the problem of social cost---Coase
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从庇古税、科斯定理探讨我国治理环境问题的经济手段作者:李彬来源:《财税月刊》2015年第10期摘要 2013年开始全国雾霾肆虐,严重影响公众的生活质量和健康指数。
这要求我们加快环境保护立法,实行环境保护“费改税”。
本文就我国现存环境污染治理手段上存在的弊端,从庇古税和科斯定理的角度出发并借鉴国外开征环境税的经验,探讨解决我国环境问题的经济手段。
关键词庇古税;科斯定理;环境保护税十八大报告指出我国应“坚持节约资源和保护环境的基本国策”,“形成节约资源和保护环境的空间格局、产业结构、生产方式和生活方式”。
税务总局税科所副所长靳东升说,环境保护税立法需要综合考虑资源环境承受能力和社会可持续发展能力,可以根据不同领域分类试点推进,更好地发挥税收在污染防治和节能减排过程中应有的作用。
一、环境污染的外部成本的效率损失环境污染具有明显的负外部效应,负外部性是某个经济行为个体的活动使他人或社会受损,而造成外部经济的人却没有为此承担成本。
这种外部成本不仅会对消费者带来损害,同时也会对其他生产者造成不利的影响。
如建筑工地的扬尘、煤炭燃烧、工业喷涂等引发了严重的雾霾天气,带来了一系列的社会问题,人们抵抗需要购置防护物品、需支付治疗由雾霾天气引发的疾病的费用,政府需要因治理雾霾需要支付管理成本等。
二、环境经济手段的优化选择OECD(1994)环境经济手段可以定义为:“从影响成本收益入手,引导经济当事人进行选择,以便最终有利于环境的一种手段”。
经济手段和管制手段的组合,是一种更有效的组合。
1.庇古税(Pigouvain Tax)。
实施庇古税有两种可行的办法:①向每一单位产品征收一个给定的税额,这税额根据边际外部成本的价值来制定;②直接向外部成本本身征税。
2.科斯定理(Coase Theorem)。
在交易费用为零和对产权充分界定并加以实施的条件下,经济的外部性或者说非效率可以通过当事人的谈判而得到纠正,从而达到社会效益最大化[1]。
《代理问题与企业理论》读书笔记碎碎片片文章题目:代理问题与企业理论(Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm)作者:尤金·法玛(Eugene F.Fama)尤金·法玛教授可以称得上是金融经济学领域的思想家。
法玛教授1939年2月14日出生于美国马萨储塞州波士顿,是意大利裔移民的第三代。
1960年毕业于马萨储塞州Tufts大学,主修法文,获得学士学位,这就是一个看起来不像是日后会成为财金学界大师的开始。
1960-1963年在芝加哥大学商学院研究生院攻读MBA,1963年开始攻读博士学位,1964年获得博士学位,其博士论文为“股票市场价格走势”。
1995年,比利时鲁文大学授予法玛荣誉博士学位。
尤金·法玛在就读Tufts大学与芝加哥大学时参加了诸多的学术团体。
法玛教授的研究兴趣十分广泛,包括投资学理论与经验分析、资本市场中的价格形成、公司财务、组织形式生存的经济学。
他在经济学科的若干领域都作出了重要的贡献,在金融学独立为一个学科以及成为经济学中一个独立领域的进程中,是当之无愧的先驱。
出处:本文原载于[美]《政治经济学杂志》第88卷第2期(1980年),第288-307页。
一、写作动机长期以来,经济学家们一直关注着企业中的决策是由非股东的管理者的行为而产生的激励问题,导致企业“行为”理论和“管理”理论的发展。
但这些理论舍弃了古典的企业模型——经营企业仅仅是为了利润最大化的企业所有者与管理者是统一的,而赞成集中研究控制企业但不拥有企业并与古典的“经济人”相去甚远的管理者的动力问题。
代表有,鲍莫尔(1959)、西蒙(1959)、西尔特和马奇(1963)以及威廉姆森(1964)。
最近,经济学文献倾向于舍弃古典的企业模型但接受古典的经济行为形式,企业被认为是生产要素间的一系列契约,每一种要素为其自我利益所驱使。
因此,强调在组织中通过契约来界定产权的重要性。
施工企业使用成建制劳务队伍的必要性施工企业使用成建制劳务队伍的必要性代绘绣中铁二十局集团第一工程有限公司714000【内容摘要】目前建筑劳务市场发育不充分,劳务用工制度不完善,包工头和散兵游勇式的用工方式大量存在,带来无证上岗,素质低下,劳动者权益受到损害等一系列问题,同时也给工程质量,文明施工,安全生产带来了隐患,给行业管理带来诸多困难.本文立足现状,系统分析了施工企业使用成建制劳务队伍的必要性【关键词】施工企业;成建制;劳务分包一,施工企业劳务现状据有关资料统计,全国建筑业从业人员总计4029万人,其中农民=I3314万人, 占82%;全国已有建筑劳务企业18000多家,占建筑业企业总数约13.5%.我国的建筑业自推行项目管理体制改革以来,初步的形成了以施工总承包为龙头,以专业施工企业为骨干,以劳务作业为依托的企业组织结构型式.但是,这种理想的组织结构型式并没有起到预期的理想效果.除少部分专业程度较高的分部,分项工程由专业分包企业完成外,大部分具体的施工任务还是由建筑总承包企业组织劳务队和自有机械设备,自供材料来完成.劳务队伍专业化程度低,素质参差不齐,严重影响了施: 企业的效益和建筑市场的发展.改革开放以来,建筑业的用工制度发生了深刻变化,原来的固化劳动用工制度被打破,形成了多元化用工方式.随着建筑业管理层和劳务层的分离,在催生了大量的建筑劳务队伍的同时,大量无序流动的”散兵游勇”也在城市及工地现场聚集, 出现了一些深层次的矛盾和问题.如非法用工现象较为严重,农民工劳动和生活条件差,管理混乱,克扣,拖欠工资问题严重,侵害了农民:[合法权益,对社会稳定造成隐患;大量的农民工未经安全和职业技能培训就进入建筑工地,给工程质量和安全带来隐患;”包工头”式的用:【,无序流动,导致社会流动人口巨大,给城市人口,市容,交通,安全等方面的管理带来困难.同时,也造成了转包,挂靠,违法分包等违法违规行为的大量出现,严重扰乱_『建筑市场秩序.因而,正确培育,引导和规范建筑劳务的发展,建立和规范建筑劳务分包制度,用成建制劳务企业取代“包工头”十分必要.二,采用非建制劳务的不合理性现在建筑劳务市场施工劳务的组织主要有三种形式:施工企业(总承包企业和专业承包企业)直接雇佣劳务,成建制的分包劳务和零散用工,就施工企业的发展来看,采取成建制的分包劳务是最为合理的选择.这是因为包工头和散兵游勇式的用工方式存在着很大的问题和漏洞.首先,农民r队伍整体庞大松散,岗位技术培训,鉴定工作滞后,从业素质较低,采用这样的劳务队伍,很难保证工程的质量和进度,并且在施工过程中,容易产生安全问题,带来不必要的法律纠纷,给企业造成巨大损失.其次,使用非建制劳务队伍存在一定的法律问题.新”建筑法充分肯定劳务分包企业的法律地位,明确建筑业实行由劳务分包企业提供劳务作业分包等形式的行业用工制度,禁止包工头承揽分包业务等有关内容.施工企业如果继续使用非建制的劳务队伍,势必会与《建筑法的精神相背离,甚至构成违法行为.此外,非建制劳务队伍大多数未同劳务作业人员依法签订劳动合同,即使有合同也只是应付检查和资质申报之用,对工资支付的时问,方式,工伤意外伤害赔偿, 以及违约责任等未进行明确约定,劳务作业人员并不完全知晓自己享有的合法权益和义务,劳动报酬不能按月足额发放.绝大多数劳务随工地流动,以工地为家,生活环境艰苦,工作强度大,缺少必要的劳动保护和卫生条件,农民工的合法权益无法得到保障.在新《劳动法》的规定下,使用非建制劳务队伍已经构成了对劳动者的侵害,会给施工企业带来新的法律问题. 三,施工企业使用成建制劳务队伍的必要性1,使用成建制劳务队伍可以有效解决拖欠工资问题近年来,我国全面开展了解决建设领域拖欠工程款和农民工工资工作.在清欠过程中不难发现,凡是造成农民工上访尤其是群体上访的,多与私拉滥招,”包工头”式劳务分包等非法用工,违法劳务分包相联系.而有资质的劳务分包企业承接劳务分包作业,由于签订了规范的劳务分包合同,有组织,有制度,在合法经营方式下进行经营,劳务企业和农民工的权益都受到了保护,很少有被无故拖欠和克扣工资的问题.即便特殊原因发生了拖欠,因责任界定清楚,也可以有效防止大规模民工上访及其他突发性事件.以青岛市为例,该地近几年几乎没有发生一起拖欠农民工工资上访事件,除了清欠工作抓得好外,重要一点就是他们大力发展劳务分包企业,规范了建筑劳务市场.实践证明,建立和规范劳务分包制度是建立解决拖欠工资问题长效机制的重要举措,以成建制的劳务队伍代替包工头式的散兵游勇用工方式能够有效防止拖欠工资问题的发生,为施工企业减少不必要的法律问题.2.使用成建制劳务队伍有利于规范建筑市场秩序整顿和规范建筑市场秩序,在全社会的共同努力下,虽然取得了一些阶段性成果,遏制了建设领域违法违纪案件高发的势头,提高了工程质量和安全生产水平,但由于建筑市场中一些深层次问题尚未根本解决,建筑市场的混乱现象没有得到根治,转包,挂靠,违法分包,招投标中明招暗定等现象仍然大量存在.而”包工头”带队和零散用工的方式,使得挂靠和违法分包等现象既难以界定,也难以处罚.大量非法用工方式的存在,是造成建筑劳务分包过程中无端压价,恶性竞争的一个主要原因.根治挂靠和违法分包等现象是一个复杂的系统工程,其中一项主要工作就是形成一大批合理流动,专业化运作,企业化管理的劳务分包企业,真正形成施工总承包,专业承包,劳务分包三个层次的结构体系,有序竞争,从而切实规范建筑市场秩序.3,使用成建制劳务队伍可以确保工程质量和安全目前,我国建筑业一线作业人员仍以农民工为主,其素质和操作水平直接影响到工程质量,施工安全.这些农民工大多都来自贫困农村,受教育程度普遍较低,未经过必要的安全和技能培训,多数农民工是在其他行业找不到合适的工作岗位的情况下而进入建筑行业的,缺乏必备的专业知识和必要的劳动安全知识,雇用这些人员从事一线施工,不但严重影响了工程》转286页MODERNBUSINESS坝代商业相关的事实:一,申请权利的依据的合法性;二,债务人存在过错;三,揭穿公司面纱是债权人的利益实现的唯一方式; 四,关联企业与债务人之间存在表面的不当行为.所谓的表面的不当行为是指根据一一般人的看法可认为交易明显违反正常的交易准则,存在明显的不合理或不公平,或者说在一般的交易主体间不可能发生此类的交易.比如说,据报载,某上市公司将其60万吨重油催化裂化联营装置租给其大股东经营,年收出租费用840万元,以3.665亿投资换来的年资产收益仅为2.29%的租金收入,连设备的折旧费都不够,而同样一套装置,却使另一家公司的收益有了飞跃发展.在此,很容易看出,根据一般的交易规则和市场秩序,这种交易在一般的主体间是不可能出现的.所以如果在这种情况下,债权人只要举证存在这样表面看起来不公平的事实就可以了,而无需举证这家上市公司这种行为的目的,更不用去举证这个大股东是如何控制这个子公司的. (三)关联企业的抗辩权德国的”母公司仅于子公司的损失非由于母公司形式经营上的控制所造成时, 才可以主张免责.”这一原则不去考虑母公司的主观意识,只要其控制行为造成了子公司的损失就需要承担责任,显然有利于保护债权人的利益,但似乎有”客观归罪”之嫌.所以从公平的角度来说,这样的规定对关联企业就过于苛刻了.笔者认为,关联企业的抗辩权可以从以下几个方面考虑1,关联交易中遭受损失的一方在诉讼之前已经得到了受益方的合理补偿; 2,母公司主观上没有过错且已尽相当”注意义务”.四,结论“刺穿法人面纱”是一个十分着名的原则,它的影响深远.关联企业和关联交易的规制在我国是个立法还没有完善的区域.笔者试着从该法理出发,试图把这一原则作为解决关联企业和关联交易的利器.当然,仅仅靠这一个原理是不可能解决实际生活中的所以问题的,还需要其他的原理和制度的支持和配合.但最关键的是制定出来的法律具有可操作性,而不仅仅停留在表面上.正如哈佛大学法学院院长Clark教授在其文章中引用的一段话所说:”一般来说应该认为交易的后果是公平或者是资源的更好分配,而不是一名不文的合法规则——如果产生了后面的一种后果,恐怕当事人就会远离交易了.”圃坝代商业MODERNBUSINESS【参考文献】1,江平,《新编公司法教程》,法律出版社,第216页2,史际春《企业和公司法》,中国人民大学出版社2001年版4,鄢青《上市公司关联交易的公司法规制》载于郭锋王坚《公司法修改纵横谈》法律出版社第266页5,waukeeRefrigerator Transltco,124F,247at255(c.c.wls.1905), 6,N.ACourtMustDecideWhetherPlain-tiffisBOundB yItsSubsidiary’SArbitra- tionAgreementNewYorkLawJournal,MAR25.20027,VanDomCo.V.FutureChem.&OILCorp., 755F2d565,569—70(TthCir1985)8,HENN&ALEXANDER,LAWSOFCOR- POgATION(3ded1985)section1469,近似案例可参见黄展《跨国公司的关联交易与苏州紫兴巨亏之谜》载《经济时刊》2002年12期10,BobertCharlesClarkTheDutiesof TheCorporateDebtorToItsCreditors HarvardLawgeview(V ol90:505)at54311,刘连煜,《公司法理论与判决研究》法律出版社第57页12,BobertCharlesClarkSupranote13,《中国证券报》1997--09--10(6)16,Coase,TheProblemofSocialCost5.w&Econ.1(1960)转引Bobert CharlesClarksupra25at544【作者简介】侯俊,男,法律硕士,1980年出生,2005年毕业于苏州大学法学院.》接287页的进度和质量,而且还很容易带来一系列安全问题.包工头式的劳务队伍和零散用工方式带来的无序流动,很难对农民工进行必要的从业常识和职业技能培训,从而导致工程质量问题不断,安全事故时有发生,劳资纠纷居高不下,严重影响了建筑业的健康发展.因此,将农民工吸纳到法人形态的成建制劳务分包企业中,实行有序管理,既是解决目前劳务工人岗位培训工作严重滞后,技能鉴定覆盖面小等问题的有效途径,也是加快他们向产业工人转变的必要措施.4使用成建制劳务队伍能够保证建筑业持续健康发展从整个建筑业的发展来看,要打造现代建筑施工企业必须改变粗放型经营,转变增长方式,其着眼点必须放在提高劳动者技术水平,业务能力和综合素质上.当前,包工头式的粗放用工模式,已经无法满足建筑业对高品质,高效率工程的要求.在这种大背景下,采用成建制的劳务队伍对于施工企业的发展显得十分迫切, 在成建制的劳务企业制度下,可以对农民工进行必要的专业知识和安全知识培训, 以科学的组织形式对其进行管理,在提高他们的知识和技能水平的同时,提升其职业道德水平,逐步建立起一支高素质的建筑施工团队,为建筑业的持续发展提供必要的人员支持.圃【参考文献】1,成建制劳务企业取代”包工头”势在必行[J].建筑,2005(O7)2,张子麟.让建筑业用工告别”散兵游勇”[N].中国经济导报,2005—09—153,曾立辉,张岩俊,齐永顺.建筑施工企业劳务用工建设浅析[J】.建筑经济, 2006(s1)4,廖玉平.和谐社会与建筑劳务用工制度改革【J】.建筑经济,2006(05)5,韩庆文,许欣毅,胡进军.大力发展和培育成建制劳务企业【N】.广东建设报,2007—01-2j6,郑年栋.建筑业劳务用工制度初探[J].城市,2007(05)7,贺志军.建筑施工劳务分包企业管理机制及发展战略研究【D】.湖南大学, 2007。
新制度经济学文献:By Liang Jinhui, Zju1.The Nature of the Firm, Coase2.The problem of Social Cost, Coase3.Some Economics of Property Rights, Alchian4. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Tiebout5.Might Makes Rights, Umbeck6.Dictatorship, Democracy and Development, Olson7.Spontaneous Order, Sugden8.Culture Beliefs and the Organization of Society, Grief9.The Economics of Convention, Young10.Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, Qian and Weingast11.Reversal of Fortune, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson12.Constitutions and Commitment, North and Weingast1.The Nature of the Firm, Coase (交易费用的存在促使新的经济组织的产生)文章的核心的问题有两个:一、一般认为价格机制协调经济系统的运作,而在企业内部企业家协调生产,为什么企业这种组织是必需的呢?二、资源配置由市场进行还是由企业家来决定是如何进行选择的。
对第一个问题的回答:利用价格机制是有成本的。
对第二个问题的回答:在边际点上,在企业内部组织交易的成本等于在另一个企业中的组织成本,或是等于由价格机制组织这笔交易所包含的成本。
科斯的目标是发展一个真实而易于处理的企业理论。
7 The Problem of Social CostI Introduction : Concept of externalityA Examples in classic textsB Externality : social cost and benefitII Solutions To ExternalityA Traditional approachB A modern approachC Property rights and transaction costsD Coase approachIII Public Goods & Economic EfficiencyA Public goodsB Welfare economics and Pareto optimumIV Common Property ResourcesA Meaning & examples of common property resourcesB Over-utilization & dissipation of rent* * *I Introduction : Concept of ExternalityExternality exists whenever the exchange between two parties causes benefits or costs to the third ormore parties without any equivalent or corresponding gain or compensation.It is the result of the existence of a difference in cost or benefit between the private exchanging parties and the society as a whole.Whenever externality exists, it implies a situation of " getting something for nothing ".A Examples In Classic TextsPigou's Case of Two RoadsSuppose there are two roads, named as Road ABD and Road ACD both leading from A to D. Road ACD is the longer, wider and more winding road. Road ABD is the shorter, narrower but straight road. At thebeginning, users will go to the "faster" ( i.e. a shorter travelling time ) road ABD.Congestion on road ABD will increase the time of an extra user as well as on all other users becausetraffic is slow down as a result.Anyone user will impose time cost ( as well as petroleum expense etc. ) on himself as well as on other users on the road - a social cost.An possible example is the route from Central to Aberdeen by either Pokfulam Road ( like Road ACD ) or the Aberdeen Tunnel ( Road ABD ).Cattle Raiser & FarmerThere are 2 pieces of land lying side by side, one for wheat growing and the other for cattle raising. The raiser’s cattle eat or damage the farmer’s crops as they stray when there are no fence surrounding thewheat land.The cattle gains in weight and the raiser gains the value of meat obtained as a result.Based on Pigou’s analysis, if the raiser is not liable for the damage on crops, he will simply ignore the crop loss and run too many cattle.Conversely, the farmer raises too few crops and external cost is created by the raiser’s cattle.Orchard & The BeesAn apple grower provides apple trees for the bees to make nectar. If there is a bee-keeper nearby the apple grower, the bee-keeper benefits from the trees grown by the apple grower.Since the benefit may not be realised by the apple grower, planting will be too little.Conversely, the bee-keeper provides a pollination service to the apple grower. Since the service is not paid by anyone, he doesn’t take into account of this external benefit and too few hives will be established.The two interested parties are not guided by Adam Smith’s invisible hand to the optimal amount of applesand honey production.In traditional economic theory, such cases are examples of external ( to the exchanging parties )costs or benefits leading to a question on the efficiency and power of a free market.Some suggested that it was an indication of “ market failure “.B Externality : Social Cost & Social benefitThe existence of externality would imply that the private costs or benefits of the exchanging parties are not the same as the costs or benefits imposed on the society as a whole. The difference is called the external cost or benefit.Private Cost & Social CostPrivate cost refers to the highest-valued option forgone of a resource available to a producer or a person who makes the decision.Social cost measures the highest-valued option forgone of a resource available to the society.External cost is the cost inflicted to a third or more parties without compensation. It exists when an act of a person imposes cost on others, and the person does not need to bear the cost for some reasons. The private cost and social cost had a divergence.Social Cost = Private ( Internal ) Cost + External CostExternal benefit is a spillover to a third party without payment.Social Benefit = Private ( Internal ) Benefit + External BenefitDivergence Between Private Cost ( Benefit ) & Social Cost ( Benefit )Divergence In Costs Divergence In Benefit0 Q0 Q 0 Q0 QII Solutions To ExternalityThe market mechanism reacts to the private or internal costs or benefits with the forces of demand and supply. It is criticised that the market fails to take into account of the external costs or benefits so thatefficiency ( i.e. MUV = MSC = MPC ) cannot be achieved.A Traditional ApproachPigou’s Two RoadsPigou argued that if both roads are left free to use by drivers, there will be too many cars on Road ABD ( i.e. congestion ) and too few cars on Road ACD.Road ABD is said to be over-utilized and Road ACD is under-utilized.It leads to an inefficient allocation of resources ( roads ).There is a ( dead-weight ) loss in social welfare.Pigou suggested that a government intervention by levying a tax ( toll ) on Road ABD users to discourage the potential users. Traffic congestion could be avoided with some users drive on Road ACD.As a result, the external costs are “ internalized “ by the taxation because users of Road ABD have to bearthe full cost, i.e. social cost = original private cost + tax ( toll charge ).Cattle Raiser & FarmerThe traditional approach is to minimize the damage or cost rather than to maximize the total gain. InPigou’s opinion, the government should interv ene by introducing a tax on the cattle raiser and gives asubsidy to the farmer; or a legal prohibition on the cattle raiser on his cattle to eat the crops.Orchard & The BeesThe traditional approach would agree to give subsidies to the bee-keeper and the apple-grower because they provide mutual benefits. The problem lies on the difficulties in pricing and measurement of nectar, the value of services provided by the bees.B A Modern Approach1Frank Knight argued that the reason for a divergence is not a case that the market fails to work but it is not allowed to work. If the roads are privately owned, the wealth-maximizing owner will charge atoll ( similar to a tax ), assuming a very low collection cost. The toll forces the drivers to internalizethe external cost. The problem of externality and misallocation of resources is solved as a result.2 The effects of social cost on the cattle raiser and farmer are mutual.The relevant question is not simply : “ How should we restrain A to harm B ? “The relevant question is : “ Should A be allowed to harm B or vice versa ? “The appropriate policy is to avoid the more serious harm.3 The case of orchard and the bees is a typical example of external benefits. The use of taxation andsubsidy is not appropriate and costly.C Property Rights & Transaction CostsProperty Rights : Rule of The GameWhen we purchase some goods, we are indeed buying some rights on the goods from the s ellers. These rights control the ways particular resources that will be used and assign the resulting costs and benefits arisen from the use of these resources.Private Property : A good or asset is defined as a private property if, and only if, within well-defined limits, its owner has these sets of rights.Inter-relationship Among The RightsThe exclusive right to use implies neither the right to derive income nor the right to transfer. However, a right to transfer does imply, as least to some extent that a resource is exclusively owned.Otherwise, no one is willing to pay for it.David Hume, a famous French writer, wrote ( in A Treatise of Human Nature ) the following in 1740 :Our property is nothing but those goods, whose constant possession is established by the laws of society;that is, by the laws of justice... No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society, and after that the agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, there remains little ornothing to be done towards setting a perfect harmony and concord.With well-defined and enforced property rights, the owner will put the resources to its highest-valued use.Efficiency is attained with private costs or benefits equal to social costs or benefits.A divergence between private cost and social cost ( or benefit ) is attributed to either one or more of thefollowing :1 the absence of right to contract ;2 there is a contract but no complete agreement or stipulation ;3 there is agreement but inconsistent with the state of : marginal gain = marginal cost because theenforcement cost ( transaction cost ) is too high.Coase’s words on transaction cost : “ ... in order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary todiscover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiation leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on ... “The Problem Of ExternalityD Coase Approach : The Coase TheoremIllustration of The Coase Theorem : The Chemical FactoryA chemical factory discharges poisonous waste into a river which also provides a fishing ground in itslower part. If both the factory owner and the fishermen have their rights to produce, the factory ownerwould simply ignore the damage imposed on fishery. As a result, the amount of fish is reduced by the over-production of chemicals. There is a divergence between the private and social costs in chemicalproduction.A Table Showing The Numerical Values of The Two SidesAssume : Price of Chemical produced = $100/unit in a price-taking market.Initial Value of Fishery without pollution = $300MPB of factory = $100 – MPC MSB = $100 - MPC - MD = $100 - MSC1 The traditional analysis would stress the over-production of chemicals killing “ excessive “ fish.The remedy is to impose a tax on the factory to internalize the external cost into private costs.2 Coase suggested a solution by the assignment of rights through the use of contract.If the right of clean water belongs to the fishermen, the factory owner may pay the fishermen tobuy the right to pollute. The Coase Theorem predicts that a transfer of right is formed to maximize the potential gain. If the right belongs to the factory owner, he would sell the right (by a certainamount) to the fishermen.Coase TheoremIf property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are zero, then :1the allocation of resources will be the same, regardless of the initial assignment of property rights; and2 the allocation of resources will be efficient, so there is no problem of externality.Summary1 The assignment of property rights does not affect the allocation of resources.2 The different assignment of property rights only affects the wealth distribution and the one receivedthe payment or compensation as a result.3 Once the private property rights exist and are delineated with sufficiently low transaction cost, thedamage is allowed up to a situation where marginal cost is equal to marginal benefit.4 The traditional concept of divergence is a wrong concept of cost.A correct concept on cost could identify the potential gain and a consistent application of themaximization postulate shows that the divergence is settled by a mutual exchange of rights or market transactions.5 A market is able to internalize any external costs/benefits where government intervention orinvolvement is not essential to solve the issue of externality.6 Externality can be eliminated by completely enforced property rights. The market transactions willguarantee an efficient use of all resources.Private property rights are a pre-requisite for market transactions.7 The Coase Theorem is basically a theorem of exchange.Whenever transaction costs are sufficiently low and property rights are well-defined, people will make voluntary exchange for mutual benefits. Exchanges and negotiation of property rights will be carried out until the marginal gain is equal to the marginal cost. All potential gain is captured at that situation !* You should by now understand that there is nothing wrong with the market !III Public Goods & Economic EfficiencyA Public GoodA public good is any scarce good that can be consumed by many consumers at the same time, withoutaffecting the amount available to anyone else.It is a good which is difficult, if not impossible, to exclude non-payers from receiving benefits and whose benefits are not reduced by any extra users (both payers & non-payers).Exclusion : Whenever a consumer enjoys a good or service, anyone is deprived of that enjoyment due to private property rights. Examples are numerous.Rivalry : When a consumer possesses a good or service, the amount available to anyone is reduced by that amount held.In its pure form, a public good carries the characteristics of non-exclusion and non-rivalry.A pure public good refers to a public good that everyone has an identical amount.In other words, the cost of supplying a public good to an extra user is zero, but the cost of supplying an extra unit of public good is not.Examples of public goods are : lighthouse, street light, roads, local T.V. broadcast, radio broadcast,national defence, free ( nine years ) education in H.K.A Table Between Exclusion & RivalryA Free Rider1 Due to the property of non-exclusion of public goods, consumers are reluctant to pay for a publicgood, resulting in a case of social value greater than the social cost.These free riders” ma ke the provision of public goods especially by private competitive firms,very difficult ( though it is not impossible ). It results in a situation under which everyone wantsthe good but no one pays for it.2 Solutions* To exclude the non-contributors but it is usually inefficient because the costs of exclusion arenormally greater than the benefits resulted.* The provision and production of public goods are tie-in with some private goods, e.g. the use oftaxation together with a free education.* To implement government policy to provide the public good, e.g. social security.The issue of public good arises because property rights cannot be efficiently enforced to the benefitsthat the public good generates. If an extra user can benefit from the good at no extra cost to the society, charging a price would discourage potential users and results in a loss of total benefit to the society.The provision of public good becomes sub-optimal - thus giving a reason or justification for government intervention.B Welfare Economics & Pareto Optimum1Welfare economics refers to a branch of economics dealing with the evaluation on the desirability of different decisions on resource allocation.For example, the arguments on the use of sales tax against direct taxes in the case of HK; thevarious means of budget financing in HK; the most effective policy to deal with car thefts in HK.The value judgement that is central to welfare economics is that any change that improves the well-being of one individual without reducing the well-being of anyone else is a desirable change.2 Efficiency & Pareto OptimumAn Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) suggested the so-called Pareto optimalitycriterion :Any change that makes at least one individual better off and no one worst off is animprovement in social welfare. A situation in which it is impossible to make anyone better offwithout making someone worst off is called a Pareto optimum.3 Modern Concept On EfficiencyIn reality, there is always a cost in using the market - the transaction cost. So the more powerfulanalysis by economic theory is the application of transaction cost rather than a comparison betweenthe reality and perfect competition.To attain Pareto optimum or efficiency, transaction cost must be zero. Once transaction cost is zero,it also implies that property rights must be well-defined.We then explain human behaviour with this concept.To take the example of externality, the correction of externality is not costless. Many people oftenignore the existence of huge costs and external side-effects of the correction itself. The costs mayoutweigh the benefits.It follows that a divergence between private and social costs may not be inefficient ( because wecannot be better than the present situation - Pareto optimum ).As a result, externality needs not be eliminated by government intervention.IV Common Property ResourcesA Meaning & Examples Of Common Property ResourcesCommon property resources refer to any resources without well-defined property rights. Once the property rights of these resources are well-defined, they become private properties.No one has a right to exclude others from using it and any person is free to compete (if it is also scarce) for its use.A common property resource may be a free good like air or a scarce good like ocean life such as bluewhales, sharks; wildlife such as elephants, tigers ; and also the atmosphere.B Over-utilization & Rent Dissipation1Common property resources, with common rights, will encourage everyone to acquire them without bearing the full cost. The resource-takers tend to over-utilize the resources. In other words, in theabsence of private property rights, these resources are excessively exploited.Without exclusive rights to use the resource (or an exclusive claim to the value of it) its use willinvite c ompetition. Finally, every competitor can earn no more than the alternative earning of hisown factor inputs required in the exploitation of that property resource.2This competing use of a common property will reduce its economic rent or net value of the income earned to zero. This exclusive income or rent is said to be completely dissipated because the cost ofinputs used to get this formerly common property matches the amount of income earned at themargin.The condition is described as rent dissipation.3With the lack of exclusive use rights, the competition of a common property will lead to rent dissipation which implies :- over-exploitation or excessive use, e.g. over-fishing; over-hunting; or- under-exploitation, e.g. fruit trees in the New Territories.However, complete rent dissipation is also rare. People will restrict the use of that common propertyby regulations or information costs, e.g. marine fishing with licences, size restriction on fish andmarine life etc.* * *An Overview Of Microeconomics1This topic begins by an introduction of the concept of externality. Then, the traditional concepts of market and government intervention are explained. This is followed by the modern approachon externality, emphasizing on Coase ideas and solutions.2The real problem of social cost lies on an understanding of the nature and application of transaction cost and property rights.These two concepts can explain what is really the problem of social cost and externality.3 These two constraints give us more powerful theories to explain human behaviour.The problem of social cost also lies on these two concepts.4 The role of market and price, accompanied with transaction cost and property rights, forms thefundamental framework in microeconomic theory and analysis.End of Microeconomics。
1 基于外部性的企业社会责任福利分析黎友焕龚成威(广东省社会科学院,广州510610) 摘要:随着改革开放的深入,更多的企业开始融入国际化的浪潮中。
企业社会责任已经成为中外学者、企业家以及政府部门所关注的重要热点话题。
外部性的理论工具为分析企业社会责任及其福利效应提供了方便。
本文借助外部性理论分析了企业社会责任缺失对利益相关者带来的不经济效应,以及企业实行社会责任对自身的经济和不经济的影响。
关键词:外部性;企业社会责任;利益相关者一、外部性理论及其理解对外部性理论的开创和研究主要来源于国外,经济学家对外部性问题的研究构成外部性理论演进的五个阶段(黄敬宝2006),而有重大影响且又与企业社会责任福利分析联系最紧密的有三个,即“外部经济”理论、“庇古税”理论和“科斯定理”①。
(一)外部性相关理论1.马歇尔的“外部经济”理论阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔(Alfred Alfred MarshallMarshall )并①这三个理论在黄敬宝看来分别属于五个阶段中的第一、第二和第五阶段。
作者简介:黎友焕(黎友焕(1971-1971-1971-)),广东汕尾人,经济学博士,广东省社会科学院产业经济研究所副所长、研究员、硕士生导师,主要研究方向:世界经济、国际贸易、企业社会责任,广州,510610510610;龚成威(;龚成威(;龚成威(198519851985—)—),河南信阳人,广东省社会科学院国际贸易研究方向硕士研究生。
没有明确提出外部性这一概念,但外部性概念源于其发表的Principles of Economics (《经济学原理》,1890)所提出的“外部经济”概念。
马歇尔用“内部经济”和“外部经济”描述第四种生产要素——组织的变化如何能导致产量的增加。
对于经济中出现的生产规模扩大,我们可以把它分为两种类型,第一类,即生产的扩大依赖于产业的普遍发展;第二类,即生产的扩大来源于单个企业自身资源组织和管理的效率。
北京大学CCER双学位课程2003年春《新制度经济学导论》READING LIST读物IFurubotn G. Eirik and Rudolf Richter. 2000.Institutions and Economic Theory, The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. The University of MichiganPress.IIAlchian, A. 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory," J of Political Economy, June 1950.Milton Friedman, ‘‘The Methodology of Positive Economics,’’ in Essays in PositiveEconomics, University of Chicago Press, 1953.张五常,1990。
“关于新制度经济学”,见科斯等编,《契约经济学》经济科学出版社1999版,第3章。
Alchian, A.A. ‘‘Property Rights’’, pp1101-1104.巴泽尔: 《产权的经济分析》,上海三联1997年版。
巴泽尔:“考核费用和市场组织”,见陈郁编,《企业制度和市场组织》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社1996年版,第206-239页。
Coase, R.H. 1937. "The Nature of the Firm", In The Firm, the Market, and the Law.Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988).Coase, R.H. 1960. ‘‘The Problem of Social Cost’’, In The Firm, the Market, and the Law.Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988).North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.《新帕尔格拉夫经济学大词典》里的相关词条,包括但不限于:“稀缺性”、“机会成本”“科斯定理”、“社会成本”“完全成本定价”“公司”、“不确定性”、“自由企业”“经济组织和交易成本”“人力资本”“垄断”、“自然垄断”、“反托拉斯政策”“规模报酬”“自由进入”“管制”、“管制和放松管制”附:任课老师简介周其仁,北京大学和浙江大学教授1982年毕业于中国人民大学经济系。
The Problem of Social Cost
Author(s): R. H. Coase
Source: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3 (Oct., 1960), pp. 1-44
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: /stable/724810
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