平狄克微观经济学课后习题答案中文

CHAPTER 18EXTERNALITIES AND PUBLIC GOODSThis chapter extends the discussion of market failure begun in Chapter 17. To avoid over-emphasis on definitions, stress the main theme of the chapter: the characteristics of some goods lead to situations where price is not equal to marginal cost. Rely on the discussion of market power (Chapter 10) as an example of market failure. Also, point out with each case that government intervention might not be required if property rights can be defined and transaction costs are small (Section 18.3). The first four sections present positive and negative externalities and solutions to market failure. The last two sections discuss public goods and public choice.The consumption of many goods involves the creation of externalities. Stress the divergence between social and private costs. Exercise (5) presents the classic beekeeper/apple-orchard problem, originally popularized in Meade, “External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation,” Economic Journal (March 1952). Empirical research on this example has shown that beekeepers and orchard owners have solved many of their problems: see Cheung, “The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation,” Journal of Law and Economics (April 1973).Solutions to the problems of externalities are presented in Sections 18.2 and 18.3. Section 18.2, in particular, discusses emission standards, fees, and transferable permits. Example 18.1 and Exercise (3) are simple applications of these concepts.One of the main themes of the law and economics literature since 1969 is the application of Coase’s insight on the assignment of property rights. The original article is clear and can be understood by students. Stress the problems posed by transactions costs. For a lively debate, ask students whether non-smokers should be granted the right to smokeless air in public places (see Exercise (4)). For an extended discussion of the Coase Theorem at the undergraduate level, see Polinsky, Chapters 3-6, An Introduction to Law & Economics (Little, Brown & Co., 1983).The section on common property resources emphasizes the distinction between private and social marginal costs. Example 18.5 calculates the social cost of unlimited access to common property, and the information provided is used in Exercise (7). Exercise (8) provides an extended example of managing common property.The last two sections focus on public goods and private choice. Point out the similarities and differences between public goods and other activities with externalities. Since students confuse nonrival and nonexclusive goods, create a table similar to the following and give examples to fill in the cells:The next stumbling block for students is achieving an understanding of why we add individual demand curves vertically rather than horizontally. Exercise (6) compares vertical and horizontal summation of individual demand.The presentation of public choice is a limited introduction to the subject, but you can easily expand on this material. A logical extension of this chapter is an introduction to cost-benefit analysis. For applications of this analysis, see Part III, “Empirical Analysis of Policies and Programs,” in Haveman and Margolis (eds.), Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis (Houghton Mifflin, 1983).1. Which of the following describes an externality and which does not? Explain the difference.a. A policy of restricted coffee exports in Brazil causes the U.S. price of coffee to rise,which in turn also causes the price of tea to increase.Externalities cause market inefficiencies by preventing prices from conveying accurateinformation. A policy of restricting coffee exports in Brazil causes the U.S. price ofcoffee to rise, because supply is reduced. As the price of coffee rises, consumers switchto tea, thereby increasing the demand for tea, and hence, increasing the price of tea.These are market effects, not externalities.b. An advertising blimp distracts a motorist who then hits a telephone pole.An advertising blimp is producing information by announcing the availability of somegood or service. However, its method of supplying this information can be distractingfor some consumers, especially those consumers who happen to be driving neartelephone poles. The blimp is creating a negative externality that influences thedrivers’ safety. Since the price charged by the advertising firm does not incorporate theexternality of distracting drivers, too much of this type of advertising is produced fromthe point of view of society as a whole.2. Compare and contrast the following three mechanisms for treating pollution externalities when the costs and benefits of abatement are uncertain: (a) an emissions fee, (b) an emissions standard, and (c) a system of transferable emissions permits.Since pollution is not reflected in the marginal cost of production, its emission createsan externality. Three policy tools can be used to reduce pollution: an emissions fee, anemissions standard, and a system of transferable permits. The choice between a feeand a standard will depend on the marginal cost and marginal benefit of reducingpollution. If small changes in abatement yield large benefits while adding little to cost,the cost of not reducing emissions is high. Thus, standards should be used. However, ifsmall changes in abatement yield little benefit while adding greatly to cost, the cost ofreducing emissions is high. Thus, fees should be used.A system of transferable emissions permits combines the features of fees and standardsto reduce pollution. Under this system, a standard is set and fees are used to transferpermits to the firm that values them the most (i.e., a firm with high abatement costs).However, the total number of permits can be incorrectly chosen. Too few permits willcreate excess demand, increasing price and inefficiently diverting resources to ownersof the permits. Typically, pollution control agencies implement one of threemechanisms, measure the results, reassess the success of their choice, then reset newlevels of fees or standards or select a new policy tool.3. When do externalities require government intervention, and when is such intervention unlikely to be necessary?Economic efficiency can be achieved without government intervention when theexternality affects a small number of people and when property rights are wellspecified. When the number of parties is small, the cost of negotiating an agreementamong the parties is small. Further, the amount of required information (i.e., the costsof and benefits to each party) is small. When property rights are not well specified,uncertainty regarding costs and benefits increases and efficient choices might not bemade. The costs of coming to an agreement, including the cost of delaying such anagreement, could be greater than the cost of government intervention, including theexpected cost of choosing the wrong policy instrument.4. An emissions fee is paid to the government, whereas an injurer who is sued and is held liable pays damages directly to the party harmed by an externality. What differences in the behavior of victims might you expect to arise under these two arrangements?When the price of an activity that generates an externality reflects social costs, anefficient level of the activity is maintained. The producer of the externality reduces (fornegative externalities) or increases (for positive externalities) activity away from(towards) efficient levels. If those who suffer from the externality are not compensated,they find that their marginal cost is higher (for negative externalities) or lower (forpositive externalities), in contrast to the situation in which they would be compensated.5. Why does free access to a common property resource generate an inefficient outcome?Free access to a resource means that the marginal cost to the user is less than the socialcost. The use of a common property resource by a person or firm excludes others fromusing it. For example, the use of water by one consumer restricts its use by another.Because private marginal cost is below social marginal cost, too much of the resource isconsumed by the individual user, creating an inefficient outcome.6. Public goods are both nonrival and nonexclusive. Explain each of these terms and state clearly how they differ from each other.A good is nonrival if, for any level of production, the marginal cost of providing the goodto an additional consumer is zero (although the production cost of an additional unitcould be greater than zero). A good is nonexclusive if it is impossible or very expensiveto exclude individuals from consuming it. Public goods are nonrival and nonexclusive.Commodities can be (1) exclusive and rival, (2) exclusive and nonrival, (3) nonexclusiveand rival, or (4) nonexclusive and nonrival. Most of the commodities discussed in thetext to this point have been of the first type. In this chapter, we focus on commodities ofthe last type.Nonrival refers to the production of a good or service for one more customer. It usuallyinvolves a production process with high fixed costs, such as the cost of building ahighway or lighthouse. (Remember that fixed cost depends on the period underconsideration: the cost of lighting the lamp at the lighthouse can vary over time, butdoes not vary with the number of consumers.) Nonexclusive refers to exchange, wherethe cost of charging consumers is prohibitive. Incurring the cost of identifyingconsumers and collecting from them would result in losses. Some economists focus onthe nonexclusion property of public goods because it is this characteristic that poses themost significant problems for efficient provision.7. Public television is funded in part by private donations, even though anyone with a television set can watch for free. Can you explain this phenomenon in light of the free rider problem?The free-rider problem refers to the difficulty of excluding persons from consuming anonexclusive commodity. Non-paying consumers can “free-ride” on commoditiesprovided by paying customers. Public television is funded in part by contributions.Some viewers contribute, but most watch without paying, hoping that someone else willpay so they will not. To combat this problem these stations (1) ask consumers to assesstheir true willingness to pay, then (2) ask consumers to contribute up to this amount,and (3) attempt to make everyone else feel guilty for free-riding.8. Explain why the median voter outcome need not be efficient when majority rule voting determines the level of public spending.The median voter is the citizen with the middle preference: half the voting population ismore strongly in favor of the issue and half is more strongly opposed to the issue.Under majority-rule voting, where each citizen’s vote is weighted equally, the preferredspending level on public-goods provision of the median voter will win an electionagainst any other alternative.However, majority rule is not necessarily efficient, because it weights each citizen’spreferences equally. For an efficient outcome, we would need a system that measuresand aggregates the willingness to pay of those citizens consuming the public good.Majority rule is not this system. However, as we have seen in previous chapters,majority rule is equitable in the sense that all citizens are treated equally. Thus, weagain find a trade-off between equity and efficiency.1. A number of firms located in the western portion of a town after single-family residences took up the eastern portion. Each firm produces the same product and, in the process, emits noxious fumes that adversely affect the residents of the community.a. Why is there an externality created by the firms?Noxious fumes created by firms enter the utility function of residents. We can assumethat the fumes decrease the utility of the residents (i.e., they are a negative externality)and lower property values.b. Do you think that private bargaining can resolve the problem with the externality?Explain.If the residents anticipated the location of the firms, housing prices should reflect thedisutility of the fumes; the externality would have been internalized by the housingmarket in housing prices. If the noxious fumes were not anticipated, privatebargaining could resolve the problem of the externality only if there are a relativelysmall number of parties (both firms and families) and property rights are well specified.Private bargaining would rely on each family’s willingness to pay for air quality, buttruthful revelation might not be possible. All this will be complicated by theadaptability of the production technology known to the firms and the employmentrelations between the firms and families. It is unlikely that private bargaining willresolve the problem.c. How might the community determine the efficient level of air quality?The community could determine the economically efficient level of air quality byaggregating the families’ willingne ss to pay and equating it with the marginal cost ofpollution reduction. Both steps involve the acquisition of truthful information.2. A computer programmer lobbies against copyrighting software. He argues that everyone should benefit from innovative programs written for personal computers and that exposure to a wide variety of computer programs will inspire young programmers to create even more innovative programs. Considering the marginal social benefits possibly gained by his proposal, do you agree with the programmer’s position?Computer software as information is a classic example of a public good. Since it can becostlessly copied, the marginal cost of providing software to an additional user is nearzero. Therefore, software is nonrival. (The fixed costs of creating software are high, butthe variable costs are low.) Furthermore, it is expensive to exclude consumers fromcopying and using software because copy protection schemes are available only at highcost or high inconvenience to users. Therefore, software is also nonexclusive. As bothnonrival and nonexclusive, computer software suffers the problems of public goodsprovision: the presence of free-riders makes it difficult or impossible for markets toprovide the efficient level of software. Rather than regulating this market directly, thelegal system guarantees property rights to the creators of software. If copyrightprotection were not enforced, it is likely that the software market would collapse.Therefore, we do not agree with the computer programmer.3. Four firms located at different points on a river dump various quantities of effluent into it. The effluent adversely affects the quality of swimming for homeowners who live downstream. These people can build swimming pools to avoid swimming in the river, and firms can purchase filters that eliminate harmful chemicals in the material that is dumped in the river. As a policy advisor for a regional planning organization, how would you compare and contrast the following options for dealing with the harmful effect of the effluent:a. An equal-rate effluent fee on firms located on the river.First, one needs to know the value to homeowners of swimming in the river. Thisinformation can be difficult to obtain, because homeowners will have an incentive tooverstate this value. As an upper boundary, if there are no considerations other thanswimming, one could use the cost of building swimming pools, either a pool for eachhomeowner or a public pool for all homeowners. Next, one needs to know the marginalcost of abatement. If the abatement technology is well understood, this informationshould be readily obtainable. If the abatement technology is not understood, anestimate based on the firms’ knowledge must be used.The choice of a policy tool will depend on the marginal benefits and costs of abatement.If firms are charged an equal-rate effluent fee, the firms will reduce effluents to thepoint where the marginal cost of abatement is equal to the fee. If this reduction is nothigh enough to permit swimming, the fee could be increased. Alternatively, revenuefrom the fees could be to provide swimming facilities, reducing the need for effluentreduction.b. An equal standard per firm on the level of effluent each firm can dump.Standards will be efficient only if the policy maker has complete information regardingthe marginal costs and benefits of abatement. Moreover, the standard will notencourage firms to reduce effluents further when new filtering technologies becomeavailable.c. A transferable effluent permit system, in which the aggregate level of effluent isfixed and all firms receive identical permits.A transferable effluent permit system requires the policy maker to determine theefficient effluent standard. Once the permits are distributed and a market develops,firms with a higher cost of abatement will purchase permits from firms with lowerabatement costs. However, unless permits are sold initially, rather than merelydistributed, no revenue will be generated for the regional organization.4. Recent social trends point to growing intolerance of smoking in public areas. Many people point out the negative effects of “second hand” smoke. If you are a smoker and you wish to continue smoking despite tougher anti smoking laws, describe the effect of the following legislative proposals on your behavior. As a result of these programs, do you, the individual smoker, benefit? Does society benefit as a whole?Since smoking in public areas is similar to polluting the air, the programs proposedhere are similar to those examined for air pollution. A bill to lower tar and nicotinelevels is similar to an emissions standard, and a tax on cigarettes is similar to anemissions fee. Requiring a smoking permit is similar to a system of emissions permits,assuming that the permits would not be transferable. The individual smoker in all ofthese programs is being forced to internalize the externality of “second-hand” smokeand will be worse off. Society will be better off if the benefits of a particular proposaloutweigh the cost of implementing that proposal. Unfortunately, the benefits ofreducing second-hand smoke are uncertain, and assessing those benefits is costly.a. A bill is proposed that would lower tar and nicotine levels in all cigarettes.The smoker will most likely try to maintain a constant level of consumption of nicotine,and will increase his or her consumption of cigarettes. Society may not benefit fromthis plan if the total amount of tar and nicotine released into the air is the same.b. A tax is levied on each pack of cigarettes sold.Smokers might turn to cigars, pipes, or might start rolling their own cigarettes. Theextent of the effect of a tax on cigarette consumption depends on the elasticity ofdemand for cigarettes. Again, it is questionable whether society will benefit.c. Smokers would be required to carry smoking permits at all times. These permitswould be sold by the government.Smoking permits would effectively transfer property rights to clean air from smokers tonon-smokers. The main obstacle to society benefiting from such a proposal would bethe high cost of enforcing a smoking permits system.5. A beekeeper lives adjacent to an apple orchard. The orchard owner benefits from thebees because each hive pollinates about one acre of apple trees. The orchard owner pays nothing for this service, however, because the bees come to the orchard without his having to do anything. There are not enough bees to pollinate the entire orchard, and the orchard owner must complete the pollination by artificial means, at a cost of $10 per acre of trees.Beekeeping has a marginal cost of MC = 10 + 2Q, where Q is the number of beehives.Each hive yields $20 worth of honey.a. How many beehives will the beekeeper maintain?The beekeeper maintains the number of hives that maximizes profits, when marginalrevenue is equal to marginal cost. With a constant marginal revenue of $20 (there is noinformation that would lead us to believe that the beekeeper has any market power)and a marginal cost of 10 + 2Q:20 = 10 + 2Q, or Q = 5.b. Is this the economically efficient number of hives?If there are too few bees to pollinate the orchard, the farmer must pay $10 per acre forartificial pollination. Thus, the farmer would be willing to pay up to $10 to thebeekeeper to maintain each additional hive. So, the marginal social benefit, MSB, ofeach additional hive is $30, which is greater than the marginal private benefit of $20.Assuming that the private marginal cost is equal to the social marginal cost, we setMSB = MC to determine the efficient number of hives:30 = 10 + 2Q, or Q = 10.Therefore, the beekeeper’s private choice of Q = 5 is not the socially efficient number ofhives.c. What changes would lead to the more efficient operation?The most radical change that would lead to more efficient operations would be themerger of the farmer’s business with the beekeeper’s business. This merger wouldinternalize the positive externality of bee pollination. Short of a merger, the farmerand beekeeper should enter into a contract for pollination services.7. Reconsider the common resource problem as given by Example 18.5. Suppose that crawfish popularity continues to increase, and that the demand curve shifts from C = 0.401 - 0.0064F to C = 0.50 - 0.0064F. How does this shift in demand affect the actual crawfish catch, the efficient catch, and the social cost of common access? (Hint: Use the marginal social cost and private cost curves given in the example.)The relevant information is now the following:Demand: C = 0.50 - 0.0064FMSC: C = -5.645 + 0.6509F.With an increase in demand, the demand curve for crawfish shifts upward, intersectingthe price axis at $0.50. The private cost curve has a positive slope, so additional effortmust be made to increase the catch. Since the social cost curve has a positive slope, thesocially efficient catch also increases. We may determine the socially efficient catch bysolving the following two equations simultaneously:0.50 - 0.0064F = -5.645 + 0.6509F, or F* = 9.35.To determine the price that consumers are willing to pay for this quantity, substituteF* into the equation for marginal social cost and solve for C:C = -5.645 + (0.6509)(9.35), or C = $0.44.Next, find the actual level of production by solving these equations simultaneously:Demand: C = 0.50 - 0.0064FMPC: C = -0.357 + 0.0573F0.50 - 0.0064F = -0.357 + 0.0573F, or F** = 13.45.To determine the price that consumers are willing to pay for this quantity, substituteF** into the equation for marginal private cost and solve for C:C = -0.357 + (0.0573)(13.45), or C = $0.41.Notice that the marginal social cost of producing 13.45 units isMSC = -5.645 +(0.6509)(13.45) = $3.11.With the increase in demand, the social cost is the area of a triangle with a base of 4.1million pounds (13.45 - 9.35) and a height of $2.70 ($3.11 - 0.41), or $5,535,000 morethan the social cost of the original demand.8. The Georges Bank, a highly productive fishing area off New England, can be divided into two zones in terms of fish population. Zone 1 has the higher population per square mile but is subject to severe diminishing returns to fishing effort. The daily fish catch (in tons) in Zone 1 isF 1 = 200(X1) - 2(X1) 2where X1is the number of boats fishing there. Zone 2 has fewer fish per mile but is larger, and diminishing returns are less of a problem. Its daily fish catch isF 2 = 100(X2) - (X2) 2where X2is the number of boats fishing in Zone 2. The marginal fish catch MFC in each zone can be represented asMFC1 = 200 - 4(X1) MFC2= 100 - 2(X2).There are 100 boats now licensed by the U.S. government to fish in these two zones. The fish are sold at $100 per ton. The total cost (capital and operating) per boat is constant at $1,000 per day. Answer the following questions about this situation.a. If the boats are allowed to fish where they want, with no government restriction,how many will fish in each zone? What will be the gross value of the catch?Without restrictions, the boats will divide themselves so that the average catch (AF 1and AF 2) for each boat is equal in each zone. (If the average catch in one zone is greaterthan in the other, boats will leave the zone with the lower catch for the zone with thehigher catch.) We solve the following set of equations:AF 1 = AF 2 and X 1 + X 2 = 100 where 11121120022002AF X X X X =-=- and 222222100100AF X X X X =-=-. Therefore, AF 1 = AF 2 implies200 - 2X 1 = 100 - X 2,200 - 2(100 - X 2) = 100 - X 2, or X 21003= and 320031001001=⎪⎭⎫ ⎝⎛-=X . Find the gross catch by substituting the value of X 1 and X 2 into the catch equations:()(),,,,F 444488983331332002320020021=-=⎪⎭⎫ ⎝⎛-⎪⎭⎫ ⎝⎛= and ().,,,F 2222111133333100310010022=-=⎪⎭⎫ ⎝⎛-⎪⎭⎫ ⎝⎛= The total catch is F 1 + F 2 = 6,666. At the price of $100 per ton, the value of the catch is$666,600. The average catch for each of the 100 boats in the fishing fleet is 66.66 tons.To determine the profit per boat, subtract total cost from total revenue:π = (100)(66.66) - 1,000, or π = $5,666.Total profit for the fleet is $566,000.b. If the U.S. government can restrict the boats, how many should be allocated to eachzone? What will the gross value of the catch be? Assume the total number of boats remains at 100.Assume that the government wishes to maximize the net social value of the fish catch,i.e., the difference between the total social benefit and the total social cost. Thegovernment equates the marginal fish catch in both zones, subject to the restrictionthat the number of boats equals 100:MFC 1 = MFC 2 and X 1 + X 2 = 100,MFC 1 = 200 - 4X 1 and MFC 2 = 100 - 2X 2.Setting MFC 1 = MFC 2 implies:200 - 4X 1 = 100 - 2X 2, or 200 - 4(100 - X 2) = 100 - 2X 2, or X 2 = 50 andX 1 = 100 - 50 = 50.Find the gross catch by substituting X 1 and X 2 into the catch equations:F 1 = (200)(50) - (2)(502) = 10,000 - 5,000 = 5,000 andChapter 18: Externalities and Public Goods242 F 2 = (100)(50) - 502 = 5,000 - 2,500 = 2,500.The total catch is equal to F 1 + F 2 = 7,500. At the market price of $100 per ton, thevalue of the catch is $750,000. Total profit is $650,000. Notice that the profits are notevenly divided between boats in the two zones. The average catch in Zone A is 100 tonsper boat, while the average catch in Zone B is 50 tons per boat. Therefore, fishing inZone A yields a higher profit for the individual owner of the boat.c. If additional fishermen want to buy boats and join the fishing fleet, should agovernment wishing to maximize the net value of the fish catch grant them licenses to do so? Why or why not?To answer this question, first determine the profit-maximizing number of boats in eachzone. Profits in Zone A areππA A X X X X X =--=-1002002100019000200112112b g e j,,, or . To determine the change in profit with a change in X 1 take the first derivative of theprofit function with respect to X 1:d dX X A π1119000400=-,. To determine the profit-maximizing level of output, setd dX A π1equal to zero and solve for X 1:19,000 - 400X 1 = 0, or X 1 = 47.5.Substituting X 1 into the profit equation for Zone A gives: ()()()()()()()()250,451$5.47000,15.4725.472001002=--=A π.For Zone B follow a similar procedure. Profits in Zone B areππB B X X X X X =--=-100100100090002002222222b g e j,,, or . Taking the derivative of the profit function with respect to X 2 givesd X B π229000200=-,. Setting d B π2equal to zero to find the profit-maximizing level of output gives 9,000 - 200X 2 = 0, or X 2 = 45.Substituting X 2 into the profit equation for Zone B gives:πB = (100)((100)(45) - 452) - (1,000)(45) = $202,500.Total profit from both zones is $653,750, with 47.5 boats in Zone A and 45 boats in ZoneB. Because each additional boat above 92.5 decreases total profit, the governmentshould not grant any more licenses.。

第1篇导论：市场和价格第1章绪论1.1复习笔记1．微观经济学的主题（1）微观经济学的研究对象微观经济学研究的是个体经济单位（如消费者、工人、投资者、土地所有者和企业）的行为，也研究构成市场与行业的消费者和厂商的相互影响。

微观经济学的核心内容是论证亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”原理。

（2）经济模型经济模型是现代经济理论的一种主要分析方法，也称为经济数学模型，指用数学形式所表述的经济过程或经济理论结构。

现实世界的情况是由各种主要变量和次要变量构成的，因而非常复杂，只有把次要因素排除在外，才能对经济运行进行严格的分析。

运用经济模型，事先做出某些假设，可以排除掉许多次要因素，从而建立起一定的模型，然后通过运用这一模型，可以对错综复杂的现实世界做出简单的描述。

（3）经济理论的局限性在经济学、物理学或者其他学科中，没有一个理论是绝对正确的。

理论的有用性和合理性取决于它是否对其试图解释和预测的一系列现象成功地做出了解释和预测。

比如说，厂商并不总是追求其利润的最大化的，因此，厂商理论只在解释厂商某些行为（如资本投资决策的时机）时才获得了有限的成功。

尽管如此，这一理论确实解释了有关厂商和行业的行为、成长和演变方面的大量现象，所以它已经成为决策者手中一个重要的工具。

2．实证分析和规范分析（1）微观经济学的分析方法微观经济学既研究实证问题，也研究规范问题。

实证问题主要是解释和预测，规范问题则研究“应该如何”。

实证分析和规范分析都是重要的经济学分析方法。

（2）实证分析和规范分析的含义实证分析是进行经济分析的一种重要方法，特点是它对有关命题的逻辑分析，旨在理解经济过程实际是什么、将会是什么、为什么，而不涉及对结果好坏和是否公平的评价，其中不包含任何价值判断。

实证分析既有定性分析，也有定量分析。

规范分析也是经济学分析经济问题的一种方法，它以一定的价值判断作为出发点，提出行为的标准，并研究如何才能符合这些标准。

它力求说明“应该是什么”的问题，或者说，它回答这样的问题：为什么要做出这种选择，而不做出另一种选择？（3）实证分析和规范分析的关系实证分析和规范分析既有联系又有区别。

平狄克微观经济学第九版课后习题答案与笔记内容简介本书遵循平狄克《微观经济学》（第9版）教材的章⽬目编排，共分4篇19章，每章由三部分组成：第⼀一部分为复习笔记，总结本章的重难点内容；第⼆二部分为课（章）后复习题详解，对第9版的所有课（章）后复习题都进⾏行行了了详细的分析和解答；第三部分为课（章）后练习题详解，对第9版的所有课（章）后练习题都进⾏行行了了详细的分析和解答。

作为该教材的学习辅导书，本书具有以下⼏几个⽅方⾯面的特点：（1）整理理名校笔记，浓缩内容精华。

每章的复习笔记以平狄克所著的《微观经济学》（第9版）为主，并结合国内外其他微观经济学经典教材对各章的重难点进⾏行行了了整理理，因此，本书的内容⼏几乎浓缩了了经典教材的知识精华。

（2）解析课后习题，提供详尽答案。

本书参考⼤大量量经济学相关资料料对平狄克所著的《微观经济学》（第9版）的课（章）后习题进⾏行行了了详细的分析和解答，并对相关重要知识点进⾏行行了了延伸和归纳。

（3）补充相关要点，强化专业知识。

⼀一般来说，国外英⽂文教材的中译本不不太符合中国学⽣生的思维习惯，有些语⾔言的表述不不清或条理理性不不强⽽而给学习带来了了不不便便，因此，对每章复习笔记的⼀一些重要知识点和⼀一些习题的解答，我们在不不违背原书原意的基础上结合其他相关经典教材进⾏行行了了必要的整理理和分析。

⽬目录第1篇　导论：市场与价格　第1章　绪　论 1.1　复习笔记 1.2　课后复习题详解 1.3　课后练习题详解　第2章　供给与需求的基本原理 2.1　复习笔记 2.2　课后复习题详解 2.3　课后练习题详解第2篇　⽣产者、消费者与竞争性市场　第3章　消费者⾏为 3.1　复习笔记 3.2　课后复习题详解 3.3　课后练习题详解　第4章　个⼈需求与市场需求 4.1　复习笔记 4.2　课后复习题详解 4.3　课后练习题详解　第4章附录　需求理论：⼀种数学的处理⽅法　第5章　不确定性与消费者⾏为 5.1　复习笔记 5.2　课后复习题详解 5.3　课后练习题详解　第6章　⽣　产 6.1　复习笔记 6.2　课后复习题详解 6.3　课后练习题详解　第7章　⽣产成本 7.1　复习笔记 7.2　课后复习题详解 7.3　课后练习题详解　第7章附录　⽣产与成本理论：⼀种数学的处理⽅法　第8章　利润最⼤化与竞争性供给 8.1　复习笔记 8.2　课后复习题详解　第9章　竞争性市场分析 9.1　复习笔记 9.2　课后复习题详解 9.3　课后练习题详解第3篇　市场结构与竞争策略　第10章　市场势⼒：垄断与买⽅垄断 10.1　复习笔记 10.2　课后复习题详解 10.3　课后练习题详解　第11章　有市场势⼒的定价 11.1　复习笔记 11.2　课后复习题详解 11.3　课后练习题详解　第11章附录　纵向联合⼚商　第12章　垄断竞争与寡头垄断 12.1　复习笔记 12.2　课后复习题详解 12.3　课后练习题详解　第13章　博弈论与竞争策略 13.1　复习笔记 13.2　课后复习题详解 13.3　课后练习题详解　第14章　投⼊要素市场 14.1　复习笔记 14.2　课后复习题详解 14.3　课后练习题详解　第15章　投资、时间与资本市场 15.1　复习笔记 15.2　课后复习题详解第4篇　信息、市场失灵与政府的⾓⾊　第16章　⼀般均衡与经济效率 16.1　复习笔记 16.2　课后复习题详解 16.3　课后练习题详解　第17章　信息不对称的市场 17.1　复习笔记 17.2　课后复习题详解 17.3　课后练习题详解　第18章　外部性与公共物品 18.1　复习笔记 18.2　课后复习题详解 18.3　课后练习题详解　第19章　⾏为经济学 19.1　复习笔记 19.2　课后复习题详解 19.3　课后练习题详解附录　指定平狄克《微观经济学》教材为考研参考书⽬目的院校列列表1.2. 课后习题详解1 ⼈人们常说，⼀一个好的理理论是可以⽤用实证的、数据导向的研究来加以证伪的。

平狄克《微观经济学》（第8版）笔记和课后习题详解完整版>精研学习䋞>无偿试用20％资料全国547所院校视频及题库全收集考研全套>视频资料>课后答案>往年真题>职称考试第1篇导论：市场和价格第1章绪论1.1复习笔记1.2课后复习题详解1.3课后练习题详解第2章供给和需求的基本原理2.1复习笔记2.2课后复习题详解2.3课后练习题详解第2篇生产者、消费者与竞争性市场第3章消费者行为3.1复习笔记3.2课后复习题详解3.3课后练习题详解第4章个人需求和市场需求4.1复习笔记4.2课后复习题详解4.3课后练习题详解第4章附录需求理论——一种数学的处理方法第5章不确定性与消费者行为5.1复习笔记5.2课后复习题详解5.3课后练习题详解第6章生产6.1复习笔记6.2课后复习题详解6.3课后练习题详解第7章生产成本7.1复习笔记7.2课后复习题详解7.3课后练习题详解第7章附录生产与成本理论——一种数学的处理方法第8章利润最大化与竞争性供给8.1复习笔记8.3课后练习题详解第9章竞争性市场分析9.1复习笔记9.2课后复习题详解9.3课后练习题详解第3篇市场结构与竞争策略第10章市场势力：垄断和买方垄断10.1复习笔记10.2课后复习题详解10.3课后练习题详解第11章有市场势力的定价11.1复习笔记11.2课后复习题详解11.3课后练习题详解第11章附录纵向联合厂商第12章垄断竞争和寡头垄断12.1复习笔记12.2课后复习题详解12.3课后练习题详解第13章博弈论与竞争策略13.1复习笔记13.2课后复习题详解13.3课后练习题详解第14章投入要素市场14.1复习笔记14.2课后复习题详解14.3课后练习题详解第15章投资、时间与资本市场15.1复习笔记15.2课后复习题详解15.3课后练习题详解第4篇信息、市场失灵与政府的角色第16章一般均衡与经济效率16.1复习笔记16.2课后复习题详解16.3课后练习题详解第17章信息不对称的市场17.1复习笔记17.2课后复习题详解17.3课后练习题详解第18章外部性和公共物品18.1复习笔记18.2课后复习题详解附录指定平狄克《微观经济学》教材为考研参考书目的院校列表。

第一章复习题1．市场是通过相互作用决定一种或一系列产品价格的买卖双方的集合，因此可以把市场看作决定价格的场所。

行业是出售相同的或紧密相关的产品的厂商的集合，一个市场可以包括许多行业。

2．评价一个理论有两个步骤：首先，需要检验这个理论假设的合理性；第二，把该理论的预测和事实相比较以此来验证它。

如果一个理论无法被检验的话，它将不会被接受。

因此，它对我们理解现实情况没有任何帮助。

3．实证分析解释“是什么”的问题，而规范分析解释的是“应该是什么”的问题。

对供给的限制将改变市场的均衡。

A中包括两种分析，批评这是一种“失败的政策”——是规范分析，批评其破坏了市场的竞争性——是实证分析。

B向我们说明在燃油的配给制下总社会福利的被损坏——是实证分析。

4．由于两个市场在空间上是分离的，商品在两地间的运输是套利实现的条件。

如果运输成本为零，则可以在Oklahoma购买汽油，到New Jersey出售，赚取差价；如果这个差价无法弥补运输成本则不存在套利机会。

5．商品和服务的数量与价格由供求关系决定。

鸡蛋的实际价格从1970年至1985年的下降，一方面是由于人们健康意识的提高而导致鸡蛋需求的减少，同时也因为生产成本的降低。

在这两种因素下，鸡蛋的价格下降了。

大学教育的实际价格的升高，是由于越来越多的人倾向于获得大学教育而导致需求提高，同时教育的成本也在升高。

在这两方面因素作用下，大学教育费用提高了。

6．日圆相对美圆来说，价值升高，升值前相比，兑换同样数量的日圆需要付出更多的美圆。

由汇率的变化引起购买力的变化，在日本市场出售的美国汽车，由于美圆贬值日圆升值，持有日圆的消费者将较以前支付较底的价格；而在美国市场出售的日本汽车，由于日圆升值美圆贬值，持有美圆的消费者将面对较以前提高的价格。

第二章复习题1.假设供给曲线固定，炎热天气通常会引起需求曲线右移，在当前价格上造成短期需求过剩。

消费者为获得冰激凌，愿意为每一单位冰激凌出价更高。

CHAPTER 17MARKETS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONLike Chapter 15, this chapter follows a “hub-and-spoke” pattern. The hub, found in the introduction to the chapter, defines asymmetric information. The spokes include Sections 17.1 and 17.3 on adverse selection and moral hazard Section 17.2 on signaling the principal-agent problem in Sections 17.4 and 17.5 and the efficiency wage model in Section 17.6. Although much of the discussion of these topics is conceptual, an algebraic or geometric model is presented in each section and the exercises focus on the intuition behind the models.It is best to introduce asymmetric information by reviewing where microeconomics has assumed perfect information. For example, except for Chapter 5 and sections of Chapter 15, we have assumed perfect knowledge of the future (no uncertainty). In models of uncertainty, consumers and producers play “games against nature.” In models of asymmetric information, they are playing games with each other.Many of your students are likely to have bought or sold a used car and will, therefore, find the lemons model interesting. Start your presentation by asking the sellers of used cars how they determined their asking price. Emphasize the intuition of the model before presenting Figure 17.1. If they have understood the model, they should ask a high price to give the impression to buyers that the car they are selling is of high quality. Class discussion could consider whether the government should pass laws requiring warranties in the sale of used cars.The market for insurance is also one with which most students are familiar. Although car insurance is required in many states, liability limits may vary from policy to policy. Discuss how risk-averse individuals will want to purchase policies with higher limits and how insurance companies determine the riskiness of the insurance (see Review Question (3)). If you have used the example of buying a house in Chapter 15, you may extend it here by considering how bankers determine whether borrowers will default on their home loans (see Exercise (2)).When discussing market signaling, point out the dual function of education (as training and as a signal of higher productivity). The “Simple Model of Job Market Signaling,” which is presented in Section 17.2, might confuse students unfamiliar with discontinuous functions (see Figure 17.2). Explain how educational degrees lead to discontinuities, and stress the relationship between degrees, guarantees, and warranties of educational quality. See Exercises (1) and (2) for a discussion of these issues.Moral hazard is an easy concept to illustrate with examples, but it is important to draw a clear distinction between adverse selection and moral hazard. Exercise (5) combines discussions of the lemons market, signaling, and moral hazard. Exercise (7) combines discussions of moral hazard and warranties.The principal-agent problem is presented in the context of the relationship between employer and employee. It can be generalized to the relationship between a regulator and a regulated firm and to the relationship between voters and elected officials. In discussing the problems of monitoring agents, you can reintroduce the concept of transactions costs (from Section 16.2). Monitoring costs are discussed in Review Questions (6) and (7). The most interesting topic of this section is how to design contracts to provide the proper incentives for agents to perform in the interest of the principal. The starred Section 17.5 extends this topic to managerial incentives in an integrated firm. The model can be applied to government contracts, i.e., defense contracts, for a discussion of cost-plus contracting.The shirking model of efficiency wages is conceptually difficult. After discussing efficiency in Chapter 16, students might wonder what is so efficient about paying workers a wage that is greater than the value of their marginal product. Stress the role of asymmetric information here: firms have imperfect information about individual worker productivity. If you present this model, first read the references in Footnote 17. While Yellen’s article is concise, Stiglitz’s is more general, discussing shirking on page 20 and the relationship between efficiency wage theory and unemployment on pages 33-37.1. Why can asymmetric information between buyers and sellers lead to a market failure when a market is otherwise perfectly competitive?Asymmetric information leads to market failure because the transaction price does notreflect either the marginal benefit to the buyer or the marginal cost of the seller. Thecompetitive market fails to achieve an output with a price equal to marginal cost. Insome extreme cases, if there is no mechanism to reduce the problem of asymmetricinformation, the market collapses completely.2. If the used car market is a “lemons” market, how would you expect the repair record of used cars that are sold to compare with the repair record of those not sold?In the market for used cars, the seller has a better idea of the quality of the used carthan does the buyer. The repair record of the used car is one indicator of quality. Onewould expect that, at the margin, cars with good repair records would be kept whilecars with poor repair records would be sold. Thus, one would expect the repair recordsof used cars that are to be sold to be worse than those of used cars not sold.3. Explain the difference between adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance markets. Can one exist without the other?In insurance markets, both adverse selection and moral hazard exist. Adverse selectionrefers to the self-selection of individuals who purchase insurance policies. In otherwords, people who are less risky than the insured population will, at the margin, choosenot to insure, while people more risky than the population will choose to insure. As aresult, the insurance company is left with a riskier pool of policy holders. The problemof moral hazard occurs after the insurance is purchased. Once insurance is purchased,less risky individuals might engage in behavior characteristic of more risky individuals.If policy holders are fully insured, they have little incentive to avoid risky situations.An insurance firm may reduce adverse selection, without reducing moral hazard, andvice versa. Researching to determine the riskiness of a potential customer helpsinsurance companies reduce adverse selection. Furthermore, insurance companiesreevaluate the premium (sometimes canceling the policy) when claims are madeagainst the policy, thereby reducing moral hazard. Copayments also reduce moralhazard by creating a disincentive for policy holders to engage in risky behavior.4. Describe several ways in which sellers can convince buyers that their products are of high quality. Which methods apply in the following products: Maytag washing machines, Burger King hamburgers, large diamonds?Some signal the quality of their products to buyers through (1) investment in a goodreputation, (2) the standardization of products, (3) certification (i.e., the use ofeducational degrees in the labor market), (4) guarantees, and (5) warranties. Maytagsignals the high quality of its washing machines by offering one of the best warrantiesin the market. (See Consumer Reports, February 1988, p. 82.) Burger King relies onthe standardization of its hamburgers, e.g., the Whopper. The sale of a large diamondis accompanied by a certificate that verifies the weight and shape of the stone anddiscloses any flaws.5. Why might a seller find it advantageous to signal the quality of her product? How are guarantees and warranties a form of market signaling?Firms producing high-quality products would like to charge higher prices, but to do thissuccessfully, potential consumers must be made aware of the quality differences amongbrands. One method of providing product quality information is through guarantees(i.e., the promise to return what has been given in exchange if the product is defective)and warranties (i.e., the promise to repair or replace if defective). Since low-qualityproducers are unlikely to offer costly signaling devices, consumers can correctly view aguarantee or an extensive warranty as a signal of high quality, thus confirming theeffectiveness of these measures as signaling devices.6. Why might managers of firms be able to achieve objectives other than profit maximization, the goal of the firm’s shareholders?It is difficult and costly for shareholders to constantly monitor the actions of the firm’smanagers. The firm’s owners are in a better position to engage in monitoring, butmanagers’ behaviors still cannot be scrutinized one hundred percent of the time.Therefore, managers have some leeway to pursue their own objectives.7. How can the principal-agent model be used to explain why public enterprises, such as post offices, might pursue goals other than profit maximization?The problem of overseeing a public enterprise is one of asymmetric information. Themanager (agent) is more familiar with the cost structure of the enterprise and thebenefits to the customers than the principal, an elected or appointed official, who mustelicit cost information controlled by the manager. The costs of eliciting and verifyingthe information, as well as independently gathering information on the benefitsprovided by the public enterprise, can be more than the difference between the agency’spotential net returns (“profits”) and realized returns. This difference provides room forslack, which can be distributed to the management as personal benefits, to the agency’sworkers as greater-than-efficient job security, or to the agency’s customers in the formof greater-than-efficient provision of goods or services.8. Why are bonus and profit-sharing payment schemes likely to resolve principal-agent problems, whereas a fixed wage payment will not?With a fixed wage, the agent-employee has no incentive to maximize productivity. Ifthe agent-employee is hired at a fixed wage equal to the marginal revenue product ofthe average employee, there is no incentive to work harder than the least productiveworker. Bonus and profit-sharing schemes involve a lower fixed wage than fixed-wageschemes, but they include a bonus wage. The bonus can be tied to the profitability ofthe firm to the output of the individual employee, or to that of the group in which theemployee works. These schemes provide a greater incentive for agents to maximize theobjective function of the principal.9. What is an efficiency wage? Why is it profitable for the firm to pay an efficiency wage when workers have better information about their productivity than firms do?An efficiency wage, in the context of the shirking model, is the wage at which noshirking occurs. If employers cannot monitor employees’ productivity, then employeesmay shirk (work less productively), which will affect the firm’s output and profits. Ittherefore pays the firm to offer workers a higher-than-market wage, thus reducing theworkers’ incentive to shirk, because they know that if they are fired and end upworking for another firm, their wage will fall.1. Many consumers view a well-known brand name as a signal of quality and will pay more for a brand-name product (e.g., Bayer aspirin instead of generic aspirin, Birds Eye frozen vegetables instead of the supermarket’s own brand). Can a brand name provide a useful signal of quality? Why or why not?A brand name can provide a useful signal of quality for several reasons. First, wheninformation asymmetry is a problem, one solution is to create a “brand-name” product.Standardization of the product produces a reputation for a given level of quality that issignaled by the brand name. Second, if the development of a brand-name reputation iscostly (i.e., advertising, warranties, etc.), the brand name is a signal of higher quality.Finally, pioneer products, by virtue of their “first-mover” status, enjoy consumer loyaltyif the products are of acceptable quality. The uncertainty surrounding newer productsinhibits defection from the pioneering brand-name product.2. Gary is a recent college graduate. After six months at his new job, he has finally saved enough to buy his first car.a. Gary knows very little about the differences between makes and models of cars.How could he use market signals, reputation, or standardization to make comparisons?Gary’s problem is one of asymmetric information. As a buyer of a first car, he will benegotiating with sellers who know more about cars than he does. His first choice is todecide between a new or used car. If he buys a used car, he must choose between aprofessional used-car dealer and an individual seller. Each of these three types ofsellers (the new-car dealer, the used-car dealer, and the individual seller) uses differentmarket signals to convey quality information about their products.The new-car dealer, working with the manufacturer (and relying on the manufacturer’sreputation) can offer standard and extended warranties that guarantee the car willperform as advertised. Because few used cars carry a manufacturer’s warranty and theused-car dealer is not intimately familiar with the condition of the cars on his or her lot(because of their wide variety and disparate previous usage), it is not in his or her self-interest to offer extensive warranties. The used-car dealer, therefore, must rely onreputation, particularly on a reputation of offering “good values.” Since the individualseller neither offers warranties nor relies on reputation, purchasing from such a sellercould make it advisable to seek additional information from an independent mechanicor from reading the used-car recommendations in Consumer Reports. Given his lack ofexperience, Gary should gather as much information about these market signals,reputation, and standardization as he can afford.b. You are a loan officer in a bank. After selecting a car, Gary comes to you seeking aloan. Since he has only recently graduated, he does not have a long credit history.Despite this, the bank has a long history of financing cars of recent college graduates. Is this information useful in Gary’s case? If so, how?The bank’s problem in loaning money to Gary is also one of asymmetric information.Gary has a much better idea than the bank does about the quality of the car and hisability to pay back the loan. While the bank can learn about the car through thereputation of the manufacturer (if it is a new car) and through inspection (if it is a usedcar), the bank has little information on Gary’s ability to handle credit. Therefore, thebank must infer information about Gary’s credit-worthiness from easily availableinformation, such as his recent graduation from college, how much he might haveborrowed while in school, and the similarity of his educational and credit profile to thatof college graduates currently holding car loans from the bank. If recent graduateshave built a good reputation for paying off their loans, Gary can use this reputation tohis advantage, but poor repayment patterns by this group will lessen his chances ofobtaining a car loan from this bank.3. A major university bans the assignment of D or F grades. It defends its action by claiming that students tend to perform above average when they are free from the pressures of flunking out. The university states that it wants all its students to get As and Bs. If the goal is to raise overall grades to the B level or above, is this a good policy? Discuss with respect to the problem of moral hazard.By eliminating the lowest grades, the innovating university creates a moral hazardproblem similar to that which is found in insurance markets. Since they are protectedfrom receiving a below-average grade, some students will have little incentive to workat above-average levels. The policy only addresses the pressures facing below-averagestudents, i.e., those who flunk out. Average and above-average students do not face thepressure of failing. For these students, the destructive pressure of earning good grades(instead of learning a subject well) remains. Their problems are not addressed by thispolicy. Therefore, the policy creates a moral hazard problem primarily for the below-average students who are its intended beneficiaries.4. Professor Jones has just been hired by the economics department at a major private university. The president of the board of regents has stated that the university is committed to providing top-quality education for its undergraduates. Two months into the semester, Professor Jones fails to show up for his classes. It seems he is devoting all his time to economic research rather than to teaching. Professor Jones argues that his research will bring additional prestige to the department and the university. Should he be allowed to continue exclusively with research? Discuss with reference to the principal-agent problem.In the university context, the board of regents and its president are the principals,while the agents are the members of the faculty hired by the department with theapproval of the president and the board. The dual purpose of most universities isteaching students and producing research; thus, most faculty are hired to perform bothtasks. The problem is that teaching effort can be easily monitored (particularly if Jonesdoes not show up for class), while the benefits of establishing a prestigious researchreputation are uncertain and are realized only over time. While the quantity ofresearch is easy to calculate, determining research quality is more difficult. Theuniversity should not simply take Jones’ word regarding the benefits of his researchand allow him to continue exclusively with his research without altering his paymentscheme. One alternative would be to tell Jones that he does not have to teach if he iswilling to accept a lower salary. On the other hand, the university could offer Jones abonus if, due to his research reputation, he is able to bring a lucrative grant or otherdonations to the university5. Faced with a reputation for producing automobiles with poor repair records, a number of American automobile companies have offered extensive guarantees to car purchasers (i.e., a seven-year warranty on all parts and labor associated with mechanical problems). a. In light of your knowledge of the lemons market, why is this a reasonable policy?In the past, American companies enjoyed a reputation for producing high-quality cars.More recently, faced with competition from Japanese car manufacturers, their productsappeared to customers to be of lower quality. As this reputation spread, customerswere less willing to pay high prices for American cars. To reverse this trend, Americancompanies invested in quality control, improving the repair records of their products.Consumers, however, still considered American cars to be of lower quality (lemons, insome sense), and would not buy them, American companies were forced to signal theimproved quality of their products to their customers. One way of providing thisinformation is through improved warranties that directly address the issue of poorrepair records. This was a reasonable reaction to the “lemons” problem that they faced.b. Is the policy likely to create a moral hazard problem? Explain.Moral hazard occurs when the insured party (here, the owner of an Americanautomobile with an extensive warranty) can influence the probability of the event thattriggers payment (here, the repair of the automobile). The coverage of all parts andlabor associated with mechanical problems reduces the incentive to maintain theautomobile. Hence, a moral hazard problem is created by the offer of extensivewarranties. To avoid this problem, all routine maintenance could be performed as longas the car is under warranty.6. To promote competition and consumer welfare, the Federal Trade Commission requires firms to advertise truthfully. How does truth in advertising promote competition? Why would a market be less competitive if firms advertised deceptively?Truth-in-advertising promotes competition by providing the information necessary forconsumers to make optimal decisions. “Competitive forces” function properly only ifconsumers are aware of all prices (and qualities), so comparisons may be made. In theabsence of truthful advertising, buyers are unable to make these comparisons becausegoods priced identically can be of different quality. Hence, there will be a tendency forbuyers to “stick” with proven products, reducing competition between existing firmsand discouraging entry. Note that monopoly rents may result when consumers stickwith proven products.7. An insurance company is considering issuing three types of fire insurance policies: (i) complete insurance coverage, (ii) complete coverage above and beyond a $10,000 deductible, and (iii) 90 percent coverage of all losses. Which policy is more likely to create moral hazard problems?Moral hazard problems arise with fire insurance when the insured party can influencethe probability of a fire and the magnitude of a loss from a fire. The property owner canengage in behavior that reduces the probability of a fire, for example, by inspecting andreplacing faulty wiring. The magnitude of losses can be reduced by the installation ofwarning systems or the storage of valuables away from areas where fires are likely tostart.After purchasing complete insurance, the insured has little incentive to reduce eitherthe probability or the magnitude of the loss, and the moral hazard problem will besevere. In order to compare a $10,000 deductible and 90 percent coverage, we wouldneed information on the value of the potential loss. Both policies reduce the moralhazard problem of complete coverage. However, if the property is worth less (more)than $100,000, the total loss will be less (more) with 90 percent coverage than with the$10,000 deductible. As the value of the property increases above $100,000, the owner ismore likely to engage in fire prevention efforts under the policy that offers 90 percentcoverage than under the one that offers the $10,000 deductible.8. You have seen how asymmetric information can reduce the average quality of the products sold in a market as low-quality products drive out the high-quality ones. For those markets where asymmetric information is prevalent, would you agree or disagree with each of the following? Explain briefly:a. The government should subsidize Consumer Reports.Asymmetric information implies an unequal access to information by either buyers orsellers, a problem that leads to inefficient markets or market collapse.Although Consumer Reports provides evaluations for products ranging fromhamburgers to washing machines, it refuses to let its name be used as an endorsementof a product. While government support of Consumer Reports would be likely toincrease the ability of consumers to distinguish between high- and low-quality goods, itis probable that the Consumers Union, publisher of Consumer Reports,would rejectgovernment subsidization because such subsidization might taint the objectivity of theorganization. Note that the government has already provided an indirect subsidy to thepublication by granting the Consumers Union nonprofit status.b. The government should impose quality standards — e.g., firms should not be allowedto sell low-quality items.Option b involves a cost of monitoring. After imposing quality standards, thegovernment must either administratively monitor the quality of goods or adjudicatedisputes between the public and the manufacturers. Note, however, that low-qualitygoods may be preferred if they are sufficiently cheaper.c. The producer of a high-quality good will probably want to offer an extensivewarranty.This option provides the least-cost solution to the problems of asymmetric information.It allows the producer to distinguish products from low-quality goods because it is morecostly for the low-quality producer to offer an extensive warranty than for the high-quality producer to offer one.d. The government should require all firms to offer extensive warranties.By requiring all firms to offer extensive warranties, the government negates themarket signaling value of warranties offered by the producers of high-quality goods.9. Two used car dealerships compete side by side on a main road. The first, Harry’s Cars, sells high-quality cars that it carefully inspects and, if necessary, services. It costs Harry, on average, $8,000 to buy and service each car that it sells. The second dealership, Lew’s Motors, sells lower-quality cars. It costs Lew on average only $5,000 for each car that it sells. If consumers knew the quality of the used cars they were buying, they would gladly pay $10,000 on average for cars Harry sells, but only $7,000 on average for the cars Lew sells.Unfortunately, the dealerships are new and have not had time to establish reputations, so consumers don’t know the quality of each dealership’s cars. Consumers shopping at these dealerships figure that they have a 50-50 chance of ending up with a high-quality car, no matter which dealership they go to, and hence are willing to pay $8,500 on average for a car.Harry’s has an idea—it will offer a bumper-to-bumper warranty for all the cars it sells. He knows that a warranty lasting Y years will cost $500Y on average, and it also knows that if Lew’s tries to offer the same warranty, it will cost Lew’s $1000Y on average.(a) Suppose Harry’s offers a one-year warranty on all the cars it sells. Will this generatea credible signal of quality? Will Lew’s match the offer, or will it fail to match it sothat consumers can correctly assume that because of the warranty, Harry’s cars are high quality and hence worth $10,000 on average?If Harry were to offer a one-year warranty, the average cost to him of each car will risefrom $8,000 to $8,500. By offering the warranty, Harry will communicate the highquality of his cars and will be able to sell them for $10,000, which means that Harry’sprofit per car will increase from $500 to $1,500.Lew will not match Harry’s warranty. Without offering the warranty, Lew is able tomake $2,000 per car. If he were to offer the warranty, each car will now cost Lew$7,000, but as consumers will not be able to determine the quality of the cars Lew willmake $1,500 per car.(b) What if Harry offers a two-year warranty on his cars? Will this generate a crediblesignal of quality? What about a three-year warranty?If Harry offers a two-year warranty each car will cost him $9,000. He will earn $1,000per car as consumers will recognize the higher quality of his cars.With a three-year warranty Harry would be making $500 per car, the same that hewould have made had he not signaled the higher quality of his cars with a warranty.Therefore, Harry would not offer a three-year warranty.(c) If you were advising Harry, how long a warranty would you urge him to offer?Explain why.Harry will need to offer a warranty of sufficient length such that Lew will not find itprofitable to match the warranty. Let t denote the number of years of the warranty,then Lew will offer a warranty according to the following inequality:(8,500 - 5,000 - 2,000t) ≤ 7,000 - 5000, or 3/4 ≤t.Therefore, I would advise Harry to offer a nine-month warranty on his cars as Lew willnot find it profitable to match the warranty.。

CHAPTER 2THE BASICS OF SUPPLY AND DEMANDThis chapter departs from the standard treatment of supply and demand basics found in most other intermediate microeconomics textbooks by discussing some of the world’s most important markets (wheat, gasoline, and automobiles) and teaching students how to analyze these markets with the tools of supply and demand.Although most of the discussion of economic theory in this chapter serves as a review, the real-world applications of this theory will be enlightening for students, particularly the material covered in Section 2.5 and Examples 2.5 and 2.6.Some problems plague the understanding of supply and demand analysis. One of the most common sources of confusion is between movements along the demand curve and shifts in demand. Through a discussion of the ceteris paribus assumption, stress that when representing a demand function (either with a graph or an equation), all other variables are held constant. Movements along the demand curve occur only with changes in price. As the omitted factors change, the entire demand function shifts. Students may also find a review of how to solve two equations with two unknowns helpful.To stress the quantitative aspects of the demand curve to students, make the distinction between quantity demanded as a function of price, Q = D(P), and the inverse demand function, where price is a function of the quantity demanded, P = D-1(Q). This may clarify the positioning of price on the Y-axis and quantity on the X-axis.Students may also question how the market adjusts to a new equilibrium. One simple mechanism is the partial-adjustment cobweb model. A discussion of the cobweb model (based on traditional corn-hog cycle or any other example) adds a certain realism to the discussion and is much appreciated by students.Although this chapter introduces demand, income, and cross-price elasticities, you may find it more appropriate to return to income and cross-price elasticity after demand elasticity is reintroduced in Chapter 4. If you wait, you should postpone Exercise (7) until income and cross-price elasticities are discussed.1. Suppose that unusually hot weather causes the demand curve for ice cream to shift to the right. Why will the price of ice cream rise to a new market-clearing level?Assume the supply curve is fixed. The unusually hot weather will cause a rightwardshift in the demand curve, creating short-run excess demand at the current price.Consumers will begin to bid against each other for the ice cream, putting upwardpressure on the price. The price of ice cream will rise until the quantity demanded andthe quantity supplied are equal.4. Why do long-run elasticities of demand differ from short-run elasticities? Consider two goods: paper towels and televisions. Which is a durable good? Would you expect the price elasticity of demand for paper towels to be larger in the short-run or in the long-run? Why? What about the price elasticity of demand for televisions?Long-run and short-run elasticities differ based on how rapidly consumers respond toprice changes and how many substitutes are available. If the price of paper towels, anon-durable good, were to increase, consumers might react only minimally in the shortrun. In the long run, however, demand for paper towels would be more elastic as newsubstitutes entered the market (such as sponges or kitchen towels). In contrast, thequantity demanded of durable goods, such as televisions, might change dramatically inthe short run following a price change. For example, the initial influence of a priceincrease for televisions would cause consumers to delay purchases because durablegoods are built to last longer. Eventually consumers must replace their televisions asthey wear out or become obsolete; therefore, we expect the demand for durables to bemore elastic in the long run.5. Explain why, for many goods, the long-run price elasticity of supply is larger than the short-run elasticity.The elasticity of supply is the percentage change in the quantity supplied divided by thepercentage change in price. An increase in price induces an increase in the quantitysupplied by firms. Some firms in some markets may respond quickly and cheaply toprice changes. However, other firms may be constrained by their production capacity inthe short run. The firms with short-run capacity constraints will have a short-runsupply elasticity that is less elastic. However, in the long run all firms can increasetheir scale of production and thus have a larger long-run price elasticity.6. Suppose the government regulates the prices of beef and chicken and sets them below their market-clearing levels. Explain why shortages of these goods will develop and what factors will determine the sizes of the shortages. What will happen to the price of pork? Explain briefly.If the price of a commodity is set below its market-clearing level, the quantity that firmsare willing to supply is less than the quantity that consumers wish to purchase. Theextent of the excess demand implied by this response will depend on the relativeelasticities of demand and supply. For instance, if both supply and demand are elastic,the shortage is larger than if both are inelastic. Factors such as the willingness ofconsumers to eat less meat and the ability of farmers to change the size of their herdsand produce less determine these elasticities and influence the size of excess demand.Rationing will result in situations of excess demand when some consumers are unableto purchase the quantities desired. Customers whose demands are not met willattempt to purchase substitutes, thus increasing the demand for substitutes and raisingtheir prices. If the prices of beef and chicken are set below market-clearing levels, theprice of pork will rise.7. In a discussion of tuition rates, a university official argues that the demand for admission is completely price inelastic. As evidence she notes that while the university has doubled its tuition (in real terms) over the past 15 years, neither the number nor quality of students applying has decreased. Would you accept this argument? Explain briefly. (Hint: The official makes an assertion about the demand for admission, but does she actually observe a demand curve? What else could be going on?)If demand is fixed, the individual firm (a university) may determine the shape of thedemand curve it faces by raising the price and observing the change in quantity sold.The university official is not observing the entire demand curve, but rather only theequilibrium price and quantity over the last 15 years. If demand is shifting upward, assupply shifts upward, demand could have any elasticity. (See Figure 2.7, for example.)Demand could be shifting upward because the value of a college education hasincreased and students are willing to pay a high price for each opening. More marketc. A drought shrinks the apple crop to one-third its normal size.The supply curve would shift in, causing the equilibrium price to rise and theequilibrium quantity to fall.d. Thousands of college students abandon the academic life to become apple pickers.The increased supply of apple pickers will lead to a decrease in the cost of bringingapples to market. The decreased cost of bringing apples to market results in anoutward shift of the supply curve of apples and causes the equilibrium price to fall andthe equilibrium quantity to increase.e. Thousands of college students abandon the academic life to become apple growers.This would result in an outward shift of the supply curve for apples, causing theequilibrium price to fall and the equilibrium quantity to increase.1. Consider a competitive market for which the quantities demanded and supplied (per year) at various prices are given as follows:Price($)Demand (millions) Supply (millions) 6022 14 8020 16 10018 18 12016 20 a. Calculate the price elasticity of demand when the price is $80. When the price is$100.We know that the price elasticity of demand may be calculated using equation 2.1 fromthe text:E Q Q P PP Q Q PD D D D D ==∆∆∆∆. With each price increase of $20, the quantity demanded decreases by 2. Therefore,∆∆Q P DF HG I K J =-=-22001.. At P = 80, quantity demanded equals 20 andE D =F HG I KJ -=-802001040...b g Similarly, at P = 100, quantity demanded equals 18 andE D =F HG I K J -=-1001801056...b g b. Calculate the price elasticity of supply when the price is $80. When the price is $100.The elasticity of supply is given by:E Q Q P P Q Q PS S S S S ==∆∆∆∆. With each price increase of $20, quantity supplied increases by 2. Therefore,∆∆Q SF HG I K J ==22001.. At P = 80, quantity supplied equals 16 andE S =F HG I KJ =80160105..bg .Similarly, at P = 100, quantity supplied equals 18 andE S=FH GIK J= 1001801056...bgc. What are the equilibrium price and quantity?The equilibrium price and quantity are found where the quantity supplied equals thequantity demanded at the same price. As we see from the table, the equilibrium priceis $100 and the equilibrium quantity is 18 million.d. Suppose the government sets a price ceiling of $80. Will there be a shortage, and, ifso, how large will it be?With a price ceiling of $80, consumers would like to buy 20 million, but producers willsupply only 16 million. This will result in a shortage of 4 million.2. Refer to Example 2.3 on the market for wheat. Suppose that in 1985 the Soviet Union hadbought an additional 200 million bushels of U.S. wheat. What would the free market price of wheat have been and what quantity would have been produced and sold by U.S. farmers?The following equations describe the market for wheat in 1985:QS= 1,800 + 240PandQD= 2,580 - 194P.If the Soviet Union had purchased an additional 200 million bushels of wheat, the newdemand curve 'Q D, would be equal to Q ED + 200, or'Q D= (2,580 - 194P) + 200 = 2,780 - 194PEquating supply and the new demand, we may determine the new equilibrium price,1,800 + 240P = 2,780 - 194P, or434P = 980, or P* = $2.26 per bushel.To find the equilibrium quantity, substitute the price into either the supply or demandequation, e.g.,QS= 1,800 + (240)(2.26) = 2,342andQD= 2,780 - (194)(2.26) = 2,342.3. The rent control agency of New York City has found that aggregate demand is QD= 100 - 5P measured in tens of thousands of apartments, and price, the average monthly rental rate, P, with quantity measured in hundreds of dollars. The agency also noted that the increase in Q at lower P results from more three-person families coming into the city from Long Island and demanding apartments. The city’s board of realtors acknowledges that this is agood demand estimate and has shown that supply is QS= 50 + 5P.a. If both the agency and the board are right about demand and supply, what is the freemarket price? What is the change in city population if the agency sets a maximum average monthly rental of $100, and all those who cannot find an apartment leave the city?To find the free market price for apartments, set supply equal to demand:100 - 5P = 50 + 5P, or P = $500.Substituting the equilibrium price into either the demand or supply equation todetermine the equilibrium quantity:QD= 100 - (5)(5) = 75andQ S = 50 + (5)(5) = 75.We find that at the rental rate of $500, 750,000 apartments are rented.If the rent control agency sets the rental rate at $100, the quantity supplied would thenbe 550,000 (Q S = 50 + (5)(100) = 550), a decrease of 200,000 apartments from the freemarket equilibrium. (Assuming three people per family per apartment, this wouldimply a loss of 600,000 people.) At the $100 rental rate, the demand for apartments is950,000 units, and the resultant shortage is 400,000 units.b. Suppose the agency bows to the wishes of the board and sets a rental of $900 permonth on all apartments to allow landlords a “fair” rate of return. If 50 percent of any long-run increases in apartment offerings comes from new construction, how many apartments are constructed?At a rental rate of $900, the supply of apartments would be 50 + 5(9) = 95, or 950,000units, which is an increase of 200,000 units over the free market equilibrium.Therefore, (0.5)(200,000) = 100,000 units would be constructed. Note, however, thatsince demand is only 550,000 units, 400,000 units would go unrented.4. Much of the demand for U.S. agricultural output has come from other countries. From Example 2.3, total demand is Q = 3,550 - 266P . In addition, we are told that domestic demand is Q d = 1,000 - 46P . Domestic supply is Q S = 1,800 + 240P . Suppose the export demand for wheat falls by 40 percent.a. U.S. farmers are concerned about this drop in export demand. What happens to thefree market price of wheat in the United States? Do the farmers have much reason to worry?Given total demand, Q = 3,550 - 266P , and domestic demand, Q d = 1,000 - 46P , we maysubtract and determine export demand, Q e = 2,550 - 220P .The initial market equilibrium price is found by setting total demand equal to supply:3,550 - 266P - 1,800 + 240P , orP = $3.46.There are two different ways to handle the 40 percent drop in demand. One way is toassume that the demand curve shifts down so that at all prices demand decreases by 40percent. The second way is to rotate the demand curve in a clockwise manner aroundthe vertical intercept (i.e. in the current case the demand curve would becomeQ = 3,550 - 159.6P ). We apply the former approach in the solution to exercises here.Regardless of the two approaches, the effect on prices and quantity will be qualitativelythe same, but will differ quantitatively.Therefore, if export demand decreases by 40 percent, total demand becomesQ D = Q d + 0.6Q e = 1,000 - 46P + (0.6)(2,550 - 220P ) = 2,530 - 178P .Equating total supply and total demand,1,800 + 240P = 2,530 - 178P , orP = $1.75,which is a significant drop from the market-clearing price of $3.46 per bushel. At thisprice, the market-clearing quantity is 2,219 million bushels. Total revenue hasdecreased from $9.1 billion to $3.9 billion. Most farmers would worry.b. Now suppose the U.S. government wants to buy enough wheat each year to raise theprice to $3.00 per bushel. Without export demand, how much wheat would the government have to buy each year? How much would this cost the government?With a price of $3, the market is not in equilibrium. Demand = 1000 - 46(3) = 862.Supply = 1800 + 240(3) = 2,520, and excess supply is therefore 2,520 - 862 = 1,658. Thegovernment must purchase this amount to support a price of $3, and will spend $3(1.66million) = $5.0 billion per year.5. In Example 2.6 we examined the effect of a 20 percent decline in copper demand on the price of copper, using the linear supply and demand curves developed in Section 2.5. Suppose the long-run price elasticity of copper demand were -0.4 instead of -0.8.a. Assuming, as before, that the equilibrium price and quantity are P* = 75 cents perpound and Q* = 7.5 million metric tons per year, derive the linear demand curve consistent with the smaller elasticity.Following the method outlined in Section 2.5, we solve for a and b in the demandequation Q D = a - bP . First, we know that for a linear demand function E b P D =-F H G I KJ *. Here E D = -0.4 (the long-run price elasticity), P* = 0.75 (the equilibrium price), and Q* =7.5 (the equilibrium quantity). Solving for b , -=-F H I K0407575...b , or b = 4. To find the intercept, we substitute for b , Q D (= Q *), and P (= P *) in the demandequation:7.5 = a - (4)(0.75), or a = 10.5.The linear demand equation consistent with a long-run price elasticity of -0.4 isthereforeQ D = 10.5 - 4P .b. Using this demand curve, recalculate the effect of a 20 percent decline in copperdemand on the price of copper.The new demand is 20 percent below the original (using our convention that the wholedemand curve is shifted down by 20 percent):'Q D =-=-0810548432....a f a fP P . Equating this to supply,8.4 - 3.2P = -4.5 + 16P , orP = 0.672.With the 20 percent decline in the demand, the price of copper falls to 67.2 cents perpound.6. Example 2.7 analyzes the world oil market. Using the data given in that example,a. Show that the short-run demand and competitive supply curves are indeed given byD = 24.08 - 0.06PS C = 11.74 + 0.07P .First, considering non-OPEC supply:S c = Q * = 13.With E S = 0.10 and P * = $18, E S = d (P */Q *) implies d = 0.07.Substituting for d , S c , and P in the supply equation, c = 11.74 and S c = 11.74 + 0.07P .Similarly, since Q D = 23, E D = -b (P */Q *) = -0.05, and b = 0.06. Substituting for b , Q D = 23, and P = 18 in the demand equation gives 23 = a - 0.06(18), so that a = 24.08.Hence Q D = 24.08 - 0.06P .b. Show that the long-run demand and competitive supply curves are indeed given byD = 32.18 - 0.51PS C = 7.78 + 0.29P .As above, E S = 0.4 and E D = -0.4: E S = d (P */Q *) and E D = -b(P*/Q*), implying 0.4 = d (18/13)and -0.4 = -b (18/23). So d = 0.29 and b = 0.51.Next solve for c and a :S c = c + dP and Q D = a - bP , implying 13 = c + (0.29)(18) and 23 = a - (0.51)(18).So c = 7.78 and a = 32.18.c. Use this model to calculate what would happen to the price of oil in the short-runand the long-run if OPEC were to cut its production by 6 billion barrels per year.With OPEC’s supply reduced from 10 bb/yr to 4 bb/yr, add this lower supply of 4 bb/yr to the short-run and long-run supply equations:S c ' = 4 + S c = 11.74 + 4 + 0.07P = 15.74 + 0.07P and S " = 4 + S c = 11.78 + 0.29P .These are equated with short-run and long-run demand, so that:15.74 + 0.07P = 24.08 - 0.06P ,implying that P = $64.15 in the short run; and11.78 + 0.29P = 32.18 - 0.51P ,implying that P = $24.29 in the long run.7.Refer to Example 2.8, which analyzes the effects of price controls on natural gas. a. Using the data in the example, show that the following supply and demand curvesdid indeed describe the market in 1975:Supply: Q = 14 + 2P G + 0.25P ODemand: Q = -5P G + 3.75P Owhere P G and P O are the prices of natural gas and oil, respectively. Also, verify that if the price of oil is $8.00, these curves imply a free market price of $2.00 for natural gas.To solve this problem, we apply the analysis of Section 2.5 to the definition of cross-price elasticity of demand given in Section 2.3. For example, the cross-price-elasticity of demand for natural gas with respect to the price of oil is:E Q P P Q GO G O G G=F HG I K J FH GI KJ ∆∆. ∆∆Q P G O F H G IK J is the change in the quantity of natural gas demanded, because of a small change in the price of oil. For linear demand equations,∆∆Q P G O F H G I K J is constant. If we represent demand as:Q G = a - bP G + eP O(notice that income is held constant), then∆∆Q P G OF HG I K J = e . Substituting this into the cross-price elasticity, E e P Q PO O G=F H G I K J **, where P O * and Q G * are the equilibrium price and quantity. We know that P O * = $8 and Q G* = 20 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). Solving for e , 15820.=F H G I KJ e , or e = 3.75. Similarly, if the general form of the supply equation is represented as:Q G = c + dP G + gP O , the cross-price elasticity of supply is g P Q OG**F H G I K J , which we know to be 0.1. Solving for g , ⎪⎭⎫ ⎝⎛=2081.0g , or g = 0.25. The values for d and b may be found with equations 2.5a and 2.5b in Section 2.5. Weknow that E S = 0.2, P* = 2, and Q* = 20. Therefore,⎪⎭⎫ ⎝⎛=2022.0d , or d = 2.Also, E D = -0.5, so⎪⎭⎫ ⎝⎛=-2025.0b , or b = -5. By substituting these values for d, g, b , and e into our linear supply and demandequations, we may solve for c and a :20 = c + (2)(2) + (0.25)(8), or c = 14,and20 = a - (5)(2) + (3.75)(8), or a = 0.If the price of oil is $8.00, these curves imply a free market price of $2.00 for naturalgas. Substitute the price of oil in the supply and demand curves to verify theseequations. Then set the curves equal to each other and solve for the price of gas.14 + 2P G + (0.25)(8) = -5P G + (3.75)(8), 7P G = 14, orP G = $2.00.b. Suppose the regulated price of gas in 1975 had been $1.50 per million cubic feet,instead of $1.00. How much excess demand would there have been?With a regulated price of $1.50 for natural gas and a price of oil equal to $8.00 perbarrel,Demand: Q D = (-5)(1.50) + (3.75)(8) = 22.5, andSupply: Q S = 14 + (2)(1.5) + (0.25)(8) = 19.With a supply of 19 Tcf and a demand of 22.5 Tcf, there would be an excess demand of3.5 Tcf.c. Suppose that the market for natural gas had not been regulated. If the price of oilhad increased from $8 to $16, what would have happened to the free market price of natural gas?If the price of natural gas had not been regulated and the price of oil had increasedfrom $8 to $16, thenDemand: Q D = -5P G + (3.75)(16) = 60 - 5P G , andSupply: Q S = 14 + 2P G + (0.25)(16) = 18 + 2P G .Equating supply and demand and solving for the equilibrium price,18 + 2P G = 60 - 5P G , or P G = $6.The price of natural gas would have tripled from $2 to $6.。

平狄克《微观经济学》课后习题答案（一）(2009-05-08 17:38:55)转载标签：平狄克《微观经济学》课后习题答案教育分类：考研心记第一章复习题1．市场是通过相互作用决定一种或一系列产品价格的买卖双方的集合，因此可以把市场看作决定价格的场所。

行业是出售相同的或紧密相关的产品的厂商的集合，一个市场可以包括许多行业。

2．评价一个理论有两个步骤：首先，需要检验这个理论假设的合理性；第二，把该理论的预测和事实相比较以此来验证它。

如果一个理论无法被检验的话，它将不会被接受。

因此，它对我们理解现实情况没有任何帮助。

3．实证分析解释“是什么”的问题，而规范分析解释的是“应该是什么”的问题。

对供给的限制将改变市场的均衡。

A中包括两种分析，批评这是一种“失败的政策”——是规范分析，批评其破坏了市场的竞争性——是实证分析。

B向我们说明在燃油的配给制下总社会福利的被损坏——是实证分析。

4．由于两个市场在空间上是分离的，商品在两地间的运输是套利实现的条件。

如果运输成本为零，则可以在Oklahoma购买汽油，到New Jersey出售，赚取差价；如果这个差价无法弥补运输成本则不存在套利机会。

5．商品和服务的数量与价格由供求关系决定。

鸡蛋的实际价格从1970年至1985年的下降，一方面是由于人们健康意识的提高而导致鸡蛋需求的减少，同时也因为生产成本的降低。

在这两种因素下，鸡蛋的价格下降了。

大学教育的实际价格的升高，是由于越来越多的人倾向于获得大学教育而导致需求提高，同时教育的成本也在升高。

在这两方面因素作用下，大学教育费用提高了。

6．日圆相对美圆来说，价值升高，升值前相比，兑换同样数量的日圆需要付出更多的美圆。

由汇率的变化引起购买力的变化，在日本市场出售的美国汽车，由于美圆贬值日圆升值，持有日圆的消费者将较以前支付较底的价格；而在美国市场出售的日本汽车，由于日圆升值美圆贬值，持有美圆的消费者将面对较以前提高的价格。

平狄克微观经济学(第7版)习题详解(第7篇生成成本)平狄克《微观经济学》（第7版）第7章生产成本课后复习题详解1．某公司支付给会计人员10000美元的年薪，这笔费用是一项经济成本吗？答：这笔费用是一项经济成本。

经济成本是显性成本和隐性成本之和。

显性成本指实际支出，所有涉及到货币交易行为的成本都属于显性成本。

隐性成本是一种经济成本，不涉及到货币交易行为，但涉及到生产中所使用的资源的成本。

当一个公司支付给会计人员10000美元年薪时，这是一笔货币交易，这笔费用是会计人员用劳动换来的收入。

因此，这笔费用属于经济成本中的显性成本。

2．某小零售店女店主自己做账，你将如何计算她工作的机会成本？答：该店主自己做账的机会成本是：她利用做账的时间和精力做其他事情时所能获得的最大收入。

根据机会成本的定义，如果该小零售店女店主不是自己做账，她可以在这段时间里做其他的事情，例如做小生意或者参加一些休闲活动。

那么，女店主自己做账的机会成本就是她用于做账的时间做其他事情时所能获得的最大收入。

3．解释以下说法正确与否：（1）如果一家企业的拥有者不给自己支付工资，则会计成本为零，而经济成本为正。

（2）会计利润为正的企业不一定经济利润也为正。

（3）企业雇佣了一些目前处于失业状态的工人，则其使用这些工人服务的机会成本为零。

答：（1）正确。

因为这里不存在货币交易，所以不存在会计成本（或显性成本）。

但是，因为企业的拥有者可以受雇于其他企业，因而存在经济成本。

经济成本为正，反映了此人工作时间的机会成本。

（2）正确。

会计利润仅考虑显性成本。

对于企业而言，可能还存在某些机会成本，这些机会成本没有像显性成本那样完全实现，所以对于会计利润为正的企业，有可能加进这些机会成本之后，经济利润为负。

这意味着企业没有最有效地利用其资源。

（3）错误。

机会成本衡量了这些工人的时间价值，因而不可能为零。

对于工人而言，尽管工人目前处于失业状态，但是他们仍掌握一定的技能，这些技能具有价值，进入某一企业工作意味着他们放弃了去另一家企业工作，或者利用时间在家照顾老人或孩子的机会，这些可能的选择使得雇佣工人的机会成本大于零。

平狄克微观经济学课后习题答案(中文)第九版第一章经济学的研究对象和方法习题1-1答案：经济学的研究对象是人类的经济活动，包括生产、交换、分配和消费等方面。

经济学的研究方法主要包括观察、实证分析和理论分析等。

习题1-2答案：观察是经济学研究的基础，通过观察可以获得经济现象的真实情况。

实证分析是基于观察数据进行的定量分析，通过统计分析等方法来验证经济理论的有效性。

理论分析是通过构建模型和假设来研究和解释经济现象的原因和机制。

习题1-3答案：经济学的分类有宏观经济学和微观经济学两个主要方向。

宏观经济学研究整个经济体系的总体运行规律，涉及国民经济的总量问题；微观经济学研究个体经济单位（如个人、家庭、企业）的经济行为和决策，涉及资源配置和效率问题。

习题1-4答案：正式的经济学的定义是一个关于个体与群体选择的社会科学。

它研究人们如何利用有限的资源，以满足无限的欲望。

经济学通过分析经济行为的原理和规律，帮助人们做出更好的经济决策，实现资源的高效配置和社会福利的最大化。

第二章需求、供给与市场均衡习题2-1答案：需求是指个人或市场上愿意购买某种商品或服务的能力和意愿。

供给是指个人或企业愿意出售某种商品或服务的能力和意愿。

习题2-2答案：需求曲线是描述消费者对某种商品或服务需求量与价格之间关系的曲线。

供给曲线是描述生产者或企业对某种商品或服务供给量与价格之间关系的曲线。

习题2-3答案：当市场需求量大于市场供给量时，市场处于短缺状态，价格将上涨；当市场供给量大于市场需求量时，市场处于过剩状态，价格将下降。

只有当市场需求量等于市场供给量时，市场达到均衡状态，价格稳定。

习题2-4答案：市场需求量变化的因素包括消费者收入、商品价格、相关商品价格和个人偏好等。

市场供给量变化的因素包括生产成本、生产技术、生产要素价格和政府政策等。

第三章边际分析及其应用习题3-1答案：边际分析是指在某一决策过程中，考察增加或减少一单元该决策的收益或成本的变化量。