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英语人力资源管理50题1. In a company, the process of identifying and attracting potential employees is called _____.A. recruitmentB. selectionC. trainingD. development答案：A。
本题考查人力资源管理的基本概念。
选项A“recruitment”意为招聘，指识别和吸引潜在员工的过程，符合题意。
选项B“selection”指选拔，侧重于从候选人中挑选合适的人员。
选项C“training”是培训，针对已入职员工提升技能。
选项D“development”是发展，通常指员工在职业上的长期发展规划。
2. The department responsible for managing employees' performance and providing feedback is _____.A. HRB. FinanceC. MarketingD. Operations答案：A。
在公司中，负责管理员工绩效并提供反馈的部门通常是人力资源部门（HR）。
选项B“Finance”是财务部门，主要处理财务相关事务。
选项C“Marketing”是市场营销部门，专注于市场推广和销售。
选项D“Operations”是运营部门，负责日常业务运营。
3. The term used to describe the knowledge, skills, and abilities that an employee brings to a job is _____.A. job descriptionB. job specificationC. competencyD. Workload答案：C。
“Competency”指的是员工带到工作中的知识、技能和能力。
选项A“job description”是工作描述，详细说明了工作的职责和任务。
产业组织学英语Industrial Organization: An OverviewIndustrial organization is a branch of economics that focuses on the study of how firms and industries are organized and how they interact with each other in the marketplace. It examines the behavior of firms, market structure, and the effects of government policies on industry performance.One of the key concepts in industrial organization is market structure. Market structure refers to the characteristics of a market, such as the number and size of firms, barriers to entry, product differentiation, and the degree of competition. There are four main types of market structures: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly.Perfect competition is characterized by a large number of small firms that produce identical products. There are no barriers to entry or exit in this type of market structure, and firms are price takers. Monopolistic competition is similar to perfect competition but with product differentiation. Firms in monopolistic competition have some control over price due to product differentiation.Oligopoly is characterized by a small number of large firms that dominate the market. These firms have significant market power and can influence prices. Collusion between firmsis common in oligopolistic markets, leading to higher prices and reduced consumer welfare.Monopoly occurs when there is only one firm in the market with no close substitutes for its product. Monopolies have complete control over price and can earn abnormal profits.Industrial organization also examines firm behavior within these market structures. It looks at how firms make decisions regarding pricing, output levels, advertising, research and development (R&D), and entry or exit from markets. Firms aim to maximize their profits by considering factors such as costs, demand conditions, competitive pressures, and government ernment policies play a crucial role in shaping industry performance. Industrial organization analyzes how government interventions such as antitrust laws, regulations on mergers and acquisitions, intellectual property rights protection, subsidies or taxes affect firm behavior and industry outcomes. These policies aim to promote competition, prevent market power abuse, and enhance consumer welfare.In conclusion, industrial organization is a field of study that examines how firms and industries are organized and how they interact in the marketplace. It analyzes market structure, firm behavior, and the effects of government policies on industry performance. By understanding these dynamics, policymakers and businesses can make informed decisions to promote competition, innovation, and economic growth.。
经济学原理中对于产业区的英文表达Industrial clusters, a significant concept in economics, refer to geographical concentrations of interrelated businesses, suppliers, and institutions in a particular industry. These clusters are often formed due to the synergies created by proximity, specialization, and knowledge sharing among the participating entities. The economic benefits of industrial clusters are numerous, ranging from cost savings and efficiency gains toinnovation and competitiveness enhancement.The formation of industrial clusters is typicallydriven by several factors. One of the key drivers is the availability of resources and infrastructure. Industries tend to cluster in regions that offer abundant natural resources, skilled labor, and well-developed infrastructure. For instance, the automotive industry often clusters around areas with a strong supply of steel, rubber, and other raw materials, as well as a skilled workforce.Another important factor is the presence of supporting institutions and networks. These can include research institutions, universities, trade associations, andgovernment agencies that provide expertise, funding, and other support to the industry. The existence of such institutions and networks fosters collaboration and knowledge sharing among businesses, leading to the creation of a vibrant and innovative industrial ecosystem.The economic benefits of industrial clusters arediverse and significant. Firstly, clusters promote cost savings and efficiency gains by enabling businesses toshare resources, infrastructure, and knowledge. Thisreduces operational costs and enhances productivity, making the entire cluster more competitive.Secondly, industrial clusters foster innovation. The proximity of businesses and institutions within a cluster allows for the easy exchange of ideas, technologies, and best practices. This fosters a culture of innovation and experimentation, leading to the development of new products, processes, and services.Thirdly, clusters enhance the competitiveness of the region's economy. By attracting businesses, investors, and talent, clusters contribute to economic growth and jobcreation. They also raise the profile of the region, making it more attractive to external investors and partners.Moreover, industrial clusters contribute to the resilience and adaptability of the economy. In times of economic downturn or disruption, clusters can provide a buffer by pooling resources and expertise to address challenges and seize new opportunities.However, it's worth noting that the formation and sustenance of industrial clusters are not without challenges. Issues such as competition for resources, environmental impacts, and governance structures can arise within clusters. Therefore, it's crucial for policymakers and stakeholders to work closely to address these challenges and ensure the sustainable development of clusters.In conclusion, industrial clusters play a pivotal role in the economic development and competitiveness of regions. By leveraging the synergies created by proximity, specialization, and knowledge sharing, clusters enable businesses to achieve cost savings, efficiency gains, and innovation. As such, policymakers and stakeholders shouldprioritize the creation and nurturing of industrialclusters to promote economic growth and prosperity.**经济学中的产业区：其形成与影响的视角**产业区是经济学中的一个重要概念，指的是特定行业内相互关联的企业、供应商和机构在地理上的集中。
（2011届）本科毕业设计（论文）外文翻译原文：BEFORE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN A FEDERALSTRUCTURE: STATEINDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATESConsidering stateindustrial policyefforts directly, let me say something about the scope and limits of the national initiatives that currently frame them. I abstract initially from fiscal concerns --ie., whether there is any money to do that which is proposed -- and only look at content.THE CLINTONIAN VIEW OF INDUSTRIAL POLICYThe "new Democrats" of the Clinton administration came to power on the promise of delivering an economic policy different from the "tax and spend and regulate" policies alleged of old-style Democrats. Whether they can deliver on that promise in a way that preserves discernible differences between Democratic and Republican economic policy is anyone's guess. The purported distinction from past policies on which this promise rests goes something like this.Under "old" Democratic views, direct government regulation of prices and other conditions of market entry, the use of government purchasing power to subsidize favored economic practices, the redistribution of income on the basis of need rather than contribution, and other efforts to alter the terms and conditions of economic reward were acceptable means of "promoting the general welfare." The "new" Democratic view holds that such policies are generally pointless, self-defeating, or malign. They generate excessive bureaucracies, inappropriately substitute government judgment for market judgment, are insufficiently attentive to labor supply effects, or otherwise presume greater government capacity to shape the economy than is warranted.Of the many reasons offered for this change of view, the most basic concerns afundamental change in thestructureof the U.S. economy itself.A generation ago, the story goes, the U.S. operated as an essentially closed domestic system. In that context, effective government control of the domestic economy was indeed possible.Now, however, the U.S. operates in a truly international economic system, characterized by the relatively free flow of capital and goods across national borders. In this world, government can no longer directly determine--a fortiori not with the command-and-control regulation and macro-economic policy tools available from old -- the character of production within its borders, largely because the very notion of economic "borders" is meaningless.This view, it is emphasized, does not amount to a prescription for laissez faire. The Clintonians, like the Dukakisites before them, believe that government has an important role to play in securing "good jobs at good wages." That role, however, is both diminished and changed by the new environment. Instead of vainly trying to constrain capital's choices in economic development, government should use its power to improve the factors of production at capital's disposal. It should invest in physical infrastructure, diffuse technology, and improve the country's human capital base. This, it is hoped, will make it an attractive site for investment by firms offering good jobs -- in particular, those roving multinationals that locate their best jobs in rich nations even as they source much production to poor ones. And that, it is thought, is about as much as it is reasonable to hope for.Completing this story is a certain description of the current character of economic activity within the U.S. itself.On this description, unrelenting pressures (again, heavily, international ones) are forcing a restructuring of U.S. firms away from Taylorist production and toward "high performance" forms of work organization engaged in "quality competition." As used in contemporary debates, "high performance" organization roughly denotes the most complete and flexible deployment of firm resources to advance continuous innovation. "Quality competition" denotes a market strategy emphasizing non-price product or service features -- variety, customization, performance, timeliness in delivery, attendant servicing of customers -- as well as cost. Under a regime of quality competition,products and services are essentially all viewed as capital goods. Customers assess their price/performance ratio, rather than price alone.In a world economy densely populated by countries and firms paying a fraction of U.S. wages, such a quality strategy is essential to preserving living standards. After all, unless customers are getting a quality premium, they will not be willing to absorb "premium" labor costs. But, again, according to the Clintonian view, firms are already moving in the high-performance direction -- and, it is assumed, paying labor a premium as they do so. There exists a happy congruence between what firms find they need to do to be profitable and what the society needs to secure the general welfare.Government's role in facilitating the high performance transition at home is equivalent to what is recommended for making the U.S. an internationally attractive investment site -- education, technology diffusion, modernized infrastructure. High performance work organization -- characterized by flexible automation, on-line quality control, multi-skilled work groups, flattened management hierarchies, increased cross-department communication, greater autonomy for front-line production workers in all manner of decisions -- requires workers with high and broad skills, which recommends greater efforts in education and training. To meet demand for high-performance supplier chains, government should help diffuse technology be diffused to those small and medium-sized enterprises ("foundation firms") currently frozen out of capital markets. And to satisfy demand for modern logistics, it needs to revamp its rotting infrastructure.WHAT IS WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?What are we to make of all this as a description of the world, and of appropriate policy? What I make of it is that it is seriously wrongheaded. To be sure, international competition is real, and the tasks of social management of the economy have importantly changed. To be sure, something like "quality competition" is necessary to defending living standards in the United States. And, to be sure,industrial restructuring of the right sort will require better education, more technology diffusion, and the repair and modernization of our infrastructure. But the way in which any ofthese tasks will need to be discharged, the degree to which firms will need to be pressured to accomplish them, and whether their accomplishment alone exhausts the list of needed or possible interventions depends on one's analysis of the options available to government, and the actual facts of current restructuring in the United States. And on both these fronts I think the Clintonians are mistaken.For starters, the picture of a more or less complete internationalization of the U.S. economy is overdrawn. To believe the Clintonians, the economy is now one in which all factors move freely across borders, except those sunk in the ground or attached directly to human beings; the institutional infrastructure of production (labor market institutions, producer associations, community ties of various stripes and kinds) is largely irrelevant to the quality of production; and government has no hard ground on which to stand in imposing any social control over the economy. The real economy, however, is one in which most goods and services are still not directly exposed to international competition; it is one in which quality competition is critically contingent on immobile institutional supports (providing training and integrated social services, facilitating firm innovation and learning, enabling and encouraging producers to live up to international quality standards, attaching to this support a variety of antecedent conditions on its receipt); and it is one in which government purchasing power alone provides a powerful weapon to shape the path of development. This reality suggests that the room for maneuver and guidance is far greater than the Clintonians would have us believe. Government need not be entirely timid.And the government had better not be timid, since the path of current economic restructuring in the U.S. is not nearly as happy as the Clintonians like to think.Most U.S. firms are not responding to competitive pressures by going the "high-wage, high-performance" route, but by either "sweating" labor under conditions of very low investment in training and new technology, or by advancing a species of "lean commodity production" that uses advanced quality and production cost-cutting tactics, but does not share the resulting productivity gains with labor. This pattern of response is what explains the last twenty years of data on wage decline, wage depressionamong the fastest growing segments of the economy, and the weak or negative relation, on a firm and sectoral basis, between productivity growth and wages. Far from a happy congruence between what is needed for profitability and what is needed for general welfare, "good" firms are losing out to "bad" firms pursuing tactics which, if generalized, will be (already have been) disastrous for living standards.What the U.S. needs most to do in this context is foreclose the low-wage option on restructuring. With a stick of direct labor market and production regulation, and a carrot of government purchases and assistance awarded those firms moving in the desired direction, it needs to push restructuring in a direction other than the one it now "naturally" takes. This need not involve government substitution of its judgment for that of firms on how results are best achieved. Nor must it take the form of "picking winners and losers" by industry group. However, it will require setting social standards of performance for firms and using government power to enforce them. Regrettably, this is just what the administration appears unwilling to do. One consequence of this unwillingness will be a continuation of present trends toward declining living standards and increased inequality. A more immediate consequence is that even the administration's narrower agenda of industry assistance will not enjoy broad business support, and will have limited effect. That agenda assumes an industry demand for higher quality factors -- in particular, human capital -- that in most cases does not exist. Advancing it risks having all the production and labor market effects of pushing on a string.HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, AND HARD LIBERALISMFinally, hard budget constraints and an exceptionally "liberal" institutional terrain create barriers to effective government intervention -- even of the narrower kind favored by the Clintonians.To take only one example, the administration had made clear its interest in devising a "school to work" transition system in the U.S. heavily modeled on German apprenticeship. But the amounts of money being talked about are trivial. To put this in perspective, German apprentices each cost employers about $4,500 a year on average (in some areas of manufacturing, the costs is several times this), in what are typically four year programs of "dual" workplace-schoolinstruction.Were a German apprenticeship system extended to the U.S., with the sixty-five percent rate of coverage for the total high school cohort claimed in Germany, it would cost U.S. employers about thirty-two billion dollars annually.No one seriously believes that anything approaching this effort will be made in the U.S. anytime soon on behalf of young front-line workers.Even if the money were available, however, a variety of institutional supports on which the German system relies are not available here. In addition to high schools delivering young adults with sound knowledge tested at national standards (something that it would be possible to do something about, albeit also costly), the German system relies on several such institutional supports. One is a dense network of more or less obligatory business association. This assures requisite takeup rates among business of young apprentices and serves to generalize standards across firms. A second is a fairly "patient" relationship between banks and industry. This enables firms to invest in the skills of the future workhorse even during recession. A third is an incredibly highly regulated youth labor market. This makes it possible to set trainee allowances low, which makes training itself affordable to firms. It requires, however, limiting the availability of non-apprentice employment. A fourth, indispensable both to the provision and monitoring of training, is competent and nearly universal worker representation (in the forms of works councils), and a powerful labor movement able to regulate training-compensation trade-offs and to push forindustrial upgrading society-wide. Fifth and finally, as that which apprenticeship both feeds and relies on, is anindustrial culture in which firms are already organized in ways that take advantage of advanced skills. This is what pulls the string.None of this is available in the United States. All of it would be powerfully resisted if anyone tried to build it. And in no case can it be built overnight. This lends an air of unreality to the bold claims being made for youth apprenticeship, but not that program alone. There are similar budget constraints, and similar institutional gaps, in virtually all the proposed areas of Clintonian intervention. And so I am skeptical of it going very far. So much, however, for the national scene.Source:Rogers, Joel. Canada -- United States Law Journal, 1993, V ol. 19, p175, 9p译文：工业政策在一个联邦结构:国家产业政策的美国在考虑国家产业政策直接努力,让我谈谈的范围和限制的国家行动,目前框架。
Chapter One (第一章)International Economics Is Different(国际经济学是一门独特的学科)1. Four Controversies (四个有争议的事件)（1）Imports of Automobile Tires （汽车轮胎的进口）（2）Immigration （移民）（3）China′s Exchange Rate (中国的汇率)（4）Global Financial and Economic Crisis （全球金融和经济危机）2.Economics and the nation-state（经济学和国家政府）Nations are sovereign (国家是主权独立的)Nobody is in charge of the whole world economy(没有人可以掌控整个世界经济)Nations have their separate policies(国家拥有独立的政策)（1）Factor mobility（要素流动性）（2）Different fiscal policies（不同的财政政策）（3）Different moneys（不同的货币）Part One: The Theory of International Trade(第一篇：国际贸易理论第二章至第七章)Chapter Two (第二章)The basic theory using demand and supply（需求与供给的基本理论）1.Four Key Questions About International Trade(贸易的四个重要问题)2.Demand and supply(需求与供给)(1)Demand and Consumer surplus（需求与消费者剩余）①Price of elasticity of demand（需求价格弹性）The percent change in quantity demanded of a product caused by a one percent increase in the price of this product（产品价格上升一个百分点所引起的该产品需求数量的百分比变化）注意：需求曲线越平坦，说明越具有价格弹性②Consumer surplus（消费者剩余）The difference between the value that consumers place on the units of the product that they buy and the payment that they make to obtain these units.（消费者在每单位产品上愿意支付的价格与获得这些产品实际支付的价格之间的差额）（2）Supply and producer surplus(供给与生产者剩余)①Price of elasticity of supply（P20）②Supply surplus (figure 2.1)(P22)3. Two national markets and the opening of trade（两国的市场与贸易的开展）（1）Free Trade Equilibrium （自由贸易均衡）What will happen when US trade with the rest of country?Buy low and sell high ----- arbitrage（套利）Note: one –dollar, one-vote metric (一元一票制)（2）Which country gains more?（哪个国家获益更多）The country that experiences the larger price change has a larger value of the net gains from trade (经历较大价格变化的国家从贸易中获得较大的净收益)Chapter Three (第三章)Why Everybody Trades：Comparative Advantage(为什么开展贸易：比较优势)1. Adam smith′s theory of absolute advantage （斯密的绝对优势理论）（1）Mercantilism （重商主义）（P35）（2）The theory of absolute advantageEvery country will focus on producing what it does best and exports it。
大众经济学中的英文单词adverse selection 逆向选择Africa 非洲average incomes 平均收入ecological collapse 生态崩溃aggregates 总和，综合agreements 协议breaking 违背community 社区enforcement 强制执行human rights 人权market-community mediation 市场和社区之间的调解tied engagements 捆绑的约定agriculture 农业gender discrimination in 性别歧视在incomes 收入labour 劳动risks 风险subsidies 补贴subsistence 生存anonymity principle 匿名原则anti-trust laws 反托拉斯法Argentina 阿根廷Aristotle 亚里士多德Australia 澳大利亚authoritarianism 专制主义Bangladesh 孟加拉国bankruptcy 破产banks 银行bargaining 议价。
讨价还价，谈判barter 物物交换beliefs 信任，信念bifurcations 分歧点biomass-based economies 自然经济birth control 节育borrowing 借贷Brazil 巴西breach if contract 违约bribery 贿赂capital assets 资产资产carbon emissions 碳氧化物排放Central American 中美洲central planning 中央计划children 子女mortality rates 死亡率resources transferred to 转移到……的资源citizenship 公民身份civil rights 公民权利climate change 气候变化collective action 集体行动colonization 殖民commondities 物品，商品service 服务communities 社区agricultural risks 农业风险authoritarianism 专制主义common resources 共有资源conformity 遵从性failure 失灵infrastructure 基础设施networks 人际网络competitive equilibrium 竞争均衡competitiveness 竞争性conformism 遵从行为consensus principle 一致性原则constituents 成分consumption 消费climate change 气候变化discount rate 贴现率equalize 使均等marginal costs 边际成本contingent commodity 应急商品contingent markets 应急市场employment 雇佣forward markets 期货市场legal 法律的social 社会的cooperation 合作copyright 版权corporations 公司corruption 腐败cost of living 生活成本country-specific idiosyncrasies 国家独有的特质CPRs common property resources 共有财产资源credit 信贷critical mass 临界规模cronyism 任人唯亲culture 文化currency crashes 货币崩溃dated commodities 时间商品debt 债务deflation 通货紧缩deforestation 森林砍伐demand curve 需求曲线democracy 民主as a merit good 作为一种公益品protection of 保护voting rules 投票规则demographic transitions 人口转变discount rates 贴现率discoveries and inventions 发现与发明dividends 红利division of labour 劳动分工ecological services 生态服务economic history 经济史economies of scale 规模经济education 教育efficient 效率enforcement 强制执行external 外部的government 政府mutual 共同的social norms 社会规范emgagements 参与，约定Enlightenment 启蒙运动environment 环境climate change 气候变化ecological stress 生态压力population growth 人口增长trade expansion 贸易扩张equilibrium 均衡communitarian 社区合作的competitive 竞争的democratic 民主的reproductive 生育的social 社会的Ethiopia 埃塞俄比亚ethnic networks 种族的人际网络export subsidies 出口补贴externalities 外部性female employment 女性就业female infanticide 扼杀女婴fertility 生育financial institutions 金融机构firms 企业ideal markets 理想市场monopolist 垄断者moral hazard 道德风险food distribution 食物分配forward markets 期货市场France 法国free trade 自由贸易free-rider problem 搭便车问题freedom 自由funeral expenses 葬礼的开销game theory 博弈论GDP gross domestic productenforcement expenditure 执行费用支出productive base 生产基础rich-poor gap 贫富差距sustainable development 可持续发展trust 信任gender inequality 性别不平等Germany 德国currency crashes 货币崩溃unemployment rate 失业率globalization 全球化allocation of 配置dated 时间的demand for 对……的需求determinants 决定因素distribution of 分配durable 耐用的externalities 外部性firms 企业ideal markets 理想市场merit 公益的open access 开放获得outcomes 结果ownership 所有权private 私人的governance 治理allocation of resources 资源配置corruption 腐败emergency aid 紧急援助function 功能macroeconomic 宏观经济稳定social cost-benefit analysis 社会成本收益分析trade expansion 贸易扩张govenment bonds 政府债券Great Depression 大萧条greenhouse gases 温室气体grim strategy 冷酷策略happiness levels 幸福水平HDI 人类发展指数 Human Development Index health care 健康保障historical narratives 史实性叙述home sales 房产销售households 家庭common property resources 共有财产资源conformity 遵从性dysfunctional 运转不良的external enforcement 外部的强制的执行externalities 外部性food allocation 食物分配gender inequlity 性别不平等ideal markets 理想市场incomes 收入money 货币mutual affection 相互之间的感情mutual enforcement 共同的强制执行transactions 交易wealth distribution 财富分配human capital 人力成本human rights 人权ideal markets 理想市场ideas 理念immigration 入境移民incentives 激励inclusive investment 总括投资inclusive wealth 总括财富income 收入happiness levels 幸福水平households 家庭lifetime flow of 一生流量India 印度CPRs 共有财产资源population census 人口普查sustainable development 可持续发展women's health 妇女健康individual well-being 个人福祉industrial revolution 工业革命inflation 通货膨胀information 信息infrastructure 基础设施institutions 制度，机构as productive base 作为生产基础enforcement 强制执行failure 失灵regulation of CPRs 共有财产资源的规章insurance 保险interest rates 利率intergenerational issues 有跨时代意义的话题international 国际贸易investment 投资involuntary unemployment 非自愿失业IPCC International Panel on Climate Change 政府气候变化专门委员会joint stock companies股份公司kinship 血缘亲族knowledge 知识labour force 劳动力land 土地Latin American 拉丁美洲Law of Large Numbers 大数定律legal contracts 法律合同lending 贷出life expectancy at birth 出生时的预期寿命limited liability companies 有限责任literacy 识字，读写能力living standards 生活水平logging industry 采伐行业long-term relationships 长期（合作）关系macroeconomics 宏观经济学manufactured capital 制造资本marginal cost of production 边际生产成本markets 市场insurance 保险interdependent 相互依赖的natural resources 自然资源prices 价格single 单一的socialism 社会主义wealth inequlities 财富不均mathematical models 数学模型media 媒体merit goods 公益品migration 移居models 模型monopoly 垄断moral hazard 道德商品mortgages 抵押mutual affection 相互之间的感情Nash equilibrium 纳什均衡national defence 国家防御natural capital 自然资本natural resources 自然资源local commons 本地公产scarcity 稀缺sustainability 可持续发展性trade expansion 贸易扩张Nepal 尼泊尔networks 网络neutrality principle 中立原则Nigeria 尼日利亚non-cooperation 不合作oligopoly 寡头垄断open access commodities 开放获得的商品opportunity 机会成本Pakistan 巴基斯坦partnerships 合作关系patents 专利patron-client relationship 主雇制peer review 同行审阅pensions 养老金performance bonuses 绩效奖金personal relationships 人际关系piece rates 计件工资plurality runoff 排序复选制policy evaluation 政策评估policy prescriptions 政策评估political instability 政治上的不稳定pollutants 污染物population census 人口普查population growth 人口增长poverty 贫困predictions 预测prices 价格resource scarcity 资源稀缺shadow 影子spot 现货private goods 私人品pricatization 私有化productive base 生产基础property rights 产权pro-social disposition 亲社会倾向public goods 公共品free-rider problem 搭便车问题knowledge 知识stated preferences 陈述偏好public health 公共卫生public sphere 公共领域rank-order rule 排名顺序规则retional beliefs 理性信任reciprocity 互惠regulation 规章religious faith 宗教信仰research and development (R&D)研究和开发（研发）revealed preferences 显示偏好rich/poor nations富裕/贫穷国家risk 风险rule of law 法治rule of priority 优先原则rural population 农村人口savings 储蓄science 科学shadow prices 影子价格shares 股份simple majority rule 简单多数规则Singapore 新加坡skills 技能，技术slumps 衰退Smith，Adam 亚当斯密social capital 社会资本social contracts 社会契约social cost-benefit analysis 社会成本收益分析social equilibria 社会均衡social norms 社会规范gender inequality 性别不平等social productivity 社会生产力social well-being 社会福祉individual well-being 个人福祉merit goods 公益品revealed and stated preferences 显示偏好和陈述偏好socially influential behaviour 社会性影响行为South East Asia 东南亚specialization 专业化spot prices 现货价格states 国家政权enforcement 强制执行ideal role of the 理想角色legal tender 法定货币Minimal 最小的stated preferences 陈述偏好stock market 股票市场stock options 股票期权sub-Saharan Africa 非洲撒哈拉沙漠以南地区living standards 生活水平sustainable development 可持续发展subsidies 补贴subsistence farming 生存农业supply curves 供给曲线sustainable development 可持续发展taxation 税收technological progress 技术进步terrorism 恐怖主义tertiary education 高等教育TFR（total fertility rate）总生育率thrift 节俭tipping points 引爆点total factor productivity 全要素生产率transactions 交易cheques 支票verifiable 可认定的transitivity principle 传递性原则transport networks 交通运输网络trust 信任culture 文化exteral enforcement 外部的强制执行long-term relationships 长期合作关系mutual affection 相互之间的感情mutual enforcement 共同的强制执行personal relationships 人际关系property rights 产权UNDP（United Nations Development Programme）联合国开发计划署unemployment 失业United Kingdom 英国sustainable development 可持续发展total factor productivity 全要素生产率unemployment rate 失业率United States 美国average incomes 平均收入bankruptcy rates 破产率Congressional voting outcomes 国会投票结果legal profession 法律行业living standards 生活水平sustainable development 可持续发展unemployment 失业率universities 大学variables 变量Venezuela 委内瑞拉virtuous/vicious cycles 良性/恶性循环voting rules 投票规则wages 工资income 收入wealth 财富distribution 分配inclusive 总括的transfer 转移working capital 流动资本World Bank 世界银行World Values Survey 世界价值观调查adverse selection 逆向选择Africa 非洲average incomes 平均收入ecological collapse 生态崩溃aggregates 总和，综合agreements 协议breaking 违背community 社区enforcement 强制执行human rights 人权market-community mediation 市场和社区之间的调解tied engagements 捆绑的约定agriculture 农业gender discrimination in 性别歧视在incomes 收入labour 劳动risks 风险subsidies 补贴subsistence 生存anonymity principle 匿名原则anti-trust laws 反托拉斯法Argentina 阿根廷Aristotle 亚里士多德Australia 澳大利亚authoritarianism 专制主义Bangladesh 孟加拉国bankruptcy 破产banks 银行bargaining 议价。
分享返回分享首页»分享经济学专业英语词汇整理来源：金相彬S.K.的日志1、Ability-to-pay principle（of taxation）（税收的）支付能力原则按照纳税人支付能力确定纳税负担的原则。
纳税人支付能力依据其收人或财富来衡量。
这一原则并不说明某经济状况较好的人到底该比别人多负担多少。
2、Absolute advantage 绝对优势如果一个国家用一单位资源生产的某种产品比另一个国家多，那么，这个国家在这种产品的生产上与另一国相比就具有绝对优势。
3、Accelerator principle 加速原理解释产出率变动同方向地引致投资需求变动的理论。
4、Actual, cyclical, and structural budget 实际预算、周期预算和结构预算实际预算的赤字或盈余指的是某年份实际记录的赤字或盈余。
实际预算可划分成结构预算和周期预算。
结构预算假定经济在潜在产出水平上运行，并据此测算该经济条件下的政府税入、支出和赤字等指标。
周期预算基于所预测的商业周期（及其经济波动）对预算的影响。
5、Adaptive expectations 适应性预期见预期（expectations）。
6、Adjustable peg 可调整钉住一种（固定）汇率制度。
在该制度下，各国货币对其他货币保持一种固定的或曰"钉住的"汇率。
当某些基本因素发生变动、原先汇率失去合理依据的时候，这种汇率便不时地趋于凋整。
在1944-1971年期间，世界各主要货币都普遍实行这种制度，称为"布雷顿森林体系"。
7、Administered（or inflexible）prices 管理（或非浮动）价格特指某类价格的术语。
按照有关规定，这类价格在某一段时间内、在若干种交易中能够维持不变。
（见价格浮动 price flexibility）8、Adverse choice/selection 逆向选择一种市场不灵。
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11.Amihud, Yakov, Jesper C. Bent, and Haim Mendelson, 1992, “Further Evidence on the Risk-Return Relationship,” Working Paper, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. 12.Amihud, Yakov, and Haim Mendelson, 1986, “Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread”,Journal of Financial Economics 17, pp.223-49.13.Bachelier, L.1900, “Theory of speculation”, in Cootner, P.(ed), The random character ofstock market prices, MIT press.14.Black, Fischer, 1972, “Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing”, Journal ofBusiness, July.15.——，1976,“The Pricing of Commodity Contracts”，Journal of Financial Economics3,pp.167—79.16.Black, Fischer, Michael C. Jensen, and Myron Scholes, 1972, “The Capital Asset PricingModel: Some Empirical Tests,” in Michael C.Jensen (ed.), Studies in the Theories of Capital Markets, Praeger, New York.17.Black，F., and M. Scholes，1973，“The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities”，Journal of Political Economy 81，pp.637—59.18.Bodie, Zvi, Alex Kane and Alan J. Marcus, 2002, Investments, 5th ed., McGraw-Hill.19.Campbell, J.Y., 1999, “Asset prices, consumption, and the business cycle”, in John Taylorand Michael Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, North-Holland, Amsterdam.20.——, 2000, “Asset Pricing at the Millennium,” Journal of Finance 55, pp.1515-68.21.Chen, N., R. Roll, and S. Ross, 1986, “Economic Forces and the stock Market,”Journal ofBusiness 59, pp. 383-403.22.Chordia, Tarun, Richard Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000, “Commonality in Liquidity”,Journal of Financial Economics 56, pp.3-28.23.Cornell, Bradford and Marc R. Reinganum, 1981, “Forward and Futures Prices: Evidencefrom the Foreign Exchange Markets”, Journal of Finance 36, Dec..24.Cowles, A.，1933, “Can stock market forecasters forecast?” Econometrica 1, pp. 309-24.25.Cox，J.C., J.E.Ingersoll，and S.A.Ross，1981, “The Relationship between Forward Prices andFuture Prices”，Journal of Financial Economics，pp.321—46.26.DeBondt, W. F. M., and Thaler, R., 1985, “Does the stock market overact?” Journal ofFinance 40, pp.793-805.27.——, 1987, “Further evidence on investor overreaction and stock market seasonality”,Journal of Finance 42, pp. 557-81.28.Engle, Robert F., 1982, “Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity with Estima tes of theVariance of U.K. Infla tion,” Econometrics 50, pp.987-1008.29.Fabozzi, Frank J., 2000, Bond Markets, Analysis and Strategies, 4th ed., Prentice Hall.30.Fama E.，1970, “Efficient capital market: a review of theory and empirical work”, Journal ofFinance 25, pp.383-417.31.——，1991，“Efficient Markets II,” Journal of Finance 46, pp. 1575-1618.32.——, 1981, "Stock Returns, Real Activity, Inflation, and Money", American EconomicReview, September.33.Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth French, 1992, “The Cross Section of Expected StockReturns,” Journal of Finance 47, pp.427-66.34.——，1993, “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds,” Journal of FinancialEconomic s, Vol. 33, No. 1, February, pp. 3-56.35.——，1995, “Size and book-to-market factors in earnings and returns,” Journal of Financ e,V ol. 50, No.1, March, pp. 131-155.36.——, 1996, “Multifactor explanations of asset-pricing anomalies,” Journal of Financ e, Vol.51, No. 1, March, pp. 55-84。
产业政策英语Industrial policy is an important aspect of government intervention in the economy to promote the growth and development of specific industries. It involves the formulation and implementation of policies to support, promote, and regulate industrial activities. Industrial policy aims to create a conducive environment for the growth of industries, enhance their competitiveness, and ensure their contribution to economic development.One of the key objectives of industrial policy is to promote the growth of strategic industries that are crucial for economic development and national security. Governments often identify priority sectors, such as manufacturing, high-technology industries, and strategic infrastructure, and provide them with targeted support through various measures such as subsidies, tax incentives, and infrastructuredevelopment. This is aimed at fostering the development of industries that have high growth potential and can generate significant spillover effects on the rest of the economy.Industrial policy also focuses on promoting innovation and technological development within industries. Governments often provide support for research and development, technology transfer, and the adoption of advanced technologies to enhance the competitiveness of industries. This may include measures such as funding for research and development activities, support for technology parks and incubators, and the provision of tax incentives for firms engaged in innovation activities. By fostering technological advancement, industrial policy seeks to enhance the productivity and competitiveness of industries in the global market.Moreover, industrial policy plays a crucial role in promoting inclusive growth and regional development.Governments often design industrial policies to support the development of industries in less developed regions, in order to reduce regional disparities and promote balanced economic growth. This may involve providing incentives for investment in disadvantaged regions, supporting the development of infrastructure, and promoting the growth of local industries through targeted policies and programs.In addition, industrial policy aims to create a favorable regulatory environment for industries, to ensure fair competition and sustainable development. This includes the formulation and enforcement of regulations to prevent anti-competitive practices, protect the environment, and ensure the health and safety of workers. Governments also play arole in providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises and promoting entrepreneurship, as these are important drivers of economic growth and job creation.Overall, industrial policy is an important tool for governments to steer the direction of economic development, promote the growth of strategic industries, and ensure inclusive and sustainable economic growth. By providing targeted support and creating an enabling environment for industries, governments can play a critical role in driving economic transformation and development.。
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