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1. The Theory of the Firm and Agency Problems★Coase, R., 1937, The nature of the firm, Economica4, 386 - 405★Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz, 1972, Production, information costs and economic organizations, American Economic Review, 777-795.★Williamson, O., 1971, The vertical integration of production: Market failure considerations, American Economic Review, 112-123.★Williamson, O., 1981, The modern corporation: Origins, evolution, attributes, Journal of Economic Literature, 1537-1568.Alchian, A. and S. Woodward, 1988, The firm is dead; Long live the firm: A review of OliverE. Williamson’s The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Journal of Economic Literature,65-79.★Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305- 360Fama, E. and M. Jensen, 1983, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics, 301-325Jensen, M., 1986, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, American Economic Review, 323-329.★Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, The Nature of Man, in The New Corporate Finance, 4-19. 2. Corporate Governance: Overview★Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, 1997, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance 52, 737-783.★La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1999, Corporate Ownership Around the World, Journal of Finance 54(2), 471-520.★La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 1113-1155.★Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, and Andrei Shleifer, 2008, The Law and Economics of Self-dealing, Journal of Financial Economics, 430-465.★Bebchuk, Lucian and Assaf Hamdani, 2009, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, forthcoming.3. Corporate Governance and Capital MarketsShleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny. 2000, Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 3-27★Morck, Randall, Bernard Yeung, and Wayne Yu, 2000, The information content of stock markets: Why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? Journal of Financial Economics 58, 215-260Jin, Li and Stewart Myers, 2006, R2 around the world: New theory and new tests, Journal of Financial Economics 79, 257 - 292.La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, and Andrei Shleifer, 2006, What works in securities laws? Journal of Finance, 1-32.4. Corporate Governance and Firm Value★La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 2002, Investor protection and corporate valuation, Journal of Finance, 1147-1170.★Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and A. Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 – 155.★Core, J., W. Guay, and T. Rusticus, 2006, Does weak governance cause weak stock returns?An examination of firm operating performance and investors’ expectations, Journal of Finance, 655 – 687.★Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1988, Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315.★McConnell, J. and H. Servas, 1990, Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-613.★Cho, M.H., 1998, Ownership structure, investment, and corporate value: An empirical analaysis, Journal of Financial Economics 47, 103-121.Baek, J., J. Kang, and K. S. Park, 2004, Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from the Korean financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 71, 265-313.Doidge, C., G.A. Karolyi, and R. M. Stulz, 2004, Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S.worth more? Journal of Financial Economics 71, 205-238.Mitton, T., 2002, A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 64, 215-241.Friedman, E., S. Johnson, and T. Mitton, 2003, Propping and tunneling, Journal of Comparative Economics 31, 732-750.Bae, K., J. Kang, and J. Kim, 2002, Tunneling or valued-added? Evidence from mergers by Korean business groups, Journal of Finance 57, 2695-2740.5. Asymmetric information and Capital market☆ Alchian, A., 1950, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, The Journal of Political Economy, 58 (3): 211-221.☆ Black, Fischer, 1986,Noise, The Journal of Finance, 41 (3): 529-543.☆Dequech, D. 1999, Expectations and Confidence under Uncertainty, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 21 (3): 415-430.○Chan, K., A.J. menkvel and Z. Yang, 2008, Information Asymmetry and Asset prices: Evidence from the China Foreign Share Discount, Journal of Finance.☆ Healy, Paul M., Krishna G. Palepu, 2001, Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure,and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature, Journal of Accounting and Economics 31: 405-440.★ Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olsson and K. Schipper, 2003, Accounting Anomalies andInformation Uncertainty, Working paper.★ Attig, N., W. Fong, Y. Gadhoum and L. Lang, 2004, Effects of Large Shareholding onInformation Asymmetry and Stock Liquidity, Working paper.6. Information disclosure and corporate governance★ Botosan, Christine A., 1997, Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital, TheAccounting Review Vol72 (3): 323-349.★Botosan, C. A. And M. A. Plumlee, 2002, A Re-examination of disclosure Level and theExpected Cost of Equity Capital, Journal of Accounting Research vol. 40 (1).☆ Song, F. and A. V. Thakor, 2006, Information Control, Career Concerns, and CorporateGovernance, Journal of Finance (4).○ Gul F. and H. Qiu, Legal Protection, Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetryin Emerging Financial Markets, Working paper.☆ Bebchuk, L. 2002, Asymmetric information and the choice of corporate governancearrangements, Working paper.☆ Bushman, R.M. and A.J. Smith, 2003, Transparency, Financial Accounting Informationand Corporate Governance, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 65-87.7. Large Shareholder, Liquidity and Stock Market☆ Bolton, P. and E. Thadden, 1998, Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control, The Journal of Finance 53 (1): 1-25.☆ Demsetz, H. 1983, The structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, Journal ofLaw and Economics, 26 (2): 375-390.☆ Shleifer A. and R.W. Vishny, 1986, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 94: 461-488.☆ Maug, E., 1998, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a trade-Off Between Liquidityand Control? The Journal of Finance, Vol LIII: 65-98.★Parigi, B.M. and L. Pelizzon, 2007, Diversification and ownership concentration, Journal of Banking & Finance 32: 1743-1753.★ Maury, B. and A. pajuste, 2005, Multiple large shareholders and firm value, Journal ofBanking & Finance 29: 1813-1834.○Lemmon, M. and K. V. Lins, 2003, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, andFirm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis, The Journal of Finance, Vol.LVIII: 1145-1168.8. Political Connection, Regulations and Firm Value☆ Stigler, "What Can Regulators Regulate? The case of electricity", 1962, Journal of Law and Economics★ Stigler, George, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics, I(Spring1971), 3-21.★ Blanchard, Olivier, and Shleifer, Andrei, “Federalism with and withoutPoliticalCentralization: China versus Russia,” manuscript, MIT and HarvardUniversity,February 2000.☆ Faccio, Mara, “Politically-Connected Firms: Can They Squeeze the State,” manuscript,University of Notre Dame, March 2002.★ Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, "Politicians and Firms," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics (109) 1994, 995-1025.☆ Bhattacharya, Utpal., Hazem Daouk, 2009, “When no law is better than a good law”,Working Paper.○Mingyi Hung TJ Wong and Tianyu Zhang, “Political Relations and Overseas StockExchange Listing: Evidence from Chinese State-owned Enterprises”, working paper.★ Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007, Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance,andPost-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms, Journal of FinancialEconomics, 84, 330-357.9. Behavior Finance★ Nicholas Baeberis, and Richard Thaler, 2002. Survey of Behavioral Finance.○Graham, J.F., Harvey, C.R., 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-243.★ Alti, A., 2006. How persistent is the impact of market timing on capital structure? Journal of Finance 61, 1681-1710.○ Baker, M., Wurgler, J., 2002. Market Timing and capital structure. Journal of Finance 57,1-32.○Kayhan, A., Titman, S., 2007. Firms’ histories and their capital structures. Journal ofFinancial Economics 83, 1-32.★ Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 2001. Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60, 3-43.○ DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., Skinner, D.J., 2004. Are dividends disappearing? Dividendconcentration and the consolidation of earnings? Journal of Financial Economics 72, 425-456.★ Billett, M., Qian, Y., 2006. Are overconfident CEOs born or make? Evidence ofself-attribution bias from frequent acquirers. Unpublished working paper, Henry B, TippieCollege of Business, University of Iowa.○ Doukas, J., Petmezas, D., 2006. Acquisitions, overconfident managers and self-attributionbias.Unpublished working paper, Department of Finance, Graduate School of Business, OldDominion University.○ Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2005. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal ofFinance 60, 2661-2700.10. The Board of DirectorsWeisbach, M., 1988, Outsider directors and CEO turnovers, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431-460.Yermack, D., 1996, Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics 40, 185-211.Rosenstein, S. and J. Wyatt, 1997, Inside Directors, Board Effectiveness, and Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Financial Economics 44, 229-250.Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach, 1988, The determinants of board composition, Rand Journal of Economics 19, 589-606.Warner, J., R. Watts, and K. Wruck, 1988, Stock prices and top management changes, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 461-492.Johnson, Bruce, Robert Magee, Nandu Nagarajan and Henry Newman, 1985, An Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths: Implications for the Management Labor Model, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 151-174.11. Talent, Incentives, and Executive CompensationsBaumol, W., 1990, Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive, Journal of Political Economy 98, 893-921.Murphy, K., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1991, The allocation of talent: Implications for growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 503-530.Jensen, Michael, and Kevin Murphy, 1990, Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives, Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-264.Core, John, Robert Holthausen and David Larcker, 1999, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371-406.Rose, Nancy, and Andrea Shepard, 1997, Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment? RAND Journal of Economics 28, 489-514. 12. Corporate RestructuringDesai, H. and P. Jain, 1999, Firm performance and focus: Long-run stock market performance following spinoffs, Journal of Financial Economics 54, 75-101.Daley, L., V. Mehrotra and R. Sivakumar, 1997, Corporate focus and value creation: Evidence from spinoffs, Journal of Financial Economics 45, 257-281.Chen, P., V. Mehrotra, R. Sivakumar, and W. Yu, 2001, Layoffs, shareholders’ wealth, and corporate performance, Journal of Empirical Finance 8, 171-199.Servaes, H., 1996, The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger Wave, Journal of Finance 51, 1201-1225.Berger, P. and E. Ofek, 1996, Bustup Takeovers of Value-Destroying Diversified Firms,Journal of Finance 51, 1175-1200.Lamont, O. A. and C. Polk, 2002, Does diversification destroy value? Evidence from the industry shocks, Journal of Financial Economics 63, 51-77.Gillian, S., J. Kensinger, and J. Martin, 2000, Value creation and corporate diversification: the case of Sears, Roebuck & Co., Journal of Financial Economics 55, 103-137.Cusatis, P., J. Miles and J. Woolridge, Some new evidence that spinoffs create value, in NCF, 592-599.Mansi, S and D. M. Reeb, 2002 Corporate diversification: What gets discounted, Journal of Finance, 2167-2183Graham J. R., M. L. Lemmon and J. G. Wolf, 2002, Does corporate diversification destroy value? Journal of Finance , LVII, 695-720.Schoar, A, 2002, Effects of corporate diversification on productivity, Journal of Finance, LVII, 2379-2403.Campa, J. M. and S. Kedia, 2002, Explaining the diversification discount, Journal of Finance, 1731-1762.Aggarwal, R. and A. A. Samwick, 2003, Why do managers diversify their firms? Agency reconsidered. Journal of Finance, LVIII, 71-118.13. Risk ManagementGuay, W.R., 1999, The impact of derivatives on Þrm risk: An empirical examination of new derivative, Journal of Accounting and Economics 26 , 319-351Allayannis, G., and Weston, J.P., 2001, The use of foreign currency derivatives and firm market value, The Review of Financial Studies 14, 243-276.Guaya, W., and Kothari, S.P., 2003, How much do firms hedge with derivatives? Journal of Financial Economics 70, 423–461.Tufano, P., 1996, Who manage risks: An empirical examination of risk manage practices in gold mining industry, The Journal of Finance, 1097-1137.。