什么叫透明性
透明性是指在系统或技术中的某个方面被隐藏或屏蔽，使用户或其他系统的组件无需关心底层的实现细节。
透明性的目标是简化使用和理解系统的过程，用户或其他系统组件可以在不需要了解内部细节的情况下进行操作。
有几种常见的透明性类型：
1. 透明性的种类：
•透明性（Transparent）：用户或组件无需感知底层操作，可以直接使用系统或服务。
•访问透明性（Access Transparency）：用户无需知道数据或资源的物理位置，可以透明地访问它们。
•位置透明性（Location Transparency）：用户或程序无需关心资源的物理位置，可以透明地使用它们，无论资源在网络的何处。
•复制透明性（Replication Transparency）：多个副本的存在对用户或应用程序是透明的，用户无需关心使用的是哪个副本。
2. 示例：
•在分布式计算系统中，透明性可以使用户无需关心分布式系统的底层实现，从而将多台计算机组成的集群视为单一的计算资源。
•在数据库系统中，透明性可以使用户无需了解数据存储的具体细节，例如数据的分布和备份。
透明性有助于简化系统的使用和维护，提高系统的可扩展性和可维护性。
通过隐藏底层的复杂性，透明性使系统更易于理解和操作。
TRANSPARENCY MASTERSThe materials on the following pages can be easily copied and converted to transparencies for overhead projectors. Instructors using College Writing Skills with Readings as a class text are permitted to copy and so use any of these materials.142Diagram of an EssayTitle of the EssayIntroductionBodyConclusion143Prewriting Techniques✐ FreewritingWrite without stopping.Don’t worry about “mistakes.”Just get words on paper or on screenQuestioningAsk Why? When? Who? How?L ist MakingList as many items about your topic as you can think of.ClusteringPut your topic in a circle in the middle of a page.Add ideas in boxes or circles arrowing out from your topic’s circle.144145The Four Bases of Effective Writingsupport of the thesis?⏹ Any rough spots where sentences do not flow smoothly and clearly? ⏹ Any mistakes in grammar,punctuation, or usage?Writing a Thesis StatementWrite a thesis that is neither too broad nor too narrow for each group of three supporting points.1. Thesis: ____________________________________________a. My first car was a rebellious-looking one which matched theway I felt and acted as a teenager.b. My next car reflected my more mature and practical adultself.c. My latest car seem s to tell me that I’m aging; it shows mygrowing concern with comfort and safety.2. Thesis: ____________________________________________a. Going to a college can save up to $20,000 in tuition.b. If the college is nearby, there are no costs for room andboard.c. Some course credits that are accumulated can betransferred to a university.3. Thesis: ____________________________________________a. First, I tried simply avoiding the snacks aisle of thesupermarket.b. Then I started limiting myself to only five units of any givensnack.c. Finally, in desperation, I began keeping the cellophanebags of snacks in a cupboard.4. Thesis: ____________________________________________a. First of all, I was a typical “type A” personality: anxious,impatient, and hard-driving.b. I also had a family history of relatives with heart trouble.c. My unhealthy lifestyle, though, was probably the majorfactor.146Completing Thesis StatementsComplete the following thesis statements by adding a third supporting point that will match the two already provided.1. Because I never took college preparatory courses in highschool, I entered college deficient in mathematics, study skills,and _______________________________________.2. A good salesperson needs to like people, to be aggressive, and__________.3. Rather than blame myself for failing the course, I blamed theinstructor, my adviser, and even __________.4. Anyone who buys an old house planning to fix it up should beprepared to put in a lot of time, hard work, and __________.5. Our old car eats gas, makes funny noises, and __________.6. My mother, my boss, and my __________ are three peoplewho are very important in my life right now.7. Getting married too young was a mistake because we hadn’tfinished our education, we weren’t ready for children, and__________.8. Some restaurant patrons seem to leave their honesty, theircleanliness, and their __________ at home.9. During my first semester at college, I had to learn how tomanage my time, how to manage my diet, and __________.10. Three experiences I wish I could forget are the time I fell off aladder, the time I tried to fix my parents’ lawn mower, and__________.147Introductions and Conclusions⏹Common Methods of Introduction1. Begin with a broad, general statement of your topic and narrow itdown to your thesis statement.2. Start with an idea or situation that is the opposite of the one youwill develop.3. Explain the importance of your topic to the reader.4. Use an incident or brief story.5. Ask one or more questions.6. Use a quotation.7. Give background information.⏹Common Methods of Conclusion1. End with a summary and final thought.2. Include a thought-provoking question or short series of questions.3. End with a prediction or recommendation.148Providing TransitionsIn the spaces provided, add appropriate transitions to tie together the sentences and ideas in the following essay. Draw from the words given in the box below.Hooked on BuyingEvery day, Canadians head out in droves for our country’s department stores, discount centres, and shopping malls. We all have to buy something we think we really need or we feel is an incredible bargain. In reality, though, we are just ready for another fix of our favourite drug: shopping. There are several reasons why we seem to have turned into a nation of consumer junkies.__________, Canadians believe in competition, even when it comes to acquiring possessions. We feel like losers if we don’t own the cars, appliances, clothes, and furniture our neighbours and friends own. __________, the Browns’ four-year-old car will seem fine until the Smiths next door buy a brand-new model. Then the competitive instinct to stay ahead in the game sends the Browns out scouting the new car lots. __________, the competitive urge tells us that people’s success in life is measured by how much they own. So we admire those with the most material possessions, the ones who own three cars or enough shoes to fill a walk-in closet.A __________ reason for our addiction to consumer goods is the North American b elief that “new is better.” It is possible to fix a broken toaster, mend torn clothing, or make do with an outdated refrigerator. __________ we prefer to throw out the old and buy the new. __________, we have junkyards and dumps bursting with the still-usable items we no longer want. Instead of reusing or recycling, which would make more economic sense, we throw away.__________, our buying habit is maintained and encouraged by advertisers. We are bombarded by television and print ads that carry seductive messages.__________ of these messages is that buying a particular product—a stereo, a motorcycle, or a dishwasher, __________—is all that is needed to make the purchaser happy. __________ message is that buying a certain product will make the user a better, more attractive person. Every shampoo, makeup, or cologne tries to convince us that a single item can transform us into the ideal self we fantasize about.In this country, shopping satisfies our psychological needs. We are truly hooked on the thrill that comes from passing cash or plastic over a store counter and receiving some new possession in return.149Outlining PracticeUnder each of the three thesis statements that follow is a scrambled list of primary and secondary supporting ideas. Put the ideas into logical order by filling in the outline to the right of each list.1. Thesis:In today’s world, people try to avoid silence as much as possible.On vacation ____________________ TV on as background noise _________________ At school _________________ School radio station playing in cafeteria ____________________ Stereos and radios on nonstop _________________ Noisy “toys” such as snowmobiles and dirt bikes _________________ At home ____________________ Noisy places such as crowded beaches and _________________ amusement parks _________________ TV soap operas on in waiting rooms2. Thesis: A marriage improves when both partners work.Helps relationship ____________________ Able to afford some luxuries _________________ Gives feeling of achievement _________________ Helps each individual ____________________ Learn to appreciate time together _________________ Helps financially _________________ Eases paying monthly bills ____________________ Gives feeling of independence _________________ Able to talk together about outside activities _________________ 3. Thesis: A few tips can help you to be a smarter car buyer.Agreeing on a price ____________________ Consult Consumer Reports _________________ Signing the final papers _________________ Shopping around ____________________ Ask for a discount if you’re paying cash _________________ Visit several dealers _________________ Make sure the loan interest rate you want is ____________________ specified on paper _________________ Watch out for added contract clauses, such as _________________ insurance and special warrantiesStart with a lower price than you’re willing to pay150Editing PracticeSee if you can locate and correct the ten sentence-skills mistakes in the following passage. The mistakes are listed in the box below.Another field that seems to attract eccentric teachers is English. One of my high school English teachers Mr. Karlinsky used to carry a long wooden pointer around the room. When he spotted a student who was not paying attention. He would sneak up from behind and rap the pointer as hard as possible on the student’s desk. The unexpected and earsplitting crack would cause the victims body to rise at least six inches from the desk chair. College has its share of strange English teachers as well, for example, one of my professors liked to draw on the board. Dr. Sandlin would stroll around the room, chalk in hand, waiting for the chance to draw something. Then she would spend thirty minutes of a fifty-minute class drawing Shakespeare’s Globe Theatre or a seventeenth-century sword. The oddest English teacher I have had was Mr. Shaw, who taught a drama course. Mr. Shaw loved the sound of his own voice, when we read a play, he would take all the parts. Standing behind the lectern Mr. Shaw would run through an entire play by himself. While the students either fell asleep, doing homework for other classes, or read magazines. Mr. Shaw was so happy to be acting he did not seem to mind. At the end of class, as we picked up our books and head out the door, Mr. Shaw could still be heard booming out the end of a scene from Hamlet or The Glass Menagerie.151Essay Evaluation FormEvaluate the essay in question by answering the questions that follow. Base 1: Unity⏹Is there a clearly stated thesis in the introductory paragraph?⏹Do all the supporting paragraphs back up the thesis?Your comments:Base 2: Support⏹Is there specific evidence?⏹Is there plenty of it?Your comments:Base 3: Coherence⏹Is there a clear method of organization? (List of items or a time order?)⏹Are transitions used to connect sentences and ideas?Your comments:Base 4: Sentence Skills⏹Are there any rough spots where the sentences do not flow smoothlyand clearly?⏹Are there any mistakes in grammar, punctuation, or usage?Your comments:152。
中文3309字Transparency and Corporate Governance MaterialSource:/units/am/pdf/HWTransparencyJan2007.pdf Author: Benjamin Hamelin1 AbstractAn objective of many proposed corporate governance reforms is increased transparency. This goal has been relatively uncontroversial, as most observers believe increased transparency to be unambiguously good. We argue that, from a corporate governance perspective, there are likely to be both costs and benefits to increased transparency, leading to an optimum level beyond which increasing transparency lowers profits. This result holds even when there is no direct cost of increasing transparency and no issue of revealing information to regulators or product-market rivals. We show that reforms that seek to increase transparency can reduce firm profits, raise executive compensation, and inefficiently increase the rate of CEO turnover. We further consider the possibility that executives will take actions to distort information. We show that executives could have incentives, due to career concerns, to increase transparency and that increases in penalties for distorting information can be profit reducing.2 IntroductionsIn response to recent corporate governance scandals, governments have responded by adopted a number of regulatory changes. One component of these changes has been increased disclosure requirements.For example, Sarbanes-Oxley(sox),adopted in response to Enron,WorldCom, and other public governance failures,required detailed reporting of off-balance sheet financing and special purpose entities.Additionally, sox increased the penalties to executives for misreporting. The link between governance and transparency is clear in the public‟s (and regulators‟) perceptions; transparency was increased for the purpose of improving governance.Yet, most academic discussions about transparency have nothing to do with corporate governance. The most commonly discussed benefit of transparency is that it reduces asymmetr ic information, and hence lowers the cost of trading the firm‟s securities and the firm‟s cost of capital. To offset this benefit, commentators typically focus on the direct costs of disclosure, as well as the competitive costs arising because the disclosure provides potentially useful information toproduct-market rivals. While both of these factors are undoubtedly important considerations in firms …disclosure decisions, they are not particularly related to corporate governance.In this paper, we provide a framework for understanding the role of transparency in corporate governance. We analyze the effect that disclosure has on the contractual and monitoring relationship between the board and the CEO. We view the quality of information the firm discloses as a choice variable that affects the contracts the firm and its managers. Through its impact on corporate governance, higher quality disclosure both provides benefits and imposes costs. The benefits reflect the fact that more accurate information about performance allows boards to make better personnel decisions about their executives. The costs arise because executives have to be compensated for the increased risk to their careers implicit in higher disclosure levels, as well as for the incremental costs they incur trying to distort information in equilibrium. These costs and benefits complement existing explanations for disclosure. Moreover, because they are directly about corporate governance, they are in line with common perceptions of why firms disclose information.We formalize this idea through an extension of Hamelin and Wasatch (1998) and Hamelin‟s(2005) adaptation of Hailstorm‟s(1999) career-concerns model to consider the question of optimal transparency. Section 2 lays out the basics of this model, in which the company chooses the “quality” of the performance measure that directors use to assess the CEO‟s ability. In this model, the optimal quality of information for the firm to reveal can be zero, infinite, or a finite positive value depending on the parameters. When we calibrate the model to reflect actual publicly traded large us corporations, we find that the parameters implied by the calibration lead to a finite value for optimal disclosure quality. Thus, our analysis suggests that disclosure requirements going beyond this optimal level are likely to have unintended consequences and to reduce value.We evaluate the implications of penalties and incentives that potentially affect the motives of CEOs to distort the information coming from their firms. Measures that punish exaggerating effort can be effective if they are sufficiently severe to curtail this effort; however, relatively minor penalties can be counterproductive. In addition, incentives for CEOs to improve the accuracy of information can harm shareholders because such incentives push a CEO to disclose more than the value-maximizing quantity of information.3 Concealing InformationIn light of some recent corporate scandals, one concern is not that executives distort information, but rather that they conceal it. In this subsection, we briefly address what our analysis can say with respect to concealing information.One question is whether the other players know if the CEO has concealed information? If so, then presumably they can punish the CEO for non-disclosure Moreover, if it is common knowledge that the CEO knows the value of signals that he conceals, then an unraveling argument (Grossman, 1981)applies: Whatever the inferred expected value of unrevealed signals is, the CEO will have an incentive to reveal those above that expected value. Hence, the only equilibrium is one in which unrevealed signals are inferred to have the lowest possible value and the CEO is correspondingly induced to reveal all signals. We predict therefore that concealment is unlikely to be an issue if the other players know what the set of signals is.Suppose, in contrast, that the other players did not know what the complete set of signals was(e.g., the set varies over time).If the CEO did not know the realized value when he deciding to reveal or conceal a signal, then he would wish to conceal all signals that he could: more signals means a more precise posterior estimate of his ability, which means greater career risk for him. Our model, thus, predicts that when (i) the CEO has discretion over what signals are revealed and (ii) must commit to reveal or conceal prior to learning the value of the signals, he will choose to commit to conceal all signals over which he has discretion.If, instead, the CEO is not committed to a disclosure decision prior to learning the value of the signals, then he will be tempted to reveal those that are favorable to him. The other players will infer that they are getting a biased sample and, thus, make a downward adjustment. In this sense, the situation is similar to that of “exaggerating effort. “The details of the analysis are, to be sure, different and await future analysis, but our general conclusions will generally hold.4 Discussions and ConclusionMost corporate governance reforms involve increased transparency.Yet, discussions of disclosure generally focus on issues other than governance, such as the cost of capital and product-market competition. The logic of how transparency potentially affects governance is absent from the academic literature.We provide such analysis in this paper. We show that the level of transparency can be understood as deriving from the governance relation between the CEO and the board of directors. The directors set the level of transparency (e.g., amount andquality of disclosure) and it is, thus, part of an endogenously chosen governance arrangement.Increasing transparency provides benefits to the firm, but entails costs as well. Better transparency improves the board‟s monitoring of the CEO by providing i t with an improved signal about his quality. But better transparency is not free: The better able the market is to learn about the CEO‟s ability, the greater the risk to which the CEO is exposed. In our setting, the profit-maximizing level of transparency requires balancing these two factors.Our model implies that there can be an optimal level of transparency. Consequently,attempts to mandate levels beyond this optimum decrease profits. Profits decrease both because managers will have to be paid higher salaries to compensate them for the increased career risk they face, and because greater transparency increases managerial incentives to engage in costly and counterproductive efforts to distort information. We emphasize that these effects occur in a model in which all other things equal, better information disclosure increases firm value.One key assumption we make throughout the paper is that the board relies on the same information that is released to the public in making its monitoring decisions. Undoubtedly, this assumption is literally false in most firms, as the board has access to better information than the public. Nonetheless, CEOs do have incentives to manipulate information transfers to improve the board‟s perception of them, and this idea has been an important factor in a number of recent studies(see, e.g., Adams and Ferreira, in press).In addition, in a number of publicized cases, boards have been kept in the dark except through their ability to access publicly disclosed documents; the circumstances in which boards must rely on publicly available information are likely the cases in which the board-CEO relationship is most adversarial, and hence are the cases in which board monitoring is likely most important. Certainly, our basic assumption that the quality of public disclosure has a large impact on the board‟s ability to monitor management is plausible.Our model is set in the context of a board that is perfectly aligned with shareholders‟interests. One could equally well apply it to direct monitoring by shareholders. If there were an increase in the quality of available information either due to more stringent reporting requirements or because of better analysis (e.g., of the sort performed by institutional investors or a more attentive press),then our model contains clear empirical predictions. In particular, it suggests thatconsequences of improved information would be increases in CEO salaries and the rate of CEO turnover. In fact, both CEO salaries and CEO turnover have increased substantially starting in the 1990s, with at least some scholars‟attributing the increase to the higher level of press scrutiny and investor activism (see Kaplan and Minton, 2006).This pattern of CEO salaries and turnover is consistent with our model; moreover, it is consistent with the idea that better information has both costs and benefits through itsimpact on corporate governance.Some issues remain. As discussed above, we have only scratched the surface with respect to issues of managerial concealment of information. We have abstracted away from any of the concerns about revealing information to rivals or regulators that earlier work has raised. We have also ignored other competing demands for better information, such as to help better resolve the principal-agent problem through incentive contracts (see e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1983, Singh, 2004).Finally, we have ignored the mechanics of how the firm actually makes information more or less informative (e.g., what accounting rules are used, what organizational structures, such as reporting lines and office organization, are employed, etc.).While future attention to such details will, we believe, shed additional light on the subject, we remain confident that our general results will continue to hold.译文透明度与公司治理资料来源:哈佛商学院教育网作者：本杰明•埃尔马兰，迈克尔•魏斯巴赫1 摘要许多提出的关于公司治理改革的目标是提高透明度。
顾建光：《公共管理英语》(修订版)--词汇汇总Lesson 1citizen 公民 municipal government 市政府 administrative affairs 行政事务transparency 透明度 accomplishment 成就，成绩 financial budget 财政预算implementation 实施，实行 obligation 义务，责任 lag behind 落后于bulletin 公告，公报 natural disaster 自然灾害 to grant 授予，认可license 许可证 booth 货摊，小摊 civil affairs 国内事务domicile registration 居民登记 matrimonial registration 婚姻注册e-government 电子政府 to facilitate 使更容易 regulation 规章制度，条例healthcare 医疗卫生 Handling Affairs Online 在线事务办理to retain 保留，保存Lesson 2bureaucracy 官僚机构，官僚作风 bureaucratic constrain 官僚式约束to inhibit 抑制，约束 citizenry 平民，公民 to espouse 信奉cynic 愤世嫉俗者 to render 表现，使成为 quasi-market 准市场to streamline 使简化，使有效率，使现代化 slacken off 放慢，放缓in conjunction with 与。
结合起来 status quo 现状reward and appraisal system 奖励与褒扬制度 to reshuffle 改组commitment 承诺Lesson 3public administration 公共管理，公共行政 decentralization 分权化liberalization 自由化 thrust 冲击 centralization 权力集中化diagnosis 诊断，判断 impetus 推动力，刺激 permanent tension 长期的压力 revenue 财政收入 revival 复兴，恢复 consolidation 联合，统一autonomy 自治，自治权 infrastructure 基础设施 jurisdiction 司法权，裁判权innovation 创新，革新 responsiveness 回应 interdependence 互相依赖remit 汇出 at odds 争议，争吵 local authority 地方政府central authority 中央政府 ceiling 上限，天花板 performance 绩效，成就emergence 出现 statute 条例，法令Lesson 4private sector 私营部门，民营部门 to generate 产生，造成judicial services 法律服务 know-how 技术秘诀 regulation 管制oversight 疏忽，失察 entrepreneur 企业家gross national income（GNI）国民总收入Euromoney 欧洲货币 creditworthiness 信贷价值 public sector 公共部门 vibrant 充满活力的，活跃的 to levy 征税 progressivity 进步incentive 动机monopoly 垄断 budget 预算 accessibility 可达性，可获得性affordability 可承担，可负担性 stark 完全的，巨大的Lesson 5community 社区 interpersonal 人与人之间的 predisposition 倾向to embody 使具体化，具体表现 indelible 不可或缺的，永恒的to exile 放逐，流散 to transcend 超越 static 静止的，静态的heritage 遗产，继承物Lesson 6performance management 绩效管理 to forge 打造，锤炼 diagnostic 诊断的 integrative 综合的，一体化的 holistic 总体的，全部的mission 使命unitarist 一元论的 a logical progression 一种逻辑级数performance appraisal 绩效评估 diagnosis 诊断Lesson 7indicator 指标 in aggregate 总起来看，总起来说system of national accounts 国民账户体系 statistics 统计，统计数据currency 流通货币 gross national income（GNI）国民总收入unincorporated business 综合经营的商业 multiple exchange rate 多重汇率Lesson 8disparity 不同，差距 coastal 沿海的 interior 内陆的financial sector 经济部门 surge 波动，汹涌 drought 干旱housing mortgage loan 住宅抵押贷款 disposable income 税后收入，可支配收入to trigger 引发，引起 state-owned enterprises 国有企业fiscal revenue 财政收入 expenditure 支出，花费 allowance 津贴，补助 extra-budgetary funds 预算外资金 unauthorized spending 未授权的花费treasury bond 国库券 stock market 股票市场 A-share A股Indices（index的复数）指标，指示物 quota 配额 to rebound 反弹tandem 纵列的 consecutive fiscal stimulus 连续的财政鼓励 rebate rate 折扣率aggravate deflationary 加重通货紧缩 phytosanitary 植物检疫的，控制植物病害的Lesson 9well-off 小康的，富裕的 incomprehensive 范围有限的 to shake off 摆脱，甩掉to illustrate 例示，说明 multiplication scenario 乘法情境division scenario 除法情境 to conform to the tide of the times 符合时代潮流to endeavor to foster 努力培育 household contract system 家庭联产承包责任制initiative 进取性 to usher in 引进 wrestling 对抗，斗争resource shortage 资源短缺 positive factor 积极因素，有利因素hegemony 霸权unswervingly boost 坚定不移地推进Lesson 10recipient 接受者 foreign direct investment（FDI）外商直接投资momentum 动力，势头 be attributed to 归因于，由于。
