下载文档原格式
标准普尔信用评级标准普尔信用评级是全球知名的信用评级机构之一，成立于1860年，总部位于美国纽约。
作为全球领先的信用评级机构之一，标准普尔致力于为投资者和市场提供独立、客观、专业的信用评级服务，对于全球金融市场具有重要的影响力和地位。
首先，标准普尔信用评级的评级体系是基于信用风险的评估，通过对债券、公司、金融机构、主权国家等发行人的信用状况进行分析和评估，为投资者和市场提供信用风险的参考依据。
标准普尔信用评级主要包括长期债务评级、短期债务评级、展望评级等，其中长期债务评级是对发行人长期偿债能力的评估，短期债务评级是对发行人短期偿债能力的评估，展望评级是对未来信用状况的展望和预测。
其次，标准普尔信用评级的评级标准严格、科学、公正，评级过程包括对发行人的财务状况、经营状况、行业风险、市场风险、政治风险等多方面的综合评估，评级结果反映了发行人的信用风险水平。
标准普尔信用评级以AAA、AA、A、BBB、BB、B、CCC、CC、C、D等不同的等级来评定发行人的信用状况，其中AAA为最高等级，D为违约等级。
不同的信用评级反映了不同发行人的信用风险水平，为投资者和市场提供了重要的参考依据。
再次，标准普尔信用评级的评级结果对于市场具有重要的影响力和参考意义。
投资者和市场参与者通常会参考标准普尔信用评级的结果来进行投资决策和风险管理，高信用评级的发行人通常能够以较低的成本融资，低信用评级的发行人则可能面临融资困难和成本上升。
因此，标准普尔信用评级的评级结果对于市场的流动性、风险定价和投资配置具有重要的影响。
最后，标准普尔信用评级在全球范围内具有广泛的认可和影响力，其评级结果被广泛应用于债券市场、股票市场、银行业、保险业、资产管理业等领域，为全球金融市场的稳定和健康发展发挥着重要作用。
同时，标准普尔信用评级也在不断创新和完善评级体系，提高评级的准确性和及时性，以更好地为投资者和市场提供信用风险管理服务。
综上所述，标准普尔信用评级作为全球知名的信用评级机构，其评级体系严格、科学、公正，评级结果具有重要的参考意义和影响力，为全球金融市场的稳定和健康发展发挥着重要作用。
标普对中国银行的评级1. 介绍标普对中国银行进行了评级，本文将详细介绍标普对中国银行的评级情况及其影响。
2. 标普评级体系标普评级体系是全球最为广泛应用的信用评级体系之一，由国际信用评级机构标准普尔金融服务（Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC，简称标普）开发和使用。
标普评级体系通过对各个实体的信用风险进行评估和分类，为投资者提供了参考依据。
3. 标普对中国银行的评级3.1 评级结果根据标普最新发布的评级报告，标普将中国银行的长期外币和本地货币的评级分别定为A+和A。
3.2 评级原因标普评级机构给出了以下几个评级原因：1.中国银行是中国境内最大的商业银行之一，拥有庞大的资产规模和广泛的业务网络，稳定的经营能力是评级的重要因素之一。
2.中国银行在过去几年中取得了可观的盈利，并通过提高资本充足率和降低风险敞口来增强了其财务实力。
3.中国银行在风控和内部控制方面也取得了不俗的成绩，能够有效管理风险并保护债权人的利益。
4.中国银行作为国有银行，享有来自中国政府的隐性支持，这也提高了其评级的稳定性和可靠性。
3.3 评级展望标普对中国银行的评级展望为稳定，主要基于以下几个因素：1.中国银行在中国境内的经营环境相对稳定，国内经济增长趋势良好，这有助于支持中国银行的业务扩张和盈利能力。
2.中国政府持续加大金融监管力度，提高了整个银行业的风险管理水平，这对中国银行的健康发展起到了积极促进作用。
3.中国银行在数字化转型方面投入了大量资源，并取得了一定的成果，这有助于提升其业务效率和竞争力。
4. 评级对中国银行的影响4.1 对债务融资的影响作为一个银行，中国银行需要通过发行债务来获取资金，评级结果将直接影响中国银行的债务融资成本。
较高的评级将有助于降低借款的利率，提高融资的灵活性。
4.2 对投资者的影响评级给投资者提供了一个参考，可以帮助投资者判断中国银行的信用风险，并对其进行投资决策。
标准普尔信用评级中国标准普尔信用评级（Standard & Poor's Credit Ratings）是全球著名的信用评级机构之一，其对各国家和地区的信用状况进行评估，为投资者和市场参与者提供重要的参考信息。
中国作为世界第二大经济体，其信用评级备受关注。
本文将从标准普尔信用评级的背景、评级标准、中国的评级情况以及评级对中国经济的影响等方面进行分析。
首先，标准普尔信用评级是由标准普尔全球评级服务公司（Standard & Poor's Global Ratings）进行的，该公司是全球三大信用评级机构之一，总部位于美国纽约。
其评级主要基于对国家经济实力、财政状况、政治稳定性、货币政策、外汇储备、金融体系健康状况等因素的评估。
评级分为AAA、AA、A、BBB、BB、B、CCC等不同等级，其中AAA为最高等级，CCC为最低等级，还有“+”、“-”符号表示更精细的评级水平。
其次，标准普尔信用评级的标准严格而全面，评级过程中充分考虑了国家的宏观经济状况和政策环境。
评级机构会对国家的债务水平、经济增长、外汇储备、通货膨胀率、政治稳定性、财政政策、货币政策等因素进行深入研究和分析，以确保评级结果的客观性和准确性。
同时，评级机构还会定期对国家的评级进行更新和调整，以反映国家经济状况的变化。
目前，中国的主权信用评级为AA-，展望为稳定。
这一评级反映了中国经济实力的增强和政府改革的积极性。
中国作为全球第二大经济体，其经济增长稳定，外汇储备充裕，通货膨胀率可控，政治稳定，财政政策和货币政策得到有效执行。
这些因素都为中国的信用评级提供了有力支撑。
中国的信用评级对中国经济有着重要的影响。
首先，较高的信用评级能够降低中国政府融资成本，吸引更多的外国投资者，促进国际资本流动。
其次，稳定的信用评级有助于提升中国国际形象，增强国际信任度，为中国企业“走出去”提供更多的便利。
再者，信用评级还可以作为评估中国宏观经济政策效果的重要参考指标，为政府决策提供重要参考。
标准普尔评级标准普尔评级是指标准普尔公司对债券、股票等金融工具的信用风险进行评估和等级划分的一种评级体系。
该评级体系对于投资者、发行人和监管机构来说都具有重要意义，因为它能够帮助他们更好地了解和评估金融工具的风险水平。
本文将对标准普尔评级的背景、评级标准和影响因素进行介绍。
首先，我们来了解一下标准普尔评级的背景。
标准普尔公司是全球著名的信用评级机构之一，成立于1860年，总部位于美国纽约。
该公司通过对债券、股票等金融工具进行评级，向投资者提供有关这些金融工具信用风险的评估报告。
标准普尔评级通常以字母等级来表示，从最高到最低依次为AAA、AA、A、BBB、BB、B、CCC、CC、C、D等级，其中AAA为最高等级，D为违约等级。
其次，我们来了解一下标准普尔评级的标准。
标准普尔评级主要基于发行人的信用风险来进行评估，评级标准包括财务状况、偿债能力、行业风险、市场地位、管理层能力等多个方面。
评级过程中，标准普尔公司将对发行人的财务报表、经营情况、行业发展趋势等进行全面分析，并据此确定其信用风险等级。
此外，标准普尔评级还会考虑宏观经济环境、政治风险、法律法规等因素对发行人信用风险的影响。
最后，我们来了解一下标准普尔评级的影响因素。
标准普尔评级对于投资者、发行人和监管机构都具有重要影响。
首先，对于投资者来说，标准普尔评级能够帮助他们更好地了解和评估投资标的的信用风险，从而做出明智的投资决策。
其次，对于发行人来说，标准普尔评级能够提高其在债券市场的知名度和信誉度，降低融资成本，吸引更多投资者。
最后，对于监管机构来说，标准普尔评级能够帮助其监管金融市场，保护投资者利益，维护金融市场的稳定和健康发展。
综上所述，标准普尔评级是一种重要的信用评级体系，对金融市场具有重要意义。
通过了解标准普尔评级的背景、评级标准和影响因素，我们能够更好地理解和运用这一评级体系，从而更好地管理金融风险，保护投资者利益，促进金融市场的稳定和健康发展。
国际三大评级机构（详细版）公开信息评级''pi''评级符号后标有''pi''表示该等评级是使用已公开的财务资料或其它公开信息作为分析的依据，即标准普尔并未与该机构的管理层进行深入的讨论或全面考虑其重要的非公开资料，所以这类评级所依据的资料不及全面的评级全面。
公开信息评级每年根据财务报告审核一次，但当有重大事情发生而可能影响发债人的信用素质时，我们也会实时对评级加以审核。
公开信息评级没有评级展望，不附有''+''或''-''号。
但如果评级受到主权评级的上限限制时，''+''或''-''号有可能被使用。
短期信用评级级别评定A-1偿还债务能力较强，为标准普尔给予的最高评级。
此评级可另加''+''号，以表示发债人偿还债务的能力极强。
A-2偿还债务的能力令人满意。
不过相对于最高的评级，其偿债能力较易受外在环境或经济状况变动的不利影响。
A-3目前有足够能力偿还债务。
但若经济条件恶化或外在因素改变，其偿债能力可能较脆弱。
B偿还债务能力脆弱且投机成份相当高。
发债人目前仍有能力偿还债务，但持续的重大不稳定因素可能会令发债人没有足够能力偿还债务。
C目前有可能违约，发债人须依赖良好的商业、金融或经济条件才有能力偿还债务。
由于其财务状况，目前正在受监察。
在受监察期内，监管机构有权审定某一债务较其它债务有优先权。
SD/D当债务到期而发债人未能按期偿还债务时，即使宽限期未满，标准普尔亦会给予''D''评级，除非标准普尔相信债务可于宽限期内偿还。
此外，如正在申请破产或已作出类似行动以致债务的付款受阻，标准普尔亦会给予''D''评级。
当发债人有选择地对某些或某类债务违约时，标准普尔会给予"SD"评级（选择性违约）。
主权信用评级标准普尔
标准普尔公司对主权信用的评级主要分为投资级和投机级两大类。
投资级包括AAA、AA序列、A序列和BBB序列，而投机级则分为BB序列、B序列、CCC序列、CC、C和D。
信用级别由高到低排列，AAA级具有最高信用等级，而D级最低，视为对条款的违约。
从AA至CCC级，每个级别都可以
添加“+”或“-”来表示信用高低程度。
标准普尔评级由美国标准普尔公司1923年开始编制发表，是世界权威金融分析机构。
标准普尔为投资者提供信用评级、独立分析研究、投资咨询等服务，其中包括反映全球股市表现的标准普尔全球1200指数和为美国投资组合指数的基准的标准普尔500指数等一系列指数。
请注意，以上内容仅供参考，建议咨询专业人士获取准确信息。
标准普尔法
"标准普尔法" 一词可能存在一些歧义，因为它可能指的是不同的概念。
以下是两种可能的解释：
1.标准普尔评级法（Standard & Poor's Rating Services）：标准
普尔是全球著名的金融信息服务公司之一，其评级部门主要负责对企业、政府和金融工具进行信用评级。
标准普尔评级是投资者、机构和市场参与者参考的重要指标之一。
评级通常分为不同的等级，如AAA、AA、A、BBB等，反映了对债务发行方偿付能力的评估。
2.标准普尔500指数（Standard & Poor's 500）：标准普尔500
指数是由标准普尔公司维护的美国股票市场的一个广泛追踪指数。
该指数包括了500家美国大型上市公司，代表了美国股市的整体表现。
投资者通常将标准普尔500指数作为股市整体表现的一个重要参考。
如果你有其他上下文或详细信息，可以提供更多细节，以便我更好地回答你的问题。
一、外文原文The Credit Rating Agencies: How Did We Get Here? Where Should We Go?Lawrence J. White*"…an insured state savings association…may not acquire or retain any corporate debt securities not of investment grade." 12 Code of Federal Regulations § 362.11 " …any user of the information contained herein should not rely on any credit rating or other opinion contained herein in making any investment decision." The usual disclaimer that is printed at the bottom of Standard & Poor’s credit ratings The U.S. subprime residential mortgage debacle of 2007-2008, and the world financial crisis that has followed, will surely be seen as a defining event for the U.S. economy -- and for much of the world economy as well -- for many decades in the future. Among the central players in that debacle were the three large U.S.-based credit rating agencies: Moody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P), and Fitch.These three agencies' initially favorable ratings were crucial for the successful sale of the bonds that were securitized from subprime residential mortgages and other debt obligations. The sale of these bonds, in turn, were an important underpinning for the U.S. housing boom of 1998-2006 -- with a self-reinforcing price-rise bubble. When house prices ceased rising in mid 2006 and then began to decline, the default rates on the mortgages underlying these bonds rose sharply, and those initial ratings proved to be excessively optimistic -- especially for the bonds that were based on mortgages that were originated in 2005 and 2006. The mortgage bonds collapsed, bringing down the U.S. financial system and many other countries’ financial systems as well.The role of the major rating agencies has received a considerable amount of attention in Congressional hearings and in the media. Less attention has been paid to the specifics of the financial regulatory structure that propelled these companies to the center of the U.S. bond markets –and that thereby virtually guaranteed that when they did make mistakes, those mistakes would have serious consequences for the financial sector. But an understanding of that structure is essential for any reasoned debate about the future course of public policy with respect to the rating agencies.This paper will begin by reviewing the role that credit rating agencies play in the bond markets. We then review the relevant history of the industry, including the crucial role that the regulation of other financial institutions has played in promoting the centrality of the major credit rating agencies with respect to bond information. In the discussion of this history, distinctions among types of financial regulation –especially between the prudential regulation of financial institutions (which, as we will see, required them to use the specific bond creditworthiness information that was provided by the major rating agencies) and the regulation of the rating agencies themselves –are important.We next offer an assessment of the role that regulation played in enhancing the importance of the three major rating agencies and their role in the subprime debacle. We then consider the possible prospective routes for public policy with respect to the creditrating industry. One route that has been widely discussed –and that is embodied in legislation that the Obama Administration proposed in July 2009 –would tighten the regulation of the rating agencies, in efforts to prevent the reoccurrence of those disastrous judgmental errors. A second route would reduce the required centrality of the rating agencies and thereby open up the bond information process in way that has not been possible since the 1930s.Why Credit Rating Agencies?A central concern of any lender -- including the lender/investors in bonds -- is whether a potential or actual borrower is likely to repay the loan. This is, of course, a standard problem of asymmetric information: The borrower is likely to know more about its repaying proclivities than is the lender. There are also standard solutions to the problem: Lenders usually spend considerable amounts of time and effort in gathering information about the likely creditworthiness of prospective borrowers (including their history of loan repayments and their current and prospective financial capabilities) and also in gathering information about the actions of borrowers after loans have been made.The credit rating agencies (arguably) help pierce the fog of asymmetric information by offering judgments -- they prefer the word "opinions"-- about the credit quality of bonds that are issued by corporations, governments (including U.S. state and local governments, as well as "sovereign" issuers abroad), and (most recently) mortgage securitizers. These judgments come in the form of “ratings”, which are usually a letter grade. The best known scale is that used by S&P and some other rating agencies: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, etc., with pluses and minuses as well.4Credit rating agencies are thus one potential source of such information for bond investors; but they are far from the only potential source. There are smaller financial services firms that offer advice to bond investors. Some bond mutual funds do their own research, as do some hedge funds. There are “fixed income analysts” at many financial services firms who offer recommendations to those firms’ clients with respect to bondinvestments.Although there appear to be well over 100 credit rating agencies worldwide,6 the three major U.S.-based agencies are clearly the dominant entities. All three operate on a worldwide basis, with offices on all six continents; each has ratings outstanding on tens of trillions of dollars of securities. Only Moody’s is a free-standing company, so the most information is known about Moody’s: Its 2008 annual report listed the company’s total revenues at $1.8 billion, its net revenues at $458 million, and its total assets at year-end at $1.8 billion.7 Slightly more than half (52%) of its total revenue came from the U.S.; as recently as 2006 that fraction was two-thirds. Over two-thirds (69%) of the company’s revenues comes from ratings; the rest comes from related services. At year-end 2008 the company had approximately 3,900 employees, with slightly more than half located in the U.S.Because S&P’s and Fitch’s ratings operations are components of larger enterprises (that report on a consolidated basis), comparable revenue and asset figures are not possible. But S&P is roughly the same size as Moody’s, while Fitch is somewhat smaller. Table 1 provides a set of roughly comparable data on each company’s analytical employees and numbers of issues rated. As can be seen, all three companies employ about the same numbers of analysts; however, Moody’s and S&P rate appreciably morecorporate and asset-backed securities than does Fitch.The history of the credit rating agencies and their interactions with financial regulators is crucial for an understanding of how the agencies attained their current central position in the market for bond information. It is to that history that we now turn. What Is to Be Done?In response to the growing criticism (in the media and in Congressional hearings) of the three large bond raters' errors in their initial, excessively optimistic ratings of the complex mortgage-related securities (especially for the securities that were issued and rated in 2005 and 2006) and their subsequent tardiness in downgrading those securities, the SEC in December 2008 promulgated NRSRO regulations that placed mild restrictions on the conflicts of interest that can arise under the rating agencies' "issuer pays" business model (e.g., requiring that the agencies not rate debt issues that they have helped structure, not allowing analysts to be involved in fee negotiations, etc.) and that required greater transparency (e.g., requiring that the rating agencies reveal details on their methodologies and assumptions and track records) in the construction of ratings.Political pressures to do more -- possibly even to ban legislatively the "issuer pays" model –have remained strong. In July 2009 the Obama Administration, as part of its larger package of proposed financial reforms, offered legislation that would require further, more stringent efforts on the part of the rating agencies to deal with the conflicts and enhance transparency.This regulatory response –the credit rating agencies made mist akes; let’s try to make sure that they don’t make such mistakes in the future –is understandable. But it ignores the history of the other kind of financial regulation – the prudential regulation of banks and other financial institutions -- that pushed the rating agencies into the center of the bond information process and that thereby greatly exacerbated the consequences for the bond markets when the rating agencies did make those mistakes. It also overlooks the stultifying consequences for innovation in the development and assessment ofinformation for judging the creditworthiness of bonds.Regulatory efforts to fix problems, by prescribing specified structures and processes, unavoidably restrict flexibility, raise costs, and discourage entry. Further, although efforts to increase transparency may help reduce problems of asymmetric information, they also have the potential for eroding a rating firm’s intellectual property and, over the longer run, discouraging the creation of future intellectual property.There is another, quite different direction in which public policy might proceed in the wake of the credit rating agencies’ mistakes. Rather than trying to fix them through regulation, it would provide a more markets-oriented approach that would likely reduce the importance of the incumbent rating agencies and thus reduce the importance (and consequences) of any future mistakes that they might make. This approach would call for the withdrawal of all of those delegations of safety judgments by financial regulators to the rating agencies. The rating agencies’ judgments would no longer have the force of law. Those financial regulators should persist in their goals of having safe bonds in the portfolios of their regulated institutions (or that, as in the case of insurance companies and broker-dealers, an institution's capital requirement would be geared to the risk ness of the bonds that it held); but those safety judgments should remain the responsibility of theregulated institutions themselves, with oversight by regulators.Under this alternative public policy approach, banks (and insurance companies, etc.) would have a far wider choice as to where and from whom they could seek advice as to the safety of bonds that they might hold in their portfolios. Some institutions might choose to do the necessary research on bonds themselves, or rely primarily on the information yielded by the credit default swap (CDS) market. Or they might turn to outside advisors that they considered to be reliable -- based on the track record of the advisor, the business model of the advisor (including the possibilities of conflicts of interest), the other activities of the advisor (which might pose potential conflicts), and anything else that the institution considered relevant. Such advisors might include the incumbent credit rating agencies. But the category of advisors might also expand to include the fixed income analysts at investment banks (if they could erect credible "Chinese walls") or industry analysts or upstart advisory firms that are currently unknown.The end-result -- the safety of the institution's bond portfolio -- would continue to be subject to review by the institution's regulator.That review might also include a review of the institution's choice of bond-information advisor (or the choice to do the research in-house) -- although that choice is (at best) a secondary matter, since the safety of the bond portfolio itself (regardless of where the information comes from) is the primary goal of the regulator. Nevertheless, it seems highly likely that the bond information market would be opened to new ideas -- about ratings business models, methodologies, and technologies -- and to new entry in ways that have not actually been possible since the 1930s.It is also worth asking whether, under this approach, the "issuer pays" business model could survive. The answer rests on whether bond buyers are able to ascertain which advisors do provide reliable advice (as does any model short of relying on government regulation to ensure accurate ratings). If the bond buyers can so ascertain,then they would be willing to pay higher prices (and thus accept lower interest yields) on the bonds of any given underlying quality that are "rated" by these reliable advisors. In turn, issuers -- even in an "issuer pays" framework -- would seek to hire these recognized-to-be-reliable advisers, since the issuers would thereby be able to pay lower interest rates on the bonds that they issue.That the "issuer pays" business model could survive in this counter-factual world is no guarantee that it would survive. That outcome would be determined by the competitive process.ConclusionWhither the credit rating industry and its regulation? The central role -- forced by seven decades of financial regulation -- that the three major credit rating agencies played in the subprime debacle has brought extensive public attention to the industry and its practices. The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently (in December 2008) taken modest steps to expand its regulation of the industry. The Obama Administration has proposed further efforts.There is, however, another direction in which public policy could proceed: Financial regulators could withdraw their delegation of safety judgments to the credit ratingagencies. The policy goal of safe bond portfolios for regulated financial institutions would remain. But the financial institutions would bear the burden of justifying the safety of their bond portfolios to their regulators. The bond information market would be opened to new ideas about rating methodologies, technologies, and business models and to new entry in ways that have not been possible since the 1930s.Those who are interested in this public policy debate should ask themselves the following questions: Is a regulatory system that delegates important safety judgments about bonds to third parties in the best interests of the regulated financial institutions and of the bond markets more generally? Will more extensive regulation of the rating agencies actually succeed in forcing the rating agencies to make better judgments in the future? Would such regulation have consequences for flexibility, innovation, and entry in the bond information market? Or instead, could the financial institutions be trusted to seek their own sources of information about the creditworthiness of bonds, so long as financial regulators oversee the safety of those bond portfolios?二、翻译文章信用评级机构:我们怎么会在这里?我们到哪去?劳伦斯 J 怀特美国联邦法规法典第362章11节12条指出：“…任何已投保的国家储蓄机构…不得取得或者保留任何公司债券投资级别的债券。
标准普尔信用评级标准普尔信用评级（Standard & Poor's Credit Ratings）是全球知名的信用评级机构之一，其评级结果被广泛应用于金融市场和企业融资活动中。
本文将对标准普尔信用评级的背景、评级标准和影响进行介绍。
首先，标准普尔信用评级的背景。
标准普尔是全球最早的信用评级机构之一，其信用评级业务始于1860年。
作为全球三大信用评级机构之一，标准普尔的评级结果被广泛应用于债券市场、银行信贷、企业融资等领域。
其评级结果直接影响着债券价格、企业融资成本以及投资者的投资决策。
其次，标准普尔信用评级的标准。
标准普尔信用评级主要针对债券发行人、债券产品和债券发行人的信用评级。
其评级标准主要包括债券发行人的偿债能力、财务状况、流动性、管理层能力等方面。
标准普尔将发行人分为不同的信用等级，包括AAA、AA、A、BBB、BB、B、CCC、CC、C等等，其中AAA为最高信用等级，C为最低信用等级。
不同的信用等级代表着不同的偿债能力和风险水平。
最后，标准普尔信用评级的影响。
标准普尔信用评级直接影响着债券市场和企业融资活动。
高信用等级的债券发行人可以享受较低的融资成本，吸引更多投资者的认购；而低信用等级的债券发行人则面临着融资成本较高、融资难度大的问题。
此外，标准普尔信用评级还对投资者的投资决策产生直接影响，投资者通常会根据标准普尔的评级结果进行投资组合的配置和风险控制。
综上所述，标准普尔信用评级作为全球知名的信用评级机构之一，其评级结果对债券市场、企业融资活动和投资者的投资决策产生着重要影响。
在实际应用中，投资者和发行人都应该充分了解标准普尔信用评级的背景、评级标准和影响，以更好地进行投资决策和融资活动。
General Criteria:Principles Of Credit RatingsChief Credit Officer,Corporates&Governments:Colleen Woodell,New York(1)212-438-2118;colleen_woodell@Chief Credit Officer,Structured Finance:Francis Parisi,PhD,New York(1)212-438-2570;francis_parisi@Chief Credit Officer,EMEA:Blaise Ganguin,Paris(33)1-4420-6698;blaise_ganguin@Chief Credit Officer,Asia-Pacific:Ian D Thompson,Melbourne(61)3-9631-2100;ian_thompson@Chief Credit Officer:Mark H Adelson,New York(1)212-438-1075;mark_adelson@ Table Of ContentsSCOPE OF THE CRITERIASUMMARY OF CRITERIA UPDATEIMPACT ON OUTSTANDING RATINGSEFFECTIVE DATE AND TRANSITIONFUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF STRUCTURED FINANCE RATINGS AND CRITERIAFUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENT RATINGS AND CRITERIARELATED CRITERIA AND RESEARCHGeneral Criteria:Principles Of Credit Ratings(Editor's Note:This criteria article was originally published on Feb.16,2011.We are republishing this article following our periodic review completed on Jan.17,2013.This article fully supersedes(but does not make substantive changes to)"Principles of Corporate And Government Ratings,"published June26,2007,and"Principles-Based Rating Methodology For Global Structured Finance Securities,"published May29,2007.It also supersedes"Structured Investment Vehicle Criteria,"published March13,2002,"Corporate Securitizations:The Role of Risk Capital in Aligning Stakeholder Interests,"published Sept.18, 2003,and"CDO Spotlight:Quantitative Modeling Approach To Rating Index CPDO Structures,"published March22,2007.)1.Standard&Poor's Ratings Services uses a principles-based approach for assigning and monitoring ratings globally.These broad principles apply generally to ratings of all types of corporates,governments,securitization structures,and asset classes.However,for certain types of issuers,issues,asset classes,markets,and regions,Standard&Poor's complements these principles with specific methodologies and assumptions.2.Readers should read this article in conjunction with"Understanding Standard&Poor's Rating Definitions,"publishedJune3,2009,and"Methodology:Credit Stability Criteria,"published May3,2010.3.Standard&Poor's assigns credit ratings to both issuers and issues,and strives to maintain comparability of ratingsacross sectors and over time.That is,Standard&Poor's intends for each rating symbol to connote the same general level of creditworthiness for issuers and issues in different sectors and at different times.Enhancing comparability requires calibrating the criteria for determining ratings.Standard&Poor's calibrates criteria through various means including measuring default behavior across sectors and over time,applying common approaches to risk analysis,and using a common set of macroeconomic scenarios associated with the different rating levels.The scenario associated with the'AAA'rating level is one of extreme macroeconomic stress--on par with the Great Depression of the1930s.The scenarios associated with the lower rating levels are successively less stressful.Credits rated in each category are intended to be able to withstand the associated level of macroeconomic stress without defaulting(although we might significantly lower the ratings on those credits as economic stresses increase).SCOPE OF THE CRITERIA4.These criteria apply to ratings of all issuers and issues rated by Standard&Poor's.SUMMARY OF CRITERIA UPDATE5.This article fully supersedes(but does not make substantive changes to)"Principles of Corporate And GovernmentRatings,"published June26,2007,and"Principles-Based Rating Methodology For Global Structured FinanceSecurities,"published May29,2007.6.The analytic framework for structured finance securitization ratings includes five key areas:•Credit quality of the securitized assets;•Legal and regulatory risks;•Payment structure and cash flow mechanics;•Operational and administrative risks;and•Counterparty risk.7.The analytic framework for corporate and government ratings includes three key areas:•Creditworthiness before external support;•External support;and•Analysis of specific instruments.IMPACT ON OUTSTANDING RATINGS8.This criteria update does not cause changes to any outstanding ratings.EFFECTIVE DATE AND TRANSITION9.These criteria are effective immediately for all new and outstanding ratings.FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF STRUCTURED FINANCE RATINGS AND CRITERIACredit Quality Of The Securitized Assets10.In most securitization transactions,the first key step in analyzing the credit quality of the securitized assets isdetermining the amount of credit support necessary,in our opinion,to maintain a rating at the'AAA'level.That determination is equivalent to estimating the amount of losses that the assets would suffer under conditions of extreme stress.The estimation can include reference to historical studies of the subject asset class or,when such studies are not available and as we deem appropriate,comparison or benchmarking relative to asset classes for which such studies do exist.11.For some asset classes,the estimation may proceed in stages:We might separately estimate asset default frequenciesand loss severities under extreme stress conditions and then combine those components to form the overall loss estimate.Similarly,for some asset classes,the estimation may use generalizations based on historical studies,such as the notion that losses under extreme stress conditions can be estimated as a multiple of expected losses,with the multiple potentially varying for different asset classes.12.For some asset classes,Standard&Poor's defines an archetypical asset pool and uses it as a comparison benchmarkfor gauging the estimated losses under extreme stress for pools underlying actual transactions in such asset classes.In some cases,the maximum rating for the highest rated security may be below'AAA'based on our assessment of factors such as country risk,or transfer and convertibility risk,and we would adjust the analysis accordingly.13.In many securitization transactions,a key step in analyzing the credit quality of the securitized assets is estimating thelevel of expected losses.The level of expected losses generally corresponds to the amount of credit enhancementassociated with the'B'rating level.Estimation of expected losses generally uses the recent performance of similar assets as a guide.The estimation may include adjustments based on our assessment of current trends,as well as evolving market practices.14.Interpolation is one of the methods we may use when we analyze the amount of credit enhancement associated withthe rating levels between'AAA'and'B'for transactions in certain asset classes.For other asset classes,we create specific benchmarks,such as coverage multiples or simulated default rates,within a mathematical simulation model.15.Our view on the credit quality of a pool of assets may change over time.The performance of the pool may divergefrom expectations and that divergence may reveal credit strengths or weakness that were not previously apparent.Through our surveillance processes,we reassess the credit quality of the pool based on certain information regarding the observed performance and other factors we deem relevant.Legal And Regulatory Risks16.Standard&Poor's assessment of legal and regulatory risks focuses primarily on the degree to which a securitizationstructure isolates the securitized assets from the bankruptcy or insolvency risk of entities that participate in the transaction.Typically,our analysis focuses on the entity or entities that originated and owned the assets before the securitization,although the creditworthiness of other entities also may be relevant.A true sale of the subject assets from the originator/seller to a special purpose entity(SPE)is one method commonly used by an arranger seeking to achieve asset isolation in a securitization.From a legal perspective,a true sale is generally understood to result in the assets ceasing to be part of the seller's bankruptcy or insolvency estate.There may also be other legal mechanisms, apart from true sale,that may achieve analogous comfort.SPEs are entities that typically are used in a securitization transaction to"house"the assets that will back the payment obligations usually represented by the securities issued by the SPE.In the context of our analysis,Standard&Poor's forms an opinion about the insolvency remoteness of an SPE based on our evaluation of the specific facts and circumstances that we view as applicable to a particular transaction.Among other things,the analysis considers whether the separate legal identity of the SPE would be respected by bankruptcy courts or bodies charged with similar functions.In addition,we assess the presence of features intended to minimize the likelihood that the SPE itself becomes the subject of bankruptcy.Payment Structure And Cash Flow Mechanics17.The rating analysis for structured finance typically includes an analysis of payment structure and cash flow mechanics.This portion of the analysis may involve both assessing the documentation for a security and testing the cash flows using quantitative models.In both cases,the objective is to assess whether the cash flow from the securitized assets would be sufficient,at the applicable rating levels,to make timely payments of interest and ultimate payment of principal to the related securities,after taking account of available credit enhancement and allowing for transaction expenses,such as servicing and trustee fees.The analysis may encompass diverse features of the payment structure and cash flow mechanics,ranging from the basic payment priorities inherent in a deal(i.e.,the subordination hierarchy of tranches)to the impact of performance covenants(i.e.,so-called"triggers")that may operate as switches that materially change the distribution priorities if they are breached.Finally,for securities that embody support facilities from third parties,such as insurance policies,guarantees,bank credit and liquidity facilities,and derivativesinstruments,the analysis focuses on the payment mechanics for those obligations.Operational And Administrative Risks18.The analysis of operational and administrative risks is another part of the structured finance rating analysis.This partof the analysis focuses on key transaction parties to determine whether they are capable of managing a securitization over its life.Key transaction parties may include a transaction's servicer or manager,the asset manager of acollateralized debt obligation(CDO),the trustee,the paying agent,and any other transaction party;herein wecollectively refer to these parties as servicers.19.In securitizations involving many asset classes,the analysis focuses on evaluating a servicer's or manager's ability toperform its duties,such as receiving timely payments,pursuing collection efforts on delinquent assets,foreclosing on and liquidating collateral,tracking cash receipts and disbursements,and providing timely and accurate investor reports.For transactions that involve revenue-producing assets(e.g.,commercial property),the analysis may include, as we deem appropriate,assessment of certain incremental risks associated with managing the assets.For actively managed portfolios,the analysis considers the asset manager's capabilities and past performance as an asset manager.20.The analysis of operational and administrative risks generally considers the possibility that a servicer may becomeunable or unwilling to perform its duties during the life of the transaction.In that vein,the analysis may consider both the potential for hiring a substitute or successor servicer and any arrangements that provide for a designated backup servicer.That portion of the analysis would typically consider the sufficiency of the servicing fee to attract a substitute, the seniority of the fee in the payment priorities,and the availability of substitute servicers.Counterparty Risk21.The fifth part of the rating analysis is the analysis of counterparty risk.That analysis focuses on third-party obligationsto either hold assets(including cash)or make financial payments that may affect the creditworthiness of structured finance instruments.Examples of counterparty risks include exposures to institutions that maintain key accounts and exposures to the providers of derivative contracts such as interest rate swaps and currency swaps.The counterparty risk analysis considers both the type of dependency and the rating of the counterparty for each counterpartyrelationship in a transaction.FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTRATINGS AND CRITERIACreditworthiness Before External Support22.The most important step in analyzing the creditworthiness of a corporate or governmental obligor is gauging theresources available to it for fulfilling its commitments relative to the size and timing of those commitments.Assessing an obligor's resources for fulfilling its financial commitments is primarily a forward-looking exercise.It may entail estimating or projecting future income and cash flows.It may include consideration of economic conditions,the regulatory environment,and economic projections and forecasts.For business entities,future income and cash flows may come primarily from ongoing operations or investments.For governmental entities,income and cash flows may come primarily from taxes.In some cases,other resources,including liquid assets or,in the case of a sovereign obligor, the ability to print currency,may be relevant.23.The assessment of resources considers both the expected level of future income and cash flows and their potentialvariability.For all types of obligors,the assessment includes both qualitative and quantitative factors.24.The quantitative side of the analysis focuses primarily on financial analysis and may include an evaluation of anobligor's accounting principles and practices.25.For business entities,key financial indicators generally include profitability,leverage,cash flow adequacy,liquidity,and financial flexibility.For financial institutions and insurers,other critical factors may include asset quality,reserves for losses,asset-liability management,and capital adequacy.Off-balance sheet items,such as securitizations,derivative exposures,leases,and pension liabilities,may also be part of the quantitative analysis.Cash flow analysis and liquidity assume heightened significance for firms with speculative-grade ratings('BB+'and lower).26.For governmental entities,the quantitative factors we assess are different from the factors we assess for businessentities;they generally include both economic factors and budgetary and financial performance,as well as additional items for sovereign obligors.The economic side of the analysis typically encompasses demographics,wealth,and growth prospects.The budgetary and financial side generally includes budget reserves,external liquidity,andstructural budget performance.For sovereign obligors,additional quantitative factors that may,in our view,berelevant to our analysis include fiscal policy flexibility,monetary policy flexibility,international investment position, and contingent liabilities associated with potential support for the financial sector.27.Trends over time and peer comparisons may be part of the quantitative analysis for both business and governmentalentities.28.On the qualitative side,the analysis of business entities focuses on various factors,including:country risk,industrycharacteristics,and entity-specific factors.We intend for our analysis of the country risk factor to capture ourassessment of the financial and operating environment that applies broadly to businesses in a particular country, including a country's physical,legal,and financial infrastructure.Historically,this assessment has often operated to constrain the ratings of business entities in countries that have high country risk.29.Industry characteristics typically encompass growth prospects,volatility,and technological change,as well as thedegree and nature of competition.Broadly speaking,the lower the industry risk,the higher the potential credit rating for an obligor in that sector.The analysis also considers certain entity-specific factors that we believe can distinguish an individual obligor from its peers.These may include diversification of the obligor's products and services as well as risk concentrations,particularly for a financial institution.Obligor-specific factors also may include operationaleffectiveness,overall competitive position,strategy,governance,financial policies,risk management practices,and risk tolerance.30.Qualitative factors for governmental entities are somewhat different from the factors for business entities.Our analysismay encompass political risks,including the effectiveness and predictability of policymaking and institutions and the transparency of processes and data and the accountability of institutions.In addition,for sovereign obligors,consideration of political risks may include an assessment of the potential for war,revolution,or other security-related events to affect creditworthiness.Other qualitative considerations that may be part of an analysis of a governmental obligor include revenue forecasting,expenditure control,long-term capital planning,debt management,andcontingency planning.Finally,the assessment of a governmental obligor focuses on the potential that the obligormight default even when it has the resources to meet its financial commitments.External Support31.In addition to our assessment of an obligor's stand-alone creditworthiness,Standard&Poor's analysis considers thelikelihood and potential amount of external support(or influence)that could enhance(or diminish)the obligor's creditworthiness.When an obligor's creditors have the benefit of contractual support,such as a guarantee from a higher-rated guarantor,the analysis may assign the guarantor's rating to the supported issue or issuer.However,this occurs only when the guarantee satisfies stringent conditions and guarantees full and timely payment of the underlying obligation.32.Apart from formal guarantees,the analysis considers the potential for other support from affiliated business entities,governments,and multilateral institutions.For affiliated business entities,the analysis considers both the degree of strategic importance of subsidiaries or affiliates to determine the likelihood and degree of support by a stronger parent and-the parent's capacity to provide such support.33.For governmental support,the analysis considers the potential for various forms of support.For example,the analysisconsiders potential support for government-related entities(GREs),such as certain public utilities,transportation systems,and financial companies.The analysis of a GRE considers the role that the entity plays and the nature of its links to its government.A similar line of analysis applies to the potential for extraordinary government support to banks that,in our view,have systemic importance in a national economy.In the case of a sovereign obligor,the analysis considers the potential for support from multilateral institutions(e.g.,the International Monetary Fund[IMF]).34.The assessment of potential external support generally does not include the benefits that an obligor receives merely bybeing part of a system or framework.We consider those benefits in the assessment of industry characteristics or otherwise in the analysis of stand-alone creditworthiness.For example,the stand-alone analysis of a bank includes consideration of benefits that we believe it may receive from supervision within its regulatory framework and from access to low-cost borrowings from its central bank.Likewise,the analysis of governments(e.g.,a school district)may include an evaluation of system support provided by a higher level entity(e.g.,a city or state).35.In some cases,external support can have a negative influence on an entity's creditworthiness.For example,this canhappen when a weaker parent company drains cash flows or assets from a stronger subsidiary through dividends or in other ways.Similarly,a sovereign government can be a negative factor for a company's creditworthiness if itintervenes by withdrawing resources or limiting the company's financial flexibility.Notching And Analysis Of Specific Instruments36.The analysis of specific instruments includes consideration of priorities within an obligor's capital structure and thepotential effects of collateral and recovery estimates in the event of the obligor's default.The analysis may apply notching to instruments that rank above or below their obligor's senior,unsecured debt.For example,subordinated debt would generally receive a rating below the senior debt rating.Conversely,secured debt may receive a rating above the unsecured debt rating.37.Notching also applies to the structural subordination of debt issued by operating subsidiaries or holding companiesthat are part of an enterprise viewed as a single economic entity.For example,the debt of a holding company may berated lower than the debt of its subsidiaries that have the enterprise's assets and cash flows.We extend the notching approach to analyzing the creditworthiness of instruments involving payment priority.For example,we would generally rate preferred stock and so-called hybrid capital instruments lower than senior debt to indicate that payment could be deferred.RELATED CRITERIA AND RESEARCH•Methodology:Credit Stability Criteria,May3,2010•Understanding Standard&Poor's Rating Definitions,June3,2009•Principles Of Corporate And Government Ratings,June26,2007•Principles-Based Rating Methodology For Global Structured Finance Securities,May29,2007These criteria represent the specific application of fundamental principles that define credit risk and ratings opinions. Their use is determined by issuer-or issue-specific attributes as well as Standard&Poor's Ratings Services'assessment of the credit and,if applicable,structural risks for a given issuer or issue rating.Methodology and assumptions may change from time to time as a result of market and economic conditions,issuer-or issue-specific factors,or new empirical evidence that would affect our credit judgment.Copyright © 2014 by Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC. All rights reserved.No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software, or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an "as is" basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT'S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P's opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives.To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, (free of charge), and and and (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at /usratingsfees.。
