本科毕业论文（设计）
外文翻译
原文：
Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm
performance
Executive compensation has been a central research topic in economics and business during the past two decades, recently gaining impetus in the wake of corporate scandals that have exposed significant vulnerabilities in corporate governance and the subsequent far reaching regulatory changes (Sarbanes–Oxley). Prior research into executive compensation has primarily focused on issues related to the level and structural mix of compensation packages, and their sensitivity to firm performance (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Yermack 1995; Baber et al. 1996; Hall and Liebman 1998; Core et al. 1999; Murphy 1999; Bryan et al. 2000). Early compensation studies focused on the CEO, subsequently expanding the scope to the compensation of the entire managerial team. Thus, for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) report that managers with divisional responsibilities have lower pay–performance sensitivities than do managers with broad oversight authority, who in turn have lower pay–performance sensitivities than does the CEO, concluding that pay–performance sensitivity increases with the span of authority. Similarly, Barron and Waddell (2003) examine the characteristics of compensation packages of the five highest paid executives and find that higher rank managers have a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation in pay packages than do lower ranked executives.
The issue of pay dispersion across managerial team members has received conceptual attention by labor economists and organization theorists, yet scant empirical research has been performed to date. In this study, we investigate empirically the effect of managerial compensation dispersion on firm performance.
We draw on two competing models—the tournament theory and equity fairness arguments—to formulate our hypotheses: Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen,1981) views the advancement of executives in the corporate hierarchy as a tournament in which individuals compete for promotion and rewards. High-performing executives with considerable managerial potential win promotion and commensurate compensation. A large spread of compensation across corporate hierarchical levels attracts talented and venturesome participants to compete in the managerial tournament, providing extra incentives to exert effort. The winners’ talent and the extra effort exerted will, according to the tournament model, translate to high firm performance.
The empirical evidence on the tournament theory is rather limited and results are mixed. Supporting evidence comes from studies of sport activities (Ehrenberg and Bognanno,1990; Becker and Huselid,1992) and by controlled experiments (Bull et al.,1987). In business settings, Main et al. (1993), using survey data for top executives in 200 US firms, during 1980–1984, report that a greater spread of top-executive compensation is positively related to firm performance. Similarly, based on proprietary data of 210 Danish firms during 1992–1995, Eriksson (1999) provides somewhat weak evidence that higher pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance. In contrast, O’Reilly et al. (1988) do not find support for the tournament argument in a sample of 105 Fortune 500 firms, and Conyon et al. (2001) report that variation in executive compensation is not associated with enhanced firm performance in a sample of 100 UK firms in 1997.
In contrast with the tournament model, notions of equity fairness postulate that the quality of social relations in the workplace affect firm performance (Akerlof and Yellen,1988,1990; Milgrom,1988; Milgrom and Roberts,1990) and that large pay dispersion adversely affects employee relations and morale, leading to counterproductive organizational activities, which eventually reduce firm performance. Supporting evidence for the adverse effects of wage dispersion on performance is also limited. Using a sample of university faculty, Pfeffer and Langton (1993) report that greater wage dispersion within academic departments reduces
faculty satisfaction as well as research productivity and collaboration among colleagues. There is also some preliminary evidence in business settings (Drago and Garvey,1998) that supports the argument for equity fairness.
In this study we examine a sample of 12,197 firm-year observations for 1,855 US companies spanning the period 1992–2003, and find that firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q and alternatively by stock returns, is positively associated with the compensation dispersion of the firm s’ top-management team. Additionally, we document that firms with large compensation dispersion have higher future return on assets (ROA) than comparable lower pay dispersion companies. Collectively, our results suggest that the compensation dispersion of the top management team is positively related to firm performance.
Our analysis also indicates that the association between firm performance and pay dispersion is conditional on agency costs and corporate governance structure. Specifically, high pay dispersion is associated with better performance in firms with high agency costs related to managerial discretion (e.g., firms with large R&D expenditures). This finding supports the notion that in firms with assets or activities that are difficult for shareholders to monitor, a greater pay dispersion mitigates some of the managers–shareholders agency costs by motivating managers to improve long-term firm performance. Our findings are also consistent with prior studies’ result that firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to substitute direct monitoring with equity-based compensation incentives to reduce agency costs of managerial discretion (Smith and Watts,1992; Gaver and Gaver,1993; Bryan et al.,2000). We further find that the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion is stronger for firms with more effective corporate governance. Specifically, firms with a high proportion of outside directors on the board and with CEOs who are not board chair have a stronger positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion. Thus, our results corroborate the complementary roles of compensation contracts and corporate governance in reducing agency costs (Mehran,1995; Hartzell and Starks,2003).
This study contributes to the managerial compensation research on several
dimensions. Primarily, it provides comprehensive and updated evidence that managerial compensation dispersion is positively associated with firm performance. Pay dispersion per se was so far a somewhat neglected area in managerial compensation research. Our study thus contributes to recent research that focuses on the executive-team compensation (Aggrawal and Samwick,2003; Barron and Waddell,2003), compared to prior compensation research that was often restricted to the CEO. This study also extends the literature on the interaction between corporate governance and the structure of managerial compensation. For the corporate governance strand of research we show that improved governance structures (such as a higher proportion of independent board members and separation of the CEO and Chairman positions) enhances the positive association between pay dispersion and firm performance. Thus, corporate governance and managerial pay dispersion are complementary and perhaps mutually enhancing mechanisms for strengthening firm performance. In the context of shareholders–mangers agency costs, we provide evidence suggesting that managerial pay dispersion can potentially mitigate agency costs in firms that are difficult to monitor. More generally, our study supports the notion that the structure of executive compensation affects agency costs and firm performance.
Prior research and our hypotheses
1. Tournament theory
This theory (Lazear and Rosen,1981) views the advancement of executives in a corporate hierarchy as a contest in which individuals compete for promotion and rewards. High-performing executives win promotions and receive prizes in the form of generous pay and perks in their new positions. The compensation spread across hierarch ical levels (large‘‘prizes’’ at the top) provides extra incentives to participate in the managerial ‘‘tournament’’ and exert considerable efforts to win the top prize. The main elements of the tournament theory are as follows: (i) Tournaments reward players with prizes based upon relative performance. The best performer receives the largest prize while the worst performer receives the smallest. (ii) Rewards are intrinsically nonlinear. (iii) The spread in prizes increases with the number of
competitors. (iv)Participants with low ability will choose higher risk strategies to increase the probability of winning. Thus, a participant’s ability is negatively related to the variability of his/her performance.
Empirical evidence supporting the tournament theory was obtained in sport settings. For example, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) examine the performance of golfers and conclude that as prize differentials increase, players’ performance improves. Becker and Huselid (1992) examine the performance of drivers in professional auto racing, and report that pay dispersion has positive incentive effects on both individual performance and driver safety. In a business setting, Main et al. (1993) use survey data for 200 firms during 1980–1984 and report that pay differential increases substantially as one ascends the corporate hierarchy, consistent with tournament theory’s prediction that extra weight on top-ranking prizes motivates participants to aspire to higher goals, and that the dispersion in top compensation increases with the number of contestants. The main finding of Main et al. (1993) is that firm performance is positively associated with executive pay dispersion. In a similar vein, Bognanno (2001) reports that the CEO pay rises with the number of vice-presidents competing for the top position. However, he finds that inconsistent with the tournament prediction, firms do not maintain short-term promotion incentives, as longer time in position prior to promotion reduces the effect of pay increase from the promotion. Finally, Conyon et al. (2001) examine a sample of 100 large UK firms during 1997–1998 and find no evidence that larger pay dispersion is positively associated with improved firm performance. O’Reilly et al. (1988) report similar findings for the United States. Thus, the business-setting evidence on the tournament theory is mixed and somewhat dated.
2. Equity fairness
Economic theory asserts that in equilibrium wages are equal to employees’ marginal productivities. Such mainstream thinking has been challenged: Drawing on social exchange models, equity notions, and related work in sociology and psychology, Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1988), and Levine (1991) argue that low pay dispersion may have a positive effect on employee efforts and
productivity by creating harmonious and efficient labor relations thereby leading to higher output and productivity. In a similar vein, Levine (1991) develops a model showing that lowering pay dispersion can increase employee cohesiveness, which in turn will enhance productivity.
Further insight into the economic efficiency associated with a low pay dispersion is provided by Lazear (1989), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990): If promotion and salaries are based on relative rather than individual performance, as postulated by tournament theory, then employees will advance not only by performing well, but also by seeing to it that their rivals perform poorly. Consequently, employees have weaker incentives to cooperate, and in extreme cases may engage in outright sabotage of others’ activities. To mitigate this, a firm may encourage cooperation by, among other things, reducing pay dispersion. Low dispersion may reduce effort, but at the same time increase cooperation. Thus, in general, it is optimal on productivity grounds to compress wage structure, to some extent, to promote cooperation (Lazear,1989).4 In a similar vein, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) use the principal-agent framework to suggest that employees may engage in rent-seeking activities to secure influence over organizational decision processes. Such influence-oriented activities arise when organizational decisions affect the distribution of wealth or other benefits among members or constituent groups. In their selfish interest, the affected individuals attempt to influence the decision process to their benefit. Furthermore, if firms cannot perfectly monitor output, workers may have incentives to exaggerate their output and lobby for higher wages. Thus, for example, the proponents of a project (e.g., R&D) may devote excessive effort to build the best possible case for investing in that project, hiding potential difficulties and focusing on the upside, while at the same time trying to denigrate competing proposals. Such arguments have led Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to promote wage compression under certain circumstances to alleviate these counterproductive activities.
Empirical tests of the above equity fairness arguments include the work of Pfeffer and Langton (1993), who report that the higher the wage dispersion of university faculty, the lower their satisfaction and research productivity and the less
likely it is that faculty members will collaborate on research. Similarly, Cowherd and Levine (1992) report a positive relationship between product quality and various measures of interclass pay equity (low wage dispersion). Drago and Garvey (1998) report that strong promotion incentives are associated with reduced employee cooperation and individual efforts. Contradicting the equity fairness predictions, Hibbs and Locking (2000) report that compression of wage dispersion in Swedish companies depressed output and labor productivity.
Source: Kin Wai Lee,Baruch Lev,Gillian Hian Heng Yeo,2008"Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance,and firm performance".Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting , V ol.30,pp.315-338.
译文：
高管薪酬分散，公司治理，与企业绩效
管理人报酬在过去二十年来是经济和商业中心的研究课题，最近在公司丑闻曝光后，已获得在公司治理中的漏洞和随后的重大深远（萨班斯）监管改革的动力。在此之前，改为执行制度的研究主要集中在有关水平和结构组合的报酬方案上，公司业绩的敏感性（兰伯特和拉克尔，1987年；詹森和墨菲，1990年；Yermack，1995；巴伯等，996年；霍尔和利伯曼，1998年，科尔等，1999年；墨菲，1999年；布莱恩等，2000年）。早期的研究主要集中在CEO的报酬，后来扩大范围到整个管理团队的报酬。因此，举例来说，Aggarwal和Samwick（2003年）的报告称，有责任的高层管理人员更具有广泛的监督权力，反过来谁具有比该公司首席执行官较低工资敏感性，得出的结论是支付性能与权威的跨度敏感性增加。同样，Barron和沃德尔（2003年）研究的五名最高薪行政人员薪酬方案的特点发现，较高职级的管理人员在薪酬的激励补偿大于低排名行政人员。
薪酬管理团队成员分散各地的问题已受到劳动经济学家和组织理论家的关注，但迄今已进行的概念缺乏实证研究。在这项研究中，我们调查评价了企业经营者报酬与企业绩效关系的分散。我们利用两个竞争模型，理论和产权竞赛的公平性参数，制定我们的假设：Tourna -ment理论（拉齐尔和罗森，1981年）的
意见，在企业层次的一场比赛中，个人晋升和奖励的管理人员竞争地位。高级管理人员的潜力相当大的不良宣传和相应的管理人员获得赔偿。大量的赔偿遍布企业等级层次吸引人才的竞争和冒险参加比赛的管理，提供额外的奖励尽的努力。获奖者的才华和施加额外的努力，将按照比赛模式，转化为高公司业绩。
在比赛的经验证据理论是相当有限的，结果是喜忧参半。支持的证据来自体育活动（朗贝格和Bognanno，1990年；贝克尔和Huselid，1992年）的研究和控制的实验（布尔等，1987年）。在商业环境中，主营等（1993年），使用在美国公司高层管理人员200名调查数据，在1980-1984年的报告说，高管薪酬更快的传播与公司绩效呈正相关。同样，基于对丹麦1992-1995年间210家公司的专有数据，埃里克森（1999年）提供的证据表明，有些弱较高层薪水分散与公司业绩是正相关。与此相反，奥赖利等（1988年）没有找到一个样本为比赛论，105财富500强公司，以及康勇等人（2001年）报告说，行政补偿的变化与一个英国公司在1997年的抽样调查100增强公司业绩是不相关的。
与模型对照的比赛，公平公正的观念推断是社会关系的工作质量影响公司业绩（阿克洛夫和耶伦，1988年，1990年；米尔格罗姆，1988年；米尔格罗姆和罗伯茨，1990年），而大分散不利影响雇员的工资关系和士气，导致适得其反的组织活动，并最终减少企业绩效。支持工资色散性能产生负面影响的证据也是有限的。使用的是大学教师样本，Pfeffer和兰顿（1993年）报告说，在学术部门更加分散降低教师工资的满意度以及研究生产力和同事之间的协作。也有一些企业初步证据设置（德拉戈和加维，1998年），支持对公平公正的说法。
在这项研究中，我们研究了12197家公司，1855年美国公司横跨1992-2003年期间取样调查，发现公司绩效，托宾的Q衡量和股票收益或者，正相关的赔偿分散的企业的高层管理团队。此外，我们的文件，与大型企业有较高的色散补偿将来付出比同类低分散公司的资产率（ROA）的回报。总的来说，我们的结果表明，补偿高层管理团队分散是正相关的公司业绩。
我们的分析还表明，公司绩效和薪酬之间的关联是分散在代理成本和公司治理结构的条件。具体来说，待遇高分散性与更好的表现在企业的代理成本高与管理决定有关（例如，用大的R＆D支出的公司）。这一发现支持这一概念与资产或活动，难以监控的企业为股东，付出更大的分散减轻了管理人员与股东的一些机
构通过激励管理成本，提高长期的公司业绩。我们的研究结果也与以往的研究结果相联系，具有高增长机会的公司更可能以替代股票为基础的薪酬激励直接监测，以减少管理自由裁量权（史密斯和Watts，1992年；Gaver，1993年；布莱恩等，2000年）。我们进一步发现，公司绩效和薪酬之间的正相关性是分散的企业更强更有效的法人治理结构。具体来说，有外部董事在董事会与CEO等高层公司董事会主席之间有一个坚定的性能和较强的正相关分散支付。因此，我们的结果证实在降低代理成本补偿合同和公司治理的互补作用（迈赫兰，1995年；哈策尔和斯塔克斯，2003年）。
这项研究有助于在多个层面的管理补偿研究。首先，它提供全面及最新的证据表明，企业经营者报酬的分散与企业绩效呈正相关。分散支付本身是迄今为止有点忽略了企业经营者报酬的研究领域。从而有助于我们的研究最近的研究，对行政团队的补偿（Aggrawal和Samwick，2003；Barron和沃德尔，2003年）的重点，而优先受偿的研究，往往局限于行政总裁。这项研究还扩展了对公司治理与企业经营者报酬结构的相互作用文学。为研究公司治理链，我们表明，改善治理结构（如独立董事成员的人口比例与行政总裁及主席职务分离）增强了与企业之间的支付分散呈正相关性。因此，公司治理和管理分散支付，或许是相辅相成相互促进的机制，加强企业绩效。在股东，经理人代理成本方面，我们提供的证据表明，分散支付的管理有可能减轻企业是很难监控的代理成本。更一般地，我们的研究支持这一观点，即行政赔偿的结构会影响代理成本与公司绩效。
此前的研究和我们的假设
1、竞争理论
这个理论（拉齐尔和罗森，1981年）认为：企业中管理人员的优势是个人为了晋升和奖励而进行竞争。高绩效管理人员往往能获得晋升和优厚的薪酬的双赢，并在其新岗位津贴形式的奖励。等级各个层次都拥有的津贴（最上级拥有最高的奖励）为竞争管理者和为了最高奖励而努力者提供了额外的奖励。竞争理论的主要因素为如下：（一）根据相关的绩效提供参与者相对应的奖励。表现最佳者拥有最高的奖励，而表现最差者拥有最小的奖励。（二）奖励本质上是非线性的。（三）奖金随竞争者的数目的增加而增加。（四）低能力的参与者会选择风险较高的战略以提高获胜的概率。因此，参加者的能力与他/她的表现是负
相关。
支持竞赛理论的实证证据是在体育运动中获得。例如，Ehrenberg and Bognanno（1990年）研究高尔夫选手的表现并得出结论：获奖的差距增加，球员的表现有所改善。Becker和Huselid（1992年）研究专业赛车车手的表现，并指出分散支付对个人表现和驾驶安全有着积极的效应。在商业场合和经营场所等，使用1980-1984年间200家公司的调查数据指出企业在一个层次上薪酬差距大幅增加，与竞赛理论的预测一致，即排名靠前的奖励拥有者具有更高的目标，而且在上级选手的补贴随着人数增加而增加。对经营企业的研究的另一个发现是公司业绩与高管薪酬的支付呈正相关。与此类似，Bognanno（2001年）报告说：CEO薪酬随着为竞争高职位而竞争的副主席的数目上升而上升。然而，他发现与比赛的预测不符的是公司并没有短期促销奖励，时间较长的位置晋升前降低了工资增长的促进作用。最后，康勇等对1997-1998年间100个英国大型公司进行抽样调查，发现没有发现高薪酬和提高公司绩效呈正相关的证据。奥赖利等人的研究指出美国类似的发现。因此，对竞赛理论业务混合设置的证据是有些过时。
2、公平公正
经济理论称：均衡工资等于员工的边际生产力。这种主流思想已经受到了挑战：社会交换模式，公平观念，社会学和心理学相关的工作。阿克洛夫和耶伦（1988年，1990年），米尔格罗姆和罗伯特（1988年），和李维尼（1991年）认为，底薪酬可以对创建和谐社会，高效的劳动关系，从而导致更高的产量和员工的努力效率产生积极影响。与此类似，莱文（1991年）开发了一个模型显示，降低工资可以提高员工的凝聚力分散，从而将提高生产力。
拉齐尔（1989年）和米尔格罗姆和Roberts（1990年）把底薪酬有关的经济效率提供了进一步研究：如果晋升和薪酬是基于相对而非个人表现如竞赛理论的假设，那么可以看到不仅员工表现良好，而且他们的对手表现不佳。因此，员工激励较弱的合作在极端情况下可能彻底破坏从事其他的活动。为了缓解这一点，企业可能会鼓励企业间合作，降低薪酬的支付。底薪酬可以减少工作量，但同时加强合作。因此，在一般情况下，它有助于以生产力的理由来压缩工资结构，在一定程度上促进合作。与此类似，米尔格罗姆和Roberts（1990年）使用委托代理框架建议最佳员工可从事寻租活动，来确保了组织决策过程。当组织决定影
响的财富或其他利益或组成团体成员之间分配时，这种影响力为导向的活动便产生了。私利受影响的个人试图影响决策过程来对他们有利。此外，如果公司不能完全监视输出，工人可能有动机夸大其输出和更高的工资。举例来说，一个项目（如研发）的支持者可能投入过多的精力来建立投资于该项目，隐藏潜在的困难和上级的压力，与此同时试图诋毁竞争的提案。这些论点已导致米尔格罗姆和Roberts，在某些情况下压缩工资，以减轻这些适得其反的活动。
上述股权的公平性参数的实证试验工作研究表明大学教师较高的薪酬和较低的满意度，生产力的可能性就越小，教师对研究工作的合作度较小。同样，牛郎和Levine（1992年）指出产品质量和组内薪酬（低薪酬支付）的各项措施之间的关系呈正相关关系。 Drago和加维（1998年）的报告指出强有力的激励与促进合作与减少员工个人的努力有关和公平公正的预测相矛盾。海布斯和锁定（2000年）报告说，工资差距在瑞典公司导致了产量和劳动生产率减少。
出处: 巴鲁克列夫，《高管薪酬分散，公司治理与企业绩效》, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting ,第30卷，2008：315-338。
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The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand the relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobservable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency problems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. "Ex-post settling up" by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firm's actual performance from stockholders' optimum is settled up in managers' compensation, then the agency cost will be fully borne by the agent (manager). The theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen and Senbet (1981), and empirical evidence of Amihud andLev (1981), Walking and Long (1984), Agrawal and Mandelker (1985), andBenston (1985), among others, suggest that managers' holding of common stock and stock options have an important effect on managerial incentives. For example, Benston finds that changes in the value of managers' stock holdings are larger than their annual employment income. Agrawal and Mandelker find that executive security holdings have a role in reducing agency problems. This implies that the share holdings and stock options of the managers are likely to affect the corporate investment decisions. A typical management scheme consists of flat salary, bonus payment and stock options. However, the studies, so far, only provide links between the stock options and corporate investment decisions. There are few evidences that the compensation schemes may have impacts on the corporate investment decisions. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework to study the effects of management compensation schemes on the corporate investment decisions. Assuming that the compensation schemes consist of flat salary, bonus payment, and stock options, I first examine the effects of alternative compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions under all-equity financing. Secondly, I examine the issue in a setting where a firm relies on debt financing. Briefly speaking, the findings are consistent with Amihud and Lev's results. Managers who have high shareholdings and rewarded by intensive profit sharing ratio tend to underinvest.However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the model. Section HI discusses the managerial incentives under all-equity financing. Section IV examines the managerial incentives under debt financing. Section V discusses the empirical implications and presents the conclusions of the study.
中小企业如何进行绩效管理--规章制度 所谓绩效管理，是指各级管理者和员工为了达到组织目标共同参与的绩效计划制定、绩效辅导沟通、绩效考核评价、绩效结果应用、绩效目标提升的持续循环过程，绩效管理的目的是持续提升个人、部门和组织的绩效。 影响绩效的主要因素有员工技能、外部环境、内部条件以及激励效应。员工技能是指员工具备的核心能力，是内在的因素，经过培训和开发是可以提高的;外部环境是指组织和个人面临的不为组织所左右的因素，是客观因素，我们是完全不能控制的;内部条件是指组织和个人开展工作所需的各种资源，也是客观因素，在一定程度上我们能改变内部条件的制约;激励效应是指组织和个人为达成目标而工作的主动性、积极性，激励效应是主观因素。 绩效管理对于中国企业已经不是一个陌生的话题，从以年终分配为目的的绩效考核到以全面提升企业管理水平为目的的绩效管理，很多经营者都希望通过绩效考核能够提高企业整体绩效水平。而如何真正将绩效管理运用到企业的经营中，并起到战略牵引的作用，也是让很多管理者头痛的问题。在绩效管理的实施中，最常见的问题就是流于形式，实际工作没有深入下去，执行不到位，造成推行绩效考核的管理成本大于绩效水平提高的效果;或者绩效考核实施目标不明确，为了分配奖金而考核，大家挖空心思寻找考核的漏洞和可能的机会，而不是将关注点集中在绩效水平的提升上。这里就涉及到绩效考核的战略导向、实施目标和切入点等一系列需要前期明确和处理的问题，在此就中国中小型企业中可能存在的一些现象做研究分析与大家共享。 在绩效考核实际实施和操作过程中，不同企业之间或相同企业在不同阶段，企业具体的战略目标是大相径庭的，这就决定了推进和实施绩效考核的切入点和侧重点也不相同。如果仅仅根据绩效考核理论生搬硬套，多数情况会象一盘好看却不好吃的菜，让人大倒胃口，有时还会造成不同程度的负面影响。 对于中国多数的中小型企业，绩效考核并不是一步到位、在短时间内建立得非常完善、表面十分光鲜就可以解决问题的;而是要从实际出发，从梳理流程、规范管理入手，开始绩效管理的第一步，等到运行时机成熟、数据积累充分之后，再将绩效考核全面推进，做到每个阶段都有明确具体的目标，每个阶段的实施都能对绩效水平的提高产生较大作用。 一、中小企业的现状与现代管理理论的矛盾 以目前中国中小型企业为例，绩效考核的操作和实施并不是一蹙而就、一步到位，建立得非常完善就可以解决问题的。在很多关于绩效考核的介绍中，为大家提供了完备的建立和实施绩效考核的方法及步骤，而从绩效考核的实施操作来看，这相当于为大家提供了一个非常规范的范本，不过这个范本通常隐含了很多假设作为前提条件，比如一般都要求企业的各项规章制度比较完备、管理流程比较清晰，从而设置各种绩效指标将目标层层分解，把企业的战略目标宣灌到各个层级的各个岗位上，从而保持多数员工的工作目标与整体战略目标的一致性，最大限度调动员工的积极性和创造性达到绩效水平的整体提升。显然，是一个完美的设想，但是对于我们多数的中小企业是否真的可以在这个美丽的设想下，实现绩效水平的大幅提升呢? 目前对于很多企业，尤其是中国的中小型企业，多数是由原来几十人、甚至十几个人的小单位或小作坊发展壮大起来的，在改革开发的市场大潮中有勇气、有魄力，做出了一番事业，在多年的经营中积累了大量的经验和竞争优势;同时这些企业最容易出现的弊病就是管理体系的不规范与落后，尤其是相对与现代化企业制度和管理理论而言。 当然，这是一定时期，中国企业发展的历史造成的，从小作坊或小单位发展到几百人、几千人、几万人甚至更大的企业，他们都有过十分辉煌的历史，但原有的经营模式和管
英文文献及翻译 文献题目An Overview of Servlet and JSP Technology 文献作者Nagle ,Wiegley 题目翻译Servlet和JSP技术简述 参考人 院 (系) 专业班级 学号
1 A Servlet's Job Servlets are Java programs that run on Web or application servers, acting as a middle layer between requests coming from Web browsers or other HTTP clients and databases or applications on the HTTP server. Their job is to perform the following tasks, as illustrated in Figure 1-1. Figure 1-1Web middleware role 1.1 Read the explicit data sent by the client. The end user normally enters this data in an HTML form on a Web page. However, the data could also come from an applet or a custom HTTP client program. 1.2 Read the implicit HTTP request data sent by the browser. Figure 1-1 shows a single arrow going from the client to the Web server (the layer where servlets and JSP execute), but there are really two varieties of data: the explicit data that the end user enters in a form and the behind-the-scenes HTTP information. Both varieties are critical. The HTTP information includes cookies, information about media types and compression schemes the browser understands, and so on. 1.3 Generate the results. This process may require talking to a database, executing an RMI or EJB call, invoking a Web service, or computing the response directly. Your real data may be in a relational database. Fine. But your database probably doesn't speak HTTP or return results in HTML, so the Web browser can't talk directly to the database. Even if it could, for security reasons, you probably would not want it to. The same argument applies to most other applications.You need the Web middle layer to extract the results inside a document.
本科毕业论文（设计） 外文翻译 原文： Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance Executive compensation has been a central research topic in economics and business during the past two decades, recently gaining impetus in the wake of corporate scandals that have exposed significant vulnerabilities in corporate governance and the subsequent far reaching regulatory changes (Sarbanes–Oxley). Prior research into executive compensation has primarily focused on issues related to the level and structural mix of compensation packages, and their sensitivity to firm performance (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Yermack 1995; Baber et al. 1996; Hall and Liebman 1998; Core et al. 1999; Murphy 1999; Bryan et al. 2000). Early compensation studies focused on the CEO, subsequently expanding the scope to the compensation of the entire managerial team. Thus, for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) report that managers with divisional responsibilities have lower pay–performance sensitivities than do managers with broad oversight authority, who in turn have lower pay–performance sensitivities than does the CEO, concluding that pay–performance sensitivity increases with the span of authority. Similarly, Barron and Waddell (2003) examine the characteristics of compensation packages of the five highest paid executives and find that higher rank managers have a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation in pay packages than do lower ranked executives. The issue of pay dispersion across managerial team members has received conceptual attention by labor economists and organization theorists, yet scant empirical research has been performed to date. In this study, we investigate empirically the effect of managerial compensation dispersion on firm performance.
企业员工福利外文翻译文献 (文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译) 译文： 西方企业员工福利满意度研究述评 摘要：近年来，西方企业管理学界越来越重视员X-福利满意度理论研究，因为员工的福利满意度会直接影响他们的工作态度、工作行为与企业经营管理工作的效果。本文概述了西方企业员工福利满意度理论研究的现状，并根据组织公平理论和双因素理论，探讨福利管理决策公平与不同类型的福利对员工满意度的影响，最后为我国企业加强福利管理工作提出了若干建议。 关键词：福利；满意度；组织公平；双因素理论 一、企业福利政策的发展趋势 福利是员工薪酬的一个重要组成部分。近年来，越来越多的企业为员工提供良好的福利待遇，以便吸引、激励并留住优秀员工。企业的福利政策出现了以下发展趋势：(1)福利在员工薪酬组合中的比重增大，企业支付的福利费用大幅增加。 (2)员工也必须承担部分福利费用。企业以往为员工免费提供所有福利。目前，许
多员工必须承担部分医疗保险、养老保险费用。(3)企业的福利制度越来越复杂，福利形式越来越多样化，管理人员需要花费更多的时间与精力来从事员工福利制度设计与管理工作。许多企业在制定与实施福利制度时较少考虑员工的反应。例如，有些企业为了降低福利费用，采用灵活的福利制度，或将部分福利管理工作外包给其他公司，而不考虑员工是否满意。许多欧美学者认为，企业管理人员在制定与实施福利制度时必须考虑员工的反应。他们的实证研究表明，员工对福利的满意度会直接影响企业福利制度的效果。 二、员工福利满意度理论研究概述 20世纪60年代以来，西方企业管理学界对员工薪酬理论进行了大量的研究。然而，企业管理学者却较少研究员工福利理论。在现有文献中，欧美学者主要从福利的激励作用、员工对福利计划的理解和偏好、福利与员工薪酬满意度的关系、员工的福利满意度等方面研究员工福利理论。美国学者威盛顿(Barton I。．Weathington)和坦切克(I。ois E．Tetrick)指出，企业管理学界在员工福利这个领域的研究成果存在以下不足：(1)许多学者实际上是研究员工的薪酬满意度或工作满意度，而不是研究员工的福利；(2)大多数学者只研究福利对员工的影响，却忽视各类福利对员工工作态度和工作行为的影响；(3)企业管理理论研究人员主要从企业的角度来研究福利制度，却很少考虑员工对福利的态度。近年来，西方企业管理学界逐渐加强了对员工福利满意度的研究。 I．员工福利满意度的计量 1985年，美国学者赫尼曼(Herbert G．Heneman)和希沃布(Donald P．Schwab)编制了一个由18个计量项目组成的“员工薪酬满意度”量表(pay satisfaction questionnaire，简称PSQ)。他们采用以下四个项目来计量员工的“福利满意度”： (1)员工对整套福利的满意度； (2)员工对企业支付的福利费用数额的满意度； (3)员工对福利价值的满意度； (4)员工对福利类别的满意度。 许多欧美企业管理学者在实证研究中把员工的福利满意度作为薪酬满意度的一个组成成分，采用PSQ量表计量员工的福利满意度。 现在，许多欧美学者对员工的福利满意度进行更深入的研究。不少学者认为员工福利满意度是一个多维概念。美国学者戴恩霍(Carol Danehower)与勒斯特(John A．I．ust)指出，员工的福利满意度应包括员工对企业支付的福利费用与企业为他们提供的整套福利的质量的满意度。他们设计了一个由11个项目组成的员工福利满意度量表(benefit satisfaction ques—tionnaire，简称BSQ)，从上述两个方面来计量员工的福利满意度。他们的一系列实证研究支持员工的福利满意度是一个二维概念的结论。然而，他们也发现BSQ量表中的某些项目不能很好地计量员工对福利质量的满意度。因此，他们对BSQ量表进行了适当的修改，又增加了两个项目，并于1995年对美国某大学的2 815位员工进行了问卷调查。他们的数据分析结果表明，新的BSQ量表中的13个项目分别属于员工对福利质量的满意度、对福利费用的满意度、对福利信息的满意度三个维度。他们根据数据分析结果，指出员工的福利满意度是一个复杂的多维概念。但是，加拿大学者特兰布雷(Michel Tremblay)等人的实证研究结果并不支持戴恩霍和勒斯特的观点。他们发现，员工的福利满意度是一个单维概念。美国学者米塞利(Marcia P．Miceli)和雷恩(Matthew C．Lane)把员工福利满意度分为两类：一类是员工对福利水平的满意度，它受员工感觉中“应该得到”与“实际得到”的福利之差的影响；另一
企业高管薪酬外文翻译文献 (文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译) 翻译: 管理者薪酬和企业债务期限结构 摘要：高管薪酬通过组合敏感性股价变动与股票报酬波动影响管理风险偏好。股票价格不支持管理风险，而股票报酬波动鼓励冒险。理论表明，
短期债务通过控制管理风险偏好减轻债务代理成本。我们断定，找到首席执行官组合和短期到期债务之间关系的证据。我们还发现，短期到期债务减轻对债券收益率激励机制的影响。总的来说，我们的经验证据表明，短期债务减轻了从风险补偿所产生的债务代理成本。 使用股票及期权为基础做为高管薪酬的现象在过去的几十年里急剧增加。首席执行官财富的暴露使股票价格在1980年到1994年间增加了两倍，然后1994年到2000年间又增加了一倍。高管薪酬的这种变化对经理所承受的风险有直接的影响，从而改变双方的激励机制和行为。卡彭特和兰伯特探讨了对管理者激励补偿两方面的影响。一个影响是通过补偿股票价格的敏感性造成的。第二个影响是通过补偿股票报酬波动的敏感性造成的。对股票价格补偿方案的灵敏度越高，经理人的风险偏好就越弱。相比之下，对股票收益波动率补偿方案的敏感性越高，经理人的风险偏好就越大。通过改变管理风险偏好，基于股票的补偿也影响那些风险偏好的第三方看法。本研究的主要目的是探讨短期债务在减少来自高管激励合同所产生的债务代理成本的作用。具体来说，我们研究了这两种组合敏感度对公司债务期限结构的影响。此外，我们分析债务到期对投资组合灵敏度和债券收益率之间的关系。实证结果提供了一个一致的意见，短期债务减少了与薪酬激励相关的债务代理成本。 传统的代理理论提出了股东和债权人之间的利益冲突。在他们的开创性研究中，法玛、米勒、詹森和麦克林认为，股东有动机减少债券持有人财富通过代入高风险的投资，这种现象通常被称为资产替代。股权报酬对管理人员去资产替代提供一个潜在的强大动力。债权人了解这些
绩效管理外文翻译外文文献中英翻译____________________________________________________________________ ________________________ Performance management-how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means,
Powerdesigner的起步与数据建模 1、数据建模与PowerDesigner 数据模型是信息的一种表示方法和生产消费系统。数据建模包括分析的数据实体系统中存在的关系。PowerDesigner提供概念,逻辑,和物理数据模型来让你你的系统分析和模型各级抽象概念。 1.1概念数据模型, 一个概念数据模型(CDM)代表逻辑结构,数据系统独立于任何软件或数据存储结构。它给的形式表示数据,需要运行企业、经营活动,可能包含数据对象尚未实施在物质数据库。一个清洁发展机制可以让您: ?代表组织的数据,在一个图形格式创造的实体关系图表 ?数据设计的有效性进行了验证。 ?产生一个逻辑数据模型(LDM),物理数据模型(PDM),或一个面向对象模型(OOM 指定一个对象),表示清洁发展机制使用UML标准。 1.2逻辑数据模型 一个逻辑数据模型可以帮助你设计一个数据库结构和执行一些数据库denormalization独立于任何特定的数据库管理系统行为物理的要求。你可以用逻辑模型作为一种中介步骤进行了对比与数据库设计的概念和物理结构:在一开始?CDM含有实体,属性,关系、领域、数据项目和业务规则。如果需要的话,你可能会显露出清洁发展机制在几个设计步骤从高水平较低水平的模型,清洁发展机制。 ?产生LDM。FK和指定创建索引列名称和其他共同特点 ?生成一个或更多的(PDMs),每一个为特定的数据库实施这个设计过程使每件东西都保持一致允许你在一个大发展的努力。 1.3的物理数据模型
物理数据模型(PDM)是一个数据库设计工具的实施适合建模和数据查询生理结构在数据库中。如图1所示。 根据数据库的选型你想设计时,你会用不同类型的PDM图。 ?操作PDM——你使用的结构设计产品具有可操作性的数据库。一般情况下,在数据建模,物理分析遵循概念和/或逻辑分析,并提出了具体的实际实施数据库中的数据,能满足你的表现和物理限制。 ?商业智能产品数据管理的,你也可以用产品设计了数据库的结构环境,包括: ?数据仓库或数据集市数据库操作传输数据,从运算数据库,和聚拢所有可能需要的信息的查询资料库,在OLAP(在线分析处理)商业分析和决策执行。数据仓库数据库收集所有的数据处理的公司的例子,而数据集市关注小实体的公司。 你使用物理的图表来设计数据仓库和数据集市的数据库。由于这些数据库通常包含了大量的数据存储时,你就不需要设计业绩。你可以指定类型(事实和尺寸)数据库表格有预习多维结构的OLAP(在线分析处理)数据库。 ?多维的OLAP(在线分析处理)数据服务器-通常是封装了数据最先被聚集在数据仓库和数据集市(虽然有时是直接从操作数据库)转移,促进组织的信息查询 进行不同的工具。商业分析师使用的OLAP(在线分析处理)数据库发送查询和检索商务信息中存在的不同维度的数据库。你用PDM多维的图表来设计不同的维度和正方体OLAP(在线分析处理)内的数据库。 2、创建一个数据模型
首先，画一下我们通常讲研发管理的范畴：确定如何立项，如何确定产品目标，如何把控项目进度，如何驱动产品一代代完善以及如何调动团队积极性等。 在时间周期上来说，我们归纳为5个关键步骤：选方向、定目标、控进度、带团队和排干扰。相配套的，则是在这五个关键步骤的一些流程和工具的使用。 一、高效研发的5个关键步骤 第一步：立项——定方向 在豌豆荚的整个研发过程中，立项称为ProductBrief或者Project Brief。团队的产品经理会撰写一个1－2页的文档，然后和执行团队进行评审，如果评审通过，立项就成功了。文档一般包含会包含以下内容： 1. 愿景：一句话表达清楚要做什么； 2. 分析市场机会和趋势，决定当前策略； 3. 确定目标用户的特征和核心需求； 4. 现存的解决方案和各自的优劣势； 5. 该项目对豌豆荚的利益点；如果不做该项目，哪些竞争对手会做，对竞争对手的利益点； 6. 需要哪些技术的支持和驱动，哪些技术是豌豆荚的弱项； 7. 人力需求； 8. 项目的紧急程度，是否需要快速推进； 9. 发布策略； 10.核心衡量指标，用来衡量成功的指标。 第二步，OKR 体系——定目标 对一个项目来说，设定目标是非常重要的，因为这决定了如何去做，以及能做到何种程度。豌豆荚采纳的目标管理是从 Google 引进的 OKR 体系（Objectives& Key Results，目标与关键成果），这跟传统的 KPI（Key Performance Indicator，关键绩效考核）稍微有些区别： 1. OKR 首先是沟通工具：豌豆荚共有 300 多人，每个人都要写 OKR。为了便于沟通，所有这些OKR都会放在一个文档里。任何员工都可以看到 CEO 的这个季度最重要的目标是
外文文献原稿和译文 原稿 Performance management - how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means, towards a common goal; problem, find the problems, find problems or prevent problems; obey the law, be protected
高管人员绩效考核与薪酬激励制度． 高管人员绩效考核与薪酬激励制度绩效考核与薪酬激励制度
总则第一章 为推进公司建立与现代企业制度相适应第一条有效地调动高管人员的积极性的激励约束机制，进一步提升提高企业经营管理水平，和创造性，促进公司做强、发展三大业绩，公司效益、安全、结做大、做好，确保公司发展战略目标的实现, 合公司实际，制定本制度。
本制度所称高管人员指下列人员：第二条(一)公司总经理、副总经理、财务负责人、董事会秘书。 (二)公司董事会薪酬与考核委员会认为应 当适用的其他人员。 第三条公司高管人员绩效考核以企业效益、安全、发展三大业绩为出发点，根据公司年度预算、经营计划和高管人员分管工作的工作目标生产、． 完成情况，进行综合考核，根据考核结果确定高管人员的年度薪酬分配。
第四条公司高管人员绩效考核与薪酬分配遵循以下原则： (一)按劳分配与责、权、利相结合的原则； (二)收入水平与公司业绩及分管工作目标 挂钩的原则； (三)考虑公司长远利益、促进公司持续健康发展的原则； (四)定量与定性考核相结合，结果与过程相统一的原则；
(五)有奖有罚、奖罚对等、激励与约束并重的原则。 第二章管理机构 第五条公司董事会薪酬与考核委员会是对高管人员进行绩效考核以及确定薪酬分配的管理机构，具体测算和兑现工作由公司企管部和财务部负责实施。 薪酬与考核委员会的主要职责权限：第六条 根据高管人员管理岗位的主要范围、职责、)(一
重要性以及其他相关企业相关岗位的薪酬水平薪酬计划或方案主要包括制定薪酬计划或方案。但不限于绩效评价标准、程序及主要评价体系、奖励和惩罚的主要方案和制度等； 负责对公司高管人员薪酬方案提出修改意)(二见、审查、确认高管人员年度目标责任书； (三)负责对公司薪酬制度执行情况进行监督；
原文 Enterprise salary reward management Keyword：Enterprise salary reward management Salary the overall function of function and the management of human resource that rewards is consistent also for is can attract and encourage the human resource needed by enterprise from labour economy angle speak salary reward have 3 great merits can: guarantee function , encourage function and regulation function. Refering to the angle of the management of human resource salary reward should embody and play mainly it's encourage function the salary with reasonable establishment reward management system is every problem that enterprise needs solve. In recent years, as enterprise manages , mechanism change and establish modern enterprise system step by step needs, the built-in wages degree of assignment system of enterprise the self who changes enterprise into gradually from government behavior behavior. Therefore how to meet market needs establish with modern enterprise system appearance the supplemental salary, that suits enterprise self development reward management system and distribution scheme, high limit land development enterprise human resource Qian can, become every important program of current Chinese enterprise. Salary the substance that rewarded , it is that enterprise, for employee, is the contribution done by enterprise that function and purpose salary reward , include realization Ji effect , the corresponding repayment and that effort, time, knowledge, ability, experience and creation pay that paid out or thank. Essentially, it is a kind of fair distribution principle that exchanges or trades and has embodied socialist market