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林迈可：让世界听到延安的声音作者：覃仕勇来源：《百年潮》2015年第12期林迈可（Michael Lindsay）出生于英国一个世代书香家庭，其祖父为历史学家，父亲是牛津大学贝里奥学院院长、英国上院议员。
他来华的时间是抗日战争全面爆发的1937年。
这一年，是林迈可从牛津毕业一周年。
他受燕京大学（简称燕大）聘请，担任燕大的经济学导师，并领导创办牛津大学式的导师制。
1937年12月，林迈可绕道美国，从温哥华乘船来到中国。
同来的船上，林迈可结识了白求恩。
林迈可和白求恩成了无话不谈的好朋友，两人在日本横滨分手时约定，将来在华北根据地相见。
到了燕大，林迈可住进临湖轩司徒雷登校长的寓所。
司徒雷登那种宁可学校关门也要支持中国人民抗日的精神很快就影响到了林迈可。
1938年，林迈可利用复活节假期践行了与白求恩的约定，和燕大的几名教师一起进入晋察冀根据地，与白求恩相聚。
通过白求恩，林迈可见到了吕正操将军。
毫无疑问，对林迈可来说，根据地的一切都是无比新奇的。
在根据地，群众举行声势浩大的抗日集会，新招募的军队充满豪情和斗志地操练，兵工厂的工人在热火朝天地工作，乡村小学校的黑板上写满了鼓舞人心的抗日标语，男女平等参政议政，还有那令人耳目一新的在露天舞台上演的抗日话剧。
事实上，全世界都对中国的抗战根据地充满了种种猜测和好奇。
许多人了解根据地这个神秘的群体，都是借助于一本由日本记者波多野乾一写的《延安水浒传——中共高级领袖解明》一书，书中将当时中国共产党高层文官武将按照《水浒传》108名好汉的次序进行“对号入座”。
该书不仅是外界了解共产党领袖的重要参考资料，也是侵华期间日军高级将领进入中国战场前的必读之物。
林迈可不但见到了吕正操，还在根据地军民的护送下进入设在山西省五台山区的聂荣臻将军的晋察冀军区司令部和宋劭文主任委员领导下的边区政府。
在根据地军民高昂抗日斗志的感染下，林迈可参加了游击队破袭平汉铁路的战斗。
林迈可还在山西武乡县砖壁村的八路军总部见到了朱德总司令。
The China Miracle DemystifiedJustin Yifu LinThe World BankWhen China began its transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy in 1979, it was a poor, inward-looking country with a per capita income of US$182 and a trade dependence (trade to GDP) ratio of 11.2 percent.1China’s economic performance since then has been miraculous. Annual GDP growth averaged 9.9 percent over the 30-year period, and annual growth in international trade, 16.3 percent China is now a middle-income country, with a per capita GDP of US$3,688 in 2009, and more than 600 million people have escaped poverty. Its trade dependence ratio has reached 65 percent, the highest among the world’s large economies. In 2009 China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy and replaced Germany as the world’s largest exporter of merchandise. China’s car market is now the world’s largest, and Shanghai has been the world’s busiest seaport by cargo tonnage since 2005. The spectacular growth over the past three decades far exceeded the expectations of anyone at the outset of the transition, including Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s reform and opening-up strategy.2Interest among academics in China’s transition and development experience hasPaper prepared for the panel on “Perspectives on Chinese Economic Growth” at the Econometric Society World Congress in Shanghai on August 19, 2010.1Unless indicated otherwise, the statistics on the Chinese economy reported in the paper are from China Statistical Abstract 2010, China Compendium of Statistics 1949–2008, and various editions of China Statistical Yearbook, published by China Statistics Press.2Deng’s goal at that time was to quadruple the size of China’s economy in 20 years, which would have meant average annual growth of 7.2 percent. Most people in the 1980s, and even as late as the early 1990s, thought that achieving that goal was a mission impossible.increased exponentially in the past three decades.3I. The Reason for China’s Extraordinary Performance in Transition In this paper I try to provide answers to five related questions: Why was it possible for China to achieve such extraordinary performance during its transition? Why was China unable to attain similar success before its transition started? Why did most other transition economies, both socialist and nonsocialist, fail to achieve a similar performance? And can other developing countries achieve a similar economic performance?Rapid, sustained increase in per capita income is a modern phenomenon. Studies by economic historians, such as Angus Maddison (2001), show that average annual per capita income growth in the West was only 0.05 percent before the 18th century, jumping to about 1 percent in the 19th century and reaching about 2 percent in the 20th century. That means that per capita income in Europe took 1,400 years to double before the 18th century, about 70 years in the 19th century, and 35 years thereafter.A continuous stream of technological innovation is the basis for sustained growth in any economy. The dramatic surge in growth in modern times is a result of a paradigm shift in technological innovation. Before the industrial revolution in the 18th century, technological innovations were generated mostly by the experiences of craftsmen and farmers in their daily production. After the industrial revolution, experience-based innovation was increasingly replaced by field experimentation and, later, by science-based experiments conducted in scientific laboratories (Lin 1995; Landes 1998). This shift speeded the rate of technological innovation, marking the3 The EconLit database includes 27 peer-reviewed scholarly journal articles with China or Chinese in their title published in 1979, a number that jumps to 70 for 1989 and 1,016 for 2009.coming of modern economic growth and contributing to the dramatic acceleration of income growth in the 19th and 20th centuries (Kuznets 1966).The industrial revolution not only accelerated the rate of technological innovation but also transformed industrial, economic, and social structures. Before the 18th century every economy was agrarian; 85 percent or more of the labor force worked in agriculture, mostly in self-sufficient production for the family. The acceleration of growth was accompanied by a move of labor from agriculture to manufacturing and services. The manufacturing sector gradually moved from very labor-intensive industries at the beginning to more capital-intensive heavy and high-tech industries. Finally, the service sector came to dominate the economy. Accompanying the change in industrial structure was an increase in the scale of production, the required capital and skill, the market scope, and the risks. To exploit the potential unleashed by new technology and industry, and to reduce the transaction costs and share risks requires innovations as well as improvements in an economy’s hard infrastructure, such as power and road networks, and its soft infrastructure. Soft infrastructure consists of such elements as belief, the legal framework, financial institutions, and the education system (Lewis 1954; Kuznets 1966; North 1981; Lin 2010).A developing country such as China, which started its modernization drive in 1949, potentially has the advantage of backwardness in its pursuit of technological innovation and structural transformation (Gerschenkron 1962). In advanced high-income countries technological innovation and industrial upgrading require costly and risky investments in research and development, because their technologiesand industries are located on the global frontier. Moreover, the institutional innovation, which is required for realizing the potential of new technology and industry, often proceeds in a costly trial-and-error, path-dependent, evolutionary process (Fei and Ranis 1997). By contrast, a latecomer country in the catching up process can borrow technology, industry, and institutions from the advanced countries at low risk and costs. So if a developing country knows how to tap the advantage of backwardness in technology, industry, and social and economic institutions, it can grow at an annual rate several times that of high-income countries for decades before closing its income gap with those countries.In the post–World War II period, 13 of the world’s economies achieved average annual growth of 7 percent or above for 25 years or more. The Commission on Growth and Development, headed by Nobel Laureate Michael Spence, finds that the first of 5 common features of these 13 economies is their ability to tap the potential of the advantage of backwardness. In the Commission’s language, the 13 economies, “they imported what the rest of the world knew and exported what it wanted” (World Bank 2008, p. 22).4After the transition was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, China adopted the opening-up strategy and started to tap the potential of importing what the rest of the world knows and exporting what the world wants. This is demonstrated by the rapid4The 2nd to fifth features are, respectively, macroeconomic stability, high rates of saving and investment, market system, and committed, credible, and capable governments. Lin and Monga (2010a) show that the first three features are the results of following the economy’s comparative advantages in developing industries at each stage of its development, and the last two features are the preconditions for the economy to follow its comparative advantages in developing industries.growth in its international trade, the dramatic increase in its trade dependence ratio, and the large inflows of foreign direct investment. While in 1979 primary and processed primary goods accounted for more than 75 percent of China’s exports, by 2009 the share of manufactured goods had increased to more than 95 percent. Moreover, China’s manufactured exports upgraded from simple toys, textiles, and other cheap products in the 1980s and 1990s to high-value and technologically sophisticated machinery and information and communication technology products in the 2000s. China’s exploitation of the advantage of backwardness has allowed the country to emerge as the world’s workshop and to achieve extraordinary economic growth by reducing the costs of innovation, industrial upgrading, and social and economic transformation.II.Why Did China Fail to Achieve Rapid Growth before 1979? China possessed the advantage of backwardness long before the transition began in 1979. The socialist government won the revolution in 1949 and started modernizing in earnest in 1953. Why had China failed to tap the potential of the advantage of backwardness and achieve dynamic growth before 1979? This failure came about because China adopted a wrong development strategy at that time.China was the largest economy and among the most advanced, powerful countries in the world before pre-modern times (Maddison 2007). Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other first-generation revolutionary leaders in China, like many other Chinese social and political elites, were inspired by the dream of bringing about China’s modernization as fast as possible.Lack of industrialization—especially lack of the large heavy industries that were the basis of military strength and economic power—was perceived as the root cause of the country’s backwardness. Thus it was natural for the social and political elites in China to prioritize the development of large, heavy, advanced industries after they won the revolution and started building the nation.5Starting in 1953, China adopted a series of ambitious Five-Year Plans to accelerate the building of modern advanced industries with the goal of overtaking Britain in 10 years and catching up to the USA in 15 years. But China was a lower-income agrarian economy at that time. In 1953, 83.5 percent of its labor force was employed in the primary sector, and its per capita income (measured in purchasing power parity terms) was only 4.8 percent of that of the United States (Maddison 2001). Given China’s employment structure and income level, the country did not possess comparative advantage in modern advanced industries of high-income countries, whether latent or overt, and Chinese firms in those industries were not viable in an open competitive market. In the 19th century the political leaders of France, Germany, the United States, and other Western countries pursued effectively the same strategy, motivated by the contrast between Britain’s rising industrial power and the backwardness of their own industry (Gerschenkron 1962; Chang 2003).65 The desire to develop heavy industries existed before the socialist elites obtained political power. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the father of modern China, proposed the development of “key and basic industries” as a priority in his plan for China’s industrialization in 1919 (Sun 1929).6 While the policy goal of France, Germany, and the United States in the late 19th century was similar to that of China in the mid-1950s, the per capita incomes of the three countries were about 60–75To achieve its strategic goal, the Chinese government needed to protect the priority industries by giving firms in those industries a monopoly and subsidizing them through various price distortions, including suppressed interest rates, an overvalued exchange rate, and lower prices for inputs. The price distortions created shortages, and the government was obliged to use administrative measures to mobilize and allocate resources directly to nonviable firms (Lin 2009; Lin and Li 2009).Thanks to these interventions, China was able to quickly establish modern advanced industries, test nuclear bombs in the 1960s, and launch satellites in the 1970s. But the resources were misallocated, the incentives were distorted, and the labor-intensive sectors in which China held a comparative advantage were repressed. As a result, economic efficiency was low, and the growth before 1979 was driven mainly by an increase in inputs.7III. Why Didn’t Other Transition Economies Perform Equally Well? Despite a very respectable average annual GDP growth rate of 6.1 percent in 1952–78 and the possession of large modern industries, China was almost a closed economy, with 71.3 percent of its labor force still in traditional agriculture. In 1952–78 household consumption grew by only 2.3 percent a year, in sharp contrast to the 7.1 percent average growth after 1979.All other socialist countries and most developing countries after World War II adopted a development strategy similar to that of China. Most colonies gained political independence after the 1950s. Compared with developed countries, these newly percent of Britain’s at the time. The small gap in per capita incomes indicated that the industries on the governments’ priority lists were the latent comparative advantages of the three countries (Lin and Monga 2010b).7 Estimates by Perkins and Rawski (2008) suggest that the average annual growth of total factor productivity was 0.5 percent in 1952–78 and 3.8 percent in 1978–2005.independent developing countries had extremely low per capita income, high birth and death rates, low average educational attainment, and very little infrastructure—and were heavily specialized in the production and export of primary commodities while importing most manufactured goods. The development of modern advanced industries was perceived as the only way to achieve rapid economic takeoff, avoid dependence on the Western industrial powers, and eliminate poverty (Prebisch 1950).It became a fad after the 1950s for developing countries in both the socialist and the nonsocialist camps to adopt a development strategy oriented toward heavy industry and import substitution (Lal and Mynt 1996). But the capital-intensive industries on their priority lists defied the comparative advantages determined by the endowment structure of their low-income agrarian economies. To implement their development strategy, developing countries introduced distortions and government interventions like those in China.88 There are different explanations for the pervasive distortions in developing countries. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005); Engerman and Sokoloff (1997); and Grossman and Helpman (1996) propose that these distortions were caused by the capture of government by powerful vested interests. Lin (2009, 2003) and Lin and Li (2009) propose that the distortions were a result of conflicts between the comparative advantages of the economies and the priority industries that political elites, influenced by the dominant social thinking of the time, targeted for the modernization of their nations.This strategy made it possible to establish some modern industries and achieve investment-led growth for one or two decades in the 1950s to the 1970s. Nevertheless, the distortions led to pervasive soft budget constraints, rent-seeking, and misallocation of resources. Economic efficiency was unavoidably low. Stagnation and frequent social and economic crises began to beset most socialist and nonsocialist developing countries by the 1970s and 1980s. Liberalization from excessive state intervention became a trend in the 1980s and 1990s.The symptoms of poor economic performance and social and economic crises, and their root cause in distortions and government interventions, were common to China and other socialist transition economies as well as other developing countries. But the academic and policy communities in the 1980s did not realize that those distortions were second-best institutional arrangements, endogenous to the needs of protecting nonviable firms in the priority sectors. As a result, they recommended that socialist and other developing countries immediately remove all distortions by implementing simultaneous programs of liberalization, privatization, and marketization with the aim of quickly achieving efficient, first-best outcomes.But if those distortions were eliminated immediately, many nonviable firms in the priority sectors would collapse, causing a contraction of GDP, a surge in unemployment, and acute social disorders. To avoid those dreadful consequences, many governments continued to subsidize the nonviable firms through other, disguised, less efficient subsidies and protections (Lin and Tan 1999). Transition and developing countries thus had even poorer growth performance and stability in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1960s and 1970s (Easterly 2001).During the transition process China adopted a pragmatic, gradual, dual-track approach. The government continued to provide necessary protections to nonviable firms in the priority sectors. At the same time it liberalized the entry of private enterprises, joint ventures, and foreign direct investment in labor-intensive sectors in which China had a comparative advantage but that were repressed before the transition. This transition strategy allowed China both to maintain stability by avoiding the collapse of old priority industries and to achieve dynamic growth by simultaneously pursuing its comparative advantage and tapping the advantage ofbackwardness in the industrial upgrading process. In addition, the dynamic growth in the newly liberalized sectors created the conditions for reforming the old priority sectors. Through this gradual, dual-track approach China achieved “reform without losers” (Lau, Qian, and Roland 2000; Lin, Cai, and Li 2003; Naughton 1995) and moved gradually but steadily to a well-functioning market economy.A few other socialist economies—such as Poland 9IV. Lessons of China’s Development for Other Developing Countries , Slovenia, and Vietnam, which achieved outstanding performance during their transitions—adopted a similar gradual, dual-track approach (Lin 2009). Similarly, Mauritius adopted such an approach in the 1970s to reform distortions caused by the import-substitution strategy, becoming an extraordinary success story in Africa (Subramanian and Roy 2003).Can other developing countries achieve a performance similar to that achieved by China over the past three decades? The answer is clearly yes. Every developing country has a similar opportunity if at each stage of its development the country knows how to develop its industries according to its comparative advantages so as to tap the potential of the advantage of backwardness in its technological innovation and structural transformation. A well-functioning market is a precondition for developing an economy’s industries according to its comparative advantages, because only with such a market can relative prices reflect the relative scarcities of factors of production in the economy. Such a clear functioning market naturally propels firms to enter industries consistent with those country’s comparative advantages. If a developing9 In spite of its attempt to implement a shock therapy at the beginning, Poland did not privatize its large state-own enterprises until very late in the transition.country follows its comparative advantages in technological and industrial development, it will be competitive in domestic and international markets. In other words, it will grow fast, accumulate capital rapidly, and upgrade its endowment structure quickly. When the endowment structure is upgraded, the economy’s comparative advantages change and its industrial structure as well as hard and soft infrastructure need to be upgraded accordingly. In the process it is desirable for the state to play a proactive, facilitating role in compensating for externalities created by pioneer firms in the industrial upgrading and coordinating the desirable investments and improvements in soft and hard infrastructure, for which individual firms cannot internalize in their decisions. Through the appropriate functions of competitive markets and a proactive, facilitating state, a developing country can tap the potential of the advantage of backwardness and achieve dynamic growth (Lin 2010).Most developing countries, as a result of their governments’ previous development strategies, have various kinds of distortions and many existing firms are nonviable in an open competitive market. In this respect too, China’s experience in the past 30 years provides useful lessons. In the reform process it is desirable for a developing country to adopt a dual-track approach, providing some transitory protections to nonviable firms to maintain stability but liberalizing entry into sectors in which the country has comparative advantages to tap the advantage of backwardness. If they can do this, other developing countries can also achieve stability and dynamic growth in their economic liberalization process.Thirty years ago no one would have imagined that China would be among the 13economies that tapped the potential of the advantage of backwardness and realized average annual growth of 7 percent or above for 25 or more years. For developing countries now fighting to eradicate poverty and close the gap with high-income countries, I hope that lessons from China’s transition and development will help them join the list of those realizing growth of 7 percent or more for 25 or more years in the coming decades.China too can still benefit from the potential of the advantage of backwardness. After 30 years of transition China’s per capita income is only about 7.4 percent of the average for high-income countries when measured by market exchange rates and 16 percent when measured in purchasing power parity terms. I hope that China also will learn from the lessons of its past and maintain a dynamic, sustainable, and inclusive growth in the coming 30 years.ReferencesAcemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson. 2005. “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth.” In Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 1A, ed. P.Aghion and S. N. Durlauf, 385–472. Amsterdam: Elsevier.Brandt, L., and T. G. Rawski, eds. 2008. China’s Great Economic Transformation.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Chang, H. 2003. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. London: Anthem Press.Easterly, W. 2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Engerman, S. L., and K. L. Sokoloff. 1997. “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States.” In How Latin America Fell Behind,ed.S. Haber [[possible to provide page numbers for this chapter?]]. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Fei, J., and G. Ranis. 1997.Growth and Development from an Evolutionary Perspective. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Gerschenkron, A. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman. 1996. “Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics.” Review of Economic Studies 63 (2): 265–86.Kuznets, S. 1966. Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Lal, D., and H. Mynt. 1996. The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth: A Comparative Study. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Landes, D. 1998. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor. New York and London: Norton.Lau, L. J., Y. Qian, and G. Roland. 2000. “Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual-Track Approach to Transition.” Journal of Political Economy 108 (1): 120–43.Lewis, W. A. 1954. “Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labour.”Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 22 (2): 139–91.Lin, J. Y. 1995. “The Needham Puzzle: Why the Industrial Revolution Did Not Originate in China.”Economic Development and Cultural Change41 (2): 269–92.———. 2003. “Development Strategy, Viability and Economic Convergence.”Economic Development and Cultural Change 53 (2): 277–308.———. 2009. Economic Development and Transition: Thought, Strategy, and Viability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.———. 2010.“New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development.” Policy Research Working Paper 5197, World Bank, Washington, DC.Lin, J. Y., and F. Li. 2009. “Development Strategy, Viability, and Economic Distortions in Developing Countries.” Policy Research Working Paper 4906, World Bank, Washington, DC.Lin, J. Y., and C. Monga. 2010a. “The Growth Report and New Structural Economics,”Policy Research Working Paper 5336, World Bank, Washington, DC.———.b. “Growth Identification and Facilitation: The Role of the State in the Dynamics of Structural Change.” Policy Research Working Paper 5313, World Bank, Washington, DC.Lin, J. Y., and G. Tan. 1999. “Policy Burdens, Accountability, and Soft Budget Constraints.” American Economic Review 89 (2): 426–31.Lin, J. Y., F. Cai, and Z. Li. 2003. The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform. Hong Kong SAR, China: Chinese University Press. Maddison, A. 2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD Development Centre.———. 2007. Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run—Second Edition, Revised and Updated: 960–2030 AD. Paris: OECD Development Centre. Naughton, B. 1995. Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1993.New York: Cambridge University Press.North, D. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W.W. Norton. Perkins, D. H., and T. G. Rawski. 2008. “Forecasting China’s Economic Growth to 2025.” In China’s Great Economic Transformation, ed. L. Brandt and T. G.Rawski, 829–85. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Prebisch, R. 1950. The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems. New York: United Nations. Reprinted in Economic Bulletin for Latin America 7, no. 1 (1962): 1–22.Ravallion, M., and S. Chen. Forthcoming. “China’s (Uneven) Progress against Poverty: An Update.” Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC.Subramanian, A., and D. Roy. 2003. “Who Can Explain the Mauritian Miracle? Mede, Romer, Sachs, or Rodrik?” In In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth,ed. D. Rodrik, 205–43. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sun, Y. S. 1929. The International Development of China (Shih yeh chi hua). 2nd ed.New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons.World Bank (on behalf Commission on Growth and Development). 2008. The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.。
林纾作者：胡笑铭来源：《祖国》2018年第12期在我国的翻译史上，林纾是一个奇妙的存在。
他精通古文，却也使用白话；不通外语，却译作等身；他是先进的维新党，也是顽固的守旧派；他的翻译盛极一时，晚年却也被无情批判。
林纾就是这样的一个复杂而又矛盾的综合体，但却又是个纯粹的翻译人。
林纾原名林秉辉，字琴南，乳名群玉。
出生于一个微寒却又和睦的家庭，父亲经商，母亲温婉。
外祖父为太学生，外祖母与祖母虽识字不多，但从小给予他的教诲，小小的群玉却始终铭记在心。
外祖母常说“孺子不患无美食，而患无大志。
”而祖母常讲“不务正而居高位，耻也。
畏天而循分，足矣。
”林纾就是在这样一个幸福的家庭长大的。
可惜好景不长。
父亲经商失败，远赴台湾淡水经商，希望重振旗鼓。
福州家中的妻子儿女却只能靠给别人做针线活补贴家用。
群玉虽乖巧伶俐，记忆超群，却也因为家境一落千丈，无法上学读书。
后为帮助父亲，只身远赴淡水经商。
因为操劳和伤心过度，他染上了肺痨，整日咳血，身体十分虚弱。
群玉娶妻生子后，岳父十分欣赏他勤奋好学，所以一直资助群玉考取功名。
虽然天资聪颖，笔耕不辍，但他二十七岁考取秀才，三十岁才中举人。
后来六次赴京礼部考进士接连失败失败，受尽挫折，最终放弃仕途发展，安心教学。
自父亲去世，自己身体变差后，群玉努力学习拳术与剑术。
又因为其性格直率，狷介耿直，常与人就当今时政争辩，被同乡人成为“狂生”。
在浓重的封建礼教下，能放纵自己的个人情感，实属异类；并且在当时的社会环境下，亦是非常罕见的。
本以为中了举人之后，有了教书的职务，家里的经济情况有所好转。
但是好景不长，妻子刘琼姿病逝。
之后，长女和次子也相继病逝。
不久，维新变法开始了。
林纾虽中举人，也在各大学堂，书局担任要职，但内心还是有一颗强烈的救国之心。
这接二连三的打击与动荡，最终并没有让林纾倒下，而是在一个偶然的机会，开始接触到西方小说世界。
他深感政局动荡，民众又无法真正地汲取到当今先进的资本主义的反帝救国思想，便与友人王寿昌合作，王寿昌口译，林纾笔著，与1899年翻译《巴黎茶花女遗事》一书。
公元兴衰作者：谢琳来源：《中国摄影》2016年第05期公元，作为中国感光材料工业的重要代表，经历了一个从无到有、从自主建设到引进技术、从薄弱到兴盛并最后走向衰落的过程。
这一过程成为经济全球化趋势下，民族工业发展的一个缩影。
来去匆匆的公元，你为中国摄影史留下什么呢？公元胶片的创始人林希之先生于1969年辞世，而他的同事、徒弟、同辈亲人以及公元厂的历届领导、公元的元老级见证人，有些已经去世，而健在的也大都八九十岁了。
我着手调查公元史发现：公元感光材料厂并没有保存完整的文字和音像历史资料，原来的信件等纸质文件早已消失。
因此，我只好以采访当事人的口述历史方式出版了《对话公元》一书。
在三年多时间里，我走访了45位老公元人，力图真实展示公元厂从无到有、从小到大、从辉煌走向没落的整个历史进程。
一“元”初始林希之，这位公元厂的创始人，曾被誉为“中国感光工业之父”，他的一生充满了传奇色彩。
林希之，原名林应熙，1921年出生于汕头市一个六世同堂的富商家庭，祖父曾代理英商太古公司的船务，在汕头创办“太古南记行”。
他的父亲一共娶了四房太太，母亲为二房。
林希之七岁时，母亲就去世了。
林希之没上过正规小学，1934年秋，他来到汕头市私立英华补习学校念书，其间各种科目成绩优异。
芦沟桥事变打破了他静默的学生生活，不久他随家避乱香江，并考进赤柱一所贵族学校—圣士提反书院，相当于现在的高一。
林希之学习成绩在班中名列第一，而且荣获过四年级特设的中文科金牌奖。
在大学预科那年，他被委任为学长，他的好学精神与道德品质受到学校的好评。
1941年秋，林希之以优异成绩考进香港大学。
不料才读了一学期，日本进犯香江，学校被迫停办，林希之只好随家人回到汕头。
1945年秋，日本投降后，林希之来到上海圣约翰大学专攻化学。
其间，林希之曾经听到过一位外籍教师哀叹中国工业落后的现状，此事一直刺痛着他的心。
他暗暗发誓：将来一定要在感光材料方面为中国争一口气。
1948年末，林希之只差半年便可获得学位，无奈时局变化，外籍教授纷纷回国，林希之也就此肄业归乡。
2020·1290读档 民国人物文/ 沈旻 沈岚“无为而治”的 国民政府主席林森南京长江路292号总统府大院内有座标志性建筑，抗战胜利后人称子超楼，后一度成为蒋介石的总统办公楼。
此楼由民国建筑师虞炳烈设计，南京鲁创营造厂承建，1934年12月6日动工，工程为期一年，耗资106952块大洋，于1936年元旦正式启用。
楼高6层，长33.34米，宽20米，形制大气端庄，正南面用耐火砖装饰，东西两侧以立体纹样水泥砂石饰面，富有层次，门前十级汉白玉台阶，级数象征着辛亥革命双十节，两侧各两盏进口欧式路灯，极其典雅精致。
子超是南京国民政府主席林森的字，这座大楼因由林森主持修建而得名。
楼前还有两株参天雪松，系1934年大楼奠基仪式上林森亲手栽种，树苗从印度引进，以寸计金，价格不菲。
从南望去，这两株雪松仿佛构成一个“林”字，仰视大楼正立面，又好似“森”字间架结构。
当年,从南京浮桥如意里 2 号林公馆到子超楼国民政府办公处的沿路居民每天都能看见一袭长袍马褂，一履布鞋，没有半点官架子的林森持杖而行。
辛亥元老林森（1868—1943），福建闽侯人，原名林天波，字子超，号长仁，自号青芝老人。
林森的父亲是名鞋匠，母亲务农，他自小过继给叔父为嗣子。
1877年后，林森先后进入教会创办的培元学校、鹤岭英华书院、台湾中西学堂读书，毕业后赴台北电报局谋职。
于1891年结婚，次年妻病故，遂不再娶。
甲午战争战败后，清廷被迫将台湾割让给日本，林森在国土沦丧的切肤之痛刺激下，开始辗转闽、沪、穗及日本等地探求革命道路并加入兴中会，其间与孙中山有了第一次接触。
1897年，他再赴台北参加义军策划反清抗日，失败后回到福州。
1902年，他考入上海海关工作，次年组织旅沪福建学生会，1905年中国同盟会成立时率全体会员加入，并创办福州阅报社宣传革命。
1909年，调往江西省九江海关工作，设立当阳书报社继续革命宣传。
另外，他还创办商团，举办军事训练班，联络新军，为武装反清做准备。
雾峰林家：一个家族的史诗作者：陈子铭来源：《闽南风》2012年第08期一个漳州家族，在大清帝国的中晚期随移民潮登陆台湾，他们崛起于垄亩，因农而商，由商而仕，垦种习武，经世致用。
一百多年的家庭历史，创造、奋争，大起大落，愈挫愈勇，财富、权力、荣耀、牺牲，犹如这个家族的宿命。
他们的历史是台湾近代历史，甚至是中国近代历史的一个缩影。
人们称他们是台湾世家，这就是雾峰林家。
2004年，中央电视台播出36集电视连续剧《沧海百年》，这个家族波澜壮阔的历史，由两岸演员一起演绎得回肠荡气。
人们由此再次把焦点投射到这个神秘家族，以及那个时代的中国动荡不安的历史发展场景。
18世纪，台湾已经成了充满希望的土地，漳泉移民潮水般地涌到这个岛屿。
林石，漳州平和县埔坪乡一个18岁的农家子，随着乡里人来到这里，一个家族的史诗从此开始。
这一年是乾隆十二年，即1747年。
雾峰林家的先祖可以追溯到中原士族衣冠南渡时晋安郡王林禄。
他们中的一支辗转迁徙到漳州平和的埔坪村，旧日衣冠耐不住时光的消磨，早已成了山野田间的一介村夫。
我们所知道的林石这个时候正在因为父母的早逝，必须上奉祖母下抚幼弟而前景黯然。
不过，有一种传说令人疯狂。
“台地一年耕，可余七年食”，成了数十万漳州人不顾一切涌入台湾的诱因。
当年，台湾南部自颜思齐后已经大片开发。
但是，中部沃野千里，草深及膝，还是鹿群逐走的猎场。
在此之前，两个漳州军人——康熙四十五年（1710）的定海总兵张国和和雍正二年（1724）的南澳总兵蓝廷珍，已经在这儿招佃垦荒，他们创建了“张兴庄”和“蓝兴堡”。
对于那些数百年来局促于方寸之间精耕细作的漳州农夫来说，忽然面对这一幅徐徐展开的荒野，需要有一种方式对它表示敬畏，这就是垦拓——让丰茂的田地成为大自然祭坛上的献礼。
土地垦拓由此成为清代台湾最基本的经济活动。
漳州移民一旦踏上莽荒之地，环境的挑战迫使人们以血缘、地缘关系建立起一个垦拓聚落，一些有能力的人成为“垦首”。
力，并动议伊斯兰合作组织召开外长会议讨论“新疆局势”问题。
这是明显干涉中国内政。
驻沙特使馆根据国内指示，与伊斯兰合作组织进行了必要的交涉后，该组织表示将外长会议推迟到7月22日。
为了加大做伊斯兰合作组织的工作力度，坚决打掉拟议中的外长会议，杨洪林奉命中断休假提前返馆，和伊斯兰合作组织打了一场艰苦的“遭遇战”。
他首先会见了伊斯兰合作组织少数民族事务总司司长塔拉勒，塔拉勒是沙特人。
当时秘书长伊赫桑奥卢在瑞士休假，秘书长顾问马斯利也在开罗休假。
在一个多小时的会谈中，杨洪林坚持以情动人，他说，“对“7·5”事件，中国政府已经多次阐明原则立场，这是中国的内政，并多次向伊斯兰合作组织介绍了事件真相。
“这次事件，是一小撮分裂分子内外勾结策划制造的一起严重恐怖犯罪事件，旨在破坏新疆的社会稳定和经济发展，破坏民族和睦。
它既不是民族问题，也不是宗教问题，与穆斯林无关。
阿卜杜拉国王曾经说过，作为穆斯林，首先应该爱国，应该做个好公民。
中国对恐怖主义的立场是一贯的，即：反对将恐怖主义与特定的宗教、民族和国家相联系。
反恐需要国际合作。
希望贵组织认真对待并积极回应中国政府的要求，立即取消讨论‘新疆局势’的会议。
如果贵组织还有不清楚的地方，那么双方可以沟通，但不能开会讨论，因为这是中国的内政！”谈话中，塔拉勒拨通了伊斯兰合作组织秘书长顾问马斯利在开罗家里的电话，杨洪林与马斯利通了话。
在电话中杨洪林特别强调当前国际形势复杂多变，面对新的严重挑战和考验，双方更应加强协调，密切合作。
他强调，“中方理解伊斯兰合作组织对中国穆斯林的关切，但‘7·5’事件的肇事者是一小撮分裂分子，他们通过打砸抢烧杀来破坏国家安定，破坏民族团结，破坏经济发展，企图达到分裂祖国的目的。
这些人决不能代表穆斯林，他们的2008年4月3日，阿卜杜拉国王会见杨洪林大使行为严重歪曲了伊斯兰教义，严重损害了穆斯林的形象。
希望伊斯兰合作组织从发展与中国关系的大局着眼，对中方的良好愿望作出积极回应，请敦促秘书长立即取消原定讨论‘新疆局势’的外长会议，以推动双方关系顺利健康发展”。
