投资条款清单termsheet

投资协议条款清单（Term Sheet）- 强卖权Term Sheet: Drag AlongThis is one of those terms that has recently increased in importance to VCs due to the all the financing and exit dynamics that occurred during the downturn of 2001 – 2003. A typical drag-along agreement is short and sweet and looks as follows:"Drag-Along Agreement: The [holders of the Common Stock] or [Founders] and Series A Preferred shall enter into a drag-along agreement whereby if a majority of the holders of Series A Preferred agree to a sale or liquidation of the Company, the holders of the remaining Series A Preferred and Common Stock shall consent to and raise no objections to such sale."As transactions started occurring that were at or below the preferred liquidation preferences, entrepreneurs and founders –not surprisingly – started to resist doing these transactions since they often weren't getting anything in the deal. While there are several mechanisms to address sharing consideration below the liquidation preferences (e.g. the "carve out" - which we'll talk more extensively about some other time), the fundamental issue is that if a transaction occurs below the liquidation preferences, it's likely that some or all of the VCs are losing money on the transaction. The VC point of view on this varies widely (and is often dependent on the situation) – some VCs can deal with this and are happy to provide some consideration to management to get a deal done; others are stubborn in their view that since they lost money, management shouldn't receive anything.However, in all of these situations, the VCs would much rather control their ability to compel other shareholders to support the transaction being considered. As more of these situations appeared, the major holders of common stock (even when they were in the minority of ownership) began refusing to vote for the proposed transaction unless the holders of preferred waived part of their liquidation preferences in favor of the common. Needless to say, this "hold out technique" did not go over well in the venture community and, as a result, the drag-along became more prevalent.I've heard founders and early shareholders say a variety of things with regard to a drag-along, but the most inane is "it's not fair – I want to be able to vote my stock however I want to." Remember that this term is one of a basket of terms that are part of an overall negotiation associated with injecting money into your company. There are tradeoffs in any negotiation and nothing is standard – so "fair" is an irrelevant concept –if you don't like the terms, don't do the deal.If you are faced with a drag-along, your ownership position will determine whether or not this is a relevant issue for you. An M&A transaction does not require unanimous consent of shareholders (these rules vary by jurisdiction, although the two most common situations are either majority of each class (California) or majority of all shares on an as converted basis (Delaware)), although most acquirers will want 85% to 90% of shareholders to consent to a transaction. So – if you own 1% of a company, while the VCs would like you to sign up to a drag-along, it doesn't matter that much (unless there are 30 of you that own 1%.) Again –make sure you know what you are fighting for in the negotiation – don't put disproportionate energy against terms that don't matter.When a company is faced with a drag along in a VC financing proposal, the most common compromise position is to try to get the drag along to pertain to following the majority of the common stock, not the preferred. This way – if you own common – you are only dragged along when a majority of the common consents to the transaction. This is a graceful position for a very small investor to take (e.g. I'll play ball if a majority of the common plays ball) and one that I've always been willing to take when I've owned common in a company (e.g. I'm not going to stand in the way of something a majority of folks that have rights equal to me want to do.) Of course, preferred investors can always convert some of their holding to common to generate a majority, but this also results in a benefit to the common as it lowers the overall liquidation preference.投资协议条款清单（Term Sheet）- 购买参与权Term Sheet: Pay-to-PlayAt the turn of the century, a pay-to-play provision was rarely seen. After the bubble burst in 2001, it became ubiquitous. Interesting, this is a term that most companies and their investors can agree on if they approach it from the right perspective.In a pay-to-play provision, an investor must keep "paying" (participating pro ratably in future financings) in order to keep "playing"(not have his preferred stock converted to common stock) in the company. Sample language follows:"Pay-to-Play: In the event of a Qualified Financing (as defined below), shares of Series A Preferred held by any Investor which is offered the right to participate but does not participate fully in such financing by purchasing at least its pro rata portion as calculated above under "Right of First Refusal" below will be converted into Common Stock. [(Version 2, which is not quite as aggressive): If any holder of Series A Preferred Stock fails to participate in the next Qualified Financing, (as defined below), on a pro rata basis (according to its total equity ownership immediately before such financing) of their Series A Preferred investment, then such holder will have the Series A Preferred Stock it owns converted into Common Stock of the Company. If such holder participates in the next Qualified Financing but not to the full extent of its pro rata share, then only a percentage of its Series A Preferred Stock will be converted into Common Stock (under the same terms as in the preceding sentence), with such percentage being equal to the percent of its pro rata contribution that it failed to contribute.]A Qualified Financing is the next round of financing after the Series A financing by the Company that is approved by the Board of Directors who determine in good faith that such portion must be purchased pro rata among the stockholders of the Company subject to this provision. Such determination will be made regardless of whether the price is higher or lower than any series of Preferred Stock.When determining the number of shares held by an Investor or whether this "Pay-to-Play" provision has been satisfied, all shares held by or purchased in the Qualified Financing by affiliated investment funds shall be aggregated. An Investor shall be entitled to assign its rights to participate in this financing and future financings to its affiliated funds and to investors in the Investor and/or its affiliated funds, including funds which are not current stockholders of the Company." We believe this is good for the company and its investors as it causes the investors "stand up" and agree to support the company during its lifecycle at the time of the investment. If they do not, the stock they have is converted from preferred to common and they lose the rights associated with the preferred stock. When our co-investors push back on this term, we ask: "Why? Are you not going to fund the company in the future if other investors agree to?" Remember, this is not a lifetime guaranteeof investment, rather if other prior investors decide to invest in future rounds in the company, there will be a strong incentive for all of the prior investors to invest or subject themselves to total or partial conversion of their holdings to common stock. A pay-to-play term insures that all the investors agree in advance to the "rules of engagement" concerning participating in future financings.The pay-to-play provision impacts the economics of the deal by reducing liquidation preferences for the non-participating investors. It also impacts the control of the deal, as it reshuffles the future preferred shareholder base by insuring only the committed investors continue to have preferred stock (and the corresponding rights).When companies are doing well, the pay-to-play provision is often waived, as a new investor wants to take a large part of the new round. This is a good problem for a company to have, as it typically means there is an up-round financing, existing investors can help drive company-friendly terms in the new round, and the investor syndicate increases in strength by virtue of new capital (and –presumably –another helpful co-investor) in the deal.。

本条款清单概述了潜在投资者（“投资人”）投资于xxxx有限公司（“公司”）的拟议的主要条款。

本清单旨在概述投资协议中的主要意向性条款，并不构成有约束力的协议。

“公司”：xxxx有限公司，成立于中华人民共和国的有限责任公司“投资人”深圳市xxxx创业投资有限公司及其他一致行动人所管理的资金（以下简称“xx创投”）“投资金额”：￥xxxxxxxx元人民币其中，“xx创投” 投资￥xxxxxxxx元人民币“预计上市”：预期“公司”股份最晚将于201x年12月31日以前于中国国内证券交易所(“证交所”)上市（首次公开发行）“投资股份”：相当于完全摊薄后“公司”总股本的x%“目前投资估值”：完全摊薄及包含“投资人”投入资金之估值为￥xxxxxxxxxx元人民币“可转让性”：“投资人”可在“公司”上市后根据中国“证交所”上市规则的要求在禁售期后出售全部或部分股份“投资人的权利”：“投资人”将享有所有的监察权，包括收到提供予公司管理层之所有信息的权利“陈述与保证”：于重要的事项上，如组织及资格、财务报表、授权、执行和交割、协议有效性和可执行性、股票发行、相关监管机构所要求报告、未决诉讼、符合法律及环保规定、政府同意、税项、保险充足性、与协议及章程条款无冲突性、资本化、没有重大的不利改变等事情上，由“公司”所作出的惯例性的陈述与保证；“投资人”及公司免于对投资前的财务报表中未反映的税收和负债承担责任，公司现有股东同意承担由此所引起的全部责任；除非经“投资人”同意，公司现有股东不得将其在“公司”及子公司的股份质押或抵押给第三方“保密”：除当法律上要求或/和遵守相关监管机构/权威机构（视情况而定）的披露要求外，在此的任何一方同意就本清单所包含的信息保守秘密“排他性”：于预期的结束日期200x年x月xx日之前，被投资方现有股东及其任何职员、董事、雇员、财务顾问、经纪人、股东或者代表公司行事的人士不得寻求对于企业有关资产或股权的收购融资计划，以及就此与投资方以外的任何其他方进行谈判。

投资协议条款清单（Term Sheet）- 回购权作者: 桂曙光Term Sheet: Redemption RightsRedemption rights usually look something like:"Redemption at Option of Investors: At the election of the holders of at least majority of the Series A Preferred, the Company shall redeem the outstanding Series A Preferred in three annual installments beginning on the [fifth] anniversary of the Closing. Such redemptions shall be at a purchase price equal to the Original Purchase Price plus declared and unpaid dividends."There is some rationale for redemption rights. First, there is the "fear" (on the VCs part) that a company will become successful enough to be an on-going business, but not quite successful enough to go public or be acquired. In this case, redemption rights were invented to allow the investor a guaranteed exit path. However, any company that is around for a while as a going concern that is not an attractive IPO or acquisition candidate will not generally have the cash to pay out redemption rights.The second reason for redemption rights pertains to the life span of venture funds. The average venture fund has a 10 years life span to conduct its business. If a VC makes an investment in year 5 of the fund, it might be important for that fund manager to secure redemption rights in order to have a liquidity path before his fund must wind down. As with the previous case, whether or not the company has the ability to pay is another matter.Often, companies will claim that redemption rights create a liability on their balance sheet and can make certain business optics more difficult. In the past few years, accountants have begun to argue more strongly that redeemable preferred stock is a liability on the balance sheet, not an equity feature. Unless the redeemable preferred stock is mandatorily redeemable, this is not the case and most experienced accountants will be able to recognize the difference.There is one form of redemption that we have seen in the past few years and we view as overreaching – the adverse change redemption. We recommend you never agree to the following which has recently crept into terms sheets."Adverse Change Redemption: Should the Company experience a material adverse change to its prospects, business or financial position, theholders of at least majority of the Series A Preferred shall have the option to commit the Company to immediately redeem the outstanding Series A Preferred. Such redemption shall be at a purchase price equal to the Original Purchase Price plus declared and unpaid dividends."This is just too vague, too punitive, and shifts an inappropriate amount of control to the investors based on an arbitrary judgment. If this term is being proposed and you are getting pushback on eliminating it, make sure you are speaking to a professional investor and not a loan shark.In our experience, redemption rights are well understood by the market and should not create a problem, except in a theoretical argument between lawyers or accountants.。

TermSheet、SPA、SHA是啥？⼀张图告诉你VC投资协议的26个条款！写这个标题，想起了之前的创投律师圈的⼀个笑话。

⼀个哥们是创投圈的律师精英，典型的⼯作狂⼈，难得上⽹被我逮到，于是上去寒暄两句。

“晚上⼲嘛？”我问。

他答道：“做个SPA。

”“哦？你也喜欢做SPA？喜欢哪种精油呢？”那之后，不知道为啥，他不理我了…好吧，解释条款，先从这⼏个概念说起。

Term Sheet、SPA、SHA是啥?主要是缩写，让⼤家感到迷惑了。

Term Sheet是指投资意向书（有时候简写为：TS）SPA 是指股权认购协议（国内公司法就是“增资协议”）SHA 是指股东协议，就是股东之前的特殊约定，例如马云及于软银和雅虎签署了股东协议，约定了投票权等安排。

三者是相互关联的，TS的内容是对于SPA和SHA主要内容的概括。

TS除了保密、排他性、费⽤等条款外，其他条款⼀般都没有法律约束⼒的，双⽅可以重新修改的，不遵守。

那么，接下来我们就说说条款吧。

典型的投资协议的26个条款我把VC投资的26个条款分了五个类型，也就是每个类型的条款性质不⼀样，可以在创业融资的时候采取不同的谈判策略，我就上图吧：VC投资协议典型条款上图可以看出，SPA和SHA的内容，主要是⼀些列的条款，主要有：投资⾦额、估值、增资数量、交割条件，还会包括；投资⼈防稀释权利、优先购买权、随售权、登记申请权、保护性条款（需投资⼈和投资⼈董事特别批准的公司事项）、董事会构成、优先股转换等股东权利等等。

在投资的不同阶段，投资的诉求他们的诉求是不⼀样，了解这些有利于推进融资谈判。

投资⼈保护机制，来源：李宁律师但是，这肯定不是天使投资协议的条款，不过如果你知道了VC投资协议的26个条款，天使投资协议会有其中的5-7个条款，也就不难去了解了。

天使投资的必备条款徐⼩平的真格基⾦向创业者推两页纸投资协议，包含了投资额、股权⽐例、期权、董事会席位等关键项关键条款，只有两页纸，⼀⽬了然，简单易懂。

投资条款清单模版Term Sheet投资条款清单模版（Term Sheet）是在进行一项初步投资决策之前，投资人和公司之间达成的一份协议。

它可以被视为投资合同的“简化版”，其中包含了双方就一些主要条款达成的共识，并且为投资阶段的后续谈判奠定了基础。

以下是一份投资条款清单模版的示范，帮助你了解其主要组成部分和内容。

投资基本信息•投资人名称：•投资金额：•融资轮次（Pre-Seed, Seed, Series A/B/C, 等）：•其他投资人（如果有）：•投资估值：•投资人持有股份比例：•投资人优先权（如果有）：•投资人退出方式（如回购、IPO、融资计划等）：股本结构•公司名称：•公司成立日期：•注册资本：•实收资本：•股东的股份比例：•稀释：•优先股或普通股等股份类型的数量和比例：投资条件•投资条款：股份或债务转换、退出方案、股权回购等：•股东权利：议汇权、投票权、信息披露等：•涉及的业务和产品：•营销和销售计划：•就业和人力资源相关事项：•风险、保证和承诺：•权利与完整性保证：其他条款•谈判期限：•条款解释：•法律适用法律：•保密协议：•终止条款：执行条款•需要的文件和信息：•批准和签字：总结上述条款只是投资条款清单模版的一个示范，实际上，有些投资人可能会有其他的特定要求和条款。

因此，在确定任何投资交易之前，双方都应盡量详细地讨论和协商出各种问题，以确保交易的成功和避免未来的法律纠纷。

掌握这份模版只是一个良好的起点，在投资交易中，最重要的是通过良好的沟通和协商达成双方的共识。