E文麦肯锡为500强企业做的咨询报告12
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Family System versus Economic System: Chinese Family Business Networks in Taiwan Wenyi Chu Associate Professor National Taiwan University 85, Lane 144, Keelung Road, Sec. 4 Taipei, Taiwan Phone: (+886) 2 2363-0231 Fax: (+886) 2 2364-5141 E-mail: wenyichu@mba.ntu.edu.tw
Family System versus Economic System: Chinese Family Business Networks in Taiwan ABSTRACT An important organizational feature of Chinese family firms is that they are organized through a
network of small and medium-sized firms inter-linked to one another through ties of kinship and
personal relationships. Based on the concept of institutional overlaps, this research argues that
the management of Chinese family business networks in Taiwan is simultaneously influenced by
two different factors: family/interpersonal factors, and economic/strategic factors. By using data
collected from 122 affiliated companies of twenty-eight family business networks in Taiwan,
this research found that the internal organizations of family business networks are influenced
both by family business considerations and economic efficiency considerations, but the
influence of economic factors is more significant. This research shows that although Taiwanese
family business networks have not completed the transformation from entrepreneurial control to
professional management, most family business networks have adopted an internal organization
that follows some basic economic rationales proposed in the Western literature.
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Family System versus Economic System: Chinese Family Business Networks in Taiwan Introduction
In recent decades the most important innovations in business management are emerging in
the fast-growing region of the world – the Southeast Asia. In this region, most economies are
dominated by overseas Chinese family businesses (Seagrave, 1995; Weidenbaum and Hughes,
1996), especially in the three overseas Chinese economies: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
Overseas Chinese family businesses have gained a wide reputation for cost efficiency,
responsiveness, flexibility, and global competitiveness (Carney, 1998). Their significant
economic performance has also sets off an emerging line of studies on the institutional and
economic structure of East Asian capitalism as well as the organizational characteristics of
Chinese family firms (e.g. Hamilton & Biggart, 1988; Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996).
Most existing studies on Chinese family firms follow the institutional perspective to
examine organizational isomorphism in Chinese economic communities. Scholars argue that,
due to some historical, political, social and culture backgrounds, overseas Chinese family firms
tend to be small in size, only engage in few stages of the value-added activities, and rely heavily
on personal relations and personal trust to reduce transactional uncertainties and risks (Hamilton
and Biggart, 1988; Hamilton and Kao, 1990; Kao, 1993; Orru, Biggart and Hamilton, 1991;
Redding, 1996; Whitley, 1990; Wong, 1996). Therefore, an important organizational feature of
Chinese family firms is the “weak organizations, strong linkages” (Redding, 1996) pattern of
operations: firms are organized through a network of several small and medium-sized firms that
are interlinked, connected to one another and so creating cooperative networks of firms through 2
kinship circle and ties of common origins. Many scholars have recognized families and
networks as the basic social institutions of Taiwan’s businesses (e.g. Greenhalgh, 1988;
Hamilton and Kao, 1987; Kao, 1996).
Although these existing studies provide some answers on how institutional/contextual
environments make the family business network a dominant form of business organizations
among overseas Chinese businesses, few research efforts have been granted to the internal
administrative arrangements of Chinese family business networks. For instance, are the control
styles of the parental founding entrepreneur and the second generation different? Do
professional managers and family managers receive the same level of decision-making
autonomy? To what level do the internal organizations fit external strategic and industrial
requirements facing firms? As Fukuyama (1995) and Duncan and Flamholtz (1982) pointed out,
the greatest difficulty facing Chinese family businesses is the transition from entrepreneurial
management to professional management. However, in family businesses, the complex of
emotions and business needs make these issue of corporate governance particularly difficult to
answer (Magretta, 1998), and the high emphasis of personal ties and personal trust may obstacle
