Accrual Process – Reinstatement Estimation

acca p7知识点-回复ACCA P7 Knowledge Point: Audit Evidence and ProceduresAudit evidence plays a critical role in the audit process. It provides the necessary support for the auditor to form an opinion on the financial statements under review. In this article, we will explore the concept of audit evidence and the procedures involved in obtaining and documenting it.1. Understanding Audit Evidence:Audit evidence refers to the information used by the auditor to support their opinion on the financial statements. It is obtained through various procedures such as inspection, observation, inquiry, confirmation, and reperformance. The auditor assesses the relevance and reliability of the evidence to determine its suitability for their audit objectives.2. Relevance of Audit Evidence:To be relevant, audit evidence should have a logical connection and be directly related to the assertions being tested. This requires the auditor to understand the client's business and control environment and identify the areas of risk. Relevance ensures thatthe evidence obtained provides meaningful insights into the financial statements.3. Reliability of Audit Evidence:The reliability of audit evidence refers to its trustworthiness. More reliable evidence carries more weight in the auditor's assessment. Factors affecting reliability include the source and nature of evidence, the internal control environment, and the auditor's own expertise and independence.4. Obtaining Audit Evidence:Auditors use various procedures to gather audit evidence. These include:- Inspection: Examining records, documents, or tangible assets enables auditors to obtain objective evidence.- Observation: Watching a process or procedure being performed provides direct evidence of its existence and effectiveness.- Inquiry: Seeking information from management, employees, or third parties allows auditors to gather subjective evidence.- Confirmation: Obtaining written responses from external parties to corroborate information provided by the client.- Reperformance: Redoing specific procedures performed by the client to verify their accuracy and consistency.5. Evaluating Audit Evidence:Once obtained, audit evidence needs to be evaluated. This involves determining its sufficiency and appropriateness to support the audit objectives. The auditor considers factors such as the nature, timing, and quality of evidence, as well as the extent of testing performed.6. Documenting Audit Evidence:Audit evidence needs to be appropriately documented to provide a clear and transparent trail of the auditor's work. Documentation should include details of the procedures performed, the conclusions reached, and any significant findings or exceptions identified. This is crucial for reviewers and regulators to assess the adequacy of the audit work.7. Use of Analytical Procedures:Analytical procedures involve the analysis of financial andnon-financial data to identify anomalies or unusual trends. These procedures help auditors assess the reasonableness of financialinformation and highlight areas requiring further investigation.8. Audit Sampling:Due to the time and cost constraints of a complete audit, auditors often use sampling techniques to select a representative subset of items from a population. This allows them to draw conclusions about the entire population. Sampling procedures need to be carefully designed to ensure the samples selected are unbiased and representative.9. Substantive Testing vs. Test of Controls:Auditors perform substantive testing to obtain direct evidence about the completeness, accuracy, and validity of individual transactions. Test of controls, on the other hand, focuses on assessing the effectiveness of internal controls. The choice of procedures depends on the auditor's assessment of control risks and the desired level of assurance.10. Professional Skepticism and Judgment:Throughout the audit process, it is essential for auditors to maintain professional skepticism and exercise sound judgment. They need to be critical and independent in their assessment ofevidence, questioning assumptions and seeking corroborative evidence when necessary.In conclusion, audit evidence and procedures form the backbone of the audit process. Understanding the relevance and reliability of evidence, obtaining it through various procedures, and evaluating and documenting it are vital steps for auditors. By ensuring the quality and sufficiency of evidence, auditors can provide meaningful and reliable opinions on the financial statements.。

1.audit 审计2.attestation 鉴证3.c redibility 可信赖程度4.audit of financial statements 财务报表审计5.agreed-upon procedures 执行商定程序6.high levels of assurance 高水平保证pilation 编制8.reliability 可靠性9.relevance 相关性10.professional skepticism 职业谨慎11.objectivity 客观性12.professional competence 专业胜任能力13.Senior/CPA-in-charge 项目经理14.audit engagement letter 业务约定书15.recurring audit 连续审计16.the client 委托人17.change CPA 更换注册会计师18.the existing CPA 现任注册会计师19.the successor CPA 后任注册会计师20.the preceding CPA 前任注册会计师21.issue the audit report 出具审计报告22.expert 专家23.the board of directors 董事会24.knowledge of the entity‘ s business 了解被审计单位情况25.assess material misstatement risks 评估重大错报风险26.detemine the nature ，timing and extent of theaudit procedures 确定审计程序的性质、时间和范围27.a general knowledge of 初步了解――― 的情况28.a more knowledge of 进一步了解的情况29.the prior year‘s working papers 以前年度工作底稿30.minutes of meeting 会议纪要31.business risks 经营风险32.appropriateness 适当性33.accounting estimate 会计估计34.management representations 管理层声明35.going concern assumption 持续经营假设36.audit plan 审计计划37.significant audit areas 重点审计领域38.error 错误39.fraud 舞弊40.modified or additional procedures 修改或追加审计程序41.misappropriation of assets 侵占资产42.transactions without substance 虚假交易43.unusual pressures 异常压力44.the suspected noncompliance 涉嫌存在违法行为45.materialiy 重要性46.exceed the materiality level 超过重要性水平47.approach the materiality level 接近重要性水平48.an acceptably low level 可接受水平49.the overall financial statement level and in related account balances and t ransaction levels 财务报表层和相关账户、交易层50.misstatements or omissions 错报或漏报51.aggregate 总计52.subsequent events 期后事项53.adjust the financial statements 调整财务报表54.perform additional audit procedures 实施追加的审计程序55.audit risk 审计风险56.detection risk 检查风险57.inappropriate audit opinion 不适当的审计意见58.material misstatement 重大的错报59.tolerable misstatement 可容忍错报60.the acceptable level of detection risk 可接受的检查风险61.assessed level of m aterial misstatement risk 重大错报风险的评估水平62.simall business 小规模企业63.accounting system 会计系统64.test of control 控制测试65.walk-through test 穿行测试munication 沟通67.flowchart 流程图68.reperformance of internal control 重新执行69.audit evidence 审计证据70.substantive procedures 实质性程序71.assertions 认定72.esistence 存在73.occurrence 发生pleteness 完整性75.rightsand obligations 权利和义务76.valuationand allocation 计价和分摊77.cutoff 截止78.accuracy 准确性79.classification 分类80.inspection 检查81.supervision of counting 监盘82.observation 观察83.confirmation 函证putation 计算85.analytical procedures 分析程序86.vouch 核对87.trace 追查88.audit sampling 审计抽样89.error 误差90.expected error 预期误差91.population 总体92.sampling risk 抽样风险93.non-sampling risk 非抽样风险94.sampling unit 抽样单位95.statistical sampling 统计抽样96.tolerable error 可容忍误差97.therisk of under reliance 信赖不足风险98.therisk of over reliance 信赖过度风险99.therisk of incorrect rejection 误拒风险100.the risk of incorrect acceptance 误受风险101.working trial balance 试算平衡表102.indexand cross-referencing 索引和交叉索引103.cashreceipt 现金收入104.cash disbursement 现金支出105.bank statement 银行对账单106.bank reconciliation 银行存款余额调节表107.balance sheet date 资产负债表日realizable value 可变现净值109.store room 仓库110.sale invoice 销售发票111.price list 价目表112.positive confirmation request 积极式询证函113.negative confirmation request 消极式询证函114.purchase requisition 请购单115.receiving report 验收报告116.gross margin 毛利117.manufacturing overhead 制造费用118.material requisition 领料单119.inventory-taking 存货盘点120.bond certificate 债券121.stock certificate 股票122.audit report 审计报告123.entity 被审计单位124.addressee of the audit report 审计报告的收件人125.unqualified opinion 无保留意见126.qualified opinion 保留意见127.disclaimer of opinion 无法表示意见128.adverse opinion 否定意见审计词汇审计法Audit Law, Audit Act审计法实施条例the Implementary Rules of the Audit law审计标准audit criteria ，audit standard审计准则auditing standard审计原则auditing principles审计手册audit manual公认审计准则Generally Accepted Auditing Standards审计法律规范audit laws and regulations审计体制audit system审计权限audit purview ；audit jurisdiction ；audit mandate审计职责audit responsibility审计监督audit supervision ；supervision through auditing审计管辖权audit jurisdiction审计执法implementation of audit laws and regulations审计处理audit sanction审计处罚audit penalty依法审计conduct auditing in accordance with laws 审计意见audit opinion审计决定audit decision审计建议audit suggestion, audit recommendation 复核意见conclusion of audit review审计复议audit appeal审计听证audit hearing审计复核audit review审计战略audit strategy审计计划audit plan审计方案auditing program审计目标auditing objective审计范围audit scope审计内容audit coverage审计结论audit conclusion审计任务audit assignments审计结果audit finding审计报告audit report审计方法audit method审计过程auditing process审计证据audit evidence审计测试audit test审计风险audit risk审计抽样audit sampling审计软件audit software审计程序auditing procedures审计调查audit investigation审计小组audit team审计线索audit trail工作底稿working paper绕过计算机审计auditing around the computer通过计算机审计auditing through the computer计算机辅助审计computer-assited audit信息技术审计IT audit合法性审计compliance audit, regularity audit合规性审计compliance audit综合审计comprehensive audit效益审计value for money audit （VFM audit ）绩效审计performance audit财务审计financial audit财务报表审计financial statement audit财务收支审计audit of financial revenues and expenditures决算审计final account audit经济责任审计accountability audit任中经济责任审计middle term accountability a udit 离任经济责任审计term-end accountability audit管理审计management audit项目审计project audit外部审计external audit内部审计internal audit政府审计government audit联合审计joint audit实地审计field audit期末审计final audit期中审计interim audit定期审计periodic audit初次审计initial audit初步审计preliminary audit事后审计post-audit事前审计pre-audit事中审计concurrent audit专项审计special audit法定审计statutory audit后续审计successive audit跟踪审计follow up audit全过程审计whole process auditing突击审计surprise audit审计报告audit report标准报告standard report 长式报告long-form report短式报告short-form report审计工作报告audit working report审计结果公告Announcement of Audit Findings审计长Auditor General副审计长Deputy Auditor General审计主任chief auditor资深审计师senior auditor审计师（员）auditor注册内部审计师certified internal auditor （CIA）注册信息系统审计师certified information systems auditor （CISA ）注册公共会计师certified public accountant （CPA ）特许会计师chartered accountant （CA）审计经费audit funds审计业务费audit operating expense审计专项经费special funds for auditing无保留意见:unqualified opinion保留意见qualified opinion无法表示意见: disclaimer of opinion否定意见:adverse opinion。

会计英语第四版参考答案Chapter 1: Introduction to Accounting1. What is accounting?- Accounting is the systematic recording, summarizing, and reporting of financial transactions and events of a business entity.2. What are the main functions of accounting?- The main functions of accounting are to providefinancial information for decision-making, ensure compliance with laws and regulations, and facilitate the management of a business.3. What are the two main branches of accounting?- The two main branches of accounting are financial accounting and management accounting.4. What is the purpose of financial accounting?- The purpose of financial accounting is to provide an accurate and fair representation of an entity's financial position and performance to external users.5. What is the double-entry bookkeeping system?- The double-entry bookkeeping system is a method of recording financial transactions in which every transactionis recorded twice, once as a debit and once as a credit, to maintain the equality of the accounting equation.Chapter 2: Accounting Concepts and Principles1. What are the fundamental accounting concepts?- The fundamental accounting concepts include the accrual basis of accounting, going concern, consistency, and materiality.2. What is the accrual basis of accounting?- The accrual basis of accounting records transactions when they occur, regardless of when cash is received or paid.3. What is the going concern assumption?- The going concern assumption is the premise that a business will continue to operate for the foreseeable future.4. What is the principle of consistency?- The principle of consistency requires that an entity should apply accounting policies consistently over time.5. What is the principle of materiality?- The principle of materiality states that only items that could potentially affect the decisions of users of financial statements are included in the financial statements.Chapter 3: The Accounting Equation and Financial Statements1. What is the accounting equation?- The accounting equation is Assets = Liabilities +Owner's Equity.2. What are the four main financial statements?- The four main financial statements are the balance sheet, income statement, statement of changes in equity, and cashflow statement.3. What is the purpose of the balance sheet?- The balance sheet provides a snapshot of an entity's financial position at a specific point in time.4. What is the purpose of the income statement?- The income statement reports the revenues, expenses, and net income of an entity over a period of time.5. What is the purpose of the cash flow statement?- The cash flow statement reports the cash inflows and outflows of an entity over a period of time.Chapter 4: Recording Transactions1. What is a journal entry?- A journal entry is the initial recording of atransaction in the general journal.2. What are the steps in the accounting cycle?- The steps in the accounting cycle are analyzing transactions, journalizing, posting, preparing a trial balance, adjusting entries, preparing financial statements, and closing entries.3. What is the difference between a debit and a credit?- A debit is an increase in assets or a decrease inliabilities or equity, while a credit is an increase in liabilities or equity or a decrease in assets.4. What are adjusting entries?- Adjusting entries are made at the end of an accounting period to ensure that revenues and expenses are recorded in the correct period.5. What is the purpose of closing entries?- Closing entries are made to transfer the balances of temporary accounts to the owner's equity account and to prepare the accounts for the next accounting period.Chapter 5: Accounting for Merchandising Businesses1. What is a merchandise inventory?- A merchandise inventory is the stock of goods held by a business for sale to customers.2. What is the cost of goods sold?- The cost of goods sold is the direct cost of producing the merchandise sold during an accounting period.3. What is the gross profit?- The gross profit is the difference between the sales revenue and the cost of goods sold.4. What is the difference between a perpetual and a periodic inventory system?- A perpetual inventory system updates inventory records in real-time with each sale or purchase, while a periodicinventory system updates inventory records at specific intervals, such as at the end of an accounting period.5. What is the retail method of inventory pricing?- The retail method of inventory pricing is a method of estimating the cost of ending inventory by applying a cost-to-retail ratio to the retail value of the inventory.Chapter 6: Accounting for Service Businesses1. What are the main differences in accounting for service businesses compared to merchandise businesses?- Service businesses do not have inventory and their primary expenses are typically labor and overhead costs.2. What is the main source of revenue for service businesses? - The main source of revenue for service businesses is the fees charged for the services provided.3. What are the typical expenses。

J.of Multi.Fin.Manag.23 (2013) 134–145Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirectJournal of Multinational FinancialManagementjournal homepage:/locate/econbaseCEO’s financial experience and earnings management ଝFuxiu Jiang ∗,Bing Zhu,Jicheng HuangSchool of Business,Renmin University of China,59Zhongguancun Street,Haidian District,Beijing 100872,Chinaa r t i c l ei n f oAvailable online 14 March 2013JEL classification:G32G34M41Keywords:Financial experience Earnings management Management turnover CEOa b s t r a c tWe study whether Chinese CEOs with financial experience engage in more earnings management or less earnings management than those without such experience.In doing so,we distinguish between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings manage-ment.Overall,we find that CEOs with financial experience tend to do less real earnings management,while we find no evidence that they do either more or less accrual-based earnings man-agement.Our findings tend to confirm that CEOs with financial experience provide more precise earnings information and higher quality financial statements.© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1.IntroductionAlthough top managers,especially CEOs,are presumed to have a generalist’s view,their past work experience shapes an orientation in their life,and this orientation can exert some influence on the firm’s strategic choices (Hambrick and Mason,1984).The impact of the CEO’s work experience upon strategy adoption is well established.An early case study by Dearborn and Simon (1958)reports that when a group of executives from different functional areas are presented with the same problem,ଝWe thank an anonymous referee and Kenneth A.Kim for the helpful and excellent comments.We acknowledge the financial support from Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University (no.NCET-10-0796),the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities and the Research Funds of Renmin University of China (nos.11XNJ005,11XNK029),and China National Natural Science Foundation (nos.70972129and 71172179).Any errors are entirely our own.Huang thanks the support of the Ministry of Education academic doctoral Prize in 2011.∗Corresponding author.E-mail addresses:jfx@ (F.Jiang),lichendaozhu@ (B.Zhu),huangjicheng008@ (J.Huang).1042-444X/$–see front matter © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.F.Jiang et al./J.of Multi.Fin.Manag.23 (2013) 134–145135 they define the problem largely in terms of goals and tasks in their respective functional areas,even though they are motivated to consider it from a company-wide viewpoint.Subsequent empirical studies provide further evidence.For example,Song(1982)finds that CEOs with operational work experience are more apt to favor internally developed diversification,while CEOs with experience in nonoperational functions are more inclined toward diversification through acquisition.Tyler and Steensma(1998)show that executives with technical work experience assess potential technological alliances more favorably than their counterparts with other work experience.Barker and Mueller (2002)claim that R&D spending is greater atfirms where CEOs have career experience in R&D.All these studies show that the CEO’s past functional experience significantly affectsfirm decisions.In recent years,more and more companies have tended to hire CEOs withfinancial experience. Durfee(2005)reports that the percentage of Fortune100CEOs who were former CFOs increased from 12%to20%over the past ten years.Cullinan and Roush(2011)find that out of264CEO appointments in publicly tradedfirms from2001to2004,15.48%of the CEOs appointed before SOX had accounting and/orfinance experience,while33.33%of CEOs appointed after SOX had it.This trend also holds in China.In1995,only0.9%of CEOs hadfinancial experience,but the percentage increased to5.71in 2002,and remained above5%from2003to2010.If the CEO’s past functional experience influences thefirm’s decisions,and CEOs withfinancial experience are more familiar with or expert infinancial decisions,is there any difference infinancial decisions betweenfirms whose CEOs have hadfinancial experience andfirms whose CEOs have not?In this paper,we try to answer this question from the perspective of earnings management.Many studies in thefields offinance and accounting focus on earnings management tech-niques,motivation,and governance mechanisms.For example,Baber et al.(1991),Bartov(1993), Roychowdhury(2006),and Beatriz and Encarna(2009)investigate why and how management manip-ulates earnings opportunistically.Klein(2002),Xie et al.(2003),and Bergstresser and Philippon(2006) study how earnings management can be effectively constrained through government mechanisms. Matsunaga and Yeung(2008)find thatfirms whose CEOs havefinancial experience provide more pre-cise earnings guidance and improve the quality offinancial disclosure,and they argue that the quality of afirm’sfinancial disclosures is a function of the CEO’sfinancial experience.To our knowledge, their article provides thefirst empirical evidence on the impact of CEOs withfinancial experience on earnings management.However,there is still some room to study this topic.First,Matsunaga and Yeung(2008)used only one year(2004)of data to identify CEOs from the ExecuComp database,so their research employs a relatively small sample.Thus,it is important to understand whether the result is robust and broadly applicable.Furthermore,they examined the effect of the CEO’sfinancial experience only on accrual-based earnings management through discretionary accruals,and did not consider earnings management through real activities.Many studies demonstrate that earnings management includes both accrual-based and real activity earnings management(Schipper,1989;Healy and Wahlen,1999).Accrual-based earnings manage-ment(manipulation of earnings through exploitation of accounting discretion)is easy to detect, so it becomes less likely with the development of accounting standards and regulatory systems. As the manipulation of real transactions(cashflows from operations,discretionary expenses,and production costs)is harder to discern and moreflexible,firms have switched to managing earn-ings in this way(Roychowdhury,2006;Cohen et al.,2008).Bruns and Merchant(1990)show in their survey thatfinancial executives indicate a greater willingness to manipulate earnings through real activities than through accruals.Through surveys and interviews with401financial executives, Graham et al.(2005)find that78%of survey participants report that they would rather smooth earnings by real economic actions,while only7.9%state that they would alter accounting assump-tions to meet an earnings target.Thus we ask whether this choice is affected by the CEO’sfinancial experience.Executives with expertise and cognitive frameworks based partially on their career experiences are more likely to identify problems and seek additional information from the same functional domain and thus produce more successful decisions(Hambrick and Mason,1984;Fredrickson,1985;Walsh, 1988;Hitt and Tyler,1991).CEOs withfinancial experience who consistently follow the accounting136 F.Jiang et al./J.of Multi.Fin.Manag.23 (2013) 134–145understand the role offinancial disclosures in reducing information asymmetry between corporations and investors(Matsunaga and Yeung,2008)and helping market participants to assess corporate value (Hutton and Stocken,2006).CEOs are responsible for earnings disclosure,and they must personally certify the accuracy and completeness of thefinancial information released by the company,1both in the U.S and in China.Financial expertise and experience allow CEOs to better monitorfirms’accounting and disclosure policies.So compared tofinancially inexperienced counterparts,CEOs withfinancial experience provide more precise earnings guidance to analysts(Matsunaga and Yeung,2008)and are less likely to manipulate earnings.Using a somewhat broader definition offinancial experience than do Matsunaga and Yeung,we define a CEO withfinancial experience as someone who has served as CFO,or in another high admin-istrative position infinance or accounting,for example as chief accounting officer or vice-CEO for finance or accounting.In order to separate managerfixed effect fromfirmfixed effect,2we begin our empirical investigation by identifying CEO turnover events of Chinese listedfirms from2002to2008. Using the difference-in-differences(DID)estimation method,and subgrouping this sample into pre-and post-turnover samples as well as treatment samples and control samples,we test how CEOs with financial experience affect accrual-based and real earnings management.While Matsunaga and Yeung (2008)find thatfirms with CEOs who have CFO experience tend to use less accrual-based earnings management,wefind no relation between these variables.However,in accord with their arguments that the quality of afirm’sfinancial disclosures is a function of the CEO’sfinancial experience,wefind robust evidence that CEOs withfinancial experience are less likely to manage earnings by real activities than CEOs without comparable experience,which shows that CEOs withfinancial experience provide more precise earnings information and improve the quality offinancial statements.Our paper provides thefirst empirical evidence that CEO’sfinancial experience has impact on real earnings management,and advances the growing literature on determinants of earnings management. The paper also contributes to the literature in the effect of CEO’s functional experience onfirm’s strate-gic choice.In addition,ourfindings partly suggest a possible explanation for the recent phenomenon that manyfirms hire CEOs withfinancial experience.The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.Section2introduces the data,defines the main variables,and provides descriptive statistics.Section3presents empirical tests on whether having a CEO withfinancial experience affects earnings management,measured by discretionary accruals and by activities manipulation separately.Section4tests the robustness of the main results.Section5 concludes.2.Data,definitions,and descriptive statistics2.1.Data and sample selectionWe use data on Chinese listedfirms from both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.CEO turnover information comes from the WIND database.CEO experience is identified by CEO resumes from the WIND database.Financial statement data come from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database(CSMAR).We require each CEO turnover event in this test to have data available for at least two years in the pre-turnover period and two years in the post-turnover period(excluding the turnover year).3The sample period is from January1,2002,to December31,2008.We further eliminatefive categories of CEO turnover events:(1)those involvingfirms in thefinan-cial industry;(2)those involvingfirms that were in special trade(ST)status in either turnover year or1Frank and Goyal(2007)suggest that if a manager runs afirm for a long time,then a managerialfixed effect will be hard to tell apart from afirmfixed effect.Turnover events can partly get around these problems.Thefirm’s basic characteristics and opportunities are not likely to be fundamentally changed around a turnover event,so changes infirm policies can be partly attributed to CEO changes.2Allowing for some high frequency offirm CEO turnovers,if the samefirm has more than two turnovers,we require that each interval between two turnovers be not less than4years,or we keep only thefirst turnover.3In Table1we report that we have977CEO turnover events,but we use only949in our research.The other28events include 24in which the former CEO had hadfinancial experience while the new CEO had not,and4events in which both the formerF.Jiang et al./J.of Multi.Fin.Manag.23 (2013) 134–145137 Table1CEO turnover sample selection process.No.CEO turnover:2000–2010Elimination Observation 1CEO turnovers for nonfinancial listedfirms41982Exclude turnovers before2002and after2008191622823Excludefirms with ST status in year of CEO turnover and one year before35219304Excludefirms with CEO tenure less than two years45714735Excludefirms with reappointment of CEO1714566Excludefirms with missing data479977the preceding year(by the rules of the China Securities Regulatory Commission,firms reporting losses in two consecutive years operate under a special trade mechanism,and their strategy and activities are quite different from those of otherfirms);(3)events involving CEOs with tenure of less than two years(since such CEOs are unlikely to have continuous influence on thefirm’s decisions);(4)events in which the CEO is the same person before and after the turnover(some CEOs are reappointed);(5) events with missing data.Ourfinal sample includes977CEO turnover events.The detailed sample selection process is shown in Table1.2.2.Variable definition2.2.1.Financial experienceWe deem the CEO to have hadfinancial experience if CEO has previously served as CFO,chief accounting officer,vice-CEO in charge of thefinance or accounting department.In the end,949CEO turnover events are included in our sample.4Of these,52are cases in which the new CEO hasfinancial experience while the former one has not,which serve as our treatment group;897are turnovers in which neither CEOs hasfinancial experience,which act as our control group.This turnover sample allows us to investigate whether changes in earnings management associated with the appointment offinancially experienced CEOs differ from changes associated with the appointment offinancially inexperienced ones.2.2.2.Earnings managementEarnings management includes accrual-based and real activity earnings management.We compute discretionary accruals to proxy for accrual-based earnings management using the Jones model(Jones, 1991).We also use a cross-sectional modified Jones model to test the robustness of ourfindings.We first run the following cross-sectional OLS regression in Eq.(1)for each CSRC industry-year with at least10observations.This approach partially controls for industry-wide changes in economic condi-tions that affect accruals(Defond and Jiambalvo,1994;Kasznik,1999).Then for everyfirm-year,the discretionary accruals(DAC i,t)is total accruals minus thefitted normal accruals using the estimated coefficient from Eq.(1).TA i,t A i,t−1=ˇ11A i,t−1+ˇ2REV i,tA i,t−1+ˇ3PPE i,tA i,t−1(1)where TA i,t=( CA i,t− CASH i,t)−( CL i,t− CLD i,t)−DEP i,t;TA i,t is the total accruals offirm i for period t; CA i,t is the change in current assets offirm i for period t; CASH i,t is the change in cash and cash equivalents offirm i for period t; CL i,t is the change in current liabilities offirm i a for period t; CLD i,t is the change in long-term debt due within one year offirm i for period t;DEP i,t is depreciation and amortization expense offirm i for period t;A i,t−1is total assets offirm i at the end of period t−1; REV i,t is the change of revenue offirm i for period t;PPE i,t isfixed assets offirm i at period t;DAC i,t is discretionary accruals offirm i for period{t}.All the variables are scaled by A i,t−1.4In Table1we report that we have977CEO turnover events,but we use only949in our research.The other28events include 24in which the former CEO had hadfinancial experience while the new CEO had not,and4events in which both the former138 F.Jiang et al./J.of Multi.Fin.Manag.23 (2013) 134–145To capture real earnings management,we follow Roychowdhury(2006)and separately estimate abnormal levels of cashflows from operations,discretionary expenses,and production costs.For everyfirm-year,we measure the abnormal CFO(EM CFO),abnormal production costs(EM COST), and abnormal discretionary expenses(EM EXP)as the difference between actual values and the nor-mal levels calculated using the estimated coefficient from cross-sectional regressions for each industry and year in Eqs.(2)–(4).Then we use these three variables as proxies for real earnings management (EM)in Eq.(5).CFO i,t A i,t−1=ˇ0+ˇ11A i,t−1+ˇ2S i,tA i,t−1+ˇ3S i,tA i,t−1+εt(2)COST i,t A i,t−1=ˇ0+ˇ11A i,t−1+ˇ2S i,tA i,t−1+ˇ3S i,tA i,t−1+ˇ4S i,t−1A i,t−1+εt(3)EXP i,t A i,t−1=ˇ0+ˇ11A i,t−1+ˇ2S i,t−1A i,t−1+εt(4)EM=EM COST−EM CFO−EM EXP(5) where CFO i,t is net cashflow from operations offirm i for period t;COST i,t is production cost,defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventories offirm i for period t;EXP i,t is the sum of sales expense and administrative expense offirm i for period t;S i,t is revenues offirm i for period t; S i,t is change in revenues offirm i for period t;and S i,t−1is change in revenues offirm i for period t−1.A i,t−1is total assets offirm i at the end of period t−1.All the variables are scaled by A i,t−1.Following Bergstresser and Philippon(2006)and Jiang et al.(2010),we include among our control variablesfirm size(SIZE),firm leverage(LEVERAGE),profitability(ROA),growth(TOBINQ),standard deviation of cashflow from operations(STDCASH),standard deviation of revenues(STDSALE),and standard deviation of revenues growth(STDGROWTH).In addition,as in studies of how earnings man-agement can be effectively constrained through government mechanisms(Klein,2002;Xie et al., 2003;Bergstresser and Philippon,2006),and following Cohen et al.(2008),we control for a set of dummy variables to proxy for corporate governance features and audit quality.We also include year and industry dummies.Detailed variable definitions are in Table2.Table2Variable definitions.Variable Implication DefinitionEM Real earnings management Abnormal levels of cashflows from operations,discretionary expensesand production costs,from Roychowdhury(2006)modelDAC Accrual-based earningsmanagementAbsolute discretionary accruals,from Jones(1991)modelSIZE Firm size Log of thefirm’s total assetsLEVERAGE Firm leverage Total book value of debt normalized by total book value of assetsROA Return on assets Net income divided by average total assetsTOBINQ Growth ratio Sum of the total book value of debt and market value of equity deflatedby thefirm’s total assetsSTDCASH Standard deviation of cashflowsfrom operations Standard deviation of thefirm’s cashflows from operations over the preceding three-year period including the current yearSTDSALE Standard deviation of revenues Standard deviation of thefirm’s revenues over the precedingthree-year period including the current yearSTDGROWTH Standard deviation of revenuesgrowth Standard deviation of thefirm’s revenues growth over the preceding three-year period including the current yearAUDIT Audit quality An indicator variable that equals one if thefirm is audited by one ofthe Big Four auditfirms,and zero otherwiseOPINION Auditing opinion An indicator variable that equals one for standard qualified report,andzero otherwiseCON Property ownership An indicator variable that equals one if thefirm is controlled byF.Jiang et al./J.of Multi.Fin.Manag.23 (2013) 134–145139 Table3Descriptive statistics.Variable Treatment Control T-test of mean differences Mean Median N Mean Median N Two-tailed p-valuePanel A:firm characteristicsSIZE21.2921.1720821.4221.3735880.08LEVERAGE0.500.522080.520.5235880.11ROA0.020.022080.020.0235880.58TOBINQ 1.56 1.29208 1.54 1.2735880.66STDCASH0.050.042080.050.0335880.30STDSALE0.100.072080.100.0635880.80STDGROWTH0.350.182080.360.1735880.80OPINION0.93 1.002080.92 1.0035880.62AUDIT0.020.002080.030.0035880.47CON0.63 1.002080.72 1.0035880.01Panel B:earnings managementDAC0.140.092080.120.0935880.23EM0.170.122080.150.1035880.17Treatment means that the former CEO lacksfinancial experience and the new CEO hasfinancial experience.Control indicates that both former and new CEOs lackfinancial experience.All variables are defined in Table2.2.3.Descriptive statisticsTable3provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study.We compare the treatment sample to the control sample.Panel A shows the mean and median offirm characteristics and Panel B contains the descriptive statistics of earnings management.To avoid the influence of outliers,we winsorize each continuous variable at the top and bottom one percentiles of their distributions.From panel A of Table3,we can see that the average log value of assets of the treatment group is 21.29,while that of the control group is21.42.The average book leverage of the treatment group is 0.5and that of the control group is0.52.ROA is the same for both groups,at0.02.93%of the treatment groupfirms and92%of the control groupfirms received standard qualified auditing reports.2%of the treatment groupfirms and3%of the control group ones are audited by one of the Big4auditfirms (Deloitte&Touche,Ernst&Young,KPMG,and Pricewaterhouse Coopers).State-owned enterprises constitute63%of the treatment groupfirms and72%of the control group ones.The result shows that there is no significant difference between the treatment groupfirms and control group ones on most of thefirm characteristic measures,except for the small difference of averagefirm size and percentage of State-owned enterprises.In panel B of Table3,we provide descriptive statistics of accrual-based and real earnings manage-ment for the treatment and control groups.The average(median)accrual-based earnings management of the treatment group is0.14(0.09)and that of the control group is0.12(0.09).The mean(median)of real earnings management is0.17(0.12)for the treatment group and0.15(0.1)for the control group.3.Empirical method and results3.1.Difference-in-differences methodThis paper,based on CEO turnovers,uses the difference-in-differences(DID)methodology(Imbens and Wooldridge,2009),which exploits the richness offirm-level data while also avoiding the pitfalls of the regression-based method.The empirical model for the DID approach is as follows.|EM i,t|=˛0+˛1EER i∗POST t+˛2EER i+˛3POST t+˛4X i,t+εi,t(6) |DAC i,t|=˛0+˛1EER i∗POST t+˛2EER i+˛3POST t+˛4X i,t+εi,t(7) where i indexesfirms,t indexes years,|EM|is the absolute value of real earnings management,and140 F.Jiang et al./J.of Multi.Fin.Manag.23 (2013) 134–145to one if the former CEO lacksfinancial experience while the new CEO has it(defining our treatment group),and zero if both the former CEO and the new one lackfinancial experience(defining our control group).POST is a time variable set equal to one if thefirm-year is in the post-appointment period and zero if in the pre-appointment period.X i,t is a vector offirm-level control variables that includefirm size,firm leverage,profitability,growth,standard deviation of cashflows from operations,standard deviation of revenues,standard deviation of revenues growth(Bergstresser and Philippon,2006;Jiang et al.,2010),corporate governance and audit quality(Klein,2002;Xie et al.,2003;Bergstresser and Philippon,2006;Cohen et al.,2008),and year dummies as well as industry dummies.All the standard errors in regressions are clustered at thefirm level to adjust for heteroskedasticity.We run the OLS regression model using the CEO turnover samples for up to two years before turnover and up to two years after turnover(i.e.,from t−2to t+2relative to event year t).Our dominating variable is the interaction of the two indicator variables,EER×POST.The coefficient˛1represents the incremental change in earnings management associated with the appointment of a CEO who hasfinancial experience relative to the appointment of a CEO who has nofinancial experience.If˛1is significantly positive,then the appointment of a CEO with financial experience is associated with more earnings management,and vice versa.The coeffi-cient˛2indicates whether the earnings management of the treatment group differs from that of the control group before the appointment.The coefficient˛3gives the difference of earn-ings management between the pre-appointment and post-appointment periods for the control group.3.2.CEO’sfinancial experience and real earnings managementTo understand the impact of CEOfinancial experience on real earnings management,wefirst esti-mate separate regressions for the periods before and after the CEO appointment.As the result of columns(1)and(2)in Table4,wefind that the estimated coefficient for EER before the appointment is significantly positive and that after the appointment it is negative but insignificant(coeffi-cient=−0.016,p=0.276).The results indicate thatfirms that appoint a new CEO withfinancial experience tend to have done more real earnings management before the turnover thanfirms that appoint a new CEO withoutfinancial experience,but after the turnover there is almost no difference.We then conduct separate regressions for the treatment group and the control group,and the results are shown as column(3)and column(4)in Table4.We can see that the coefficient of POST is significantly negative for the treatment group and positive for the control group;that is,there is a significantly negative relation between the new CEO’sfinancial experience and real earnings management in the treatment group,while in the control group there is a contrary result.These results suggest thatfirms whose new CEO hasfinancial experience may encounter significant earnings decline after the turnover,but forfirms whose new CEO has nofinancial experience,real earnings management will rise.Lastly,we use the whole sample to run a regression of the DID model.From column5in Table4, wefind that the coefficient on the interaction of EER and POST(EER×POST)is significantly negative (coefficient=−0.045,p=0.005),which is consistent with the results in column(3)and column(4).The control variables SIZE,LEVERAGE,ROA,TOBINQ,STDSALE,STDCASH,and STDGROW are all posi-tively related to real activities earnings management.However,the corporate governance and audit variable is not significantly related to real activities earnings management,which shows that corpo-rate governance has weak effects on earnings management in China.All of the above results provide a consistent and robust conclusion that appointing a CEO withfinancial experience lessens real earnings management.3.3.CEO’sfinancial experience and accrual-based earnings managementUsing similar methods,we examine whether accrual-based earnings management is associated with the CEO’sfinancial experience.Table5provides the regression results,which run counter to thefindings of Matsunaga and Yeung(2008)thatfirms run by ex-CFOs tend to have moreF.Jiang et al./J.of Multi.Fin.Manag.23 (2013) 134–145141 Table4CEO’sfinancial experience and real earnings management.Pre-appointment Post-appointment Treatment Control WholeEER0.036**−0.0160.034* (−0.041)(0.276)(0.052) POST−0.077***0.016**0.014**(0.008)(0.016)(0.033) EER×POST−0.045***(0.005) SIZE0.0080.019***0.0200.014***0.014***(0.107)(0.001)(0.211)(0.001)(0.000) LEVERAGE0.038*0.03160.0950.0300.033*(0.096)(0.191)(0.216)(0.119)(0.081) ROA0.318***0.246***−0.0420.278***0.264***(0.000)(0.000)(0.826)(0.000)(0.000) TOBINQ0.0090.018**0.0220.014*0.015**(0.335)(0.041)(0.298)(0.052)(0.04) STDSALE0.189***0.264***0.312*0.229***0.229**(0.000)(0.000)(0.056)(0.000)(0.000) STDCASH0.782***0.778***0.964***0.784***0.792***(0.000)(0.000)(0.005)(0.000)(0.000) STDGROWTH0.0090.025**0.023*0.016**0.016**(0.259)(0.011)(0.095)(0.035)(0.027) OPINION−0.001−0.026*0.022−0.015−0.013(0.935)(0.064)(0.632)(0.149)(0.209) AUDIT0.0060.0160.117*0.0050.010(0.731)(0.598)(0.070)(0.785)(0.557) CON0.0010.0040.0090.0010.001(0.944)(0.738)(0.697)(0.863)(0.86) INTERCEPT−0.167−0.342***−0.411−0.265***−0.274***(0.152)(0.007)(0.256)(0.007)(0.005) Year YES YES YES YES YES Industry YES YES YES YES YES Adjusted R216.26%19.47%35.03%17.71%18.75% Observations1898189820835883796This table presents the estimated coefficients of OLS regression relating the appointment of a CEO withfinancial experience to real earnings management as estimated by the method of Roychowdhury(2006).Pre-appointmentfirm-years are in the two-year period before the CEO turnover year,and Post-appointmentfirm-years are in the two-year period after the CEO turnover year.Treatment means that the former CEO lacksfinancial experience and the new CEO hasfinancial experience. Control indicates that both former and new CEOs lackfinancial experience.The whole sample consists of allfirms with CEO turnover,estimated by the DID model.EER is a dummy variable set equal to one if the sample is in the Treatment group and zero if in the Control group.POST is a time dummy variable set equal to one if thefirm-year is in the Post-appointment period,zero if in the Pre-appointment period.EER×POST is an interaction of the two indicator variables.All control variables are defined in Table2.*Indicates that estimated coefficient is significant at two-tailed10%level.**Indicates that estimated coefficient is significant at two-tailed5%level.***Indicates that estimated coefficient is significant at two-tailed1%level.regression results for the pre-and post-appointment periods,wefind that neither of the coeffi-cients of EER is significant,which suggests that there is no significant difference in accrual-based earnings management betweenfirms that have CEOs withfinancial experience and those that have CEOs without comparable experience.We alsofind that the coefficient of POST is not significant either in the treatment or in the control group,which indicates that thefinancial experience of a newly appointed CEO(or lack thereof)has no impact on accrual-based earnings management.In addition,we test the relation with the whole turnover sample using the DID method,with results shown in column(5).The coefficient on the interaction EER and POST(EER×POST)is not signifi-cant,nor are the coefficients for EER and POST separately.All of the results suggest thatfinancially experienced CEOs do not differ fromfinancially inexperienced ones in accrual-based earnings man-。

审计常用英语词汇1.audit 审计2.Acceptable difference 可接受差异3.Accounting activities 会计活动4.Accounting estimate and polices 会计估计和会计政策5.Anti-fraud controls 内部控制6.Assertion 认定7.Audit committee 审计委员会8.Audit file assembly date 审计文档装订日ponent auditor组成部分审计师10.assurance 鉴证11.credibility 可信赖程度12.audit of financial statements 财务报表审计13.agreed-upon procedures 商定程序14.high levels of assurance 高水平保证pilation 编制16.reliability 可靠性17.relevance 相关性18.professional skepticism 职业谨慎19.objectivity 客观性20.professional competence 专业胜任能力21.Senior/CPA-in-charge 项目经理22.audit engagement letter 审计业务约定书23.recurring audit 连续审计24.the client 委托人（客户）25.change CPA 更换注册会计师26.the existing CPA 现任注册会计师27.the successor CPA 后任注册会计师28.the preceding CPA前任注册会计师29.issue the audit report 出具审计报告30.expert 专家31.the board of directors 董事会32.knowledge of the entity‘ s business 了解被审计单位情况33.assess material misstatement risks评估重大错报风险34.determine the nature， timing and extent of the audit procedures 确定审计程序的性质、时间和范围35.general knowledge of ——初步了解―――的情况36.further assessment of——进一步了解的情况37.the prior year‘s working papers 以前年度工作底稿38.meeting minutes 会议纪要39.business risks 经营风险40.appropriateness 适当性41.accounting estimate 会计估计42.management representations 管理层声明43.going concern assumption 持续经营假设44.audit plan 审计计划45.significant audit areas 重点审计领域46.error 错误47.fraud舞弊48.modified or additional procedures 修改或追加审计程序49.misappropriation of assets 侵占资产50.transactions without substance 虚假交易51.unusual pressures 异常压力52.the suspected non-compliance 涉嫌存在违法行为53.materiality 重要性54.exceed the materiality level 超过重要性水平55.approach the materiality level 接近重要性水平56.an acceptably low level 较低的可接受水平57.the overall financial statement level and in related account balances andtransaction levels 财务报表层和相关账户、交易层58.misstatements or omissions 错报或漏报59.aggregate 总计60.subsequent events 期后事项61.adjust the financial statements 调整财务报表62.perform additional audit procedures 实施追加的审计程序63.audit risk 审计风险64.detection risk 检查风险65.inappropriate audit opinion 不适当的审计意见66.material misstatement 重大的错报67.tolerable misstatement 可容忍错报68.the acceptable level of detection risk 可接受的检查风险69.assessed level of material misstatement risk 重大错报风险的评估水平70.small business 小规模企业71.accounting system 会计系统72.test of control 控制测试73.walkthrough test 穿行测试munication 沟通75.flow chart 流程图76.reperformance of internal control重新执行内部控制77.audit evidence 审计证据78.substantive procedures 实质性程序79.assertions 认定80.existence 存在81.occurrence 发生pleteness 完整性83.rights and obligations 权利和义务84.valuation and allocation 计价和分摊85.presentation and disclosure 表达和披露86.cutoff 截止87.accuracy 准确性88.classification 分类89.inspection 检查90.supervision of counting 监盘91.observation 观察92.confirmation 函证93.calculation 计算94.analytical procedures 分析程序95.vouch 抽凭96.trace 追查97.audit sampling 审计抽样98.error 误差99.expected error 预期误差100.population 总体101.sampling risk 抽样风险102.non- sampling risk 非抽样风险103.sampling unit 抽样单位104.statistical sampling 统计抽样105.tolerable error 可容忍误差106.the risk of under reliance 信赖不足风险107.the risk of over reliance 信赖过度风险108.the risk of incorrect rejection 误拒风险109.the risk of incorrect acceptance 误受风险110.trial balance 试算平衡表111.index and cross-referencing 索引和交叉索引112.cash receipt 现金收入113.cash disbursement 现金支出114.bank statement 银行对账单115.bank reconciliation 银行存款余额调节表116.balance sheet date 资产负债表日 realizable value 可变现净值118.storeroom 仓库119.sale invoice 销售发票120.price list 价目表121.positive confirmation request 积极式询证函122.negative confirmation request 消极式询证函123.purchase request 请购单124.receiving report 验收报告125.gross margin 毛利126.manufacturing overhead 制造费用127.material request 领料单128.inventory stocktaking 存货盘点129.bond certificate 债券130.stock certificate 股票131.audit report 审计报告132.entity 被审计单位133.addressee of the audit report 审计报告的收件人134.unqualified opinion 无保留意见135.qualified opinion 保留意见136.disclaimer of opinion 无法表示意见137.adverse opinion 否定意见138.ability to perform the work 完成工作的能力139.acceptance procedures 承接（业务）程序140.accountability 可计量性141.accruals 应计项目142.appointment 任命143.assurance engagement 保证债务144.audit committee 审计委员会145.audit evaluation 审计业务146.audit staffing 审计工作人员147.audit trail 审计线索148.auditing standards 审计准则mittee 委员会150.cash count 现金盘点151.client screening 委托人甄别parative financial statements 比较财务报表pletion of the audit 审计的结束pliance with accounting regulations 符合会计规则155.confidentiality 保密性156.confirmation of accounts receivable 应收账款的函证157.conflict of interest 利益冲突158.control environment 控制环境159.control procedures 控制程序160.Control deficiency 控制缺陷161.control risk 控制风险162.corporate governance 公司治理,公司管制163.corresponding figures 相应的计算164.creditors 债权人165.current audit files 本期审计档案166.date of report 报告的日期167.detection risk 检查风险168.direct verification approach 直接核查法169.directional testing 方向的抽查170.disagreement with management 与管理层意见不一致171.documenting the audit process 记录审计流程172.evaluating of results of audit procedures 评估审计程序执行的结果173.examinations 检查174.expectations 期望175.expected error 预期的差异176.experience 经验177.external audit 外部审计178.external review reports 外部审阅报告179.fair 公正、公允180.final assessment of control risk 控制风险的最终评定181.final audit 期末审计182.financial statement assertions 财务报表认定183.fraud and error 舞弊184.fraud 欺诈185.going concern assumption 持续经营假设186.guidance for internal auditors 内部审计员的指导187.hospitality 款待188.independent estimate 独立的估计189.inherent risk 固有风险190.insurance 保险191.integrity 完整性192.interim audit 中期审计193.internal auditing 内部审计194.internal auditors 内部审计师195.internal control system 内部控制系统196.inventory system 盘存制度197.inventory valuation 存货估价198.ISA 230 documentation 国际审计准则第230号底稿记录199.legal obligation 法定义务,法定责任200.levels of assurance 鉴证程度/水平201.limitation on scope 审计范围限制202.management representation letter 管理当局声明书203.material misstatements of fact 重大错报204.measurement 计量205.modified reports 修订报告206.negative assurance 消极保证207.non-executive directors 非执行董事208.non-sampling risk 非抽样风险209.obligating event 负有责任事件210.opening balances 期初余额211.operational audits 经营审计212.other information 其他的信息213.overall review of financial statements 财务报表的总体审阅214.overhead absorption 管理费用分配215.periodic plan 定期的计划216.permanent audit files 永久审计档案217.personal relationships 个人的亲属关系218.planning 计划编制219.professional duty of confidentiality 保密的职业责任220.qualitative aspects of errors 差错的性质221.random selection 随机选择222.reasonable assurance 合理保证223.reassessing sampling risk 重新评价抽样风险224.reservation of title 保留225.rights 认股权226.risk and materiality 风险和重要性227.risk-based approach 以风险为导向的方法228.rules of professional conduct 职业道德守则229.sales cut-off 售截止230.sales system 销售（货）体系231.sample size 样本量232.sampling risk 抽样风险233.sampling units 抽样单位234.schedule of unadjusted errors 未调整的差错235.scope and objectives of internal audit 内审范围和目标236.segregation of duties 职责分离237.statement 1:integrity,objectivity and independence 声明1: 公正，客观性和独立238.statement 2:the professional duty of confidence 声明2: 保密的职业责任239.statutory audit 法定审计240.statutory duty 法定责任241.stratification 分层242.substantive tests 实质性测试243.sufficient appropriate audit evidence 充分的适当审计证据244.supervision 监督245.supervisory and monitoring roles 监督和监控角色246.suppliers statements 供应商的声明247.system and internal controls 系统和内部的控制248.tolerable error 可容忍误差ing the work of an expert 利用专家的工作250.valuation 计价，估价251.voluntary disclosure 自愿披露252.working papers 工作底稿253.Emphasis of matter paragraph(s)强调事项254.Inquiry 询问255.Investigate 调查256.Recalculation重新计算257.Service organization 服务组织258.Tests of details 细致性测试259.Walkthrough 窜行测试260.working capital forecast 运营资本预测261.profit forecast 盈利预测262.Prospectuses 招股章程263.Institute of Certified Public 首次公开发行264.retrospective adjustments 追溯调整。

六西格玛术语中英文对照$k-—Thousands of dollars千美元＄M——Millions of dollars百万美元％ R & R-—Gage % Repeatability and Reproducibility ％重复性和再现性ANOVA——Analysis Of Variance 方差分析AOP——Annual Operating Plan年度运营计划BB——Black Belt黑带A process improvement project team leader who is trained and certified in the Six Sigma breakthrough methodology and tools， and who is responsible for project execution.经“六西格玛"方法论和工具使用培训并认证的过程改进项目的项目负责人，负责项目的执行. BOD——Board of Directors董事会BPM——Business Process Management商业流程管理BTS——Breakthrough Technology Solution 突破性改进解决方案C ＆ E——Cause and Effects matrix因果矩阵CAP——Change Acceleration Process加速变革流程Capability——能力The total range of inherent variation in a stable process。

It is determined by using control charts data。

在稳定过程中全部内在固有变化的改变范围。

它由控制图的数据来确定。

CapabilityIndex—-能力指数A calculated value used to compare process variation to a specification。

2025届仿真模拟★第02套2025年普通高等学校招生全国统一考试英语注意事项：1．答卷前，考生务必将自己的姓名、准考证号填写在答题卡和试卷指定位置上。

2．回答选择题时，选出每小题答案后，用铅笔把答题卡上对应题目的答案标号涂黑。

如需改动，用橡皮擦干净后，再选涂其他答案标号。

回答非选择题时，将答案写在答题卡上，写在本试卷上无效。

3．考试结束后，将本试卷和答题卡一并交回。

英语听力 高三模拟 第2025-02套.mp4第一部分听力（共两节，满分30分）做题时，先将答案标在试卷上。

录音内容结束后，你将有两分钟的时间将试卷上的答案转涂到答题卡上。

第一节（共5小题；每小题1.5分，满分7.5分）听下面5段对话。

每段对话后有一个小题，从题中所给的A、B、C三个选项中选出最佳选项。

听完每段对话后，你都有10秒钟的时间来回答有关小题和阅读下一小题。

每段对话仅读一遍。

例：How much is the shirt?A. £19.15.B. £9.18.C. £9.15.答案是C。

1．Where does the conversation probably take place?A. In a supermarket.B. In the post office.C. In the street. 2．What did Carl do?A. He designed a medal.B. He fixed a TV set.C. He took a test.3．What does the man do?A. He’s a tailor.B. He’s a waiter.C. He’s a shop assistant. 4．When will the flight arrive?A. At 18:20.B. At 18:35.C. At 18:50.5．How can the man improve his article?A. By deleting unnecessary words.B. By adding a couple of points.C. By correcting grammar mistakes.第二节（共15小题；每小题1.5分，满分22.5分）听下面5段对话或独白。