2012-The Effect of DirectorInterlocks on Firms' Adoption of Proactive Environmental Strategies

2012年职称英语综合类新增文章—阅读理解1.第一篇：Telling Tales about People讲述关于人们的故事2.第八篇：The Changing Middle Class变化中的中产阶级3.第十篇：A Letter from Alan艾伦的来信4.第十一篇：The Development of Ballet芭蕾舞的发展5.第十六篇：The Sahara 撒哈拉沙漠6.*第十七篇：Eiffel Is an Eyeful（2011年教材中为C级文章）引人注目的埃菲尔铁塔7.*第十八篇：Goal of American Education（2011年教材中为C级文章）美国教育的目标8.*第十九篇：The Family家庭9.*第二十篇：Tales of the Terrible Past讲述可怕的过去10.*第二十一篇：Spacing in Animals（2011年教材中为C级文章）动物的空间距离11.*第二十二篇：Some Things We Know about Language（2011年教材中为C级文章）我们知道的关于语言的一些事情12.*第二十三篇：The Only Way Is Up（2011年教材中为C级文章）只好向上13.*第二十四篇：Clone Farm（2011年教材中为C级文章）克隆农场14.*第二十五篇：Income（2011年教材中为C级文章）收入15.*第二十六篇：Seeing the World Centuries Ago看许久以前的世界16.*第二十七篇：Importance of Services（2011年教材中为C级文章）服务业的重要性17.*第二十八篇：The National Park Service（2011年教材中为C级文章）国家公园的服务机构18.*第二十九篇：Find Yourself Packing It On? Blame Friends（2011年教材中为C级文章）发现自己变胖了？这得责怪朋友们19.*第三十篇："Lucky" Lord Lucan - Alive or Dead“幸运的”鲁肯伯爵一是死是活20.*第三十三篇：Oseola McCarty老妇人Oseola McCarty21.+第三十四篇：To Have and Have Not逃亡22.+第三十五篇：Going Her Own Way选择她自己的路23.+第三十六篇：A Tale of Scottish Rural Life（2011年教材中为B级文章）一个关于苏格兰乡村生活的故事24.+第三十七篇：Pop Music in Africa非洲的流行音乐25.+第三十八篇：Why So Many Children为什么有这么多的孩子26.+第三十九篇：Eat to Live（2011年教材中为B级文章）为了活着吃饭27.+第四十篇：Narrow Escape（2011年教材中为B级文章）美国疾病预防新政策28.+第四十七篇：Narrow Escape九死一生第一篇Telling Tales about PeopleOne of the most common types of nonfiction, and one that many people enjoy reading, is stories about people's lives. These stories fall into three general categories: autobiography, memoir, and biography.An autobiography is the story of a person's life written by himself or herself. Often it begins with the person's earliest recollections and ends in the present. Autobiography writers may not be entirely objective in the way they present themselves. However, they offer the reader a good look at the way they are and what makes them that way. People as diverse as Benjarmin Franklin and Helen Keller have written autobiographies. 1Other writers, such as James Joyce，have written thinly fictionalized accounts of their lives. These are not autobiographies，but they are very close to it.Memoirs, strictly speaking, are autobiographical accounts that focus as much on the events of the times as on the life of the author. 2Memoir writers typically use these events as backdrops for their lives. They describe them in detail and discuss their importance. Recently，though，the term memoir seems to be becoming interchangeab1e with autobiography. A memoir nowadays may or may not deal with the outside world.Biographies are factual accounts of someone else's life. In many senses，these may be the hardest of the three types to write. Autobiography writers know the events they write about because they lived them. But biography writers have to gather information from as many different sources as possible. Then they have to decide which facts to include. Their goal is to present a balanced picture of a person，not one that is overly positive or too critical. A fair well-presented biography may take years to research and write.词汇：backdrop /'b k,dr?p/ n. 背景interchangeable /int? 't?end??bl/ adj. 可转换的注释：1. People as diverse as Benjamin Franklin and Helen Keller have written autobiographies. 就像本杰明富兰克林和海伦凯勒一样，各种各样的人们已经写了自传。

2012 考研英语二阅读第四篇In the fourth passage of the 2012 National Entrance Examination for English postgraduates, the text discusses the impact of globalization on language diversity and language endangerment. The passage delves into the various factors contributing to the decline of lesser-known languages and emphasizes the importance of preserving linguistic diversity.Globalization, characterized by increased interconnectedness and cultural exchange, has led to the domination of a few major languages such as English, Spanish, and Mandarin. As these languages become more prevalent in international communication, native speakers of lesser-known languages are increasingly shifting towards these dominant languages. This linguistic shift is due to various factors, including economic opportunities, educational opportunities, and social pressures.One consequence of this trend is the endangerment of many languages, some of which are on the brink of extinction. UNESCO estimates that one language dies every two weeks, leading to a loss of cultural heritage and knowledge. Linguistic diversity is crucial for maintaining different worldviews,traditions, and ways of knowing. When languages disappear, unique perspectives and knowledge systems also vanish.Efforts to preserve linguistic diversity are essential in ensuring cultural richness and promoting understanding among different language communities. Language revitalization programs, community-based language documentation projects, and educational initiatives are some of the strategies employed to safeguard endangered languages. Governments,non-governmental organizations, and academic institutions play a vital role in supporting these efforts.In conclusion, the globalization of language poses a significant threat to linguistic diversity, with many lesser-known languages facing extinction. Preserving language diversity is imperative for maintaining cultural heritage, promoting intercultural understanding, and ensuring the survival of unique knowledge systems. By recognizing the value of linguistic diversity and supporting initiatives to safeguard endangered languages, we can work towards a more inclusive and culturally diverse world.。

EDWARD J. ZAJACKellogg School of ManagementUniversityNorthwestern60208-2001Evanston,IL(847) 491-8272 (Phone and Fax)e-zajac@ACADEMIC POSITIONS:1993-present James F. Beré Professor of Management and Organizations,Northwestern University1995-present Professor of Management and Organizations, Professor ofHealth Industry Management, Professor of Sociology (bycourtesy), Northwestern University1991-1995 Associate Professor of Management and Organizations,Northwestern University1986-1991 Assistant Professor of Management and Organizations,Northwestern University1993-present Visiting Scholar (on occasion): Free University of Berlin,National University of Singapore, Erasmus University,University of Zurich, Hong Kong University of Science andTechnology, Singapore Management University EDUCATION:1981-1986 Ph.D., Organization The Wharton School,and Strategy University of Pennsylvania 1981-1985 M.A., Organization The Wharton School,and Strategy University of Pennsylvania 1981-1984 M.B.A., Management/ The Wharton School,Strategic Planning University of Pennsylvania 1979-1980 Fulbright Scholar University of Cologne, Germany 1975-1979 B.S., Accounting LaSalle College,and German Philadelphia, PAPUBLICATIONS:I. Mahmood, H. Kim, and E.J. Zajac. "Where Can Capabilities Come From:Network Ties and Capability Acquisition in Business Groups." StrategicManagement Journal, 32:820-848, 2011.E.J. Zajac, T.A. D'Aunno, & L.R. Burns. "Managing Strategic Alliances." InShortell and Kaluzny’s Health Care Management: Organization Design andBehavior, (L.R. Burns, E.H. Bradley, & B.J. Weiner, eds.), pp. 321-346, 2011.S. Ansari, P. Fiss, and E.J. Zajac. "Made to Fit: How Practices Vary as TheyDiffuse." Academy of Management Review, 35:67-92, 2010.J. Li, C. Zhou, & E.J. Zajac. "Control, Collaboration, and Productivity inInternational Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence." Strategic ManagementJournal, 30:865-884, 2009.D. Hambrick, A. von Werder, &E.J. Zajac. “New Directions in CorporateGovernance Research.” Organization Science, 19:1-5, 2008.L.O. Wang & E.J. Zajac. "Acquisition or Alliance? A Dyadic Perspective onInterfirm Resource Combinations." Strategic Management Journal, 28:1291-1317, 2007.P. Fiss & E.J. Zajac. "The Symbolic Management of Corporate Strategy:Framing, Decoupling and Strategic Change." Academy of Management Journal, 49:1173-1193, 2006.M. Washington & E.J. Zajac. "Status Evolution and Competition: Theory andEvidence." Academy of Management Journal, 48:282-296, 2005.P. Fiss & E.J. Zajac. "The Diffusion of Ideas Over Contested Terrain: The(Non)adoption of a Shareholder Value Orientation Among German Firms."Administrative Science Quarterly, 49:501-534, 2004.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. “The Social Construction of Market Value:Institutionalization and Learning Perspectives on Stock Market Reactions.”American Sociological Review, 69:433-457, 2004.M. Jensen & E.J. Zajac. "Corporate Elites and Corporate Strategy: HowDemographic Preferences and Structural Position Shape the Scope of the Firm."Strategic Management Journal, 25:507-524, 2004.X. Yin & E.J. Zajac. “The Strategy/Governance Structure Fit Relationship: Theory and Evidence in Franchising Arrangements." Strategic Management Journal,25:365-383, 2004.E.J. Zajac & J. D. Westphal. “Intraorganizational Economics.” In Companion to Organizations, (J.A.C. Baum, ed.), pp. 233-255, 2002.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "Explaining Institutional Decoupling: The Case of Stock Repurchase Programs." Administrative Science Quarterly, 46: 202-228, 2001.M.S. Kraatz & E.J. Zajac. "How Resources Affect Strategic Change and Performance in Turbulent Environments: Theory and Evidence." Organization Science, 12: 632-657, 2001.B.R. Golden & E.J. Zajac. "When Will Boards Influence Strategy? Inclination X Power = Strategic Change." Strategic Management Journal, 22: 1087-1112, 2001.E.J. Zajac, M.S. Kraatz, & R. Bresser. "Modeling the Dynamics of Strategic Fit: A Normative Approach to Strategic Change." Strategic Management Journal, 21: 429-454, 2000.R. Gulati & E.J. Zajac. "Reflections on the Study of Strategic Alliances." In Cooperative Strategy: Economic, Business, and Organizational Issues (D. Faulkner & M. De Rond, eds.), pp. 365-374, 2000.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "Symbolic Management of Stockholders: Corporate Governance Reforms and Shareholder Reactions," Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 127-153, 1998.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "Toward a Behavioral Theory of the CEO/Board Relationship: How Research Can Enhance Our Understanding of Corporate Governance Practices." In Navigating Change: How CEOs, Top Teams, and Boards Steer Transformation (D.C. Hambrick, D.A. Nadler, M.L. Tushman, eds.), pp. 256-277, 1998.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "Defections from the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, Reciprocity, and the Diffusion of Board Independence in U.S. Corporations," Administrative Science Quarterly, 42:161-183, 1997.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "Managerial Incentives in Organizations: Economic, Political, and Symbolic Perspectives," Organizational Decision Making, (Z. Shapira, ed.), pp. 133-157, 1996.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "Director Reputation, CEO/Board Power, and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks," Administrative Science Quarterly, 41:507-529, 1996.M.S. Kraatz & E.J. Zajac. "Exploring the Limits of the New Institutionalism: TheCauses and Consequences of Illegitimate Organizational Change," American Sociological Review, 61:812-836, 1996.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "Who Shall Succeed? How CEO/Board Preferences and Power Affect the Choice of New CEOs," Academy of Management Journal, 39:64-90, 1996.R.P. Beatty & E.J. Zajac. "Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk-Bearing in Initial Public Offering Firms," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 8:87-96, 1995.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "Accounting for the Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and Symbolism," Administrative Science Quarterly, 40:283-308, 1995.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection," Administrative Science Quarterly, 40:60-83, 1995.R.P. Beatty & E.J. Zajac. "Top Management Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk-Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings," Administrative Science Quarterly, 39:313-336, 1994.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "The Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When is More not Better?" Strategic Management Journal, 15:121-142, 1994.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "Substance and Symbolism in CEOs' Long-Term Incentive Plans," Administrative Science Quarterly, 39:367-390, 1994.J.B. Barney & E.J. Zajac. "Competitive Organizational Behavior: Toward an Organizationally-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage." Strategic Management Journal, 15:5-9, 1994.E.J. Zajac & M.S. Kraatz. "A Diametric Forces Model of Strategic Change: Assessing the Antecedents and Consequences of Restructuring in the Higher Education Industry," Strategic Management Journal, 14:83-102, 1993.E.J. Zajac & C.P. Olsen. "From Transaction Costs to Transactional Value Analysis: Implications for the Study of Interorganizational Strategies," Journal of Management Studies, 30:131-145, 1993.M.H. Bazerman, M.A. Neale, K.L. Valley, E.J. Zajac & Y.M. Kim. "The Effects of Agents and Mediators on Negotiation Outcomes," Organization Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 53:55-73, 1992.4E.J. Zajac. "Relating Economic and Behavioral Perspectives in Strategy Research." Advances in Strategic Management, (P. Shrivastava, A. Huff, J. Dutton, eds.), Volume 8, pp.69-96, 1992.W.G. Astley & E.J. Zajac. "Intraorganizational Power and Organizational Design: Reconciling Rational and Coalitional Models of Organization," Organization Science, 2:399-411, 1991.E.J. Zajac, B.R. Golden, & S.M. Shortell. "New Organizational Forms for Enhancing Innovation: The Case of Internal Corporate Joint Ventures," Management Science, 37:170-184, 1991.E.J. Zajac & M.H. Bazerman. "Blind Spots in Industry and Competitor Analysis: The Implications of Interfirm (Mis)perceptions for Strategic Decisions," Academy of Management Review, 16:37-56, 1991.S.M. Shortell & E.J. Zajac. "Health Care Organizations and the Development of the Strategic Management Perspective," Innovations in Health Care Delivery: New Insights into Organization Theory, (S. Mick, ed.), pp. 141-180, 1990.E.J. Zajac. "CEO Selection, Succession, Compensation, and Firm Performance: A Theoretical Integration and Empirical Analysis," Strategic Management Journal, 11:217-230, 1990.S.M. Shortell & E.J. Zajac. "Perceptual and Archival Measures of Miles and Snow's Strategic Types: A Comprehensive Assessment of Reliability and Validity," Academy of Management Journal, 33:817-832, 1990.W.G. Astley & E.J. Zajac. "Beyond Dyadic Exchange: Functional Interdependence and Subunit Power," Organization Studies, 11:481-501, 1990.E.J. Zajac & S.M. Shortell. "Changing Generic Strategies: Likelihood, Direction, and Performance Implications," Strategic Management Journal, 10:413-430, 1989.E.J. Zajac. "Interlocking Directorates as an Interorganizational Strategy: A Test of Critical Assumptions," Academy of Management Journal, 31:428-438, 1988.J.R. Kimberly & E.J. Zajac. "The Dynamics of CEO/Board Relationships," The Executive Effect: Concepts and Methods for Studying Top Managers, (D. Hambrick, ed.), pp. 179-204, 1988.S.M. Shortell & E.J. Zajac. "Internal Corporate Joint Ventures: Development Processes and Performance Outcomes," Strategic Management Journal, 9:527-542, 1988.5C.J. Fombrun & E.J. Zajac. "Structural and Perceptual Influences on IntraindustryStratification," Academy of Management Journal, 30:33-50, 1987.R.P. Beatty & E.J. Zajac. "CEO Change and Firm Performance in LargeCorporations: Succession Effects and Manager Effects," Strategic Management Journal, 8:305-317, 1987.J.R. Kimberly & E.J. Zajac. “Strategic Adaptation in Health Care Organizations:Implications for Theory and Research.” Medical Care Review, 42:267-302. WORKING PAPERS:J. Pozner & E.J. Zajac. "Explaining Firm Performance: The SymbolicManagement of Quarterly Earnings Announcements." Revise and resubmit,Organization Science.M. Piao & E.J. Zajac. "How Exploitation Impedes and Impels Exploration: Theory and Evidence.” Revise and resubmit, Strategic Management Journal.S. Albers & E.J. Zajac. “What Makes A Strategic Alliance? An OrganizationTheory Analysis.” Revise and resubmit, Journal of Management Studies.Y.S. Bermiss & E.J. Zajac. "Under Construction: How Commensuration andManagement Fashions Affect Corporate Reputaiton Rankings.” Revise andresubmit, Organization Science.I.Stern, J.M. Dukerich, & E.J. Zajac. “When Stars Align: How Scientific Reputationand Status Affect Alliance Formation.” Revise and resubmit, StrategicManagement Journal.M. Kennedy, R. Solomon, & E.J. Zajac. “The Cost of Crying Wolf: Institutions,Incentives, and Social Exchange in Publicity.” Revise and resubmit, Academy of Management Journal.J. Li, W. Ju, & E.J. Zajac. “Gets and Gives: Political Ties as a Double-EdgedResource for Enhancing Firm Innovation.”L.O. Wang & E.J. Zajac. "Creating Value through Mergers and Acquisitions: ADyadic, Knowledge-based Approach."S. Giorgi & E.J. Zajac. “Braking the Law: How The U.S. Auto IndustrySymbolically Managed Product Safety.”M-H. Morris, F. Wohlgezogen, & E.J. Zajac. “Rich Language for Poor Firms: The6Symbolic Management of Bankruptcy.”CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS (NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL): R. Lungeanu & E.J. Zajac. “Well-Matched: Ownership Experience and IPOSuccess.” National Academy of Management meeting, Boston, 2012.I. Naumovska, P. Lee, & E.J. Zajac. “When Practices Diffuse in a Bubble:Reverse Mergers and the Internet Wave.” National Academy of Managementmeeting, Boston, 2012.A. Thomas, T. Mellewigt, & E.J. Zajac. “My Once and Future Partner – orAcquiree? Unpacking the Impact of Partner-Specfic Alliance Experience.”National Academy of Management meeting, Boston, 2012.W. Jung & E.J. Zajac. “What Complements Complementarity: PerformanceDifferences between Generalist and Specialist Alliance Partners.” InternationalStrategic Management Society meeting, Miami, 2011.M-H. Morris, F. Wohlgezogen, & E.J. Zajac. “Rich Language for Poor Firms: The Symbolic Management of Bankruptcy.” National Academy of Managementmeeting, San Antionio, 2011.M. Kennedy, R. Solomon, & E.J. Zajac. “Signaling, Cheap Talk, and the Cost ofCrying Wolf.” International Strategic Management Society meeting, Rome, 2010.J-E. Pozner & E.J. Zajac. “On Language: Impression Management as a Tool ofSymbolic Management.” National Academy of Management meeting, Montreal,2010.S. Perkins, M-H. Morris, & E.J. Zajac. “Fit to be Tied: Using ContractsStrategically to Ensure Partner Performance.” International Strategic Management Society meeting, Washington, 2009.C-N. Chung, Y-C. Kim, & E.J. Zajac. “When Institutional Logics Collide, WhoWins? The Incorporation of Independent Directors into Family Firms.”International Strategic Management Society meeting, Washington, 2009.J. Li, W. Ju, & E.J. Zajac. “Gets and Gives: The Double-Edged Role of PoliticalTies in Firm Innovation.” National Academy of Management meeting, Chicago,2009.C-N. Chung, Y-C. Kim & E.J. Zajac. “Institutional Collision in CorporateGovernance: The Incorporation of Independent Directors in Family Firms in7Emerging Economies.” Academy of International Business, San Diego, 2009.S. Perkins & E.J. Zajac. “Dismantling (or Maintaining) the Status Quo: The Role of Symbolic Management in Institutional Change.” Academy of International Business, Milan, 2008.M.K. Kennedy & E.J. Zajac. “Making (and Keeping) It Real: How Social Exchange Systems Enable/Constrain the Enactment of New Market Positions.” National Academy of Management meeting, Anaheim, 2008.S.S. Levine & E.J. Zajac. “Institutionalization in Efficient Markets: The Case of Price Bubbles.” National Academy of Management meeting, Anaheim, 2008.J. Li, W. Ju, & E.J. Zajac. “The Double-Edged Role of Political Ties in the Innovation Process.” International Strategic Management Society meeting, Cologne, 2008.S. Albers & E.J. Zajac. “What Makes A Strategic Alliance? An Organizational Analysis.” International Strategic Management Society meeting, Cologne, 2008. S.S. Levine & E.J. Zajac. “The Institutional Life of Financial Bubbles.” American Sociological Association meeting, New York, 2007.S. Perkins & E.J. Zajac. “Signal Or Symbol? Interpreting Firms’ Strategic Response To Institutional Change In The Brazilian Stock Market.” International Strategic Management Society meeting, San Diego, 2007.S. Giorgi & E.J. Zajac. “Struggling For Supremacy In Institutional Competition: How The United States Automobile Industry Re-Constructed Product Safety.” International Strategic Management Society meeting, San Diego, 2007.S. Albers & E.J. Zajac. “Towards a Theory of Strategic Alliances as an Organizational Form.” National Academy of Management meeting, Philadelphia, 2007.S.S. Levine & E.J. Zajac. “The Social Life of Financial Bubbles.” American Economic Association meeting, Chicago, 2007.M. Kennedy & E.J. Zajac. "Leveraging Stable Institutions for Strategic Change: Business Journalism and Market Formation." International Strategic Management Society meeting, Vienna, 2006.J. Pozner & E.J. Zajac. "Sense-Giving as Corporate Strategy: Antecedents and Consequences of the Use of Symbolic Language in Corporate Quarterly Earnings Announcements.” National Academy of Management meeting, Atlanta, 2006.8Y.S. Bermiss & E.J. Zajac. "Changing Fortunes: Making Sense of Corporate Reputation over Time.” National Academy of Management meeting, Atlanta, 2006.J. Li, C. Zhao, & E.J. Zajac. "How Do Differences in Joint Venture Ownership Affect Productivity: Theory and Evidence from China." Academy of International Business meeting, Beijing, 2006.S. Bermiss & E.J. Zajac. "Making Sense of Corporate Reputation over Time." International Strategic Management Society meeting, Orlando, 2005.J. Pozner & E.J. Zajac. "Explaining Firm Performance: The Symbolic Management of Quarterly Earnings Announcements." International Strategic Management Society meeting, Orlando, 2005.M. Piao & E.J. Zajac. "Re-examining Triadic Principal-Agent Relationships: The Case of IPOs." National Academy of Management meeting, Honolulu, 2005.E.J. Zajac & L. Wang. "The Effect of Acquirer and Target Characteristics on Total Value Creation in Mergers and Acquisitions." National Academy of Management meeting, Honolulu, 2005.P. Lee & E.J. Zajac. "Signifying Strategic Change with Corporate Names: The Symbolic Management of the “.com” Moniker." International Strategic Management Society meeting, Puerto Rico, 2004.M. Kennedy & E.J. Zajac. "Strategy and Symbolic Moves: How Firms Influence the Media in the Social Construction of New Market Niches." International Strategic Management Society meeting, Puerto Rico, 2004.P. Fiss & E.J. Zajac. "Framing and Strategic Change." National Academy of Management meeting, New Orleans, 2004.P. Lee & E.J. Zajac. "Corporate Names as Frames: Symbolic Management During the “.com” Era." 6th International Conference on Corporate Discourse, Amsterdam, 2004.E.J. Zajac & M. Piao. "The Strategic Role of Structural Holes: Information Brokerage or Trust Brokerage?" International Strategic Management Society meeting, Baltimore, 2003.L.O. Wang & E.J. Zajac. "Acquisition or Alliance? A Dyadic Perspective on Interfirm Resource Combinations." National Academy of Management meeting, Seattle, 2003.9P. Fiss & E.J. Zajac. "Predicting the Path of a Diffusing Ideology: The Case of a Shareholder Value Orientation in Germany." National Academy of Management meeting, Seattle, 2003.E.J. Zajac. "Corporate Governance as Ideology: Explaining the Diffusion of the Agency Perspective." National Academy of Management meeting, Denver, 2002.E.J. Zajac. "What is Business Policy and Strategy and Where May It be Headed? Reflections of a Third-Generation Strategy Researcher." National Academy of Management meeting, Denver, 2002.E.J. Zajac & P. Fiss. "Strategy as Ideology: Has the Shareholder-Value Orientation Diffused in Germany?" International Strategic Management Society meeting, San Francisco, 2001.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. “Do Markets Learn? Institutional vs. Market Learning Perspectives on the Consequences of Stock Repurchase Programs.” National Academy of Management meeting, Washington, D.C., 2001.X. Yin & E.J. Zajac. “The Role of Governance Structure in Strategic Change: Theory and Evidence in Franchising." National Academy of Management meeting, Washington, D.C., 2001.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. “Do Markets Learn? The Institutionalization of Stock Buybacks.” American Sociological Association meeting, Anaheim, 2001.E.J. Zajac & P. Fiss. "Corporate Governance and Contested Terrain: The Rise of the Shareholder Value Orientation in Germany." National Academy of Management meeting, Toronto, 2000.X. Yin & E.J. Zajac. “How Governance Structure Affects the Probability, Magnitude, and Direction of Strategic Change." International Strategic Management Society meeting, Berlin, 1999.M. Jensen & E.J. Zajac. "Revisiting the Effects of Strategic Leadership on Corporate Strategy: The Unit of Analysis Dilemma." National Academy of Management meeting, Chicago, 1999.E.J. Zajac & X. Yin. “Strategy, Governance Structure, and Performance: Theory and Evidence in Franchising Arrangements." National Academy of Management meeting, Chicago, 1999.M. Jensen & E.J. Zajac. "How Top Management Power and Preferences Affect Corporate Restructuring." International Strategic Management Society meeting,10Orlando, 1998.X. Yin & E.J. Zajac. “Franchising and Its Effects of Strategic Decisions and Organizational Performance: A Multilevel Analysis." International Strategic Management Society meeting, Orlando, 1998.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "The Social and Political Determinants of Stock Buybacks." National Academy of Management meeting, San Diego, 1998.E.J. Zajac, M.S. Kraatz, & R. Bresser. "Modeling the Dynamics of Strategic Fit: How Organizational Resources and Environmental Forces Affect the Desirability of Strategic Change." International Strategic Management Society meeting, Barcelona, 1997.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "Do Firms Get What They Pay For? How Alternative Performance Criteria Affect the CEO Pay-For-Performance Relationship." National Academy of Management meeting, Boston, 1997.E.J. Zajac & B.R. Golden. "When Will Boards Influence Strategy? Inclination X Power = Strategic Change." National Academy of Management meeting, Boston, 1997.M. Washington & E.J. Zajac. "By Invitation Only: Status, Privilege, and the Social Structure of Tournaments." National Academy of Management meeting, Boston, 1997.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "Director Reputation, CEO/Board Power, and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks." National Academy of Management meeting, Cincinnati, 1996.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "Symbolic Management of Stockholders: Corporate Governance Reforms and Market Reactions." National Academy of Management meeting, Cincinnati, 1996.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "Toward a Behavioral Theory of the CEO/Board Relationship: How Research Can Enhance Our Understanding of Corporate Governance Practices." Conference on Senior Leadership and Corporate Transformation, Columbia University, 1996.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "How the Corporate Director Market Works: The Dynamic Segmentation of Active and Passive Board Members." International Strategic Management Society meeting, Mexico City, 1995.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "Expanding the Notion of Strategy: Resource Allocation vs. Symbolic Management Perspectives." National Academy of11Management meeting, Vancouver, 1995.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "Defections from the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, Reciprocity, and the Diffusion of Board Independence in U.S. Corporations." National Academy of Management meeting, Vancouver, 1995.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "The Symbolic Management of CEO Compensation: Agency vs. Human Resource Justifications." National Academy of Management meeting, Dallas, 1994.E.J. Zajac, M.S. Kraatz, and R. Bresser. "Developing Normative Models of Organizational Change and Performance: Theory and Evidence in the Savings and Loan Industry." National Academy of Management meeting, Dallas, 1994.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "Who Shall Rule After a CEO Succession? The Likelihood and Direction of Changes in CEO Characteristics." National Academy of Management meeting, Dallas, 1994.E.J. Zajac. "From Interlocking Directorates to the Study of Boards of Directors: Overcoming Inertia in a Research Tradition." Conference on Strategic Change, University of Warwick, England, 1993.E.J. Zajac & J.D. Westphal. "Revisiting the CEO Succession--Firm Performance Relationship." National Academy of Management meeting, Atlanta, 1993.J.D. Westphal & E.J. Zajac. "Substance and Symbolism in CEOs' Long-Term Incentive Plans." National Academy of Management meeting, Atlanta, 1993.E.J. Zajac. "CEO Preferences for Incentive Compensation: An Empirical Analysis." National Academy of Management meeting, Las Vegas, 1992.M.S. Kraatz & E.J. Zajac. "Invisible Hand or Iron Cage? Market and Institutional Influences on Organizational Change." National Academy of Management meeting, Las Vegas, 1992.R.P. Beatty & E.J. Zajac. "Incentives, Monitoring, and Internal Control: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings." American Accounting Association meeting, Washington, 1992.E.J. Zajac & M.S. Kraatz. "Antecedents and Consequences of Restructuring: A Longitudinal Study of Strategy and Organizational Changes in the Higher Education Industry." Conference on Corporate Restructuring, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1992.E.J. Zajac. "Defining Strategy Research: Behavioral and Economic Approaches."12National Academy of Management meeting, Miami, 1991.E.J. Zajac. "The CEO Compensation Setting Process: Sources of Influence and Their Implications." Strategic Processes Research Conference, Norwegian School of Management, Oslo, 1991.C. Olsen & E.J. Zajac. "Performance in Interorganizational Relationships: Strategic and Transaction Cost Perspectives." National TIMS/ORSA meeting, Nashville, 1991.E.J. Zajac. "CEOs' Perceptions of Strategic Alliances." Conference on Managing Long-Run Relationships, Marketing Science Institute, Boston, 1990.E.J. Zajac. "Economic and Behavioral Perspectives on the Structuring of CEO Compensation: Evidence from CEOs." Conference on Corporate Governance and Competitive Strategy, University of Minnesota, 1990.E.J. Zajac. "Integrating Behavioral and Economic Approaches to Strategy Research: The Case of Market Failures." Conference on Theory Building in Strategic Management, University of Illinois, 1990.E.J. Zajac, B.R. Golden, & S.M. Shortell. "New Organizational Forms for Enhancing Innovation: The Case of Internal Corporate Joint Ventures." National TIMS/ORSA meeting, Las Vegas, 1990.R.P. Beatty & E.J. Zajac. "Top Management Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk-Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings." National Academy of Management meeting, San Francisco, 1990.E.J. Zajac & C. Olsen. "From Transaction Costs to Transactional Value Analysis: Implications for the Study of Interorganizational Strategies." International Strategic Management Society meeting, San Francisco, 1989.E.J. Zajac. "An Empirical Investigation of CEO Selection, Succession, Compensation, and Firm Performance." National Academy of Management meeting, Washington, 1989.E.J. Zajac & S.M. Shortell. "Changing Generic Strategies: Likelihood, Direction, and Performance Implications." National Academy of Management meeting, Washington, 1989.W.G. Astley & E.J. Zajac. "Intraorganizational Power and Organizational Design." National ORSA/TIMS meeting, New York, 1989.13。

Vol.33No.7Jul.2012第33卷第7期2012年7月赤峰学院学报（汉文哲学社会科学版）Journal of Chifeng University （Soc.Sci ）纵观当今研究状况和研究成果，我们不难发现人们大多都习惯于从美国价值观念﹑文化以及生态主义等角度去欣赏和探讨电影《2012》，很少人从殖民主义或后殖民主义角度去解读。

如果我们细细揣摩，我们不难发现作品中所体现的殖民主义话语和西方帝国霸权主义气息。

因而，当我们用后殖民主义批评理论去鉴赏这部大片《2012》时，就能更好地了解这部巨作所折射出来的社会和历史意义，从而使我们更好地理解和掌握其真正的内涵。

一、《2012》与后殖民主义《2012》，又名《2012-世界末日》，它是由美国著名导演罗兰·艾默里奇2009年拍摄的大片。

它是继《哥斯拉》﹑《独立日》﹑《后天》﹑《史前一万年》之后又一卖座电影，是一部关于全球毁灭的灾难电影。

电影讲述了2012年世界末日到来时，主人公杰克逊以及世界各国人民挣扎求生的经历。

该片被称为是《后天》的升级版，总投资超过2亿美元，当然票房也相当可观，被誉为“美国史上最具卖座电影之一”。

《2012》是一部优秀的灾难性电影，取材自神秘的玛雅预言。

这部电影大致讲述的是杰克逊带着孩子去黄石公园度假，却发现曾有美好回忆的湖泊已经干涸了，而且这个地区也成为了禁区。

在这里，他偶然遇见了查理，查理说出了玛雅预言，即地球将毁灭，人类将面临空前的自然灾害。

为了求生，杰克逊带领他一家逃离洛杉矶，前往查理提到的方舟。

在寻找和前往方舟的路途中，杰克逊一家经历了很多生死考验，并且也亲眼目睹了许多可怕的场面，如大陆崩塌后没入海洋﹑里约热内卢耶稣像倒塌﹑洛杉矶地震后变成大裂谷﹑海啸卷起航母砸向白宫﹑海啸淹没喜马拉雅山脉﹑海啸席卷冰岛﹑拉斯维加斯被有毒火山摧毁﹑夏威夷被喷涌的岩浆变成火海﹑梵蒂冈被夷为平地等。

最后杰克逊一家随着方舟到达了所谓的“人类希望之所”。

Telecom Traffic and Investment in Developing Countries: The Effects of International Settlement Rate ReductionsScott J. WallstenStanford Institute for Economic Policy ResearchandThe World BankWallsten@AbstractIn 1997 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission ordered sharp decreases in international settlement rates (bilaterally negotiated rates for telecom traffic between pairs of countries) for telecom traffic between the U.S. and the rest of the world. Even the poorest countries with the least developedtelecommunications networks must slash rates for traffic to the U.S. by 2003. Developing countries, which received about $35 billion in net settlement payments from U.S. telecom carriers between 1985 and 1998, were upset by the FCC’s decision, since lower rates mean lower payments. They note that the payments represent a significant share of their telecom revenues and help finance telecom investment. The FCC’s unilateral decision, they claim, will substantially harm the development of their telecom sectors. In this paper I use a panel dataset of 179 countries from 1985 – 1998 to test the effects of settlement rate changes on telecom traffic and investment. I find rates significantly negatively correlated with traffic, with the largest effects in the poorest countries. In other words, reduced settlement rates spur international telecom traffic from developing countries to the U.S. And while there is a statistically significant correlation between settlement payments and telecom revenues in developing countries, I find no evidence that the payments are invested in telecom networks. Settlement payments appear to have no effect on growth in the number of telephone mainlines or on imports of telecommunications equipment.IntroductionBetween 1985 and 1998, United States telephone carriers transferred almost $50 billion to non-US carriers for international telecommunications traffic between the US and other countries (FCC, 2000). Developing countries received about 70 percent of these payments (Braga, et al 1998). The payments result from large traffic imbalances between the US and almost every other country and international accounting rates—bilaterally negotiated symmetric prices carriers pay each other to terminate international telephone calls in the other country—that are far above cost. To deal with what US carriers perceived as unfair subsidies of foreign telecom providers, in 1997 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) unilaterally established benchmark settlement rates far below those in effect at the time. The FCC established a stringent timeline, with the rates between the US and even the poorest countries with the least developed telephone networks scheduled to fall dramatically by 2003. Not surprisingly, developing countries are upset by the FCC’s action, noting that these payments represent a substantial share of their total telecom revenues and asserting that the payments are necessary for funding investment in their domestic telecom networks.Curiously, given the large magnitudes of the payments and the importance of international settlement rates to international telephone traffic, there is almost no empirical work on the effects of settlement rates. In this paper, I ask two questions. First, how do settlement rates affect international call volume? This question is important because telecom traffic is a real economic good, while the settlement payments are, in a global sense, merely monetary transfers. Second, do developing countries, in fact, use the payments to fund telecom investment? I use a panel dataset of 179 countries from 1985 to 1998 to explore the effects of settlement rates on international telecom traffic and on investment in domestic telecom networks.I find a strong, statistically significant negative relationship between international settlement rates and calls from other countries to the US, even controlling for country and year fixed effects, population, per capita income, and country’s income classification (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high income). The relationship appears to be strongest in the poorest countries, where I find an elasticity of about negative 0.9—each one percent decrease in settlement rates leads to a 0.9 percent increase in outbound traffic to the United States. In other words, reducing settlement rates stimulates international telecom traffic, which, presumably, improves economic growth.Lower settlement rates also reduce settlement paymen ts from the US. How will reduced payments affect developing countries? Consistent with the claims, I find a statistically significant positive relationship between settlement payments and telecom revenues in poor countries. However, the results suggest that the settlement payments are not invested in the local network. I find no correlation between settlement payments and telephone mainlines or imports of telecommunications equipment.International Accounting Rates“Accounting rates” for International Message Telephone Service (IMTS) are bilaterally negotiated rates for international telephone calls between every pair of countries in the world. In theory, the accounting rate represents the cost of an international telephone call between a country-pair (Frieden, 1996). The originating and terminating carriers are assumed to have equal costs in completing the call. The “settlement rate”—the amount the originating carrier pays the foreign carrier to complete the call—is typically half the accounting rate. The originating carrierbills the caller some retail price (the “collection rate”), pays the foreign carrier the settlement rate, and keeps the balance.1While accounting rates are supposed to reflect the cost of a telephone call between two countries, almost nobody even pretends to maintain that fiction anymore. The FCC (1997) estimated that accounting rates were five to ten times the true cost of completing a call. By some estimates, the total cost (including operating expenses) of an internationa l call over cable and satellite services was less than $0.01 per minute by 1996 (FCC, 1997). That year the average settlement rate for calls between the US and other countries excluding Western Europe and North America was about $0.88 per minute. Even countries that receive large net settlement payments from US carriers do not claim that the accounting rates reflect the true costs of IMTS service. Instead, they say that the payments are an important component of their telecom revenue and are necessary for financing investments in the local network (e.g., Khalidson, 2000; Braga, 1999; Telecommunications Reports, 1997).If international telecom traffic were relatively balanced, telecom carriers would have little reason to complain, as net settlement payments would be minimal.2 But there is no reason to believe that incoming and outgoing telecom traffic should be equal. First, international trade always involves imbalances, and telecom traffic is no different (Melody, 2000). Second, residents of wealthier countries are likely to make more calls to residents of poorer countries than vice-versa if prices are symmetric. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, different levels of competition and market structure around the world and arbitrary accounting rates between countries have led to serious distortions in the international telecommunications market.1 The accounting rate system began in the 1930s when all countries had monopoly telecom providers. A system was needed to facilitate interconnection between these carriers to make international telephony possible. See Ergas and Paterson (1991) or Frieden (1996) for a detailed history of the accounting rate system.The most serious distortion in international telecom markets is call turnaround, or “callback.”3 The liberalized and relatively competitive US market means that retail prices of calls from the US to other countries are typically much lower than prices of calls to the US. Technological advances make it trivial to reverse a call terminating in the US and make it appear to originate in the US (or any other country). Consumers abroad have probably benefited from callback, which effectively brings the price of calls to the US closer to the prices of calls from the US.4All these factors stimulating calls from the US (both those that truly originate in the US and those that cause calls to appear to have originated in the US) have generated a large gap between incoming and outgoing US telephone traffic. As Figure 1 demonstrates, traffic from the US to the rest of the world soared while traffic to the US increased only slightly during the 1990s. As a result, net settlement payments from the US to these countries increased from about $1 billion in 1985 to more than $5 billion in 1996 before falling to about $4.4 billion in 1998 as accounting rates began to fall (see Figure 2). Needless to say, US international telecom carriers were increasingly upset by the large payments they were making to foreign telecom firms. And, indeed, the FCC (1997) estimated that “at least seventy percent of that total [is] an above-cost subsidy from US consumers to foreign carriers.”2 Consumers, however, would have great cause to complain. Balanced traffic would simply allow all telecom firms to benefit equally from accounting rates that keep prices far above cost.3 Call rerouting—diverting traffic through a third country—is also common and has the same effect as callback.4 Many believe that callback benefits liberalized countries by pushing down prices. Malueg and Schwartz (1998), however, demonstrate how the symmetric division of accounting rates and “proportional return”—a feature of the accounting rate system mandating that traffic from foreign monopolists go to US carriers in proportion to those carriers share of traffic to the foreign country—can actually benefit the monopolists.Incoming traffic highly profitableOne reason US interexchange carriers find the imbalance upsetting is because incoming traffic under the accounting rate regime tends to be much more profitable to them th an is outgoing traffic. Consider a telecom firm’s profits for outgoing and incoming calls, where π is the firm’s profit, Q is telecom traffic, S is the settlement rate, MC is the true marginal cost of the call (assumed to be equal for originating or terminating a call), and P is the price charged to the consumer:Incoming: πi = Q i*[S – MC]Outgoing: πo = Q o*P - Q o*[S + MC]An incoming minute is more valuable to the firm than an outgoing minute ifS – MC > P – [S + MC]S > ½PAs long as the settlement rate is more than half the price charged the consumer, the firm’s profits from incoming calls are greater than from outgoing calls.As Cave and Waverman (1998, p.884) note, “each operator will have a desired optimal accounting rate. In determining this rate, the operator—if unconstrained by regulation—will strike a balance between the profits available to it from terminating a call (causing it to favor a high rate) and the desire to earn profits on outgoing calls (causing it to prefer a lower settlement rate paid to its correspondent).” The current system also means that firms with net inflows prefer higher accounting rates, since S – MC represents profit, while countries with net outflows prefer low accounting rates, since S is a cost they must cover (Ergas an d Paterson, 1991).Accounting rates and the FCC’s decisionSince US international carriers are unlikely in the foreseeable future to have more incoming than outgoing traffic, it is not surprising that they would like settlement rates to decrease. As settlement rates come down, outgoing calls become more profitable. Likewise, foreign carriers, which even absent callback are likely to receive more calls from the US than vice-versa, oppose reducing settlement rates. And while callback has undoubtedly put downward pressure on retail prices of calls to the US, by itself it is unlikely to push down accounting rates. Because incoming calls are so profitable, non-US monopolists can still earn above-normal profits from callback even if incoming calls substitute for outgoing calls.5 Along with settlement payments, Figure 2 shows average US accounting rates by region from 1985 to 1999. The figure reveals an unmistakable downward trend in accounting rates to all points in the world. This trend probably resulted from the FCC’s 1986 decision to allow the resale of international private leased circuits for international telecommunications (Stern and Kelly, 1997). The FCC hoped that the use of private circuits would introduce competition into the international telecommunications market, putting downward pressure on prices. Nonetheless, US outgoing traffic increased faster than settlement rates decreased, and net settlement payments continued to skyrocket.In 1992, the ITU attempted to reduce accounting rates with agreement ITU-T D.140, “which committed them to implementing principles of cost-orientation, non-discrimination, and transparency when negotiating accounting rates, and to do so within a five-year period” (Kelly, 1997). This initiative had moderate success at best. Indeed, by 1996 rates remained far above5 Some carriers have taken this arbitrage a step further. In 1997 Hong Kong Telecommunications International launched its own callback service, which presumably allowed it to receive a settlement payment for incoming calls it generated and also reap additional profits as long as it could price the callback service above the settlement rate.cost, and the rate of decrease even seemed to slow (for example, the average accounting rate for traffic between the US and Africa barely budged between 1991 and 1995). Moreover, rates are anything but transparent—only the US, the U.K., and New Zealand make their accounting rates public (Kelly, 1997; Wheatley, 1999).Under pressure from US international carriers and anxious to reduce prices of international calls, the FCC decided to act unilaterally. In August 1997 the FCC adopted an order specifying benchmark rates and a strict timeline for their adoption. Table 1 shows the benchmark rates, whose level and adoption timeline depend on national income and teledensity (telephones per capita). High-income countries (those with a per-capita income of about $9000 and higher) had to reduce settlement rates to $0.15 per minute almost immediately. Low-income countries (those with annual per-capita incomes of less than about $730) with less than one mainline per hundred people had until 2003 to adopt settlement rates of $0.23 per minute.High-income countries with liberalized telecom markets had no trouble meeting this goal. For example, by 1999 the off-peak accounting rate between the US and the U.K. was about $0.14 per minute (meaning the settlement rate was about $0.07 per minute)—well below the benchmark. Indeed, in 1999 the FCC decided that the accounting rate system is entirely unnecessary for countries with competitive telecom markets. FCC Order 99-73 “removed the international settlements policy and contract filing requirements for arrangements with foreign carriers that lack market power [and] removed the international settlements policy for arrangements with all carriers on routes where rates to terminate US calls are at least 25 percent lower than the relevant settlement rate benchmark previously adopted by the FCC in itsSettlement Rate Benchmark Order” (FCC 1999a). By July 1999, the FCC exempted 11 countries from the accounting rate regime (FCC 1999b).6Meeting the benchmarks is not easy for developing countries. While they were allowed settlement rates more than 50 percent higher than high-income countries, their rates had much further to fall. In 1996 the average settlement rate for African and South Asian countries, for example, was almost $1.00 and $1.40 per minute, respectively. By 1999 those rates had fallen to about $0.60 and $1.20 per minute. These reductions have affected net settlement payments, which began to decline in 1997. While dramatic, the rates are still far from the FCC benchmarks.Developing countries have objected strongly to the FCC’s order. This is hardly surprising given the direction of the payments and the fact that the payments can represent more than half of all reported telecom revenue in some developing countries (Braga, et al, 1998).7 But the important question is what the real effects of reduced settlement rates are likely to be. Madden and Savage (1998) demonstrate that accounting rates, along with market structure and ownership, are an important determinant of retail prices. Thus, lower settlement rates, by reducing the costs to the carrier of an international call, should reduce retail prices. Ergas and Paterson (1991) note that international telecom traffic is quite price sensitive. Lower prices, by stimulating additional telecom traffic, would benefit the economies of developing countries. Lower settlement rates also mean lower settlement payments, which developing countries view6 These countries are Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.7 Interestingly, while US interexchange (long distance) carriers such as AT&T and WorldCom supported the FCC’s decision to lower accounting rates, other US telecom firms, such as SBC and GTE, opposed it (Telecommunication Reports, 1997). This opposition is undoubtedly because those firms are large stakeholders in foreign carriers including Telmex (Mexico, partly owned by SBC) and CANTV (Venezuela, partly owned by GTE), which receive large net settlement payments. In 1997, Mexico and Venezuela received $710 million and $72 million, respectively, in net settlement payments. Because of their ownership positions in foreign telecom firms, many US telecom firms also benefit from net settlem ent payments. In other words, some of the settlement payments are simply transfersas detrimental. What are the likely effects of reduced settlement payments? Developing countries maintain that these transfers help finance the development of their local networks. Whether that is true is an empirical question.In the remainder of the paper I set out to uncover the real effects of international settlement rates. Specifically, I ask two questions. First, how do settlement rates affect telecom traffic? Second, how do settlement payments affect investment in the local telecom network? The following sections discuss the data, methodology, and results.Empirical Methods and ResultsDataThe data I use to investigate these questions come from several sources. The FCC publishes historical accounting rates between the US and all other countries.8 These data are currently available from 1985 through 1999. To make the rates comparable across countries and over time, I calculate the rate for a three-minute call between the US and each other country. In a few countries with multiple carriers the rate differs by carrier. In those cases I take the average rate for that country. International traffic data also comes from the FCC. Each year the FCC publishes what is known as the “43.61 International Traffic Report” which provides, among other information, total minutes of incoming and outgoing traffic between the US and every other country. Traffic data are currently available from 1992 through 1998.9 Finally, net settlement payments also come from the FCC, and are available from 1985-1998.10 Figures 1 through 3, discussed above, show regional trends in these data.from one US-based carrier to another.8 Available from < /ib/td/pf/account.html>9 Available from < /Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/intl.html>.10 Available from </ib/td/pf/account.html>The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) compiles information on the telecommunications sector in countries around the world. The ITU data I use include telecom revenues, the number of telephone mainlines, and imports of telecommunications equipment (in dollars) by country for 1985-1998. Finally, World Bank Development Indicators provide each country’s population and GDP.Accounting rates and call volumePerhaps the most serious problem with the accounting rate system is that it has kept telephone rates for international calls far above cost by essentially putting a floor on the rate any firm can charge. Madden and Savage (1998) demonstrate that accounting rates are an important determinant in retail prices. Ergas and Paterson (1991) report a strong price elasticity of international calls, with greater elasticities for higher accounting rates. These relationships suggest that lower accounting rates are likely to stimulate additional telecom traffic.To test the relationship between accounting rates and call volume, I estimate equation (1): (1) M it = β1(R it*Low it) + β2(R it*LowMid it) + β3(R it*UpMid it) + β4(R it*High it) + γ1(Low it) +γ2(LowMid it) + γ3(UpMid it) + γ4(High it) + α1(population it) + α2(income it) + δ1(Year) +δ2(Country) + εitIn this equation, M it is the number of minutes from country i in year t to the US that are billed in country i. R it is the settlement rate between country i and the US in year t. Low it, LowMid it, UpMid it, and High it are dummy variables indicating whether the country is considered low, lower-middle, upper-middle, or high income, respectively. I include population and income to control for the two factors that are likely to be the most important determinant of international telecom traffic. I include year fixed effects to control for time trends, and country fixed effectsto control for unobserved country differences. All variables are included as logs of the actual value, so the equation is a log-linear specification.I interact the settlement rate with the income level dummy variables to test how the effects of accounting rate changes affect countries depending on their development status. Specifying the model this way is important for several reasons. First, the FCC order sets the benchmark settlement rate according to this division. It is therefore necessary to determine how accounting rate changes are likely to affect countries within these groupings. Second, accounting rates tend to be much higher for poorer countries, meaning both that they have further to fall to meet the benchmarks and that changes may have bigger effects. Finally, poorer countries are upset by the decision and will see the biggest changes; we must determine how they will be affected.The careful reader will note that M it is the number of minutes of telecom traffic to the US billed outside of the US rather than total telecom traffic. I purposely exclude the number of minutes billed inside the US. The reason for this decision is that callback and other innovations have caused much of incoming US traffic to appear in the data as outgoing US traffic (and thus billed in the US). Because outgoing minutes surged as accounting rates fell, any empirical analysis that did not control for callback volume would likely find a negative correlation between traffic and accounting rates. Without that crucial control, however, the finding would be specious. Unfortunately, there is no good estimate of callback volume between the US and each other country.Using minutes billed abroad nicely solves this problem for the purposes of the analysis. Callback and other technologies have suppressed the number of minutes billed outside the US, as some traffic that actually originates outside the US is recorded as if it had originated inside theUS. By using this figure I bias the estimation against finding a negative correlation between settlement rates and call volumes since rates fell while incoming minutes were artificially suppressed. In other words, this analysis will understate any stimulatory effect that reduced accounting rates may have on outgoing telecom traffic.Table 2 shows the results of this estimation. The first column shows the results when country and year fixed effects are included. The estimation reveals a strong, statistically significant, negative price elasticity for all income levels. Even more striking is the fact that the elasticity (and statistical significance) appears stronger for poorer countries. The poorest countries show an elasticity of negative 0.9: for each one percent decrease in the settlement rate outgoing traffic increases by about 0.9 percent.It seems surprising at first that population and income are not significant in determining outgoing call volume. The main reason for this result appears to be the inclusion of the country fixed effects. These fixed effects control for much of the variation in population and income, as the second column of the table, which shows the estimation without the country fixed effects, reveals. This estimation shows that the negative price elasticity remains, and also that population and income are correlated with outgoing minutes. While excluding the fixed effects is useful to demonstrate more simple correlations, they are important to include since the estimation cannot otherwise control for so many other unobserved country-specific factors.The empirical results strongly suggest that, as we would expect, reducing accounting rates will stimulate international telephone traffic. Moreover, this effect is stronger for poorer countries. In this respect, not only will poor countries benefit from reductions in accounting rates, but they will benefit by even more than rich countries. Consider, for example, Africa. In 1998 the average settlement rate was about $0.72 per minute. Telecom traffic from Africa to theUS that year totaled about 98 million minutes. Reducing the accounting rate to $0.23 per minute implies approximately a 70 percent decrease in the settlement rate. Assuming tha t most African countries fall in the “low income” category, our estimated price elasticity suggests the rate decrease would mean a 63 percent increase in minutes. While it is dangerous to project out-of-sample, the estimates suggest that traffic to the US could increase by almost 59 million minutes as a result of the rate decrease alone.Settlement payments and investment in telephone networksFew would argue with the conclusion that reduced settlement rates will stimulate telephone traffic. Instead, the controversy focuses on the settlement payments. Essentially, developing countries contend that those payments help finance investments in their domestic networks. In this section I evaluate that claim. I estimate three versions of equation (2) to explore the relationship between investment and settlement payments.(2) Y it = β1(Pay it*Low it) + β2(Pay it*LowMid it) + β3(Pay it*UpMid it) + β4(Pay it*High it) + γ1(Low it) +γ2(LowMid it) + γ3(UpMid it) + γ4(High it) + α1(population it) + α2(income it) + δ1(Year) +δ2(Country) + εitPay it is the net settlement payment from the US to country i in year t. The other independent variables are as defined above. Y it represents a different variable for each of the three versions of the equation. First, I run the regression defining Y it as telecom revenues. Second, I define the dependent variable as the number of mainlines in the country. Number of mainlines is probably the best indicator of true investment as it indicates national penetration of the telecom network. Finally, I define the variable as spending on imports of telecommunications equipment. While this may not be a good indicator of investment for industrialized countries, it is quite good fordeveloping countries, which import almost all such equipment and claim to need the hard currency from the settlement payments in order to pay for those imports.The first column of Table 3 shows the relationship between telecom revenue and settlement payments. With the exception of upper-middle income countries, we observe a statistically significant positive correlation between settlement payments and telecom revenues. In this light, it is clear why telecom firms in developing countries are upset by the FCC decision: reduced settlement payments will reduce their rev enues. The question is, what happens to this additional telecom revenue? Is it invested in the domestic telecom network? Will reduced settlement payments reduce investments in domestic networks?The second column of Table 3, which shows the results of estimating equation (2) when the dependent variable is the log of the number of mainlines, begins to suggest the answer. The estimation reveals no correlation between settlement payments and network growth (except in the wealthiest countries). Indeed, for the poorest countries the estimation reveals a t-statistic of only 0.17 on the payment coefficient. We cannot reject the hypothesis that settlement payments have no effect on network growth. In other words, the data do not support the contention that settlement payments have been invested in the domestic network.To investigate further, I explore the effects of settlement payments on imports of telecommunications equipment. The third column shows the result of estimating Equation (2) using imports of telecom equipment as the dependent variable. Again, there is no statistically significant correlation between payments and imports (moreover, the sign on the coefficient, though statistically insignificant, is negative). Similar to the estimation just described, the evidence suggests that settlement payments are not used for imports of telecommunications equipment.。

电影华尔街观后感管理学角度英文文档：Title: Management Perspectives from the Film Wall StreetThe film Wall Street, directed by Oliver Stone, provides a captivating insight into the world of finance and its intricate relationships.From a management perspective, the movie offers valuable lessons on ethics, decision-making, and the consequences of unchecked ambition.The character of Gordon Gekko, played by Michael Douglas, embodies the classic example of a manager driven by excessive greed.His unethical practices and manipulation of the stock market highlight the importance of ethical conduct in management.It is a stark reminder that the pursuit of wealth should not come at the expense of integrity and ethical standards.Furthermore, the film showcases the significance of moral courage and the need for whistleblowing in the face of corruption.Bud Fox, the young and ambitious stockbroker, eventually realizes the detrimental effects of his association with Gekko and takes a stand against him.This highlights the importance of integrity and the need for individuals to question and challenge unethical practices within organizations.The movie also emphasizes the importance of long-term vision and strategic thinking in management.Gekko"s short-sighted approach tobusiness ultimately leads to his downfall, while Bud Fox"s transformation into a more ethical and responsible broker symbolizes the value of considering the long-term consequences of actions.In conclusion, Wall Street serves as a cautionary tale for managers about the dangers of unchecked ambition and the importance of ethical conduct.It underscores the need for moral courage and the pursuit of long-term sustainability.While the film primarily focuses on the financial sector, its lessons on management are applicable across all industries.中文文档：标题：电影《华尔街》的管理学视角电影《华尔街》由奥利弗·斯通执导，深入揭示了金融世界的复杂人际关系。

中考英语人物成就描述单选题80题1. Confucius was a great thinker whose ideas ______ for thousands of years.A. have influencedB. influencedC. were influencedD. are influenced答案：A。

本题考查现在完成时的用法。

“for thousands of years”是现在完成时的标志，A 选项“have influenced”是现在完成时，表示动作从过去持续到现在，并可能继续下去；B 选项“influenced”是一般过去时，只表示过去的动作；C 选项“were influenced”是一般过去时的被动语态，不符合语境；D 选项“are influenced”是一般现在时的被动语态，也不符合语境。

2. Marco Polo is known for his travels to China, and his stories ______ widely.A. were spreadB. spreadC. have spreadD. are spread答案：C。

此题考查现在完成时。

“widely”表明其影响是持续的，C 选项“have spread”是现在完成时，强调过去的动作对现在的影响；A 选项“were spread”是一般过去时的被动语态；B 选项“spread”是过去式或过去分词，时态不符合；D 选项“are spread”是一般现在时的被动语态，均不符合语境。

3. Archimedes discovered the principle of buoyancy when he was in the bath. This principle ______ important in science.A. isB. wasC. has beenD. will be答案：C。

When it comes to crafting an English essay about a movie,there are several key elements to consider.Heres a detailed guide on how to write an engaging and wellstructured essay:1.Introduction:Start your essay with an engaging introduction that captures the readers interest.Introduce the movie title,the director,the main actors,and the genre.You might also want to include a brief statement about the movies significance or why you chose to write about it.Example:In the realm of science fiction,Interstellar directed by Christopher Nolan stands out as a cinematic masterpiece that not only entertains but also provokes deep contemplation on the nature of time,space,and human survival.2.Background Information:Provide some background information about the movie,such as its release year,box office performance,and critical reception.This helps to set the stage for the discussion that follows.Example:Released in2014,Interstellar garnered both commercial success and critical acclaim,earning several awards and nominations for its visual effects and thoughtprovoking narrative.3.Plot Summary:Give a concise summary of the movies plot without revealing any major spoilers.This section should be brief and focus on the main storyline. Example:The story follows the journey of Cooper,a former NASA pilot,who is tasked with leading a team of astronauts through a wormhole in search of a new home for humanity,as Earth is on the brink of becoming uninhabitable.4.Character Analysis:Discuss the main characters and their roles in the movie.Analyze their motivations,development,and how they contribute to the story.Example:Cooper,portrayed by Matthew McConaughey,is a complex character driven by his love for his family and the survival of mankind.His relationship with his daughter, Murph,adds emotional depth to the narrative.5.Themes and Symbolism:Explore the themes and symbols present in the movie. Discuss how they contribute to the overall message and impact of the film.Example:Themes of love,sacrifice,and the human spirits resilience are central to Interstellar.The concept of time dilation is not only a scientific phenomenon but alsoserves as a metaphor for the emotional distance between characters.6.Cinematography and Visual Effects:Comment on the movies visual aspects,including the cinematography,special effects,and set design.Discuss how these elements contribute to the storytelling.Example:Nolans use of practical effects and stunning cinematography by Hoyte van Hoytema create an immersive experience,allowing the audience to feel the vastness of space and the isolation of the characters.7.Sound and Music:Reflect on the role of sound and music in the movie.Discuss the composers work and how it enhances the films atmosphere and emotional impact.Example:Hans Zimmers haunting score for Interstellar perfectly complements the films emotional beats,with the use of organ and orchestral arrangements adding a sense of grandeur and urgency to the space exploration sequences.8.Cultural Impact and Legacy:Discuss the movies cultural impact,how it was received by audiences,and its place in the history of cinema.Example:Interstellar has left an indelible mark on the science fiction genre,sparking discussions on the feasibility of interstellar travel and the ethical implications of sacrificing ones life for the greater good.9.Conclusion:Conclude your essay by summarizing the main points and reflecting on the movies overall significance.You might also include your personal opinion and recommendation.Example:In conclusion,Interstellar is a visually stunning and intellectually stimulating film that challenges our understanding of time,space,and humanitys place in the universe.It is a mustwatch for anyone seeking a thoughtprovoking cinematic experience.10.Works Cited:If you have referenced any external sources,such as interviews with the director or reviews,be sure to include a list of works cited.Remember,an effective essay not only informs but also engages the reader with a wellargued perspective and a clear understanding of the movies artistic and cultural significance.。

八年级英语电影评论角度拓展单选题50题1. In the movie "Frozen", the main theme is about _____.A. adventure and courageB. love and familyC. friendship and teamworkD. mystery and magic答案：B。

本题考查对电影《冰雪奇缘》主题的理解。

选项A“adventure and courage”侧重于冒险和勇气，在这部电影中并非主要主题。

选项C“friendship and teamwork”虽然也是积极的元素，但不是其核心主题。

选项D“mystery and magic”神秘和魔法只是电影的一些元素，而非主题。

而电影《《冰雪奇缘》主要围绕姐妹之间的爱以及家庭关系展开，所以选项B 正确。

2. The theme of the movie "Avatar" is mainly _____.A. environmental protectionB. science fiction and imaginationC. human evolutionD. war and peace答案：A。

对于电影《《阿凡达》，其主题重点在于环境保护。

选项B“science fiction and imagination”科幻和想象是电影的表现形式，不是核心主题。

选项C“human evolution”人类进化并非该电影的主要探讨内容。

选项D“war and peace”战争与和平并非此电影的重点主题。

所以应选择A。

3. In the film "The Lion King", the central theme is _____.A. power and ambitionB. growth and responsibilityC. revenge and justiceD. music and dance答案：B。