英国大型公司的自愿性环境信息披露【外文翻译】
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issb可持续信息披露准则ISSB(可持续信息披露准则,International Sustainability Standards Board)是一个全球性的组织,致力于制定和推广企业可持续发展的信息披露准则。
ISSB的目标是提供一套能够评估和比较企业在环境、社会和治理(ESG)方面表现的准则,从而帮助投资者做出更明智的投资决策,促进全球的可持续发展。
以下是一些关于ISSB的相关参考内容。
1. ISSB的历史和背景ISSB是国际财务报告准则理事会(IASB)的一个分支机构,成立于2021年。
ISSB是由世界上各个国家的利益相关者共同成立的,包括投资者、企业、监管机构等。
ISSB的成立是为了填补可持续发展信息披露的缺口,提供一个全球性的准则体系。
2. ISSB的目标和原则ISSB的目标是提供一套全球可适用的可持续信息披露准则,促进企业在ESG方面的透明度和可比性。
ISSB的准则应该具有全球适用性和普适性,以确保企业在任何地方都能够根据相同的标准进行信息披露。
ISSB的准则还应该能够满足投资者和其他利益相关者的需求,帮助他们理解企业的可持续发展表现。
3. ISSB的工作流程和标准制定过程ISSB的工作流程包括标准制定、意见征询、公众研讨和最终发布等环节。
ISSB的标准制定过程是透明和包容的,充分考虑了各方的利益。
ISSB还与其他相关组织和机构合作,共同推动全球可持续发展的目标。
4. ISSB的可持续信息披露准则内容ISSB的可持续信息披露准则涵盖了多个方面,包括环境、社会和治理。
在环境方面,准则可以包括企业的能源消耗、温室气体排放、水资源利用等。
在社会方面,准则可以涉及企业的员工福利、社区关系、人权问题等。
在治理方面,准则可以关注企业的董事会结构、内部控制、反腐败等。
ISSB的准则应该能够帮助企业识别和披露与其业务相关的关键环境、社会和治理问题。
5. ISSB的准则对于投资者的意义ISSB的可持续信息披露准则对于投资者非常重要。
esrs 披露标准English Answer:The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) Disclosure Requirements for ESG Funds.The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has established disclosure requirements for ESG funds to enhance transparency and comparability of ESG-related information for investors. These requirements aim to provide investors with clear and consistent information about the ESG characteristics of funds, enabling them to make informed investment decisions.Key Disclosure Requirements:ESG Objectives and Strategy: Funds must clearly state their ESG objectives and the strategies they employ to achieve them. This includes outlining the specific ESG factors considered in investment decisions and themethodology used to integrate ESG considerations into the investment process.ESG Risk Management: Funds must disclose their approach to managing ESG risks and the processes they have in place to identify, assess, and mitigate these risks.ESG Performance Metrics: Funds must provide quantitative and qualitative metrics to demonstrate their ESG performance. These metrics should align with the fund's stated ESG objectives and strategy and should be presented in a clear and understandable manner.ESG Data Sources: Funds must disclose the sources of the ESG data they rely on to make investment decisions and the measures they take to ensure the reliability and accuracy of this data.Remuneration Policy: Funds must disclose their remuneration policy and how it aligns with the ESG objectives of the fund. This includes explaining how ESG performance is incorporated into the assessment of employeeperformance and compensation.Compliance Deadlines:The ESMA disclosure requirements for ESG funds cameinto effect on March 10, 2021. Funds that are subject to these requirements must ensure that their disclosures arein compliance by the following deadlines:Existing Funds: Existing ESG funds must comply with the requirements by June 30, 2022.New Funds: New ESG funds launched after March 10, 2021 must comply with the requirements from the date of launch.Impact of the Disclosure Requirements:The ESMA disclosure requirements are expected to have a significant impact on the ESG fund industry. They will enhance transparency and comparability of ESG-related information, enabling investors to make more informed investment decisions. The requirements will also promotethe adoption of ESG principles and encourage fund managers to integrate ESG considerations into their investment strategies.中文回答:欧洲证券和市场管理局(ESMA)ESG 基金披露标准。
内部控制系统披露—一种可替代的管理机制塞尔吉奥-贝里塔会计部门博科尼大学根据代理理论,各种治理机制减少了投资者和管理者之间的代理问题(Jensen and Meckling,1976; Gillan,2006)。
传统上,治理机制已经被认定为内部或外部的。
内部机制包括董事会及其作用、结构和组成(Fama,1980;Fama and Jensen,1983),管理股权(Jensen and Meckling,1976)和激励措施,起监督作用的大股东(Demsetz and Lehn,1985),内部控制系统(Bushman and Smith,2001),规章制度和章程条款(反收购措施)和使用的债务融资(杰森,1993)。
外部控制是由公司控制权市场(Grossman and Hart,1980)、劳动力管理市场(Fama,1980)和产品市场(哈特,1983)施加的控制。
各种各样的金融丑闻,动摇了世界各地的投资者,公司治理最佳实践方式特别强调了内部控制系统在公司治理中起到的重要作用。
内部控制有助于通过提供保证可靠性的财务报告,和临时议会对可能会损害公司经营目标的事项进行评估和风险管理来保护投资者的利益。
这些功能已被的广泛普及内部控制系统架构设计的广泛认可,并指出了内部控制是用以促进效率,减少资产损失风险,帮助保证财务报告的可靠性和对法律法规的遵从(COSO,1992)。
尽管有其相关性,但投资者不能直接观察,因此也无法得到内部控制系统设计和发挥功能的信息,因为它们都是组织内的内在机制、活动和过程(Deumes and Knechel,2008)。
由于投资者考虑到成本维持监控管理其声称的(Jensen and Meckling,1976),内部控制系统在管理激励信息沟通上的特性,以告知投资者内部控制系统的有效性,是当其他监控机制(该公司的股权结构和董事会)比较薄弱,从而为其提供便捷的监控(Leftwich et等, 1981)。
上市企业esg信息披露法规ESG信息披露是指企业在环境、社会和治理方面向投资者和利益相关方公开披露相关信息的行为。
随着社会对企业社会责任的关注不断增加,越来越多的企业开始重视ESG信息披露,并将其纳入公司治理的重要环节。
在全球范围内,越来越多的国家和地区开始制定相关法规,要求上市企业进行ESG信息披露。
这些法规旨在促进企业在环境、社会和治理方面的可持续发展,提高企业的透明度和责任感,保护投资者和利益相关方的权益。
在欧洲,ESG信息披露已经成为上市企业必须遵守的法规要求。
欧盟于2014年颁布了《公司社会责任指令》,要求所有上市企业在其年度报告中披露与环境、社会和治理相关的信息。
此外,欧洲还推出了《非金融报告指令》,要求上市企业披露与环境、社会和治理相关的非财务信息。
在美国,虽然没有明确的联邦法规要求上市企业进行ESG信息披露,但美国证券交易委员会(SEC)鼓励上市企业自愿披露与ESG相关的信息。
此外,一些州份如加利福尼亚州和纽约州也出台了相关法规,要求上市企业进行ESG信息披露。
在中国,ESG信息披露也逐渐成为上市企业的法规要求。
中国证监会于2020年发布了《上市公司环境信息披露指引》,要求上市企业在其年度报告中披露与环境相关的信息。
此外,中国证监会还要求上市企业披露与社会责任和公司治理相关的信息。
ESG信息披露的法规要求不仅仅是为了让投资者和利益相关方了解企业的可持续发展情况,更重要的是推动企业在环境、社会和治理方面采取积极的行动。
通过强制要求企业进行ESG信息披露,可以促使企业更加重视环境保护、社会责任和公司治理,从而实现可持续发展的目标。
然而,ESG信息披露的法规要求也存在一些挑战。
首先,不同国家和地区的法规标准存在差异,企业需要花费更多的成本和精力来满足不同的要求。
其次,ESG信息披露的内容和指标并不统一,企业需要根据不同的法规要求进行调整和补充。
此外,一些企业可能存在信息披露不准确或不完整的情况,影响了投资者和利益相关方对企业的判断和决策。
国内外环境会计信息披露比较研究随着全球化的加剧和国际贸易的快速发展,企业在境内外市场都需要适应各种不同的环境和法规,包括环境会计信息披露方面的要求。
环境会计信息披露是企业按照相关法规和规定披露与环境相关的信息,以便各方了解企业在环境方面的经营情况和影响。
本文将比较国内外环境会计信息披露的要求和实践,并探讨其差异和影响。
国内环境会计信息披露的要求主要包括《企业会计准则》和《公司法》等相关法规的规定。
根据这些规定,企业需要在财务报表中披露与环境相关的信息,如环境负债、环境成本、环境投资等。
一些行业标准和指南也对环境会计信息披露进行了规定。
相比之下,国外的环境会计信息披露要求更为严格和具体。
在美国,企业需要遵守美国公共公司会计监督委员会(PCAOB)和美国证券交易委员会(SEC)等相关监管机构的要求,在财务报表中披露与环境相关的信息。
一些国际性的环境会计准则,如国际金融报告准则(IFRS)和国际审计准则(ISA),也对环境会计信息披露进行了规定。
国外企业在环境会计信息披露方面更加重视和规范,主要表现在以下几个方面。
企业的环境会计信息披露范围和内容更为广泛和具体,包括环境政策、环境风险、环境绩效等。
在环境会计信息披露的程序和方法上,国外企业更加注重科学性和规范性,并配合独立审计的要求。
国外企业还注重环境会计信息披露的透明度和可比性,以方便投资者和其他利益相关者进行比较和分析。
国内外环境会计信息披露的差异主要源于两方面的原因。
不同国家和地区的环境立法、监管和准则不同,导致环境会计信息披露的要求和实践不同。
国内外企业对环境问题的关注程度和管理水平存在差异,这也影响了环境会计信息披露的内容和质量。
国内环境会计信息披露的不足不仅影响了企业的形象和声誉,也影响了投资者和其他利益相关者对企业的信任和决策。
国内企业应当重视环境会计信息披露,加强内部管理和制度建设,提高信息披露的质量和可信度。
政府和相关部门也应当加强监管和指导,推动环境会计信息披露的改进和标准化。
cdp sbti 标准CDP(碳披露项目)和SBTi(科学基准目标倡议)是两个在应对气候变化方面起到重要作用的标准和倡议。
本文将详细介绍CDP和SBTi的背景、目标、标准内容以及其在减排行动中的作用。
首先,我们来了解一下CDP和SBTi的背景。
CDP是全球领先的环境报告和披露平台,成立于2003年。
CDP的目标是通过推动企业、城市和政府机构报告和披露其气候变化相关数据,从而帮助了解和解决气候变化的风险和机遇。
而SBTi是由CDP、全球上市公司协会(World Benchmarking Alliance)、全球影响力报告联盟(World Resources Institute)和可持续发展解决方案网络(UN Global Compact)共同发起的倡议,于2015年成立。
SBTi的目标是帮助企业制定符合科学基准目标的减排目标,并在实施过程中提供支持和监测。
CDP和SBTi的核心目标是推动减少温室气体排放和适应气候变化。
为了实现这些目标,CDP和SBTi制定了一系列的标准和指南。
首先,CDP要求企业、城市和政府机构报告其温室气体排放数据、水资源管理和森林披露等相关信息。
CDP还建立了一个评级系统,用于评估组织的气候变化管理水平,从而激励和推动更多的组织采取行动减少排放。
而SBTi则要求企业制定符合科学基准目标的减排计划,包括减少绝对排放量和减少单位产出的排放量。
CDP和SBTi的标准内容主要包括以下几个方面。
首先是温室气体排放数据的披露和管理。
组织需要报告其碳排放量,包括直接排放和间接排放。
此外,组织还需要报告其他温室气体的排放情况,如甲烷、二氧化氮等。
其次是减排目标的设定和计划。
组织需要制定具体的减排目标,并规划减排措施和时间表。
第三是适应气候变化的措施。
组织需要报告其对气候变化的风险识别和适应策略。
最后是科学基准目标的制定和评估。
组织需要参照科学研究和国际协议,制定符合科学标准的减排目标,并接受SBTi的审查和认证。
中文2194字外文翻译原文:Disclosure Quality and Cash FlowWe study a relatively recent change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely the issuance of management cash flow forecasts. While we find some management cash flow forecasts in the early 1980s, the incidence of such disclosures is low until recent years. However, since 2000, there has been a dramatic increase in the issuance of management cash flow forecasts and the number of such forecasts has more than tripled from pre-2000 levels.One potential explanation for this trend is Regulation FD, which went into effect in 2000. For example, if managers were disclosing cash flow forecasts privately to analysts prior to Regulation FD, they would have to publicly disclose such forecasts to all parties after Regulation FD or curtail their management cash flow forecasts completely. Regulation FD potentially increases company disclosure of a wide array of financial information, including cash flow information. Consistent with this, we also document an increasing frequency of management earnings forecasts in recent years.Another potential explanation for the recent trend of more management cash flow forecasts is investors and analysts paying more attention to cash flow information than before. Recent corporate scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and others, have heightened investor concern over potential accounting earnings manipulations. Such concerns were recently noted in a Business Week article entitled “Fuzzy Numbers”.Consistent with an increase in the demand for cash flow information by investors, we also find analyst forecasts of cash flow during the 2000-2003 period more than doubled from pre-2000 levels.We study voluntary management cash flow forecasts and test hypotheses on managers’incentives to issue these forecasts. Prior voluntary disclosure literatureoffers varying predictions for management’s incentives to provide disclosure as well as the nature of information conveyed in management disclosures. For example, theoretical models demonstrate that when there are proprietary costs of disclosure or when investors are uncertain about the information management has, firms will voluntarily disclose good news and withhold less favorable news. Early empirical studies on management earnings forecasts provide evidence consistent with this prediction. More recent empirical work, however, suggests the importance of litigation risk in affecting management earnings forecasts. Skinner[1994] and Kasznik and Lev[1995] document that management earnings forecasts are more likely to convey bad news, consistent with managers are concerned with the risk of litigation and issue preemptive earnings forecasts to adjust downward investor expectations.Earnings forecasts likely play a special role in reducing the risk of litigation, and a more important role than management cash flow forecasts. For firms with bad news and thus concerned about potential litigation, earnings-related disclosures are likely to be more effective in conveying that bad news to investors than disclosures of other financial information such as cash flows because, in general, earnings is the most informative summary performance measure. Thus, earnings disclosure is more likely to bring about the needed adjustment to investor expectations. As a result, the propensity for earnings forecasts to reflect bad news as documented in some of the prior studies may not apply to other types of management forecasts such as cash flow forecasts. Consistent with this, using data since the 1980’s, researchers find that better performance is associated with higher overall disclosure levels.We predict that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to pre-commit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our findings are consistent with these predictions. We find that the likelihood of management cash flow forecasts increases in periods when there is a large increase in operating cash flow, when analysts are forecasting an earnings loss, when management specifically reveals in their press releases that earnings will be either below or above expectations and when firm isyoung. In addition, we find that the likelihood of management cash flow forecasts decreases in periods with extreme positive discretionary accruals.We document that firms issuing management cash flow forecasts tend to have better cash flow information than those without a forecast and that management cash flow forecasts tend to beat existing expectations. This applies to situations where there is very bad or very good news in earnings and when the firm is young, suggesting that management uses cash flow forecasts to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in earnings and to signal economic viability in young firms.We provide evidence on how management reports actual cash flow information in (subsequent) press releases. We document that managers use discretion in reporting realized cash flows in earnings announcement-related press releases and adopt alternative definitions of cash flows (vis-à-vis GAAP definitions of cash flow per the statement of cash flows). Specifically, management-announced actual cash flows tend to exceed actual GAAP cash flows. As a result, management-announced actual cash flows meet or beat management cash flow projections more often than actual GAAP cash flows meet or beat management projections, generating significantly positive cash flow forecast errors. This finding suggests that a similar practice to management’s announcement of pro forma earnings also exists for management announcement of cash flows.Sloan (1996) provides evidence that investors overestimate the persistence of accruals and underestimate the persistence of cash flow. This results in mispricing –labeled the accrual anomaly –where a trading strategy designed to exploit investors’ misunderstanding of the persistence of earnings components earns significant abnormal returns. Literature extending Sloan (1996) primarily focuses on accrual overvaluation (e.g., Xie [2001]; Thomas & Zhang [2002]; Collins, Gong, & Hribar [2003]). However, recent research suggests that research focusing on accrual mispricing without also considering cash flow mispricing is incomplete (Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Yu [2007]; Barone & Magilke [2008]). Thus, in this paper, we investigate the role that disclosure quality plays in the accuratevaluation of both accruals and cash flow. Specifically, we examine whether investors price securities as if they better understand the information in accruals and cash flow for future earnings for firms with high disclosure quality relative to firms with low disclosure quality.Investigating the association between disclosure quality and the mispricing of accruals and cash flow is important because it highlights the role that disclosure quality plays in helping investors to efficiently impound accounting information into prices, thus establishing a link between disclosure quality and market efficiency. As such, this study tests a conjecture in Thomas (2000) that the mispricing of earnings information may result from low-quality disclosures. Our results contribute to the literature by providing evidence that the existence of at least some market anomalies may be reduced by high quality disclosure. Moreover, our research may provide evidence to policy makers as they weigh the costs and benefits of mandating improved disclosures.Recent research provides evidence that temporary accounting distortions arising from accrual estimation errors plays a significant role in the lower earnings persistence of accruals relative to cash flow (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna [2006]). These accrual estimation errors could be a result of both unintentional errors in forecasting the future economic benefits of accruals and intentional managerial manipulation (Xie [2001]; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna [2006]). Sloan (1996) argues that investors fail to fully understand the differential persistence of accruals because they do not understand the greater subjectivity involved in estimating accruals relative to cash flow. Recent research also suggests that investors underestimate the persistence of cash flow and thus, fail to fully understand the future economic benefits of cash flow (Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Yu [2007]; Barone & Magilke [2008]).Theory suggests that increased disclosure plays a role in equity markets by reducing information asymmetries, increasing liquidity, and reducing the cost of capital (Diamond & Verrecchia [1991]; Kim & Verrecchia [1994]). However, very few papers investigate the role that disclosure plays in efficient pricing. Our focuson disclosure is based on the idea that more informative disclosures allow investors to more fully understand the information in accruals and cash flow for future earnings. We conjecture that, all things equal, investors can better understand the managerial assumptions used to record accruals and therefore, can better forecast the future economic benefits and valuation implications of accruals when disclosure quality is higher. We also conjecture that, all things equal, investors can better understand the information in cash flow for future earnings, and thus can more accurately value cash flow, when disclosure quality is higher. More specifically, we predict that stock prices of firms with higher-quality disclosures more accurately reflect the lower (higher) earnings persistence of accruals (cash flow) relative to firms with lower-quality disclosures.Following Sloan (1996), we use the Mishkin (1983) rational expectations framework (hereafter referred to as the “Mishkin test”) to examine whether t he earnings expectations embedded in stock prices accurately reflect the differential persistence of the components of earnings (i.e., accruals and cash flow). We first confirm that the mispricing phenomenon documented by Sloan (1996) occurs in our full sample of firms. That is, we find that investors behave as if they over-estimate the persistence of accruals and under-estimate the persistence of cash flow. We then repeat the Mishkin test using two sub-samples of firms: High-Quality Disclosers (i.e., firms in the top quintile of disclosure quality) and Low-Quality Disclosers (i.e., firms in the bottom quintile of disclosure quality). The results of the sub-sample analysis reveal that the market prices accruals and cash flow differently for the different sub-samples. Specifically, we find significant overpricing of accruals and underpricing of cash flow for Low-Quality Disclosers. However, there is no evidence of mispricing of accruals and cash flow for High-Quality Disclosers. This result implies that investors better understand the information in accruals and cash flow for future earnings when disclosure quality is high.Following prior literature (e.g., Collins, Gong, & Hribar [2003]; Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Mashruwala, Rajgopal, & Shevlin [2006]; Barone & Magilke [2008]), we use a cross-sectional regression approach to investigate whetheraccruals and cash flow are associated with future returns after controlling for variables known to predict future returns (i.e., size, book-to-market). Consistent with recent research, in our full sample, we find no evidence that accruals are associated with future returns when cash flow and the control variables are included in the model (Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Yu [2007]; Barone & Magilke [2008]). However, we do find evidence that is consistent with the existence of cash flow mispricing (Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Yu [2007]; Barone & Magilke [2008]).This study investigates the relationship between disclosure quality and the mispricing of the components of earnings (i.e., accruals and cash flow). Our results provide useful information to regulators, academics, and investors interested in the pricing of earnings components. Specifically, we illustrate a potential benefit of better quality disclosure by documenting a specific case in which higher-quality disclosure is associated with more efficient prices. The results of this study are also relevant to the stream of recent academic research investigating the determinants of accrual and cash flow mispricing.Source:Michael S. Drake,James N. Myers and Linda A. Myers,2008“disclosure quality and cash flow”,August.pp.2-4.译文:信息披露质量和现金流本文研究自愿性信息披露管理实践方面的最新变化,即现金流量预测管理的发布。
《金融机构环境信息披露指南》金融行业标准Financial institutions play a crucial role in the global economy. They serve as intermediaries, facilitating the flow of funds between savers and borrowers, and providing essential financial services to individuals, businesses, and governments. 金融机构在全球经济中扮演着至关重要的角色。
它们作为中介,促进储户和借款人之间资金的流动,并为个人、企业和政府提供必不可少的金融服务。
In today's rapidly changing business environment, stakeholders are demanding greater transparency and accountability from financial institutions. Information disclosure has become increasingly important as investors, regulators, and the public seek to better understand the risks and opportunities facing these organizations. 在当今快速变化的商业环境中,利益相关方要求金融机构提供更多的透明度和问责制。
信息披露变得日益重要,因为投资者、监管机构和公众都希望更好地了解这些组织面临的风险和机遇。
The "Guidelines for Environmental Information Disclosure by Financial Institutions" provide a framework for financial institutions to disclose relevant environmental information, including theirenvironmental policies, practices, performance, and impact. By following these guidelines, financial institutions can enhance their transparency and demonstrate their commitment to sustainability and responsible business practices. 《金融机构环境信息披露指南》为金融机构披露相关环境信息提供了框架,包括他们的环境政策、实践、绩效和影响。
issb 可持续信披准则ISSB(International Sustainability Standards Board)可持续信披准则是一项旨在推动企业在环境、社会和治理(ESG)方面进行透明度和披露的全球性倡议。
该准则旨在帮助企业更好地管理和报告其可持续发展绩效,以促进可持续发展目标的实现。
以下是对ISSB可持续信披准则的介绍和解读。
一、引言可持续发展已成为全球范围内企业和投资者关注的重要议题。
随着环境和社会问题的日益突出,投资者越来越关注企业在ESG方面的表现。
为了满足投资者的需求,提高企业的透明度和披露水平,ISSB可持续信披准则应运而生。
二、背景ISSB可持续信披准则由国际财务报告准则理事会(IFRS Foundation)发起,并与全球范围内的利益相关方合作制定。
其目标是建立一个全球性的、统一的可持续发展信息披露框架,以提高企业的可比性和透明度。
三、准则内容ISSB可持续信披准则主要包括以下几个方面:1. 企业战略与目标:准则要求企业明确规划和披露其可持续发展战略和目标,包括环境、社会和治理方面的目标,并与财务目标相结合。
2. 风险管理:准则要求企业识别和管理与可持续发展相关的风险,包括气候变化、自然资源管理、劳工权益等方面的风险,并披露相关的管理措施。
3. 业绩指标与报告:准则要求企业披露与可持续发展相关的关键业绩指标,如碳排放量、能源消耗、员工满意度等,并提供详细的报告说明。
4. 利益相关方参与:准则要求企业积极与利益相关方进行合作,包括员工、客户、供应商、社区等,以提高可持续发展绩效。
5. 标准与认证:准则要求企业遵循国际标准和认证,如ISO 14001环境管理体系认证、SA8000社会责任管理体系认证等,并进行相应的披露。
四、准则的意义和影响ISSB可持续信披准则对企业和投资者都具有重要意义和影响:1. 对企业而言,准则的实施有助于提高企业的可持续发展绩效,增强企业的竞争力和声誉,吸引更多的投资和资源。
外文文献翻译原文及译文(本文档归max118 网hh2018 所有,仅供下载使用)中文标题:印度环境会计披露实践的影响因素:来自NIFTY 公司的经验证据文献出处:The IUP Journal of Accounting Research & Audit Practices, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2016译文字数:3900 多字原文Factors Influencing Environmental Accounting and Disclosure Practices in India: Empirical Evidence from NIFTY CompaniesB Omnamasivaya* and M S V PrasadThe study examines the factors determining the level of environmental disclosure information by taking a sample of NIFTY 50 companies from National Stock Exchange (NSE). The environmental information disclosure is measured by using an Environmental Accounting Disclosure Index (EADI) and the variables used in the study are profitability, corporate size, age, financial leverage, industry type, legal ownership and foreign operations. The relationship is tested using multiple regression analysis. The results show that there is a positive relationship between EADI and profitability, financial leverage, industry type and legal ownership, and a negative relationship between EADI and corporate size, age and foreign operations.IntroductionClimate change is one of the greatest challenges that the world is facing today. Climate change is the variation in the global climate over time. The climate change creates manifold problems like global warming, glacier meltdown, soil erosion, land degradation, deforestation, loss of biodiversity and all kinds of pollution. Human influence on the nature is one of the major causes of such problems. Indiscriminate use of resourcesand undue influence on nature in the name of development can be identified as the prime causes of climate change. As a result, in the last few decades, the adverse effect of environmental pollution on economic development has become a public concern all over the world (Goswami, 2014).The state of world‘s environment and the impact of mankind on the ecology of the world have led to increased public concern and scrutiny of the operations and performance of organizations. Globally, corporations are expected to include environmental concerns in business operations and interaction with stakeholders. As a result, firms can no longer ignore the problems of the society in which they operate. This has thus instituted a social contract between organizations and the environment, thereby making environmental responsibility a corporate dictate (Olayinka and Oluwamayowa, 2014).Every business has responsibility to use the resources at judiciously. Every enterprise needs to behave like a good corporate citizen, and the corporate behavior is judged by its actions related to the community, the steps taken to protect the environment or pollution control. In the context of the Indian corporate sector, companies are not performing as good citizens. Due to this reason many laws have been laid down by the government for making the companies good corporate citizens and fulfill their social responsibility (Chauhan, 2005).In India, the economic reforms initiated in the 1990s have unwittingly contributed to a rise in environmental problems. The awareness level of stakeholders and public regarding the environmental issues has increased the pressure on companies to disclose environmental information. As a result, the companies have started disclosing the environmental information in annual reports and sustainability reports to satisfy all their stakeholders.The Indian government has taken several steps to protect the environment. It has set up the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) with the aim to coordinate, among the states and the various ministries, the issues relating to environmental protection and antipollution measures. Necessary legislation has also been passed. In India, Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) and State Pollution Control Board (SPCB) were established under the Water Act. The CPCB has identified 17 categories of industries which are highly polluting (Joshi et al., 2011).In India, specific environmental accounting rules or environmental disclosure guidelines for communication to different stakeholder groups are not available for Indian companies. There is no mandatory requirement for quantitative disclosure of (financial) environmental information in annual reports either under the Companies Act or as per the Indian Accounting Standards. Furthermore there are 23 stockexchanges in India which are controlled by the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act, 1992. Each of these stock exchanges has different listing requirement for Indian companies to disclose environmental information. Therefore, any environmental disclosure by Indian companies is purely voluntary (Makori and Jagongo, 2013). Against this backdrop, the present study examines the factors determining the level of environmental disclosure information in India.Legitimacy TheoryIn order to explain the reasons for environmental disclosure, we use legitimacy theory. There are many theories which explain the various reasons for social and environmental accounting disclosures, but legitimacy theory is the most suitable theory to explain the environmental disclosure. Organizations cannot survive without meeting the societal expectations. The society expects that the organizations should be proactive in protecting the environment and minimizing the environmental hazards. In case organizations fail to meet the societal expectations, there is a severe threat to their existence. Nowadays Indian companies are legitimizing because of the awareness about environmental disclosure practices in the society. Therefore, Indian companies are taking several steps to protect the environment and are disclosing the relevant environmental information in their annual reports and company websites.Legitimacy relates to the environmental issues which are disclosedin the companies’ annual reports. This indicates the management concerns towards the community. Therefore, the management of different companies or managers have different ideas or thoughts about what the society expects and managers will adapt different strategies to show the society that the organization is meeting the expectations of the community (Zain, 2006).The theory of legitimacy is based on two fundamental ideas: companies need to legitimize their activities, and the process of legitimacy that confers benefits to businesses. Thus, the first element is compatible with the idea that environmental disclosure is related to the social pressure. In this context, the need for legitimacy is not the same for all companies due to the degree of social pressure the company is exposed to, and the level of response to this pressure. There are a number of factors which determine the degree of social pressure on companies and their responses to the pressure. These factors are potential determinants of corporate social disclosure. The second component is based on the idea that companies can expect to benefit by a legitimate behavior based on the social responsibility activity. In addition to that, the legitimacy theory provides a comprehensive framework to explain both the determinants and consequences of social disclosure (Mohamed et al., 2014).Literature ReviewKokubu et al. (2001) examined the annual reports of 1,203 companies to investigate the determinants of environmental disclosure. Environmental disclosure was measured by using an environmental disclosure index and the six independent variables used in the study were company size, financial performance, strength of consumer relations, dependence on debt, dependence on the capital market and type of industry. The study found that company size and industry type influence environmental disclosure.Elijido-Ten (2004) conducted a study on the determinants of environmental disclosures by using 40 Malaysian companies by applying stakeholder theory. The environmental disclosure was measured by using an environmental disclosure index. The study used three determinants: stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance. The study found that both top management and government power were the determinants of environmental disclosure, and it was also found that there was no relationship between economic performance and environmental disclosure.Yuen et al. (2009) examined 200 companies to investigate the relationship between firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure. Voluntary disclosure practices were measured by using a disclosure index and the independent variables used in the study were concentration of ownership, ownership by state, individual ownership, firm size, leverage,profitability and type of industry. The study found that individual ownership, audit committee, firm size, and leverage positively related to voluntary disclosure.Galani et al. (2011) examined the relationship between environmental disclosure and firm size by using 100 Greek companies. Environmental disclosure was measured by using environmental disclosure index and the independent variables tested in the study were profitability, size and listing status. The study found that there was a positive significant relationship between environmental disclosure and size of the firm and it was also found that there was no relationship between environmental disclosure and profitability listing requirements.Joshi et al. (2011) analyzed as ma ny as 45 Indian companies’ annual reports to investigate the factors influencing environmental disclosure. The environmental disclosure was measured using environmental disclosure index and the independent variables used in the study were profitability, size, accounting firm, industry, foreign operations, age, ownership and financial leverage. The study found that size and industry were significant determinants for environmental disclosure.Rouf (2011) examined the relationship between firm-specific characteristics and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) by taking 176 Bangladesh companies. CSRD was measured by using the CSRD index and the variables in the study were independent directorsand firm size. The study found that there was a positive relationship between CSRD and independent directors and firm size did not affect CSRD.Abdo and Al-Drugi (2012) studied whether any company characteristics influenced environmental disclosures by using 43 Libyan oil and gas companies. Environmental disclosures were measured using content analysis through word count and four characteristics were selected: company’s size, privatization, age, and nationality. The study found that there was a positive association between environmental disclosure and company’s size, company’s privatization, and company’s nationality; and it was also found that the age of the company was significant and negatively related to the level of environmental disclosure.Oba and Fodio (2012) examined the relationship between board characteristics and quality of environmental disclosure by taking 21 companies in Nigeria. Environmental disclosure was measured by using an environmental disclosure index and the independent variables used in the study were board size, foreign directors, gender mix, and board independence. The study found that there was no relationship between board size and environmental disclosure.Suttipun and Stanton (2012) conducted a study on the determinants of environmental disclosure by using 75 Thai companies. The environmental disclosure was measured by word count and the fiveindependent variables used in the study were size of the company, type of industry, ownership status, profitability and country of origin of the company. The study found that there was a positive relationship between environmental disclosure and size of the company.Development of HypothesesCorporate SizeMany of the researchers found a positive relationship between environmental disclosure and size, and many studies supported that large- sized firms disclose more on environment (e.g., Kokubu et al. 2001; Joshi et al., 2011; Suttipun and Stanton, 2012; Makori and Jagongo, 2013; Akbaş , 2014; and Sulaimana et al., 2014).There is a contrast between small enterprises and large enterprises. Large companies require more funds and for that they raise funds through external sources. For attracting the investors and to reduce the agency cost, large companies disclose more information and therefore get public support (Joshi et al., 2011).ProfitabilityThe profitability of a firm is an important factor in determining the environmental disclosure practices. As for whether environmental issues are important or not, it is argued that when the profit is low, the importance of environmental issues is low (Joshi et al., 2011). Many studies have reported that there is a positive relationship betweenprofitability and environmental disclosure (e.g., Nurhayati et al., 2015). A very few studies did not support that (e.g., Galani et al. 2011; Rouf, 2011; Akbaş , 2014; and Sulaimana et al., 2014).Many studies have used the profitability ratios like Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Investment (ROI), Return on Equity (ROE), Net Profit Margin and Dividend Per Share (DPS) to measure the firm profitability. This study uses ROE to measure profitability.Financial LeverageThe agency theory states that with the increase of debt proportion in capital structure, the greater is likely to be the conflict of interest between shareholders, creditors and managers; and the higher the agency cost, the greater is the incentive for managers to disclose more information. From the perspective of social and environmental responsibilities, companies with higher financial leverage are willing to disclose more environmental information to maintain good relationship with stakeholders (Joshi et al., 2011).Many studies have supported the association between financial leverage and environmental disclosure (Joshi et al., 2011; and Sulaimana et al., 2014). They reported that financial leverage has no impact on the disclosure level in India. Kokubu et al. (2001) stated that debt did not significantly influence the corporate environmental reports in Japan. However, this study uses debt-equity ratio for measuring financialleverage.Industry TypeMany studies have examined whether the industry influences the disclosure of environmental information, and many studies have supported strongly that environmental-sensitive companies disclose more environmental information than non-environmental-sensitive companies. Joshi et al. (2011) stated that environmental-sensitive companies in India are likely to disclose more environmental protection information than others. Akbaş (2014) reported that t here is a significant positive relationship between industry membership and the extent of environmental disclosure.ConclusionThe study examined the factors influencing EADI by taking a sample of 50 companies listed on NSE. The environmental accounting disclosure is measured by EADI, and the independent variables used in the study are corporate size, age, profitability, financial leverage, legal ownership, industry and foreign operations. The relationship is tested using multiple regression analysis. The R2 under the model is 0.6033, which indicates that the model is capable of explaining 60.33% of variability in the disclosure of environmental information in the sample companies. The adjusted R2 indicates that 53.72% of variation in the dependent variable is explained by the variations in the independentvariables. The results of multiple regression reveal that there is a positive relationship between EADI and profitability, financial leverage, industry type, and legal ownership, and a negative relationship between EADI and corporate size, age and foreign operations.Limitations: The main limitation of the study is that the data was selected only for one year. The sample size was also limited. Another limitation of the study is that there are many variables which may influence environmental disclosure like board of directors, CEO’s role, audit firm size, etc., but we have selected very few variables.Future Scope: There is huge scope for further research on environmental accounting disclosure in the Indian context, as there is less amount of research on this subject. Further research can focus on the relationship between environmental accounting disclosure practices and financial performance of the companies.译文印度环境会计披露实践的影响因素:来自NIFTY 公司的经验证据B Omnamasivaya,M S V Prasad该研究通过从国家证券交易所(NSE)获取NIFTY 50 公司的样本来分析环境披露信息水平的影响因素。
外文文献翻译原文:Voluntary Environmental Disclosuresby Large UK Companies2. INFLUENCES ON VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE DECISIONSV oluntary disclosures are attempts to remove informational asymmetries between the firm and external agents, primarily agents in the investment community. As recent events in the arena of corporate social responsibility have demonstrated, ethical, social, and environmental aspects of business activities are associated with significant financial consequences. Given the possibility of hidden corporate attributes, investors may prefer not to invest in companies that fail to volunteer information concerning their environmental performance. The point is that, absent disclosure, ‘investors will assume the worst and will bid down its st ock price’ (Cormier and Magnan, 2003, p.47).In that sense, voluntary environmental disclosures may be viewed as attempts by firms to reduce the information risks (and their associated costs) faced by potential and actual investors.However, not all firms choose to make such disclosures, and those disclosures that are made are of varying quality. This is because disclosure is costly in two respects: the costs of measuring, verifying, collating and publishing environmental information; the loss of strategic discretion associated with making public commitments to verifiable future actions and/or performance (Verrecchia, 1983; Li et al., 1997; Cormier and Magnan, 1999; and Skinner, 1994). Corporate decisions concerning the provision and quality of voluntary environmental disclosures are therefore expected to hinge upon a range of firm and industry characteristics that influence the relative costs and benefits of disclosing such information (Cormier and Magnan, 1999 and 2003; and Li et al.,1997). The existing literature demonstrates that these costs and benefits are associated with pressure from external agents such as legislators, regulators,community and environmental lobby groups, consumers and socially responsible investors (Roberts,1992; Li et al., 1997; Sinclair-Desgagne and Gozlan, 2003; and Willis, 2003), the firm’s vulnerability to those pressures as captured by its size and media visibility (Cormier and Magnan,2003; Patten,2002b; and Roberts, 1992), its environmental performance(Patten,2002; and Ullmann,1985), its ownership and governance structures (Cormier and Magnan,2003; Roberts, 1992; and Cullen and Christopher, 2002), and resource availability (Cormier and Magnan,2003; and Roberts, 1992). We will discuss each of these factors in turn.(i) The Nature of Business ActivitiesThe existing environmental disclosure literature identifies a number of legislative, regulatory and institutional sources of pressure on the firm to make such disclosures, and notes that industries differ in respect of their inherent environmental impact(Halme and Huse, 1996), the visibility of environmental issues and the degree and type of regulatory intervention. Industries with a high environmental impact are characterised by their association with particularly visible environmental issues (Bowen,2000) such as global warming and the risk of oil spills. The activities of firms in these industries are subject to intense scrutiny from environmental pressure groups, and recent studies emphasize the visibility of environmental issues in determining environmental responsiveness (Bowen,2000; and Dutton et al., 1990). The association of the organization with environmental issues, in the eyes of external groups including investors and regulators, may stimulate environmental disclosure because of the enhanced urgency of visible issues. This promotes a need to remove informational asymmetries between the firmand external agents in order to reassure the latter regarding the activities of the firm (Dutton et al., 1990). Empirical study has associated high environmental impact with the metals, resources, paper and pulp, power generation,water, and chemicals sectors (Bowen, 2000; Sharma, 1997; and Hoffman, 1999).H1a: The likelihood of a firm making a voluntary environmental disclosure is higher in industries associated with visible environmental issues.One distinctive facet of our empirical analysis involves a clear distinction betweenthe decision to participate in any, perhaps minimal, level of environmental disclosure, and the influences upon the quality of such disclosures. Sinclair-Desgagne and Gozlan(2003) introduce a theoretical model that permits companies to choose the quality of their environmental disclosures according to the nature of their prevailing stakeholder environment. They concl ude that, ‘the quality of voluntarily disclosed environmental information is largely demand-driven’ (p. 380) in the sense that high quality disclosures are expected to be associated with firms that face environmentally concerned stakeholders. Hence, in addition to systematic variation across industries in the likelihood that companies make environmental disclosures, we also hypothesise such variation in the quality of disclosures.H1b: The quality of voluntary environmental disclosure is higher in industries associated with visible environmental issues.(ii) The Environmental Performance of FirmDisclosure fulfils a variety of important functions including informing relevant groups about the firm’s environmental performance, attempting to alter perceptions about the organization’s performance and altering societal expectations of firmperformance (Lindblom, 1994; Patten, 2002a; and Gray et al., 1995). Consistent with this, disclosure may be motivated by the desire to:create an impression of sensitivity to important non-market influences that may be in the long-term interest of the shareholders (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989, p. 39).The need to create, and benefit from creating, such an impression would be expected to fall most heavily on firms that have a record of poor environmental performance. Furthermore, an impetus to disclose among poor performers is driven by the risk of damage to the reputation of senior corporate management that accompanies failure to report bad news in a true light (Trueman, 1997; Hughes and Sankar, 1997; and Skinner, 1994). Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:H2a: The likelihood of participation in voluntary environmental disclosure is negatively associated with a firm’s environmental performance.H2b: The quality of voluntary environmental disclosure tends to be higher the worse is a firm’s environmental performance.(iii) Firm Size and Organizational VisibilityOrganizational size and visibility are commonly proposed as firm-level drivers of environmental disclosure (Patten, 2002a and 2002b; Hackston and Milne, 1996; and Cormier and Magnan, 2003). Large firms tend to be more visible to relevant publics and so tend to be subject to greater political and regulatory pressure from external interests (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Patten 2002b; and Brown and Deegan, 1998).Becasuce of this, large firms may be especially driven to make environmental disclosures to demonstrate that their actions are legitimate and consistent with good corporate citizenship. Furthermore, Cowen et al. (1987) argue that larger organizations are more likely to use formal channels of communication (such as disclosures in annual reports or other corporate documentation) in order to disseminate information concerning corporate activities.H3a: The likelihood of participation in voluntary environmental disclosure is positively related to firm size.H3b: The quality of voluntary environmental disclosure tends to be higher the larger is the firm.Although firm size has often been used as a proxy for corporate visibility, much of the recent disclosure literature emphasises the importance of media exposure (Patten,2002a and 2002b; and Brown and Deegan, 1998). The link between media exposure and organizational visibility, which is well-established in the literature (Sharma and Nguan, 1999; and Meznar and Nigh, 1995), implies that organisations with a higher degree of media exposure tend to be more prone to pressure from social and political stakeholders. Indeed, evidence suggests that organisational visibility prompts firms to take leading roles in managing environmental impacts (Sharma and Nguan, 1999).Thus, we hypothesise that media exposure stimulates an active policy of disclosure.H4a: The likelihood of participation in voluntary environmental disclosure is positivel y related to a firm’s media exposure.H4b: The quality of voluntary environmental disclosure tends to be higher the greater is the firm’s media exposure.(iv) Company OwnershipTraditionally, relationships between the owners of companies and their managers have been described from the perspective of the principle-agent model (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When ownership is dispersed, shareholders, having little by way of direct authority over managers, must monitor their activities. In the absence of an ability to effectively monitor management, the consequent degree of informational asymmetry between the organisation and its shareholders may bring an adverse investor reaction. Indeed, there is evidence of such an effect on environmental disclosure activism (Ullmann, 1985). Hence, one would expect a diffused ownership structure to carry with it an incentive for a firm to voluntarily provide information to shareholders through disclosures (Cullen and Christopher, 2002). In addition, formal modes of communication, such as disclosures made in annual reports, may provide a relatively efficient means of providing information concerning the firm’s environmental impact to a large number of small shareholders. Therefore, we hypothesise that:H5a: The likelihood of participation in voluntary environmental disclosure is positively related to the dispersion of share ownership.H5b: The quality of voluntary environmental disclosure tends to be higher the more dispersed is share ownership.(v) Firm ResourcesFinancially healthy organizations can more easily meet their obligations to owner stakeholders and are less likely to be subject to significant pressure from other financial stakeholders, such as creditors. A developing strand of literature argues that the presence of sur plus financial resources, or ‘organizational slack’, can play a variety of roles in shaping corporate strategy, and the manner of its implementation (Singh,1986; and Sharfman et al., 1988). The presence of slack may stimulate proactive and innovative strategic decision-making (Cyert and March, 1963), or buffer the organization from its operating environment, and so permit suboptimal behaviours to arise and persist (Thompson, 1967). Indeed, in the context of voluntary environmental disclosures,1 slack may promote disclosure simply by providing theresources to meet the accompanying administrative costs.We propose two measures of firm resources for inclusion in this study: profitability and leverage. Firstly, profits provide managers with a pool of resources from which the costs of making environmental disclosures are funded. Secondly, firms with relatively low levels of leverage may experience less pressure from creditor stakeholders and therefore find it easier both to raise funds with which they can fund environmental disclosures, and to have the discretionary ability to focus on organizational activities,such as voluntary disclosure, that are only indirectly linked to the financial success of the firm. In addition, less of their profit streams will be devoted to meeting interest payments to debt holders.H6a: The likelihood of participation in voluntary environmental disclosure is positively related to a firm’s profitability.H6b: The quality of voluntary environmental disclosure tends to be higher the more profitable is the firm.H7a: The likelihood of participation in voluntary environmental disclosure is negatively related to firm leverage.H7b: The quality of voluntary environmental disclosure tends to be lower the higher is the degree of firm leverage.(vi) Board CompositionHaniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that:corporate governance should be considered [as an influence on disclosure] because it is the board of directors that manages information disclosure in annual reports and therefore disclosure may be a function of the constituents of boards (p. 318).The prevalence of agents, such as non-executive directors, who tend to be more strongly aligned with external stakeholder interests than managers (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992) may provide, ‘additional windows on the world’ (Tricker, 1984,p. 171). Better alignment with the views of external groups brings greater expectation of voluntary disclosure activism.H8a: The likelihood of participation in voluntary environmental disclosure is positively related to the number of non-executive directors.H8b: The quality of voluntary environmental disclosure tends to be higher the more non-executive directors the firm has.3. DATA AND METHOD OF ESTIMATIONThe starting point for our sample is the FTSE All-Share Index. The All-Share index is the broadest index of UK listed stocks, representing over 98% of the UK market capitalisation. At the date of our study, 2000, the All-Share index comprised approximately 700 companies (excluding investment trusts) drawn from a wide spectrum of business activities. For our purposes, complete data could be obtained for 447 companies (or about 64% of the FTSE All-Share firms). Throughout our analysis, unless otherwise stated, we introduce a one-year lag between the dependent and independent variables, i.e. disclosure in 2000 is determined by firm and industry characteristics in 1999. This helps to clarify any potentially troubling issues of causality.Approximately 47% of the sample are manufacturers, while just over 33% of the sample are service industry companies (over 9% of which are retailers) while an additional 7% are allocated to the financial services sector. Almost 10% of sample companies are involved in construction, while the remaining 3% are utilities.The DTI’s Small Business Servi ce data suggest that approximately 56% of the large firms in the sectors covered by our analysis are manufacturers, approximately a quarter of 1% are utilities or are involved in extraction, 26% are wholesalers or retailers, 11% are involved with transport, storage or communication and6%are hotels or restaurants.By this yardstick, the sample analyzed here is broadly representative. Differences arise because of the relatively rough industrial classification employed in the DTI statistics and because our sample is composed disproportionately of very large firms. This leads to the over-sampling from industries where the average size of firms is very large and the under-sampling of firms in industries where the average size of firmis small. Hence our sample includes a higher than expected proportion of firms from the utilities and oil/gas/mining sectors and a lower than expected proportion of firms from the retail sector.Source: Stephen Brammer and Stephen Pavelin.Voluntary Environmental Disclosuresby Large UK Companies[J].Journal of Business Finace and Accounting,2006, (33):1168-1188.译文:英国大型公司的自愿性环境信息披露2. 影响自愿性环境会计信息披露的决定因素通过自愿披露信息来努力消除公司和外部代理之间的信息不对称,主要是在投资环境领域的代理。