长沙大学Changsha University第三届模拟联合国The 3rd Model United Nation英文组English Group背景文件Background GuideStatement of the ProblemThe world is in an unusually prolonged and widespread global expansion—the strongest in more than three decades. Economic integration and technological change have played a crucial part in driving this expansion and sustaining it in the face of recent shocks and some daunting longer-term economic policy challenges.Yet there remains substantial ambivalence about the benefits of globalization. To many, the costs seem more compelling than the benefits. The sources of this ambivalence are varied. Some are familiar and some new.Concerns about the distributional impact of trade have been given new force by the de cline in labor’s share of national income; the long-term trend of rising income inequality; the increase in the share of goods and services that are tradable, and therefore of the broader scope of the population affected by the pressure of competition; and the perceived acceleration in the pace of economic change.The greater mobility of financial flows has increased the sense among policymakers in many countries that their jobs have become harder, that they are less the masters of their own fate than in the past, and that they have a diminished ability to shield their companies and citizens from volatility.But do these changes in economic circumstances and in perceptions fundamentally change what we know about the broad economic merits of global integration? I do not believe the basic economics of that judgment have changed.Few would argue that economic integration by itself is sufficient to achieve broad-based gains in income growth both within and across countries. The relative prosperity of nations reflects different choices made by governments about a range of policies and institutions beyond the realm of trade and financial restrictions. But integration is an essential ingredient for achieving sustained growth. Reasonable people can disagree on the magnitude of gains that can be attributed to trade rather than other economic policies. But the evidence in support of the broad consensus that openness and integration contribute significantly to better growth outcomes remains compelling.Just as compelling is the evidence against the proposition that protection in the form of restrictions on trade increases growth or reduces inequality. The world has a lot of experience with different policies designed to slow the pace of integration or to insulate parts of the economy from its effects, and these policies have generally been associated with worse economic outcomes. The poor do not benefit from protectionism.Although the balance of economic evidence has not fundamentally changed, the politics around globalization and integration have become more challenging.The fact that the United States is now in the fifth consecutive year of expansion and that unemployment is now at 4.4 percent doesn’t seem to have made trade any more popular. A recent Pew poll suggested that that nearlytwo-thirds of Americans feel less secure about their jobs than in earlier generations. And many attribute this increase in anxiety to trade.This phenomenon of persistent and perhaps rising ambivalence about integration in the face of solid growth in average incomes is not unique to the United States. Here, as in many countries, the political consensus in favor of economic openness seems more fragile than it once was.The debate about how to respond to this challenge tends to see the economic and political imperatives as in conflict. The most appealing political response—usually some form of selective restriction on trade or investment—is generally the option with the worst economic return. The typical political impulse is to try to address directly the source of the competitive pressure and to relieve it, but these measures cannot offer lasting relief. The economic price of protection, in terms of distorted incentives, reduced flexibility and broader costs on the economy as a whole, seem both more substantial and more enduring than any temporary political benefit.The policy strategies that offer a better longer-term return do not try directly to relieve the pressures that come from economic and financial integration. Instead, they focus on the broader complement of policies and institutions that improve the capacity of economies to adapt to change and to absorb shocks. Those countries that have experienced the greatest gains as the world has become more integrated have been those with the type of policy and institutional infrastructure that facilitates economic flexibility and resilience in the face of change. The policies that offer the most promise in terms of broad-based income gains are not those that try to provide insulation from volatility, but those that make it easier to live with volatility.In the realm of macroeconomic policy, this means further progress toward monetary policy credibility and fiscal sustainability, so that central banks and governments have the capacity to react to adverse shocks and mitigate the damage they can cause.Even with the remarkable improvements in the conduct of monetary policy around the world over the past two decades, central banks in many countries do not have institutional independence, in law or in practice. And many still operate under policy regimes directed at limiting exchange rate changes—objectives that will necessarily conflict with their ability to achieve price stability, as their capital accounts become progressively more open. Economies with flexible exchange rate regimes generally fare better in the face of adverse external shocks. And in countries where central bank credibility is more firmly established, monetary authorities are better able to react to a sharp fall in asset prices or a negative demand shock.In fiscal policy, the same basic point applies. Where fiscal sustainability is more firmly established, governments have more scope to respond to adverse demand shocks by reducing taxes or increasing expenditures. Where deficits and debt to GDP ratios are high and rising, governments have less scope for countercyclical fiscal policy. In these cases fiscal stimulus is more likely to bemet by a rise in risk premier, reducing, if not fully offsetting, the desired benefits to growth. Even in those emerging markets that have seen the most impressive progress toward fiscal sustainability, few have reached the point where they have built much of a cushion against future shocks. And in the United States and many other economies, the demographic changes now working their way through the economy entail very large future deficits and consequently very limited fiscal room for maneuver.The right macroeconomic policy framework is crucial. But we have come to recognize that other issues, traditionally the province of microeconomics, have a vital role in contributing to effective macroeconomic policy. A critical factor distinguishing long-term economic performance among countries with relatively good monetary and fiscal policies is the degree of overall flexibility they exhibit in labor, product and financial markets. This is not simply about the presence or absence of regulation. It is a function of the incentives regulation creates and the extent to which it gets in the way of competition, impedes the allocation of labor and capital to industries with a higher return, favors established firms, and creates barriers to new entrants.As the substantial body of research on structural reforms by the OECD has demonstrated, where regulation is more compatible with flexibility, productive growth has generally been higher, as technological advances have been diffused and adopted more rapidly. The IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook reports that, among the major economies, those with more flexible labor markets have seen smaller declines in labor’s share of income.Open economies, of course, need strong and resilient financial systems. As financial systems develop and capital markets become more open and integrated, savings should be allocated more efficiently and risks distributed more broadly, both within and across countries. This process, however, is messy and very challenging to manage well. The history of economic crises over the last two decades is a history not just of fiscal profligacy and monetary policy mistakes, but of financial system weakness—often the result of rapid deregulation and capital account liberalization in a context of weak supervision and a broad government guarantee of bank liabilities.The development of deeper and more resilient financial markets is important for economies to be able to cope better with exchange rate flexibility and capital mobility. And financial strength is an important part of the arsenal of macro policy tools, for monetary policy is less effective in cushioning the effects of asset price and demand shocks in circumstances where the banking sector is impaired.A final and critical dimension of the policy framework that is important to the successful management of economic integration is the design of the public or social infrastructure. Raising the quality of educational outcomes is vital, as is the design of the network of insurance mechanisms, from unemployment insurance and training support, to health care and pension schemes. As progressively larger shares of the population become more exposed to thepressures of competition, as economies become more flexible, governments have to do a better job of designing programs of assistance that can ease the costs of adjustment.These policies and institutional reforms are fundamentally the responsibility of national governments. International institutions can help, with technical assistance and financial support, but these challenges are essentially national challenges. The reforms of the international institutions now underway to make them more representative of the changing balance of economic activity in the world are laudable. And we share a common interest in a broad range of informal mechanisms for cooperation on policies in the financial arena. But ultimately it is the quality of the choices national governments make that will determine how their economies fare in a more open global economy.Global integration is not the primary source of the world’s economic problems, nor can it be the primary solution to them. But economic integration can contribute significantly to sustained growth, rising incomes and declining poverty rates. The most effective policy response to the concerns of those who fear the consequences of further integration is to direct more political capital to the challenge of developing the economic and institutional infrastructure that will enable governments and their citizens to adapt more readily to change. History of the ProblemA Short History of the Integrated FrameworkThe first WTO Ministerial Conference, held in 1996, recognized that the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) faced difficulties integrating into the global economy. This led to the adoption of the WTO Plan of Action forLeast-Developed Countries. The following year, the WTO convened a High Level Meeting to discuss the specific needs of the LDCs and to formulate a programme to strengthen their trade capacities, including supply-side and market access capacities. The outcome of this meeting was what became known as the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries or the "IF" in short.The main objective of the IF was to improve the capacity of the LDCs to formulate, negotiate and implement trade policy so as to be able to fully integrate into the multilateral trading system and to take up the market opportunities this presents. Support was offered to the IF by six major multilateral agencies, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Trade Centre (ITC), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).The achievements of the IF during the early years were modest, with only a handful of LDCs accessing benefits from the initiative. When the six agencies met in 2000 to review progress they adopted a number of recommendations and implemented institutional changes to improve the IF's effectiveness. Two main objectives were formulated for the revamped IF; firstly, to mainstream trade into the LDCs' Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) or similarnational development plans; and secondly, to assist in the coordinated delivery of trade-related technical assistance.A new tripartite governance and management structure was established to enable the IF to be more country-driven and better coordinated.Current SituationIn LDCsThe National EIF Focal Point (FP) leads the EIF process in the LDC –usually a senior government official appointed by the LDC and supported by a National Implementation Unit (NIU).The EIF Donor Facilitator (DF) works with the FP to facilitate donor coordination and the donor/government dialogue on trade issues and Aid for Trade. The DF is a representative from the donor community active in supporting an LDC’s trade agenda and is identified by the government and other donors.The EIF National Steering Committee (NSC) is the senior level forum for decision-making and coordination among government partners on trade, the private sector, civil society and the donor community.GloballyThe EIF Steering Committee reviews the overall effectiveness of the EIF and ensures transparency of the EIF process. The Steering Committee is made up of all LDCs, all donors to the Trust Fund, the six EIF core partner agencies, the ES and TFM ex officio, and others granted observer status by the EIF Board. The EIF Board is the key decision-making body for the EIF programme looking at policy, financial and operational issues. The Board is made up of three capital-based LDC and donor representatives each, members from the core and observer agencies, as well as the ES and TFM ex officio.The EIF Executive Secretariat, housed in the WTO, works in support of the EIF together with the EIF Trust Fund Manager, represented through the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as selected by the EIF Board.Relevant WTO ActionsThe Work of the Task ForceGiven the growing interest in trade and development, and the weaknesses noted above, the Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF at their meeting in September 2005 concluded3 that the IF should be enhanced and provided with additional resources. The World Bank staff estimated that an amount of between US$200 million and $400 million would be needed for an enhanced IF, based on the needs identified in the current 40 recipient countries and assuming that the IF would be expanded to include the "IDA-only" countries. Subsequent to this, the IFSC established a Task Force to develop proposals fo r such an enhancement, including expanding the IF’s resources and scope, and making it more effective. The Terms of Reference of the Task Force are provided in Appendix I.The Task Force included representatives of LDCs and donors (see Appendix IIfor list of members) and, after an initial meeting chaired by the Ambassador of Zambia, the Ambassador of Canada was invited to assume the Chair. The Task Force conducted its work in two phases, before and after the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial. In its initial phase the Task Force developed consensus recommendations on its terms of reference and key elements. These were approved by Ministers at Hong Kong.Subsequently, the Task Force met twelve times between January and May, 2006, including a session to hear the views of the IF agencies (WTO, World Bank, UNDP, IMF, UNCTAD, ITC). To guide its substantive discussions, individual discussion papers were prepared by members on scope, funding,in-country performance, and on management, governance and administration. The Task Force conducted a two-day workshop, 1 to 2 April, at Coppet, Switzerland, to develop initial recommendations. In its final meetings the Task Force refined these recommendations, a task considerably aided by contributions made by the IF agencies.Throughout its work the Task Force benefited from the strong engagement of its members, ensuring that there was always a lively and informed discussion. Task Force members took their responsibilities extremely seriously. It was particularly gratifying to note that there was often representation from capitals (from both the LDCs and donors) as well from the Geneva missions, illustrating the importance attached to the work of the Task Force by its members. The Task Force benefited from a strong blend of development and trade expertise among its membership.The point of departure for the substantive discussions of the Task Force was the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration4, which reaffirmed the commitment "to effectively and meaningfully integrate LDCs into the multilateral trading system," noted that the Ministers attached "high priority to the effective implementation of the Integrated Framework" and recognized the "urgent need to make the IF more effective and timely" (paragraph 48). Ministers required the Task Force to report back to the IF Steering Committee by 30 April 2006 so that an enhanced IF could be launched by 31 December 2006.It was agreed that the enhanced IF should comprise three specific elements:(i) Increased, additional, predictable financial resources to implement Action Matrices;(ii) Strengthened in-country capacities to manage, implement and monitor the IF process; and(iii) Enhanced IF governance.The Task Force recognized the importance of trade liberalization and the fact that such liberalization should lead to improved economic conditions in the LDCs and assist in meeting the Millennium Development Goal of reducing poverty by half. However there was also a recognition that trade liberalization in itself would not bring about such improvements unless it was handled in a sustainable manner and integrated into a country's overall developmentstrategy.The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness was seen as very important in this process, and our recommendations draw on these principles.The Paris Declaration makes specific commitments in the following areas:1. Strengthening partner countries’ national development strategies and associated operational frameworks (e.g., planning, budget, and performance assessment frameworks).2. Increasing a lignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities, systems and procedures and helping to strengthen their capacities.3. Enhancing donors’ and partner countries’ respective accountability to their citizens and parliaments for their development policies, strategies and performance.4. Eliminating duplication of efforts and rationalizing donor activities to make them as cost-effective as possible.5. Reforming and simplifying donor policies and procedures to encourage collaborative behavior and progressive alignment with partner countries’ priorities, systems and procedures.6. Defining measures and standards of performance and accountability of partner country systems in public financial management, procurement, fiduciary safeguards and environmental assessments, in line with broadly accepted good practices and their quick and widespread application.NICA National Integration Council (NIC) to promote and foster social integration among Singaporeans and with new Singapore Citizens and Permanent Residents has been formed.It will be chaired by Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister for Community Development, Youth and Sports, and will be composed of leaders from the community, private sector and government.Plans for the formation of the NIC were first announced during the Committee for Supply debate in February, and was announced by the Minister at a Ministerial Community Walkabout.The NIC will encourage collaborative social integration efforts among the people, the public and the private sectors. The NIC will drive new integration initiatives in schools, workplaces, the community, and through the media. Enhanced Integrated FrameworkThe Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) is a multi-donor programme, which helps least-developed countries (LDCs) play a more active role in the global trading system. The program has a wider goal of promoting economic growth and sustainable development and helping to lift more people out of poverty.The program is currently helping 47 LDCs worldwide, supported by a multi-donor trust fund with a funding target of US$ 250 million.The EIF Trust FundThe EIF programme is supported by a Multi-Donor Trust Fund. As ofJanuary 2011, there were contributions from 22 donors. Total funding available stood at approximately US$ 120 million, with total pledges of US$ 182 million to be disbursed over a five year period. In 2007 at the High-Level Conference in Stockholm pledges were made of up to US$ 170 million, against a target of US$ 250 million.Proposed SolutionsOnce the IFSC has approved the Task Force's recommendations more work will need to be done to flesh out the details and undertake some specific actions so that implementation of the enhanced IF can proceed in January 2007. This work will need to focus on:• Institutional issue s, including staffing of the Executive Secretariat,• defining the in-country approach and programming issues, and• launching the replenishment process.The specific institutional issues include:• transmitting details of the enhanced IF to all stakeh olders,• drafting new terms of reference for the IFSC and the Board,• transforming the IFWG into the Board,• clarifying the status of the Executive Secretariat and its relationshipwith the WTO,• drafting a service agreement with the WTO,• specif ying the type of staff for the Executive Secretariat, includingdrafting job descriptions,• initiating the recruitment process for the CEO and other staff, and• investigating the most cost-effective method for managing the trust fund.The in-country issues that have to be fleshed out include the following:• detailing likely in-country measures needed to support the Focal Pointthrough the national implementation unit,• discussing the role of donors in-country including that of the donor coordinator,• clarifying the roles of the different agencies and other stakeholders, and • working out details for in-country programming whereby the differentagencies would have a clearer picture of their possible specificresponsibilities and how the process would work, including pre-DTIS work, preparation of the DTIS, mainstreaming work, preparation for andimplementation of activities funded through Tier 2.The work regarding the replenishment process includes:• Further clarifying the cost estimates, and• Fixing a date for and organizing a pledging conference.。
