The role of performance measures in the intertemporal decisions of business unit managers

*Corresponding author.Tel.:202/9945089;fax:202/9945164;e-mail:baber @.Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(1998)169—193Accounting earnings and executive compensation:The role of earnings persistenceWilliam R.Baber *,Sok-Hyon Kang ,Krishna R.KumarSchool of Business and Public Management,The George Washington Uni v ersity,NW,Washington,DC 20052,USASchool of Management,Yale Uni v ersity,New Ha v en,CT 06520,USAReceived 1June 1997;received in revised form 1July 1998AbstractA cross-sectional analysis of cash compensation paid to CEOs of 713US firms reveals that the sensitivity of compensation to earnings varies directly with earnings persistence.Additional analysis indicates that this sensitivity is greater for cases where executives are approaching retirement.Such evidence suggests the use of earnings persistence to counterbalance adverse consequences of earnings-based contracting with managers who face finite decision horizons. 1998Elsevier Science B.V.All rights reserved.JEL classi fication:J33;L2;M4Keywords:Earnings persistence;Executive compensation;Horizon problem1.IntroductionContemporary economic theory,which portrays the firm as a series of contractual relations among stakeholders,establishes a significant role for accounting performance measures when such measures are incrementally in-formative with respect to management’s actions or when their use encourages efficient risk-sharing between contracting parties (Gjesdal,1981;Holmstrom,1979;Lambert and Larcker,1987;Banker and Datar,1989;Sloan,1993).0165-4101/98/$—see front matter 1998Elsevier Science B.V.All rights reserved.PII:S 0165-4101(98)00021-4170W.R.Baber et al./Journal of Accounting and Economics25(1998)169–193This role for accounting is supported by evidence of strong contempor-aneous correlations between accounting earnings and executive compensation (e.g.,Lambert and Larcker,1987;Jensen and Murphy,1990;Baber et al., 1996).Despite this considerable theoretical and empirical justification,performance evaluations based on accounting earnings continue to be criticized for encourag-ing actions that sacrifice long-term profitability for short-term profit gains (Smith and Watts,1982;Dechow and Sloan,1991;Kaplan and Atkinson,1998). This drawback,designated the‘horizon problem’,occurs when the decision-maker’s anticipated tenure with thefirm is shorter than thefirm’s optimal investment horizon(Smith and Watts,1982;Johnson,1987;Dechow and Sloan, 1991;Ittner et al.,1997).Prior studies advocate reliance on long-term perfor-mance measures,deferred or stock-based compensation,or intra-firm monitor-ing to extend management’s decision horizon(Lewellen et al.,1987;Tehranian et al.,1987;Dechow and Sloan,1991).Such mechanisms can temper the horizon problem,yet current earnings cannot easily be dismissed as a less preferred basis for contracting.In particular,both theory and empirical evidence support the premise that earnings are incrementally useful over stock returns and other measures for contracting purposes(Holmstrom,1979;Lambert and Larcker, 1987;Jensen and Murphy,1990;Sloan,1993;Baber et al.,1996).Thus,de-emphasizing current earnings can compromise efficient contracting.Recent studies suggest that compensation committees adjust earnings-based performance measures when doing so improves incentive arrangements(Clinch and Magliolo,1993;Dechow et al.,1994;Gaver and Gaver,1998).In this study, we present evidence that compensation committees consider not only the current-period earnings innovations but also their persistence into the future when rewarding managers based on earnings. Using a cross-section of1992 and1993compensation paid to CEOs of713US corporations,wefind that the strength of pay-for-performance relations between CEO salary and bonuses and accounting performance increases with measures of earnings persistence.The notion that more persistent earnings innovations are assigned greater value in securities markets is now well documented(Kormendi and Lipe,1987;Collins and Kothari,1989;Ali and Zarowin,1992a);however,whether and why com-pensation committees adjust for earnings persistence in executive compensation contracts are heretofore uninvestigated.Thefinding that greater weight is assigned to persistent earnings innovations appears to be consistent with compensation committees’efforts to mitigate the Other studies that examine whether compensation committees make informed adjustments on reported earnings include Abdel-Khalik(1985),Healy et al.(1987),Holthausen et al.(1995)and Natarajan(1996).W.R.Baber et al./Journal of Accounting and Economics25(1998)169–193171 horizon problem.Recall that the horizon problem derives from managers’preferences for lower-NPV projects yielding higher current-period accounting earnings over higher-NPV projects yielding lower current earnings. Arrangements that reward earnings persistence encourage managers to look beyond the current-period earnings and thus extend managers’decision hor-izons,without sacrificing the use of earnings as a contracting vehicle.Additional analysis indicates that relative weights assigned to persistence are greater for CEOs who are approaching retirement.Such individuals face relatively short decision horizons,and therefore,this evidence supports an interpretation that persistent earnings innovations are assigned greater weight to attenuate the horizon problem.The executive compensation literature also suggests different roles for current cash salary and bonus compensation components than for deferred,typically equity-based,components(Bizjak et al.,1993;Yermack,1995).Thus,although our primary focus is to ascertain the extent that earnings persistence is related to executive compensation,an ancillary issue is whether persistence manifests differentially for alternative compensation vehicles.Deferred performance-based components,such as stock options and restricted stock which address long-term consequences of managers’actions,are based primarily on security returns. Equity values impound the consequences of earnings persistence,and therefore, conditioning equity-based components on earnings persistence can be redund-ant.Our evidence is consistent with this reasoning.In particular,wefind positive associations between earnings persistence and weights assigned to current-period earnings innovations for cash salary and bonus components,but not for deferred equity-based compensation components such as stock options or restricted stock.Finally,prior studies report statistically significant correlations between the properties of earnings time series andfirm-specific characteristics,includingfirm size,risk,competition,product types,and earnings response coefficients(Lev, 1983;Collins and Kothari,1989;Easton and Zmijewski,1989).Other studies indicate that weights assigned to accounting earnings in determining the size and the change of executive compensation also depend onfirm-specific factors such as investment opportunities and the cashflows-versus-accruals composi-tion of reported earnings(Gaver and Gaver,1993;Baber et al.,1996;Natarajan, 1996).Thus,we investigate whether the primary results can be attributed to thesefirm-specific characteristics that can be correlated with measures of earn-ings persistence.Wefind that the primary results are robust after considering these characteristics.The next section outlines the arguments that guide our expectations about the role of earnings persistence.The data are described in Section3.The primary empirical tests are presented and discussed in Section4.Additional analyses that support the primary results are reported and discussed in Section5. Section6summarizes the implications of the study.Results using (1! )to measure earnings persistence are reported as primary results.We also report results for alternative measures of earnings persistence that are suggested in the extant literature.2.Unexpected accounting earnings and executive compensation2.1.Earnings inno v ations and earnings persistenceWe adopt an IMA (1,1)time-series characterization of earnings,which facili-tates parsimonious empirical specifications of both earnings innovations and earnings persistence (Beaver,1970;Beaver et al.,1980;Ali and Zarowin,1992b).In particular,X R !X R \ "ºE (X R )! ºE (X R \),(1)where period t earnings innovation ºE (X R )is i.i.d.,and is assumed to be firm-specific.If "0,then earnings follow a random walk process,and all earnings innovations are expected to be permanent (persistent).In contrast,when "1,earnings follow a mean reverting process,and all earnings innova-tions are expected to be transitory .Thus,the parameter (1! ),which measures the extent that earnings innovations are permanent versus transitory,quantifies the notion of earnings persistence.2.2.The compensation functionExisting studies indicate contemporaneous correlations between stock re-turns and executive compensation (Murphy,1985;Coughlan and Schmidt,1985;Jensen and Murphy,1990),and between accounting earnings and executive compensation (Lambert and Larcker,1987;Dechow et al.,1994).Rosen (1992)and Holmstrom (1992),in particular,note the need for considering both ac-counting and security performance indicators when analyzing executive com-pensation arrangements.Thus,meaningful specifications of relations between compensation and firm performance include both accounting earnings and common stock returns as explanatory variables.Following Lambert and Larcker (1987),Jensen and Murphy (1990),and Baber et al.,(1996),we consider a CEO compensation functionCOMP G R " # ºE (R G R )# ºE (X G R )#e G R,(2)where for firm i and period t , COMP G R is the change in executive compensa-tion,ºE (R G R )is the unexpected common stock return,and ºE (X G R )is the earnings innovation.The intuition behind expression (2)is that changes in compensation respond to unexpected performance in accounting earnings and security returns —in particular,we expect '0and'0.172W.R.Baber et al./Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(1998)169–193Formal analysis indicates that,if earnings persistence is rewarded,then the sensitivity of compensation to earnings innovations can vary with the discount rate (r ).We demonstrate later that empirical results are robust to a consideration of the discount rate.The principal focus is on the parameter ,which indicates the sensitivity of compensation to earnings innovations.In particular,we are interested in how varies with earnings persistence.For the IMA (1,1)characterization of earn-ings time series,it can be shown that the expected present value of earnings innovations is [1#(1! G )/r ]ºE (X G R ),where G is the IMA parameter for firm i and r is the equity discount rate. The unity in the brackets reflects the value of current -period earnings innovations,while the quantity (1! G )/r indicates the present value of ‘persistent’effects of the earnings innovation.Note that[1#(1! G )/r ]increases in persistence.If earnings equal cashflows,if earnings time series follow the IMA(1,1)process,and if compensation committees assign equal weights on current earnings innovations and discounted values of ex-pected earnings in each future period (dollar-for-dollar),then the coefficient on ºE (X G R )equals [1#(1! G )/r ]times a certain (positive)proportionality con-stant —that is, " [1#(1! G )/r ], '0.All three conditions may not hold in practice,but in general,we expect to be increasing in persistence (1! G ).More formally,we specify " # (1! G ),where '0.Thus (expres-sion)(2)becomesCOMP R " # ºE (R R )#[ # (1! )]ºE (X R )#e R,(3)where firm subscripts i are suppressed to ease the exposition.The following hypothesis,stated in the alternative form,applies.H :The sensitivity of CEO compensation to unexpected earnings increases with the extent that earnings innovations are persistent ('0).A related issue is how associations between compensation changes and accounting earnings depend on whether compensation takes the form of cash or stock.Note that security prices incorporate both the short-run and the long-run consequences of managers’actions.Thus,conditioning security returns on earnings persistence can be redundant.To the extent that equity-based compensation,such as stock options and restricted stock,is determined by security returns,we expect accounting earnings —and earnings persistence,in particular —to play a more dominant role in the determination of cash,than stock-based,compensation components.Two streams of the literature support this characterization.First,a number of studies indicate that the permanent versus transitory distinction is im-pounded in security prices (Kormendi and Lipe,1987;Collins and Kothari,W.R.Baber et al./Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(1998)169–193173174W.R.Baber et al./Journal of Accounting and Economics25(1998)169–193 1989). Second,results in Baber et al.(1996)indicate that relations between accounting earnings and cash compensation are more substantial(that is, relations are greater both in magnitude and statistical significance)than rela-tions between accounting earnings and stock-based compensation.3.Data and sample selectionCEO compensation data are from1992and1993proxy statements for2009 publicly traded USfirms that responded to a mail request to provide statements for both years.We address compensation changes,and therefore,we omit172firms where the CEO does not serve at least two consecutive full years during the1991—93period. Financial data are from the1993COMPUSTAT primary, secondary,or tertiary datafiles.Eliminatingfirms that lack the data required to compute variables—primarily —or where estimates of do not converge, leaves713firms.In some cases,we have useable data for only one year. Excluding outliers using procedures described in Belsley et al.(1980)yields a maximum of1268firm-year observations for the primary analysis.Disclosures required since1992by the US Securities and Exchange Commission permit meaningful valuations of both cash and equity compensation and also permit decompositions of total compensation into cash versus non-cash and salary versus bonus components.Table1summarizes selected characteristics of the samplefirms.Industry distributions are in panel A,and descriptive statistics are in panels B,C,and D. Profiles for1992and1993are comparable,and therefore,we report only the 1993summary.Statistics displayed in panel B for CEO compensation indicate that the distribution of deferred compensation(primarily the value of stock options and restricted stock awards)is highly skewed and also has a relatively If security prices are a sufficient statistic for the agent’s actions,then not only earnings persistence,but also earnings itself,is redundant.We observe,however,that accounting earnings is used in executive compensation contracts,which suggests that earnings offer incremental informa-tional and/or risk-sharing benefits(Sloan,1993).If reported salaries are pro-rated for CEOs who serve less than a full year,then compensation changes are over-or under-stated.Note that1992is thefirst year thatfirms disclose executive compensation details.Thus,we obtain1991and1992data from1992proxy statements and1993 data from1993statements.Stock option values are computed using the Black and Scholes(1973)approach,adjusted to consider the possibility of early exercise(Hemmer et al.,1994).For relatively few cases where details required to apply the methodology are omitted,we assume that vesting occurs two years after the grant and that the exercise period is identical to the period for the most recent option where the exercise period is provided.Items designated as‘other’compensation—for example,the use of an automobile—are excluded from computations of total compensation and compensation compo-nents.Alternative values,computed using the Black—Scholes approach without adjusting for early exercise,do not materially affect the results.W.R.Baber et al./Journal of Accounting and Economics25(1998)169–193175 Table1Characteristics of samplefirmsPanel A:Distributions of samplefirms across industriesIndustry Number offirmsBasic industries50Capital goods168Construction28Consumer goods245Energy38Financial services78Transportation25Utilities81Total713Descriptive statistics(1993)n Mean Median Std.dev.Panel B.CEO compensation($thousands)Total compensation6889976271,126Cash salary plus bonus689642495524Stock-based compensation68835559795Cash bonus689218110339Panel C:Dependent variables:percent change in compensationTotal compensation6350.2180.035 1.047Cash salary plus bonus6490.0850.0250.374Stock-based compensation3680.477!0.029 4.573Cash bonus4670.1590.011 1.210Panel D:Independent variables:Stocks returns[RE¹]6490.1690.0920.498 Earnings innovations[ºE(X)]6490.0410.0180.394 Earnings persistence [PERSIS¹]6490.8570.8540.300Totalfirms with usable data for1992or1993or both years.Industry classifications are from Ali and Kumar(1994).Descriptive statistics for1992are comparable.Earnings persistence(1! )is computed from X R"ºE(X R! ºE(X R\ ),where X R is year t"1974through1993earnings per share before extraordinary items(COMPUSTAT data item C58).high variance.Moreover,although mostfirms have stock option plans(or similar deferred compensation plans),less than one-half awarded such compen-sation in1993.Note that dependent variables,displayed in panel C,are computed as percent changes.Finally,the mean(median)value of the IMAWe require a minimum of 12annual earnings observations during the period 1974—1993to estimate .Firms are omitted when they do not satisfy this criterion.Similar results obtain when earnings levels are included in the specification.parameter (1! )is 0.857(0.854)using 1974—1993earnings per share data. This estimate is comparable to the median point estimate of 0.85reported in Ali and Zarowin (1992a)using a different sample and time period (1970—1988).Finally,the requirement that firms have earnings time-series sufficient to compete potentially restricts our ability to generalize results.To investigate this issue,we compare the sample observations with approximately 1400obser-vations that are excluded owing to data availability.We find that the excluded firms are smaller than the sample firms,but they perform comparably.In particular,both book values of total assets and market values of equity for excluded firms are substantially less (statistical comparisons are significant for (0.01),but both accounting performance (accounting earnings deflated by the book value of stockholders’equity)and security returns realized during 1992and 1993are comparable (two-tailed '0.10).Our specific concern then,is whether these size differences indicate structural differences in relations between compensation and performance,and in particular,whether they undermine the use of accounting earnings to set executive compensation.Regressions of changes in executive compensation on security returns and changes in accounting performance indicate that compensation-accounting performance relations are positive and statistically significant for the excluded firms (t "4.65),although a Chow test indicates that these relations are less substantial than those for the larger firms that comprise the sample (t "2.09). These analyses suggest a cautious interpretation of the results with respect to the smaller,omitted firms to the extent that accounting performance is less impor-tant as a determinant of executive compensation.4.Primary analysis4.1.The regression speci ficationWe estimate the following specification of expression (3):COMP G R " # >RE ¹G R # \ RE ¹G R *PERSIS ¹G R # b ºE (X G R )# >ºE (X G R )*PERSIS ¹G R # b PERSIS ¹G R # G R ,(4)176W.R.Baber et al./Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(1998)169–193Prior studies (e.g.Dechow et al.,1994;Gaver and Gaver,1998)address compensation levels,rather than changes.We use compensation changes to control for a large number of factors that vary cross-sectionally across the sample firms,and that are shown in prior studies to influence compensa-tion levels.Such factors include firm size,the CEO’s age,tenure and stock holdings,the composition of the board of directors,and other corporate governance-related factors (Core et al.,1998;Cyert et al.,1998).Also,results are comparable when dependent variables are computed,as in Baber et al.(1996),as the change deflated by the base salary in the prior year.Note that (0)indicates that we do not expect the estimate to be statistically significant and (?)indicates that we make no prediction about the direction of the effect.whereCOMP G R "year t !1to year t percent change in firm i CEO compensation specified as either (i)cash compensation defined as cash salary plus cash bonus,(ii)total compensation defined as the sum of cash plus stock-based compensa-tion,(iii)stock-based compensation defined as the value of stock options,stock appreciation rights,phantom stock,or restricted stock,or (iv)cash bonuses; RE ¹G R "firm i ,year t (raw)common stock return;ºE (X G R )"firm i ,year t unexpected earnings per share before extraordinary items (computed using COMPUSTAT data item C 58in expression 1),deflated by the beginning of the year book value per share of stockholders’equity (COMPUSTAT data item C 60divided by COMPUSTAT data item C 25);PERSIS ¹G R "firm i ,year t earnings persistence estimated as (1! G )from expression (1)using 1974—1993annual earnings per share before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item C 58);I (k "0,2,5)"regression parameters; GR "error term;and where predicted signs for the estimates are displayed parenthetically. Five features of the model require elaboration.First,we address four speci-fications of the dependent variable COMP .The motive for doing so is to evaluate whether various compensation components are structured differently,and in particular,to ascertain whether and how earnings persistence interacts with relations between the accounting earnings measures and changes for each compensation metric.Second,following Lambert and Larcker (1987),we use raw common stock returns RET as a proxy for unexpected security returns ºE (R ).This procedure assumes that expected security returns are both cross-sectionally and inter-temporally constant.Other studies that make this assumption include Jensen and Murphy (1990)and Baber et al.(1996).Results (not reported)are compara-ble for risk-adjusted,market-adjusted,and industry-adjusted common stock return specifications of ºE (R ).Third,computations of the measure PERSIS ¹,which indicate the extent that earnings are persistent,involve straightforward applications of expression (1)to W.R.Baber et al./Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(1998)169–193177178W.R.Baber et al./Journal of Accounting and Economics25(1998)169–193obtainfirm-specific maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter (Ali andZarowin,1992b).Estimates of ,which in theory are1for a mean-revertingprocess and0for a random walk process,vary inversely with earnings persist-ence,and therefore,we use(1! )as a measure of PERSIS¹to obtainempirical measures that vary directly.Alternative measures of earnings persist-ence are considered later as refinements to the primary analysis.Fourth,the variables RE¹*PERSIS¹and PERSIS¹,which are not impliedby the formal analysis(Eq.(3)),are included in the empirical specification toexamine whether earnings persistence interacts with security returns or hasexplanatory power as a main effect.We expect the estimate on RE¹*PERSIS¹to be non-positive for two reasons.First,the existing evidenceis that earnings persistence is properly impounded in security prices(Kormendiand Lipe,1987;Collins and Kothari,1989).If so,then conditioning relationsbetween compensation and security returns on earnings persistence is redund-ant.This reasoning implies "0.On the other hand,if earnings persistence increases reliance on accounting earnings,then compensation committees may substitute accounting earnings for security returns.If so,then we expect (0. We note at this point that results are robust with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of these two variables from the specification.Fifth,since we use cross-sectional data,both the dependent and independentvariables are scaled by appropriate deflators.Consistent with the use of securityreturns as an explanatory variable,and to preserve the use of a pure ac-counting-based performance measure,we scale unexpected earnings by begin-ning of the year book value of owners’equity such that unexpected accountingearnings can be interpreted as unexpected ROE.Security return and accountingreturn computations are deflated to control for size-related factors,and thus,wespecify dependent variables as percent changes.The parameter estimate onºE(X)*PERSIS¹addresses the hypothesis, and thus,is the principal focus of the study.Under the(null)hypothesis that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to earnings innovations is unaffected by earnings persistence,the parameter is zero.Under the alternative hypothesis, the weight assigned to earnings innovations increases as earnings persistence (PERSIS¹)increases,and thus,the estimate for the interaction ºE(X)*PERSIS¹is positive.Expectations for other parameters are as follows.Given the well-documentedrole of stock returns in rewarding managers,we predict positive relationsbetween compensation and security returns RE¹( '0).Finally,if accounting income plays a role in executive compensation,then we expect positive relations between compensation changes and unexpected earnings.In particular,if ºE(X)*PERSIS¹is not in the specification,or if earnings persistence is irrel-evant to executive compensation,then we expect positive signs for the estimate .If earnings persistence is relevant,however,then both estimates and indicate the overall relation between compensation and earningsMore specifically,[ # (PERSIS ¹G )]ºE (X G )can be expressed as [d +#d G ]ºE (X G)"d +ºE (X G )#d G ºE (X G ),where d +is the mean [ # (PERSIS ¹G )]and d Gis the firm-specific deviation from the mean.The term d G ºE (X G),which is an omitted variable in the restrictedspecification displayed in column C 1,is negatively correlated with ºE (X G).This implies that theestimateis biased downward.In particular, #PERSIS ¹"!0.1487#(0.4292;0.857)"0.219.Thus,compensationincrease by 0.219;10%"2.19%.innovations.That is,predictions about the sign ofon the main effect need tobe interpreted in conjunction with the estimateon the interaction.Thus,weare uncertain about the sign on the estimate .4.2.ResultsResults for regression model (4),displayed in Table 2,support the hypothesis specifically,and more generally,the discussion in Section 2.When compensa-tion is specified as the cash salary and bonus component and earnings persist-ence is not considered (column C 1),relations between compensation changes and unexpected earnings are positive and statistically significant.Notice that,in the context of expression (3),in column C 1is an estimate of the average of[ # (PERSIS ¹G)]for all firms,which is positive.This estimate can be biased,however,since the specification does not permit PERSIS ¹Gto varyacross firms.Results when earnings persistence is considered (column C 2)indicate a posi-tive,statistically significant estimateon the interaction ºE (X )*PERSIS ¹,which implies that the role of unexpected earnings varies directly with earnings persistence.The estimates and,evaluated for an average firm witha persistence parameter (PERSIS ¹)of 0.857,indicate that,if current period unexpected earnings are 10%of equity,then salary and bonuses increase by approximately 2.2%,which substantially exceeds the 0.6%increase indicated by the restricted specification in column C 1. Relations are similar when compen-sation is specified as changes in cash bonus (column C 3)but,not when specified as changes in stock-based compensation components (column C 4).Results for total compensation are weak (column C 5),as one would expect given the results for compensation components.Finally,for specifications of cash salary and bonus and of total compensation,estimateson the interaction betweensecurity returns and earnings persistence are negative and marginally significant ( (0.11).This relation provides some evidence of the substitution of ac-counting returns for security returns as accounting earnings become more persistent.W.R.Baber et al./Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(1998)169–193179。

内部审计文献综述标准范文Title: Literature Review on Internal Audit: A Comprehensive OverviewAbstract:Internal audit plays a crucial role in ensuring the effectiveness of an organization's internal control system and the reliability of financial reporting. This literature review aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the existing research on internal audit, covering key topics such as the role of internal audit, its performance evaluation, and emerging trends in the field. By synthesizing and analyzing relevant studies, this review not only contributes to the existing body of knowledge in internal audit but also offers insights for practitioners and future research directions.Introduction:Internal audit is an independent and objective assurance activity that allows organizations to evaluate and improve their governance, risk management, and internal control processes. With the growing complexity of business operations and increased scrutiny on corporate governance, the importance of effective internal audit has become more evident. This literature review aims to examine and summarize the key findings and trends in the literature related to internal audit, providing a framework for understanding the current state of research in this field.Role of Internal Audit:The role of internal audit has evolved over the years. Initially, internal audit focused primarily on compliance and transactional review. However, it has gradually expanded to include proactive risk identification, fraud detection, and strategic advisory roles. Several studies highlight the importance of an independent and robust internal audit function in enhancing corporate governance, identifying operational inefficiencies, and preventing fraudulent activities.Performance Evaluation of Internal Audit:Evaluating the performance of the internal audit function is essential for measuring its effectiveness and identifying areas for improvement. Various studies propose different performance evaluation frameworks, emphasizing the need for a balanced approach that considers both qualitative and quantitative measures. Key performance indicators such as audit quality, risk assessment, and employee competency are commonly used to assess the performance of internal audit departments. Emerging Trends in Internal Audit:The digital transformation and increasing reliance on technology have significantly impacted the internal audit profession. Studies have begun to explore the implementation of data analytics, artificial intelligence, and robotic process automation in internal audit processes. Furthermore, the integration of sustainability-related risks and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors into internal audit practices is gaining attention.Conclusion:This literature review provides a comprehensive overview of the research conducted on internal audit. The evolving role of internal audit, the importance of performance evaluation, and the emerging trends in the field have been examined. The findings of this review contribute to the existing body ofknowledge in internal audit and offer insights for practitioners and researchers. Future research should focus on exploring the impact of emerging technologies and addressing the challenges faced by internal audit in a rapidly changing business environment.。

The Dilemma of Performance AppraisalPeter Prowse and Julie ProwseMeasuring Business Excellence,V ol.13 Iss:4,pp.69 - 77AbstractThis paper deals with the dilemma of managing performance using performance appraisal. The authors will evaluate the historical development of appraisals and argue that the critical area of line management development that was been identified as a critical success factor in appraisals has been ignored in the later literature evaluating the effectiveness of performance through appraisals.This paper willevaluatethe aims and methodsof appraisal, thedifficulties encountered in the appraisalprocess. It also re-evaluates the lack of theoretical development in appraisaland move from he psychological approachesof analysistoamorecritical realisation ofapproaches before re-evaluating the challenge to remove subjectivity and bias in judgement of appraisal.13.1IntroductionThis paper will define and outline performance management and appraisal. It will start by evaluating what form of performance is evaluated, then develop links to the development of different performance traditions (Psychological tradition, Management by Objectives, Motivation and Development).It will outline the historical development of performance management then evaluate high performance strategies using performance appraisal. It will evaluate the continuing issue of subjectivity and ethical dilemmas regarding measurement and assessment of performance. The paper will then examine how organisations measure performance before evaluation of research on some recent trends in performance appraisal.This chapter will evaluate the historical development of performance appraisal from management by objectives (MBO) literature before evaluating the debates between linkages between performance management and appraisal. It will outline the development of individual performance before linking to performance management in organizations. The outcomes of techniques to increase organizational commitment, increase job satisfaction will be critically evaluated. It will further examine the transatlantic debates between literature on efficiency and effectiveness in the North American and the United Kingdom) evidence to evaluate the HRM development and contribution of performance appraisal to individual and organizational performance.13.2 What is Performance Management?The first is sue to discuss is the difficulty of definition of Performance Management. Armstrong and Barron(1998:8) define performance management as: A strategic and integrated approach to delivering sustained success to organisations by Improving performance of people who work in them by developing the capabilities of teams And individual performance.13.2.1 Performance AppraisalAppraisal potentially is a key tool in making the most of an organisation’s human resources. The use of appraisal is widespread estimated that 80–90%of organizations in the USA and UK were using appraisal and an increase from 69 to 87% of organisations between 1998 and 2004 reported a formalperformance management system (Armstrong and Baron, 1998:200).There has been little evidence of the evaluation of the effectiveness of appraisal but more on the development in its use. Between 1998 and 2004 a sample from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD, 2007) of 562 firms found 506 were using performance appraisal in UK.What is also vital to emphasise is the rising use of performance appraisal feedback beyond performance for professionals and managers to nearly 95% of workplaces in the 2004 WERS survey (seeTable 13.1).Clearly the use of Appraisals has been the development and extension of appraisals to cover a large proportion of the UK workforce and the coverage of non managerial occupations and the extended use in private and public sectors.13.2.2 The Purpose of AppraisalsThe critical issue is what is the purpose of appraisals and how effective is it ？Researched and used in practice throughout organizations? The purpose of appraisals needs to be clearly identified. Firstly their purpose. Randell (1994) states they are a systematic evaluation of individual performance linked to workplace behaviour and/or specific criteria. Appraisals often take the form of an appraisal interview,usually annual,supported by standardised forms/paperwork.The key objective of appraisal is to provide feedback for performance is provided by the linemanager.The three key questions for quality of feedback:1. What and how are observations on performance made?2. Why and how are they discussed?3. What determines the level of performance in the job?It has been argued by one school of thought that these process cannot be performed effectively unless the line manager of person providing feedback has the interpersonal interviewing skills to providethat feedback to people being appraised. This has been defined as the “Bradford Approach” which places a high priority on appraisal skills development (Randell, 1994). This approach is outlined in Fig. 13.1 whichidentifies the linkages betweeninvolving,developing, rewarding and valuing people at work..13.2.3 Historical Development of AppraisalThe historical development of performance feedback has developed from a range of approaches.Formal observation of individual work performance was reported in Robert Owens’s Scottish factory inNew Lanarkin the early 1800s (Cole, 1925). Owen hung over machines a piece of coloured wood over machines to indicate the Super intendent’s assessment of the previous day’s conduct (white forexcellent, yellow, blue and then black for poor performance).The twentieth centuryled to F.W. Taylor and his measured performance and the scientific management movement (Taylor, 1964). The 1930sTraits Approaches identified personality and performance and used feedback using graphic rating scales, a mixed standard of performance scales noting behaviour in likert scale ratings.This was used to recruit and identify management potential in the field of selection. Later developments to prevent a middle scale from 5 scales then developed into a forced-choice scale which forced the judgement to avoid central ratings.The evaluation also included narrative statements and comments to support the ratings (Mair, 1958).In the 1940s Behavioural Methods were developed. These included Behavioural Anchored Rating Scales (BARS); Behavioural Observation Scales (BOS); Behavioural Evaluation Scales (BES); critical incident;job simulation. All these judgements were used to determine the specific levels of performance criteria to specific issues such as customer service and rated in factors such asexcellent,average orneeds to improve or poor.These ratings are assigned numerical values and added to a statement or narrative comment by the assessor. It would also lead to identify any potential need for training and more importantly to identify talent for careers in linemanagement supervision and future managerial potential.Post1945 developed into the Results-oriented approaches and led to the development of management by objectives (MBO). This provided aims and specific targets to be achievedand with in time frames such as pecific sales, profitability,and deadlines with feedback on previous performance (Wherry, 1957).The deadlines may have required alteration and led to specific performance rankings of staff. It also provided a forced distributionof rankingsof comparative performance and paired comparison ranking of performance and setting and achieving objectives.In the 1960s the developmentof Self-appraisal by discussion led to specific time and opportunity for the appraisee to reflectively evaluate their performance in the discussion and the interview developed into a conversation on a range of topics that the appraise needed to discuss in the interview. Until this period the success of the appraisal was dependent on skill of interviewer.In the 1990s the development of 360-degree appraisal developed where information was sought from a wider range of sources and the feedback was no longer dependent on the manager-subordinate power relationship but included groups appraising the performance of line managers and peer feedback from peer groups on individual performance (Redman and Snape, 1992). The final development of appraisal interviews developed in the 1990s with the emphasis on the linking performance with financial reward which will be discussed later in the paper.13.2.4 Measures of PerformanceThe dilemma of appraisal has always to develop performance measures and the use of appraisal is the key part of this process. Quantitative measure of performance communicated as standards in the business and industry level standards translated to individual performance. The introduction of techniques such as the balanced score card developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992).Performance measures and evaluation included financial, customer evaluation, feedback on internal processes and Learning and Growth. Performance standards also included qualitative measures Which argue that there is an over emphasis on metrics of quantitative approach above the definitions of quality services and total quality management.In terms of performance measures there has been a transformation in literature and a move in the 1990s to the financial rewards linked to the level of performance.The debates will be discussed later in the paper.13.3 Criticism of AppraisalsCritiques of appraisal have continued as appraisal shave increased in use and scope across sectors and occupations. The dominant critique is the management framework using appraisal as an orthodox technique that seeks to remedy the weakness and propose of appraisals as a system to develop performance.This “orthodox” approach argues there are conflicting pur poses of appraisal (Strebler et al, 2001). Appraisal can motivate staff by clarifying objectives and setting clear future objectives with provision for training and development needs to establish the performance objective. These conflicts withassessing past performance and distribution of rewards based on past performance (Bach, 2005:301).Employees are reluctant to confide any limitations and concerns on their current performance as this could impact on their merit related reward or promotion opportunities(Newton and Findley, 1996:43).This conflicts with performance as a continuum as appraisers are challenged with differing roles as both monitors and judges of performance but an understanding counsell or which Randell(1994)argues few manager shave not received the raining to perform.Appraisal Manager’s reluctance to criticise also stems from classic evidence fromMcGregor that managers are reluctant to make an egative judgement on an individual’s performance a sit could be demotivating,leadto accusationsoftheirown supportand contributiontoindividual poor performance and to also avoid interpersonal conflict (McGregor, 1957).One consequence of this avoidance of conflict is to rate all criterion as central and avoid any conflict known as the central tendency.In a study of senior managers by Long neckeretal.(1987),they found organisational politics influenced ratings of 60 senior executives.The findings were that politics involved deliberate attempts by individuals to enhance or protect self-interests when conflicting courses of action are possible and that ratings and decisions were affected by potential sources of bias or inaccuracy in their appraisal ratings (Longeneckeret al., 1987).There are methods of further bias beyond Longenecker’s evidence. The polit ical judgements and they have been distorted further by overrating some clear competencies in performance rather than being critical across all rated competencies known as the halo effect and if some competencies arelower they may prejudice the judgment acrossthe positive reviews known as the horns effect (ACAS, 1996).Some ratings may only cinclude recent events and these are known as the recency effects. In this case only recent events are noted compared to managers gathering and using data throughout the appraisal period .A particular concern is the equity of appraisal for ratings which may be distorted by gender ,ethnicity and the ratings of appraisers themselves .A range of studies in both the US and UK have highlighted subjectivity in terms of gender (Alimo-Metcalf, 1991;White, 1999) and ethnicity of the appraise and appraiser(Geddes and Konrad, 2003). Suggestions and solutions on resolving bias will be reviewed later.The second analysis is the radical critique of appraisal. This is the more critical management literature that argues that appraisal and performance management are about management control(Newton and Findley, 1996;Townley, 1993). It argues that tighter management control over employee behaviour can be achieved by the extension of appraisal to manual workers, professional as means to control. This develops the literature of Foucault using power and surveillance. This literature uses cases in examples of public service control on professionals such a teachers (Healy, 1997) and University professionals(Townley, 1990).This evidence argues the increased control of public services using appraisal as a method of control and that the outcome of managerial objectives ignores the developmental role of appraisal and ratings are awarded for people who accept and embrace the culture and organizational values . However, this literature ignores the employee resistance and the use of professional unions to challenge the attempts to exert control over professionals and staff in the appraisal process (Bach, 2005:306).One of the different issues of removing bias was the use of the test metaphor (Folgeretal.,1992).This was based on the assumption that appraisal ratings were a technical question of assessing “true” performance and there needed to be increased reliability and validity of appraisal as an instrument to develop motivation and performance. The sources of rater bias and errors can be resolvedby improved organisational justice and increasing reliability of appraiser’s judgement.However there were problems such as an assumption that you can state job requirements clearly and the organization is “rational” with objectives that reflect values and that the judgment by appraisers’ are value free from political agendas and personal objectives. Secondly there is the second issue of subjectivity if appraisal ratings where decisions on appraisal are rated by a “political metaphor”(Hart le, 1995).This “political view” argues that a appraisal is often done badly because there is a lack of training for appraisers and appraisers may see the appraisal as a waste of time. This becomes a process which managers have to perform and not as a potential to improve employee performance .Organisations in this context are “political” and the appraisers seek to maintain performance from subordinates and view appraises as internal customers to satisfy. This means managers use appraisal to avoid interpersonal conflict and develop strategies for their own personal advancement and seek a quiet life by avoiding censure from higher managers.This perception means managers also see appraisee seeks good rating and genuine feedback and career development by seeking evidence of combining employee promotion and pay rise.This means appraisal ratings become political judgements and seek to avoid interpersonal conflicts. The approaches of the “test” and “political” metaphors of appraisal are inaccurate and lack objec tivity and judgement of employee performance is inaccurate and accuracy is avoided.The issue is how can organisations resolve this lack of objectivity?13.3.1 Solutions to Lack of Objectivity of AppraisalGrint(1993)argues that the solutions to objectivity lies in part with McGregor’s (1957) classic critique by retraining and removal of “top down” ratings by managers and replacement with multiple rater evaluation which removes bias and the objectivity by upward performance appraisal. The validity of upward appraisal means there moval of subjective appraisal ratings.This approach is also suggested to remove gender bias in appraisal ratings against women in appraisals (Fletcher, 1999). The solution of multiple reporting(internal colleagues, customers and recipients of services) will reduce subjectivity and inequity of appraisal ratings. This argument develops further by the rise in the need to evaluate project teams and increasing levels of teamwork to include peer assessment. The solutions also in theory mean increased closer contact with individual manager and appraises and increasing services linked to customer facing evaluations.However, negative feedback still demotivates and plenty of feedback and explanation by manager who collates feedback rather than judges performance andfail to summarise evaluations.There are however still problems with accuracy of appraisal objectivity asWalker and Smither (1999)5year studyof 252 managers over 5 year period still identified issues with subjective ratings in 360 degree appraisals.There are still issues on the subjectivity of appraisals beyond the areas of lack of training.The contribution of appraisal is strongly related to employee attitudes and strong relationships with job satisfaction(Fletcher and Williams, 1996). The evidence on appraisal still remains positive in terms of reinvigo rating social relationships at work (Townley,1993)and the widespread adoption in large public services in the UK such as the national health Service (NHS)is the valuable contribution to line managers discussion with staff on their past performance, discussing personal development plans and training and development as positive issues.One further concern is the openness of appraisal related to employee reward which we now discuss.13.3.2 Linking Appraisals with Reward ManagementAppraisal and performance management have been inextricably linked to employee reward since the development of strategic human resource management in the 1980s. The early literature on appraisal linked appraisal with employee control (Randell, 1994;Grint, 1993;Townley, 1993, 1999) and discussed the use of performance related reward to appraisals. However therecent literature has substituted the chapter titles employee “appraisal” with “performance management”(Bach, 2005; Storey, 2007) and moved the focus on performance and performance pay and the limits of employee appraisal. The appraisal and performance pay link has developed into debates to three key issues:The first issue is has performance pay related to appraisal grown in use?The second issue is what type of performance do we reward?and the final issue is who judges management standards?The first discussion on influences of growth of performance pay schemes is the assumption that increasing linkage between individual effort and financial reward increases performance levels. This linkage between effort and financial reward increasing levels of performance has proved an increasing trend in the public and private sector (Bevan and Thompson, 1992;Armstrong and Baron, 1998). The drive to increase public sector performance effort and setting of targets may even be inconsistent in the experiences of some organizational settings aimed at achieving long-term targets(Kessler and Purcell, 1992;Marsden, 2007). The development of merit based pay based on performance assessed by a manager is rising in the UK Marsden (2007)reported that the: Use of performance appraisals as a basis for merit pay are used in65 percent of public sector and 69 percent of the private sector employees where appraisal covered all nonmanagerial staff(p.109).Merit pay has also grown in use as in 1998 20% of workplaces used performance related schemes compared to 32% in the same organizations 2004 (Kersley et al., 2006:191). The achievements of satisfactory ratings or above satisfactory performance averages were used as evidence to reward individual performance ratings in the UK Civil Service (Marsden, 2007).Table 13.2 outlines the extent of merit pay in 2004.The second issue is what forms of performance is rewarded. The use of past appraisal ratings as evidence of achieving merit-related payments linked to achieving higher performance was the predominant factor developed in the public services. The evidence on Setting performance targets have been as Kessler (2000:280) reported “inconsistent within organizations and problematic for certain professional or less skilled occupations where goals have not been easily formulated”. There has been inconclusive evidence from organizations on the impact of performance pay and its effectiveness in improving performance. Evidence from a number of individual performance pay schemes report organizations suspending or reviewing them on the grounds that individual performance reward has produced no effect in performance or even demotivates staff(Kessler, 2000:281).More in-depth studies setting performance goals followed by appraisal on how well they were resulted in loss of motivation whilst maintaining productivity and achieved managers using imposing increased performance standards (Marsden and Richardson, 1994). As Randell(1994) had highlighted earlier, the potential objectivity and self-criticism in appraisal reviews become areas that appraisees refuse to acknowledge as weaknesses with appraisers if this leads to a reduction in their merit pay.Objectivity and self reflection for development becomes a weakness that appraises fail to acknowledge as a developmental issue if it reduces their chances of a reduced evaluation that will reduce their merit reward. The review of civil service merit pay (Makinson, 2000)reported from 4major UK Civil Service Agencies and the National Health Service concluded that existing forms of performance pay and performance management had failed to motivate many staff.The conclusions were that employees found individual performance pay divisive and led to reduced willingness to co-operate with management ,citing managerial favorites and manipulation of appraisal scores to lower ratings to save paying rewards to staff (Marsden and French, 1998).This has clear implications on the relationship between line managers and appraises and the demotivational consequences and reduced commitment provide clear evidence of the danger to linking individual performance appraisal to reward in the public services. Employees focus on the issues that gain key performance focus by focusing on specific objectives related to key performance indicators rather than all personal objectives. A study of banking performance pay by Lewis(1998)highlighted imposed targets which were unattainable with a range of 20 performance targets with narrow short term financial orientatated goals. The narrow focus on key targets and neglect of other performance aspects leads to tasks not being delivered.This final issue of judging management standards has already highlighted issues of inequity and bias based on gender (Beyer, 1990; Chen and DiTomasio, 1996; Fletcher, 1999). The suggested solutions to resolved Iscrimination have been proposed as enhanced interpersonal skills training are increased equitable use of 360 degree appraisal as a method to evaluate feedback from colleagues as this reduces the use of the “political metaphor”(Randell, 1994;Fletcher, 1999).On measures linking performance to improvement require a wider approach to enhanced work design and motivation to develop and enhance employee job satisfaction and the design of linkages between effort and performance are significant in the private sector and feedback and awareness in the public sector (Fletcher and Williams, 1996:176). Where rises be in pay were determined by achieving critical rated appraisal objectives, employees are less self critical and open to any developmental needs in a performance review.13.4 ConclusionAs performance appraisal provides a major potential for employee feedback that could link strongly to increasing motivation ,and a opportunity to clarify goals and achieve long term individual performance and career development why does it still suffers from what Randell describes as a muddle and confusion which still surrounds the theory and practice?There are key issues that require resolution and a great deal depends on the extent to which you have a good relationship with your line manager . Barlow(1989)argued `if you get off badly with your first two managers ,you may just as well forget it (p. 515).The evidence on the continued practice of appraisals is that they are still institutionally elaborated systems of management appraisal and development is significant rhetoric in the apparatus of bureaucratic control by managers (Barlow, 1989). In reality the companies create, review, change and even abolish appraisals if they fail to develop and enhance organisational performance(Kessler, 2000). Despite all the criticism and evidence the critics have failed to suggest an alternative for a process that can provide feedback, develop motivation, identify training and potential and evidence that can justify potential career development and justify reward(Hartle, 1997).绩效考核的困境Peter Prowse and Julie Prowse摘要本文旨在用绩效考核方法来解决绩效管理的困境。

performance evaluation methodsPerformance evaluation is one of the most critical aspects of any organization. It refers to the process of assessing an employee's work performance against predetermined standards of performance. The primary objective of performance evaluation is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of an employee and provide feedback to help them improve their work.There are several methods of performance evaluation used in organizations. This article will discuss some of these methods in detail.1. Self-EvaluationSelf-evaluation is a method of performance evaluation in which employees assess their performance against predetermined goals and standards. This method involves employees reflecting on their work, identifying their strengths and weaknesses, and documenting their accomplishments.Self-evaluation can be a valuable tool, as it allows employees to take ownership of their performance, encourages self-reflection, and can improve communication between employee and employer.2. Peer EvaluationPeer evaluation is a method of performance evaluation in which an employee's performance is assessed by their colleagues. This method involves colleagues providing feedback on the employee's work, interpersonal skills, and overall contribution to the team.Peer evaluation can be a useful tool, as it provides employees with valuable feedback from their colleagues, encourages teamwork and collaboration, and can help identify areas for improvement.3. Manager EvaluationManager evaluation is a method of performance evaluation in which an employee's performance is assessed by their manager. This method involves the manager providing feedback on the employee's work performance, as well as their contribution to the organization.Manager evaluation can be effective if the manager has a good understanding of the employee's work and can provide constructive feedback. However, this method can also be biased, as managers may be influenced by personal biases or factors outside of work.4. 360-Degree Feedback360-degree feedback is a method of performance evaluation in which an employee's performance is assessed by multiple sources, including colleagues, managers, and customers. This method involves gathering feedback from a variety of perspectives to provide a comprehensive view of theemployee's performance.360-degree feedback can be an effective tool, as it provides a more complete picture of an employee's performance, encourages collaboration and teamwork, and can help identify areas for improvement.In conclusion, there are several methods of performance evaluation used in organizations. Each method has itsstrengths and weaknesses, and the most effective method will depend on the objectives of the evaluation and the culture of the organization. Employers should consider using a varietyof methods to provide a comprehensive view of an employee's performance and encourage ongoing development and improvement.。

计划管理副主管英语The Role and Responsibilities of a Deputy Manager in Project Management.In the fast-paced and ever-evolving world of business, project management has become a crucial component of any successful organization. At the helm of these projects are the project managers and their deputies, who guide the ship through rough waters and ensure that the objectives are met with precision and efficiency. This article delves into the role and responsibilities of a deputy manager in project management, highlighting the key skills, qualifications,and challenges they face in executing projects successfully.The Role of the Deputy Manager in Project Management.The deputy manager in project management plays apivotal role in ensuring the smooth running of projects. They are typically part of the senior management team and report directly to the project manager, assisting them inday-to-day operations and decision-making. The deputy manager's responsibilities span across various areas, including but not limited to:1. Supporting the Project Manager: The deputy manager acts as a trusted advisor and sounding board for theproject manager. They provide valuable insights, feedback, and alternative perspectives that help shape strategic decisions.2. Overseeing Project Execution: They oversee the implementation of projects, ensuring that the work is carried out according to the agreed scope, timeline, and budget. This involves monitoring progress, identifying risks, and taking corrective measures to mitigate any potential delays or cost overruns.3. Leading Teams: The deputy manager often leads a team of project coordinators, analysts, and other project management professionals. They mentor and guide the team, ensuring that they have the necessary skills and resources to perform their duties effectively.4. Communicating with Stakeholders: They act as the liaison between the project team and various stakeholders, including clients, suppliers, and internal departments. They ensure that information flows freely and that all parties are kept informed of the project's progress and any potential issues.5. Managing Resources: The deputy manager is responsible for allocating and managing project resources, including personnel, funds, and equipment. They ensure that these resources are used efficiently and effectively to maximize the project's chances of success.Qualifications and Skills Required.To effectively fulfill the role of a deputy manager in project management, individuals must possess a combination of qualifications, skills, and experiences. These include:Education: A degree in project management, business administration, or a related field is typically required.Postgraduate qualifications, such as an MBA or a master's degree in project management, can further enhance one's credentials.Professional Certifications: Obtaining professional certifications, such as the Project Professional (PMP) or the Certified Associate in Project Management (CAPM) from the Project Management Institute (PMI), can demonstrate proficiency in project management principles and practices.Technical Skills: The deputy manager should possess strong technical skills in areas such as Microsoft Project, Microsoft Office Suite, and other project management software tools.Leadership and People Management Skills: The ability to lead, motivate, and mentor a team is crucial. The deputy manager must be able to build trust, communicate effectively, and resolve conflicts to create a positive work environment.Analytical and Decision-Making Skills: The deputymanager must possess strong analytical skills to identify risks, assess options, and make informed decisions. They should also be able to think strategically and anticipate potential issues to mitigate them before they arise.Attention to Detail: Project management is a highly detailed-oriented field. The deputy manager must pay close attention to details, ensuring that all aspects of the project are executed according to plan.Adaptability and Flexibility: Projects often face unexpected changes and challenges. The deputy manager must be able to adapt quickly to these changes and flexibly adjust plans and resources to ensure the project's success.Challenges Faced by Deputy Managers.While the role of a deputy manager in project management can be rewarding, it also comes with its unique challenges. These include:1. Balancing Multiple Projects: Deputy managers oftenoversee multiple projects simultaneously, each with its own unique challenges and deadlines. Managing these projects effectively and ensuring that they all meet their objectives can be a daunting task.2. Handling Complex Stakeholder Relationships: Managing relationships with various stakeholders, including clients, suppliers, and internal departments, can be complex. Deputy managers must be adept at communication and negotiation to ensure smooth collaboration and conflict resolution.3. Dealing with Unexpected Changes: Projects often face unexpected changes, such as scope creep, budget cuts, or personnel changes. Deputy managers must be able to adapt quickly to these changes and make informed decisions to minimize their impact on the project's success.4. Maintaining High Performance Standards: Deputy managers are expected to maintain high performance standards and deliver results that meet or exceed expectations. This can be pressure-filled, especially when dealing with tight deadlines or challenging project scopes.Conclusion.The role of a deputy manager in project management is crucial to the success of any project. They play a pivotal role in supporting the project manager, overseeing project execution, leading teams, communicating with stakeholders, and managing resources. To effectively fulfill this role, individuals must possess a combination of qualifications, skills, and experiences that enable them to handle the unique challenges of project management. By continuously developing their skills and staying abreast of industry trends, deputy managers can help their organizations achieve their strategic objectives through successful project delivery.。

军队文职述职报告尊敬的领导：时间荏苒，瞬间间我已经受军队文职岗位已有几年时间。

在过去的一年里，我深感肩上的责任重大，岗位的光荣使命对于我来说更是鞭策和激励。

在这封述职报告中，我将向您汇报过去一年来的工作状况，并对将来的工作提出一些建议。

一、岗位工作履职状况通过一年的努力工作，我在岗位上取得了一些可喜的效果。

起首，我严格按照上级指示和有关制度，勤勉履行各项文书工作，如撰写公文、协调会议等。

同时，我加强了对重要文件和资料的整理与归档管理，确保了信息的快速传递和准确性。

其次，我加强了与外单位的沟通与协调。

定期召开联席会议，与其他单位保持了紧密的联系，准时解决了一些协作工作中的问题。

我还主动参与各类会议和座谈会，了解上级的工作方针和要求，并将其贯彻到实际工作中。

此外，我在组织人事工作中发挥了乐观作用。

我按时组织了干部选拔任用、人员统计、人员调配等工作，并加强了与相关部门的协作与协作。

同时，我也做好了平时的绩效考核工作，确保了岗位人员的工作乐观性和凝聚力。

二、存在问题及改进措施在工作中，我也存在一些问题，需要进一步改进。

起首，由于军队文职工作的特殊性和不息变化的局势，我需要更加深度地进修有关军事政策和法规知识，以提高自己的业务水平宁专业素养。

其次，要提高沟通和协调能力。

虽然我在过去一年中加强了与外单位的联系，但还有待进一步提高。

我将继续加强与各军种及相关部门的联系，加强信息的共享和沟通，以推动各项工作的顺畅开展。

你接下来，我将加强和完善内部管理与工作流程。

通过进一步优化文件管理、流程规范化、信息化等措施，提高办公效率和协同能力。

同时，加强团队建设，提高员工的工作意识和专业素养，以更好地完成岗位职责。

三、对将来工作的建议尊敬的领导，鉴于军队文职工作的特殊性和挑战性，我提出以下几点建议供参考：起首，加强政策进修和探究，保持对国家军事政策的跟踪和了解，以更好地为工作提供有效支持。

其次，加强职业技能培训，不息提高自身的专业素养和综合能力，适应和应对工作中的变化。

预算绩效管理知识竞赛题库英文回答：1. What is the primary purpose of performance budgeting?To determine how effectively resources are used to achieve desired outcomes.2. What are the key components of a performance budget?Strategic goals, performance indicators, targets,and funding levels.3. What is the role of performance measures in performance budgeting?To measure progress towards achieving strategicgoals and to inform decision-making.4. What are the benefits of performance budgeting?Improved transparency, accountability, and efficiency.5. What are the challenges of performance budgeting?Selecting appropriate performance measures, ensuring data accuracy, and addressing unintended consequences.6. What is the difference between input, output, and outcome measures?Input measures focus on resources used, output measures focus on activities completed, and outcome measures focus on the overall impact of programs.7. What is the role of stakeholders in performance budgeting?Stakeholders provide input on performance measures, targets, and funding levels.8. How can performance budgeting be used to improve public policy?By providing evidence-based information to support decision-making and by holding policymakers accountable for results.9. What are some examples of successful performance budgeting initiatives?The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) in the United States.The Budget for Results program in the United Kingdom.10. What are the future trends in performance budgeting?Increased use of data analytics, greater emphasis on outcome measures, and more sophisticated performance management systems.中文回答：1. 绩效预算管理的主要目的是什么？确定如何有效地利用资源实现预期成果。