政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束

政策性负担与企业的预算软约束来自中国的实证研究一、本文概述本文旨在深入探讨政策性负担与企业预算软约束之间的关系，并通过中国的实证研究进行验证。

文章首先对政策性负担和预算软约束的概念进行界定，并阐述两者之间的内在联系。

随后，文章梳理了国内外关于政策性负担与预算软约束的相关研究，总结了现有研究的成果与不足，为本研究提供了理论基础和参考依据。

在实证研究部分，文章选取了中国企业作为研究对象，通过收集大量的数据，运用计量经济学方法进行实证分析。

研究内容包括政策性负担对企业预算软约束的影响程度、不同行业、不同所有制企业之间的差异以及政策性负担与预算软约束对企业绩效的影响等。

文章在实证研究中发现，政策性负担对企业的预算软约束具有显著影响，这种影响在不同行业、不同所有制企业之间存在差异。

文章还发现政策性负担与预算软约束对企业绩效产生了负面影响，表明政策性负担和预算软约束问题亟待解决。

文章根据实证研究结果，提出了相应的政策建议，旨在减轻企业的政策性负担，硬化企业的预算约束，从而提高企业的竞争力和市场效率。

本文的研究对于深化理解中国企业面临的政策性负担与预算软约束问题，以及推动相关政策的制定和完善具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。

二、文献综述本文的文献综述部分将深入探讨政策性负担以及企业的预算软约束两个核心概念的理论背景、发展历程以及现有研究成果。

我们将从国内外学者的研究出发，对这两个主题的相关理论进行梳理和评价，从而为本研究的实证分析提供理论基础和参考依据。

我们回顾政策性负担的相关研究。

政策性负担通常指的是政府为了实现特定的社会或经济目标，而赋予企业的非市场性负担。

这些负担可能包括社会责任、环境保护、公共基础设施建设等。

国内外学者对政策性负担的研究主要集中在政策性负担的成因、影响及其对企业行为的影响等方面。

我们将对这些研究进行综述，以理解政策性负担对企业经营和预算决策的影响。

我们关注企业的预算软约束现象。

预算软约束是指企业在面临财务困境时，由于政府干预或其他原因，企业能够继续获得资金支持，从而避免破产清算的现象。

预算软约束" 在学术文献中的解释1、预算软约束是指,向企业提供资金的机构(政府或银行)未能坚持原先的商业约定,使企业的资金运用超过了它的当期收益的范围2、广义的预算软约束是指当一个预算约束体的支出超过了它所能获得的收益时,预算约束体没有被清算而破产,而是被支持体救助得以继续存活下去3、长期以来,在传统经济体制环境下,国有企业处于一种所有者缺位的状态,国有企业经营者的利益与其所有者的利益处于一个不十分一致的状态,其受到约束相对较少,学术界称为“预算软约束”4、社会主义经济中的国有企业一旦发生亏损,政府常常要追加投资、增加贷款、减少税收,并提供财政补贴,这种现象被亚诺什·科尔奈(Kornai,1986)称为“预算软约束”5、这种现象被亚诺什·科尔奈（Kornai,1986）称为“预算软约束”.科尔奈把社会主义经济中的许多问题都归因于预算软约束的存在.为了取得国有企业改革和社会主义经济改革的成功,消除预算软约束刻不容缓科尔奈版本的预算软约束非常简单，说一个家里，有老子有儿子，老子自然是非常喜欢这个儿子，用他的原话就是“父爱主义”。

老子希望儿子不要成为纨绔子弟，花钱不要大手大脚。

但是呢，这个老子又偏偏是如此溺爱这个孩子。

所以，每次这个儿子找老子要钱，老子都照给不误。

科尔奈就说，有了这么一个老子，养十个儿子估计九个都会变成纨绔子弟。

这个老子就是政府，儿子就是国有企业，要钱就给这件事情就是预算软约束。

科尔奈最初的著作，尽管在理论上并谈不上优美，但是他揭示了一个及其重要的现象，就是在社会主义国家，政府对于国有企业的“父爱主义”，使得这些企业永远不用担心自己的生产是不是有效率，自己的产品是不是有销路，或者自己是不是亏损。

因为企业最后总是可以伸手向政府要钱。

后来有很多人为“父爱主义”提供理论基础，就是这种“父爱”是从哪里来的。

我对文献已经忘得差不多了，Eric Maskin的理论是认为，如果一个非常集中的金融体系，那么银行很可能被一个坏企业给套住。

预算软约束的成因,后果及治理对策一、预算软约束的成因预算软约束是指组织或个人在预算制定和执行过程中存在的一种情况，即预算制定者无法强制执行预算，导致预算失去约束力。

预算软约束的成因可以从以下几个方面进行分析：1.1 预算制定不科学预算制定过程中，可能存在预算目标不清晰、指标设定不合理、数据不准确等问题，导致预算制定的基础不牢固，难以为预算执行提供有效的约束力。

1.2 预算执行不到位预算执行中，可能存在预算执行责任人不尽职、预算执行过程不透明、预算执行监管不到位等问题，导致预算执行无法有效约束组织或个人的行为。

1.3 利益冲突与信息不对称在预算制定和执行过程中，可能存在各方利益冲突，导致预算制定者和执行者之间存在信息不对称，从而降低了预算的约束力。

二、预算软约束的后果预算软约束的后果可能表现为以下几个方面：2.1 预算目标无法实现由于预算无法约束组织或个人的行为，导致预算制定的目标无法实现，影响组织或个人的发展和运营。

2.2 资金浪费与效益低下预算软约束可能导致资金的浪费和效益的低下，由于无法有效约束和监管资金的使用，可能出现不必要的支出和低效的投资，导致资源的浪费和效益的降低。

2.3 组织失去信任与动力预算软约束可能导致组织内部失去对预算的信任和执行的动力，预算无法发挥激励和约束的作用，可能影响组织的凝聚力和团队合作。

三、治理预算软约束的对策为了解决预算软约束问题，我们可以采取以下几个方面的对策：3.1 完善预算制定过程在预算制定过程中，要加强对预算目标的明确和指标的科学设定，确保预算制定的合理性和可行性。

同时，要加强数据的收集和分析，提高预算制定的信息支持和科学性。

3.2 健全预算执行机制建立健全的预算执行机制，明确预算执行的责任人和监管机构，加强对预算执行的监督和考核。

同时，要加强预算执行的透明度和公开度，提高预算执行的规范性和效率。

3.3 加强沟通与协调在预算制定和执行过程中，要加强各方的沟通与协调，减少利益冲突和信息不对称，提高预算制定者和执行者之间的信任和合作，从而增强预算的约束力。

政策性负担名词解释
政策性负担包括两方面的内容：战略性政策负担和社会性政策负担。

战略性政策负担是指国有企业，尤其是那些大型国有企业在传统的发展战略的指导思想下，投资于不具比较优势的资本相对密集的产业和产业区段所形成的负担。

由于这些企业所选择的产业、产业区段和技术是同经济的要素禀赋结构相违背的，它们会在高成本下从事生产，无法获得市场上的正常利润，这些企业便是缺乏“自生能力”的。

而社会性政策负担则是指由于国有企业承担过多的冗员和工人的退休、养老保险以及诸如职工医疗、子女教育等社会性职能所形成的负担。

社会性政策性负担同样会增加企业的生产成本，所以这些企业在自由竞争的市场上必然是要亏损的。

在存在信息不对称问题的情况下，这些政策性负担便会引发国有企业严重的道德风险和“预算软约束”问题。

政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束随着市场经济、市场化改革的逐步深入，政府在经济生活中的角色发生了深刻的变化，由原来的“大管家”到现在的“公正仲裁者”和“市场监管者”。

政府为了促进经济发展和调节市场秩序，在市场机制面前主要是通过政策性负担、道德风险等方式来引导市场的行为，而预算软约束则是政府行为的一种后续调整。

政策性负担，指的是政府对某些行业或者企业采取一些行政措施增加企业成本，或是以行政手段影响市场。

这种方式主要是通过税费、补贴、行政许可等方式来实现。

政策性负担是政府实现经济调节的重要手段，尤其是在跨地区、跨产业的重点行业和企业。

政策性负担可以对行业结构进行调整，可以在某些情况下实现市场效率和社会公正的平衡，但是政策性负担的乱用也会制约经济发展，产生不良影响。

道德风险，是指因为市场信息不对称而形成的一种不同于实体风险的风险类型，主要是指不良的信用行为和行业外部性。

道德风险通常附加于交易中，使得交易另一方发生不利的情况。

道德风险也是政府调节市场的重要方式之一，政府可以通过公共信息平台、信用监督、市场准入规则等方式来降低道德风险，进而增强市场的竞争效率。

预算软约束，是指政府在预算制度中面临的制约，主要体现在政府对预算限制的“软约束”和预算执行能力的“软约束”上，而这两种“软约束”又相互关联。

预算软约束是行政管理中比较常见的制度问题，一方面，它既充分考虑了财政纪律和财务可行性，另外一方面，它也具有一定的弹性和调整性，因此在政府行为中具有重要意义。

在政策性负担、道德风险和预算软约束的背景下，政府需要在市场化改革的进程中继续探索和完善其经济调节的手段、方法，从宏观层面提高市场经济运行的效率，从微观层面保护企业的合法权益，为市场的稳定和可持续发展奠定坚实的基础。

同时，政府应该加强对政策实施成效的监督和评估，做好“阳光预算”等公共预算管理工作，保证公共资源的合理使用，实现政府工作的透明化。

政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束主要思想现有的文献在预算软约束的制度原因上还存在许多争论。

虽然任何一个单一的理论都不可能解释预算软约束所有方面的现象，但是，对于前社会主义经济和转型经济来讲，预算软约束的形成却有一些共同的原因。

林颜夫及其合作者系统阐述了转型经济中企业的预算软约束问题的观点，认为“政策性负担”是形成企业预算软约束问题的根本原因，企业的的所有权性质与企业的预算算软约束之间并不存在必然然的因果关系。

进一步，林林毅夫及其合作者在一个更更大的框架下分析了为为什么转型经济中企业的““政策性负担”会普遍存在在：这些国家都不同程度地地推行着违背经济比较优势势的赶超战略。

下面我们以以中国的经济现实为例例，对上述思想进行简要的的归纳。

中国的国有企企业普遍承担着两方面的政政策性负担：战略性政策负负担和社会性政策负担。

战战略性政策负担，是指在传传统的赶超战略的影响下，投资于我国不具备比比较优势的资本密集型产业业或产业区段所形成的负担担；社会性政策负担，则是是指由于国有企业承担过多多的冗员和工人福利等社会会性职能而形成的负担。

这这两方面的政策性负担，都都是中国推行重工业优优先发展战略的内生产产物。

中国从20世纪纪50年代开始推行重工业业优先发展的战略，而中国国是一个资本非常稀缺、劳劳动力相对富余的经济，政政府想要优先发展的资本密密集型的重工业是同中国经经济的比较优势相背离的，，所以这些企业在开放、竞竞争的市场环境中缺乏自生生能力。

为了实施重工业优优先发展的战略，就必然会会对经济进行扭曲，人为压压低利率、汇率、原材料价价格等以降低重工业企业的的成本，并且给予市场垄断断地位以提高产品价格；但但是，当市场化改革开始后后，经济中的要素和产品价价格逐渐由市场竞争决定，，失去了这些补贴和保护以以后，重工业企业缺乏自生生能力，在开放竞争的市场场中无法盈利的问题就由隐隐性变为显性，这便形成了了国有企业的战略性政策负负担。

政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束（Policy burden, moral hazardand soft budget constraint）Policy burden, moral hazard and soft budget constraintPolicy burden, moral hazard and budget soft constraint, 2008-12-20, 15:09:58Main ideaThe existing literature still has a lot of arguments about the reasons for the soft budget constraint. Although no single theory can not explain the soft budget constraint of all aspects of the phenomenon, but for the former socialist economy and transition economy, the formation of soft budget constraints but there are some common reasons.Lin Yan Fu and its partners (199419971999) introduced the soft budget constraint of enterprises in transition economy point of view, that "the policy burden" is the fundamental cause of the problems of the soft budget constraint, soft budget constraint between the ownership of enterprises and there is no causal relationship. Further, Yifu Lin and his partners in a larger framework of why in transition economy enterprises "policy burden" will exist: these countries have varying degrees pursued against economic comparative advantage strategy. Here, we take the economic realities of China as an example and make a brief summary of the above ideas.China's state-owned enterprises generally bear two policy burdens: strategic, policy burden and social policy burden.Policy burden, refers to the influence of traditional overtaking strategy, investment in China has not formed a comparative advantage in capital intensive industry or industry sector burden; social policy burden, is refers to the state-owned enterprises undertake functions of employees and workers and other social welfare and the formation of multiple burden. The policy burden of these two aspects is an endogenous product of China's implementation of the priority development strategy of heavy industry.China started to carry out the heavy industry development strategy in 1950s, and Chinese is a very scarce capital, relative labor surplus economy, capital intensive government wants to give priority to the development of heavy industry is comparative advantage with Chinese economy deviates from, so that some enterprises lack of viability in the open and competitive market environment. In order to implement the strategy of heavy industry priority development, is the inevitable result of economic distortions, artificially low interest rates, exchange rates, raw material prices and other heavy industrial enterprises to reduce the cost, and give the market monopoly to increase product prices; however, when the market reform began, the economy factor and product prices gradually by market competition, after losing these subsidies and protection, the lack of viability of heavy industrial enterprises, can not be profitable in open competition in the market is from recessive into dominant which will form the strategic policy burden of state owned enterprises. On the other hand, due to the heavy industry is capital intensive industry, it is able to absorb the employment of the population is very small, but China is a labor surplus countries, in orderto solve the employment problem, the government will require state-owned enterprises to hire more staff, and assume some enterprises should not bear the social function of the on the formation of the state-owned enterprise social burden, it will undoubtedly increase the cost of state-owned enterprises.Have the responsibility of the government policy burden on enterprises caused by the loss, in order to let the government take the policy burden of state owned enterprises to survive, must advance the protection of state-owned enterprises or subsidies, but because of the information asymmetry, the government does not know the policy burden to the enterprise's loss is how much. Also it is hard to know a business loss is the policy burden caused by the enterprise itself or due to improper management or moral risk managers which, in the incentive compatibility condition, enterprise managers will all losses, including the loss of policy burden and moral risk caused by improper management the loss is attributed to the policy burden, the government cannot distinguish the two kinds of loss difference, but can not dodge the work of policy burden When a loss is made, the enterprise has to bear all the losses of the enterprise. After the loss of the enterprise, it also gives the subsidy afterwards, thus forming the soft budget constraint of the enterprise. Because of the possibility of ex post protection or subsidy, the moral hazard of enterprise manager is more important. Thus, in the case of asymmetric information and inconsistent incentives, the soft budget constraint caused by the policy burden will seriously affect the operating efficiency and incentive mechanism ofstate-owned enterprises.As long as enterprises bear the policy burden, it will lead to soft budget constraints. Whether the enterprise bears the policy burden or not has nothing to do with the form of ownership of the enterprise, so there is no necessary link between the soft budget constraint and the nature of the ownership of the enterprise. State owned enterprises such as Eastern Europe and Russia have not been stripped of their policy burden since their massive privatization,Moreover, privatization will increase the bargaining power of enterprises, so the problem of soft budget constraints has not only been solved, but the government subsidies have increased. These facts can be explained by the above theory.Policy burden and soft budget constraint of state owned enterprisesWe use L to represent the policy burden of state-owned enterprises bear, with profits of state-owned enterprises no PI said the policy burden, the enterprise policy burden after profit for the l. We use B PI Zi (L) said the enterprise policy burden l to government benefits, assuming general B (L) >l, which means that in addition to economic benefits, but also bring some benefits to the policy burden of other government, such as the establishment of the government officials can performance to show off the capital intensive advanced industries, or to increase employment and promote social stability. Suppose the government to managers of state-owned enterprises pay a fixed payment. W * here we consider when state-owned enterprises policy burdens, following the game between government and enterprise: a game: a period, before theproduction of state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises to choose whether to let the government bear the burden of policy during the period of two L; the managers in the state-owned enterprises, to observe whether the enterprise policy burdens of L, and then choose their effort for the production period; three, the production is completed, the government observed that the profits of state-owned enterprises, and then decide whether and how much subsidy subsidy.Several explanations are needed for the game. The first is the government subsidy policy, assuming that the government only in the case of loss of production enterprises will consider whether subsidies; and, if the government decides business subsidies, subsidies is just equal to business losses; in addition, the government's subsidy cost of theta s, including theta, (0, 1). That is to say, the government could only bear part of the cost of subsidies. The second is the question of pay managers, we assume that only when the production is completed, and to pay for production start-up capital and enterprise policy burden, before the payment of enterprise manager's compensation w *; that is to say, if in the period of three business losses and the government does not provide subsidies, managers will not get paid in this case, the closure of enterprises, the government's payment is 0. third is the information structure of the model, if there is policy burden, production increased by some uncertain factors, which will bring the problem of information asymmetry hypothesis in the production process of enterprises in (stage two), to the degree of government, which is not observed unable to control the entrepreneur. Finally, it is the government and enterprisemanagers to retain payment, if the government does not allow enterprises to bear the burden of policy, the government kept the payment pi *, reserve managers in the state-owned enterprises to pay 0. we assume at the same level of payment, the government tends to allow enterprises to bear the burden of policy, and the enterprise manager is always tend to make less effort. We use the backward method to solve the above, from which we can clearly see the policy burden is how to influence the production of state-owned enterprises, and take the policy burden of the enterprise is how to obtain the conditions of existence.First of all, the policy burden will affect the production efficiency of state-owned enterprises, which from the proposition 1, China has the choice of production managers can see. Many empirical studies have found that the state-owned enterprise's production efficiency is lower than that of private enterprises, the literature tends to be attributed to the public nature of the state-owned enterprises, but from the analysis here can see that state-owned enterprises policy burden is an important cause of the lack of efficiency of state-owned enterprises.Secondly, due to the policy burden, l will inevitably increase the cost of state-owned enterprises, so these enterprises do not have "viability" in a competitive market environment". A proposition tells us that the policy burden of state-owned enterprises to survive the conditions, can rely on two ways: one is to rely on government subsidies to help the loss of state-owned enterprises; the two is to maintain the monopoly of state-owned enterprises, restriction of entering the marketto obtain monopoly profits. In fact, from a broader concept, the maintenance of monopoly status of state-owned enterprises is actually a subsidy, which is a hidden subsidy for state-owned enterprises at the expense of social efficiency.Of a proposition for further analysis, we can get some of the following corollary: corollary one, when the state-owned enterprise policy burdens, enterprise managers choose q production yield is always less than the optimal output of Q *. A corollary the fact that under the condition of asymmetric information, moral hazard problem of policy burden will bring the enterprise manager the enterprise manager will reduce their effort, thereby reducing the state-owned enterprise production efficiency, increase social producer and consumer surplus losses. The policy burden is the cause of low efficiency of state-owned enterprises,Because it raises the moral hazard problem of state-owned enterprise managers. In fact, from the critical value proposition for B (L) and non l of this, we have seen the impact of policy burden on the efficiency of state-owned enterprises, because when the l< pi * corollary two, when the state-owned enterprise policy burdens, increase the degree of market competition will be more prone to loss of state owned enterprises, and increases the costs of government subsidies.Inference two, in fact, shows that the increase of market competition will make the budget soft constraints ofstate-owned enterprises explicit and increase the cost of government subsidies. The course of China economic reform can well reflect the conclusion of corollary two: before the reformand opening up, generally profitable state-owned enterprises, since the reform and opening up, the loss of small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises more and more big, largely because of their industry market entry threshold is low, a large number of non-public economy into the competition. Due to bear the burden of policy, and the resulting low efficiency of state-owned enterprises (corollary 1), so small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises loss also can hardly be avoided, and the increasing loss of government subsidies for these enterprises are also increasing, which brings the risk of fiscal and financial system. By corollary two, we can also understand why the central government will adopt a "large" strategy for the reform of state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises nationwide because almost all of the profits are created by large state-owned enterprises in the monopoly industry, small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises widespread losses, the government will have the motivation to get rid of the burden of small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises.Inference three, when the state-owned enterprise bears the policy burden and the loss, the lower the theta, the more the government subsidies, the output of state-owned enterprises deviate (lower), the greater the magnitude of the output.Inference three tells us that if the rate of government subsidy costs is lower, the larger the subsidy it can afford. The managers of state-owned enterprises have the incentive to expand their losses, so that companies can receive more subsidies from the government. Corollary three the conclusion reflects the characteristics of China Economy: the localgovernment has a strong incentive to intervene in financial institutions, the financial institutions to provide loans to the local state-owned enterprises, and once these loans become bad debts, the loan loss costs are mostly borne by the central government; the operators of state-owned commercial Chinese the bank is also reflected, since the reform of commercial banks in 1994, the state-owned commercial banks by the central government intervention has become less and less, and they are mainly from the local government intervention. We can infer from corollary three, when the market competition degree is high enough, if strict financial policy, local government fiscal or financial constraints more hard (theta is higher), then the budget constraints of local state-owned enterprises is hard (get less subsidies), the higher the efficiency of state-owned enterprises.Inference four, when state-owned enterprises bear the policy burden, if the B (L) is bigger, the output of the state-owned enterprises deviates (lower), the magnitude of the optimal output is greater.Inference four and inference are similar in three ways, but they apply more widely (do not require state owned enterprises to lose money). If more benefits from the government policy burden from the enterprise, the government is willing to pay the subsidy amount is bigger, so the state-owned enterprise managers have an incentive to less effort to share the government from the policy burden of goodExplanation of realistic problems and policy suggestionNext, we will use the model results to analyze some realistic problems in socialism and transitional economy. First of all, why, in the era of planned economy, enterprises basically do not have any production autonomy? When the enterprise undertakes the policy burden, enterprise managerial discretion completely will bring serious moral hazard, and deprived of the sovereignty of the enterprise, such as the use of means of production quotas, is a suboptimal institutional arrangement, it can reduce the efficiency loss under certain conditions, to ensure the efforts of enterprises the manager of the lowest. Second, why, in the process of China's state-owned enterprises reform, the government subsidies to state-owned enterprises experienced a process from financial subsidies to bank loans, and then to the stock market financing In fact, for the government, this is because finance is the most hard on the financial constraints of the government, bank loans, financial constraints and stock market financing the most soft (i.e., theta minimum) is the government finance to take their money to subsidies, while bank lending is with other people's money subsidies, while the stock market financing. And equity financing constraint than debt financing more flexible. Third, why is the government offering more subsidies to firms after Russia's massive privatization of state-owned enterprises? If private enterprises bear the policy burden, private enterprises receive more subsidies from the government than state-owned enterprises,This can explain the phenomenon of Russia's economy. Then why does the Russian government not divest the policy burden of the enterprises after privatization? This is because in the "Big Bang" type of reform measures, the policy burden of theenterprise has not been stripped, or do not have the conditions to divest enterprise policy burden.Finally, we discuss the policy implications of the above model results. In the economic transition from plan economy to market economy, and inevitable market competition more intense, in this case, the policy burden of enterprises will inevitably bring about the issue of soft budget constraint, so enterprises, to the soft budget constraint hardening of enterprise must peel the policy burden of enterprises. But how to divest the enterprise's policy burden? From the above analysis we can see that the key from two aspects: one is to reduce the enterprise policy burden to the government to bring the benefits of B (L), or increase the government to allow enterprises to take the policy burden cost. B (L) in our model is exogenous, but obviously, B (L) size is also affected by external factors, such as economic system, if sufficient employment or social security system is perfect, so the necessity for the government to allow enterprises to maintain a large number of redundant personnel is reduced, the B (L at the same time) will be relatively small, if the whole society know to catch up with the price, the government gave up to catch up with the idea, then B (L) will decrease.Two is the financial constraint to hardened government, implementation relatively tight financial and fiscal policies of the government behavior, the purpose is to let the government bear the full cost of its subsidies to enterprises (0 1), for example, reduce government intervention in the financial system, the commercial financial institutions to become independent, the government subsidy of state-owned enterprisestool. In addition, the competitive pressures brought by the entry of WTO into the financial system also contribute to the commercial reform of the financial system.When has two above conditions, the government will have the enthusiasm to eliminate the policy burden of enterprises, but once the policy burden eliminated, the government is no longer on the loss of the enterprise responsibility, enterprise budget constraints also can be hardened, can improve the economic efficiency. From the above analysis, we can see why privatization in Russia without hardening budget constraints of enterprises, because it is not stripped of the policy burden of the enterprise, will only make the privatization of government subsidies increased financial pressure, leading to serious inflation and financial risks.Policy burden is the fundamental reasons existing in the enterprise in the transition countries of soft budget constraints, due to the government's strategy, so that our country to cancel the soft budget constraint of existing enterprises, and to avoid the soft budget constraint of new enterprises, must first give up the idea of catching up. Secondly, the right policy should be taken to remove the policy burden borne by state-owned enterprises. In the short term, is to accelerate the establishment of social security system, accelerate the development of labor-intensive small and medium-sized enterprises, to social policy to reduce the burden of stripping enterprise for the government and society to bring pressure; on the other hand, is to reduce government intervention in financial institutions and the financial system, the financial constraints of the government to reducethe risk of atherosclerosis. The financial system, and to create conditions for capital intensive enterprises excessive use of international capital or converting to labor intensive industry to solve the problem of viability of state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises to eliminate strategic policy burden.conclusionUnder the framework of a dynamic game, this paper modeled the theory of the policy burden and the soft budget constraint of Yifu Lin and its partners (1994, 1997 and 1999). The main conclusions of the article include: information asymmetry, incentive incompatibility, policy burden will inevitably lead to the moral hazard problem of enterprises, reduce the efficiency of the enterprise; further, if the degree of market competition is sufficient, policy burden will lead to soft budget constraints of enterprises, that is to say, in such a situation the former is the sufficient condition of the latter; not the public ownership of the soft budget constraint and the enterprise, contrary to the enterprise policy burden under the condition of private enterprise than state-owned enterprises are more prone to soft budget constraint, and the incentive to the government to more subsidies; when the state-owned enterprise policy burdens, the production manager ofstate-owned enterprises deprived of autonomy, such as production quotas, is often a suboptimal system arrangement, which explains why the country before the reform The reasons for the ownership of the enterprise, the factory director and the manager, as well as the ownership of the wealth, material, production, supply and marketing have been deprived. Further,in the logic framework of this paper we put forward the corresponding policy recommendations: in the process of economic transition, the degree of market deepening, to harden the soft budget constraint of state-owned enterprises, it must be the policy burden stripping of state-owned enterprises,To divest the policy burden of state-owned enterprises, we must abandon the idea of catching up, reduce the benefits of the government from the policy burden of state-owned enterprises, and harden the financial constraints of the government itself.。