互联网金融P2P网络借贷外文翻译文献

文献出处: Waitz M. The small and medium-sized enterprise financing under P2P finance [J]. Journal of Business Research, 2016, 8(6): 81-91.原文The small and medium-sized enterprise financing under P2P financeWaitz MAbstractSmall and medium-sized enterprise financing difficult is worldwide difficult problem. Article introduces the concept of the Internet financial, mainly summarized the P2P financial in the development of financial innovation and integration of science and technology, a combination of academic research on P2P financial now of the five directions of various views and opinions. Points out the current P2P financial problems in the development of risk control, and analyses the trend of the Internet financial.Keywords: P2P financial; Financial innovation; Risk control1 IntroductionLook from the history of enterprise development, a large enterprise originate from small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) is the most dynamic part of the national economy, often walk in the forefront of technology development, in the high-tech industry, clean energy, green economy, etc, have good performance, play an important role in the economic transformation. Small and medium-sized enterprise financing difficult is worldwide difficult problem. These small and medium-sized enterprise financing environment and narrow channels, more than 60% are unable to get a bank loan. At present, science and technology enterprises and the characteristics of light assets, financing difficulties, become a huge bottleneck of sustainable development.2 The concept of the Internet financialIn the past two years, the Internet financial show explosive growth, since 2014, the Internet financial sector performance strength. Current economic field exists the phenomenon of two special contradiction, one is the small and medium-sizedenterprises in the total number of enterprises accounted for a large, but the universal problems of financing difficulties; Second, folk idle capital, but in addition to the stock market and housing market, it is difficult to invest in other areas. And on the basis of the Internet, cloud computing, big data and highly fit market leads the development of the Internet financial, to solve these two problems, better serve the real economy, especially small and medium-sized enterprise development to create a good financial environment, but also for China's overtaking play an important role in the implementation of international competition corners.Internet financial besides master client, also facilitate completes the upstream suppliers, downstream capital use party, the integration of point and point, combining with the characteristics of the Internet (P2P) and the nature of financial (capital).Based on the development of the Internet financial, financial supply ability is improved, inclusive to strengthen, can mobilize more financial resources, broader, more coverage, more decentralized, more diversified needs.The Internet the most narrow financial concept is P2P (Peer - to - Peer Lend - ing) financial platform, the core of the P2P model is: on the web site has a qualification platform, the borrower credit information, and provide the loan project specific situation, the borrower's integrity and economic strength and other related information; Investors according to the platform to provide information, make decisions, and finally made a decision of to make loans to borrowers.P2P finance is a new kind of financial model, through the Internet and large data, make to minimize the asymmetric information, this new financing channels, for individuals and businesses to provide great convenience, is a beneficial supplement of the existing banking system. Peer-to-peer (P2P) had a great influence on financial business in China. Traditional banking business model, mainly is the savings and loan business, P2P entirely new business models, deconstructs the traditional banking business model, breaking the monopoly of state-owned Banks, to a certain extent, in the form of fragmentation added to the drawback of the market.P2P financial innovation of science and technology and financial integration development, the release of the science and technology system reform and the doubledividend of financial reform, to introduce more financial products to serve the scientific and technological innovation, support the development of science and technology enterprises, solve to create light assets of small and mid-sized enterprise multidimensional financing difficulties; Also is helpful for financial innovation, find new investment direction, in order to obtain a higher return on investment.In 2005, the world's first P2P Zopa, a financial company (Zone of Possi - ble Agreement) was founded in London. In 2006, the United States, the first a P2P financial company Prosper founded in California. In 2007, our country the first P2P finance company established on credit, at present, the P2P financial firms more than more than 300, traded as high as more than 200 one hundred million. Financial risk is a highly amplified industry, P2P financial with convenient Internet natural attributes, but relative to the traditional financial institutions, financial in the Internet's openness also determines the P2P web site platform, information security, etc, could be affected by a great deal of challenges, risk control will be more pressure.3 The five direction of current P2P financial3.1 What is: it is subversive or supplementaryHas view: P2P financial is the innovation of the Internet with the traditional financial integration, at present is still in the stage of integration, there are a lot of problems, problems are not terrible, problems can also be seen as a contradiction, the process to solve the problem, is to promote the process of developing a new thing, this is the necessary stage P2P financial growth. To correctly treat the present P2P financial problems and drawbacks: a guide; Second, we must avoid risk. Only in this way, will lead to financial and the Internet have more innovation, to the prosperity of the rational.3.2 What: high-end service grassroots or serviceComprehensive research achievements of this direction, mainly has the following kinds of views and opinions. Has view: is a multi-level capital market, the P2P finance is one of the components, compared with traditional financial companies, should follow the development way of differentiation and mainly for the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprise service. View: P2P financial if theservice object, mostly low risk customers, then there will be a problem, must do a certain size, can have a better economic returns, and to do a certain size, must put the human cost, time cost and the cost of capital, the same small P2P financial companies, will form a lot of pressure, therefore, some P2P financial enterprises gradually became the "pool", big customers, lending if big client management problems, is easy to appear P2P financial risk, and even lead to P2P financial business owners "run". So P2P financial enterprises, should do more small loans, don't dabble in big customers, big customer risk is too big, not P2P financial companies can undertake. And do more small loans, the cost is lower than the bank, have a competitive advantage.3.3 How to do: innovation mode of risk preventionComprehensive research achievements of this direction, mainly has the following kinds of views and opinions. The argument goes, the Internet technology and the integration of financial haven't reached a very reasonable, scientific, P2P financial there will be many new problems. And when the P2P financial after reaching a certain size, risk control will be the key to the healthy development of the P2P financial. If the P2P financial regulation, also will become a important test of P2P regulators wisdom. Have a view is: to the P2P financial risk control, should start from to the customer credit, credit reporting system perfect, to both sides of the docking loans, although to do so is very hard, but can avoid many risks, guarantee the healthy development of the financial industry, the P2P.At the same time, to clear the main body of industry regulations, for the convenience of management, appendage management should be implemented.3.4 Who is going to do: working in the financial sector or non-financial areasComprehensive research achievements of this direction, mainly has the following kinds of views and opinions. The argument goes, P2P financial done by a team with a finance background is better; Due to the P2P finance is based on the Internet, with Internet gene, so the team should have the knowledge and skills of specialized personnel to participate in the Internet. View: P2P financial can be developed from the traditional financial transformation, also can by Internet companies innovation, finally formation of the team, must have both the financial and investment knowledge, andthe Internet. Knowledge of finance and investment aspects of the personnel, in accordance with the rules of the financial industry control risk; The persons with Internet knowledge, according to the rules of the network industry big data analysis, selected customers for sales, customer maintenance, at the same time do a good job in network security. View: P2P financial represents the future direction of financial development, some commercial Banks now also vigorously develop P2P financial, but at the same time to prevent the transfer of risk to the banking system, increased regulation of lending to P2P network platform.3.5 How to pipe: cross-border development and supervised respectivelyHas view: P2P financial, in essence, is still a financial, compared with the traditional industry, is only the change of the financial model, so must be regulated. If not strengthen supervision, can appear the problem such as run, adverse to the healthy development of the industry, and easy to bring serious social problems, affect social stability. View: in research regulation, there should be a state investment fund, to support the top in the field of technology innovation.P2P financial as a new financial form, to the top ahead of research and development, to prevent the banking system similar to the problem now. The argument goes: Europe, the United States based on large data of individual credit reporting system is relatively developed, can effectively prevent fraud. One is to establish individual credit system as soon as possible. The second is to establish P2P lending related laws and regulations as soon as possible. Three is to strengthen self-discipline of the P2P lending industry. Four is entry qualifications have to be very clear, the implementation system of archival filing registration.译文P2P 金融下的中小企业融资Waitz M摘要中小企业融资难是世界性难题。

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)互联网金融对传统金融的影响摘要网络的发展，深刻地改变甚至颠覆了许多传统行业，金融业也不例外。

近年来，金融业成为继商业分销、传媒之后受互联网影响最为深远的领域，许多基于互联网的金融服务模式应运而生，并对传统金融业产生了深刻的影响和巨大的冲击。

“互联网金融”成为社会各界关注的焦点。

互联网金融低成本、高效率、关注用户体验，这些特点使其能够充分满足传统金融“长尾市场”的特殊需求，灵活提供更为便捷、高效的金融服务和多样化的金融产品，大大拓展了金融服务的广度和深度，缩短了人们在时空上的距离，建立了一种全新的金融生态环境；可以有效整合、利用零散的时间、信息、资金等碎片资源，积少成多，形成规模效益，成为各类金融服务机构新的利润增长点。

此外，随着互联网金融的不断渗透和融合，将给传统金融行业带来新的挑战和机遇。

互联网金融可以促进传统银行业的转型，弥补传统银行在资金处理效率、信息整合等方面的不足；为证券、保险、基金、理财产品的销售与推广提供新渠道。

对于很多中小企业来说，互联网金融拓展了它们的融资渠道，大大降低了融资门槛，提高了资金的使用效率。

但是，互联网金融的跨行业性决定了它的风险因素更为复杂、敏感、多变，因此要处理好创新发展与市场监管、行业自律的关系。

关键词：互联网金融；商业银行；影响；监管1 引言互联网技术的不断发展，云计算、大数据、社交网络等越来越多的互联网应用为传统行业的业务发展提供了有力支持，互联网对传统行业的渗透程度不断加深。

20世纪末，微软总裁比尔盖茨就曾断言，“传统商业银行会成为新世纪的恐龙”。

如今，随着互联网电子信息技术的发展，我们真切地感受到了这种趋势，移动支付、电子银行早已在我们的日常生活中占据了重要地位。

由于互联网金融的概念几乎完全来自于商业实践，因此目前的研究多集中在探讨互联网金融的具体模式上，而对传统金融行业的影响力分析和应对措施则缺乏系统性研究。

文献出处:Aronson J. The research of P2P model of financial [J] Value Creation in E-Business Management, 2016,12(5):85-95.原文The research of P2P model of financialAronson JAbstractThe development of the Internet financial, constantly create new financial model, P2P is one of the new financial model, the development of rapid direct threat to the commercial Banks in the financial world's dominance. In P2P explosive savage growth process, however, there are regulatory or incomplete system, risk control measures is not mature, P2P financial platform collapse would happen often, this leads to the development of P2P is in trouble Based on this, this paper introduces the P2P concepts and the reasons on the basis of the financial model, analyzes the difficulties faced by the current P2P financial model, and accordingly put forward the development of P2P financial model.Keywords: P2P financial mode; The theoretical analysis; Measures1 IntroductionThe wide application of Internet technology, when science and technology combined with financial, gives rise to some emerging Internet model, P2P has greatly reduced the transaction cost, satisfy the customer demand for financial, especially the working class and the small and medium-sized enterprise loan demand. But so far, due to the lack of innovation mode of financial supervision, to information asymmetry, imperfect credit system construction, and low security of adverse effect caused by funds, hindered the healthy and orderly development of P2P.For Internet financial can inject vigor, continuing for the financial sector to the real economy better service, we must strengthen the industry regulation, establish effective credit evaluation system and P2P platform to establish effective risk control system.So-called peer-to-peer (P2P), is the abbreviation of English Peer to Peer, meaning "person-to-person", refers to the directly by third-party Internet platform of money lending financing behavior, is a kind of direct financing behavior of individualto individual. It originated in Britain, and later to the United States, Germany and other countries, China introduced in 2007.In our country, its typical model is: the network credit companies provide a platform, by borrowing free bids, brokered transactions. Money lenders to obtain interest income with the risk; Money borrowed people due to repay the principal, the network credit charge intermediary company.Peer-to-peer (P2P) the causes of financial mode mainly lies in the fact that Internet technology rapidly Exhibition. With the development of Internet, the scope of its popularization in our country is more and more widely, new technology and new business forms appear constantly, and gradually extended to the financial sector, the financial and the Internet fusion degree in the process of deepening, the financial industry got the booming development, at the same time, also produced a P2P financial mode; Fill the shortcoming in traditional financial business function in our country at present. Let those be bank financial products and loan threshold shut out of the working class and the small and medium-sized enterprises can also have the opportunity to enjoy the financial services. Working class a large body of demand for money have great demand; Other small and medium-sized enterprises (SEM) in many places the arrested development, mainly due to small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) in bank loans difficult, loans due to the high cost. In order to promote the development of their own, small and medium-sized enterprises to seek other financing mode, which promote the generation of the P2P financial model.2 The status quo of P2P financial model2.1 P2P financial models lack of effective supervisionRelative to the early start of online banking, online securities and so on in the form of financial regulatory policy relatively incomplete, relatively mature management framework. But P2P financial mode in 2012 entered the blowout outbreak period. But the Internet financial regulatory agencies and related regulatory policy did not keep up with the pace of its rapid development, for the development of P2P is also hinder the role. Should be further follow relevant regulations to meet the constantly enrich and expand the urgent needs of the emerging financial forms. The lack of regulation for a long time, has been out of the grey zone and regulatory gap,there are low barriers to entry, lending money monitoring vacancy, credit evaluation system is not sound, and many other problems.The industry has been in a savage growth state, run, capital chain rupture and collapse phenomenon appeared frequently. ack of legal norms, unclear regulatory policy, business operation is not standard to causes such as the chaos of industry management.2.2 Domestic credit system construction is not perfectThe Internet in the financial, financial credit system is the basis of the healthy and standardizing development of the financial industry, the Internet. But the current construction of credit system is not perfect, personal credit record includes only with bank lending behavior and maintain within the Banks, other financial institutions can't call society.P2P network platform loan borrowers can only through an indirect way to verify information and the judgment through the subjective experience of auditors. Abroad in the implementation of a P2P financial model, the comparison of perfect personal credit system construction, when making loans, personal credit can achieve effective query, which leads the P2P financial mode constantly development and improvement. Internet financial enterprise credit reporting database is not perfect in our country, is not included in the central bank credit reporting system, for both the management difficulty is big, no effective mechanism and discipline and punishment.2.3 Information asymmetry cause malicious default riskOf the Internet financial transactions, payments and services are completed on the Internet, virtualization of trading, trading process is not transparent and so on have made the financial risk more diversified and uncontrolled. Of new trading patterns of this for the disclosure of the information has the certain difficulty, in P2P financial mode, due to information asymmetry, P2P platform there may be a risk, the truth of the borrower to provide information due to the master of P2P platform borrowing history data is limited, its credit rating system is also unable to grasp the situation of the borrowers, the condition of the fake information or the borrower. Once appear, default or delay balance, due to recover the cost is higher, lenders are hard to take back the principal and interest of the person failed to perform its obligations due to lending and lead to potential financial damage is one of the reasons that hinder thedevelopment of P2P.3 The implement measures3.1 Encourage innovation to strengthen the basis of industry regulationDue to P2P long-term financial platform is in a state of lack of regulation, resulting in a variety of financial risk problems occur unceasingly, serious impact on the development of P2P financial, based on this, as soon as possible, perfect the construction of Internet financial regulation legal system in our country, should provide a clear and transparent legal environment, including the market access supervision, operation supervision and exit regulatory measures to standardize the development of the P2P network platform. But don't like management of traditional financial institutions, so as not to stifle financial innovation. Perfect financial market system, pratt &whitney financial development, encourage financial innovation, rich level financial markets and products. Regulators want reasonable grasp the boundaries of innovation and strength, not to hinder the sustainable development of financial innovation, whether it be a financial product innovation, and financial service innovation. To strengthen management and ensure that financial security is very necessary, cut can not manage, weaken the vitality of financial innovation.3.2 promoting the construction of credit evaluation systemA severe credit system can restrain people daily financial activity. Therefore, in a constantly enrich financial transaction way to meet the demand of investment and financing of all social strata at the same time, the credit system construction also needs to be perfect and connectivity. At present, the central bank has started the construction of personal credit system, however, the central bank alone is not enough to build personal credit system, and will result in incomplete information system, therefore, in the process of building the personal credit system in the future, should attract more participants, to establish the perfect credit system, make scientific evaluation to the borrower's credit rating, for P2P platform provides necessary judgment. In addition, P2P financial platform should also set up its own credit system, establish a customer database, regular update of customer information in a database, at the same time, guarantee the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the new customerinformation, and effective to evaluate the customer's credit.3.3 P2P platform to strengthen risk control abilityP2P business at the core of the pricing power is in the team's own risk, the risk management ability is the core of the P2P company competitiveness. establish a risk control function is clear, for policy making, the characteristics of customer data mining, overdue customers, study and so on carries on the effective management, to standardize the front-end marketing, China audit, background collection each work orderly. At the same time, digital risk control model is established and the score card system is the effective measure to standardize P2P scientific management, with a complete set of scientific management methods, to cure it to risk control examination and approval decision engines and business process, to guide the business for examination and approval of risk control. Second, compared with the traditional financial institutions such as Banks, Internet financial firms can take advantage of big data analytics, cloud computing technology to manage customer credit evaluation and customer information, above is actually a credit evaluation system and risk control measures of innovation. Third, should attach importance to small and scattered plays important role in reducing risk, network platform, in the face of the large capital demand loan can be systemic forced to spread risk, is more than a sum of money into different sum, scattered the people who need loans to lend, risk can be effectively diluted. Fourth, guarantee qualification can be introduced with a third party professional guarantee companies provide guarantee, in case of bad debts by guarantee company compensation, in order to ensure safe operation, to ensure the safety of information and capital of investors. by using the combined risk of internal and external control means, in view of information asymmetry and capital safety is low in the strong guarantee.Era development is irreversible, the subversion and innovation of the Internet continues, because the P2P financial pattern in the global new things, the speed of development and the construction of the corresponding system is not perfect, resulting in the development of P2P financial face a lot of trouble. despite the difficulties, the game between the various arms intensified, but it's true that the development of P2Pinjected new vitality into the financial sector, in order to promote the healthy and orderly development of P2P, needs to explore the path to promote the development of P2P financial, P2P platform in the process of operation gradually improve risk control ability, ensure the safety of the funds. These efforts will make P2P financial mode gradually towards standardization and legalization, make it effectively fill the shortcoming in traditional financial business function at present, the future will be better able to make the financial service for the real economy, support the national strategic transformation of the economic structure.译文P2P金融模式研究Aronson J摘要互联网金融的发展，不断地创新出新型的金融模式，P2P就是其中一种新型金融模式，其发展的迅速直接威胁到商业银行在金融界的主导地位。

P2P金融风险管控中英文对照外文翻译文献P2P金融风险管控中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：P2P 金融下的中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资难是世界性难题。

文章介绍了互联网金融的概念，重点概括了 P2P 金融在科技和金融创新融合方面的发展，综合了现在学术界对 P2P 金融研究的五大方向方面的各种观点和见解。

指出了当前 P2P 金融发展的突出问题风险控制，并对互联网金融的大趋势进行了分析。

关键词: P2P金融; 金融创新; 风险管控1引言从企业发展的历史看，大型企业都来源于中小企业。

中小企业是国民经济中最具活力的部分，往往走在技术发展的最前端，在高科技产业、清洁能源、绿色经济等方面都有很好的业绩，在经济转型中发挥着巨大作用。

中小企业融资难是世界性难题。

这些中小企业融资环境和渠道狭窄，有 60% 以上无法获得银行贷款。

目前，科技型企业又有轻资产的特点，融资困境，成为困扰可持续发展的巨大瓶颈。

2 互联网金融的概念近两年来，互联网金融呈现井喷式发展， 2014 年以来，互联网金融板块表现强势。

当前经济领域存在两个特别矛盾的现象，一是中小企业在企业总数中占比很大，但普遍存在融资难的问题; 二是民间闲散资金多，但除了股市和房市，往别的领域投资很难。

而以互联网、大数据、云计算为基础和高度契合市场引领的互联网金融的发展，对于解决这两个难题，更好地为实体经济，尤其是中小企业发展创造良好的金融环境，也为中国在国际竞争当中实现弯道超车起到重要作用。

互联网金融除了掌握客户端外，还便于做好上游资本供给方、下游资本使用方点与点的整合，结合互联网的其中特质( P2P) 及金融的本质( 资本) 。

依托互联网金融的发展，金融供给能力得以提高，包容性得以增强，可以动员更多的金融资源，覆盖面更广，覆盖度更多，满足更分散、更多元化的需求。

互联网金融最狭隘的概念就是 P2P( Peer-to-Peer Lend-ing) 金融平台，P2P 模式的核心是: 在这个具有资质的网站平台上，借款人发出借贷信息，并提供借贷项目的具体情况、借款人的相关诚信及经济实力等有关信息; 投资人根据平台上提供的信息，进行决策，最后做出向借款人发放贷款的决定。

互联网金融外文文献翻译随着信息技术的迅猛发展，互联网金融已成为当今金融领域的热门话题。

为了深入了解这一领域的国际前沿动态，对相关外文文献的翻译显得尤为重要。

互联网金融是指利用互联网技术和信息通信技术实现资金融通、支付、投资和信息中介服务的新型金融业务模式。

它打破了传统金融的时间和空间限制，极大地提高了金融服务的效率和覆盖面。

在翻译互联网金融外文文献时，首先要面对的是专业术语的翻译。

例如，“PeertoPeer Lending”通常被翻译为“P2P 借贷”，“Blockchain Technology”则是“区块链技术”，“Fintech”是“金融科技”。

准确翻译这些术语对于理解文献的核心内容至关重要。

同时，互联网金融领域的发展日新月异，新的概念和词汇不断涌现。

这就要求译者时刻关注行业动态，及时掌握最新的术语和表达方式。

比如，“Digital Currency”（数字货币）、“RoboAdvisor”（智能投顾）等都是近年来出现的新词汇。

除了术语，句子结构的处理也是翻译中的难点。

外文文献中常常会出现长难句，句子成分复杂，逻辑关系隐晦。

在翻译时，需要对句子进行仔细分析，理清其结构和逻辑关系，然后用符合中文表达习惯的方式进行翻译。

例如：“The rapid development of fintech has not only disrupted the traditional financial landscape but also created numerous opportunities for innovative financial services, which has posed both challenges and prospects for the regula tory framework” 可以翻译为：“金融科技的快速发展不仅颠覆了传统的金融格局，还为创新金融服务创造了众多机会，这给监管框架带来了挑战和前景。

外文文献翻译原文及译文文献出处：Jensen Fabian. The research of P2P online lending [J] Business Research, 2017, 9(3):31-41.原文The research of P2P network LendingJensen FabianAbstractMicro, small and medium enterprises is facing with financing difficulties，rural poor areas also lack of financial services，which has always been plagued policy makers of the two factors, also seriously restricted the economic development and hinder the two factors in the construction of a fair society. After the positive study of the relevant departments and academia，finally figured out "small loan company" this kind of small financial institutions，in order to the transfusion organization become the rural development and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).Practice has proved that this kind of form does have some effect on the solution of the problem, but microfinance companies ’丨not deposit-taking’’policy, and become a big obstacle to influence its development. This makes the tighter credit environment，capital requirements of small and medium-sized enterprises and the vulnerable groups are far from satisfied. At the same time, the abnormal social folk capital abundant, high inflation，the stock market is tanking, strictlycontrol the real estate market economy, these funds need find investment breakthrough，and so a new kind of folk lending model，P2P network borrowing appeared.Keywords: P2P lending, Microfinance, Private lending1 IntroductionP2P lending (Peer - to - Peer lending) is an emerging in recent years the personal of personal credit model lending companies through the online platform set both a deaL Commitment to funding "connect”form of folk lending is emerging and increasingly prosperous. Is funding needs, while there is a desire to invest, such companies have to do is by their structures, network platform for the idle private capital looking for matches. And such companies provide essentially is a P2P (Peer to Peer or Person to Person, (individual financial information services for individuals) it is actually a kind of new flow of private capital. Platform itself the role of information intermediary，information disclosure, credit rating，fund settlement, overdue collection services, platform profit mainly comes from the customer to pay fees. In 2005, ZOPA，in London, the first microfinance website to personal online，pulled open the prelude of the P2P lending. After ten years of operation, a total of 750 million pounds of matching network. The platform Prosper2014 years accumulative total turnover of about $2.5 billion.P2Pnetwork, in countries such as Britain and the United States has been aloan in addition to the traditional savings and investment channels of the alternative (Slavin，2007).The success of the European and American practice for P2P network gradually towards the world.P2P lending in this form is in recent years the development of the abnormal rapidly, mainly because the form meets demand from both sides of the capital supply and demand of current economic situation. On the one hand, for money supply，in the face of high inflation and low bank deposits, bank deposit income is very small. At the same time, the stock market in the past two years is bad，real estate and gold investment door abuse is too high, and the current situation of risk is not small. In the face of all these various traditional investment present situation of the market situation is not optimistic, a large number of civilian capital urgently needs to find new breakthrough.P2P lending this form seems to be in order to meet the urgent demand, because this kind of investment model is unfolding the following several aspects: the advantages of high returns, basic around 20% annual return. Door, and the low just registered in relevant websites can become money lenders. High transparency, money lenders can according to the web site provides information about capital demanders object，to choose our willing to lend the money to lend，borrowers will provide regular use of funds, guarantee for capital lendersunderstand the usage and safety.2The origin of the P2P lending and the statusDue to the development of the P2P lending is less than 10 years, so the early literature focuses on introducing the origin and development of the network lending. Ferichs and Schumann (2008) mentioned that in 2005 the first lending site zopa，founded in the UK. Borrowing from a wide variety of network platforms appear in succession.Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) points out that facing the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection under asymmetric information, based on assumptions, such as disposable abandonment and anonymous trading orthodox financial institutions will be in accordance with the new market basic principles to be followed in the classical theory to its lending of small and medium-sized enterprises and farmers to provide collateral or guarantee. So those are unable to provide collateral poor farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises will be excluded from the formal financial institutions, in the end they will have to enter the network to meet the demand of their own money lending market. Slavin (2007) pointed out: the P2P loans in the United States and Britain has developed into a kind of savings and investment alternatives. Berger and Gleisner (2009) referred to in the United States first lending site prosper，com was established in 2006 in February，Germany’s first lending site was established in February 2007, at present, due to the legal system is different in different countries, almost all of the network platform lending operations are limited in the range of their own country. Ashta and Assadi (2009) research has shown that the type of online peer-to-peer lending platform and operation mode has its own features，in general they can be divided into two categories - for-profit and nonprofit platform, platform of for-profit business generally confined to the domestic, and non-profit platform to do business on a global scale. Both lenders is the biggest difference between the original and different requirements for earnings. For-profit platform lenders will risk requires a reasonable return for oneself, and non-profit lenders on the platform of general income does not make the request，they just want to ’’d o n a t e”part of his property，in order to help the poor people of the world.3The model of P2P network lendingPlatform is divided into two categories: basic for-profit and the for-profit (Ashta & Assadi，2009).Here the ’’p r o f i t”refers to the investment platform for investors- Investors profit type platform, hope by lending money to get match the economic benefits of risk. Non-profit platform of investors, the investment behavior is to help others, does not pay attention to taking economic returns. Nowadays the most profit type platforms are within the scope of its business，subject to regulatoryrequirements of the host countries (Berger, 2009)-Non-profit type platform is generally not subject to regional restriction, can operate on a global scale. The typical platform subdivided into three categories: public welfare，pure intermediary type and compound type mediation, after two classes are for-profit platform. The practice platform for the main service object as low-income people is in less developed areas. Simple mediation type platform only play the role of information intermediary, not to interfere in the user transaction. Compound intermediary platform to provide information service but also act as supervisors, joint chasing people, such as rate-setters role.3.1Public welfareKiva，founded in 2005, is an organization in Europe and the wealthy investors offering loans to small businesses in developing countries not for-profit P2P network platform. Basic obtained by raising its operating funds for small borrowers to provide low-interest loans and intermediary service free of charge. Because of the different national legal policy，Kiva f s business need to cooperate with local microfinance institutions (MFI)，through its as a middleman to supervise and repay the loan (Ashta & Assadi，2009).3.2Simple mediation typeProsper in lending transactions only simple information intermediaryrole，through information disclosure and credit ratings provide the basis for both freedom of choice，Prosper after the deal itself is no longer involved in lending transactions. The entire Prosper platform has social security number, personal id number, bank accounts and personal credit scoring more than 520 American citizens can ’’l o a n s.First i t’s borrowing set similar EBay M double blind auction model This approach based on borrowing the preference，and strives to achieve the borrower loan conditions and investors' investment speed the acceptance and balance each other，by dynamic game to get the best interest rates (Chen et al”2014).3.3Composite mediation typeZOPA, as the ancestor of P2P network credit platform, has always been considered one of the most successful P2P network model, most scholars attribute the success to perfect risk control system. First，ZOPA .among cooperation with credit rating Company，it is according to its credit rating to determine the borrower's credit rating, and arrange it into the corresponding segment of the market, for investors to choose from. Second, ZOPA, almost all engage in transactions and related affairs. In addition to providing information to act as watchdogs，check the legality of the borrower loan procedures，completeness，supervise the borrower repayment on time，etc. ZOPA, provides a more real andtransparent financial services，at the same time，effective risk control measures can make the risk lower than traditional financial institutions.4The influence factors of P2P lendingNetwork, as it were, to borrow a thing has attracted the attention of many scholars since its birth, Klafft (2008) study that due to network lending type is a new thing, the lender lack the experience of the anonymous Internet loans, this will increase the risk of lending to network. Rothschild believes in a just grew up in the imperfect market, the researchers only indirectly through study the behavior of the borrower characteristics to obtain information about the development of the network of borrowing. But according to the behavior characteristics of the borrower and the study of the relationship lending to network events are not unified conclusion at present, such as those for borrowers loan application in the attached photos of research conclusions and even on the contrary，some research results such as Andrews (2008)，it is concluded that the race, gender, personal characteristics such as little impact on the success rate of borrowing.Everett (2008) studies have found that if the loan borrowers in the group have acquaintances or merely know, makes the default rate be significantly decreased. Although Davis (2001) points out that the loan team a lack of clear ownership, while no significant characteristics andunified management decision-making mechanism, these decide whether people will join loan group is a random act. But as long as the team was able to set up loan，it can play the role of will be very important. D a t t a’s (2008) is one of the study found that the loan group leader role according to the relevant information to the t e a m’s members within the group of borrowers，and they do so power or is selfless attitude or is in order to get the corresponding reward. From this level, the loan group leaders mainly depends on the action of collecting and processing information to provide Suggestions for group members, through these behaviors, they in fact take on the role of the monitoring process of loan repayment, and in this way it indirectly promote the circulation of money lending website. According to e x p e r t’s research，in addition to loan group have a way to have obvious effect on reducing loan default rates that is to the network of group lending. This approach originated in the social network theory.5ConclusionsAfter the development history of P2P loans, theoretical basis and the development of P2P enterprise situation analysis of the P2P lending, we can find it is a full of potential and worth to continue to develop and put into lending to emerging patterns, especially considering it in solving the small micro enterprise financing difficulties and poor areas have played a huge role，need the government to make active efforts more，measures assoon as possible, in the right support and guide the development of this model.P2P网络借贷研宄Jensen Fabian摘要中小微企业融资难，贫闲地区农村缺乏金融服务，这一直是网扰政策制定者的两个因素，也是严重制约了经济发展、阻碍公平社会建设的两个因素。

本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献标题: Online brokers lead the way for French internet finance作者: Caffard, Christophe期刊名称: International Financial Law Review卷: 20；期: 3；页: 20-24Online brokers lead the way for French internet finance1 Regulated brokersRegulated brokers are legal entities which have an investment services licence and are subject to the prudential regulations of the Comite de Reglementation Bancaire et Financiere (CRBF) and the Conseil des Marches Financiers (CMF).* Choice of legal form: regulated brokers are not required to be incorporated in a specific legal form; however, under article 13 of the MAF Law, the CECEI checks whether the legal form of the brokerage company is appropriate for providing investment services. In practice, any type of commercial company is admitted: societes de capitaux (limited companies) or societes de personnes (partnerships). The formalities of share transfer, tax and the scope of liability of a company's management will be relevant factors to the choice of legal form.* Application for an investment services licence from the CECEI: the most important part of the application is the description of the investment services, and a business plan including prospective financial statements for the following three years. The CMF will check whether the business plan is consistent with the investment services licence requested by the broker. The CECEI will ensure that the applicant's own initial funds are consistent with the business plan.The scope of the investment services licence is variable and covers one or more ofthe following investment services:Reception and transmission of orders to another investment services provider on behalf of investors, for execution. This is the core investment service provided by thebrokerage companies and, as such, a licence to provide this service is the minimum required for a brokerage company. Brokerage companies may request an investment services licence limited to the reception and transmission of orders. In this case, there will need to be a tripartite agreement between the investor, the broker and an investment services provider authorized to execute the orders of the investor. These single-- licensed brokerage companies are mere intermediaries remunerated by a commission paid by the investors. They are not entitled to benefit from the European passport under the ISD.Execution of such order other than for own account. This is defined as the execution of orders on behalf of a customer under the provision of an agency or a brokerage agreement. The brokerage company authorized to execute orders received from the investors offers a larger range of services with more potential. The broker with an investment services licence covering the execution of orders will be in charge of executing the final orders on the regulated markets, provided it is has been authorized as a market member. Unauthorized brokerage companies transmit the orders they have received to authorized market members. Authorized brokerage companies may offer investors a quasi-immediate execution of orders on the markets.Placing. This is the search for subscribers or purchasers on behalf of the issuer or seller of financial instruments. According to the CMF, in the case of a public offer of listed financial instruments placed by a market firm (for example on the Paris Stock Exchange or Nouveau March&), an online broker, which sells financial instruments online, is deemed to be providing his client with a reception-transmission of orders service and not a placing service. A placing service requires the broker to comply with capital adequacy ratios whenever it is associated with an underwriting commitment.Account-keeping, custody and clearing. These are not considered to be investment services, but assimilated services restricted to credit institutions or investment firms, and are subject to the CMF's General Regulations.CRBF regulators. CBF regulations subject brokerage companies to the following requirements: the minimum issued and paid-up share capital depends on the nature and number of investment services carried out; brokerage companies who offeraccount-keeping, custody and reception, transmission and execution of orders must have a minimum paid-up share capital of Ffrl million (about $160,000). This is reduced to Ffr350,000 when the brokerage company is not involved in account-keeping or custody services;* the minimum shareholder funds must be equal to the higher of- 25% of the overheads of the previous year, or overheads forecast in the business plan; and- the aggregate client positions divided by 150;* internal compliance procedures must be established; and* the brokerage company must comply with certain ratios relating to solvency and large exposure.Regulated brokers are also subject to the CMF's rules on the appointment of a compliance officer, information and advice for clients, mandatory clauses to be inserted in clients' agreements, professional cards required from certain employees and reporting requirements to the CMF.2 Non-regulated brokersNon-regulated brokers are sole agents appointed by an investment firm authorized by the CECEI, or an appropriate authority of an EU member state. Sole agents are nonregulated entities and are neither subject to the minimum capital and shareholder funds requirements nor to the CMF/CRBF regulations.Sole agents enter into investment services agreements with clients on behalf and in the name of their principal, who must be a regulated investment services provider. These agreements are binding on who is, as a general rule, solely liable visa-vis clients and the supervisory authorities (the CMF and/or the Bank of France). In this respect, the incorporation and activities of a sole agent brokerage is simpler, safer and cheaper than for regulated brokers. However, sole agents are fully dependent on the principal since they are not authorized to be appointed by more than one investment firm and if, for any reason, the mandate is cancelled or terminated, sole agents must stop any brokerage activity, unless they get a new mandate or are granted an investment service licence by the CECEI. Sole agents do not benefit from theEuropean passport under the ISD, as they are not considered to be investment firms. It is important to note that the sole agent does not own the brokerage business, since clients simply have a contractual relationship. This is why sole agent status is generally more suitable when the principal and agent are companies within the same group or with long-term common interests.French branches of EU investment service providersThe licence for an EU investment service provider allows it to set up branches in France, subject to authorization from the authorities of its home state.This procedure is much simpler and quicker than an application for an investment services licence with the CECEI. The other advantages of operating in France in this way are that a branch is not required to show an endowment capital in France, and that prudential ratios of the home state apply to the French branch.As a general rule under the ISD, the home state authorities retain jurisdiction over the branch in the home state, with the exception of the public policy rules, which will apply to the branches. In France, the regulation referred to below is considered to be a public policy rule with which French branches operating online brokerage services in France must comply.Regulations applicable to brokerage servicesThe offer of brokerage services and the provision of brokerage services are regulated by reference to the nature of the financial instruments offered online.The offer of brokerage servicesAdvertising / marketingThe advertising of financial instruments is heavily regulated when advertisements are included in a public offering process. In this case the advertisement is in the form of a prospectus, which must comply with COB regulations, which provide detailed requirements regarding the form and content of the prospectus. As a general rule, any other form of advertising in a public offering process must refer to the prospectus approved by the COB.* The marketing in France of financial instruments listed on a foreign market must comply with COB regulation no. 99-04. This provides that, before anytransaction, the broker must send his clients an information memorandum presenting the foreign market and the financial instruments dealt on that market. This may be sent to clients via the internet.Any advertising of operations on the foreign market must include certain mandatory information, including the identification of the legal entity which is soliciting French clients.As a general rule, the advertising of collective investment schemes is subject to regulation by the COB, which ensures that any advertisement is consistent with the notice d'information and with regulations applicable to collective investment schemes generally. SICA Vs and FCPs subject to COB regulation no. 89-02 may not be marketed until the management company has been notified of the COB's approval.However, any direct or indirect solicitation to invest in collective investment schemes subject to the simplified COB approval procedure (less formal because the scheme only targets professional investors), must contain a disclaimer informing investors that any subscription or transfer of shares or units, is restricted to qualified investors or investors whose initial investment is at least euro500,000 ($457,000) or (depending on the scheme) euro,30,000. The disclaimer must also mention that these collective investment schemes are not approved by the COB and adhere to specific investment rules.* The COB has issued guidelines no. 99-02 relating to the marketing and sale via the internet of i) collective investment scheme units or shares; and ii) discretionary mandates. These guidelines are not binding. Its purpose is to clarify certain aspects of the COB regulations which apply to collective investment schemes (management company and depositary) and to any information on financial instruments disclosed during a public offering. The COB is preparing new guidelines relating to financial advice and information disseminated via the internet.* COB regulations and recommendations are applicable to online brokers whenever financial instruments (listed or otherwise) are offered to the public.* Under the CMF's regulations, regulated brokers are bound to inform and advise their clients after having assessed their financial knowledge.* In any event, there is a prohibition on advertising units of investment funds which invest in futures markets (Article 23 of the law of 23/12/1988), or to market non-OECD financial instruments in France without the prior consent of the French Ministry of Economy.3 Canvassing lawUnder the law of 1972 relating to financial canvassing, canvassing consists of contacting potential clients by way of visits, letters, circulars and telephone calls to: i) induce them to subscribe, purchase, exchange or sell securities or participate in such operations; and ii) offer services and advice on a regular basis.The law of 1972 is not adapted to the internet and legislative reform in this field is awaited. The CMF, the COB and the CECEI consider that offers to provide e-banking and e-brokerage services would be treated in the same manner as offers of services or advice by way of letters, circulars or telephone calls.It is difficult to determine which information systems or practices will qualify as financial canvassing (and therefore regulated) or merely as financial advertising (and therefore permitted); the CECEI and the COB have not yet given any clear guidance on this question.According to a discussion and research paper on internet risk released by the Commission Bancaire (the supervisory arm of the Bank of France) in July 2000, advertising messages, including a link to the seller's site (in the case of banks) displayed on general purpose websites, or posting information, advice or offers on sites or news groups in the client's country, would be viewed as financial advertising and would not constitute financial canvassing.The Bank of France takes the view that in these examples there is no active solicitation of clients since they access the financial advertisements deliberately and of their own accord, as if visiting the premises of a bank.In contrast with these passive marketing techniques, sending messages to email addresses would be equated with sending letters and as such would qualify as canvassing, according to the Bank of France.In any case, before soliciting French customers, the brokerage company mustnotify the Bank of France (CECEI) of its intention to solicit such customers; and employees of the brokerage company must be granted a specific solicitation card by the French authorities. Any breach of this rule would constitute a criminal offence.4 Public offering regulationsPublic offering regulations are applicable whenever financial instruments are issued or transferred to the public in France, using advertising, canvassing, credit institutions or investment service providers. Public offerings are heavily regulated and are subject to a number of requirements, including prior approval by COB of a prospectus, filing with the Commercial Registry of the French translation of the issuer's constitutional documents, publication of a legal notice in the BALO and continuing information obligations.The public offering regulations apply to offers of both listed and unlisted financial instruments. In this respect, online brokers offering listed shares to the public are subject to public offering regulations and in particular COB Regulation no. 99-08, under which the online broker must comply with the following disclosure and advertising rules:* the preparation of a simplified prospectus which must be approved by the COB and made freely available to the public; and * any advertisement must refer to the simplified prospectus and specify how to obtain a copy.A private placement (as opposed to a public offering) is defined as the issue or transfer of financial instruments to qualified investors or to a restricted circle of investors.In order to ensure a private placement via the internet, it is necessary to restrict electronic access to the broker's website by passwords granted solely to qualified investors. It is also mandatory under COB Regulation No. 99-09 that a private placement disclaimer be displayed on the webpages of the broker's website. The disclaimer must mention that:* offering materials (advertisements, information memoranda, etc) have not been submitted to the COB for its approval;* qualified investors must participate in the private placement for their ownaccount;* any offer to the public of the financial instruments subscribed or purchased by the qualified investors in the private placement would be subject to public offering regulations; and* if the investors are members of a restricted circle of more than 100, they must certify that they are associated with the management of the issuer on a professional or a personal basis. The provision of online brokerage servicesRules of conduct applicable to online brokers Regulated brokers and principals of non-regulated brokers are investment service providers and are subject to the rules of conduct set out in its General Regulation. The CMF has issued General Decision no. 99-07 providing regulations and guidelines. It implements the CMF rules of conduct.As a general rule, the message must clearly identify the issuer of a message offering the service of reception or transmission of orders. In particular, the website must display the legal status of the broker and the investment service it is authorized to provide. Regulated brokers and non-regulated brokers must be clearly distinguished, and the latter must disclose the identity of their investment service provider whom they are asking as agent.If the online broker is not in charge of account-keeping and custody services, whoever is must be clearly identified. Before entering into a contract with any new client, theonline broker must verify the client's identity and domicile by requesting the following documents:a photocopy of a valid official identity document (passport, identity card, driving licence);* bank details; and* written evidence of address.The broker must send confirmation that he has received these documents and, in doing so, check the client's address. These formalities and verifications may not be carried out via the internet.Once the identity and domicile ofthe new client have been checked, the onlinebroker can provide investment services to his client where:* the client has signed an agreement relating to the evidential rules and procedures applicable to the reception of orders via the internet;* the funds or financial instruments have been credited to the client's account. This does not apply to the broker if it is not the account keeper or the custodian;* the broker has checked that its client may receive the information on the relevant financial instruments and risks via the internet; and* the broker must ensure that the client receives in advance more detailed information regarding operations involving financial instruments which do not correspond to the client's regular dealings.In cases where the broker is responsible for account-- keeping, it should operate an automated system monitoring the accounts of the client and freezing any order in the event of insufficient provision or margin cover.The CMF also recommends that this automated system should freeze any order sent by the client which does not comply with market regulations.Compliance with these rules of conduct raises problems when the broker's website is outsourced to a third party, which happens frequently. The authorities are concerned that brokers may lose control over the operation of their websites and would be unable to take any operational responsibility, while remaining liable. This is why the Commission Bancaire is considering imposing an obligation on investment firms and credit institutions providing online financial services, to monitor their outside internet service providers and/or software companies.5 Regulation of contracts entered Into by online brokersContracts with clients These are subject to the CMF regulations, and in particular to CMF General Decision no. 98-28 relating to the mandatory clauses which must be included in agreements entered into with clients. It came into force in June 2000 and any existing contract is required to be duly amended.The agreements must contain a clause setting out the identity of the client and its legal capacity. In particular, qualified investors must be identified among other legal entities as well as the investment services provided. The categories of financialinstruments and financial services must also be stated in the agreement. This is important since it is taken into account when determining whether the broker has properly assessed the skills of his client. In this respect, it is recommended that high-risk speculative and/or complex operations, such as operations on futures markets, be restricted to informed clients or to qualified investors.In practice, the online broker asks new clients to answer a questionnaire which acts as proof that the broker has fulfilled its obligations to assess the skills ofits client.The agreement must contain a confidentiality clause which is binding. In this respect, it is useful for the online broker to provide exceptions to this obligation so that information on clients can be centralized within a member ofthe same group of companies, or accessed by an outside software company.Contracts with other investment services providersThe number of contracts entered into by brokers with other investment service providers depends on the scope of its licence. Non-regulated brokers must enter into an exclusive mandate with a licensed investment service provider.Regulated brokers which are not market members or not licensed for the execution of orders must conclude a transmission of orders agreement with market members or other investment service providers.These contracts are not subject to the CMF General Decision no. 98-28 or to other specific regulations, with the exception of.* clearing agreements;* when a client gives a broker with whom he has an account an order for transmission to another non-resident institution with comparable status, the broker is forbidden from being remunerated in the form of hard commission (a commission rebate) by the institution to which the order has been transmitted; and* a non account-keeping broker receiving orders from a client for transmission to another institution may be remunerated in the form of a hard commission, provided that the broker informs the client when entering into contractual relations (and thereafter annually) of the terms and conditions and amount of the hard commission.Contracts entered into with software companiesThese contracts might at first appear to have regulatory implications. However, recent financial regulations applicable to e-- brokerage now have a direct bearing on implications for IT agreements.In practice, brokers must ensure that the operation of the website and the reception and transmission of software orders complies with the CMF General Decision and any other applicable regulations applicable. The upgrade clause of the IT agreement entered into with the software company should address the question of the software being upgraded in the event of changes to applicable regulations.It is also recommended that any outsourcing agreement contains a clause which sets out how the online broker monitors the operation of the outsourced website.二、文献综述互联网金融发展文献综述摘要互联网金融的快速发展成为近年来中国经济金融领域备受瞩目的重要现象，国内学术界讨论互联网金融的文献数量也急速膨胀，但目前尚缺少对与互联网金融相关的各类文献进行全面梳理的综述类论文。

P2P网络借贷外文翻译文献综述P2P网络借贷外文翻译文献综述(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)译文:P2P 金融下的中小企业融资Waitz M摘要中小企业融资难是世界性难题。

文章介绍了互联网金融的概念，重点概括了 P2P 金融在科技和金融创新融合方面的发展，综合了现在学术界对 P2P 金融研究的五大方向方面的各种观点和见解。

指出了当前 P2P 金融发展的突出问题风险控制，并对互联网金融的大趋势进行了分析。

关键词: P2P金融; 金融创新; 风险管控1引言从企业发展的历史看，大型企业都来源于中小企业。

中小企业是国民经济中最具活力的部分，往往走在技术发展的最前端，在高科技产业、清洁能源、绿色经济等方面都有很好的业绩，在经济转型中发挥着巨大作用。

中小企业融资难是世界性难题。

这些中小企业融资环境和渠道狭窄，有 60% 以上无法获得银行贷款。

目前，科技型企业又有轻资产的特点，融资困境，成为困扰可持续发展的巨大瓶颈。

2 互联网金融的概念近两年来，互联网金融呈现井喷式发展， 2014 年以来，互联网金融板块表现强势。

当前经济领域存在两个特别矛盾的现象，一是中小企业在企业总数中占比很大，但普遍存在融资难的问题; 二是民间闲散资金多，但除了股市和房市，往别的领域投资很难。

而以互联网、大数据、云计算为基础和高度契合市场引领的互联网金融的发展，对于解决这两个难题，更好地为实体经济，尤其是中小企业发展创造良好的金融环境，也为中国在国际竞争当中实现弯道超车起到重要作用。

互联网金融除了掌握客户端外，还便于做好上游资本供给方、下游资本使用方点与点的整合，结合互联网的其中特质( P2P) 及金融的本质( 资本) 。

依托互联网金融的发展，金融供给能力得以提高，包容性得以增强，可以动员更多的金融资源，覆盖面更广，覆盖度更多，满足更分散、更多元化的需求。

互联网金融最狭隘的概念就是 P2P( Peer-to-Peer Lend-ing) 金融平台，P2P 模式的核心是: 在这个具有资质的网站平台上，借款人发出借贷信息，并提供借贷项目的具体情况、借款人的相关诚信及经济实力等有关信息; 投资人根据平台上提供的信息，进行决策，最后做出向借款人发放贷款的决定。

译文原文出处：Decision Support Systems, Volume 49, Issue 1, April 2010, Pages 52-60Lauri Puro, Jeffrey E. Teich, Hannele Wallenius, Jyrki WalleniusP2P借贷中的借款人决策建议Lauri Puro, Jeffrey E. Teich, Hannele Wallenius, Jyrki Wallenius摘要在网上竞拍的设立与竞标过程中，人们总是面临艰难的战略决策。

在本项研究中，将介绍基于P2P贷款拍卖网站，帮助贷款人与借款人规范决策过程的模型——借款人决策建议模型（Borrower Decision Aid）。

在网上竞拍提供了中大量现实生活中的竞价数据，使笔者能够以此为决策者建立新的决策工具。

借款人决策建议模型（Borrower Decision Aid）将帮助借款人量化其战略选择，例如启动利率和贷款金额要求。

笔者将确定基于借款人，与贷款成功率、最终利率相关的变量。

1引言1.1背景是第一个基于网上逆向拍卖的P2P借贷市场。

在这个市场上，人们提出申请贷款，称为清单，然后其他人就这些清单进行出价。

获胜的投标者获得的提供贷款资金的机会，而利率由拍卖决定——竞争越激烈，利率就越低。

换句话说，这种方式越过中介银行连接了需要资金的人与愿意提供贷款的人。

通常情况下，一项贷款有多投标者（贷款人），因为大多数贷款人提供给每笔贷款50到200美元。

贷款人通过提供小额资金给多个贷款项目的方式来分散风险。

于2006年2月公开上线，至今已经促成超过1.5亿美元的贷款。

在本项研究中，我们将关注借款人的角色，即创建贷款清单的人。

在网上竞拍的过程中，借款人需要做出一些重要的战略决策，进而决定其是否能够获得提供贷款。

本项研究的目的就是为借款人的决策提供决定性的帮助。

在前人研究中，仅有少数讨论过竞拍过程中的决策建议，例如[1,8,15,16,23,25]，但是他们的研究角度与本文不同。

本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献信息标题: Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending作者: Berger, Sven C; Gleisner, Fabian期刊名称: Business Research；第2卷；第1期；页码：39-65年份: 2015.Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2PLendingAbstractWe analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these market participants act as financial intermediaries and significantly improve borrowers' credit conditions by reducing information asymmetries, predominantly for borrowers with less attractive risk characteristics. Our findings may be surprising given the replacement of a bank by an electronic marketplace.Keywords: Asymmetric information, intermediation, social lending, electronic marketsManuscript received July 7, 2008, accepted by Christian Schlag (Finance) March 5, 2009.1 IntroductionThe evolution of information technology in recent years has led to the development of electronic marketplaces where traditional intermediaries may be less important or even redundant for the economic interaction of market participants (Benjamin andWigand 1995, Evans and Wurster 1997, Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Within the financial services industry, the debate about disintermediation and the future relevance of financial intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 2001, Nellis, McCaffery, and Hutchinson 2000, Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell 1999) is fueled by the increasing role of electronic lending markets (P2P Lending or Social Lending) where an electronic marketplace replaces a bank as the traditional intermediary and enables the brokerage of consumer loans directly between borrowers and lenders (Hulme and Wright 2006, Meyer 2007). A recent study predicts that within the next few years such social banking platforms may have a market share of ten percent of the worldwide market for retail lending and financial planning (Gartner Inc. 2008). For the US, the P2P lending market is estimated to grow to a volume of up to ten billion USD within the next 10 years (Bruene 2007). We examine more than 14,000 credit transactions on the American electronic P2P lending platform , covering all transactions that took place in the market between 2005-11 and 2007-09. Our analysis of the P2P credit market starts with the observation that, despite the direct mediation of loans in the marketplace, new types of intermediaries emerge as market participants provide paid intermediary services. In the paper we then focus on the following questions: (1) From a theoretical point of view, how can these intermediaries create value in the interaction between borrowers and lenders? (2) Should all borrowers make use of an intermediary, and can it make sense to pay for intermediary services? (3) From the borrowers' perspective, what is the economic impact of intermediation in the electronic lending marketplace? Our empirical analysis is confirmatory in nature. It is based on the literature on financial intermediation (e. g., Diamond 1984, Leland and Pyle 1976) from which we derive hypotheses on the role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces.The electronic lending platform Prosper provides an excellent laboratory for studying intermediaries in electronic marketplaces. Prosper is the largest provider with nearly 90 million USD in loans originated in the examination period from 2005-11 to 2007-09, as market participants were permitted to act as paid intermediaries in this period. As of 2008-09-30, Prosper dominated the US market for P2P lending with atotal of 176 million USD in issued loans, followed by its competitor Lending Club with 19 million USD.1 At that time, the market share of P2P consumer loans represented a fraction of the around 490 billion USD of non-revolving consumer credit outstanding at commercial banks (Federal Reserve 2008). All loans on Prosper have an identical maturity of 36 months. Our data sample includes detailed information on 14,321 financial transactions as well as the market participants that chose to participate in the market and covers transactions with and without the use of an intermediary. This allows us to test for aspects of the financial transaction and individual factors that might influence the usage of intermediary services. In line with traditional intermediation theory, we find that financial intermediaries on electronic P2P lending platforms have significant impact on borrowers' credit conditions, suggesting that intermediation helps to reduce the prevalent information asymmetries. The intermediary primarily contributes by screening potential borrowers. A mandatory screening process by means of the intermediary's commitment to screen every borrower within the group significantly improves borrowers' access to credit. Following diligent screening, the intermediary's recommendation of a borrower signals better information about creditworthiness and thus leads to better credit conditions. Moreover, bidding on the screened borrower's credit listing has an even stronger impact on the resulting interest rate.Our results indicate that borrowers should consider the reputation of an intermediary as it serves as a good proxy for the future diligent assessment of borrowers. Intermediation costs can be compensated by lower interest margins for borrowers. These results are robust to self-selection regarding the choice of an intermediary and characteristics of the financial transaction. All in all, our results suggest that financial intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces may create substantial value for borrowers. Our findings are consistent with a stream of literature suggesting that electronic markets create business opportunities for new intermediaries (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Methlie and Pedersen 2002, Bakos 1991, Bakos 1998, Sen and King 2003). Despite the electronic credit marketplace enables the direct mediation of loans, new financial intermediaries emerge between borrowers and lenders. There areseveral reasons why our results are of particular interest also for banks and other financial service providers that face the strategic decision of an active involvement in electronic lending markets. One option could be to participate in these marketplaces and offer financial advisory. Another interesting possibility could be to enter the P2P lending market and to establish a new marketplace to support the existing retail operations and enable cross-selling. Eventually, lending marketplaces are potential customers for banks' transaction services.Our approach to examining the role of financial intermediaries on electronic lending platforms makes three important contributions to the literature: First, this is one of the first studies analyzing an electronic lending marketplace, and the first study to empirically examine intermediation on an electronic P2P lending platform. We explain how electronic credit markets work, and provide insights into the role of intermediaries in the marketplace. Second, we test theoretical predictions from the literature on financial intermediation with new data. Our sample of more than 14,000 transactions on a P2P lending marketplace includes detailed information on the involved market participants and the loan characteristics. The dataset covers the complete transaction history of the credit marketplace for a time period of almost two years. Third, we quantify the economic impact of intermediation and other transaction characteristics on borrowers' loan spread and show that the usage of financial intermediaries which are neither professional nor institutional but members of the network may significantly improve the terms of trade for the borrowers.The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section gives an overview of electronic P2P lending platforms and explains the functioning of these marketplaces. Section 3 summarizes the relevant previous literature on financial intermediation and derives hypotheses about the role of intermediaries on electronic lending platforms. Section 4 overviews the methodology employed, describes the data, and presents the empirical results of our analyses as well as robustness tests. In section 5 we conclude with a summary and the limitations of our study.2 Intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces2.1 Electronic marketplaces and disintermediationMarkets are essential for economic activity in mediating the demand for and supply of goods and services. Intermediaries help to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by (1) providing transaction processing capabilities, (2) bringing enhanced levels of knowledge and expertise, and (3) adding to the transactability of a given good or service (Chircu and Kauffman 2000).The internet has made e-commerce possible where electronic markets are becoming more important in coordinating supply and demand (Grieger 2003, Segev, Gebauer, and Farber 1999). Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure conditions (Cordella 2006), significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional intermediaries (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Many authors argue that once electronic markets emerge, traditional intermediaries may be threatened by an electronic brokerage effect also called disintermediation (for a literature overview see Chircu and Kauffman 2000). In sharp contrast to that, the theoretical contributions on electronic markets and disintermediation have not yet been supported by convincing empirical evidence (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Sen and King 2003). Moreover, the displacement of traditional intermediaries may never occur. Authors like Sarkar, Butler, and Steinfield (1998) or Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that electronic markets may lead to new forms of intermediation.2.2 Electronic lending platformsElectronic lending platforms are electronic markets that mediate between borrowers and lenders of loans.Wefocus here on consumer loans between individual borrowers and lenders and exclude platforms for bonds or syndicated loans (Steelmann 2006). The electronic credit marketplace as a website in the World Wide Web constitutes the general conditions for peer-to-peer lending and provides the administration of current loans. Electronic lending platforms differ in the way loans are originated: Some providers mediate between borrowers and lenders themselves, whereas other providers match borrowers' credit listings and lenders' bids with an auction mechanism (Meyer 2007).The lion share of participants in the marketplace are private individuals, althoughthere are institutional lenders investing in some, too. There are numerous providers that operate nationally due to differing regulatory frameworks. Table 1 provides an overview of the three major Anglo-American and German providers and their business models. A recent development of the business model of P2P lending marketplaces is that lenders may trade loans prior to maturity, increasing the liquidity of P2P loans. As of February 2009, Prosper is still in the process, whereas Lending Club has already successfully registered with the SEC to create a secondary loan market. Despite differing business models, there is one distinctive feature that these marketplaces have in common: Transactions in electronic credit marketplaces occur anonymously between fictitious "screen names". Therefore, information is asymmetrically distributed between borrowers and lenders. Loans are not collateralized and lenders face the inherent risk of default (Steelmann 2006). Despite anonymous interactions, loan listings contain additional information on potential borrowers. Lenders can evaluate individual creditworthiness through quantitative as well as qualitative figures. , America's largest peer-topeer lending marketplace, provides an individual rating and an indicator of indebtedness in cooperation with the credit reporting agency Experian as the two main quantitative figures. The informational value of these figures should be considered high, although the degree to which consumer credit reports are accurate, complete or consistent is in dispute (Avery, Calem, Canner, and Bostic 2003). Most platforms give market participants the opportunity to provide additional personal information about their background, their financial standing and the purpose of the loan. This qualitative, "soft" information is mandatory and its validity is a priori not controlled. Borrowers thereby might have an incentive to overemphasize their "quality" (the present value of the prospective projects, their financial standing or payment behavior) in their personal descriptions (moral hazard).Among the emerging literature on electronic lending marketplaces, a number of working papers examine the role of borrowers' "soft" information that is conveyed in personal pictures and descriptions. A study by Herzenstein, Andrews, Dholakia, and Lyandres (2008) analyzes around 5,000 loan listings on during June 2006and finds that demographic attributes such as race and gender have only a small effect on the likelihood of the auction's funding success when compared to the impact of borrowers' financial strength and effort when listing and publicizing the auction.In contrast to that, Ravina (2008) shows that borrowers' characteristics such as beauty and race significantly affect loan fundability and loan pricing. Incorporating nearly 12,000 loan requests from 2007-03-12 and 2007-04-16 she finds that borrowers perceived as beautiful are more likely to get a loan and pay significantly lower credit spreads. Moreover, Ravina finds that black borrowers pay significantly higher spreads even though they are not more likely to default.A study by Pope and Sydnor (2008) analyzes around 110,000 loan listings on in a one-year period from 2006-06 until 2007-05. There results indicate significant racial disparities on the credit market: Loan listings of black borrowers are less likely to be funded and the spreads paid by blacks are higher than those by comparable whites. In contrast to Ravina (2008), they find that blacks have a higher relative default rate than white borrowers. Of course, it is impossible to evaluate whether P2P lending offers more or less equal access to credit compared to traditional consumer lending: Inherent in an analysis on P2P lending based on transaction data is a potential sample selection bias. Lenders using the online platform might represent those with a high probability of default or lenders whose credit applications have been rejected at traditional banks. For example, Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) find that small business lenders strategically self-select into electronic (transactional) lending with respect to the publicly available information on their creditworthiness. It follows that from observed transactions in a P2P marketplace a comparison to loan availability and loan pricing at traditional banking institutions is not possible.However, none of this is the aim of this paper: We focus on the role of intermediaries that emerge in the interaction between borrowers and lenders in the electronic P2P lending market. Central to our analyses are social networks on the Prosper marketplace called groups.2.3 Groups on In addition to personal profiles, borrowers and lenders can form groups. These smallercommunities within the marketplace review and assess the creditworthiness of individual members. Groups are potentially beneficial for market participants by providing and verifying information or obtaining additional information about borrowers that is not publicly available. Groups lack distinct ownership and governance features as they typically exist in credit cooperatives (Davis 2001, Taylor 1971). There is no ownership of the groups, and there is no collective decision mechanism on accepting group members or granting loans. Furthermore, groups do not exclusively deal with their members. At any time, lenders from outside the group may invest in a group member's loan listing. This implies that there is no rotation of money within the group, and no specific allocation process. There are two papers that specifically examine the role of groups on the P2P lending website : Freedman and Jin (2008) use transaction data from 200601-06 until 2008-07-31 covering around 290,000 loan listings and 25,000 funded loans. They find evidence for the idea that the monitoring within social networks provides a stronger incentive to pay off loans ex-post: Loans with friend endorsements and friend bids have fewer missed payments and yield significantly higher rates of return than other loans. Everett (2008) looks at the influence of group membership on loan default within 13,486 Prosper loans. The dataset covers funded loans from 2006-05-31 until 2007-11-06 and incorporates ex post loan performance information until 2008-05-07. He finds that membership in a group significantly decreases loan default risk if the group enforces real-life personal connections like, e.g., employees of the same company or alumni of a certain university. Both studies presented above look at social networks in the credit market but do not specifically take the group leader into account. It is, however, not the group as an institution per se, but the group leader who decides about membership and plays a substantial role in the lending process.2.4 Group leaders as financial intermediariesIn order to reduce information asymmetries, lenders must screen potential borrowers. Given the large number of available credit listings, it can be costly or impossible to process the information available about potential borrowers. Therefore, intermediaries emerge in the electronic marketplace offering intermediary services in order to assessand limit credit risk. Every participant in the online lending platform can found a group and become a group leader. Group leaders set membership criteria and administer the group. Groups are smaller communities within the marketplace where group members may share a bond based on employment, geography, education, common leisure activities, or other factors. The principle that people from close communities act more responsibly towards each other aims to lower the risk of defaults and therefore enables lending at better rates. Among the most important tasks of the group leader is the screening of borrowers within the group (a voluntary due diligence known as "vetting"). Within groups, it is common that borrowers send personal documents regarding their identity, income, and other pertinent information to the group leader. The group leader may also establish personal contact with the borrowers' employer to verify the personal income in order to recommend a borrower's credit listing.The assignment as a group leader may be timeconsuming, since a detailed "due diligence" of a potential borrower can take several hours. There are many individual motives for forming a group and becoming a group leader. Intrinsic motivation may result from altruism or related social returns from leading a group. As extrinsic motivation and as a more tangible example, the owner of an Apple computer store may run a group on Prosper to promote sales by providing an alternative form of consumer finance. Leading a group can also be even more directly monetarily motivated: Group leaders were permitted to receive remuneration ("fees") for their effort, acting as paid intermediaries. Group leaders collect a fee in the form of additional interest for providing intermediation services until 2007-09-12, when Prosper modified the fee concept (Prosper Marketplace Inc. 2007b). The incentive for borrowers to disclose information to the group leader is to attract more bids on their credit listing for the purpose of better interest rates. Group leaders also supervise the repayment of loans within their group. In the case of default, Prosper informs the group leader who can encourage loan repayment and may arrange limited repayments (called "community payments") on behalf of a member who is not able to do so. Group leaders thus serve as a financial intermediary by acting as middlemen betweenlenders and borrowers. Even though the electronic lending marketplace displaces the traditional depository institution as a financial intermediary (Datta and Chatterjee 2008), group leaders emerge as new intermediaries. The group leader facilitates the movement of capital from surplus units in the marketplace to deficit units by producing information, providing advice, and monitoring loan repayment. Where intermediary services were concerned, borrowers faced the choice between "free" or "paid" intermediaries. It is a priori not clear if intermediation created value for the electronic marketplace and, in particular, for the borrowers.Wefocus here on the value of intermediation for borrowers.3 Development of hypothesesThere is extensive research on financial intermediation. In this section we review the relevant intermediation literature in order to derive hypotheses about the role of intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces. Traditionally, transaction costs and information problems have provided the foundation for understanding intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 1998, Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993, Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Santomero 1984). Due to asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, financial markets can perform poorly or even fail when borrowers know their characteristics (the present value of the prospective projects), but lenders cannot distinguish between them. Market value then reflects average project quality (Akerlof 1970, Leland and Pyle 1976). As a result, "good risks" are driven out of the market and average project quality decreases (adverse selection). This can be the case if borrowers cannot be expected to be entirely straightforward about their characteristics since there may be a substantial reward for exaggerating positive qualities (moral hazard). In his seminal article, Diamond (1984) argues that intermediaries can help to overcome problems of asymmetric information by acting as "delegated monitors". When several lenders in a loan syndicate want to monitor a borrower and monitoring is costly, there will either be inefficiently high monitoring expenditure or a free-riding problem, where no lender has an incentive to monitor. In this case, a financial intermediary as a delegated monitor minimizes the costs of monitoring. In Diamond (1984) the intermediary holds deposits and writes loan contracts to borrowers, whichis not the case with the group leader in the electronic lending platform. Nevertheless, the argumentation is applicable to the lending platform Prosper for two reasons. Firstly, the capital of several lenders is syndicated into one loan. Secondly, lenders face a large number of potential borrowers in the marketplace. Lenders benefit from additional private information about borrowers in order to better assess credit risk and the appropriate borrowing rate required. Acquiring private information about credit listings implies a time-consuming (repeated) interaction with the borrower which is costly. Therefore, there are group leaders who act as intermediaries in producing additional private information about borrowers within groups. The intermediary realizes significant economies of scale by producing information for the marketplace. Intermediaries can solve another information problem prevalent in electronic marketplaces. Borrowers might not be willing to disclose proprietary information to a large number of lenders in a public financial market. Following Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), an intermediary acts as the facilitator of knowledge sharing, whereby proprietary information is only disclosed vis-à-vis the intermediary.In the marketplace, participants can voluntarily disclose additional private information regarding their credit listing. Within groups, borrowers may disclose proprietary information regarding their financial standing solely to the group leader. As group members, borrowers can thus avoid disclosing private information to the marketplace. Group leaders assess and recommend a borrower's credit quality based on additional private information, and at the same time preserve the privacy of proprietary information. Groups enable a better assessment of the borrowers' credit quality, resulting in potentially lower rates for borrowers.Finally, group leaders not only screen potential borrowers, but also monitor ongoing loan repayment in place of the potentially large number of lenders. In cases of loan default, Prosper informs the group leader who may encourage loan repayment and even arrange limited repayments by the group. If a borrower's loan is more than one month late, lenders can make what is called a "community payment" on behalf of a borrower who is temporarily not able to do so. These payments can be compared to a mutual insurance mechanism.All in all, the intermediary reduces uncertainty for lenders, which should be reflected in lower required risk premiums. The arguments provided above lead us to the first fundamental hypothesis:Hypothesis H1: Borrowers within groups are able to borrow at lower credit spreads. Next, we formulate three hypotheses that enable us to decompose the role of the group leader in the lending marketplace. With imperfect information about borrowers' credit quality, lenders can use publicly observable signals to assess credit risk (Riley 1975, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Spence 1973). Observable characteristics or actions can serve as signals. On the electronic lending platform Prosper, the recommendation of a credit listing by a group leader is a strong observable signal of credit quality. Borrowers can voluntarily provide additional private information regarding their financial standing to their group leader. Group leaders can then recommend credit listings within their groups. This observable recommendation serves as a signal of good credit quality for the marketplace.This leads to:Hypothesis H2: The recommendation of a credit listing by the group leader leads to lower credit spreads.The reliability of information produced by an intermediary is a prevalent problem in the intermediation literature. Group leaders might recommend credit listings within their group without prior diligent screening. It may be difficult or impossible for potential lenders to distinguish good information from bad. Group leaders can signal credibility of a recommendation by bidding on the recommended credit listing. The potential investment of the group leader is an observable signal for information quality (Leland and Pyle 1976). We derive:Hypothesis H3a: A group leader's bidding serves as a credible signal for the quality of the credit listing and results in lower credit spreads.Hypothesis H3b: A group leader's bidding on a credit listing signals information quality and has a stronger impact on credit spreads than a recommendation by the group leader.We derive two additional hypotheses about the reputation and the size of groups. Past activities within a group, especially regarding the diligent assessment of individualborrowers by the group leader, are only imperfectly observable. In contrast, the reputation of a group in the electronic marketplace is observable from its group rating. The group rating is a measurement of a group's performance in paying back its loans in comparison with expected (historical) default rates. A defaulted loan worsens a group's rating and therefore its reputation. Tirole (1996) shows analytically how a group's good reputation positively influences individual behavior. The group rating reflects a group's ability to assess borrowers' credit quality, and serves as a proxy for the group leader's behavior in the future.In addition to a group leader's general ability, we argue that group reputation serves as an effective mechanism to prevent collusion between the group leader and a borrower within the group. The phenomenon of collusion (see, e.g., Tirole 1991) could be a major concern for participants in the electronic lending marketplace. This would be the case if a potential borrower could "bribe" the group leader in order to receive a recommendation and a bid. With an increasing probability for such collusive behavior, the credibility of the observable actions of the intermediary would be significantly reduced. This would be reflected in a decreasing group rating due to higher than expected defaults within the group. We deduce:Hypothesis H4: A higher group rating leads to lower credit spreads.When deciding to join a group, market participants face the choice of group size. At first sight, a smaller group seems to offer a potentially closeknit community in the marketplace that facilitates the interaction and closer collaboration of group members with the group leader. This is fairly comparable to the stream of literature on relationship lending that emphasizes the exchange and evaluation of "soft information" within small banks (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005). On closer examination, and presumably more important, borrowers and lenders might prefer larger groups because they generate more opportunities for exchange, collectively provide more funds for loans, and, thus, offer easier access to credit. From an investor's perspective, in addition to a larger network, bigger groups are attractive because they may enable effective "peer-monitoring" which lowers credit risk. The concept of peermonitoring,。