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邹渝，罗建华，张伟，等.战场搜救装备体系作战能力需求论证方法研究[J].医疗卫生装备,2021,42（4）:1-5.• IThesis•专题研究窑8编者按：战场联合搜救体系建设是联合作战体系建设的重要组成部分，是顺利遂行搜救任务的基础，是形成战场联合VV V VVV 搜救能力的关键。
战场联合搜救体系建设涵盖指挥体系、力量体系和装备体系等多个方面，需要以实战化需求为牵弓I,聚焦体 :系论证、能力需求论证和体系试验等关键环节。
本期我刊特邀全军战场联合搜救体系建设总师组郑然教授担任栏目主编，组 织相关人员围绕战场搜救装备体系作战能力需求论证方法研究、面向能力差距的陆军战场搜救体系论证研究、陆军战场搜救 装备体系作战试验研究等进行全面论述，敬请关注。
本期特邀栏目主编：郑然栏目主编简介：郑然（1975—）,男，博士，教授，博士研究生导师，陆军军医大学陆军卫勤训练基地模拟训练中心主任,全军战场联合搜救体系建设总师组专家，全军医学科技委员会卫勤专委会委员，重庆市突发事件卫生应急专家咨询委员会委员，重庆市医学会灾难医学专业委员会副主任委员遥主要从事战场联 合搜救、卫勤保障训练和卫勤仿真等方面的研究。
作为课题负责人先后承担国家和军队各类科研任务10余项，发表论文50余篇，出版专著3部，获软件著作权9项。
研究成果获国家级教学成果二等奖1项，军 队教学成果一等奖1项、二等奖1项，军队科技进步二等奖1项。
2019年入选陆军科技英才库，获军队优 秀专业技术人才二类岗位津贴。
X、v x"战场搜救装备体系作战能力需求论证方法研究刍卩 渝】，罗建华2,张 伟1*,徐 超彳，胡 波1，郑 然1*（1.陆军军医大学陆军卫勤训练基地，重庆400042；2.陆军装甲兵学院演训中心，北京100072；3.陆军研究院特种勤务研究所，西安710018）［摘要］目的：基于战场搜救装备体系的构建实际，探讨定性定量相结合的装备体系作战能力需求论证方法。
一、DODAF定义DODAF是采用标准方法，表述“EA的数据和关系类型”的指引，是表述“EA的模型标准集之格式和内容”的指引，是解决复杂系统（含人的因素，如行动者[机构或人员]类型）结构化问题的指引；DODAF V2.02立足实体(如机关)与时俱进地转型，聚焦于6类利益攸关方、6个标准疑问、可遴选的8个视点和52个模型，提供解决人员、流程和技术融为一体、结构化、深层次问题的（建模）方法集。
依据DODAF架构的EA，可揭示团队当前状况、勾画团队未来蓝图、确定团队的发展计划，从而奠定团队可视、可控、和谐、滚动和持续发展的基础。
架构EA的最终目的：是夯实团队信息化乃至现代化的基础。
依据DODAF架构的EA，支持作战（或业务）决策、联合能力集成和发展决策、统一采办决策、组合投资（融资）管理决策、系统工程决策、网络中心化集成决策；支持机构改革（转型）、规划论证研究、发展路线图开发、业务流程再造、复杂系统设计和开发、面向服务的解决方案。
二、DODAF构想提供顶层、促进团队架构（EA）开发的概念、指引、最佳实践和方法集合，支持指挥、管理和能力域的决策流程。
▲支持团队向网络中心化方向发展（如支持网络化作战），支持面向服务的架构（SOA）的开发。
▲聚焦于产生关键决策的架构数据，可确保架构师通过视图和模型，为决策者提供可视的源头信息；可以促进灵活开发符合团队文化和特色的视图。
▲为架构师创建支持团队管理的EA，提供方法和推荐技术。
三、DODFA的目的和范围依托类似“通用方法和语言”的一组通用词汇，为团队架构(EA)开发、EA信息交换和促进EA之间的互用性提供指引。
大型、复杂实体，需要精益求精的信息、系统、服务和技术来完成复杂、联合的使命。
为此，需要结构化、可重复的评估和选择投资方法，需要建立新系统、部署新技术和提供新服务的能力，以提高决策和管理价值，进行有效转型。
DODAF的指引，适用于EA开发、维护和使用；DODAF的基础结构，支持同层EA 统一拼接、各层EA统一链接。
美国国防部架构框架D o D A F介绍文稿归稿存档编号：[KKUY-KKIO69-OTM243-OLUI129-G00I-FDQS58-美国国防部架构框架（DoDAF）介绍摘要： DoDAF是由美国国防部的US Undersecretary of Defense for Business Transformation工作小组所制定的系统体系结构框架(Architecture Framework,简称AF)。
关键词： DODAF，C4ISR，美国国防部，架构框架DoDAF是由美国国防部的US Undersecretary of Defense for Business Transformation工作小组所制定的系统体系结构框架(Architecture Framework,简称AF)。
其前身是C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance )体系结构框架。
近年来，基于DoDAF而发展出来的有：英国国防部提出的MODAF和NAF (NATO Architecture Framework)。
美国国防部（DoD）于2004年2月颁布了《体系结构框架》的1.0版本用于指导国防指挥1.DoDAF的演进C4ISR AF 1.0 ----于1996年6月推出。
C4ISR AF 2.0 ----于1997年12月推出。
DoDAF 1.0 ----于2003年8月推出，增加其运用范围，不局限C4ISR里，可以应用到所有的任务领域（Mission Area）；同时也推出CADM v1.01。
DoDAF 1.5 ----于2007年4月推出，特别强调以网路为中心(Net-Centric)的概念，在体系结构的描述里体现了网络为中心的概念；也推出CADM v1.5以便储存Net-Centric新概念的描述文件。
基于dodaf的装备体系结构建模方法1. 背景介绍美国国防部架构框架（DoDAF）是一种基于数据和组件的体系结构分析方法，旨在提高各种军事项目和技术开发计划的效率和效益。
随着装备体系结构的复杂性和多样性不断增加，DoDAF的应用显得尤为重要。
2. DoDAF的构成元素DoDAF的主要构成元素包括：数据视图、活动视图、逻辑视图和物理视图。
数据视图描述了数据的流动和存储参数以及数据处理的过程。
活动视图列举了各项活动、任务和流程，并确定了它们之间的关系。
逻辑视图则包括所有操作间的控制流和时序信息。
而物理视图则是具体物体的描述，包括实际装备、传感器、机构和对应的软件支持。
3. 基于DoDAF的装备体系结构建模方法在进行装备体系结构建模之前，要明确需要达到的目的和规模。
通过构建DoDAF模型，可以帮助分析师更好地识别和规划组织的需求。
以下是具体的建模步骤：3.1 确定为何需要建模建模的目的通常是为了规划和设计装备系统、辅助指挥、决策和管理过程以及协调各工作组件之间的关系。
3.2 分析和收集需求需求分析是确定系统目标、功能和性能的过程。
利用DoDAF，可以收集和归纳数据、活动、逻辑和物理要素，也可以确定性能和特征的相关细节。
3.3 设计模型利用收集到的信息，设计详细的实现计划并构建装备体系结构模型。
3.4 进行验证和测试当建模完成之后，要进行验证和测试以确保所有的数据都可以被安全地存储和交互。
通过验证和测试，可以确保DoDAF模型的准确性和可行性。
4. 结论基于DoDAF的装备体系结构建模可以帮助军事系统分析师更好地了解和处理这些系统的各个组件之间的关系，包括数据、活动、逻辑和物理要素，并有效地整合它们。
同时，基于DoDAF的方法提供了可行的解决方案，对于保障军事设施安全和效益有重要意义。
Mission Reliability Modeling for Equipment System Based on the Operational Viewpoint ofDoDAF 2.0Lin Shaoyang,College of Information System and Management National University of Defense TechnologyChangsha, P. R. China***************************Wu XiaoyueCollege of Information System and Management National University of Defense TechnologyChangsha, P. R. ChinaAbstract—Currently, Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 2.0 is widely used in many aspects of the architecture-related modeling fields. Due to the highly complex structure of architecture, its reliability became a pivotal issue. However, DoDAF 2.0 is lack of a specific viewpoint to model the reliability of the architecture. This paper introduces an approach to deal with reliability modeling method related missions posed by Equipment System (ES), which is an obvious characterized architecture. OV-1, OV-5a and OV-6c of DoDAF 2.0's operational viewpoint are extracted and extended as the modeling framework. Use case diagram, class diagram and sequence diagram of Unified Modeling Language (UML) are picked to present the products mentioned. The study also regulates a series of standards for each extended product in detail, in order to collect requisite reliability-related parameters for further analysis and calculation. Later, the proposed model is applied to an ES as an example to verify its availability.Keywords-reliability modeling; equipment system; mission reliability; equipment system; operational viewpoint; DoDAF2.0I.I NTRODUCTIONEquipment System (ES) is made up of wide ranges of correlative and function-complementary equipment, which integrate into an organic integrity of diverse categories, structures and scales, according to the claim of optimal placement and operational capability， thus making up a large high-level system, namely System of Systems (SoS) or architecture.Reliability is a key performance parameter in system design, so has become a basis factor affecting mission success [1]. Mission is the foundation of ES, since all member of ES are related with each other as a whole by the same target—achieving the specific destination. Mission reliability refers to the probability that a system will perform its specified mission in its mission section [2]. Therein, mission section is the profile to the events and time sequence the mission has to follow. Mission reliability reflects the ability of fulfilling the task successfully, thus playing a big part in ES operational effectiveness.On the basis of multi-view method, Architecture Framework (AF) provides a collection of normalized modeling process and description method, which standardizes the contents contained to ensure the unified understanding and comparing principal from all stakeholders [3]. Currently DoDAF 2.0 of U.S. is often adopted as descriptive model in military field [4-6]. Nonetheless, no specialized reliability modeling viewpoint or product arises in DoDAF 2.0.Several reliability modeling methods have been used in the mission reliability analysis. Fault tree analysis is suitable in describing non-repairable systems in [7–9], but its limitations become apparent when conducted to quantitative issues. Bayesian Networks were developed as a logic graphical representation [10–11], and it has shown its agile computation efficiency. This approach is also applied in the proposed methodology. Later, state-space models, namely Markov chains and Petri nets, appear as main methods for analyzing system's dynamic reliability [12-14]. However, it has the state space growth explosion problem.Yet, methods mentioned above show weakness on describing ES, since ES usually has great amount of units of different levels and complicated logical relations. On the other hand, product sets of DoDAF 2.0 do not supply all sufficient data for ES reliability analysis. In the paper, we propose a reliability modeling framework based on the operational viewpoint of DoDAF 2.0, viewing to probe into a reliability modeling framework to ES.For the rest of the paper, section II introduces DoDAF 2.0 and its operational viewpoint. Section III demonstrates the processed reliability modeling product set and its UML description in detail. Section IV describes the application of this approach to an ES as a case study. Section V summarizes the paper and gives a perspective to further research.II.D O DAF2.0A ND I TS O PERATIONAL V IEWPOINTDoDAF 2.0 is a graphical and tabular description for SoS. It provides general guidance for development, usage and management of DoD architectures with an emphasis on interoperability and integration between constituentInternational Conference on Logistics Engineering, Management and Computer Science (LEMCS 2014)systems in SoS [15]. In total, 8 viewpoints and 52 products are built in DoDAF 2.0.Viewpoint replaces "view" of antecedent versions, in order to coordinate with ISO. These viewpoints are further classified for describing the overarching aspects for every viewpoint (All Viewpoint, AV), requirements and deployments (Capability Viewpoint, CV), data relationships and alignment structure (Data and Information Viewpoint, DIV), operation scenarios and activities (Operational Viewpoint, OV), relationships between OV&CV and projects being implemented (Project Viewpoint, PV), performers, activities services and their exchanges (Service Viewpoint, SvcV), applicable principals (Standard Viewpoint, StdV), and the composition, interconnectivity and context (System Viewpoint, SV)，as Fig.1 demonstrating. Each of these views has a well-defined product set in accordance with different perspectives.The DoDAF 2.0 viewpoints reside in a presentation layer, underlying which there is a data layer where defining attributes and relationships of the architecture can be documented [16]. There is a natural and straight correspondence between AF and UML [3]. Additionally, DoDAF 2.0 formalism is increasingly being supported by other commercially available architecting tools, in which documents, sheets, matrices and such structured presentations are employed to narrow development cycle, e.g. DOORs of Telelogic, Requisite Pro of Rational and Caliber RM of Borland. One of the advantages UML possesses is that not only does it allow capturing DoDAF 2.0's data layer but also supports modeling and simulation on purpose of verification.OV describes the missions and activities, operational elements, and resource flow exchanges required to conduct operations [16]. OV is adept at tracing system's dynamic behaviors and transformation, and just such character makes it quiet suitable for modeling ES mission reliability. OV has 9 products in total, involved capturing organization relationships, resource flows, state transition and other architecture's characters. For mission reliability modeling, this paper provides a tailored product set, including OV-1, OV-5a and OV-6c to model ES's mission reliability, and it would be elaborately discussed in nextFigure 1. DoDAF 2.0 eight viewpoints.III.M ISSION R ELIABILITY M ODEL U NDER OVProduct SetThe clipped product set of ES mission reliability model is shown in Fig. 1.OV-1 aims at describing the contents and processes of the mission(s) that ES has to fulfill. Graph of jpg is recommended as the storage format. Its visualized representation enables further reliability modeling, meanwhile offering information particularly concerned by high-level decision makers during their decision process. OV-1's contents depend on the unique objective and application of specific ES. In general, it may involve operation processes, organization hierarchy, geographical distribution and operational expectations including what missions will emerge, which unit(s) will undertake, what sequences should be complied with et al, and also the interaction with external environment and systems. The links between two elements are suggested but not limited as one of the follows:∙Control: Control link from A to B means B's activity is managed by A's instructions.∙TrackInfo: TrackInfo link represents the information flow movements.∙Assistance: Assistance link from A to B indicates that if B gets failed, A would make up.∙Affirm: Affrim link reports the lower equipment's being- state and attack-complete state from lowerlevel to the command center.The relationships of the elements on the diagram sometimes convey their relative position, although this is not specifically captured in the semantics. Since each ES differs, we do not set specific rules for OV-1.OV-5a is a newly created product in DoDAF 2.0, in order to describe mission constituents and their hierarchical structure. Through the decomposition it can be cleared that the duty each mission should accomplish and unnecessary redundancy that can be eliminated. Thus the model could be simplified and efficiency may be improved as well. To clarify the affect that lower-level failure brought about to higher missions, logic connections are introduced into OV-5a. Currently 'AND' gate and 'OR' gate are mainly considered. They can be defined as follows.Def. 1AND gate: Only when all nodes under AND gate succeed does mission above the gate succeed, as Fig. 2(a).Def. 2OR gate: As long as at least one of the nodes under OR gate succeeds will mission above the gate succeed, as Fig. 2(b).OV-6c depicts the sequence and information exchanges between phases. Through constant refining to the mission process, execution order and rules would be gradually precise and accurate. UML sequence diagram is adopted as representation standard. Sequence division is consistent with divided layered graph of OV-5a. On top of the graph is ES' object, accompanied by its relevant lifeline. Specific time points are labeled on left of the lifeline labels. Bars on the lifeline stand for its duration time. Solid arrow line is message transiting between objects.In each phase's sequence diagram, time propels in terms of lifeline. In reality, lifeline is finite and does not fit for long-time phase. Thus object's lifeline should be regulated in more details. As Fig. 3 shows, on left of the object A's lifeline, t11represents A's start time and similarly t12 end time, while t21 is the time message 1 from another object arrives. t22 on the right indicates message 2 leaving time.A N DP 1P 2AO RP 1P 2BFigure 2. (a) AND gate example. (b) OR gate examplemessage 2O bj ect A t 11t12t 22message 1t 21Figure 3. OV-5a UML sequence diagram representationIV. UML D EFINITIONa. OV-5a UML normalizationOV-5a describes the operations that are normally conducted in the different nodes. The extended use-case and class diagram provides a means of breaking down activities to lower level activities as well as indicating the nodes that perform the activities. It includes node, activity, link and logic relation. Their normalized data definition is shown in table 2 (a)-(d).b. OV-5a UML normalizationThe OV-6c is used to define time based behavioral scenarios between operational elements. The interactions can be service operations as well as the interactions defined on OV-5a diagrams. There are three types of elements in OV-6c: node, lifeline and message transit. Therein, node data definition is the same as OV-5a. Lifeline can be potentially described by the messageArrivingTime and messageLeavingTime attributes of message transit. Table 3 illustrates the data definition for message transit.TABLE I.ES M ISSION R ELIABILITY M ODELTABLE II.(A)D ATA D EFINITION F OR N ODETABLE III. (A) D ATA D EFINITION M ESSAGE TRANSITV.C ASE S TUDYAn ES is presented in this part as a detailed illustration to the proposed model. The system basically consists of five parts: Ground Based Interceptor (GBI), X band Ground Based Rader (GBR), Battle Management and Command, Control & Communications (BM/C3) system, Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), and Defense Support Program/Space-Based Infrared System (DSP/SBIRS) [17].GBI is an up-to-date kinetic energy antipersonnel weapon intercepting ballistic missile warheads in its midcourse outside the atmosphere and destroying it through straightly impact. Traditional GBI consists of Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) and two booster rockets.GBR is X band phased array radar, and it is the main fire control radar of the system, deployed at the same place with GBI. It mainly involves surveillance, capture, trace, identification, fire control assistance and damage evaluation.BM/C3 is the brain of system, connecting all constituent systems organically. It mainly involves in receiving data from each detector to analyze the striking missile's parameters (like speed, trajectory, point of fall et. al), calculating "sweet point", directing UEWR and GBR to trace and capture the target, giving launch orders to GBI, offering revised target information to the flying interceptor, evaluation intercepting effect, and so on. BM/C3 is also deployed with GBI and GBR.UWER is upgraded phased array radar used to detect and track ballistic missile and provide early warnings. It detects and traces ballistic missile initial flight and provides GBR rough azimuth information.DSP supplies early warnings for the system. Via merging data from two or more DSPs, ballistic trajectory can be forecasted. Furthermore, compared with foregone missiles' infrared characteristics, the ballistic version can be confirmed. Currently, DSP is gradually replaced by SBIRS, which consists of two kinds satellites: Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) and High Earth Orbit (HEO). Highly flexible infrared sensor technique of HEO conveys strategy, the launch and flight of theatre ballistic missile, global theatre infrared data and processed intelligence. LEO satellites are equipped with two kind sensors: the capture one is to observe flame during the rocket launch phase; the other trace one could keep in track with the locked target from its midcourse until back into the atmosphere.Fig. 4 is the OV-1 model of the system. Substantially the system functions in such procedures:1: Early warning phase1) DSP/SBIRS detects the booster's plume when the striking ballistic missiles launches, and traces until its booster rocker turning off. Via repeater satellite or earth station, DSP/SBIRS sends trackinfo back to BM/C3for predicting the striking missile's incoming direction as well as impact area. Pertinent data would also be sent to UEWR.2) After gets information of ballistic position, UEWR will search and detect associative airspace to trace the striking missile. When discovering missile warhead, it will track robustly and send trackinfo to BM/C3.2: Interception decision phase1) BM/C3formulates operations management plan, including intercepting pattern, interceptor quantity, calculating effective acting distance, thus preliminarily ascertaining GBI's launch direction and moment. Meanwhile BM/C3should send control information to GBI and receive affirm to get its authorization.2) BM/C3 sends trackinfo got from UEWR to GBR to guide its search. Through detecting and tracing ballistic warhead, GBR would retrieve more precise information for BM/C3decision. Meanwhile, GBR would generate warhead image by sufficient data it has collected.3) BM/C3conducts target identification and threat evaluation to verify the warhead version, the trajectory and the impact point. On this basis, interception decision about GBI's launch moment and estimated interception point is made. When the accuracy of the estimated interception point is within the appointed scope (20km), BM/C3 would give GBI launching orders targeting on the estimated interception point.3：Interception implementation phase1) As soon as receiving orders, GBI launches immediately. After that, GBR precisely tracks GBI and warhead, returns revised objective data back to BM/C3 to update GBI's flight.2) When GBI reaches the estimated airspace, EKV separates with the booster rocket. Then EKV compares the target information detected with former images provided by GBR to verify and target objective, thus destroying it through straight collision.4： Interception effectiveness evaluation1) During the GBI collision, GBR collects interception data sending back to BM/C3.2) BM/C3evaluated the interception effectiveness. If failed, BM/C3 has to decide whether to conduct a second interception.According to the procedure, its operational activities decomposition can be depicted like Fig. 5(a). Furthermore, Fig. 5(b) shows the class diagram for the case "EKV attack". On purpose of saving space, some of the class attribute values and operations have been omitted. For the proposed model of OV-6c, the above mentioned interception decision phase is hired as an example, and it is shown in Fig. 6.VI.C ONCLUSIONDoDAF 2.0 is a rife model framework for ES. The paper proposes a mission reliability modeling method based on the operational viewpoint of DoDAF 2.0 and illustrates the UML normalization. An ES is an example of highly complex and adaptive ES characterized by a loosely coupled federation of constituent systems. The proposed model succeeds in describing ES reliability structure, proving the methods validity. For further research, transition mechanism between OV-5a and OV-5b can be investigated in terms of enriching the product set and heterogeneous representation. Besides, UML entities can be enlarged for more abundant and convenient details. More importantly, system view's product can also be used on mission reliability modeling.A CKNOWLEDGMENTThe paper is partly supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant no. 71071159.Figure 4.OV-1 modelD S P /S B I R Sdet ect pl um et racem i ssi l est ore dat asend i nf o.recei ve com m andU E W Rsearchw arheadG B IG B Rl aunch gi ve orders<extends><extends>revi se fli ghtseparat eboost ersE K V at t ack<extends><extends><extends>recei vei nf o.cal cul at edeci degenerat ei m ageFigure 5. (a) OV-5a modelactivityIDnodeContained activityDescription successrulesE K VA t t acknodeId ofActivity linkIn linkToprerequisitesuccessProbability startTime endTimeE K V S eparat enodeId ofActivity linkIn linkToprerequisitesuccessProbability startTime endTimeA t t ackO rdermessageType messageIdmessageFrom: GBR, UEWR messageArrivingTime Fl i ght P osi t i onE K V posi t i oni ngmessageType messageIdmessageFrom: GBR messageArrivingTimeR evi sed Fl i ght ANDmessageType messageId messageFrom messageTomessageArrivingTime messageLeavingTimeTarget V eri ficat i on ANDFigure 5. (b) OV-5a class diagram for the case "EKV attack"U E W RG B RB M /C 31: controlAuthorizationG B I6: launch decision order(position,time)3: traceMessage5: traceMessagewarhead image4: traceMessage 2: af f i r m at i onFigure 6. OV-6c Sequence diagram for interception decision phaseR EFERENCES[1] Reliability primer for command, control, communications,computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisssance (C4ISR) facilities. available at: http: // www. usace. ary. mil /publications/ armytm/tm5-698-3/entire.pdf.2005a.[2] Chul Kim, “Analysis for mission reliability of a combat tank ,”IEEE Transactions on Reliability, vol. 38, no. 2, pp 242-245, 1989. [3] Robert K. Garrett, Steve A., Neil T Baron, “Managing theinterstitials, a system of systems framework suited for the ballistic missile defense system ,” Systems Engineering, vol 14,no. 1, pp. 87-108,2011.[4] Yang Kewei and Tan Yuejin, Architecture RequirementsTechnique and Method. Peking: Science Press, 2010.[5] Shu Yu, Research on weapon equipment architecture modelingmethod and application based on the capability requirements, Ph.D. Dissertation, National University of Defense Technology, 2009. [6] Jiang Zhiping, Research on architecture verification method andkey technique for C4ISR system based on CADM, Ph.D. Dissertation, National University of Defense Technology, 2007. [7] Bobbio A., Portinale L, “Improving the analysis of dependablesystems by mapping fault trees into Bayesian networks ,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol. 71, no. 5, pp 249-260, 2001.[8] Hichem Boudali, Joanne,Bechta Dugan, “Dynamic fault treemodels for fault tolerant computer systems ,” IEEE Transaction On Reliability, vol. 41, no. 3, pp 363-377, 1992.[9] Huang Chin-Yu, Chang Yung-Ruei, “An improved decompositionscheme for assessing the reliability of embedded systems by using dynamic fault trees,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol 92, no. 10, pp 1403-1412, 2007.[10] Boudali H., Dugan J. B, “A discrete-time Bayesian networkreliability modeling and analysis framework ,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol 87, no. 6, pp 337-349, 2005. 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[15] Department of Defense Architecture Working Group, DoDArchitecture Framework 2.0, Volume 2: Architecture and Models, available at: /Portals/0/Documents/DODAF/DoDAF_v2-02_web.pdf[16] Biswas, A, Hayden, J, Phillips, MS, Bhasin, KB, Putt, C, &Sartwell, T, “Applying DoDAF to NASA orion mission communication and navigation architecture. In Proceedings of IEEE Aerospace Conference, pp 1-9, 2008.[17] Wang Minle and Li Yong, Ballistic Missile PenetrationEffectiveness Analysis. Peking: National Defense Industry Press, 2010.。
dodaf中元模型定义
DoDAF（Department of Defense Architecture Framework）中
的元模型是用于描述和组织架构数据的框架。
元模型定义了在DoDAF中使用的各种元素和它们之间的关系，以便为架构描述提供
一致的结构和标准化的表示方法。
在DoDAF中，元模型包括以下几个方面的定义：
1. 架构元素，包括组织、任务、功能、数据、接口、节点等，
用于描述架构中的各种实体和其属性。
2. 关系，描述不同架构元素之间的关联和联系，比如依赖关系、组成关系、引用关系等。
3. 视图和视图间关系，定义了不同视图之间的关系，以及视图
中包含的元素和关系的组织方式。
4. 元素属性，描述了每个架构元素的特征和属性，比如名称、
描述、标识符、状态等。
5. 元素分类，将架构元素按照其类型和特性进行分类，以便更好地组织和理解架构描述。
总的来说，DoDAF中的元模型定义了一套结构化的框架，用于描述和组织架构数据，使得不同的架构描述能够统一、一致地表示和交流。
这有助于提高架构的可理解性、可维护性和可扩展性，从而更好地支持决策和规划。
