脱经济危机的影响，大宗商品价格、生产资料的价格不断上涨，这必将向消费领域传递，通胀预期有可能在2010年上半年就成为现实。

本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献出处：Abor J; Bokpin A. Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policy. Studies in Economics and Finance. 2015; 27(3):180-194.Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policyAbor J; Bokpin AAbstractPurpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Design/methodology/approach - This issue is tested with a sample of 34 emerging market countries covering a 17-year period, 1990-2006. Fixed effects panel model is employed in our estimation. Findings - A significantly negative relationship between investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy is found. There are, however, insignificant effects of the various measures of corporate finance namely, financial leverage, external financing, and debt maturity on dividend payout policy. Profitability and stock market capitalization are also identified as important in influencing dividend payout policy. Profitable firms are more likely to support high dividend payments to shareholders. However, firms in relatively well-developed markets tend to exhibit low dividend payout policy. Originality/value - The main value of the paper is in respect of the fact that it uses a large dataset from emerging market countries. The results generally support existing literature on investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy.Keywords: International; Dividends; Corporate finance;1. IntroductionThe impact of investment and financing decisions on firm value has been the focus of extensive research since [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed the "separation principle". The theory asserts that in a perfect capital market, the value of the firm is independent of the manner in which its productive assets are financed. In fact someauthors like [12] Barnes et al.(1981) support their view. However, others have contrasted the findings of the earlier studies suggesting that investment, financing, and dividend policy are related ([30] Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; [46] McCabe, 1979;[5] Anderson, 1983). This is predicated on the assumption that Modigliani and Miller's ideal world does not exist. Financial markets are not perfect given taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and uncertain inflation in the market place. According to [13] Bier man and Hass (1983), management usually addresses the dividend target payout level in the context of forecasting the firm's sources and use of funds. Considering prospective investment opportunities and the internal cash generation potential of the firm, both capital structure and dividend policy are chosen to ensure that sufficient funds are available to undertake all desirable investments without using new equity ([14] Black, 1976). But what constitutes a "desirable" investment? If it is one that has an expected return greater than the cost of funds that finance it, and if the cost of retained earnings is different from the cost of new equity capital, then dividend policy, capital structure, and investment strategy are necessarily jointly determined ([15] Black and Schools, 1974).Dividend payout policy is an important corporate issue and may be closely related to, and interacts with, most of the financial and investment decisions firms make. A proper understanding of dividend policy is critical for many other areas such as asset pricing, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, and capital budgeting ([2] Allen and Michael, 1995). Firms' dividend decisions could also be influenced by their profit level, risk, and size. Though dividend policy has been identified as a major corporate decision faced by management, it remains one of the puzzles in corporate finance ([52] Obi, 2001). There has been emerging consensus that there is no single explanation of dividends. [19] Brook et al.(1998) agree that, there is no reason to believe that corporate dividend policy is driven by a single goal.Attention of empirical research has been at ascertaining the relationship between investment opportunities, corporate financing and dividend payout ([54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991; [6] Aviation and Booth, 2003). However, these findings have failed toestablish any clear link concerning this issue. Most of these studies tend to focus on developed markets. Little is, however, known about how investment opportunities and corporate finance influence dividend payout policy of emerging markets. This present study contributes to the extant literature by focusing on emerging markets. Firms in emerging markets tend to exhibit different dividend behavior from those of developed markets like the US. This may be a result of the differences in levels of efficiency and institutional arrangements between developed markets and emerging markets. It is, therefore, useful to improve our understanding of the issue from an emerging market perspective.The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout. The contribution of this paper lies in the fact that it considers a large-scale dataset covering 34 emerging market countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the literature on dividend policy. It also reviews the existing literature on the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Section 3 discusses the data used in the study and also details the model specification used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 includes the discussion of the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.2. Overview of literatureSince the publication of the dividend irrelevance theory by [47] Miller and Modigliani (1961), a lot of studies have been conducted in the area of determinants of dividend payout the world over. The dividend irrelevance theory is possible in a perfect and efficient market where stockholders are perfectly rational and there are no taxes and transaction costs. The theory, however, pointed out the importance of investment as being the main issue. Miller and Modigliani framework has thus formed the foundation of subsequent work on dividends and payout policy in general. Their framework is rich enough to encompass both dividends and repurchase, as the only determinant of a firm's value is its investment policy ([3] Allen and Michael, 2002). It is arguably said a company's overriding goal is to maximize shareholder wealth ([18]Berkley and Myers, 1996; [16] Block and Hart, 2000), but to [16] Block and Hart (2000) this concept is not a simple task as management cannot directly influence the price of a share but can only act in a manner consistent with the desires of investors. In the view of [61] Woods and Randall (1989), shareholder wealth is generally accepted as the aggregate market value of the common shares, which in turn is assumed to be the present value of the cash flows which will accrue to shareholders, discounted at their required rate of return on equity. These cash flows include dividend and perhaps more importantly capital appreciation except for its high volatility. Firms must, therefore, make important decisions over and over again about how much cash the firm should give back to its shareholders and probably what form it should take.Black (1976) observed that the harder we look at the dividends picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just do not fit together. This attests to the much controversy that surrounds dividend policy. The dividend puzzle revolves around figuring out why companies pay dividends and investors pay attention to dividend. To [18] Berkley and Myers (1996), dividend policy is seen as a trade-off between retaining earnings on one hand and paying out cash and issuing new shares on the other. The theoretical principles underlying the dividend policy of firms range from information asymmetries, tax-adjusted theory to behavioral factors. The information asymmetries encompass several aspects, including the agency cost, free cash flow hypothesis, and signaling models.Tax-adjusted models presume that investors require and secure higher expected returns on shares of dividend-paying stocks. The consequence of tax adjusted theory is the division of investors into dividend tax clientele and the clientele effect is responsible for the alterations in portfolio composition ([49] Modigliani, 1982). To [45] Marsalis and Truman (1988), investors with differing tax liabilities will not be uniform in their ideal firm dividend policy. They conclude that as tax liability increases, the dividend payment decreases while earnings reinvestment increases and vice versa.Shareholders typically face the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in the face of separation of ownership and control. The problem of information asymmetry is evident in conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. It holds that insiders such as managers have more information about the firm's cash flow than the providers of the funds. Agency costs are lower in firms with high managerial ownership stakes because of better alignment of shareholder and managerial control ([39] Jensen and Heckling, 1976) and also in firms with large block shareholders that are better able to monitor managerial activities ([57] Heifer and Vishnu, 1986). [27] Fame and Jensen (1983) argue that agency problems can be resolved by the payment of large dividend to shareholders.According to the free cash flow model, [37] Jensen (1986) explains that finance available after financing all positive net present value projects can result in conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Clearly, dividends and debt interest payment decrease the free cash flow available to managers to invest in marginal net present value projects and manager perquisite consumption. Firms with higher levels of cash flow should have higher dividend payout and/or higher leverage.The signaling theory suggests that corporate dividend policy used as a means of putting quality message across has a lower cost than other alternatives ([48] Miller and Rock, 1985; [8] Asquith and Mullins, 1986). This was developed initially for the labor market but its usefulness has been felt in the financial markets. [7] Aero (1970) defines signaling effect as a unique and specific signaling equilibrium in which a job seeker signals his/her quality to a prospective employer. The signaling theory suggests that dividends are used to signal managements' private information regarding the future earnings of the firm. Investors often see announcements of dividend initiations and omissions as managers' forecast of future earnings changes ([34] Healy and Pileup, 1988). Dividends are used in signaling the future prospects, and dividends are paid even if there is profitable investment opportunity ([11] Baker et al., 1985; [54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991).2.1 Investment opportunities and dividend payoutThe investment opportunities available to the firm constitute an important component of market value. The investment opportunity set of a firm affects the way the firm is viewed by managers, owners, investors, and creditors ([43] Caliper and Tremble, 2001). The literature has given considerable attention in recent years to examining the association between investment opportunity set and corporate policy choices, including financing, dividend, and compensation policies ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992;[29] Giver and Giver, 1993; [41] Caliper and Tremble, 1999; [40] Jones and Sharma, 2001; [1] Abbott, 2001). According to [40] Jones (2001), investment opportunity set represents a firm's investment or growth options but to [51] Myers (1977) its value depends on the discretional expenditures of managers. [51] Myers (1977) further explains investment opportunity as a yet-to-be realized potentially profitable project that a firm can exploit for economic rents. Thus, this represents the component of the firm's value resulting from options to make future investments ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992).Growth opportunities are also represented by the relative fraction of firm value that is accounted for by assets in place (plant, equipment, and other tangible assets), and that the lower the fraction of firm value represented by assets in place, the higher the growth opportunities ([32] Gull and Kelley, 1999). [43] Caliper and Tremble (2001) suggest that, the conventional notion of investment opportunity set is of new capital expenditure made to introduce a new product or expand production of an existing product. This may include an option to make expenditure to reduce costs during a corporate restructuring. An investment opportunity has been measured in various ways by various writers. These include market to book value of equity ([21] Collins and Kithara, 1989; [20] Chung and Charoenwong, 1991), book to market value of assets ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992), and Tobin's q ([58] Skinner, 1993).Existing literature suggests a relationship between investment opportunities and dividend policy. [59] Smith and Watts (1992) argue that firms with high investment opportunity set are likely to pursue a low dividend payout policy, since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources ([29] Giverand Giver, 1993). [40] Jones (2001), extending and modifying the work of [29] Giver and Gaver (1993), found out that high growth firms were associated with significantly lower dividend yields. [32] Gul and Kealey (1999) also found a negative relationship between growth options and dividends. [1] Abbott (2001) argues that firms that experienced an investment opportunity set expansion (decrease) generally reduced (increase) their dividend payout policy. Others support the fact that firms with higher market-to-book value tend to have good investment opportunities, and would retain more funds to finance such investment, thus recording lower dividend payout ratios ([56] Rozeff, 1982; [44] Lloyd et al. , 1985; [22] Collins et al. , 1996; [4] Amidu and Abor, 2006). [55] Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2001) also validated the fact that firms in high investment opportunity set group are "PE valued" whilst firms in low investment opportunity set are "dividend yield valued". This implies that for firms in low investment opportunity set, dividends are of greater relevance than earnings whilst the opposite is true for firms in high investment opportunity set. Using market-to-book ratio as proxy for investment opportunity set, [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), however, found a positive relationship between market-to-book value ratio and dividend payments, suggesting that firms with higher investment opportunities rather pay higher dividends.2.2 Corporate finance and dividend payoutThe financing choice of firms is perhaps the most researched area in finance in the past decades following the seminal article of [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) raising the issue of the relationship between a firms choice of finance and its value. Recently, there are still increasing research and new evidence being sought for the relevance or otherwise of the theory started by Modigliani and Miller. The theorem hinges on the principle of perfect capital markets. This asserts that firm value is completely independent of how its productive assets are financed. Subsequent researches have suggested a relationship between choice of financing and firm value even though some researchers corroborated the findings of Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance theory ([26] Fama, 1974; [54] Pruitt and Gitman, 1991). However, studiesby [5] Anderson (1983), [53] Peterson and Benesh (1983) have proved that in the "real world" market imperfections effectively prohibit the independence of firm's investment and financing decisions. This market imperfection is primarily coming from the fact that there are taxes, transaction cost, information asymmetry, and bankruptcy cost. This indicates a relationship between the choice of financing and firm value.Financial leverage is said to play an important role in reducing agency costs arising from shareholder-manager conflict and is believed to play a vital role of monitoring managers ([39] Jensen and Meckling, 1976; [37] Jensen, 1986; [60] Stulz, 1988). [28] Farinha (2003) contends that debt is likely to influence dividend decisions because of debt covenants and related restrictions that may be imposed by debtholders. Also, firms with high financial leverage and implied financial risk tend to avoid paying high dividends, so they can accommodate risk associated with the use of debt finance. [56] Rozeff (1982), [25] Easterbrook (1984) and [22] Collins et al. (1996) extending the agency theory observe that firms pay dividend and raise capital simultaneously. In the view of [25] Easterbrook (1984), increasing dividends raises the probability that additional capital will have to be raised externally on a periodic basis. This view is also shared by [31] Green et al. (1993) who argue that dividend payout levels are not totally decided after a firm's financing has been made. [35] Higgins (1972) suggests that firms' dividend payout ratio could be negatively influenced by their need for finance. Thus, dividend decision is taken alongside financing decisions. [36] Higgins (1981) shows a direct link between growth and financing needs, in that rapidly growing firms have external financing need because working capital needs normally exceed the incremental cash flows from new sales. [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003) support the fact that financial constraints can affect dividend decisions, therefore, firms with relatively less debt have greater financial slack and are more likely to pay and maintain their dividends.3. Data and econometric method3.1 Data and variable constructionThis study examines the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on the dividend payout policy of emerging market firms. Our dataset is composed of accounting and market data for a large sample of publicly traded firms in 34 emerging market countries over the period 1990-2006. These countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. This information is obtained through the Corporate Vulnerability Utility of the International Monetary Fund. The corporate vulnerability utility provides indicators for surveillance of the corporate sector and it relies on accounting data from Worldscope and market data mainly from Datastream.The dependent variable, dividend payout is defined as the ratio of dividend to capital. Dividend is total cash dividend paid to equity and preferred shareholders. The independent variables include investment opportunity set and corporate finance. We also control for profitability, risk, market capitalization, and two other macroeconomic variables: inflation rate and log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a measure of the country's income level.In terms of the independent variables, Tobin's q is used as a proxy for investment opportunity set. Three measures of corporate finance are used. These are; financial leverage (the ratio of debt to equity), external finance (the ratio of external finance to total finance), and debt maturity (the ratio of short-term debt to total debt).In terms of the control variables, profitability is measured as return on assets. Profitability is considered as the primary indicator of the firm's capacity to declare and pay dividends. [11] Baker et al. (1985) find that a major determinant of dividend payment is the anticipated level of future earnings. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) also report that current and past years' profits are important in influencing dividend payments. Others such as [38] Jensen et al. (1992), [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), and [4] Amidu and Abor (2006) find evidence of a positive association betweenprofitability and dividend payouts. [10] Baker (1989) finds that an important reason cited by firms for not paying dividends is "poor earnings". Similarly, [23] DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) find that a significant proportion of firms with losses over a five year period, tend to omit their dividends entirely. A positive relationship should exist between profitability and dividend payout.Risk is defined using the O-Score, which is a measure of probability of default. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) find that risk is a major determinant of firms' dividend policy. Firms which have higher risk profiles are more likely to maintain lower dividend payout policy compared with those with lower risk profiles. Using ßvalue of a firm as a measure of its market risk, [56] Rozeff (1982), [44] Lloyd et al. (1985), and [22] Collins et al. (1996) found a significantly negative relationship between ßand dividend payout. Their findings suggest that firms having a higher level of market risk will pursue lower dividend payout policy. [24] D'Souza (1999) also suggests that risk is significantly and negatively related with firms' dividend payout. We expect risk to be negatively related to dividend payout.We control for size of the market. This is defined as ratio of market capitalization to GDP. Size of the market is used as a proxy for capital market access. Firms with better access to the capital market should be able to pay higher dividends ([6] Aivazian and Booth, 2003). It is expected that a positive relationship will exist between market capitalization and dividend payout policy.We also control for two macroeconomic variables: inflation and GDP per capita. Inflation is the inflation rate. GDP per capita is log of GDP per capita and is included as a measure of the country's income level.3.2 Model specificationWe estimate the following panel data regression model: Equation 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where subscript i and t represent the country and time, respectively. Y is a measure of dividend payout. Invt is a measure of investment opportunity set. Fin are measures of corporate finance variables including, financialleverage, external finance, and debt maturity. X are the control variables and include profitability, risk, stock market capitalization, inflation, and GDP per capita. μ is the error term. Using this model, it is possible to investigate the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout policy.3.3 Estimation issuesThis study adopts a panel data method given that it allows for broader set of data points. Therefore, degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced and the efficiency of economic estimates is improved. Also, panel data can control for individual heterogeneity due to hidden factors, which, if neglected in time-series or cross section estimations leads to biased results ([9] Baltagi, 2005). The panel regression equation differs from a regular time-series or cross-section regression by the double subscript attached to each variable. The general form of the model can be written as: Equation 2 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where α is a scalar, ßis KX 1 and X it is the it th observation on K explanatory variables. We assume that the μit follow a one-way error component model: Equation 3 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where μi is time-invariant and accounts for any unobservable individual-specific effect that is not included in the regression model. The term V it represents the remaining disturbance, and varies with the individual countries and time. It can be thought of as the usual disturbance in the regression. The choice of the model estimation whether random effects or fixed effects will depend on the underlying assumptions. In a random effect model, μi and V it are random with known disturbances. In the fixed effects model, the μi are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated and the remainder disturbances stochastic with V it independent and identically distributed, i.e. νit∼iid (0,σν2 ). The explanatory variables X it are assumed independent of the V it for all i and t . We use the [62] Hausman (1978) specification test in choosing the appropriate model. We report the results of the Hausman specification test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.].4. Empirical results4.1 Descriptive statisticsTable I [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. The sample covers 34 emerging countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. It reports the mean and standard deviation of all the variables used in the study as well as the number of observations over the sample period. The mean value for the dependent variable (dividend payout) is 0.32, implying that across the sample countries the average dividend payout is 32 percent. There is, however, a variation in the dependent variable across the countries over the time period as shown by standard deviation of 0.49 with a minimum and maximum dividend payout of 0.00 and 3.93, respectively.The mean investment opportunity set measured by the Tobin's q is 1.05 with a variation of 0.52. All the countries have positive investment opportunities with minimum and maximum values of 0.06 and 5.01, respectively. Financial leverage, measured by the debt to equity ratio has a mean value of 1.17 and has a standard deviation of 127.58. External finance registers an average value of -0.01 over the period with a standard deviation of 5.27. Debt maturity has a mean figure of 0.58, indicating that short-term debt accounts for 58 percent of total debt. Profitability defined in terms of return on assets also registers an average value of 6.66 percent. The standard deviation is also shown as 5.37. Risk shows a mean value of -3.37. Stock market capitalization to GDP has a mean value of 49.74 percent. The minimum and maximum values for this variable are 0.00 and 528.49, respectively, with a variation of 66.52. The average inflation rate and GDP per capita are 2.61 and 8.04 percent, respectively (Figure 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]).4.2 Correlation analysisWe test for possible degree of multi-collinearity among the regressors by including a correlation matrix of the variables in Table II [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. Dividend payout shows significantly positive correlations with debt maturity, profitability, and GDP per capita. Investment opportunity set exhibits significantly negative correlations with financial leverage, inflation, and GDP per capita, but shows significantly positive correlations with external finance, debt maturity, profitability,and market capitalization. There is a significant but negative correlation between financial leverage and profitability and a positive correlation between financial leverage and risk. External finance shows significant and positive correlations with profitability and inflation but a negative correlation with GDP per capita. Debt maturity is significantly and negatively correlated with GDP per capita. There are significant and negative correlations between profitability and risk, market capitalization, as well as GDP per capita. However, we found positive correlation between profitability and inflation. There are statistically and significant positive correlations between risk and market capitalization, and GDP per capita. Market capitalization is also positively correlated with GDP per capita. Overall, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicates that multi-collinearity is not a potential problem in the regression models.4.3 Panel regression resultsBoth fixed and random effects specifications of the model were estimated. After which the [62] Hausman (1978) test was conducted to determine the appropriate specification. We report the results of the Hausman test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. The test statistics are all significant at 1 percent, implying that the fixed effects model is preferred over the random effects. The Hausman specification test suggests we reject the null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients are not systematic.The results indicate a statistically significant but negative relationship between investment opportunities and dividend payout ratio. It could be inferred that firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to exhibit low dividend payout ratio. In other words, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to pursue a low dividend payout ratio since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources. Paying low dividends means that such firms could retain enough funds to finance their future growth and investments.[29] Gaver and Gaver (1993) note that firms with high growth potential or investment opportunity set are expected to pay low dividends, since investment and dividends are。