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法律经济学中的法律经济分析研究第一章简介法律经济学是法律与经济学的交叉学科，旨在研究法律制度对经济行为的影响以及经济因素对法律制度的影响。
其中，法律经济分析研究是法律经济学中的重要组成部分，其主要目的是分析法律规则对经济效果的影响，并从经济学的角度提出相应的改进意见。
本文将介绍法律经济分析研究的基本概念与原理，以及其在不同领域的应用和案例分析。
第二章基本概念与原理2.1 成本效益分析成本效益分析是一种经济学方法，将所有可能的决策选项进行比较，确定最优决策的方法。
其基本思路是将所有潜在的成本与收益相加，确定能够最大限度地减少成本并最大化收益的选项。
在法律经济分析研究中，成本效益分析常被用于评估和探讨不同法律条款的经济效益和成本。
例如，在确定理赔标准时，成本效益分析可以帮助评估不同标准对保险公司和被保险人的影响，从而选择最优的标准。
2.2 边际分析边际分析是一种经济学方法，用于评估每一单元输入增加所带来的收益变化。
在法律经济分析研究中，边际分析通常用于评估特定法律规则的影响，并确定如何调整规则以达到最优效益。
例如，在互联网监管领域，边际分析可以帮助界定何种内容应该受到监管，以及哪些类型的监管对于用户和运营商来说是最优的。
第三章应用案例3.1 知识产权保护知识产权保护是法律经济分析研究的一个重要领域。
例如，在评估不同的知识产权保护制度时，经济学家需要进行成本效益分析，以确定哪种制度最有利于促进创新和知识产权的保护。
此外，边际分析也可以用于确定如何平衡知识产权保护和公共利益之间的关系。
3.2 竞争政策竞争政策是指政府针对垄断或垄断趋势制定的一系列政策措施。
在法律经济分析研究中，竞争政策的制定和实施需要进行成本效益分析和边际分析，确定政策对经济利益的影响和政策的最优实施方式。
3.3 契约法契约法是指合同法和交易法，旨在规范经济交易，保护自由市场和商业交易的公平性。
在法律经济分析研究中，经济学方法可以用于评估和分析契约法条款的效果，以及确定如何改善契约法以促进更有效的经济交易。
我国法律经济分析的研究综述1. 引言1.1 研究背景2000字内容，请看下文：研究背景：随着我国不断深化改革开放和加快现代化建设步伐，法律经济分析逐渐成为学术界和政策制定者关注的焦点。
法律经济学是一门跨学科的学科，主要研究法律制度对经济行为和资源配置的影响，旨在通过经济学的方法分析法律问题，为法律的制定和运行提供理论支撑。
我国在改革开放以来，在不断探索中逐渐建立了法律体系，并不断完善立法、司法和执法机制。
由于我国市场经济体制的不断深化和复杂化，法律经济分析在我国的研究和实践中显得尤为重要。
在我国日益完善的法律体系下，法律经济分析的重要性不断凸显。
研究法律制度对经济行为的影响，有助于深入理解法律在经济发展中的作用和效果，为我国的法治建设和经济发展提供理论指导。
探讨我国法律经济分析的研究现状、方法和发展趋势，对于促进法律经济学在我国的普及和深入研究具有重要意义。
【2000字内容到此结束】。
1.2 研究意义我国法律经济分析的研究意义主要体现在以下几个方面：法律经济分析的研究可以帮助我们更好地理解法律制度对经济发展的影响。
通过对法律规则、法律制度和法律实施的经济效果进行深入分析，可以揭示法律对市场效率、资源配置和经济增长的作用，为完善我国法律体系和促进经济持续增长提供理论支持。
法律经济分析可以促进法律与经济领域的跨学科交叉研究。
法律经济学作为法学和经济学的交叉学科，有助于加强不同学科之间的合作与交流，促进相关理论的跨学科应用，为解决法律经济领域的实际问题提供更多思路和方法。
我国法律经济分析的研究意义在于深化对法律与经济之间关系的认识，促进法律制度的完善与经济发展的协调，推动法律与经济学科的跨学科融合，为我国法治建设和经济发展提供理论支持和政策建议。
2. 正文2.1 法律经济分析的理论基础法律经济学是研究法律与经济之间相互关系的学科。
其基本假设是人们在追求利益最大化的同时也遵守法律规则，因此法律的存在可以引导和规范人们的行为，从而促进经济效率。
法律经济学经济学原理在法律中的应用法律经济学是法律和经济学的交叉学科，它研究经济学原理在法律领域的应用。
通过运用经济学的工具和理论，法律经济学可以提供对法律政策和规则的评估和分析，以及对法律制度的改革和完善提出建议。
本文将探讨法律经济学在法律中的应用，以及它对社会和经济发展的影响。
一、效率与法律效率是法律经济学的重要原则之一。
根据效率原则，法律应该追求资源的优化配置，以实现社会福利最大化。
通过经济学的分析和计算，法律经济学家可以评估不同法律政策的效率，并提出相关的优化建议。
例如，在合同法领域，法律经济学可以通过研究契约理论和信息经济学的原理，提出完善的法律规则，以促进合同交易的效率和信任。
二、激励与法律经济学原理中的激励理论也在法律中发挥着重要作用。
法律经济学认为，个体的行为受到激励的影响，而激励机制是通过法律来实现的。
例如，通过建立合适的契约法规则，可以激励经济主体之间的合作和互信，促进经济的发展。
此外，通过制定适当的法律制度，可以激励个人遵守法律规则，减少违法行为的发生。
激励理论在刑法、环境法等领域的应用广泛，对维护社会秩序和保护环境具有重要作用。
三、风险与法律风险管理也是法律经济学的关注重点之一。
经济学原理中的风险理论可以帮助评估和管理法律规则下的风险。
在合同法中，法律经济学可以通过研究风险分配和不完全契约理论，提出一系列的风险管理机制，以保护交易双方的利益。
此外，在责任法和保险法领域，法律经济学可以利用经济学模型和分析方法，评估和优化法律制度中的风险分摊规则。
四、法律制度与市场效应法律制度对市场的影响也是法律经济学的研究重点。
法律经济学认为，法律制度对市场效率和经济发展具有重要影响。
例如，通过建立健全的知识产权制度，可以促进创新和技术进步，提高经济的竞争力。
此外，通过建立有效的市场监管机制，可以减少不正当竞争和垄断行为，保护消费者权益，维护市场秩序。
因此，法律经济学提供了评估和改革法律制度的方法和思路，以促进经济的发展和社会的稳定。
法学与经济学比较研究论文法学和经济学都是现代社会中重要的学科，在社会生活和政治经济发展中发挥着重要作用。
这两个学科既有相互独立的特点，又有相互渗透的共同点。
因此，对法学和经济学的比较研究具有重要的理论和实践意义。
一、法学和经济学的不同特点法学是研究法律制度和法律规范的学科，其研究对象是法律体系、法律原理、司法机关和法律适用等。
法学在社会中的作用是规范社会行为，维护社会秩序，保护人民权益。
法学强调的是法律的正义和公平性，即法律应该公正、合理、可信。
经济学是研究经济过程和经济现象的学科，其研究对象是生产、分配和消费等方面的经济关系。
经济学在社会中的作用是调节经济秩序，提高社会生产力，促进社会福利的增进。
经济学强调的是经济的效率和效益，即如何在资源有限的情况下实现最大程度的福利增进。
二、法学和经济学的相互渗透虽然法学和经济学有着不同的研究对象和目标，但在实际运作中，两者之间也有相互渗透的共同点。
首先，法律的制定和执行需要考虑经济因素。
例如，税法制定中需要考虑税收的公平性和经济效益之间的平衡。
因此，法学和经济学都需要关注市场经济、企业管理和财务管理等领域的知识。
其次，经济行为的调控和规范需要考虑法律因素。
例如，监管机构需要根据法律规定监管市场、制定法规，以保证市场的公正、透明，并保护消费者的权益。
因此，经济学和法学都需要关注市场经济自律以及法律制度对经济活动的调节和规范。
三、法学和经济学的比较研究法学和经济学的比较研究可以从不同维度进行，从而更深刻地理解和掌握两个学科的发展趋势、特点和作用。
从理论层面来看，法学和经济学都是社会科学的重要领域，其研究任务是揭示社会现实的本质和规律。
然而，两者的分析思路和方法却是不同的。
法学强调的是正义和道德的维护，其研究方法主要是演绎法，即从普遍原理推导出具体法律规范，强调判例和规范的严格适用。
而经济学则更强调实证和数据分析，其研究方法主要是归纳法，即从具体事实和数据推导出经济规律和趋势。
西方经济学中的法经济学研究西方经济学中的法经济学研究是指将法律与经济学相结合的一门学科。
它以经济学的理论和分析方法研究和解释法律的产生、发展和影响，旨在寻求一种合理的法律规制以促进经济的健康发展。
本文将对西方经济学中的法经济学研究进行探讨。
一、法经济学的发展历程与成果法经济学的产生可以追溯到19世纪末的欧洲。
当时，随着市场经济的发展和国家法律制度的日益完善，人们开始意识到法律与经济之间的相互关系。
以美国经济学家理查德·波赫尔(Richard A. Posner)为代表的学者们，通过对法律与经济学的交叉研究，形成了一系列具有影响力的理论和方法。
1. 法和经济的相互作用在法经济学研究中，学者们关注的一个重要问题是法律对经济发展的影响。
他们通过分析法律的制定、法律的实施以及法律对市场和社会行为的引导，揭示了法律的重要作用。
例如，知识产权法律的出现保护了创新者的知识产权，激励了创新和发展。
同时，也有研究表明，过度的法律规制可能会对经济发展造成不利影响，限制市场的自由发展。
2. 法律的经济解释法经济学强调，法律可以通过经济学的理论和分析方法进行解释。
学者们将法律视为一种规范经济行为的工具，通过量化分析和模型构建，研究法律规则与经济效益之间的关系。
例如，在合同法研究中，学者们通过分析成本和利益，以及信息不对称的情况下的行为选择，提出了契约理论，解释了为什么人们在签订合同时会采取某种特定的行为策略。
二、法经济学的应用领域法经济学作为一门交叉学科，已经在各个领域得到了广泛的应用。
以下主要列举了其中的几个重要领域：1. 竞争政策和反垄断法竞争政策和反垄断法是法经济学应用最为广泛的领域之一。
通过经济学的工具，分析市场竞争的结构和行为，为政府制定反垄断政策提供依据。
例如，学者们通过研究市场结构和垄断力量的大小，提出了衡量市场竞争的指标，并为垄断行为的监管提供了理论依据。
2. 合同法与契约理论法经济学在合同法和契约理论研究中也发挥了重要作用。
法律与经济法学经济学的交叉研究近年来，法律与经济学作为两个独立学科，逐渐在学术界形成了鲜明的对立。
然而，在实践中，法律与经济学的交叉研究却表明二者之间存在紧密的联系。
法律与经济学的交叉研究旨在探讨法律与经济学之间的互动关系，寻求二者的融合发展，以促进经济和社会的可持续发展。
一、法律与经济学的本质法律学是对法律规则和制度进行研究的学科，而经济学则是对人类经济活动进行分析和解释的学科。
两者的本质区别在于研究对象的不同。
然而，法律学的产生和发展受到经济因素的制约，而经济学的研究结果也需要受到法律规则的制约。
因此，二者之间的相互关系不可忽视。
二、法律对经济的影响1. 保护经济权益法律通过规定产权保护制度、合同法规定等保护经济主体的权益，有效维护市场体系的公正和秩序。
这种法律对经济的保护作用，提供了经济活动的安全保障，激励个体和企业进行经济活动。
2. 规范市场秩序法律还制定了一系列经济法规，如反垄断法、反不正当竞争法等，以规范市场秩序，防止市场失灵和不公平竞争现象。
这有助于平衡市场力量，维护公平与效率之间的平衡。
3. 促进经济发展法律的存在为经济发展提供了制度保障。
例如，知识产权法的实施，激励了创新和技术进步；营商环境法的完善，促进了投资和就业机会的增加。
这些法律措施为经济提供了有利的环境，推动了经济的可持续发展。
三、经济对法律的影响1. 经济效率与法律规制经济学研究表明，在经济活动中，法律规制可能会带来额外成本，限制经济效率的提升。
因此，经济学的角度可以帮助法律学界优化法律规制，减少成本，提高效益。
2. 经济的变革对法律的需求经济的发展不断变革，为了适应新形势和解决新问题，法律需要根据经济需求进行调整和改革。
例如，随着互联网经济的兴起，电子商务和在线支付等新业态的出现，法律界需要制定相应的法规和政策来规范和引导经济发展。
3. 经济模型对法律决策的影响经济学中的理论模型可以或多或少地影响法律决策。
例如，经济学中的激励机制和成本效益分析模型可以为法律的制定提供参考和指导，使法律能更好地适应经济和社会的需求。
法律经济学研究方法评析摘要：法律经济学，是法学与经济学的交叉学科，它兴起于美国芝加哥学派，作为一门新兴学科，发展相当迅疾，要准确把握这门学科，必须首先要理解和运用法律经济学的研究方法，即主要包括实证经济分析、规范经济分析、公共选择分析、成本收益分析、均衡分析、个案研究与案例分析；最后，文章对法律经济学研究方法作了评析。
关键词：法律经济学；研究方法；述评一、法律经济学研究方法概述我们首先要探求法律经济学的内涵，以便更好地把握法律经济学研究的主要方向。
如果从研究方法上来定义，可以称其为“法律的经济分析”，即运用经济学方法和理论全面分析法律问题的经济学和法学整合的交叉学科。
法律经济分析的核心在于引进微观经济学中理论、观点来探索法律背后的逻辑。
主要目的在于，通过对立法、司法、执法等过程中遇到的问题所作出的决策进行定性、定量分析，以使社会资源得到有效配置与社会控制总成本最小化。
二、法律经济学的主要研究方法（一）实证经济分析实证经济分析，是将经济分析看作是一种工具，一种预测未来行为预期的工具，因为法律经济学是后果主义的，将一项法律事件或行为可能产生的各种效果予以预先考虑，并进行综合分析判断，以此来促使人们选择和预测他人的行为来指引自己的行为。
也就是说，实证经济分析的理论关键在于其强大的预测能力，被用以进行定性预测，并用这些预测的经验来着重分析某项法律制度的实施后果，检验法律制度实施效果是否符合立法者的预期立法目的。
那么，实证经济分析的理论分析工具又有哪些呢？主要以定量分析、个案研究为主要的分析工具。
即检视某项立法制度的预测能力、有效性的事实证据或经验证据的取得，它们都依赖于定量分析和案例分析的理论工具的运用。
当然，实证经济分析也有其局限性，一方面，这种理论模型如今只在侵权法领域、契约、犯罪学领域等法律关系领域适用，但不能否定所做出一定的贡献。
另一方面，实证分析模型不能涵盖所有的变量，因此就有可能导致根据该理论模型得出的结论不可靠，为法律人士所怀疑，不具有真实性。
经济学中的法经济学分析在经济学领域里，法经济学是一门与法律和经济学有关的交叉学科。
它研究了法律对经济行为的影响，以及经济学原理如何应用于法律制度中。
本文将通过分析一些法经济学的重要概念，探讨其在经济学中的应用和意义。
一、法经济学简介法经济学是一门综合性的学科，它与法律学和经济学相结合，研究法律制度是如何塑造和影响经济行为的。
它关注法律和经济学的交叉点，研究法律规则、制度和经济效应之间的关系。
法经济学强调了法律的经济影响，以及经济原理在法律制度中的应用。
二、法经济学的主要概念1. 法律和经济学的交叉点法律和经济学的交叉点是法经济学的核心要素。
通过将经济学原理运用到法律领域中，法经济学可以评估法律规则和制度对经济行为的影响。
同时，法经济学也可以分析法律制度对市场效率和社会福利的影响。
2. 经济分析法律经济分析法律是法经济学的一种方法。
它使用经济学原理和定量方法来研究法律规则和制度。
通过分析有效性、效率、公平性和激励等经济指标，经济分析法律可以评估和改进现有的法律体系。
3. 法律经济学的应用法律经济学的应用广泛涵盖了各个领域。
在合同法中，法经济学可以分析合同的成本和效益，揭示合同的设计和执行方式。
在知识产权领域，法经济学可以研究知识产权保护的经济影响和效率。
在竞争政策领域，法经济学可以评估垄断行为的经济后果和效应。
4. 纵向和横向分析法经济学的分析方法可以从纵向和横向两个方向进行。
纵向分析主要关注单个案例和法律问题，通过分析特定案例的经济效应来评估法律规则的有效性。
而横向分析则关注多个案例和法律规则，通过比较不同法律制度的经济效应来评估其差异和优劣。
三、法经济学在经济学中的应用和意义法经济学在经济学中具有重要的应用和意义。
首先，它提供了评估法律制度和规则的经济效益的方法。
通过经济分析法律，可以评估法律规则是否有效、高效和公平，并提出改进建议。
其次，法经济学可以帮助解决一些经济学中的难题。
例如，在合同法中，经济学原理可以揭示合同双方的信息不对称问题，并提出相应的解决方案。
法律经济学法律与经济关系的研究与分析在当代社会中，法律和经济之间的关系日益密切。
法律经济学作为一门交叉学科，旨在研究法律与经济之间的相互作用，深入探讨法律对经济产生的影响，以及经济对法律的塑造力量。
本文将对法律经济学的法律与经济关系进行研究与分析。
一、经济对法律的影响经济力量对法律的影响是法律经济学研究的重要领域之一。
首先，经济发展水平的不同会影响法律规则的制定和执行。
在发达经济体系中，法律与经济之间呈现出更加普遍且复杂的关系，法律对经济活动的监管力度更加强大。
其次，市场竞争对法律的改革和演变起到重要作用。
在市场经济体制下，法律需要适应经济发展需求，为经济主体的合法权益提供保障。
最后，经济因素对法律的执行和司法判决也有着直接的影响。
经济条件对判决结果的影响程度可能会引起人们的关注和争议。
二、法律对经济的影响法律对经济的影响是法律经济学另一个重要方面的研究内容。
首先，法律对市场竞争和经济效率的保护具有重要意义。
强有力的法律制度可以促进公平竞争和市场的正常运行，保护消费者和生产者的权益，维护市场秩序。
其次，法律对投资和创新有着重要的影响。
法律对知识产权的保护、资本市场的监管以及合同的执行等方面的规定和实施，对经济的创新活动和投资行为具有直接的影响。
最后，法律在调节经济政策和市场失灵方面发挥着重要作用。
法律可以通过法规和制度来调整市场机制，纠正市场的失败和不公平现象。
三、法律经济学的应用领域法律经济学作为一门交叉学科，在实践中有着广泛的应用领域。
首先，法律经济学在法律规制和法律制度的设计方面发挥着重要作用。
它可以通过经济模型和分析工具来评估不同法律规则对市场和社会的影响，为法律的制定和改革提供决策依据。
其次，法律经济学在法律争端解决和司法判决方面也具有重要意义。
通过经济分析工具，可以对法律争议的成本和效益进行评估，为司法判决提供理论依据。
此外，法律经济学还在合同法、公司法、竞争法等领域具有广泛应用。
四、法律与经济关系的挑战和前景法律与经济关系面临着诸多挑战和机遇。
*1.*182.2.111995 20042.22003(Office of Economic Opportunity, 1972) family background peer effect IQ Becker, 19812.3,2003.2.411 99 123.43.123.2112004 11 815 15 143.33.430 2000 13 2.6 10.4 2002 7.22003 200544.126 31 923 4125000 24250 9.85 5 40.8 29905 4.22006 3 20 23 6 4 3 936WTP 3 2 WTP 2 WTP 326 /service/index.html3 WTP1 16 1 4 42 20 444 2 4 95 b 2 (c) (b)+(c) 5 (d) 3 15.5% 1 204854.3335,919 3 B+CWTP WTP 2 2 ( WTP 0 ) WTP 1 4417 WTP 8125 WTP AB/C 1 + / A+B/B+C 3.44 2.37 1 B/C 1 A C4 42048 B’B/CA B/C + / A+B’/B’ 8.04 4.975200323(4),pp313-323(2003)(2005) 67 2005 22002(1998)(1995)(2003)(2005) No17()(2004)19802006 No.53, pp 194-220Office of Economic Opportunity(1972), “Equality of Educational Opportunity,” Vintage BooksBecker Gary S.(1981) A Treatise on Family, Harvard University Press1WTP 3 WTP Yes No 3 2Yes---Yes---6 ?No---[5 6 ] Yes---4 ?Yes---[4 3 ]No---3 ?No---[2 3 ]2 ?Yes---[1.5 2 ]Yes---1.5 ?No---[1 1.5 ] No---1 ?Yes---1 ? [5 1 ]No---0.5 ?No--- [5] 2WTP (1997) ([2002] 2003 ) V W εV(s , y i; x i) =W (s , y i; x i) +siεfor s=0, 1 (1)s=0 s=1 y ii x i i siε s0 s1 B i i V(1 , y i-B i; x i)> V(0, y i; x i) YESYESPr[YES]=Pr[V(1 , y i-B i; x i)> V(0, y i; x i)]=Pr[W(1 , y i-B i; x i) +1iε> W(0, y i; x i) +0iε]=Pr[∆W i>1iε 0iε] ∆W i=W(1 , y i-B i; x i) W(0, y i; x i)exp[exp(-η)]Pr[YES]=1-F(-∆W i) (2)7 NO Pr[NO] F(-∆W i) -∆W iF YES F(2)Pr[YES]=[1we−∆]-1 (3)∆W i∆W i =a + blog (ix)(4)y i x i a b log(x i) 7 (2002) 2003B(WTP) WTP 4 a,b L(θ)1NYY YNY YNN NYY NYN NN iYY i YNY i YNNi NYY i NYN i NN i ln L()(dln P d ln P d ln P d ln P d ln P d ln P )=θ=+++++∑ Y YES N NO θ)0nL()/∂θ∂θ=d YY 2 YES 4 YES P YY d YNY 2 YES 4 NO 3 YES (4) (5 ) 5 8 exp(a/b)1815 15A combination of the public and private supplementary educationin the public school for the equal educational opportunityNaohiro Yashiro (International Christian University) and Wataru Suzuki (Tokyo Gakugei University) AbstractThough all the costs for education are free in the Japanese public school based on the principle of equal educational opportunity, there is an increasing de facto disparity with a rising demand for private supplementary education outside of school. Thus, providing with these private education services in the public school at the less costs as an option for students would be helpful to reduce the disparity, but is currently not allowed as being against the principle of free public education. This study estimates a potential demand for the supplementary private education services in the public school to show the necessity for the reform.Key WordsA Combination of the Public and Private Supplementary Education, Disparity of Educational Opportunity, Contingent Valuation Method (CVM)****e-mail: koki.arai@nifty.ne.jp1 2 3 4 31(2001) (2005)10392( 23 8 5 23 ( )441 ) ( 50 10 24 48 ( )517 ) ( 12 7 18 10 ( )43 ) (1980) 34( 45 7 31 43 ( )602 )5 623 (1) (2)(3)4 355 (1990) (2002) (2006) ...3 ( : ) (3)678 62 8 62 6 10 6 21 1 300 15 77 ( ) ( 7 9 25 6 ( )144 )3 88 ( 14 12 26 13 ( )13381 )6 4 1 10 9 17 5 , ,96.6 5 5 5 5 5 , 9( (1998)) ( )( 18 6 27 11 ( )4 )3-1-1.3-3-1(Chow )t c1( ) c2( ) c3( ) c4( ) c5 (1)t c1 c2 c3 c4 c5(1)( ) 103-1-2.3-1-2-1.( ) 810 1998 2000 (Kim et al., (2005))16 200 (Abrantes-Mets et al., 2005)1173-1-2-2.5 ( ) 123-1-2-3.15 1311 612 5 5 21 22 ( 5 5 21 3 ( )1 )13 ( 15 11 28 13 ( )16 ) 23-1-3. ( )2 1414 Okuno-Fujiwara, et al. (1990)3-1-3-1.3-1-3-2. ( )()()3-1-3-3.() ()()()3-1-4.5 2 (Levenstein and Suslow (2006))12 15 ( )15 ( 12 2 23 11 ( )1 )3-2-1.163-2-1-1.174 2 6 1016 ( 28 5 12 26 ( )3756 )17 ( 9 3 31 6 ( )2 )3-2-1-2.18( )3-2-2.3(1)18 ( 12 3 27 9 ( )3 )3-2-3.(2)3-2-3-1.3-2-3-2.( )3-2-3-3.1919 ( ) ( 61 6 13 59 ( )264 )3-3-1.3(1)3-3-1-1.89 1 1 20 213-3-1-2.( ) ( 11 11 30 9 ( )3 )20 25 ( 59 2 24 55 ( )2153 )21 3-3-1-3.3-3-2.4-1-1.Duggan and Levitt (2002) 7 7 ( )22(d) ( ) ( +11 )t c1(d) c2( ) c3( ) c4( ) c5 (2)t c1 c2 c3 c4 c5(2)Porter and Zona (1999))23 1980 1990 10 600 ( ) 3 3 30 3 6.5 50 2(2006)23 (Porter and Zona, (1993)) (Pesendorfer, (2000)) (2005)244-1-2.4-1-2-1.16 105 80 254-1-2-2.1324Bajari and Ye, (2003) Ohashi, (2006) (2006) 25( ) ( 18 4 12 16 ( )1 )264-1-2-3.13 ( ) 27 64-1-3.4-1-4.26 ( ) ( 13 9 20 11 ( )6 )27 4 2829(Thomas (2005)) ( (2006))30314-2-1.3228( ) ( 18 2 3 17 ( )136 ) 29 ( 13 3 29 9 ( )15 )30 (2005)31 (2006)32 ( ) ( 18 3 8 15 ( )10 )4-2-2.8 334-2-3.4-2-3-1.8 343 54 2 ( 2)(1)33( ) ( 8 3 29 6 ( )80 )34 19 354-2-3-2.364-3-1.374-3-2.35( ) 26 ( 8 5 31 7 ( )1 )36 ( ) 13 ( 13 9 12 12 ( )1 )37 ( 14 12 24 14 ( )147 )3838 … ( (2006))( )( 23 8 5 23 ( )441 )( 28 5 12 26 ( )3756 )( 45 7 31 43 ( )602 )( 50 10 24 48 ( )517 )25 ( 59 2 24 55 ( )2153 )( 12 7 18 10 ( )43 )( )( ) ( 61 6 13 59 ( )264 )( ) ( 7 9 25 6 ( )144 )( 12 2 23 11 ( )1 )22 ( 5 5 21 3 ( )1 )( ) 26 ( 8 5 31 7 ( )1 )( 14 12 24 14 ( )147 )( )( 14 12 26 13 ( )13381 )( 13 3 29 9 ( )15 ) ( )( 9 3 31 6 ( )2 )( 12 3 27 9 ( )3 )( ) ( 18 4 12 16 ( )1 )( ) ( 13 9 20 11 ( )6 )( ) ( 18 3 8 15 ( )10 )( ) ( 8 3 29 6 ( )80 )( ) 13 ( 13 9 12 12 ( )1 )( 18 6 27 11 ( )4 )(2001) 613,614 (2001 11 12 )(2006) mimeo(2006) 99 2006 4(2005)(2002) 2(2006) 3 1199 (2006.3.15)(1998)(2006) ESRI Discussion Paper Series No. 159(2006)(1990)(2005)(1980)(2005)CR03-05 <http://www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/reports/cr-03-05.pdf>Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M., Froeb, Luke M., Geweke, John F., and Taylor, Christopher T. (2005) “A Variance Screen for Collusion,” FTC Working Paper No. 275, </be/workpapers/wp275.pdf>Bajari, Patrick and Ye, Lixin (2003) “Deciding between Competition and Collusion,” Reviewof Economics and Statistics, 85(4); 971-989Duggan, Mark and Levitt, Steven D. (2002) “Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling,” American Economic Review, 92(5); 1594-605Kim, Sonku, Lee, Inkwon, Ryu, Keunkwan and Yi, Sang-Seung (2005) “Econometric Damage Estimation from the Bid Rigging in the Korean Military Oil Procurement Auctions during 1998-2000,” paper in “Japan and Korea Mini Conference on Bid-rigging,” on January 17th with the University of Tokyo, Seoul National University, Competition Policy Research Center (CPRC) and Competitive Power Research CenterLevenstein, Margaret C. and Suslow, Valerie Y. (2006) “What Determines Cartel Success?” Journal of Economic Literature, 44; 43-95Ohashi, Hiroshi (2006) “Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Bidding Behavior: A Case Study of the Experience of Municipal Public Works,” mimeoOkuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro, Postlewaite, Andrew and Suzumura, Kotaro (1990) “Strategic Information Revelation,” Review of Economic Studies, 57(1); 25-47Pesendorfer, Martin (2000) “A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions,” Review of Economic Studies, 67(3); 381-411Porter, Robert H. and Zona, J. Douglas (1999) “Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding,” RAND Journal of Economics, 30(2); 263-288Porter, Robert H. and Zona, J. Douglas (1993) “Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions,” Journal of Political Economy 101(3); 518-538Thomas, Charles J. (2005) “Using Reserve Prices to Deter Collusion in Procurement Competition,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 53(3); 301-3261(1)( )( ) (2)(3)(4)( )( )( )(5)( )(1)( )( )( )()( )( )( )(1)( )( )( )2(1)( )(2)(2)( )( )( )(2)(Title)Fact-finding based on economical circumstantial evidences--Applying economic analysis to information exchanging, conjectural bid-riggingmechanism--(Author)Koki Arai(Affiliation)Senior Examiner, Merger and acquisition DivisionExecutive Bureau, Japanese Fair Trade Commission(Abstract)This paper surveys the points of economic analysis of the Antimonopoly cases up to recent courts’ and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission’s cases in comparison with items of circumstantial evidence in criminal code cases in order to arrange to make use of the economical circumstantial evidence in the future antitrust cases, and introduces economic thinking to be applied, especially in proving of information exchanging.(Keywords)Violation of the Antimonopoly Act, circumstantial evidence, fact-finding1.20 TRIPs (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) 1995 WTO1(CAFC) 2(2001) 3(Kortum and Lerner (1999) Lerner (2002))Harris and Todaro (1970) (1998, 1999) Harris-Todaro(1998, 1999)42 1 ( ) Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) ( )1 Romer (1990)334 3 52.2 2MAPP, IUIFAj,,,=lYYU j jjMjAjκαα−=−ˆ1,ˆ,,j j j M j A l Y Y ,,,,,καˆ 1==M A l l 1=jκj mM A P P P =≡j j l PU κα−=αααααˆ1ˆ)ˆ1(ˆ−−≡2. 1.AR Y A=ˆ A R ( )5Helpman (1993) Kwan and Lai (2003) Furukawa (2007)AP m R = (1)κα−=A U R , (2)2. 2.I F X X , 1>ε111)1(ˆ−−−⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡−+=εεεεεεθθI F M X X Y .1F I F I X QQ X εθθ⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛−=)1(, (3) I F Q Q ,εεεεεθθ−−−−+=111)1(I F Q Q P . (4)2. 3.n )(j x Fn2. 4.101F )(X −−⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡=∫σσσσnF dj j x1>σ j b 1>σ)1/()(−=σσF F w j qσσ−≡=1)(nX x j x F F F j1)(1−≡=−σππσσn X w j F Fπ F bw Fnb nx F F += σσ−=1nX x F Fσb Fn =(5) b F bw =π1/1)1(−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛−=σσσσσb F X F (6)e)(καα+−=e Pw U FF (7)2. 5.bµ+=b bb µ b w F µ( )µµ b ( )( )202. 6.λλ−1 0=wλ1>ρ6(1999) (1991) ( )6(1998, 1999)( )Chaudhuri(1989) Chaudhuri3I101)(−−⎥⎥⎦⎤⎢⎢⎣⎡=∫ρρλρρωωII I d x X ,I I l x = 1 7)1()(11−=−ραλκρρI P Q I , (8)1)(1−=−ρλκρρI X U I I . (9)(2005, pp. 81)I )1(λ−0=IU U 3.(migration arbitrage condition, MA ) NI F R N ++=,I F U U λ==A U .ρσ= 8 2 (1)-(9)789σεεεσσεσσεσσεσεσσεσκαλκαθσσε−−−−−−−−−−−−+++=−−11111)1()1()()()()(11A b e A e A n . (10) λ,,e bb2.5. ( ) b ( )ee10 eeλ9θ 5.0=θ (2005, 1, pp. 82)10λ (1999) 11 λ1 ( )σε>λ∂∂∂∂∂∂ne n b n ,,σε<λ∂∂∂∂∂∂ne n b n ,,(10)1URL4.1↑b ↓b↓e↓λσε>σε<1213ε14(2005) 4 (A4)(2) MA Harris-Todaro5.2 ( )(1998) ( ) , , 39 (6), 23-42(1999) ,.sophia.ac.jp/~m-shimok/(2005) ,Chaudhuri, D. T. (1989) “A Theoretical Analysis of the Informal Sector,” World Development, 17 (3), 779-789.Furukawa, Y. (2007) “The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and Endogenous Growth: Is Stronger Always Better?” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Contro l, forthcoming.Harris, J. R. and M. Todaro (1970) “Migration, Unemployment and Development,” American Economic Review, 60, 126-142.Helpman, E. (1993) “Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights,” Econometrica, 61, 1247-1280.Kortum, S. S. and J. Lerner (1999) “What Is behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?” Research Policy, 28, 1-22.Kwan, Y. K. and L. -C. Lai (2003) “Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Endogenous Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Contro l, 27, 853-873. Lerner, J. (2002) “Patent Protection and Innovation over 150 Years,” NBER Working Paper Series, No. 8977.Murphy, K. M., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1989) “Industrialization and the Big Push,”Journal of Political Economy, 97 (5), 1003-1027.Romer, P. M. (1990) “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, 98 (2), S71-S102.Informal Sector, Industrialization, and Intellectual Property Rights ProtectionYuichi FurukawaInternational Graduate School of Social ScienceYokohama National UniversityAbstractThis paper develops a rural-urban migration model with the urban informal sector to showthe effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. I show that, in this economy, a strengthening of IPR protection might depress industrialization, although it is often consideredas one of the most important industrialization policies.Keywords: Informal sector, industrialization, intellectual property rights protectionT ax evasion and the government’s enforcement effortsKeisuke Morita∗Graduate School of EconomicsNagoya UniversityAbstractSeveral precedent works have described the manner in which the audit rate and the penalty rate are useful to deter tax evasion and collect more tax revenues, but little attention has been devoted to investigation of how these tax enforcement efforts and the withholding tax system are used together. This paper investigates that question and shows a direction for tax enforcement efforts by adopting the same criterion as that of Christiansen (1980).Keywords: Tax evasion, Withholding tax system, Labor mobilityJEL Classification: H26∗ Correspondence address: Keisuke Morita, Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University,Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, 464-8601, Japan.E-mail:morita0323@yahoo.co.jp 1.IntroductionAlthough some coping strategies for tax evasion are known, their policy instruments introduce some problems. For example, a sufficiently high audit rate is extremely difficult to practice because such a higher audit rate engenders higher audit costs [Scotchmer (1987)]. Harsh punishments such as the death penalty are unsuitable for tax evasion because penalties are traditionally proportionate to the seriousness of a crime [Graetz and Wilde (1985)]. Even if a withholding tax system were adopted, it would be difficult to eliminate tax evasion because the capture rate of income varies according to occupation [Shibata and Hayashi (1988)]. The tax authorities of many countries work toward deterring tax evasion by combining some methods rather than adopting a particular method because of some problems that the policy instruments have. This study analyzes how some methods should be combined for tax enforcement, such as the audit rate, the penalty rate, and the withholding tax system. Christiansen (1980) is the seminal work discussing the combination of tax enforcement efforts. W e expand this work by introducing the possibility of labor mobility between two sectors: one is that tax evasion is possible, the other is that it is not so. Our investigation has two contributions for Christiansen (1980). First, we pay attention not only to the audit rate and the penalty rate, which are considered in Christiansen (1980), but also to the withholding tax system. Furthermore, although some precedent investigators aside from Christiansen (1980) have pursued the same purpose as our examination, those works do not also consider the withholding tax system1. Second, our investigation is more consistent with reality than Christiansen (1980) in that tax evaders and tax compliant persons co-exist. Although many preceding works, including Christiansen (1980), have adopted the premise by which all taxpayers underreport their own income, the tax compliant behaviors that individuals select in a real economy are various because of differences of occupation, etc. W e clear away such a premise that is often used in preceding works by considering the gaps of the captured rate for income among occupations.Pesieau and Possen (1991, 1992) and Parker (1999) considered that income taxation has some influence on occupational choice because self-employed persons can evade taxes but1 W e can hold up Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Cremer and Gahvari (1995) as examples of investigations of tax enforcement schedules. They investigated how the audit rate and the penalty rate should be set up for progressive taxation.paid employees cannot do so. These studies evolved from the question of why some developed countries had experienced a steady decline in the self-employment rate [T orrini (2004), Robson and Wren (1999)]. Because of that intention, these studies did not discuss positively how enforcement efforts should be practiced. W e explore such questions that their studies virtually ignore, whereas we also set up an occupational choice model that incorporates both self-employment and paid employment.The investigation described in this paper yields several findings. First, we show that Christiansen’s suggestion has a limitation if the labor mobility between sectors is considered. In Christiansen (1980), the higher penalty rate (and lower audit rate) on the constant expected gain from tax evasion has stronger deterrent power against tax evasion and increases tax revenues. However, if we consider labor mobility among sectors, such an enforcement effort does not always decrease tax evasion; even if that were the case, decreasing tax evasion does not always have the same meaning as collecting tax revenues. Second, we show that the higher penalty rate (and the lower audit rate) runs taxpayers to a position of being taxed at the source on the Christiansen’s criterion of the constant expected gain from tax evasion, although we should note that such an enforcement effort does not always lead directly to collecting more tax revenues with the first result. Third, the tax authority should perform tax enforcement efforts with attention to the measure of absolute risk aversion and the influence of labor mobility on the income level in each labor sector, if labor mobility exists.This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our models. In section 3, we discuss how the audit rate, the penalty rate and the withholding tax system should be combined in terms of collection of tax revenues. Section 4 closes this presentation with some concluding remarks.2.ModelPresume first that only two labor sectors exist: 1 and 2. In sector 1, an individual can evade taxes, but in sector 2 tax evasion is impossible2. Let n i be the number of workers in2 Although our discussion mainly addresses the gap of the capture rate for income among occupations in a country, we can also understand that our discussion reflects international and regional problems for tax evasion. Sector 1 describes a jurisdiction in which the tax system has weak points on encouraging tax payments. On the other hand, sector 2 describes a jurisdiction in which a withholding tax system and an sector i(i=1, 2 ). W e assume a constant number of workers in the economy: N=n1+n2. Identical individuals are risk averse and each supplies a single unit of labor into each jurisdiction of residence. W e do not consider movement costs, so individuals can move freely among sectors. The income level of sectors i is represented as y i(n i ), where ∂y i /∂n i <03. In both labor sectors, individuals face income tax rate t. The tax authority knows that tax evasion is impossible in sector 2, and the audit or the imposition of penalty is practiced for sector 1. Therefore, the individuals in sector 1 only face the audit rate p and the penalty rate m. We assume that the audit activities are practiced randomly, and that they accurately reveal the actual income, and that the penalty rate is imposed on evaded taxes4.The order of the individual’s decision-making is as follows. First, the individual chooses the sector in which to work. After earning labor income in the chosen sector, the individual in sector 1, where tax evasion is possible, chooses undeclared income x.Considering the decision-making of an individual who works in sector 1, the problem is represented asMax EU≡ (1-p)U(Y) + pU(Z),s. t. Y ≡ (1-t) y1(n1) + xt, (P1)Z ≡ (1-t) y1(n1)-mxt,where EU is a von Neumann – Morgenstern utility function. The individual’s disposable income is represented as Y because the amount of tax payment is reduced from ty1 to t(y1-x) if tax evasion is successful with probability (1-p). On the other hand, if the individual is audited with a probability p, his or her disposable income becomes Z because the tax authority recognizes the actual income y through the audit and it imposes an additional penalty on evaded taxes of tx.electric declaration are positively adopted.3 Our model is constructed by making reference to Jung et al. (1994). The negative relation between y and n might imply a complete competitive labor market, a constant total demand for product in a jurisdiction, and heterogeneity of products between jurisdictions. Although we should establish product markets more clearly, the detailed argument for product markets might compromise the focus of these analyses. W e leave it as a subject for further investigation.4 The features of audit and penalty in our model are based on Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974).W e adopt the same criterion as that of Christiansen (1980) to discuss how to combine tax enforcement efforts. Christiansen (1980) set up the following assumption as a criterion.Assumption 1Assume that the expected gain from tax evasion is constant:(1-p)-pm = constant .(1)Three points are adduced as reasons why we set up Assumption 1. First, this assumption enables us to compare our result with Christiansen’s. The comparison between results of this paper and those of Christiansen (1980) clarifies the influence of the labor mobility between sectors on tax evasion, tax revenues, and the feature of tax enforcement efforts. Second, it is not so difficult for us to understand the content of this assumption as a criterion. Presuming that some enforcement schedules exist in which individuals obtain the same level of expected gain as a result of evasion behavior, the enforcement schedule among them that has the most deterrent power against tax evasion should reduce the greatest amount of tax evasion. Third, some results obtained on this assumption are clear: this assumption furnishes us an answer for how to combine a withholding tax system, the audit rate, and the penalty rate.From (1), we obtain the relationship between the penalty rate and the audit rate asp=p(m) andmpdm dp +−=1. (2)W e assume that individuals know this enforcement rule from experience.The first-order condition about the individual’s problem is[ 1-p(m) ] U Y = p(m) U Z m ,(3)where U W ≡ ∂U/∂W (W = Y or Z)5. This condition implies that x*=x(m, n); then (1) and (3) yield the following equations of01*<⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡++−−=∂∂mxt U m U U D p m x ZZ Z Y , and(4)5Note that [(1-p)-pm]>0 when tax evasion occurs. [])()()1)(1)((*111Y R Z R DU p t n y n x Y −−−∂∂−=∂∂, (5)where D ≡[(1-p)U YY + pU ZZ m 2]t<0 is the second-order condition, and U WW ≡∂2U /∂W 2<0. Therein, R(W)≡-U WW / U W >0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. In fact, (4) is the same result as that presented by Christiansen (1980), meaning that the higher penalty rate (and the lower audit rate) on Assumption 1 decreases the undeclared income. Also, (5) depends on the measure of absolute risk aversion. Actually , (5) is negative if it is decreasing such that R(Z)>R(Y). On the other hand, if it is increasing such that R(Z)<R(Y), (5) is positive. If it is constant, i.e. R(Z)=R(Y), then (5) equals zero.Next, we observe the individual’s choice about the labor sector. W e assume that identical individuals can move among sectors without cost, so the labor mobility between sectors continues until the gains of the two sectors are completely equal. Let n i * be the number of workers in sector i at the equilibrium. The movement equilibrium between sectors will then beU[(1-t)y 2(n 2*)]=(1-p(m))U[(1-t)y 1(n 1*)+tx*]+p(m)U[(1-t)y 1(n 1*)-mtx*]. (6)From (6), we obtain⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡−−−+∆−=∂∂Z U Z Y Z U Y U m Z Y p m n )()()1()(*1, (7)where ∆≡(1-t){U I (∂y 2 /∂n 1)-[(1-p)U Y +pU Z ](∂y 1 /∂n 1)} >0 and I ≡(1-t)y 2. Therein, (7) depends on the expression in the large square bracket. On the assumption that the individual is risk averse, (7) is negative because the expression in the large square bracket is negative 6. This fact implies that the workers in sector 1 decrease when the penalty rate increases on Assumption 1.3. T ax revenues and tax enforcement effortsIn this section, we consider how tax enforcement efforts should be combined. It is considered that the tax enforcement efforts are undertaken to collect more taxes. In the following, we discuss such a problem through investigating how the higher penalty rate on Assumption 1 affects the tax revenues. It is notable that the penalty rate and the audit rate6See the Appendix for an explanation of why the large square bracket is negative.affect not only the tax revenues from sector 1 but also that from sector 2 through labor mobility. W e first investigate the influence of the penalty rate on Assumption 1 on the tax revenues in each sector; then we investigate the influence of the penalty rate on Assumption 1 on the total tax revenues.The tax revenues from sector 1 are depicted as ER 1= n 1 [ty 1 – tx {(1-p)-pm}]. Differentiating ER 1 by m shows that[]⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡∂∂∂∂+∂∂+∂∂−−−−∂∂=∂∂m n n x m x x m n pm p tx m n ty m ER 11111111])1[(1ε, (8)where ε1=-(n 1 / y 1)(∂y 1 /∂n 1 )>0. The first term of the right-hand side in this expression shows the relation between the tax enforcement efforts and the tax revenues which should be collected by the tax authority , n 1t y 1. The penalty rate and the audit rate affects n 1t y 1 indirectly through the labor mobility denoted by (7). This term depends on the measure of ε1. If 1> (=, <)ε1, this term is negative (zero, positive).On the other hand, the second term of the right-hand side in (8) shows the impact of the penalty rate and the audit rate on tax revenues with uncertainty, n 1tx[(1-p) – pm]. This term depends on the terms in the large angle bracket, which is the relation between the tax enforcement efforts and the amount of tax evasion, n 1tx 1 because [(1-p)-pm] is positive when tax evasion occurs in sector 1. Then, we look closely at the influences of the tax enforcement efforts on n 1tx 1. From (3) and (7), we obtain⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡∂∂∂∂+∂∂+∂∂=∂∂m n n x m x t n m n tx m tx n ********11111.(9)In fact, (9) shows that the influence of the chance of tax enforcement schedule on evaded taxes includes three effects. First, the higher penalty rate (and the lower audit rate) on Assumption 1 decreases the evaded taxes because the increase of the penalty rate makes the income at the detected situation lower; therefore, the risk-averse individual has a lower attraction for tax evasion [ ∂x*/ ∂m<0]. Second, the decline of attraction for tax evasion by the higher penalty rate on Assumption 1 decreases the relative disbenefit for working on thewithholding tax system. Therefore, the higher penalty rate through Assumption 1 decreases self-employment [∂n 1*/ ∂m<0]. Third, the self-employment income level changes concomitant with the decreasing prevalence of self-employment. The change of income level influences the net benefit that the individual feels for tax evasion. The influence of income level on the evasion behavior is known to depend on the measure of absolute risk aversion 7, which indicates that the indirect effect that the higher penalty rate on Assumption 1 influences the undeclared income, (∂x*/ ∂n 1)(∂n 1*/ ∂m), depends on the measure of risk aversion. From (5) and (7), if the measure of absolute risk aversion is decreasing (increasing, constant), this term is positive (negative, zero). From these explanations, we can indicate the second term of the right-hand side in (8) as follows. This term is negative if the measure of absolute risk aversion is constant or increasing. On the other hand, if the measure of absolute risk aversion is decreasing, this term is ambiguous because the positive third effect counteracts the negative first and second effects.Summarizing the preceding argument, we can state the following result.Result 11) Assume that the measure of absolute risk aversion is constant or increasing. The taxrevenues from sector 1 increase with the higher penalty rate on Assumption 1 if ε1 is no less than 1. On the other hand, it both increases and decreases with the higher penalty rate on Assumption 1 if ε1 is less than 1.2) Assume that the measure of absolute risk aversion is decreasing. The tax revenues from sector 1 both increase and decrease with the higher penalty rate on Assumption 1.In Christiansen (1980), whose model is constructed only by an evadable sector, the higher penalty rate on Assumption 1 has greater deterrent power against tax evasion. Labor mobility does not pertain in Christiansen’s model, so such the result is tied to the implication that the tax revenues increase with the higher penalty rate on Assumption 1. Our model expands Christiansen (1980) by introducing labor mobility between two sectors. Then, comparison of Result 1 with Christiansen’s result highlights several matters. First, Result 1-17See Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974.)。
