集群和新竞争经济学论文外文翻译-中英文论文对照翻译

英文文献资料（一）Clusters and the New Economics of CompetitionMichael E. Porter（Harvard university）Why Clusters Are Critical to CompetitionModern competition depends on productivity, not on access to inputs or the scale of individual enterprises.Productivity rests on how companies compete,not on the particular fields they compete panies can be highly productive in any industry–shoes, agriculture, or semiconductors – if they employ sophisticated methods, use advanced technology,and offer unique products and services. All industries can employ advanced technology; all industries can be knowledge intensive.The sophistication with which companies compete in a particular location, however, is strongly influenced by the quality of the local business environment.1 Companies cannot employ advanced logistical techniques, for example, without a high quality transportation infrastructure. Nor can companies effectively compete on sophisticated service without well-educated employees. Businesses cannot operate efficiently under onerous regulatory red tape or under a court system that fails to resolve disputes quickly and fairly. Some aspects of the business environment, such as the legal system, for example, or corporate tax rates, affect all industries. In advanced economies, however, the more decisive aspects of the business environment are often cluster specific; these constitute some of the most important microeconomic foundations for competition.Clusters affect competition in three broad ways:first, by increasing the productivity of companies based in the area; second, by driving the direction and pace of innovation, which underpins future productivity growth; and third, by stimulating the formation of new businesses, which expands and strengthens the cluster itself. A cluster allows each member to benefit as if it had greater scale or as if it had joined with others formally – without requiring it to sacrifice its flexibility.Clusters and Productivity. Being part of a cluster allows companies to operate more productively in sourcing inputs; accessing information, technology,and needed institutions; coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating improvement.Better Access to Employees and Suppliers. Companies in vibrant clusters can tap into an existing pool of specialized and experienced employees, thereby lowering their search and transaction costs in recruiting. Because a cluster signals opportunity and reduces the risk of relocation for employees, it can also be easier to attract talented people from other locations, a decisive advantage in some industries.A well-developed cluster also provides an efficient means of obtaining other important inputs.Such a cluster offers a deep and specialized supplier base. Sourcing locally instead of from distant suppliers lowers transaction costs. It minimizes the need for inventory, eliminates importing costs and delays, and –because local reputation is important –lowers the risk that suppliers will overprice or renege on commitments. Proximity improves communications and makes it easier for suppliers to provide ancillary or support services such as installation and debugging. Other things being equal, then, local outsourcing is a better solution than distantoutsourcing, especially for advanced and specialized inputs involving embedded technology, information, and service content.Formal alliances with distant suppliers can mitigate some of the disadvantages of distant outsourcing. But all formal alliances involve their own complex bargaining and governance problems and can inhibit a company’s flexibility. The close, informal relationships possible among companies in a cluster are often a superior Arrangement.In many cases, clusters are also a better alternative to vertical pared with in-house units, outside specialists are often more cost effective and responsive, not only in component production but also in services such as training. Although extensive vertical integration may have once been the norm, a fast-changing environment can render vertical integration inefficient, ineffective, and inflexible.Even when some inputs are best sourced from a distance, clusters offer advantages. Suppliers trying to penetrate a large, concentrated market will price more aggressively, knowing that as they do so they can realize efficiencies in marketing and in service.Working against a cluster’s advantages in assembling resources is the possibility that competition will render them more expensive and scarce. But companies do have the alternative of outsourcing many inputs from other locations, which tends to limit potential cost penalties. More important, clusters increase not only the demand for specialized inputs but also their supply.Access to Specialized Information. Extensive market, technical, and competitive information accumulates within a cluster, and members have preferred access to it. In addition, personal relationships and community ties foster trust and facilitate the flow of information. These conditions make information more transferable.Complementarities. A host of linkages among cluster members results in a whole greater than the sum of its parts. In a typical tourism cluster, for example, the quality of a visitor’s experience depends not only on the appeal of the primary attraction but also on the quality and efficiency of complementary businesses such as hotels, restaurants, shopping outlets, and transportation facilities. Because members of the cluster are mutually dependent, good performance by one can boost the success of the others.Complementarities come in many forms. The most obvious is when products complement one another in meeting customers’ needs, as the tourism example illustrates. Another form is the coordination of activities across companies to optimize their collective productivity. In wood products, for instance, the efficiency of sawmills depends on a reliable supply of high-quality timber and the ability to put all the timber to use – in furniture (highest quality), pallets and boxes (lower quality), or wood chips (lowest quality). In the early 1990s, Portuguese sawmills suffered from poor timber quality because local landowners did not invest in timber management. Hence most timber was processed for use in pallets and boxes, a lower-value use that limited the price paid to landowners. Substantial improvement in productivity was possible, but only if several parts of the cluster changed simultaneously.Logging operations, for example, had to modify cutting and sorting procedures, while sawmills had to develop the capacity to process wood in more sophisticated ways. Coordination to develop standard wood classifications and measures was an important enabling step. Geographically dispersed companies are less likely to recognize and capture such linkages.Other complementarities arise in marketing. A cluster frequently enhances the reputation of a location in a particular field, making it more likely that buyers will turn to a vendor based there.Italy’s strong reputation for fashion and design, for example, benefits companies involved in leather goods, footwear, apparel, and accessories. Beyond reputation, cluster members often profit from a variety of joint marketing mechanisms, such as company referrals, trade fairs, trade magazines, and marketing delegations.Finally, complementarities can make buying from a cluster more attractive for customers. Visiting buyers can see many vendors in a single trip. They also may perceive their buying risk to be lower because one location provides alternative suppliers. That allows them to multisource or to switch vendors if the need arises. Hong Kong thrives as a source of fashion apparel in part for this reason.Access to Institutions and Public Goods. Investments made by government or other public institutions– such as public spending for specialized infrastructure or educational programs – can enhance a company’s productivity. The ability to recruit employees trained at local programs, for example, lowers the cost of internal training. Other quasi-public goods, such as the cluster’s information and technology pools and its reputation, arise as natural by-products of competition.It is not just governments that create public goods that enhance productivity in the private sector. Investments by companies –in training programs, infrastructure, quality centers, testing laboratories, and so on – also contribute to increased productivity. Such private investments are often made collectively because cluster participants recognize the potential for collective benefits.Better Motivation and Measurement. Local rivalry is highly motivating. Peer pressure amplifies competitive pressure within a cluster,even among noncompeting or indirectly competing companies. Pride and the desire to look good in the local community spur executives to attempt to outdo one another.Clusters also often make it easier to measure and compare performances because local rivals share general circumstances – for example, labor costs and local market access – and they perform similar activities. Companies within clusters typically have intimate knowledge of their suppliers’ costs. Managers are able to compare costs and employees’performance with other local companies. Additionally, financial institutions can accumulate knowledge about the cluster that can be used to monitor performance.Clusters and Innovation. In addition to enhancing productivity, clusters play a vital role in a company’s ongoing ability to innovate. Some of the same characteristics that enhance current productivity have an even more dramatic effect on innovation and productivity growth.Because sophisticated buyers are often part of a cluster, companies inside clusters usually have a better window on the market than isolated competitors do. Computer companies based in Silicon Valley and Austin, Texas, for example, plug into customer needs and trends with a speed difficult to match by companies located elsewhere. The ongoing relationships with other entities within the cluster also help companies to learn early about evolving technology, component and machinery availability, service and marketing concepts, and so on. Such learning is facilitated by the ease of making site visits and frequent face-to-face contact.Clusters do more than make opportunities for innovation more visible. They also provide the capacity and the flexibility to act rapidly. A company within a cluster often can source what it needs to implement innovations more quickly. Local suppliers and partners can and do get closely involved in the innovation process, thus ensuring a better match with customers’ requirements.Companies within a cluster can experiment at lower cost and can delay large commitments until they are more assured that a given innovation will pan out. In contrast, a company relying ondistant suppliers faces greater challenges in every activity it coordinates with other organizations –in contracting, for example, or securing delivery or obtaining associated technical and service support. Innovation can be even harder in vertically integrated companies, especially in those that face difficult trade-offs if the innovation erodes the value of in-house assets or if current products or processes must be maintained while new ones are developed.Reinforcing the other advantages for innovation is the sheer pressure – competitive pressure, peer pressure, constant comparison – that occurs in a cluster. Executives vie with one another to set their companies apart. For all these reasons, clusters can remain centers of innovation for decades.Clusters and New Business Formation.It is not surprising, then, that many new companies grow up within an existing cluster rather than at isolated locations. New suppliers, for example, proliferate within a cluster because a concentrated customer base lowers their risks and makes it easier for them to spot market opportunities. Moreover, because developed clusters comprise related industries that normally draw on common or very similar inputs, suppliers enjoy expanded opportunities.Clusters are conducive to new business formation for a variety of reasons. Individuals working within a cluster can more easily perceive gaps in products or services around which they can build businesses. Beyond that, barriers to entry are lower than elsewhere. Needed assets, skills, inputs, and staff are often readily available at the cluster location, waiting to be assembled into a new enterprise.Local financial institutions and investors, already familiar with the cluster, may require a lower risk premium on capital. In addition, the cluster often presents a significant local market, and an entrepreneur may benefit from established relationships. All of these factors reduce the perceived risks of entry – and of exit, should the enterprise fail.The formation of new businesses within a cluster is part of a positive feedback loop. An expanded cluster amplifies all the benefits I have described – it increases the collective pool of competitive resources, which benefits a ll the cluster’s members. The net result is that companies in the cluster advance relative to rivals at other locations.英文文献中文翻译（二）来源：哈佛商业评论Vol.76第6期 1998年作者：迈克·E. 波特出版时间：1998簇群与新竞争经济学(美）迈克·E. 波特为什么簇群对竞争至关重要?现代竞争取决于生产力, 而非取决于投入或单个企业的规模。

外文翻译原文Clusters and the new economics of competitionMaterial Source: Michael E. Porter. Clusters and the New Economies of Competition[J].Harvard Business Review,1998(3). Author: Michael E. Porter Abstract: Today's economic map of the world is dominated by what are called clusters: critical masses in one place of unusual competitive success in particular fields. Clusters are not unique, however; they are highly typical and therein lies a paradox: the enduring competitive advantages in a global economy lie increasingly in local things knowledge, relationships, motivation that distant rivals cannot match. Untangling the paradox of location in a global economy reveals a number of key insights about how companies continually create competitive advantage. What happens inside companies is important, but clusters reveal that the immediate business environment outside companies plays a vital role as well. This role of locations has been long overlooked, despite striking evidence that innovation and competitive success in so many fields are geographically concentrated.Key words: clusters; Competition; competitive advantage;developmentNow that companies can source capital, goods, information, and technology from around the world, often with the click of a mouse, much of the conventional wisdom about how companies and nations compete needs to be overhauled. In theory, more open global markets and faster transportation and communication should diminish the role of location in competition. After all, anything that can be efficiently sourced from a distance through global markets and corporate networks is available to any company and therefore is essentially nullified as a source of competitive advantage. But if location matters less, why, then, is it true that the odds of finding a world-class mutual-fund company in Boston are much higher than in most any other place? Why could the same be said of textile-related companies in North Carolina and South Carolina, of high-performance auto companies in southern Germany, or of fashion shoe companies in northern Italy? Although location remains fundamental to competition, its role today differs vastly from a generation ago. In an era when competition was driven heavily by input costs, locations with someimportant endowment natural harbor, for example, or a supply of cheap labor often enjoyed a comparative advantage that was both competitively decisive and persistent over time. Competition in today's economy is far more dynamic. Companies can mitigate many input-cost disadvantages through global sourcing, rendering the old notion of comparative advantage less relevant. Instead, competitive advantage rests on making more productive use of inputs, which requires continual innovation. Clusters affect competitiveness within countries as well as across national borders. Therefore, they lead to new agendas for all business executives not just those who compete globally. More broadly, clusters represent a new way of thinking about location, challenging much of the conventional wisdom about how companies should be configured, how institutions such as universities can contribute to competitive success, and how governments can promote economic development and prosperity.What is a Cluster? Clusters are geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field. Clusters encompass an array of linked industries and other entities important to competition. They include, for example, suppliers of specialized inputs such as components, machinery, and services, and providers of specialized infrastructure. Clusters also often extend downstream to channels and customers and laterally to manufacturers of complementary products and to companies in industries related by skills, technologies, or common inputs. Finally, many clusters include governmental and other institutions - such as universities, standards-setting agencies, think tanks, vocational training providers, and trade associations - that provide specialized training, education, information, research, and technical support. The California wine cluster is a good example. It includes 680 commercial wineries as well as several thousand independent wine grape growers. An extensive complement of industries supporting both wine making and grape growing exists, including suppliers of grape stock, irrigation and harvesting equipment, barrels, and labels; specialized public relations and advertising firms; and numerous wine publications aimed at consumer and trade audiences. A host of local institutions is involved with wine, such as the world-renowned viticulture and enology program at the University of California at Davis, the Wine Institute, and special committees of the California senate and assembly. The cluster also enjoys weaker linkages to other California clusters in agriculture, food and restaurants, and wine-country tourism.Consider also the Italian leather fashion cluster, which contains well-knownshoe companies such as Ferragamo and Gucci as well as a host of specialized suppliers of footwear components, machinery, molds, design services, and tanned leather. It also consists of several chains of related industries, including those producing different types of leather goods (linked by common inputs and technologies) and different types of footwear (linked by overlapping channels and technologies). These industries employ common marketing media and compete with similar images in similar customer segments. A related Italian cluster in textile fashion, including clothing, scarves, and accessories, produces complementary products that often employ common channels. The extraordinary strength of the Italian leather fashion cluster can be attributed, at least in part, to the multiple linkages and synergies that participating Italian businesses enjoy.A cluster's boundaries are defined by the linkages and complementarities across industries and institutions that are most important to competition. Although clusters often fit within political boundaries, they may cross state or even national borders. In the United States, for example, a pharmaceuticals cluster straddles New Jersey and Pennsylvania near Philadelphia. Similarly, a chemicals cluster in Germany crosses over into German-speaking Switzerland. Clusters rarely conform to standard industrial classification systems, which fail to capture many important actors and relationships in competition. Thus significant clusters may be obscured or even go unrecognized. In Massachusetts, for example, more than 400 companies, representing at least 30,000 high-paying jobs, are involved in medical devices in some way. The cluster long remained all but invisible, however, buried within larger and overlapping industry categories such as electronic equipment and plastic products. Executives in the medical devices cluster have only recently come together to work on issues that will benefit them all.Clusters promote both competition and cooperation. Rivals compete intensely to win and retain customers. Without vigorous competition, a cluster will fail. Yet there is also cooperation, much of it vertical, involving companies in related industries and local institutions. Competition can coexist with cooperation because they occur on different dimensions and among different players.Clusters represent a kind of new spatial organizational form in between arm's length markets on the one hand and hierarchies, or vertical integration, on the other.A cluster, then, is an alternative way of organizing the value chain. Compared with market transactions among dispersed and random buyers and sellers, the proximity of companies and institutions in one location and the repeated exchanges amongthem fosters better coordination and trust. Thus clusters mitigate the problems inherent in arm's-length relationships without imposing the inflexibilities of vertical integration or the management challenges of creating and maintaining formal linkages such as networks, alliances, and partnerships. A cluster of independent and informally linked companies and institutions represents a robust organizational form that offers advantages in efficiency, effectiveness, and flexibility. Access to Institutions and Public Goods. Investments made by government or other public institutions such as public spending for specialized infrastructure or educational programs can enhance a company's productivity. The ability to recruit employees trained at local programs, for example, lowers the cost of internal training. Other quasi-public goods, such as the cluster's information and technology pools and its reputation, arise as natural by-products of competition. It is not just governments that create public goods that enhance productivity in the private sector. Investments by companies in training programs, infrastructure, quality centers, testing laboratories, and so on, also contribute to increased productivity. Such private investments are often made collectively because cluster participants recognize the potential for collective benefits. Clusters also often make it easier to measure and compare performances because local rivals share general circumstances, for example, labor costs and local market access and they perform similar activities. Companies within clusters typically have intimate knowledge of their suppliers' costs. Managers are able to compare costs and employees' performance with other local companies. Additionally, financial institutions can accumulate knowledge about the cluster that can be used to monitor performance.In addition to enhancing productivity, clusters play a vital role in a company's ongoing ability to innovate. Some of the same characteristics that enhance current productivity have an even more dramatic effect on innovation and productivity growth. Clusters do more than make opportunities for innovation more visible. They also provide the capacity and the flexibility to act rapidly. A company within a cluster often can source what it needs to implement innovations more quickly. Local suppliers and partners can and do get closely involved in the innovation process, thus ensuring a better match with customers' requirements.译文企业集群与新经济的竞争资料来源:迈克尔·波特.企业集群与新经济的竞争.哈佛商业评论[J].1998(3) 作者：迈克尔·波特摘要：今天的经济世界地图充斥着所谓的集群：在某些方面特定领域的临界物质的不寻常的成功竞争。

经济学论文外文翻译In recent years, the global economy has undergone significant changes, with the rise of emerging markets and the increasing interconnectedness of financial markets around the world. These changes have led to a growing interest in understanding the factors that drive economic growth and development in different countries.One of the key factors that has been identified as a driver of economic growth is innovation. Innovation plays a crucial role in driving economic growth by creating new products, services, and technologies that can boost productivity and create new sources of wealth. Countries that are able to foster a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship are more likely to experience sustained economic growth and development over the long term.In addition to innovation, other factors such as human capital, infrastructure, and institutional quality also play important roles in driving economic growth. Human capital, in particular, is crucial for economic development as it allows countries to attract investment and talent from around the world. Investments in education and training can help to improve the skills and productivity of the workforce, leading to higher levels of economic growth.Infrastructure is another key factor that can have a significant impact on economic growth. Countries with well-developed infrastructure, such as transportation networks, communication systems, and energy supply, are better able to attract investment and support economic activity. Investing in infrastructure can also help to reduce costs, improve efficiency, and stimulate economicgrowth in the long term.Finally, institutional quality is an important determinant of economic growth. Countries with strong institutions, such as well-functioning legal systems, property rights protection, and effective governance, are more likely to attract investment and foster economic development. By creating a stable and predictable environment for businesses and investors, strong institutions can help to support economic growth and development.In conclusion, economic growth is driven by a complex interplayof factors, including innovation, human capital, infrastructure, and institutional quality. By understanding and promoting these factors, countries can create the conditions for sustained economic growth and development over the long term.。

经济学英文论文及翻译范文Economics is a field that is constantly evolving and changing, and the study of economics involves a deep understanding of how individuals, businesses, and governments make decisions about how to allocate resources. This paper will explore the concepts of supply and demand, elasticity, and market structures, and their impact on the economy.The concept of supply and demand is a fundamental principle in economics, and it refers to the relationship between the quantity of a good that producers are willing to sell and the quantity that consumers are willing to buy. When demand for a good increases, the price tends to rise, and when demand decreases, the price tends to fall. On the other hand, when supply increases, the price tends to fall, and when supply decreases, the price tends to rise. This interaction between supply and demand determines the equilibrium price and quantity of a good in a market.Elasticity is a measure of how much the quantity demanded of a good responds to a change in price. The price elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of the quantity demanded to a change in price, and it is calculated as the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage change in price. If the price elasticity of demand is greater than 1, it is considered to be elastic, meaning that a small change in price leads to a relatively large change in quantity demanded. Conversely, if the price elasticity of demand is less than 1, it is considered to be inelastic, meaning that a change in price leads to a relatively small change in quantity demanded.Market structures refer to the characteristics of a market that affect the behavior of firms and the outcomes of the market. There arefour main types of market structures: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly. In a perfectly competitive market, there are many small firms selling identical products, and there are no barriers to entry or exit. Monopolistic competition is similar to perfect competition, but firms sell differentiated products. In an oligopoly, a few large firms dominate the market, and there are significant barriers to entry. A monopolyis a market with only one seller, and there are high barriers to entry. In conclusion, the concepts of supply and demand, elasticity, and market structures play a crucial role in shaping the economy. Understanding how these concepts interact and influence eachother is essential for policymakers and businesses to make informed decisions that can lead to a more efficient allocation of resources and a more prosperous economy.翻译范文如下：经济学是一个不断发展和变化的领域，经济学的研究涉及对个人、企业和政府如何做出关于资源配置的决策有着深刻的理解。

经济学英文论文及翻译题目The Impact of Globalization on Income InequalityAbstract:This paper examines the impact of globalization on income inequality. Globalization has been a major force shaping the world economy in recent decades, leading to increased interconnectedness and integration of economies. While globalization has brought about many benefits such as increased trade and economic growth, it has also been associated with rising income inequality within and between countries. This paper reviews the existing literature on the subject and analyzes the various channels through which globalization can affect income distribution. In addition, it discusses the role of policies and institutions in mitigating the adverse effects of globalization on income inequality. The findings suggest that while globalizationhas the potential to reduce poverty and improve living standardsfor many, it has also contributed to widening income disparities. Effective policy interventions and institutional reforms are crucialin ensuring that the benefits of globalization are shared more equitably across society.全球化对收入不平等的影响摘要：本文考察了全球化对收入不平等的影响。

外文翻译之一Competition and Cooperation in Industrial Cluster: TheImplication for Public PolicyDavid NewlandsEnglishEuropean Planning Studies, , (2003)2. Industrial Clusters: A Critical Reading of Different TheoriesAgglomeration Theory, From Marshall OnwardsMarshall, in his writings on Sheffield, Lancashire and other British regions, viewed the main source of external economies as the ‘commons’, the infrastructure and other services from which each individual firm in an industrial district might draw (Marshall, 1921). Examples include, in modern terminology, improved job search and job matching, more favorable access to capital finance and inter-firm labor migration. The availability of such common resources to a number of firms then enhances their size and diversity as both capital and labor are attracted to such areas to exploit the larger markets for their services. This in turn leads to reductions in factor prices and/or increases in factor productivities. These are the ways in which the external benefit to firms of a location in the industrial district manifests itself. Unit production costs will be lower within the industrial district than out with it.Parallel to his studies of industrial organization, in the various editions of his Principles of Economics, Marshall (1890, 1920) helped develop what was to become standard agglomeration theory. This was then built upon subsequently by a number of writers. For example, Scitovsky (1954) identified a further category of ‘pecuniary external economies’, Perroux (1955) contributed his famous theory of growth poles, and Chinitz (1961) applied the notion of agglomeration economies to the economic development of New York and Pittsburgh. More recently, Krugman (1991, 1995) has emphasized the importance of increasing returns as a favorable condition for the development of external economies. Porter (1990) can also be understood as belonging to this lineage in the sense that external economies make up many of the keyrelationships within his famous ‘diamond’.Standard agglomeration theory provides an explanation of why firms might cluster together, sharing a ‘commons’ of business services and a diversified labour force, and forming extensive local linkages with other firms. However, it conforms to neo-classical theory in that local economies are viewed as collections of atomistic businesses, aware of one another solely through the intermediation of price/cost signals. Firms continue to compete with each other although Marshall was keen to warn of the risks that fir ms’ collaboration, in the development of shared inputs, risked blunting competitive forces.Transaction Costs: The ‘Californian School’In the writings of the ‘Californian school’, the disintegration of productive systems leads to an increase in firms’ tr ansaction costs (Scott & Storper, 1986; Scott, 1988; Storper, 1989). Changes in market and technological conditions have led to increased uncertainty and greater risks of over capacity (of labour and capital) and of being locked into redundant technologies.The response of deepening the organizational division of labour leads to an increase in the number of formal market transactions external to the firm. There may also be an increase in the unpredictability and complexity of transactions. The costs of carrying out certain types of transaction—especially those where tacit knowledge is important or trust is required and thus complete contracting is impossible—varies systematically with distance. Thus, agglomeration is the result of the minimization of these types of transactions costs in a situation where such minimization outweighs other production cost differentials.The Californian school sought to explain observed agglomerations of economic activity. The argument centered on the localization of traded interdependencies—or simple input–output relations—but this is at best only a partial explanation, not least in being unable to distinguish convincingly between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ agglomerations. Agglomerations have been found in high wage, technologically advanced industries and low wage technologically stagnant ones alike while there are technologically dynamic agglomerations which lack the dense inter-firm linkages and coordinating institutions of a ‘new industrial district’.Nor is it clear whether markets will succeed in coordinating transactions within clusters (Cooke & Morgan, 1993). The management of traded interdependencies is exactly what we think of as the business of markets but there may nevertheless be market failure. Thus, certain “transactions—in labor markets, in inter-firm relations, in innovation and knowledge development—tended to have points of failure in the absence of appropriate institutions” (Storper,1995, p. 199). With this concern for the institutional arrangements within clusters, the ‘Californian school’ came to share certain of the arguments of the flexible specialization theorists who are discussed next and the institutional and evolutionary economists who are considered shortly.Flexible Specialization, Trust and Untraded InterdependenciesWhile neo-classical economics views firms as atomistic businesses, aware of one another only through formal market signals, modern industrial district theory emphasizes the interdependence of firms, flexible firm boundaries, and the importance of trust in creating and sustaining collaboration between economic actors within the districts.These themes arose first in the literature on flexible specialization in the ‘Third Italy’(Brusco, 1982) but was later extended to Baden-Wu¨rtemberg and other regions (Piore & Sabel, 1984). The sources of flexibility lay in collaborative networks of (mostly) small firms and supporting institutions. These networks permitted the establishment of trust between actors, a crucial argument within most contemporary approaches to clusters. The reasoning is that firms within networks of trust benefit from the reciprocal exchange of information—particularly tacit information that cannot be codified—but are simultaneously bound by ties of obligation which regulate behavior. Trust thus reinforces mutually beneficial relationships between firms. The implicit assumption is that trust is more likely to be sustained in geographically concentrated networks than more dispersed ones (Belussi, 1996).Firms may cooperate in seeking to get new work and may bid together on large projects. They may form consortia to access cheaper finance. They may jointly purchase materials and conduct or commission joint research. They may plan together and receive technical, financial and other services from the ‘commons’. However, despite all these examples of cooperative relationships, founded on or reinforced by trust, because they remain privately ownedbusinesses, firms within clusters continue to compete, with one another and with other firms, often more on quality than price.The embedding of economic relations into a wider social framework appears to be most common where business activity is conditioned by local politics, religion and close kinship and friendship relationships. Thus, “it is probably not a coincidence that the most successful districts have tended to be the most racially and culturally homogeneous” (Harrison, 1992,p. 479). Equally, national (or other broader) economic, legal and policy traditions are relevant. The development of inter-firm cooperation is more likely in some countries, such as Italy, than in others, such as the UK, because of differences in the operation of labor markets and competition policy.According to theorists such as Granovetter (1985), trust arises from the ‘digestion’ of experience. Trust accumulates from repeated interactions between firms and other actors in which they contract and recontract, formally and informally, strike deals, and help each other out at times of crisis. Trust results from a process of learning through experience which actors can be relied upon. Personal contact facilitates such repeated interactions and this in turn is likely to depend on proximity. This focus on untraded interdependencies is very different to the transactions costs approach to agglomeration. The latter concerns the cost minimization of traded relations while untraded interdependencies point to wider processes of the optimization of non-market or non-contract exchanges (Raco, 1999).Finally, it is important to note that untraded interdependencies can not only facilitate effective collective learning and action but also impede it. Especially where familiar conventions become well established, ‘sclerosis’ can set in. Areas can become locked into outdated and inferior technologies and institutions.Innovative Milieux: The GREMI GroupThere have been various schools of thought on the relationship between innovation, high technology industry and regional development. One line of enquiry has focused on the conditions for the establishment and growth of such high technology complexes as Silicon Valley and Route 128. While many factors have been identified, the most discussed is the role of local research intensive universities, Stanford in the case of Silicon Valley and MIT in thecase of Route 128. A large literature on the relationship between innovation, research universities and regional development has been spawned (Saxenian, 1985; Castells & Hall, 1994; Storper, 1993).Another direction of research has been in pursuit of the notion of an innovative milieu, the key theoretical concept of the GREMI (Groupement Europe′en des Milieux Innovateurs) group of regional economists (Aydalot & Keeble, 1988; Camagni, 1995). Clustering enables firms to benefit from a ‘collective learning process’, operating “through skilled labor mobility within the local labor market, customer–supplier technical and organizational interchange, imitation processes …and informal ‘cafeteria’effects”(Camagni, 1991, p. 130). This processdraws upon “an intricate network of mainly informal contacts among local actors …made up of personal face-to-face encounters, casual information flows, customer–supplier cooperation and the like” (Camagni, 1991, p. 131).However, there is a certain ambiguity as to what precisely milieux are. By some readings, a milieu is a set of institutions, practices and rules which provide a framework for development which guides and coordinates the activities of innovators. By other readings, a milieu is a network, of firms, research institutes and policy-makers, which provides the necessary coordination for successful innovation.These different interpretations, together with the very intangibility of milieux, are the sources of major intellectual problems. Thus, the GREMI group “has never b een able to identify the economic logic by which a milieu fosters innovation. There is circularity: innovation occurs because of a milieu, and a milieu is what exists in regions where there is innovation … they do not specify the potential mechanisms and processes by which such milieux function” (Storper, 1995, p. 203).Institutional and Evolutionary EconomicsA further approach derives from institutional and evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Amin & Thrift, 1992; Amin, 1999). Technological change is seen as path dependent since it involves sequenced, and not simultaneous, choices which are often irreversible. There is a spatial dimension to such choices with interdependencies between organizations being both traded and untraded. The latter include rules and conventionswhich shape the development and communication of knowledge between local actors. Given that there are strong irreversibilities, observed clusters are to some extent accidents of history, reflecting the impact of past choices, although their development is also influenced by the appearance and growth of reinforcing institutions.This approach is potentially very fruitful in understanding the nature of competition in contemporary capitalism (Dosi et al., 1987). Standard economic theory conceptualizes competition as the location on a production possibility frontier that maximizes a firm’s comparative advantage given an existing set of factor prices. Competition is a state, characterized by the absence or minimization of monopoly rents (Nickell, 1996). In contrast, drawing upon an Austrian perspective, institutional and evolutionary economics views competition as a process of economic change, spurred by constant technological change. Thus, if innovation is the driver of competition, a firm (or locality) may possess technologies which are superior to those of others regardless of the level of factor prices.This distinction has come to be known as that between ‘weak’ competition and ‘strong’ or Schumpeterian competition (Hudson, 1999). Weak competition involves the search for lower cost means of producing existing goods with existing technologies. Strong competition is a strategy which involves the creation of new goods or of new technologies to produce existing goods.产业集群中的竞争和合作：应用于公共政策David Newlands英国《欧洲策略研究》，2003年第11期2.产业集群：对不同理论的批判性解读标准的集聚理论——从马歇尔（Marshall）开始马歇尔在他关于Sheffield, Lancashire等其他英国地区的著作中认为外部经济的主要来源是共同的，即个体企业在一个产业地区可能享有的基础设施和其他服务等（Marshall, 1921）。

第1页 共19页中文3572字毕业论文（设计）外文翻译标题：危机管理-预防，诊断和干预一、外文原文标题：标题：Crisis management: prevention, diagnosis and Crisis management: prevention, diagnosis andintervention 原文：原文：The Thepremise of this paper is that crises can be managed much more effectively if the company prepares for them. Therefore, the paper shall review some recent crises, theway they were dealt with, and what can be learned from them. Later, we shall deal with the anatomy of a crisis by looking at some symptoms, and lastly discuss the stages of a crisis andrecommend methods for prevention and intervention. Crisis acknowledgmentAlthough many business leaders will acknowledge thatcrises are a given for virtually every business firm, many of these firms do not take productive steps to address crisis situations. As one survey of Chief Executive officers of Fortune 500 companies discovered, 85 percent said that a crisisin business is inevitable, but only 50 percent of these had taken any productive action in preparing a crisis plan(Augustine, 1995). Companies generally go to great lengths to plan their financial growth and success. But when it comes to crisis management, they often fail to think and prepare for those eventualities that may lead to a company’s total failure.Safety violations, plants in need of repairs, union contracts, management succession, and choosing a brand name, etc. can become crises for which many companies fail to be prepared untilit is too late.The tendency, in general, is to look at the company as a perpetual entity that requires plans for growth. Ignoring the probabilities of disaster is not going to eliminate or delay their occurrences. Strategic planning without inclusion ofcrisis management is like sustaining life without guaranteeinglife. One reason so many companies fail to take steps to proactively plan for crisis events, is that they fail to acknowledge the possibility of a disaster occurring. Like an ostrich with its head in the sand, they simply choose to ignorethe situation, with the hope that by not talking about it, it will not come to pass. Hal Walker, a management consultant, points out “that decisions will be more rational and better received, and the crisis will be of shorter duration, forcompanies who prepare a proactive crisis plan” (Maynard, 1993) .It is said that “there are two kinds of crises: those that thatyou manage, and those that manage you” (Augustine, 1995). Proactive planning helps managers to control and resolve a crisis. Ignoring the possibility of a crisis, on the other hand,could lead to the crisis taking a life of its own. In 1979, theThree-Mile Island nuclear power plant experienced a crisis whenwarning signals indicated nuclear reactors were at risk of a meltdown. The system was equipped with a hundred or more different alarms and they all went off. But for those who shouldhave taken the necessary steps to resolve the situation, therewere no planned instructions as to what should be done first. Hence, the crisis was not acknowledged in the beginning and itbecame a chronic event.In June 1997, Nike faced a crisis for which they had no existi existing frame of reference. A new design on the company’s ng frame of reference. A new design on the company’s Summer Hoop line of basketball shoes - with the word air writtenin flaming letters - had sparked a protest by Muslims, who complained the logo resembled the Arabic word for Allah, or God.The council of American-Islamic Relations threatened aa globalNike boycott. Nike apologized, recalled 38,000 pairs of shoes,and discontinued the line (Brindley, 1997). To create the brand,Nike had spent a considerable amount of time and money, but hadnever put together a general framework or policy to deal with such controversies. To their dismay, and financial loss, Nike officials had no choice but to react to the crisis. This incident has definitely signaled to the company that spending a little more time would have prevented the crisis. Nonetheless,it has taught the company a lesson in strategic crisis management planning.In a business organization, symptoms or signals can alert the strategic planners or executives of an eminent crisis. Slipping market share, losing strategic synergy anddiminishing productivity per man hour, as well as trends, issues and developments in the socio-economic, political and competitive environments, can signal crises, the effects of which can be very detrimental. After all, business failures and bankruptcies are not intended. They do not usually happen overnight. They occur more because of the lack of attention to symptoms than any other factor.Stages of a crisisMost crises do not occur suddenly. The signals can usuallybe picked up and the symptoms checked as they emerge. A company determined to address these issues realizes that the real challenge is not just to recognize crises, but to recognize themin a timely fashion (Darling et al., 1996). A crisis can consistof four different and distinct stages (Fink, 1986). The phasesare: prodromal crisis stage, acute crisis stage, chronic crisisstage and crisis resolution stage.Modern organizations are often called “organic” due tothe fact that they are not immune from the elements of their surrounding environments. Very much like a living organism, organizations can be affected by environmental factors both positively and negatively. But today’s successfulorganizations are characterized by the ability to adapt by recognizing important environmental factors, analyzing them, evaluating the impacts and reacting to them. The art of strategic planning (as it relates to crisis management)involves all of the above activities. The right strategy, in general, provides for preventive measures, and treatment or resolution efforts both proactively and reactively. It wouldbe quite appropriate to examine the first three stages of acrisis before taking up the treatment, resolution or intervention stage.Prodromal crisis stageIn the field of medicine, a prodrome is a symptom of the onset of a disease. It gives a warning signal. In business organizations, the warning lights are always blinking. No matter how successful the organization, a number of issues andtrends may concern the business if proper and timely attentionis paid to them. For example, in 1995, Baring Bank, a UK financial institution which had been in existence since 1763,ample opportunitysuddenly and unexpectedly failed. There wasfor the bank to catch the signals that something bad was on thehorizon, but the company’s efforts to detect that were thwarted by an internal structure that allowed a single employee both to conduct and to oversee his own investment trades, and the breakdown of management oversight and internalcontrol systems (Mitroff et al., 1996). Likewise, looking in retrospect, McDonald’s fast food chain was given the prodromalsymptoms before the elderly lady sued them for the spilling ofa very hot cup of coffee on her lap - an event that resulted in a substantial financial loss and tarnished image of thecompany. Numerous consumers had complained about thetemperature of the coffee. The warning light was on, but the company did not pay attention. It would have been much simplerto pick up the signal, or to check the symptom, than facing the consequences.In another case, Jack in the Box, a fast food chain, had several customers suffer intestinal distress after eating at their restaurants. The prodromal symptom was there, but the company took evasive action. Their initial approach was to lookaround for someone to blame. The lack of attention, the evasiveness and the carelessness angered all the constituent groups, including their customers. The unfortunate deaths thatptoms,occurred as a result of the company’s ignoring thesymand the financial losses that followed, caused the company to realize that it would have been easier to manage the crisis directly in the prodromal stage rather than trying to shift theblame.Acute crisis stageA prodromal stage may be oblique and hard to detect. The examples given above, are obvious prodromal, but no action wasWebster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, an acute stage occursacutewhen a symptom “demands urgent attention.” Whether the acutesymptom emerges suddenly or is a transformation of a prodromalstage, an immediate action is required. Diverting funds and other resources to this emerging situation may cause disequilibrium and disturbance in the whole system. It is onlythose organizations that have already prepared a framework forthese crises that can sustain their normal operations. For example, the US public roads and bridges have for a long time reflected a prodromal stage of crisis awareness by showing cracks and occasionally a collapse. It is perhaps in light of the obsessive decision to balance the Federal budget that reacting to the problem has been delayed and ignored. This situation has entered an acute stage and at the time of this writing, it was reported that a bridge in Maryland had just collapsed.The reason why prodromes are so important to catch is thatit is much easier to manage a crisis in this stage. In the caseof most crises, it is much easier and more reliable to take careof the problem before it becomes acute, before it erupts and causes possible complications (Darling et al., 1996). In andamage. However, the losses are incurred. Intel, the largest producer of computer chips in the USA, had to pay an expensiveprice for initially refusing to recall computer chips that proved unreliable o n on certain calculations. The f irmfirm attempted to play the issue down and later learned its lesson. At an acutestage, when accusations were made that the Pentium Chips were not as fast as they claimed, Intel quickly admitted the problem,apologized for it, and set about fixing it (Mitroff et al., 1996). Chronic crisis stageDuring this stage, the symptoms are quite evident and always present. I t isIt is a period of “make or break.” Being the third stage, chronic problems may prompt the company’s management to once and for all do something about the situation. It may be the beginning of recovery for some firms, and a deathknell for others. For example, the Chrysler Corporation was only marginallysuccessful throughout the 1970s. It was not, however, until the company was nearly bankrupt that amanagement shake-out occurred. The drawback at the chronic stage is that, like in a human patient, the company may get used to “quick fixes” and “band “band--aid”approaches. After all, the ailment, the problem and the crisis have become an integral partoverwhelmed by prodromal and acute problems that no time or attention is paid to the chronic problems, or the managers perceive the situation to be tolerable, thus putting the crisison a back burner.Crisis resolutionCrises could be detected at various stages of their development. Since the existing symptoms may be related todifferent problems or crises, there is a great possibility thatthey may be misinterpreted. Therefore, the people in charge maybelieve they have resolved the problem. However, in practicethe symptom is often neglected. In such situations, the symptomwill offer another chance for resolution when it becomes acute,thereby demanding urgent care. Studies indicate that today anincreasing number of companies are issue-oriented and searchfor symptoms. Nevertheless, the lack of experience in resolvinga situation and/or inappropriate handling of a crisis can leadto a chronic stage. Of course, there is this last opportunityto resolve the crisis at the chronic stage. No attempt to resolve the crisis, or improper resolution, can lead to grim consequences that will ultimately plague the organization or even destroy it.It must be noted that an unsolved crisis may not destroy the company. But, its weakening effects can ripple through the organization and create a host of other complications.Preventive effortsThe heart of the resolution of a crisis is in the preventiveefforts the company has initiated. This step, similar to a humanbody, is actually the least expensive, but quite often the mostoverlooked. Preventive measures deal with sensing potential problems (Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt, 1995). Major internalfunctions of a company such as finance, production, procurement, operations, marketing and human resources are sensitive to thesocio-economic, political-legal, competitive, technological, demographic, global and ethical factors of the external environment. What is imminently more sensible and much more manageable, is to identify the processes necessary forassessing and dealing with future crises as they arise (Jacksonand Schantz, 1993). At the core of this process are appropriate information systems, planning procedures, anddecision-making techniques. A soundly-based information system will scan the environment, gather appropriate data, interpret this data into opportunities and challenges, and provide a concretefoundation for strategies that could function as much to avoid crises as to intervene and resolve them.Preventive efforts, as stated before, require preparations before any crisis symptoms set in. Generally strategic forecasting, contingency planning, issues analysis, and scenario analysis help to provide a framework that could be used in avoiding and encountering crises.出处：出处：Toby TobyJ. Kash and John R. Darling . Crisis management: prevention, diagnosis 179-186二、翻译文章标题：危机管理：预防，诊断和干预译文：本文的前提是，如果该公司做好准备得话，危机可以更有效地进行管理。

中文4020字毕业论文（设计）外文翻译一、外文原文标题：CLUSTERS AND THE NEW ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION 原文：What Is a Cluster?Clusters are geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field. Clusters encompass an array of linked industries and other entities important to competition. They include, for example, suppliers of specialized inputs such as components, machinery, and services, and providers of specialized infrastructure. Clusters also often extend downstream to channels and customers and laterally to manufacturers of complementary products and to companies in industries related by skills, technologies, or common inputs. Finally, many clusters include governmental and other institutions –such as universities, standards-setting agencies, think tanks, vocational training providers, and trade associations – that provide specialized training, education, information, research, and technical support.The California wine cluster is a good example. It includes 680 commercial wineries as well as several thousand independent wine grape growers. (See the exhibit “Anatomy of the California Wine Cluster.”) An extensive complement of industries supporting both wine making and grape growing exists, including suppliers of grape stock, irrigation and harvesting equipment, barrels, and labels; specialized public relations and advertising firms; and numerous wine publications aimed at consumer and trade audiences. A host of local institutions is involved with wine, such as the world-renowned viticulture and enology program at the University of California at Davis, the Wine Institute, and special committees of the California senate and assembly. The cluster also enjoys weaker linkages to other California clusters in agriculture, food and restaurants, and wine-country tourism.Consider also the Italian leather fashion cluster, which contains well-known shoe companies such as Ferragamo and Gucci as well as a host of specialized suppliers of footwear components, machinery, molds, design services, and tanned leather. (See the exhibit “Mapping the Italian Leather Fashion Cluster.”) It also consists of several chains of related industries, including those producing different types of leather goods (linked by common inputs and technologies) and different types of footwear (linked by overlapping channels and technologies). These industries employ common marketing media and compete with similar images in similar customer segments. A related Italian cluster in textile fashion, including clothing, scarves, and accessories, produces complementary products that often employ common channels. The extraordinary strength of the Italian leather fashion cluster can be attributed, at least in part, to the multiple linkages and synergies that participating Italian businesses enjoy.A cluster’s boundaries are defined by the linkages and complementarities across industries and institutions that are most important to competition. Although clusters often fit within political boundaries, they may cross state or even national borders. In the United States, for example, a pharmaceuticals cluster straddles New Jersey and Pennsylvania near Philadelphia. Similarly, a chemicals cluster in Germany crosses over into German-speaking Switzerland.Clusters rarely conform to standard industrial classification systems, which fail to capture many important actors and relationships in competition. Thus significant clusters may be obscured or even go unrecognized. In Massachusetts, for example, more than 400 companies, representing at least 39,000 high-paying jobs, are involved in medical devices in some way. The cluster long remained all but invisible, however, buried within larger and overlapping industry categories such as electronic equipment and plastic products. Executives in the medical devices cluster have only recently come together to work on issues that will benefit them all.Clusters promote both competition and cooperation. Rivals compete intensely to win and retain customers. Without vigorous competition, a cluster will fail. Yet there is also cooperation, much of it vertical, involving companies in related industries and local institutions. Competition can coexist with cooperation because they occur ondifferent dimensions and among different players.Clusters represent a kind of new spatial organizational form in between arm’s-length markets on the one hand and hierarchies, or vertical integration, on the other. A cluster, then, is an alternative way of organizing the value chain. Compared with market transactions among dispersed and random buyers and sellers, the proximity of companies and institutions in one location – and the repeated exchanges among them–fosters better coordination and trust. Thus clusters mitigate the problems inherent in arm’s-length relationships without imposing the inflexibilities of vertical integration or the management challenges of creating and maintaining formal linkages such as networks, alliances, and partnerships. A cluster of independent and informally linked companies and institutions represents a robust organizational form that offers advantages in efficiency, effectiveness, and flexibility.Why Clusters Are Critical to CompetitionModern competition depends on productivity, not on access to inputs or the scale of individual enterprises. Productivity rests on how companies compete, not on the particular fields they compete in. Companies can be highly productive in any industry – shoes, agriculture, or semiconductors – if they employ sophisticated methods, use advanced technology, and offer unique products and services. All industries can employ advanced technology; all industries can be knowledge intensive.The sophistication with which companies compete in a particular location, however, is strongly influenced by the quality of the local business environment. Companies cannot employ advanced logistical techniques, for example, without a highquality transportation infrastructure. Nor can companies effectively compete on sophisticated service without well-educated employees. Businesses cannot operate efficiently under onerous regulatory red tape or under a court system that fails to resolve disputes quickly and fairly. Some aspects of the business environment, such as the legal system, for example, or corporate tax rates, affect all industries. In advanced economies, however, the more decisive aspects of the business environment are often cluster specific; these constitute some of the most important microeconomic foundations for competition.Clusters affect competition in three broad ways: first, by increasing the productivity of companies based in the area; second, by driving the direction and pace of innovation, which underpins future productivity growth; and third, by stimulating the formation of new businesses, which expands and strengthens the cluster itself. A cluster allows each member to benefit as if it had greater scale or as if it had joined with others formally – without requiring it to sacrifice its flexibility.Clusters and Productivity. Being part of a cluster allows companies to operate more productively in sourcing inputs; accessing information, technology, and needed institutions; coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating improvement.Better Access to Employees and Suppliers. Companies in vibrant clusters can tap into an existing pool of specialized and experienced employees, thereby lowering their search and transaction costs in recruiting. Because a cluster signals opportunity and reduces the risk of relocation for employees, it can also be easier to attract talented people from other locations, a decisive advantage in some industries.A well-developed cluster also provides an efficient means of obtaining other important inputs. Such a cluster offers a deep and specialized supplier base. Sourcing locally instead of from distant suppliers lowers transaction costs. It minimizes the need for inventory, eliminates importing costs and delays, and –because local reputation is important –lowers the risk that suppliers will overprice or renege on commitments. Proximity improves communications and makes it easier for suppliers to provide ancillary or support services such as installation and debugging. Other things being equal, then, local outsourcing is a better solution than distant outsourcing, especially for advanced and specialized inputs involving embedded technology, information, and service content.Formal alliances with distant suppliers can mitigate some of the disadvantages of distant outsourcing. But all formal alliances involve their own complex bargaining and governance p roblems and can inhibit a company’s flexibility. The close, informal relationships possible among companies in a cluster are often a superior arrangement.In many cases, clusters are also a better alternative to vertical integration.Compared with in-house units, outside specialists are often more cost effective and responsive, not only in component production but also in services such as training. Although extensive vertical integration may have once been the norm, a fast-changing environment can render vertical integration inefficient, ineffective, and inflexible.Even when some inputs are best sourced from a distance, clusters offer advantages. Suppliers trying to penetrate a large, concentrated market will price more aggressively, knowing that as they do so they can realize efficiencies in marketing and in service. Working against a cluster’s advantages in assembling resources is the possibility that competition will render them more expensive and scarce. But companies do have the alternative of outsourcing many inputs from other locations, which tends to limit potential cost penalties. More important, clusters increase not only the demand for specialized inputs but also their supply.Access to Specialized Information. Extensive market, technical, and competitive information accumulates within a cluster, and members have preferred access to it. In addition, personal relationships and community ties foster trust and facilitate the flow of information. These conditions make information more transferable.Complementarities. A host of linkages among cluster members results in a whole greater than the sum of its parts. In a typical tourism cluster, for example, the quality of a visitor’s experience depends not only on the appeal of the primary attraction but also on the quality and efficiency of complementary businesses such as hotels, restaurants, shopping outlets, and transportation facilities. Because members of the cluster are mutually dependent, good performance by one can boost the success of the others.Complementarities come in many forms. The most obvious is when products complement one another in meeting customers’ needs, as the tourism example illustrates. Another form is the coordination of activities across companies to optimize their collective productivity. In wood products, for instance, the efficiency of sawmills depends on a reliable supply of high-quality timber and the ability to put all the timber to use – in furniture (highest quality), pallets and boxes (lower quality), or wood chips (lowest quality). In the early 1990s, Portuguese sawmills suffered frompoor timber quality because local landowners did not invest in timber management. Hence most timber was processed for use in pallets and boxes, a lower-value use that limited the price paid to landowners. Substantial improvement in productivity was possible, but only if several parts of the cluster changed simultaneously. Logging operations, for example, had to modify cutting and sorting procedures, while sawmills had to develop the capacity to process wood in more sophisticated ways. Coordination to develop standard wood classifications and measures was an important enabling step. Geographically dispersed companies are less likely to recognize and capture such linkages.Other complementarities arise in marketing. A cluster frequently enhances the reputation of a location in a particular field, making it more likely that buyers will turn to a vendor based there. Italy’s strong reputation for fashion and design, for example, benefits companies involved in leather goods, footwear, apparel, and accessories. Beyond reputation, cluster members often profit from a variety of joint marketing mechanisms, such as company referrals, trade fairs, trade magazines, and marketing delegations.Finally, complementarities can make buying from a cluster more attractive for customers. Visiting buyers can see many vendors in a single trip. They also may perceive their buying risk to be lower because one location provides alternative suppliers. That allows them to multisource or to switch vendors if the need arises. Hong Kong thrives as a source of fashion apparel in part for this reason.Access to Institutions and Public Goods. Investments made by government or other public institutions –such as public spending for specialized infrastructure or educational programs – can enhance a company’s productivity. The ability to recruit employees trained at local programs, for example, lowers the cost of internal training. Other quasi-public goods, such as the cluster’s informa tion and technology pools and its reputation, arise as natural by-products of competition.It is not just governments that create public goods that enhance productivity in the private sector. Investments by companies –in training programs, infrastructure, quality centers, testing laboratories, and so on –also contribute to increasedproductivity. Such private investments are often made collectively because cluster participants recognize the potential for collective benefits.Better Motivation and Measurement. Local rivalry is highly motivating.Peer pressure amplifies competitive pressure within a cluster,even among noncompeting or indirectly competing companies. Pride and the desire to look good in the local community spur executives to attempt to outdo one another.Clusters also often make it easier to measure and compare performances because local rivals share general circumstances – for example, labor costs and local market access – and they perform similar activities. Companies within clusters typically have intimate knowledge of their suppliers’ costs. Managers are able to compare costs and employees’performance with other local companies. Additionally, financial institutions can accumulate knowledge about the cluster that can be used to monitor performance.Source:PorterM E. Clusters and the new economics of competition[ J ]. Harvard Business Review, 1998, 76 (6), pp.78-83二、翻译文章标题：集群和新竞争经济学译文：一、什么是集群产业集群是指与某一产业有关的企业和机构在地理位置上的集中，它包括一批对竞争起作用的、相互联系的产业和其他实体，例如包括零部件、机器和服务等专业化投入的供应商和专业基础设施的提供者。

外文文献及翻译：在全球经济中竞争：创新挑战外文文献及翻译：在全球经济中竞争：创新挑战外文资料商管031 梅文飞 0364027Competing in the global economy: the innovation challenge Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, Lord Sainsbury. Innovation Report.2003.12: 17-31，52-65.Chapter 1 The innovation challengeSummaryGlobal competition is increasing as a result of trade liberalization, technological change and reductions in transport and communication costs. UK based businesses will find it increasingly difficult to compete onlow costs alone in labour intensive industries exposed to international competition. The challenge for businesses is to compete on the basis of unique value.We have defined innovation as the successful exploitation of newideas and it is central to meeting this challenge. It involves investments in new products, processes or services and in new ways of doing business. Measures to develop the skills and creativity of the workforce are often an essential prerequisite. The speed oftechnological change and market responses make the challenge to innovate urgent and continuous.Overall UK innovation performance appears to be, at best, average compared to our major competitors. This is reflected in the largeproductivity gap that exists between the UK and its major competitors. Innovation performance accounts for a significantproportion of this gap. On the whole, UK firms face a challenge: how to raise their rate of innovation?Innovation is a complex process so understanding why the UK has a relatively modest innovation performance is not straightforward. We drew on an extensive review of the international innovation literature and consulted with a group of leading experts in the field.As a result we have identified seven critical success factors for innovation performance. They are:Sources of new technological knowledge;Capacity to absorb and exploit new knowledge;Access to finance;Competition and entrepreneurship;Customers and suppliers;The Regulatory environment;Networks and collaboration.They help us to identify current strengths and weaknesses of the UK innovation system. A highly abridged summary is provided in this chapter but the more detailed1analysis is contained in an accompanying economic report.Our vision is of the UK as a key knowledge hub in the global economy.A country that will have maintained its outstanding tradition in theadvance of scientific and technological knowledge while developing a similar level of performance in turning knowledge into exciting and novel products and services.The Report complements the Lambert Review of University-Businesslinks as well as the cross-Government Skills Strategy. It makes proposals to strengthen UK performance against all the success factors building upon initiatives that have gone before.What is innovation?1.1. Innovation in this Report is defined as the successful exploitation of new ideas. Ideas may be entirely new to the market or involve the application of existing ideas that are new to the innovating organization or often a combination of both. Innovation involves the creation of new designs, concepts and ways of doing things, their commercial exploitation, and subsequent diffusion through the rest of the economy and society. It is this last–diffusion–phase from which the bulk of the economic benefits flow. Most innovations are incremental–a succession ofindividually modest improvements to products or services over their life cycle. But a few will be dramatic, creating entirely new industries or markets.1.2. Innovation involves experimentation and risk taking. Some attempts to innovate will fail, but across the economy the successes outweigh the failures. And the failures themselves generate newknowledge, which if evaluated correctly, can improve the chances for future success. The risk of failure justifies the potentially high returns from successes, which provide the incentive to innovate in the first place. Successful innovation-led companies have a number of common characteristics (Box 1.1).Characteristics of innovation-led companies:A worldwide focus, often requiring early expansion overseas;A balanced growth strategy, based on organic growth and targeted acquisitions to enter new markets or acquire criticalexpertise;A balanced investment strategy;Above average investment in market led research and development;A focus on what really matters to the customer;An innovation culture with corporate leadership that expects growth through development of new products and services.Why is it important now?1.3. Innovation is vital to most businesses operating in the UK if they are to survive and grow in the long term. But there are five reasons why innovation matters more for businesses and the people who work in them today.Markets around the world are being liberalised. This brings opportunities from expanding trade. And firms can locate all or part of the production process or service wherever the economic advantage is greatest. But UK-based firms also face competition from firms incountries with relatively low labour costs and where education andskills levels are high. For example, hourly labour costs in South Korea2are just over half UK levels, but the proportion of graduates in the working age population is almost identical.Long-term reductions in the costs of transportation and communication have also opened up new markets and faster global communications mean that consumers learn about new fashions, ideas and products faster than ever before. The cost of sea freight has fallen by two-thirds since 1920, air transport by five-sixths since 1930. Transatlantic telephone calls are nowalmost free on the Internet.Science and Technology are providing new opportunities for businesses to compete based on exploiting knowledge, skills and creativity to produce more valuable goods and services. Industries are being created, such as Biotechnology, and traditional ones are being transformed (e.g. growth of technical textiles). Because they rely on knowledge and skills, they provide areas where high wage, developed economies can maintain a competitive advantage over low wage, unskilled ones.Services, accounting for over 70% of the economy, are becoming more technology intensive. Technology is being used to improve business processes and customer service in sectors such as retail, hotels and banking, and to develop new products combining creative strengths with the latest technology, such as computer games. Many high technologymanufacturers now make more money from services than they do from manufacturing.Increasing environmental concerns are acting as a stimulus to innovation.for example, reducing CO emissions and Demand for environmental improvements–2volumes of waste – may require changes in the economy and to the way we live. To deliver these changes the market has to generate innovative uses of technology, new ways of doing business and new consumer attitudes.1.4.The speed of changing technology and the extent to which new products and services can change market conditions mean that the challenge to innovate is urgent and continuous. UK-based businesses will find it increasingly difficult to compete on low costs alone in labour intensive industries exposed tointernational competition. The challenge for businesses is to compete on the basis of unique value.1.5. The UK is not alone in facing this challenge. European leaders agreed at Lisbon in spring 2000 to make the EU “the most dynamic, knowledge-driveneconomy in the world by 2010”. Innovation is integral to achieving this vision.How is the UK doing?1.6.We have consulted a distinguished panel of leading academic experts in drawing up the analysis underpinning this Report. Thisanalysis has been published separately. The main points concerning the UK’s innovation performance are set out below.The latest international comparisons of data on business R&D showthe UK well behind the US and roughly equal to the EU average. However, it is encouraging that after a steady period of decline from 1.5% of GDP in 1981 to 1.16% in 1997, we have seen a move in the right direction, to 1.24% in 2002.Adjusting for size of eco nomy, UK firms’ patenting activity at patent offices inEurope, Japan and the US lies well behind firms in Japan, Germany and the US and is just below the European average.3Although systematic data is lacking, it appears that the UK lags behind the US and major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies in the take- up of best practice improvements such as lean manufacturing.Data from surveys, which rely on broader measures of innovation, paint a similar picture with UK performance weakerinternational peers.1.7.The analysis suggests that UK business faces a challenge: how to raise its rate of innovation?How did we try to explain the causes of UK performance?1.8. Innovation is a complex process so understanding why the UK hasa relatively modest innovation performance is not straightforward. Tohelp us do this we drew on an extensive review of the international innovation literature, aided by a panel of experts. We also drew heavily on analysis by the AIM Management Research Forum and the OECD.As a result we have identified seven critical success factors for innovation performance. They help us to identify current strengths and weaknesses of the UK innovation system and to develop proposals to improve its performance.Success factors for UK innovation performance1.9.What follows is a highly abridged version of the supporting analysis, summarizing the UK’s performance against the seven factors: Sources of new technological knowledge play an important role in shaping innovation systems. Science-based technologies are increasing in importance. New products and services tend to embody a wider range of technologies, increasing the complexity faced by individual firms. UK-based firms make extensive use of customers and suppliers as knowledge sources. The UK Science, Engineering and Technology (SET) base is highly productive and the UK has world-class design expertise.The capacity to absorb and exploit knowledge defines aability to turn knowledge into new products, processes or services. Fundamentally it is people who create knowledge, manage businesses and innovate. Poor skills amongst managers and the workforce more generally have hindered performance. The culture within UK-owned firms appears to place less emphasis on creativity.All investments in innovation need access to finance. Relatively lower levels of innovation spend are probably more due to a lack of incentives and capacity than a shortage of funds, although some financing gaps exist.Competition provides a stimulus to innovation and helps determinethe intensity of competition and the ability of firms to spot opportunities and manage risks.Customers and suppliers put pressure on firms to deliver better quality goods and services and provide opportunities for innovation. Many UK-based firms compete in global markets and the UK is anattractive market for innovative firms from abroad.The regulatory environment affects the possibilities and incentive structures for innovation. OECD comparisons show the UK to be relatively lightly regulated, although there are continuing business concerns about the impact of new regulations.And networks and collaboration are important means of accessing knowledge. Businesses are increasingly looking outside their sectors for opportunities to4collaborate.Figure 1.4How Government policies influence innovationEnablers Advice and support for business Intellectual property framework Best practice programmers Measurement system OpportunitiesSupport for developing new lluyreyryreyt Standards Public procurement technology Bu Regulations Help accessing finance R&D tax creditsBusiness Innovation Support for inward investmentAccess to global knowledge baseBuilding blocks of innovation: a supportive climateMacroeconomic stability Education and training policy Trade policy Competition policy Physical and IT infrastructure Science policy Areas of Government influence1.10.Ultimately innovation depends on the knowledge, skills and creativity of those working in businesses. But Government has an important role in creating the right environment for innovation. Figure 1.4 sets out the main mechanisms and channels through whichGovernment – at various levels – influences businessinnovation.1.11.The Government has already laid the foundations of aninnovation-driven economy in areas such as macro-economic policy, fiscal policy, competition policy, trade policy and education and skills.1.12. Since 1997 we have pro duced three White Papers, “Our competitive future–Building a knowledge driven economy”(1998), “Excellence andOpportunity–a Science and Innovation Policy for the 21stCentury” (2000) and “Opportunity for All in a World of Change–Enterprise,Skills and Inno vation” (2001). In these we set in motion a series ofmicro-economic measures to stimulate innovation, such as increased investment in the science base, incentives to encourage research institutions and universities to commercialize their research, and measures to encourage more small businesses to start up and innovate.1.13. Policies and programmers affecting innovation are determinedat a variety of levels. In some cases, the role of the UK Government is to influence developments on a European or global scale.Chapter 3 Technology innovationSummary5Developed countries around the world have recognized that success in the future will come from businesses increasing the added value from their products, processes and services. Government action to encourage businesses to develop and implement new products and services has become a high priority. Given this, the UK Government needs to harness its resources more effectively in promoting technological innovation.The need to improve the take-up of new technologies3.1.The end of the 20th century witnessed a wave of scientific discovery and technology innovation in a range of areas that have only just begun to change the way we work and interact with our physical, natural and social environments. For example, the developments of the Internet and mobile communicationshave transformed people’s access to information.3.2.The pace of change is often quicker than anticipated and the impacts are fundamental. The growth of completely new industries such as biotechnology, software and the digital content industry in the UK, as well as the decline of more traditional sectors, bear very real testimony to this. For example during the 10 year period 1992-2002 the number of biotechnology businesses in the UK has increased0.5 from some 165 to 425, and turnover has increased by over sixfold (from ,billion to ,3.2 billion).3.3.The UK has a strong indigenous knowledge source available to business through the Science, Engineering and Technology (SET) base and we do have a strong presence in some science-based technologies such as pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and aerospace.Promoting knowledge transfer3.4. The SET base makes a major contribution to knowledge transfer through the publication of research results and the supply of highly skilled people capable of transferring and adapting codified and tacit knowledge. However, there is an additional role that Government can play in providing the opportunities and incentives for translating quality UK science into commercially successful applications.3.5.To simplify arrangements for universities, Higher Education Institutions(HEIF) is to be consolidated into a permanent third stream of knowledge transfer funding to universities, alongside that for teaching and research. More money will be put into the second round ofHEIF. The aim is to simplify the funding landscape and ensure that HEIsin England have greater discretion and the flexibility to develop their capacity in a way that best suits their needs and the needs of business.In future, support for technological innovation will be available through five products:Collaborative R&D support is available to meet some of the costs and risks associated with research and technology development, byfacilitating collaboration between different businesses and between business and the SET base across the UK.Knowledge Transfer Networks will encourage the diffusion of new and existing technology.Grant for R&D from June 2003 this has been available for individuals and SMEs, and it enables them to meet some of the costs of investing in technology innovation.6Grant for Investigating an Innovative Idea – this is a pilot,offering help to SMEsin England to look objectively at their ideas for innovative products, services or processes and to draw up an action plan to takethe idea forward.Knowledge Transfer Partnerships provide direct support for knowledge transfer by enabling universities and others in the SET base across the UK to work with businesses using recently qualified people, likegraduates, to undertake specific knowledge transfer projects in firms of all sizes.Technology IntermediariesTo complement the above actions, we will work more closely with technology intermediaries, whose role in technology development and transfer has been undervalued in recent years in both policy development and implementation. Technology intermediaries also have an importantrole to play at regional level.The principal members of the technology intermediaries’ community are the Research and Technology Organizations. They are a private sector community of effective knowledge-transfer companies. Their objective is knowledge transfer to industry to fill knowledge gaps and to stimulate innovation leading to higher value added products and services.7译文商管031 梅文飞 0364027在全球经济中竞争:创新挑战第一章创新挑战综述全球的竞争使贸易自由化的结果增加，技术变革以及运输和通讯费用减少。

CLUSTERS AND THE NEW ECONOMICS Of COMPETITION
BY MICHAEL E. PORTER
N
ow THAT COMPANIES can source capital; goods, information, and technology from around the world, often with the click of a mouse, much of the conventional wisdom ahout how companies and nations compete needs to he overhauled. In theory, more open glohal markets and faster transportation and communication should diminish the role of location in competition. After all, anything that can he efficiently sourced from a distance through glohal markets and corporate networks is availahle to any company and therefore is essentially nullified as a source of competitive advantage.
tion and competitive success in so many fields are geographically concentrated-wbetber it's entertainment in Hollywood, finance on Wall Street, or consumer eleetronics in Japan. Clusters affect competitiveness witbin countries as well as across national borders. Tberefore, tbey lead to new agendas for all business executivesnot just tbose wbo eompete globally. More broadly, clusters represent a new way of tbinking about location, cballenging mucb of the conventional wisdom about bow companies sbould be configured, bow institutions sucb as universities can contribute to competitive success, and bow governments can promote economic development and prosperity

本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目：Clusters and Comparative Advantage:Implications for Industrial Policy出处：Inter-American Development Bank作者：Andrés Rodríguez-ClareAbstractIndustrial agglomerations or “clusters” arise in the presence of industry-specific and local externalities, also called Marshallian externalities. The standard argument is that such externalities may justify a policy of infant-industry protection to allow and encourage clusters to emerge. This paper explores that argument and shows that different policy implications emerge under a more realistic modeling of clusters. In particular, rather than distorting prices to promote clusters in “advanced” sectors that may exhibit strong clustering possibilities, countries should focus instead on promoting clustering in current sectors that have demonstrated the strongest comparative advantage. Import substitution is not a proper way to achieve such a goal.IntroductionThere is a long tradition among both academics and development practitioners that associates economic development with the realization of agglomeration economies. In policy circles, this is evident in the focus on “clusters” as an important concept in understanding growth and in thinking about development policy (Porter, 1990). Clusters arise in the presence of “Marshallian externalities,”according to which firms benefit from the production and innovation activities of neighboring firms in the same and related industries.There is abundant evidence that such externalities exist and lead to industry-level agglomeration (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003). But what is the appropriate policy in the presence of Marshallian externalities (ME)? From a classical optimal-policy perspective, the correct approach would be to provide a production subsidy to firms generating ME, with the subsidy calibrated to match the strength of the externality. The problem, of course, is that this places very stringent information requirements on policy. The general impression is that “advanced”or “technology-intensive”sectors are the ones where ME are strongest, and recent empirical evidence appears to be consistent with this impression.Does this validate the common suggestion that countries should promote development of technologically advanced sectors, perhaps through Import Substitution?In this paper I will argue that Import Substitution or any policy that distorts prices so as to push resources towards “advanced”industries is notan appropriate way to deal with ME in the context of small developing countries. There are two reasons for this. First, because ME are not an intrinsic characteristic of an industry: the same industry could generate ME in one place and not the other, in one stage of its evolution and not another.A good example of this is found in the experience of many countries that followed Import Substitution strategies and succeeded in developing new industrial sectors, but failed to generate clustering and benefit from ME in these industries. Something similar happens when poor countries succeed in courting high-tech multinationals only to find that they fail to generate significant spillovers once installed. The second reason why Import Substitution is not necessarily appropriate in the presence of ME is that if an industry generates stronger ME, then it is likely that some advanced country is already benefiting from the higher productivity that comes from clustering in this sector. International prices would then be lower and nullify the stronger benefits of clustering.The consequence of this last point is that the strength of ME does not matter in choosing which clusters to promote.Rather, what matters is plain old comparative advantage. If one takes ME and clusters seriously, the correct policy is to promote clustering in existing sectors. To show these results in the simplest manner, I start in the next section with a review of the standard model of a small open economy where one of the sectors exhibits ME. This model has been used to motivate the use of Import Substitution (IS) as a development strategy. I derive the standard result that IS makes sense only if the economy has a comparative advantage in the sector that has ME. If “advanced”sectors are the ones exhibiting ME, then this already suggests that IS is not a reasonable policy for poor countries, which are not likely to have a comparative advantage in these sectors. More importantly, if—as argued above—ME are not intrinsic to particular sectors, but rather arise from the particular way in which production is organized, then the standard model is not appropriate.In Section 3 I develop an alternative model, where all sectors are amenable to experiencing ME (although the intensity of these externalities may vary across sectors) but this depends on the mode of production. Thus, instead of assuming that externalities are associated with certain industries, I postulate that externalities are related to the technology with which goods are produced. This captures the idea that what matters is not “what you produce, but how”(Porter, 1998; De Ferranti et. al., 2001). I will discuss several implications of this model, and in particular show that the best policy would be to promote clustering in the sector where the country has a comparative advantage, and not in the sector that enjoys the strongest possible ME.One drawback of both the standard model and this alternative model is that they incorporate only static externalities, whereas the empirical literature reveals that dynamic externalities (e.g., external learning bydoing) are equally if not more important. Moreover, since dynamic externalities are strongly associated with knowledge spillovers (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003), then it is very likely that they are accompanied by international spillovers, something left out of most models. The static nature of the models thus makes them difficult to relate to the recent literature on endogenous growth. In Section 4 I show a simple way in which the model presented in Section 3 can be generalized to incorporate dynamic externalities and international spillovers, and show how the income gap between North and South is related to clustering.Dynamic Externalities and International SpilloversIn contrast to the models explored above, which focus exclusively on static externalities, the empirical literature reveals that dynamic externalities play a very important role in industrial agglomeration. Moreover, given that knowledge spillovers are the main mechanism through which these dynamic externalities operate，it is likely that they are accompanied by international spillovers. Although the region where the knowledge originates is likely to benefit more and sooner, other regions are likely to benefit as well from spillovers. This section presents a very simple way to introduce dynamic externalities and international knowledge spillovers into the model developed above. The policy implications discussed are not affected; the purpose of this section is to add realism to the cluster-based model and allow for a sharper comparison between this model and the recent endogenous growth literature.The model is similar to the one presented in the previous section, although now it is assumed that production with the modern technology generates both dynamic as well as static externalities. To introduce dynamic externalities and international spillovers, I allow for an additional productivity variable, Ajit, that increases with time thanks to external industry-specific learning by doing and international spillovers. Labor productivity across sectors and technologies is just as above, except that now it is also multiplied by this variable Ajit.Let us focus on the equilibrium where the South is specialized in good 1 with no cluster. As in many recent models of growth (Parente and Prescott, 1994; Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 2004), both North and South grow at the same rate, so there is no convergence. In contrast to many of these models, however, it is not necessary for South to increase its investment in technology adoption to catch up with the North. Convergence would occur if South managed to develop a cluster, so that it too could generate both static and dynamic externalities.To summarize, the insights gained with the static model remain valid when we move to a more realistic setting with dynamic externalities and international spillovers. Countries with no clusters suffer from the lack of both static and dynamic externalities, although the income gap is boundedthanks to international spillovers. There are multiple equilibria, and the equilibrium with the highest income in South is the one where there is clustering in the sector where its comparative advantage is strongest. Policy should focus on promoting clustering in this sector and avoid price distortions.DiscussionThere are several additional policy implications of this model that I wish to highlight and discuss. The first is that protection in no way makes it more likely that a cluster will form, since the good can be produced without a cluster. Consider an initial situation where South is completely specialized in sector 1 with no cluster. Imposing a policy of Import Substitution (IS) would increase the domestic prices of good and at some point South would start producing some of this good. But it could produce it without a cluster, just as it produces good 1 without a cluster. There is no reason why IS would lead to clustering! In other words, once we accept that production in the advanced sector can take place using backward technologies or modes of production, then it becomes clear that IS does not necessarily lead to externalities and clustering. IS could simply push resources towards what are regarded in rich countries as advanced sectors, but that once in LDCs could be organized in ways that do not generate any externalities.This reasoning has broader implications. Not only IS, but any policy (even export promotion) that distorts prices so as to push resources into advanced sectors would have the same problem. Instead of policies to reallocate resources across sectors, it would be better to implement policies to promote clustering in sectors that already show comparative advantage. This implies that, as generally accepted by proponents of cluster-based policies, governments should not try to create clusters from scratch.An additional implication is that promoting a cluster is not necessarily welfare enhancing, since it could be a cluster without a comparative advantage. To see this, imagine that the South has no clusters. This immediately implies that it is specialized in sector. Imagine further that the government tries to promote a cluster in sector. To do so, it would have to distort prices, because—since Condition is not satisfied by Assumption 1—clustering in sector is not an equilibrium with undistorted prices. But if it does this, then welfare would decrease. Alternatively, if Condition is satisfied, then there is an equilibrium with full specialization in sector with a cluster, and it is conceivable that the government could induce the economy to switch to this superior equilibrium. Still, this equilibrium is inferior to the one with complete specialization and clustering in sector one. To summarize, when there are Ricardian differences (more generally, comparative advantage coming from sources different than clustering), promoting the creation of a cluster from scratch may be inferior to the status quo, and is always dominated by promotion of a cluster in sectors where theeconomy is already showing comparative advantage.Finally, the model shows that it is not the case that governments should favor clustering in industries with stronger externalities. As explained in the previous section, this is because such stronger externalities lead to higher productivity and hence lower international prices. Thus, for example, if we imagine that higher indexed goods are “more advanced” and that more advanced goods have stronger externalities, then. A common presumption here would be that policy should target more advanced sectors, to benefit from stronger clustering. The model presented here shows that this presumption is not correct. Instead, the appropriate policy is to promote clustering in the sector that has the strongest comparative advantage. Thus, industrial policy is not about “creating comparative advantage,” but ab out achieving the high productivity that comes from a cluster in the sector where it has a comparative advantage.译文：集群和比较优势：产业政策的启示摘要产业聚集区或“集群”出现于特定行业和地方也叫马歇尔的外部性的存在外部性。

外文文献翻译（附原文）外文译文一：产业集群的竞争优势——以中国大连软件工业园为例Weilin Zhao,Chihiro Watanabe，Charla-Griffy-Brown[J]. Marketing Science,2009(2):123-125.摘要：本文本着为促进工业的发展的初衷探讨了中国软件公园的竞争优势。

产业集群深植于当地的制度系统，因此拥有特殊的竞争优势。

根据波特的“钻石”模型、SWOT模型的测试结果对中国大连软件园的案例进行了定性的分析。

产业集群是包括一系列在指定地理上集聚的公司，它扎根于当地政府、行业和学术的当地制度系统，以此获得大量的资源，从而获得产业经济发展的竞争优势。

为了成功驾驭中国经济范式从批量生产到开发新产品的转换，持续加强产业集群的竞争优势,促进工业和区域的经济发展是非常有必要的。

关键词：竞争优势；产业集群；当地制度系统；大连软件工业园；中国；科技园区；创新；区域发展产业集群产业集群是波特[1]也推而广之的一个经济发展的前沿概念。

作为一个在全球经济战略公认的专家,他指出了产业集群在促进区域经济发展中的作用。

他写道：集群的概念,“或出现在特定的地理位置与产业相关联的公司、供应商和机构，已成为了公司和政府思考和评估当地竞争优势和制定公共决策的一种新的要素。

但是，他至今也没有对产业集群做出准确的定义。

最近根据德瑞克、泰克拉[2]和李维[3]检查的关于产业集群和识别为“地理浓度的行业优势的文献取得了进展”。

“地理集中”定义了产业集群的一个关键而鲜明的基本性质。

产业由地区上特定的众多公司集聚而成,他们通常有共同市场、,有着共同的供应商,交易对象,教育机构和其它像知识及信息一样无形的东西，同样地,他们也面临相似的机会和威胁。

在全球产业集群有许多种发展模式。

比如美国加州的硅谷和马萨诸塞州的128鲁特都是知名的产业集群。

前者以微电子、生物技术、和风险资本市场而闻名,而后者则是以软件、计算机和通讯硬件享誉天下[4]。

经济学小论文英文翻译The concept of supply and demand is a fundamental principle in economics. When the demand for a product or service increases, while the supply remains constant, the price of that product or service increases. Conversely, when the demand for a product or service decreases, while the supply remains constant, the price decreases.Supply and demand are influenced by a variety of factors, including consumer preferences, changes in the cost of production, and changes in the availability of resources. For example, if the cost of producing a good increases, the supply of that good may decrease, leading to an increase in price. On the other hand, if consumers' preferences shift towards a particular product, the demand for that product may increase, leading to an increase in price.In a competitive market, the interaction of supply and demand leads to an equilibrium price, where the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded. This equilibrium price is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves. If the market is not in equilibrium, there will be either a surplus or a shortage of the product, which will lead to changes in price.Understanding the dynamics of supply and demand is crucial for businesses, policymakers, and consumers. Businesses must carefully consider the factors that influence supply and demand in order to make informed production and pricing decisions. Policymakers must also consider the impact of their decisions on supply and demand in order to avoid unintended consequences.Finally, consumers must be aware of how changes in supply and demand can affect the prices of the products and services they purchase.In conclusion, supply and demand are essential concepts in economics that have a profound impact on the prices of goods and services. By understanding the factors that influence supply and demand, businesses, policymakers, and consumers can make more informed decisions.Supply and demand also play a crucial role in shaping the overall economy. When the demand for goods and services is strong, it can lead to increased production, investment, and employment opportunities, ultimately contributing to economic growth. Conversely, a decrease in demand can result in lower production, reduced investment, and potential unemployment, which can have negative ripple effects throughout the economy.Moreover, the concept of elasticity is important in understanding how changes in price and quantity affect supply and demand. Price elasticity of demand measures how sensitive the quantity demanded is to changes in price, while price elasticity of supply measures how sensitive the quantity supplied is to changes in price. When demand is price elastic, a small change in price can result in a large change in quantity demanded, whereas when demand is price inelastic, a change in price has a relatively small impact on quantity demanded.Similarly, the elasticity of supply is crucial in determining how producers respond to changes in price. In the case of price elastic supply, producers can quickly increase or decrease the quantitysupplied in response to changes in price. In contrast, when supply is price inelastic, producers may find it challenging to adjust the quantity supplied in response to price changes.Understanding these concepts allows businesses to better predict consumer behavior and make adjustments to their production and pricing strategies accordingly. It also enables policymakers to design effective economic policies, such as taxes or subsidies, to influence supply and demand in certain markets.In addition, international trade is another area where supply and demand dynamics have significant implications. Changes in supply or demand in one country can have spillover effects on the global market, impacting prices and trade flows across borders.In conclusion, the principles of supply and demand are fundamental to the functioning of economies at both micro and macro levels. The interplay between these forces determines prices, production levels, and overall economic activity. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of supply and demand is essentialfor businesses, policymakers, and individuals in making informed decisions and comprehending the complexities of the economic world.。

The green barrier to free tradeC. P. ChandrasekharJayati GhoshAs the March 31 deadline for completing the "modalities" stage of the proposed new round of negotiations on global agricultural trade nears, hopes of an agreement are increasingly waning. In this edition of Macroscan, C. P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh examine the factors and the players constraining the realisation of such an agreement.AT THE END of the latest round of meetings of the agricultural negotiations committee of the WTO, the optimism that negotiators would meet the March 31 deadline for working out numerical targets, formulas and other "modalities" through which countries can frame their liberalisation commitments in a new full-fledged round of trade negotiations has almost disappeared. That target was important for two reasons.First, it is now becoming clear, that even more than was true during the Uruguay Round, forging an agreement in the agricultural area is bound to prove extremely difficult.Progress in the agricultural negotiations was key to persuading the unconvinced that a new `Doha Round' of trade negotiations is useful and feasible.Second, the Doha declaration made agricultural negotiations one part of a `single undertaking' to be completed by January 1, 2005. That is, in a take `all-or-nothing' scheme, countries had to arrive at, and be bound by, agreements in all areas in which negotiations were to be initiated in the new round. This means that if agreement is not worked out with regard to agriculture, there would be no change in the multilateral trade regime governing industry, services or related areas and no progress in new areas, such as competition policy, foreign investment and public procurement, all of which are crucial to the economic agenda of the developed countries.The factors making agriculture the sticking point on this occasion are numerous. As in the last Round, there is little agreement among the developed countries themselves on the appropriate shape of the global agricultural trade regime.There are substantial differences in the agenda of the US, the EU and the developed countries within the Cairns group of agricultural exporters. When the rich and the powerful disagree, a global consensus is not easy to come by.But that is not all. Even if an agreement is stitched up between the rich nations, through manoeuvres such as the Blair House accord, getting the rest of the world to go along would be more difficult this time.This is because the outcomes in the agricultural trade area since the implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) began have fallen far short of expectations. In the course of Round, advocates of the UR regime had promised global production adjustments that would increase the value of world agricultural trade and an increase in developing country share of such trade.As Chart 1 shows, global production volumes continued to rise after 1994 when the implementation of the Uruguay Round began, with signs of tapering off only in 2000 and 2001. As is widely known, this increase in production occurred in the developed countries as well.Not surprisingly, therefore, the volume of world trade continued to rise as well after 1994 (Chart 2). The real shift occurred in agricultural prices which, after some buoyancy between 1993and 1995, have declined thereafter, and particularly sharply after 1997. It is this decline in unit values that resulted in a situation where the value of world trade stagnated and then declined after 1995, when the implementation of the Uruguay Round began.As Table 1 shows, there was a sharp fall in the rate of growth of global agricultural trade between the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, with the decline in growth in the 1990s being due to the particularly poor performance during the 1998 to 2001 period.Price declines and stagnation in agricultural trade values in the wake of the UR Agreement on Agriculture were accompanied and partly influenced by the persisting regionalisation of world agricultural trade.The foci of such regionalisation were Western Europe and Asia, with 32 and 11 per cent of global agricultural trade being intra-Western European and intra-Asian trade respectively (Chart 3). What is noteworthy, however, is that agricultural exports accounted for a much higher share of both merchandise and primary products trade in North America and Western Europe (besides Latin America and Africa) than it did for Asia.Thus, despite being the developed regions of the world, agricultural production and exports were important influences on the economic performance of North America and Western Europe.It is, therefore, not surprising that Europe is keen on maintaining its agricultural sector through protection, while the US is keen on expanding its role in world agricultural markets by subsidising its own farmers and forcing other countries to open up their markets. The problem is that the US has been more successful in prising open developing country markets than the large EU market.Thus, out of $104 billion worth of exports from North America in 2001, $34 billion went to Asia and $15 billion to Latin America, whereas exports to Europe amounted to $14 billion.The Cairns group of exporting countries (Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay), for some of whom at least agricultural exports are extremely important, want world market to be freed of protection as well as the surpluses that result from huge domestic support in the US and the EC.We must note that $35 billion of the $63 billion of exports from Latin America went to the US and the EU. More open markets and less domestic support in those destinations is, therefore, crucial for the region.The fact that Europe has been successful in its effort at retaining its agricultural space with the help of a Common Agricultural Policy that both supports and subsidises its agricultural producers is clear from Chart 4, which shows that intra-EC trade which accounted for 74 per cent of EU exports in 1990, continued to account for 73 per cent of total EU exports in 1995 and 2001.But North America, with far fewer countries in its fold, has also been quite insular. Close to a third of North American exports are inter-regional. Little has changed since the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.It is widely accepted that three sets of actors account for this failure of the AoA:First, in order to push through an agreement when there were signs that the Uruguay Round was faltering, the liberalisation of agricultural trade in the developed countries was not pushed far enough;Second, is the ability to use "loopholes", especially those in the form of inadequately well-defined Green and Blue Box measures, in the AoA, to continue to support and protect farmers on the grounds that such support was non-trade distorting; andFinally, there are violations of even the lax UR rules in the course of implementation, which have been aided by the failure of the agreement to ensure transparency in implementation.Not surprisingly, some countries, especially the Cairns group of exporting countries, have proposed an ambitious agenda of liberalisation in the agricultural area.Tariffs are to be reduced sharply, using the "Swiss formula", which would ensure that the proportionate reduction in the tariffs imposed by a country would be larger, the higher is the prevailing bound or applied tariff in that country.中文翻译：题目：自由贸易中的绿色壁垒作者：C. P. Chandrasekhar 、Jayati Ghosh在A完自由化的承诺在其最新一轮会议的农业谈判委员会，世界贸易组织，乐观地认为，谈判的框架将在3月31日最后期限为制定数字指标，公式和其他“方式，哪些国家可以”通过新的全面谈判回合贸易几乎已经消失。

The Problem of Social Cost社会成本问题RONALD COASE罗纳德·科斯Ronald Coase is Professor Emeritus at University of Chicago LawSchool and a Nobel Laureate in Economics. This article is fromThe Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960). Several passages devoted to extended discussions of legal decisionshave been omitted.罗纳德·科斯在芝加哥大学法学院名誉教授和诺贝尔经济学奖得主。

本文是其外法学与经济学杂志（1960年10月）。

专门的法律问题的决定的延伸讨论的几个段落已被省略。

I.THE PROBLEM TO BE EXAMINEDThis paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harm-ful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties. The economic analysisof such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the factory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economies of Welfare. The conclusion to which this kind of analysis seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory li-able for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others). It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable.一、要检查的问题本文关注的是这些行动的企业有伤害他人有用的影响。

英文文献资料（二）How do Industry Clusters Success:A Case Study in China’s Textiles and Apparel IndustriesZhiming Zhang, Chester , & Ning Cao(Institute of Textiles and Clothing,The Hong Kong Polytechnic University)3. Industry Clusters of Textiles and Apparel in ChinaIndustrial clustering is a new phenomenon in China. Only a few research started to pay attention to it in the 1990s. Wang (2001) described the development of some clusters in the coastal regions of China, and discussed their characteristics, including their localized network. He particularly examined the impact of accidental factor on the formation of clusters, and pointed out that the strength of the impact depended on the congruence of the sector choice, brought about by the accidental factor, with the natural advantages of the region and the rightness of the policy decision of the local government. Thus, the importance of government was emphasized.The first tier of the clusters existed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when China was first open to the outside world. Taking the advantages of proximity and low labor cost, many Hong Kong textile and apparel companies invested in Pearl River delta, and there appeared a few clusters of textile and apparel firms. These clusters grew fast, as new investments also came from Taiwan and other places, and many local entrepreneurs emerged as well. These clusters include Shenzhen (though later much diluted as it is now one of the largest cities in China), Dongguan (similar to Shenzhen but to a less degree), Humen, Shaxi, and others.Closely following this, the economy in Yangtze River delta developed fast and became very dynamic. Many enterprises of collective ownership and of private ownership established and grew very fast. Many of them were textile and apparel firms. It was typical that these firms clustered together. Several reasons account for their fast growth: First, the entry barrier to the textile and apparel industry was very low in terms of capital and technology. For example, at the beginning, only one manually operated device to knit socks or just a few sewing machines were needed. At the same time, there was almost endless supply of cheap labor, who were farmers eager to leave the land. As the enterprises expanded, some shrewd entrepreneurs lured technicians and skilled labors who were retired from state-owned enterprises to work for them. These firms were most located in towns. The government granted very flexible policies for the growth and operation of these firms. They were much less restricted by the clumsy rules and regulations than the state-owned enterprises, for example, they did not have to offer the so called iron-bowl to their employees, and they had no burden of payments to retired employees. On the other hand, these firms were very sensitive and responsive to market changes. Thus, they were very competitive. Second, at that time China was just about to come out of the planned economy when there was insufficient supply of almost everything. Thus, there was never a lack of strong demand for such consumer goods as textiles and apparel. Along with this, little marketing and marketing skills were needed to sell the products. Third, as these firms were started by farmer-entrepreneurs in towns and even villages, they set examples and became models to others. Many times the latter just followed the footprints of the pioneers, starting with the same methods, making the same products, and selling in the same market.As villagers often belong to the same family, they did not view each other as competitors, and helped each other in terms of capital, technique, and even customers through the strong sense of kinship.These firms were the seeds of the industrial clusters of textiles and apparel. Now most of the clusters still distributed in the two areas: Pearl River delta and Yangtze River delta. The former is Guangdong province, and the latter Zhejiang province and southern part of Jiangsu province. These happen to be the most advanced regions in China, in coastal area, with the best infrastructure in information, communication, and transportation. As a matter of fact, most of the clusters are located either beside a highway or very close to a port. They are also very close to major cities, particularly Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Shanghai.At present the structural development of the textile and apparel industry of China is characterized in two directions: one is a group of large companies based in large cities with capacity in marketing and product development, often operating supply chain regionally even globally; the other is a number of clusters of many small and medium sized firms based in small cities and towns, with featured products and vigorous growth (CNTIC, 2003). Thus, industrial clustering has become one of the two wings of the development of the textile and apparel industry in China. This demonstrates the importance of the clusters.4. Case ObservationWe conducted an industry survey in one industrial cluster, which is a town, called Shengze, located in Wujiang county of Jiangsu province in eastern China. While Shengze had an early history of silk production, it was primarily of agriculture before the late 1970s when China started economic reforms. At that time, the size of the town was about 4 square kilometers with a population of 30,000. Since then, the town has seen enormous growth and become one of the 19 towns with special features designated by CNTIC, and one of the most important textile clusters in China. The focus of Shengze is fabric manufacturing, primarily light weighted fabrics for lining of apparel. Now the size of the town has expanded to 25 square kilo meters with a population of nearly 200,000, most of them migrants from other parts of the country. There are about 1,100 factories, operating about 50,000 looms, all of which are of water-jet or air-jet. It is said to be one of the largest concentration of such looms. The total yearly output is about RMB20 billion (US$2.5 billion). There are about 4,000 selling and buying offices located in the town. The business district of the town is full of such offices, which would impress any visitors to the town. And there is no sign of stopping of the fast growth.This is a qualitative and exploratory study, and in-depth interviews with town officials and entrepreneurs were used to collect information about the industrial cluster. Altogether 3 town officials (Vice Party Secretary of the town, Director of The Town Government Office, and Director of The Town Development Office) and 8 entrepreneurs were interviewed by structured means. During the interviews, in addition to the current situation of the cluster, the history of development was also investigated. Emphases were paid to the following questions: how is the cluster formed; to what degree does township government play a role, and to what degree do market forces promote the clustering; what is the advantages of clustering to the locality and to the enterprises; what are the interactive relationship among the enterprises within the cluster; what is the relationship between the cluster and the external market system; how does the cluster attract the servicing industries; and how does the clustering help the creation of new enterprises and new jobs. These questions have profound policy and marketing implications. Some of the findings to these questions are presentedin this paper, with a focus on the origin and growth of the cluster.4.1. Historical factorsIn accordance with the literature (Krugman, 1986), the development of Shengze into a light-fabric cluster was accidental, but on he other hand quite natural with a historical reason. Located in southern China with warm climate, fertile land and abundant water from nearby rivers and lakes, Shengze had been one of the silk centers in China for hundreds of years. Historically, residents of Shengze were skillful in silk production, and many workshops and silk-related businesses were located in Shengze. Merchants from all over the country would flock to Shengze for silk. Thus, it could be regarded as a silk cluster even then. However, as planned economy was established and no private business was allowed to exist, the silk center was reduced to nothing and Shengze was no more than an ordinary agricultural town in China. This was for about 3 decades until the late 1970s. By then, economic reforms began, and town residents were allowed to start their own businesses. For a few of them, the natural choice was to enter the silk business, since this was something they were relatively familiar with and the local conditions were suitable for. This was the origin of the cluster.4.2. The Role of the Local AuthorityWhile the origin seemed to be natural and out of the plan of the local government, the government did play an important role in helping the cluster grow. Both government officials and entrepreneurs emphasized the importance of two measures taken by the local authority.The first one was the establishment of a market in its physical form. The Shengze government was sensitive to realize that the lack of a market had become the constraint on the development of the economic activities and a physical market was in demand. The government then financed and developed “The Oriental Silk Market”, which was like a mart and leased to various trading firms. This provided a platform, and tremendously stimulated the growth of businesses both in demand and supply. Later when this was no longer sufficient to hold all of the buying and selling offices, a new district was developed, which eventually expanded into an area which holds thousands of selling and buying offices.The other was the establishment of an industrial park, which is beside the provincial highway. The government provided the infrastructure in terms of road, water, electricity, and other basic conditions. This has created a good environment for manufacturing. While at the beginning, Shengze was only focused on silk production, very soon the enterprises broke the limits. As there was some similarity in technology between silk fabric and lightweight fabric, many of the firms expanded into the production of man-made fiber fabrics. Now even though Shengze is still known as a silk center, most of its looms are engaged in weaving of lightweight fabrics.4.3. The Role of Individual EntrepreneursDuring our interviews, we were very impressed with those entrepreneurs of Shengze. Many of them are local residents and previously were farmers. They demonstrated enormous spirit of risk taking, creativity, and willingness to learn from the market. One young entrepreneur started as a security guard, borrowed a little money to enter the business, then set up a small factory of his own. Now this has been expanded into a company, and just the weaving branch of it has capacity of 220 water-jet looms and 120 air-jet looms. He also exhibited outstanding leadership in organizing the local entrepreneurs to negotiate with Toyota of Japan. They collectively made the largest order ever in the world, 3,600 air-jet looms. In the process of his business expansion, he has helped numerous others to start their own business by loaning capital, sharing technology and market. Theseentrepreneurs help the development of Shengze as a cluster.4.4. The Development of the peripheral IndustriesShengze started with silk production. This was expanded into domestic trade of silk. Very soon light-weight fabric manufacturing began to develop. This further promoted the growth of trading. By then there seemed to be two wings of the town, one was enterprises of fabric manufacturing primarily clustered in the industrial park, one was the selling and buying offices of fabrics primarily clustered in the business district. As large amount of materials are needed, many yarn suppliers are attracted to come and set selling offices in Shengze. One of our interviewees was the owner of a trading company, headquartered in Hong Kong. The company imports man-made fibers from abroad, and sells these fibers to fabric weavers through its selling office here. Textile machine companies, both domestic and foreign, also set up offices in Shengze to sell machines and machine parts, and to provide services to the fabric manufacturers. It is said that none of the plants would keep any spare parts. If a belt is broken, even at midnight, a new one can be ordered and delivered in less than 20 minutes. These have significantly lowered the production costs, and are part of the external economies of the industrial clusters. As Shengze has become a fabric center, showrooms and selling offices of other fabrics, such as denim, are also set up in Shengze.4.5. Workforce SupplyAs the cluster grows and enterprises mushroom, large labor supply is needed. In his process the former agriculture town was totally transformed. Most of the land was turned into industrial uses, and all farmers are now employed in manufacturing. As the population of Shengze enlarges several folds (from about 30,000 to 200,000) in the last two decades, many migrants are attracted to live and work here. Most of the people were peasants and come from other provinces. While the neighboring Anhui province, which is relatively backward in economic development, provides a large portion of the labor supply, many workers come from remote provinces. They have formed nearly endless supply of cheap labor, and made great contribution to the development of the cluster. A large proportion of the labor supply is uneducated and unskilled. As there are many operational jobs, the raw labor could be trained in a short period time and then be able to work. Thus, the cluster in return also makes direct contribution to employment and indirect contribution to economic development of the less advanced regions of the country. However, there is a shortage of skilled labor. Compared to other places, labor compensation is better, as an operator can make about RMB1,500 (about US$180) per month. In other places, the prevalent wage rate is about RMB1,000 per month.5. Conclusive RemarksIn this paper, the development of industrial clustering of textiles and apparel in China is investigated. As a result of economic reforms and development, some characteristics of the textile and apparel industrial clusters are described. One particular cluster, Shengze which is famous for its silk and light-weight fabric, is used as a case to exemplify the growth of clusters. The empirical factors taken into account the cluster performance include the historical and natural origin, the role of the local government, the role of entrepreneurs, the development of supporting industries, and the supply of labor. During the past two decades in the process of development, the cluster not only grows in terms of quantity (number and scale of enterprises) but also in terms of quality (equipment, products, variety, marketing, and management). In the early when Shengze started to take off, factories used outdated facilities and equipment. Many of the machines used were those retired from state-owned plants. Over the years, as the enterprises grow, these machines have been gradually replaced by advanced ones. Now about 50,000 water-jet and air-jet looms are operating in Shengze,many of them are imported from abroad and are the most advanced models. Many of the companies in Shengze export fabrics to the international market. Not only do they receive order from abroad, some of them have set up offices in North America and Europe. They market their products initiatively, and obtain the most updated information on marketing and products. While most of the companies started as a family business, now many of them are managed professionally by University graduates with MBA and PhD. Many companies have well-established systems and met with international compliance standards and requirements, like ISO9000 certificates. Thus, many of the enterprises have changed from the old-fashioned township companies into modern corporation-type companies. It can be anticipated that these clusters will continue to contribute to the growth of the economy and industrial development of the country.英文文献中文翻译（二）来源：纺织与服装，技术与管理杂志（JTATM)Vol.4 第2期 2004年作者：张志明切斯特曹宁出版时间：2004年8月产业集群是如何成功：中国纺织和服装工业产业集群成功的案例研究(港）张志明切斯特曹宁3.在中国纺织品和服装产业集群产业集群在中国是一个新现象。

Industrial Clusters, Knowledge Integration andPerformanceWHAT ARE INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS?During the 1990s the explosion of specialized and popular literature on industrial clusters gave them an unprecedented relevance across a range of areas, including business management and economic, political, public and social policy. There was also a degree of confusion over what the various authors mean––and do not mean––by industrial clusters. Our first consideration therefore is terminology.It is important to point out from the outset that we are not concerned here with the kinds of economic agglomerations found in large cities and urban developments of a certain size. As various authors have noted, large urban realities of necessity and almost inevitably provide opportunities for agglomerations of sorts to emerge, human first, social and economic next (Gordon &McCann, 2000). Indeed, it is obvious to those familiar with large cities and urban realities that economic interactions within these kinds of agglomerations are typically governed by the logic of large numbers and random events. But, two basic kinds of economic benefits that are important to our understanding of industrial clusters can also usually be found here.On the one hand, large cities and similar agglomerations nurture urbanization economies––in other words, economic advantages that stem from factors or conditions that benefit all economic entities and agents that are part of the agglomeration. For example, the impressive air transportation facilities and infrastructure of a city such as London, the strategic geographic location of Athens for west–east logistical links and the multiplicity of linguistic skills present in Singapore can lead to economic advantages that can be enjoyed by all entities located in––or near––these large cities.On the other hand, urban agglomerations lead to localization economies of scale. These are specialized economic advantages stemming from close geographic proximity that benefit specific industries only. To follow the previous examples, the City of London is one of the world’s premier centers of financial talent in the form of tens––perhaps hundreds––of thousands of highly skilled finance professionals. This world-class talent pool presents obvious benefits for all financial services firms that decide to locate themselves in London. Similarly, Athens and its close surroundings is one of the world’s leading hubs of people, firms, assets and infrastructure specifically related to the shipping industry. The same can be said of Singapore, except that its shipping hub is perhaps even larger than that of Athens, with a greater global reach.The idea of localized economies of scale in geographic agglomerations has a long history in economi cs, going back to Adam Smith’s early observations of labor specialization and to Marshall’s (1925) explanations of why firms continue to localize in the same areas. Marshall highlighted three key explanations. First, firms get close together geographically because this allows them to develop a pool of specialized labor that is highly skilled for the specific needs of an industry and relatively easy for the firms in need of these skills to access. Second, these firms can provide nontradedinput specific to an indu stry, i.e. by localizing themselves in close geographic proximity, the firms can experience economies of scale in developing and using common technologies or a particular capital infrastructure. Third, firms that join together geographically can generate a m aximum flow of information and ideas. In other words, product, market and technological knowledge can be more easily sharedand more effectively turned into valuable innovations between agents that are in closegeographic proximity than between agents that are more geographically dispersed.It is interesting––and to some degree quiteparadoxical––that virtual communication technologies and developments in global transportation and logistics during the 20th century have made localization economies more––notless––critical to the competitive performance of firms. On the one hand, virtual communications and similar technologies have highlighted tacit knowledge and close personal relationships between economic agents as key determinants for the competitive success offirms. On the other hand, global logistics mean that access to basic production factors such as capital and nonspecialized labor are largely open to all, whereas flows of specialized knowledge and rich knowledge interactions that lead to valuable innovations remain stronger between agents in the same spatial group than among geographically dispersed firms.Our definition of ‘‘industrial cluster’’ includes the Marshallian notions of urbanization and especially localization economies of scale, but it clearly departs from the concept of agglomerations in that the knowledge interactions within the cluster are not random but rather deliberate, socially constructed and determinant for its competitive survival:An industrial cluster is a socioeconomic entity characterized by a social community of people and a population of economic agents localized in close proximity in a specific geographic region. Within an industrial cluster, a significant part of both the social community and the economic agents work together in economically linked activities, sharing and nurturing a common stock of product, technology and organizational knowledge in order to generate superior products and services in the marketplace.LINK BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION, SCOPE OF COMPETITION AND THE PERFORMANCE OF CLUSTERSA broad array of existing empirical evidence (some of which is referenced in the previous sections) suggests that both the degree of knowledge integration and the scope of competition are co-evolving factors that are crucial to explain the economic performance of industrial clusters. Although the empirical evidence remains slightly fragm ented, it suggests that firms in industrial clusters that present a high degree of knowledge integration and compete globally innovate more, present stronger growth patterns, adapt to changing environmental conditions more rapidly and have a more sustainabl e economic performance than firms in less integrated clusters that tend to compete within strictly local geographic boundaries (Meyer-Stamer, 1998; Porter, 1998; Pyke et al., 1990; Rabellotti, 1995; Schmitz, 2000; Simmie & Sennett, 1999). These kinds of empirical evidence underlie the following hypothesis:The higher the degree of knowledge integration between member firms, and the higher the global scope of competition of member firms, the higher the economic performance of industrial clusters.Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of our hypothesized effects, postulating a comparative taxonomy of industrial clusters across a diversity of industries and geographies, which we assessed within the context of our research. This hypothesized taxonomy is included here for illustrative purposes only. It is based, however, on an examination of over 2,000 pages of archival data, academic and specialized publications as well as expert opinion gathered through a series of field visits and interviews with industrial cluster agents (e.g., entrepreneurs, association representatives, practitioners) in southern Brazil, Brazil’s Amazon State and northern Italy. Both the literature review and the expert interviews we carried out were tightly structured around the templates and constructs outlined in Tables 1 and 2 (see Appendix B). Our analyses focused on the mid1990s, for which a relatively large body of empirical data exists on industrial clusters along the following dimensions: degree of knowledge integration, scope of competition and economic performance (e.g., Becattini, 1990; Feser & Bergman, 2000; Gordon & McCann, 2000; Meyer-Stamer, 1998; Rabellotti, 1999).Figure 1 thus illustrates a number of overall patterns that seem to emerge quite clearly from the growing––albeit fragmented––empirical literature on industrial clusters over the last two decades of the 20th century. These patterns unveil a multitude of characteristics that appear both to explain and determine the economic performance of industrial clusters. Some of these characteristics have to do with competitive factors that are inherent in the industrial sectors in which the clusters operate. Others have to do with factors concerning an industrial cluster’s institutional fabric, geographic closeness, economic linka ges and ‘‘common glue,’’ and here the scope for positive intervention is arguably greater for the macro-economic policy maker and the business planner alike.An empirical test of the hypothesis we have developed, remains, however, a challenging step for a better, holistic understanding of the major factors that both explain and determine the economic performance of an industrial cluster. We suggest that this empirical test, conducted along the constructs developed in Tables 1 and 2, could contribute to this understanding in a way that encompasses the economic and social aspects that appear to be equally important to the competitive functioning of industrial clusters.翻译：产业集群，知识整合和绩效产业集群是什么十九世纪九十年代，关于产业集群的专业的和通俗的研究文献剧增，使得产业集群与各个领域产生了空前紧密的联系，涉及商业管理和经济方面，政治上以及公共社会政策上。