优序融资理论外文文献翻译
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企业资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)An Analysis of Working Capital Management Results Across IndustriesAbstractFirms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the fund s available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied upin current assets. We provide insights into the performance of surv eyed firms across key components of working capital management by usi ng the CFO magazine’s annual Working CapitalManagement Survey. We discover that significant differences exist b etween industries in working capital measures across time.In addition.w e discover that these measures for working capital change significantl y within industries across time.IntroductionThe importance of efficient working capital management is indisputa ble. Working capital is the difference between resources in cash or readily convertible into cash (Current Assets) and organizational commi tments for which cash will soon be required (Current Liabilities). Th e objective of working capital management is to maintain the optimum balance of each of the working capital components. Business viabilit y relies on the ability to effectively manage receivables. inventory.a nd payables. Firms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied up in current assets. Much managerial effort is expended in b ringing non-optimal levels of current assets and liabilities back towa rd optimal levels. An optimal level would be one in which a balance is achieved between risk and efficiency.A recent example of business attempting to maximize working capita l management is the recurrent attention being given to the applicatio n of Six Sigma®methodology. Six S igma®methodologies help companies measure and ensure quality in all areas of the enterprise. When used to identify and rectify discrepancies.inefficiencies and erroneous tra nsactions in the financial supply chain. Six Sigma®reduces Days Sale s Outstanding (DSO).accelerates the payment cycle.improves customer sati sfaction and reduces the necessary amount and cost of working capital needs. There appear to be many success stories including Jennifertwon’s(2002) report of a 15percent decrease in days that sales are outstanding.resulting in an increased cash flow of approximately $2 million at Thibodaux Regional Medical Cenrer.Furthermore bad debts declined from 3.4millin to $6000000.However.Waxer’s(2003)study of multiple firms employing Six Sig ma®finds that it is really a “get rich slow”technique with a r ate of return hovering in the 1.2 – 4.5 percent range.Even in a business using Six Sigma®methodology. an “optimal”level of working capital management needs to be identified. Industry factors may impa ct firm credit policy.inventory management.and bill-paying activities. S ome firms may be better suited to minimize receivables and inventory. while others maximize payables. Another aspect of “optimal”is the extent to which poor financial results can be tied to sub-optimal pe rformance.Fortunately.these issues are testable with data published by CFO magazine. which claims to be the source of “tools and informati on for the financial executive.”and are the subject of this resear ch.In addition to providing mean and variance values for the working capital measures and the overall metric.two issues will be addressed in this research. One research question is. “are firms within a p articular industry clustered together at consistent levels of working capital measures?For instance.are firms in one industry able to quickl y transfer sales into cash.while firms from another industry tend to have high sales levels for the particular level of inventory . The other research question is. “does working capital management perform ance for firms within a given industry change from year-to-year?”The following section presents a brief literature review.Next.the r esearch method is described.including some information about the annual Working Capital Management Survey published by CFO magazine. Findings are then presented and conclusions are drawn.Related LiteratureThe importance of working capital management is not new to the f inance literature. Over twenty years ago. Largay and Stickney (1980) reported that the then-recent bankruptcy of W.T. Grant. a nationwide chain of department stores.should have been anticipated because the co rporation had been running a deficit cash flow from operations for e ight of the last ten years of its corporate life.As part of a stud y of the Fortune 500s financial management practices. Gilbert and Rei chert (1995) find that accounts receivable management models are used in 59 percent of these firms to improve working capital projects.wh ile inventory management models were used in 60 percent of the compa nies.More recently. Farragher. Kleiman and Sahu (1999) find that 55 p ercent of firms in the S&P Industrial index complete some form of a cash flow assessment. but did not present insights regarding account s receivable and inventory management. or the variations of any curre nt asset accounts or liability accounts across industries.Thus.mixed ev idence exists concerning the use of working capital management techniq ues.Theoretical determination of optimal trade credit limits are the s ubject of many articles over the years (e.g. Schwartz 1974; Scherr 1 996).with scant attention paid to actual accounts receivable management.Across a limited sample. Weinraub and Visscher (1998) observe a tend ency of firms with low levels of current ratios to also have low l evels of current liabilities. Simultaneously investigating accounts rece ivable and payable issues.Hill. Sartoris.and Ferguson (1984) find diffe rences in the way payment dates are defined. Payees define the date of payment as the date payment is received.while payors view paymen t as the postmark date.Additional WCM insight across firms.industries.a nd time can add to this body of research.Maness and Zietlow (2002. 51. 496) presents two models of value creation that incorporate effective short-term financial management acti vities.However.these models are generic models and do not consider uni que firm or industry influences. Maness and Zietlow discuss industry influences in a short paragraph that includes the observation that. “An industry a company is located in may have more influence on th at company’s fortunes than overall GNP”(2002. 507).In fact. a car eful review of this 627-page textbook finds only sporadic information on actual firm levels of WCM dimensions.virtually nothing on industr y factors except for some boxed items with titles such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In-House Credit Card”(128) and nothing on WC M stability over time. This research will attempt to fill this void by investigating patterns related to working capital measures within industries and illustrate differences between industries across time.An extensive survey of library and Internet resources provided ver y few recent reports about working capital management. The most relev ant set of articles was Weisel and Bradley’s (2003) article on cash flow management and one of inventory control as a result of effect ive supply chain management by Hadley (2004).Research Method The CFO RankingsThe first annual CFO Working Capital Survey. a joint project with REL Consultancy Group.was published in the June 1997 issue of CFO (Mintz and Lezere 1997). REL is a London. England-based management co nsulting firm specializing in working capital issues for its global l ist of clients. The original survey reports several working capital b enchmarks for public companies using data for 1996. Each company is ranked against its peers and also against the entire field of 1.000 companies. REL continues to update the original information on an a nnual basis.REL uses the “cash flow from operations”value located on firm cash flow statements to estimate cash conversion efficiency (CCE). T his value indicates how well a company transforms revenues into cash flow. A “days of working capital”(DWC) value is based on the d ollar amount in each of the aggregate.equally-weighted receivables.inven tory.and payables accounts. The “days of working capital”(DNC) repr esents the time period between purchase of inventory on acccount fromvendor until the sale to the customer.the collection of the receiva bles. and payment receipt.Thus.it reflects the companys ability to fin ance its core operations with vendor credit. A detailed investigation of WCM is possible because CFO also provides firm and industry val ues for days sales outstanding (A/R).inventory turnover.and days payabl es outstanding (A/P).Research FindingsAverage and Annual Working Capital Management Performance Working capital management component definitions and average values for the entire 1996 –2000 period .Across the nearly 1.000 firms in the survey.cash flow from operations. defined as cash flow from operations divided by sales and referred to as “cash conversion ef ficiency”(CCE).averages 9.0 percent.Incorporating a 95 percent confide nce interval. CCE ranges from 5.6 percent to 12.4 percent. The days working capital (DWC). defined as the sum of receivables and invent ories less payables divided by daily sales.averages 51.8 days and is very similar to the days that sales are outstanding (50.6).because the inventory turnover rate (once every 32.0 days) is similar to the number of days that payables are outstanding (32.4 days).In all ins tances.the standard deviation is relatively small.suggesting that these working capital management variables are consistent across CFO report s.Industry Rankings on Overall Working Capital Management Perfo rmanceCFO magazine provides an overall working capital ranking for firms in its ing the following equation:Industry-based differences in overall working capital management are presented for the twenty-s ix industries that had at least eight companies included in the rank ings each year.In the typical year. CFO magazine ranks 970 companies during this period. Industries are listed in order of the mean ove rall CFO ranking of working capital performance. Since the best avera ge ranking possible for an eight-company industry is 4.5 (this assume s that the eight companies are ranked one through eight for the ent ire survey). it is quite obvious that all firms in the petroleum in dustry must have been receiving very high overall working capital man agement rankings.In fact.the petroleum industry is ranked first in CCE and third in DWC (as illustrated in Table 5 and discussed later i n this paper).Furthermore.the petroleum industry had the lowest standar d deviation of working capital rankings and range of working capital rankings. The only other industry with a mean overall ranking less than 100 was the Electric & Gas Utility industry.which ranked secon d in CCE and fourth in DWC. The two industries with the worst work ing capital rankings were Textiles and Apparel. Textiles rank twenty-s econd in CCE and twenty-sixth in DWC. The apparel industry ranks twenty-third and twenty-fourth in the two working capital measures ConclusionsThe research presented here is based on the annual ratings of wo rking capital management published in CFO magazine. Our findings indic ate a consistency in how industries “stack up”against each other over time with respect to the working capital measures.However.the wor king capital measures themselves are not static (i.e.. averages of wo rking capital measures across all firms change annually); our results indicate significant movements across our entire sample over time. O ur findings are important because they provide insight to working cap ital performance across time. and on working capital management across industries. These changes may be in explained in part by macroecono mic factors Changes in interest rates.rate of innovation.and competitio n are likely to impact working capital management. As interest rates rise.there would be less desire to make payments early.which would stretch accounts payable.accounts receivable.and cash accounts. The ra mifications of this study include the finding of distinct levels of WCM measures for different industries.which tend to be stable over ti me. Many factors help to explain this discovery. The improving econom y during the period of the study may have resulted in improved turn over in some industries.while slowing turnover may have been a signal of troubles ahead. Our results should be interpreted cautiously. Our study takes places over a short time frame during a generally impr oving market. In addition. the survey suffers from survivorship bias –only the top firms within each industry are ranked each year and the composition of those firms within the industry can change annua lly.Further research may take one of two lines.First.there could bea study of whether stock prices respond to CFO magazine’s publication of working capital management rating.Second,there could be a study of which if any of the working capital management components relate to share price performance.Given our results,there studies need to take industry membership into consideration when estimating stock price reaction to working capital management performance.对整个行业中营运资金管理的研究格雷格Filbeck.Schweser学习计划托马斯M克鲁格.威斯康星大学拉克罗斯摘要:企业能够降低融资成本或者尽量减少绑定在流动资产上的成立基金数额来用于扩大现有的资金。
债务融资外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)译文:股权集中度,“控制权私人收益”和债务融资摘要:基于快速成长的'法律和经济’文献,本文分析了主要所有者在以牺牲小股东利益而获取“控制权私人收益”的环境中进行债务融资的公司治理。
这表明,所有权集中是与作为一个公司的负债比率和衡量投资的财政资源的使用效率较低有关,而这并不取决于最大股东的身份,固定的具有支配权的股东可以串通股权持有者进行控股溢价。
这个结论的其中一个可能的结果就是债务市场的企业信贷压缩,这有转型期经济体的证据支持。
关键词:所有权,控制权收益,债务引言有一个大量研究金融经济学和战略管理的文献显示获得控制权私人收益的方式和数量与管理行为和企业业绩有关。
(Gibbs, 1993;Hoskisson et al., 1994;Jensen and Warner, 1988)然而,大多以往的研究集中于大型、公开的在传统的美国/英国公司控制模型的框架范围内分散所有权的上市公司,很少是关于所有权集中的公司治理(Holderness and Sheehan, 1988;Short,1994)。
快速成长的企业所有制结构的优化取决于“控制权私人收益”的水平。
(e.g., Bennedsen and Wol fenzon, 2000; Grossman and Hart, 1988;Harris and Raviv, 1988)。
文献已超出传统的治理研究美国/英国环境,并在最近成为理论和政策辩论。
(Bebchuk, 1994;Filatotchev et al., 2001;La Porta et al., 1998;2000b;Modigliani and Perotti, 1997)这项研究对中小投资者受较少保护而控股股东广泛控制小股东的国家特别重要。
这种对控制权的行使可采取多种形式,比如利用公司机会、关联方交易、转移定价,资产转移和其他“隧道行为”剥夺企业的资产和收入。
金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献外文题目:Financial Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Private Equity Investments in the Globalization of Firms from Emerging Markets原文:1. Introduction International International business business business and and and economic economic economic development development development are are are closely closely closely related. related. related. When When applying applying to to to emerging emerging emerging markets, markets, markets, foreign foreign foreign direct direct direct investment investment investment (FDI) (FDI) (FDI) and and and development development economics are two sides of the same coin. In terms of the classical OLI model of the economics of international business, the multinational enterprises (MNE) brings into play the ownership advantage while the governments of emerging markets bring into play play the the the location location location advantage advantage advantage (Dunning (Dunning (Dunning 2000). 2000). 2000). For For For most most most part, part, part, the the the economics economics economics and and and the the strategy strategy of of of international international international business business business focused focused focused on on on the the the MNE MNE MNE while while while economic economic economic geography geography from from Koopman Koopman (1957) to to Krugman Krugman (1991) and and later later later (as (as well as as development development economics) have focused on the country in which the investment takes place. This This paper paper paper brings brings brings together together together international international international business business business development development development economics economics economics and and international trade to gain better insights into an important and fascinating phenomenon phenomenon in in in the the the arena arena arena of of of international international international business business business –– the the recent recent recent growth growth growth of of of private private equity equity investments investments investments in in in emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. markets. The The The tremendous tremendous tremendous growth growth growth of of of private private private equity equity investments in emerging markets is evident from the data presented in Table 1. The total total went went went up up up almost almost almost ten ten ten times, times, times, from from from about about about $3.5B $3.5B $3.5B to to to more more more than than than $33B $33B $33B in in in the the the period period 2003-2006. Emerging Asia led the emerging markets with $19.4B raised in 2006 by 93 funds; about a third of the money that was raised by these funds went to China and India. The main argument that is presented and discussed in this paper is that private equity equity investments investments investments in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets is is is another another another expression expression expression of of of foreign foreign foreign direct direct investment (FDI) where firms from the developed countries export specific factors of production (their ownership advantage) to small countries and emerging markets (new locations) as a way to generate value to all stakeholders. The firms in the developed countries countries in in in this this this case case case are are are specialized specialized specialized financial financial financial institutions institutions institutions (private (private (private equity equity equity funds) funds) (Yoshikawa (Yoshikawa et et et al. al. al. 2006) 2006) 2006) and and and the the the factor factor factor of of of production production production that that that they they they export export export is is is high-risk high-risk sector sector specific specific specific capital. capital. capital. We We dubbed dubbed this this this form form form of of of FDI FDI FDI as as as financial financial financial foreign foreign foreign direct direct investment investment (FFDI), but (FFDI), but the process and the rational a re the same as in are the same as in the classical FDI analysis. FFDI (synonymous –but not restricted to –for private equity throughout this this paper) paper) paper) is is is a a a subset subset subset of of of FDI FDI FDI that that that is is is solely solely solely devoted devoted devoted––as as the the the name name name implies implies implies––for investments in private firms in purpose of generating high return on- investment over a relatively short period (5-7 years). The term “short” is relative and in comparison with with the the the typical typical typical investment investment investment periods periods periods of of of the the the investors investors investors of of of private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds (e.g., (e.g., pension funds, endowment funds and the like). At the extreme, i.e., in venture capital investments, investors take into account upfront that some of their investments will be written written off off at at the the the prospects prospects prospects that that that few few few will will will generate generate generate return return return that that that will will will more more more than than compensate compensate those those those sunk sunk sunk investments investments investments (hence (hence (hence the the the “high “high “high-r -r -risk” isk” isk” referral). referral). referral). Sector Sector Sector specific specific capital is a general phenomenon. In many industries such investment is more than mere financial investment and is augmented by specific information that the investor may posses in the form of managerial expertise, deal structuring specialty, networking capabilities and the like. In the case of the high-risk capital industry there is a need to bridge the gap between the risk perception of the investment project by the entrepreneurs entrepreneurs or or or the the the “insiders” “insiders” “insiders” and and and the the the investors investors investors (most (most (most often often often risk-averse risk-averse risk-averse investors), investors), the the “outsiders”. “outsiders”. “outsiders”. This This This is is is accomplished accomplished accomplished by by by a a a combination combination combination of of of validation validation validation processes processes processes and and screening mechanisms that are engaged by the private equity funds. In this regard they act act as as as financial financial financial and and and risk risk risk intermediaries intermediaries intermediaries (Coval/Thakor (Coval/Thakor (Coval/Thakor 2005, 2005, 2005, provide provide provide an an an analytical analytical framework framework for for for this this this approach). approach). approach). The The The value value value of of of the the the general general general partners partners partners of of of private private private equity equity funds funds depends depends depends on on on the the the quality quality quality of of of the the the risk risk risk intermediation intermediation intermediation that that that they they they perform perform perform for for for their their investors. This makes them credible and reliable processors of information. Table 1: Emerging Markets Private Equity Funds Raising, 2003-2006 (US$ Millions) Emerging Asia CEE Russia Latham Sub-Sah ara Africa Middle- East Africa Multi ple Regions Total 2003 2,200 406 417 NA 350 116 3,489 2004 2,800 1,777 714 NA 545 618 6,454 2005 15,446 2,711 1,272 791 1,915 3,630 25,765 2006 19,386 3,272 2,656 2,353 2,946 2,580 33,193 Source: EMPEA (Emerging Markets Private Equity Association) 2007. The discussion and the analysis presented in this paper draw on three different bodies of literature; the literature of finance and growth from development economics, (Levine (Levine 1997, 1997, 1997, 2004), 2004), 2004), the the the literature literature literature on on on comparative comparative comparative advantage advantage advantage in in in the the the discussion discussion discussion of of patterns of trade (Deardorff 2004) and the literature of imperfect contracts in micro economics and in financial economics (Hart 2001, Zingales 2000). Financial foreign direct investment as practiced by private equity funds can be a powerful powerful contributor contributor contributor to to to economic economic economic and and and business business business growth growth growth in in in emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. markets. FFDI FFDI changes changes the the the scene scene scene of of of international international international business business business as as as it it it contributes contributes contributes to to to a a a change change change in in in the the relations relations between between between firms firms firms in in in developed developed developed countries countries countries and and and firms firms firms in in in the the the emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. The The unique unique unique relatively relatively relatively short short short term term term nature nature nature of of of a a a private private private equity equity equity investment investment investment makes makes makes it it it an an appropriate instrument for for the the transition period that that the the world of of international international business is experiencing regarding the role of emerging markets and the role of China and and India India India in in in particular. particular. particular. This This This is is is so so so because because because the the the short short short term term term nature nature nature of of of private private private equity equity investments investments allows allows allows firms firms firms in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets for for for sufficient sufficient sufficient time time time for for for transfer transfer transfer of of information and learning and yet allow the local stakeholders to resume full ownership once the process is completed. The The relations relations relations between between between the the the development development development economics economics economics literature literature literature on on on finance finance finance and and growth and the international business literature is presented and discussed in the next section section of of of the the the paper. paper. paper. It It It is is is shown shown shown that that that the the the two two two bodies bodies bodies of of of literatures literatures literatures are are are quite quite quite related related once one penetrates the specific lingo employed by each one of them. The problems in in the the the institutional institutional institutional setting setting setting and and and the the the lack lack lack of of of sufficient sufficient sufficient development development development of of of the the the capital capital markets markets in in in most most most emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets are are are overcome overcome overcome by by by creating creating creating specific specific specific international international alliances that generate local comparative advantage. In section three, the concept of local local comparative comparative comparative advantage advantage advantage (Deardorff (Deardorff (Deardorff 2004) 2004) 2004) is is is used used used for for for better better better understanding understanding understanding of of FFDI. The perfect and efficient financial market of the Modern Theory of Finance is replaced by a set of imperfect contracts negotiated and renegotiated between domestic firms firms in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets and and and private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds from from from the the the US US US and and and other other other major major capital capital markets. markets. markets. This This This issue issue issue is is is discussed discussed discussed and and and analyzed analyzed analyzed in in in section section section four four four of of of the the the paper. paper. Private equity funds drew a fair amount of criticism lately. The potential of private equity investment in emerging markets is discussed in section five of the paper. The conclusions conclusions of of of the the the study study study are are are briefly briefly briefly discussed discussed discussed in in in section section section six, six, six, the the the last last last section section section of of of the the paper. 2. Finance, Growth and International Business In a survey paper on the relations between financial development and economic growth growth Levine Levine Levine (1997) (1997) (1997) states states states that: that: that: “…the “…the “…the development development development of of of financial financial financial markets markets markets and and institutions are critical and inextricable part of the growth process”. He continues and says that: “…financial d evelopment development development is is is a a a good predictor of future rates of econom good predictor of future rates of econom ic growth, capital accumulation and and technological technological technological change. change. change. Moreover, Moreover, Moreover, cross-country, cross-country, cross-country, case case case study, study, study, industry- industry- industry- and and firm- firm- level level level analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the lack lack thereof-crucially thereof-crucially thereof-crucially affect affect affect the the the speed speed speed and and and the the the pattern pattern pattern of of of econom econom economic ic ic development”, development”, (Levine (Levine 1997, 1997, 1997, p. p. p. 689). 689). 689). Levine Levine Levine makes makes makes two two two other other other important important important points; points; points; first first first that that that the the discussion of finance and developments takes place outside the state-contingent world of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) and the discussion takes place in an incomplete world with imperfect (monopolistic) competition. The second point is that there are three main research questions in the field of finance and development that needs more attention. attention. (1) (1) (1) Why Why Why does does does financial financial financial structure structure structure change change change as as as countries countries countries grow? grow? grow? (2) (2) (2) Why Why Why do do countries at similar stages of economic development have different looking financial systems? systems? and and and (3) (3) (3) are are are there there there longterm longterm longterm economic economic economic growth growth growth advantages advantages advantages to to to adopting adopting adopting legal legal and policy changes that create one type of financial system vis-à-vis another? The three research questions raised by Levine deal with different aspects of the location of foreign direct investment. In particular, the three research questions deal with the gap between the potential of a certain country, or countries, as a site for an international oriented investment and the actual investment that has taken place. This is particularly true where the investment from the developed countries is in the form of of high-risk high-risk high-risk sector sector sector specific specific specific capital capital capital such such such as as as provided provided provided by by by private private private equity equity equity funds. funds. funds. The The potential potential of of of some some some countries countries countries in in in attracting attracting attracting private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds is is is not not not being being being fully fully realized realized due due due to to to the the the absence absence absence of of of an an an appropriate appropriate appropriate financial financial financial system. system. system. A A A well well well developed developed financial financial system system system is is is necessary necessary necessary to to to enhance enhance enhance the the the import import import of of of sector sector sector specific specific specific (high-risk) (high-risk) capital, a necessary condition for FFDI. As As the the the financial financial financial structure structure structure of of of a a a country country country changes changes changes (as (as (as the the the country country country grows), grows), grows), it it it is is suggested by Levine in his first question that different types of FDI can be accommodated. The development of FDI in China is an evidence of this process. Yet, as it is proposed in Levine’s second question, the financial markets of countries with similar similar rate rate rate of of of growth growth growth develop develop develop in in in different different different pace pace pace and and and in in in a a a different different different way. way. way. There There There are are long-term economic growth advantages of adopting certain p atterns of development patterns of development for the financial market of a given country. In many cases FDI and FFDI do depend on on relatively relatively relatively transparent transparent transparent and and and enforceable enforceable enforceable corporate corporate corporate governance. governance. governance. Morck, Morck, Morck, Wolfenzon, Wolfenzon, and and Y eung Y eung (2005) (2005) (2005) demonstrated demonstrated demonstrated that that that economic economic economic entrenchment entrenchment entrenchment has has has a a a high high high price price price in in foregone growth opportunities. There There are are are three three three related related related problems problems problems in in in creating creating creating a a a domestic domestic domestic financial financial financial system system system for for private equity and venture capital investments: How How to to to mobilize mobilize mobilize the the the type type type and and and the the the quantity quantity quantity of of of savings savings savings (capital) (capital) (capital) appropriate appropriate appropriate for for such investments where most of the capital should be imported from the major capital markets of the world? How How to to to generate generate generate credible credible credible information information information and and and trust? trust? trust? How How How to to to monitor monitor monitor management management and to exert corporate control? The The only only only feasible feasible feasible way way way to to to accommodate accommodate accommodate private private private equity equity equity and and and venture venture venture capital capital investments in emerging markets is to import sector specific high-risk capital from the US and other major capital markets. The term sector specific capital recognizes the fact that capital is not a unified factor of production (in the same way that there are different types of labor there are different types of capital). High-risk sector specific capital capital relates relates relates to to to the the the portfolio portfolio portfolio of of of the the the investors investors investors and and and to to to the the the relational relational relational capital capital capital of of of the the specific financial intermediaries (i.e., the private equity funds). Most of the high-risk capital in the world is coming from large institutional investors in the US and it is a part part of of of their their their assets’ assets’ assets’ management management management program. program. program. (A (A (A good good good example example example of of of how how how such such such capital capital relates to the total portfolio is the investment policy of CALPERS the largest pension fund in the US). Due to internal and external regulations, financial institutions cannot make make investment investment investment unless unless unless there there there is is is an an an acceptable acceptable acceptable level level level of of of transparency transparency transparency and and and corporate corporate governance governance in in in the the the country country country where where where the the the money money money is is is invested. invested. invested. Whether Whether Whether such such such a a a process process process is is possible in a given developing country and what are the chances that if implemented it will succeed is a very important question. Horii, Ohdoi, and Yamamoto (2005) deal with with this this this issue. issue. issue. They They They address address address the the the question question question why why why some some some developing developing developing countries countries countries are are are less less successful than others in adopting technologies and more effective financial markets techniques. To quote Horii et al. (2005, p. 2): “A fundamental question is why some countries are stuck with poor performance even though it results in primitive financial ma markets rkets rkets and and and unproductive unproductive unproductive technologies”. technologies”. technologies”. They They They conclude conclude conclude that that that in in in some some some cases cases cases the the expected expected increase increase increase in in in the the the income income income inequality inequality inequality due due due to to to the the the financial financial financial led led led technological technological changes deters people f rom from from adopting financial, legal, adopting financial, legal, a nd political and political reforms reforms that will that will lead to financial, business, and economic development. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) provide somewhat different answer, also focusing on income distribution but from a point of view of economic entrenchment and rent seeking behavior. Nowhere the relationship between finance, growth, and international business is more more pronounced pronounced pronounced than than than in in in the the the impressive impressive impressive development development development of of of the the the private private private equity equity equity funds funds devoted for investment in emerging markets. Table 1 presents data on the growth of private equity funds raised for investment in emerging markets by regions. The amounts of money raised by private equity funds dedicated for investments in emerging markets went went up tremendously in up tremendously in t he last five the last five y ears. More importantly years. More importantly significant amounts were were invested invested to support domestic companies in in emerging emerging markets markets to to to become become become more more more competitive competitive competitive in in in the the the global global global markets markets markets by by by providing providing providing their their their own own brands of products to the world’s consumers. Lenovo is a case in point when a major investment investment by by by three three three American American American private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds (Texas (Texas (Texas Pacific Pacific Pacific Group, Group, Group, General General Atlantic, and Newbridge Capital) was made in a Chinese company with the purpose of making Lenovo a leading competitor in the global market. 译 文:金融类对外直接投资:私募股权投资在新兴市场全球化企业中的角色一、简介国际商业和经济发展密切相关。
优序融资理论在公司债券融资上的应用作者:马文琦来源:《饮食科学》 2015年第1期马文琦(西南财经大学经济数学学院,四川成都 611130)【摘要】根据投资者的信用程度对公司进行排序,将公司分为A、B两组分别进行资本结构,运用优序融资理论(Pecking Order Theory)、资本结构的动态调整理论(Target Adjustment)对公司的负债额度决策进行分析对比,发现中国市场上的企业并不遵循优序融资理论。
虽然动态调整理论的加入增加了模型的解释力但结果说明企业大多存在着过量融资的现象。
【关键词】优序融资理论动态调整理论资本结构一、前言在资本结构研究历程中,从最初MM理论到各种放松条件MM理论,前人已经有很多研究。
有关不对称信息与资本结构中的逆向选择部分,开山的研究是Myers(1984),The Capital Structure Puzzle。
基于信息不对称的存在性和经理人最大化老股东的利益的假设提出了优序融资理论(Pecking Order)。
有关其的实证研究的事前推断是:1.SEO将导致股价下跌;2.杠杆比例与盈利能力负相关。
盈利能力越高,内源融资能力就越大,需要进行外部融资的额度也会减小;3.不对称信息越严重,优序融资的倾向越强烈。
在小公司、成长性公司,无形资产较多的公司不对称信息相对较高,在融资时将会严格遵守内源融资、债权融资、股权融资的顺序以确保大股东的利益;4.提高杠杆的公告的事件超额收益将大于0。
投资者认为公司提高杠杆比例是因为股票价值被低估,公司更倾向于在披露盈利信息公告不久后SEO,以缓解股价的波动。
在中国,不少学者对PO进行了实证分析。
盛明泉、李昊(2010)《优序融资理论对上市公司融资行为的解释力》中对公司资本结构的偏好性做出了解释;李延喜(2007)《权衡理论与优序融资理论的解释力研究:来自中国上市公司的经验证据》中,得出了资产规模与资产负债率呈显著正相关;短期负债比率与企业的盈利能力及股利支付率有更为显著的相关性,而长期负债比率则与企业规模及增长机会变量的相关性更为显著两方面的结论。
文献综述1.2011Pedro A. C. Saffi and Kari Sigurdsson 《Price Efficiency and Short Selling》(价格效率和卖空)主要研究借贷市场影响价格效率和收入分配,使用股票借贷供给和借贷费用来代理卖空限制。
主要研究结论:第一,卖空限制降低价格效率;第二,卖空限制的废除不会增加价格波动和极端负收益的发生。
2.2014Saqib Sharif, Hamish D. Anderson, Ben R. Marshall《Against the tide: the commencement of short selling and margin trading in mainland China》(应对潮流:中国大陆融资融券的开端)对于A股和H股,可卖空股票价格的下降,表明,融券主导融资的影响。
与监管部门的意图和新开发市场实验证据相反,卖空股的流动性和买卖价差都下降。
与Ausubel (1990)的结论一致,这些结果表明,不知情的投资者避开卖空股以减少和知情投资者的交易风险。
研究卖空、买空对价格、流动性和波动性的影响,使用中国大陆和香港的数据。
贡献:第一,研究融资、融券的双重影响,可以让我们评价哪个更好,我们发现卖空影响更强。
卖空交易会增加和信息知情者的交易风险;第二,我们通过新兴市场论证卖空和买空对流动性的影响。
相比发达市场,新兴市场似乎在这些方面研究较少。
新兴市场可能与发达市场不同,因为新兴市场的投资者保障更弱(Morck et al., 2000)。
与监管部门的目的和发达市场的证据不同,这种在监管上的改变导致流动性下降。
这表明,投资者避开与监管涉及的股票。
第三,新兴市场上,卖空、买空对股票收益影响有限。
Lee and Yoo (1993)发现,在韩国和台湾,买空需求和股票收益波动性之间无关,而Lamba and Ariff(2006)发现在马来西亚,买空约束的放松伴随收入的增加。
本科毕业设计(论文)中英文对照翻译(此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!)文献出处:Ashkanasy N M. The study on capital structure theory and the optimization of enterprise capital [J]. Journal of Management, 2016, 5(3): 235-254.原文The study on capital structure theory and the optimization ofenterprise capital structureAshkanasy N MAbstractIn this paper, corporate finance is an important content of modern enterprise management decision. Around the existence of optimal capitalstructure has been a lot of controversy. Given investment decisions, whether an enterprise to change its value by changing the capital structure and the cost of capital, namely whether there is a market make the enterprise value maximization, or make the enterprise capital structure of minimizing the cost of capital? To this problem has different answers in different stages of development, has formed many theory of capital structure.Key words: Capital structure; financial structure; Optimization; Financial leverage1 IntroductionIn financial theory, capital structure due to the different understanding of "capital" in the broad sense and narrow sense two explanations: one explanation is that the "capital" as all funding sources, the structure of the generalized capital structure refers to the entire capital, the relationship between the contrast of their own capital and debt capital, as the American scholar Alan c. Shapiro points out that "the company's capital structure - all the debt and equity financing; an alternative explanation is that if the" capital "is defined as a long-term funding sources, capital structure refers to the narrow sense of their own capital and long-term debt capital, and the tension and the short-term debt capital as the business capital management. Whether it is a broad concept ornarrow understanding of the capital structure is to discuss the proportion of equity capital and debt capital relations. 2 The capital structure theory Capital structure theory has experienced a process of gradually forming, developing and perfecting. First proposed the theory of American economist David Durand (David Durand) thinks that enterprise's capital structure is in accordance with the method of net income, net operating income method and traditional method, in 1958 di Gayle Anne (Franco Modigliani and Miller (Mertor Miller) and put forward the famous MM theory, created the modern capital structure theory, on this basis, the later generations and further put forward many new theory: 2.1 Net Income Theory (Net Income going) Net income theory on the premise of two assumptions --, investors with a fixed proportion of investment valuation or enterprise's net income. Enterprises to raise debt funds needed for a fixed rate. Therefore, the theory is that: the enterprise use of debt financing is always beneficial, can reduce the comprehensive cost of capital of enterprise. This is because the debt financing in the whole capital of enterprise, the bigger the share, the comprehensive cost of capital is more c lose to the cost of debt, and because the cost of debt is generally low, so, the higher the debt level, comprehensive capital cost is lower, the greater the enterprise value. When the debt ratio reached 100%, the firm will achieve maximum value.2.2 Theory of Net Operating Income (Net Operating Income going) Netoperating income theory is that, regardless of financial leverage, debt interest rates are fixed. If enterprises increase the lower cost of debt capital, but even if the cost of debt remains unchanged, but due to the increased the enterprise risk, can also lead to the rising cost of equity capital, it a liter of a fall, just offset, the enterprise cost of capital remain unchanged. Is derived as a result, the theory "" does not exist an optimal capital structure of the conclusion.2.3 Traditional Theory (Traditional going) Traditional theory is that the net income and net operating income method of compromise. It thinks, the enterprise use of financial leverage although will lead to rising cost of equity, but within limits does not completely offset the benefits of using the low cost of debt, so can make comprehensive capital cost reduction, increase enterprise value. But once exceed this limit, rights and interests of the rising cost of no longer can be offset by the low cost of debt, the comprehensive cost of capital will rise again. Since then, the cost of debt will rise, leading to a comprehensive capital costs rise more rapidly. Comprehensive cost of capital from falling into a turning point, is the lowest, at this point, to achieve the optimal capital structure. The above three kinds of capital structure theory is referred to as "early capital structure theory", their common features are: three theories are in corporate and personal income tax rate is zero under the condition of the proposed. Three theories and considering the capital structure of the dual effects of the cost of capital and enterprise value.Three theories are prior to 1958. Many scholars believe that the theory is not based on thorough analysis.3 Related theories3.1 Balance TheoryIt centered on the MM theory of modern capital structure theory development to peak after tradeoff theory. Trade-off theory is based on corporate MM model and miller, revised to reflect the financial pinch cost (also known as the financial crisis cost) and a model of agent cost.(1) the cost of financial constraints. Many enterprises always experience of financial constraints, some of them will be forced to go bankrupt. When the financial constraints but also not bankruptcy occurs, may appear the following situation: disputes between owners and creditors often leads to inventory and fixed assets on the material damaged or obsolete. Attorney fees, court fees and administrative costs to devour enterprise wealth, material loss and plus the legal and administrative expenses referred to as the "direct costs" of bankruptcy. Financial pinch will only occur in business with debt, no liability companies won't get into the mud. So with more debt, the fixed interest rate, and the greater the profitability of the probability of large leading to financial constraints and the cost of the higher the probability of occurrence. Financial pinch probability high will reduce the present value of the enterprise, to improve the cost ofcapital.(2) the agency cost. Because shareholders exists the possibility of using a variety of ways from the bondholders who benefit, bonds must have a number of protective constraint clauses. These terms and conditions in a certain extent constrained the legal management of the enterprise. Also must supervise the enterprise to ensure compliance with these terms and conditions, the cost of supervision and also upon the shareholders with higher debt costs. Supervise cost that agency cost is will raise the cost of debt to reduce debt interest. When the tax benefits and liabilities of financial constraints and agency costs when balance each other, namely the costs and benefits offset each other, determine the optimal capital structure. Equilibrium theory emphasizes the liabilities increase will cause the risk of bankruptcy and rising costs, so as to restrict the enterprise infinite pursuit of the behavior of tax preferential policies. In this sense, the enterprise the best capital structure is the balance of tax revenue and financial constraints caused by all kinds of costs as a result, when the marginal debt tax shield benefit is equal to the marginal cost of financial constraints, the enterprise value maximum, to achieve the optimal capital structure.3.2 Asymmetric Information TheoryAsymmetric Information and found)Due to the trade-off theory has long been limited to bankruptcy cost and tax benefit both conceptual framework, to the late 1970 s, the theory is centered on asymmetricinformation theory of new capital structure theory. So-called asymmetric information is in the information management and investors are not equal, managers than investors have more and more accurate information, and managers try to existing shareholders rather than new seeks the best interests of shareholders, so if business prospect is good, the manager will not issue new shares, but if the prospects, will make the cost of issuing new shares to raise too much, this factor must be considered in the capital structure decision. The significance of these findings to the enterprise's financial policy lies in: first it prompted enterprise reserve a certain debt capacity so as to internal lack of funding for new investment projects in the future debt financing. In addition, in order to avoid falling stock prices, managers often don't have to equity financing, and prefer to use external funding. The central idea is: internal financing preference, if you need external finance, preferences of creditor's rights financing. Can in order to save the ability to issue new debt at any time, the number of managers to borrow is usually less than the number of enterprises can take, in order to keep some reserves. Ross (s. Ross) first systematically introduce the theory of asymmetric information from general economics enterprise capital structure analysis, then, tal (e. Talmon), haeckel (Heikel) development from various aspects, such as the theory. After the 1980 s, thanks to the new institutional economics, and gradually formed a financial contract theory, corporate governance structure theory of capitalstructure theory, both of which emphasize enterprise contractual and incomplete contract, financial contract theory focuses on the design of optimal financial contract, and the arrangement of enterprise governance structure theory focuses on the right, focuses on the analysis of the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance.4 the capital structure theory of adaptability analysis On the one hand, capital structure theory especially the theory of modern capital structure is the important contribution is not only put forward "the existence of the optimal capital structure" this financial proposition, and that the optimal combination of the capital structure, objectively and make us on capital structure and its influence on the enterprise value have a clear understanding. The essence of these theories has direct influence and infiltrate into our country financial theory, and gives us enlightenment in many aspects: Because of various financing way, channel in financing costs, risks, benefits, constraints, as well as differences, seeking suitable capital structure is the enterprise financial management, especially the important content of financing management, must cause our country attaches great importance to the financial theory and financial practice. Capital structure decision despite the enterprise internal and external relationships and factor of restriction and influence, but its decision-making is the enterprise, the enterprise to the factors related to capital structure and the relationship between the quantitativeand qualitative analysis, discusses some principles and methods of enterprise capital structure optimization decision. Any enterprise capital structure in the design, all should leave room, maintain appropriate maneuver ability of financing, the financing environment in order to cope with the volatility and deal with unexpected events occur at any time. In general, businesses leverage ratio is high, has an adverse effect on the whole social and economic development, easily led to the decrease of the enterprise itself the economic benefits and losses and bankruptcies, deepen the entire social and economic development is not stable, increase the financial burden, cause inflation, not conducive to the transformation of industrial structure, and lower investment efficiency. Therefore, the enterprise capital structure should be in accordance with the business owners, creditors, and the public can bear the risk of the society in different aspects.译文资本结构理论与企业资本结构优化Ashkanasy N M摘要企业融资是现代企业经营决策的一项重要内容。
文献出处:Kadri Cemil Akyüz, İlker Akyüz, Hasan Serіn, et al. The financing preferences and capital structure of micro, small and medium sized firm owners in forest products industry in Turkey[J]. Forest Policy & Economics, 2016, 8(3):301-311.第一部分为译文,第二部分为原文。
默认格式:中文五号宋体,英文五号Times New Roma,行间距1.5倍。
土耳其林业行业微型以及中小企业的融资偏好和资本结构Kadri Cemil Akyqz, I˙lker Akyqz, Hasan SerJn, Hicabi Cindik卡德里杰米尔,拉克·阿基茨,哈桑·塞尔文,黑卡比克里迪克摘要:资本结构的大多数理论和实证研究都集中于大型企业。
对微型,中小型企业进行了数量有限的资本结构研究,在对影响家族企业主的资金决策的因素的调查是非常少的。
本研究探索MSMS公司所有者的资本结构和融资偏好,并更加侧重于林业产品行业中MSMS 公司的初始和持续融资中披露的债务与股本偏好。
在本研究中,土耳其黑海地区18个城市对林业产品行业的MSMS企业所有者的财务偏好进行了调查。
根据对851家企业的抽样调查,确定了这些部门的一些财务特征和资本结构。
从研究中得出的初步结果表明,MSMS 公司的所有者倾向于内部财务来源,反映在初始和持续的企业设施中,外部市场的成本资本过高。
关键词:土耳其小公司林业产品行业金融偏好财务结构小企业的一般特点五十年代和六十年代,垂直整合的大型企业集团框架内组建的大型生产单位几乎被普遍认为是经济社会发展总体模式中最重要的要素之一。
然而,随着1973年石油和能源价格冲击之后出现的动荡,出现了一些惨烈的案例,大型企业遇到经济困难,为了生存而被迫脱离劳动力(Henrekson和Johanson,1999 )。
优序融资名词解释
优序融资理论亦译为“啄食顺序理论”,是关于公司资本结构的理论。
1984年,美国金融学家迈尔斯与智利学者迈勒夫提出。
以信息不对称理论为基础,并考虑交易成本的存在。
该理论认为,公司为新项目融资时,将优先考虑使用内部的盈余,其次采用债券融资,最后才考虑股权融资,即遵循内部融资、外部债权融资、外部股权融资的顺序。
在MM理论的信息对称与不存在破产成本的前提假设条件下,该理论认为,当存在公司外部投资者与内部经理人之间的信息不对称时,由于投资者不了解公司的实际类型和经营前景,只能按照对公司价值的期望来支付公司价值,因此如果公司采用外部融资方式,会引起公司价值的下降,所以公司增发股票是一个坏消息。
如果公司具有内部盈余,公司应当首先选择内部融资的方式。
当公司必须依靠外部资金时,如果可以发行与非对称信息无关的债券,则公司的价值不会降低,因此债券融资比股权融资优先。
公众投资者比它迄今所做回吐。
承包商把生活中非常沉痛的教训至今。
他们做功课了。
承办商有变得非常不愿意把他们的出价为重建在华沙Grota Roweckiego桥由于许多错误和错误的设计文档。
本招标项目再次被推迟,由于招标文件的质量差由承包商提出异议。
这证明承包商学到了竞标自己的错误。
达留OkolskiOkolski律师事务所斯洛文尼亚目前发展的PPP在共和国斯洛文尼亚和本区域本报告的目的是介绍当前在公私合作的发展趋势在斯洛文尼亚和地区,重点是国际会议关于推进成果公私合作关系(PPP )在黑山和东南欧,这是在波德戈里察举行,黑山于2012年9月18-19日。
正如我们经常注意到在我们的国家斯洛文尼亚报道,一种气势在公私正在创建在斯洛文尼亚的合作伙伴关系由市政府,这是购买力平价的斯洛文尼亚车手在不同的领域- 社会住房,儿童日托,废管理,体育基础设施,文化建筑,停车场,公共照明,光伏,体育基础设施,智能城市的技术,信息和通信技术,道路维修,公共交通服务等。
在关于促进国际会议公私合作关系(PPP )在黑山和东南欧,这是在波德戈里察举行,黑山于2012年9月18-19日,它已经很明显,直辖市是不购买力平价只是在斯洛文尼亚,而且在主要推动力其他国家地区。
不管事实没有明确的政府政策,任何国家在地区并没有明确的制度支持,公私伙伴关系正在发展。
马其顿有在这方面要特别强调,与高数量的各种项目在市中水平,同时,黑山一些城市有报道了显着的购买力平价的经验。
我们绝不能忘了在克罗地亚的进展,基于强大机构状态的PPP机构。
很明显,需要和意愿是目前在所有国家中的地区实施购买力平价,但在另一方面,业务环境,缺乏专业技能和知识,制度上的支持和积极的政策期待而气馁的时刻。
因此,关于促进国际会议公公私伙伴关系(PPPs)的黑山和东南欧一致同意建立卓越的东南区域中心欧洲经委会国际主持下卓越的PPP中心传播在购买力平价和协助各国的最佳实践其实施地区。
MM理论及其发展——优序融资理论的发展及启示一、MM理论概述著名的美国经济学家Modigliani和Miller考察了企业资本结构和企业市场价值之间的关系,于1958年6月在《美国经济评论》上发表了《资金成本、公司财务和投资理论》。
他们在该文中认为,如果企业的投资决策与筹资决策相对独立,没有企业所得税和个人所得税,没有企业破产风险,资金市场充分有效运行,则企业的资本结构与企业价值无关,资本结构的调整和选择不影响企业的市场价值。
二、MM理论的发展MM理论发表以后,许多学者从不同角度对这一理论进行了修正。
如20世纪70年代出现的权衡理论、契约理论,并以此为起点形成的企业融资结构的代理理论、激励理论、信号传递理论和控制理论等。
1984年,Myers和Majluf在其名篇“Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have”中,根据信号传递的原理推出了他们的优序融资假说。
其假设条件是:除信息不对称外,金融市场是完全的。
首先假设公司宣布发行股票。
如果这一信息说明了公司有正净现金流的投资项目,对投资者而言这是一个好消息;如果这一信息说明公司管理者认为其资产价值被高估,对投资人就是一个坏消息。
(如果股票以很低的价格发行,价值会由原有股东向新股东转移;如果新股票价值被高估,价值以反方向转移。
)Myers和Majluf假设公司管理者代表老股东的利益,不愿意以低价发行新股而将老股东的利益向新股东转移,而一些价值被低估的好公司则宁可错过有净现值的投资机会也不愿意发行股票。
这是说股票发行公告会立即引起股票价格的下跌。
Myers和Majluf(1984)的模型简单明了,在公司发行新股进行投资时,原有股东所持有的股票市场价值为:V old=[P/(P+E)](E+S+a+b)其中,P为新股发行后老股东所持股票的市值;E为所要发行的股票价值;S为企业现金和短期证券之和;a和b分别为管理者对资产价值A 和投资项目净现值B的估计。
融资优序理论
融资优序理论是一种投资理论,它建议投资者在决定投资的时候考虑融资的因素,并根据这些因素来优化投资组合。
该理论强调投资者应根据融资情况来选择投资目标,以便最大限度地发挥自己的投资能力。
融资优序理论是由Merton Miller和Fischer Black 在1973年提出的,他们认为,投资者可以通过考虑融资因素来优化投资组合。
根据这一理论,投资者应该选择那些可以充分利用融资机会的项目,而不是那些没有融资机会的项目。
融资优序理论的基本思想是,投资者应该对融资的因素进行考虑,而不是被单一的投资目标所限制。
融资优序理论建立在风险-收益模型基础上,它认为,投资者应该尝试投资那些财务结构相对较好、可利用融资机会的投资目标,而不是那些没有融资机会的投资品种。
融资优序理论认为,投资者可以通过选择可以充分利用融资机会的投资目标,来提高投资组合的效率。
这意味着,投资者应该尝试投资那些财务结构相对较好、可以充分利用融资机会的投资目标,而不是那些没有融资机会的投资品种,这样可以使投资组合更加高效。
融资优序理论鼓励投资者考虑融资因素,以此优化投资组合。
同时,它也提供了一种方法,即通过分析融资来选择投资目标。
通过这种方法,投资者可以识别那些有融资机会的投资目标,从而最大限度地发挥自己的投资能力。
此外,融资优序理论也允许投资者改变投资组合的结构,根据融资的条件来重新分配资金,以便最大限度地发挥投资组合的效率。
总之,融资优序理论是一种基于风险-收益模型的投资理论,它强调投资者应该考虑融资因素,以便最大限度地发挥自己的投资能力,并优化投资组合。
文献出处:Cumming D, Fleming G, Schwienbacher A. Liquidity risk and venture capital finance [J]. Financial Management, 2005, 34(4): 77-105.原文Liquidity Risk and Venture Capital FinanceDouglas; Grant; SchwienbacherThis article provides theory and evidence in support of the proposition that venture capitalists adjust their investment decisions according to liquidity conditions on IPO exit markets. We refer to technological risk as a choice variable in terms of the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm in which the venture capitalist invests, and liquidity risk as the current and expected future external exit market conditions. We show that in times of expected illiquidity of exit markets (high liquidity risk), venture capitalists invest proportionately more in new high-tech and early-stage projects (high technology risk) in order to postpone exit requirements. When exit markets are liquid, venture capitalists rush to exit by investing more in later-stage projects. We further provide complementary evidence that shows that conditions of low liquidity risk give rise to less syndication. Our theory and supporting empirical results facilitate a unifying theme that links related research on illiquidity in private equity.Policymakers around the world often express concern about why there is not more investment in privately held early-stage companies. Further, the extreme cyclically of early-stage investment, and what the drivers are, remains a relatively unexplored issue in private equity and venture capital research. This article introduces a new and somewhat counterintuitive theory to facilitate an understanding of these issues. The US data examined herein support the theory.Venture capitalists ("VCs") invest in small private growth companies that typically do not have cash flows to pay interest on debt or dividends on equity. VCs invest in private companies over a period that generally ranges from two to seven years prior to exit. As such, VCs derive their returns through capital gains in exit transactions. IPO exits typically provide VCs with the greatest returns andreputational benefits (Gompers, 1996 and Gompers and Lerner, 1999,2001 ). Liquidity risk in the context of VC finance therefore refers to exit risk, particularly IPO exit risk. That is, liquidity risk refers to the risk of not being able to effectively exit and thus being forced either to remain much longer in the venture or to sell the shares at a high discount.4 The risk of not being able to effectively exit an investment is an important reason why VCs require high returns on their investments (Lerner, 2000, 2002; Lerner and Schoar, 2004, 2005). It is therefore natural to expect that exit market liquidity affects VCs' incentives to invest in different types of entrepreneurial firms.Liquidity risk is, of course, not the only type of risk that VCs face when deciding to invest in a particular project. The other types of risk may be grouped into a broad category of what we refer to in this article as technological risk, or the risk of investing in a project of uncertain quality (particular types of technological risk could include the quality of the product technology as well as the quality of entrepreneurs' technical and managerial abilities). This article considers whether changes in external conditions of liquidity risk give rise to adjustments in VCs' undertaking of projects with different degrees of technological risk.In particular, we investigate whether exit market liquidity affects the frequency of VC investment in nascent early-stage firms and hightech firms with intangible assets.5 We provide a theory and supporting empirical evidence that show the willingness of VCs to undertake projects of high technological risk is directly related to conditions of liquidity risk. We further provide complementary evidence that shows that external conditions of high liquidity risk give rise to more prevalent syndication, which in turn shows that while VCs assume more technological risk in periods of low liquidity, they take steps to mitigate this risk through syndication. We show that the theory and evidence in regards to liquidity risk introduced herein provides a unifying theme that links the results in a number of related papers on venture capital finance.It is important to point out that the ultimate source of the liquidity risk analyzed in this article is the difference in time preferences between VCs and management, since there is a greater incentive for VCs to cash out earlier than management. Thetime horizon of a VC is typically shorter because of his exit requirements. If Cs were long-term investors and would not wish to exit already after a few years, liquidity risk would not matter and incentives between VCs and management would probably be better aligned (provided managers are capable and wish to remain in place).With respect to early-stage investments, there are therefore two opposite effects documented in this article. On the one hand, more liquidity increases the likelihood of investing in new ventures; but on the other hand, it reduces the likelihood that these new ventures are in the early stage. In other words, liquidity increases the absolute number of new investments, but reduces the proportion of ventures that get early-stage finance relative to the total number of investments. These results thus indicate that VCs adjust their expected demand for liquidity to the expected supply. If they expect low liquidity in the future, they reduce their future demand for liquidity by reducing the absolute number of new ventures and by postponing the demand for liquidity for a portion of the new investments by financing ventures in their early stages.For such financial assets as publicly listed equity, there seems to be consensus about the concept of liquidity. Four different dimensions have been suggested to define the concept for traded assets (Harris, 2003; Kyie, 1985): width, immediacy, depth, and resiliency. Loosely speaking, liquidity refers to the ability to trade at low (explicit and implicit) transaction costs. KyIe (1985) further stresses the importance of continuous trading and frictionless markets to achieve perfect liquidity of assets.As for real estate or art objects, private equity is infrequently traded and thus the standard concept of liquidity hardly applies. Private equity investments are not continuously traded, since by definition they are private prior to the IPO. An important element that distinguishes private from public equity is that IPO markets are characterized by "hot" and "cold" issue phases and by clustering waves. In this article, liquidity is related to the possibility of exiting by either listing the company on a stock market or finding a strategic buyer. The notion of liquidity used here is closest to the dimension of immediacy, since here liquidity represents the likelihood of being able to divest (cost of immediacy). Das et al. (2003) show that this illiquidity mayinduce a substantial non-tradability discount.Finally, our evidence is consistent with the view that illiquidity is one reason why VCs require high returns on their investments (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a, 2001 ; see also Barry, Muscarella, Perry, and Vetsuypens, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lerner and Schoar, 2004; Cochrane, 2005; Das et al., 2003). Our evidence is consistent, in that the greater assumption of technological risk occurs at times when we may infer that the relative cost of financing innovative deals is lower. That is, in bust periods when illiquidity is high, it is generally viewed that the deal cost (in terms of the amount that a VC must pay for a given equity share in a company) is low; therefore, in bust periods, the cost of financing the more innovative companies is lower. This is consistent with our finding of a higher proportion of financings of early-stage firms in periods of exit market illiquidity.The issues considered in this article give rise to a number of questions and further research issues. Our sample was based on data from a randomly selected group of limited partnership VCs in the United States over the period 1985 - 2004. We considered a large number of robustness checks, many of which we have provided. An earlier version of this article reported other robustness checks, such as the exclusion/inclusion of Internet firms, and hot and cold markets; those excluded results were very supportive of the results explicitly reported herein. In Tables V-VII, we showed the robustness of the results to the inclusion and exclusion of the years 1999 and 2000, as well as of the years 1998-2001. We also explicitly showed the robustness of the results to numerous different explanatory variables.This article puts forth a theoretical model whereby VCs time their investments according to exit opportunities. When exit markets become less liquid, VCs invest proportionately more in new early-stage projects (relative to new projects in other stages of development) in order to postpone exit requirements and thus invest in riskier projects. As such, VCs trade-off liquidity risk against technological risk when exit markets lack liquidity. In contrast, when liquidity is high, VCs invest more in expansion-stage and later-stage projects where time until exit (investment duration) is reduced.译文流动性风险和风险资本融资道格拉斯;格兰特; 斯科威巴彻风险投资家会根据IPO退出市场的流动性状况来适时地调整他们的投资决策,本文对这一观点提供了理论和实证上的支持。
众筹投资融资外文文献翻译(含:英文原文及中文译文)文献出处:Klöhn L, Hornuf L, Schilling T. The Regulation of Crowdfunding in the German Small Investor Protection Act: Content, Consequences, Critique, Suggestions[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2015.英文原文The Regulation of Crowdfunding in the German Small InvestorProtection ActContent, Consequences, Critique, Suggestions(L Klöhn ,L Hornuf ,T Schilling)The German Bundestag has adopted the Small Investor Protection Act on 23 April 2015, which will enter into force in the coming weeks. By this Act the German legislator establishes for the first time – among other things –a regulation of the German crowdfunding market. This article describes the content of the act as relevant to crowdfunding, identifies its probable consequences, and examines the most important rules with respect to their regulatory effects. The authors conclude that despite some modifications that have been made in the course of the legislative process there still is an urgent need of improvement regarding some provisions.1 The German Crowdfunding and Crowdinvesting MarketThe promise of the Grand Coalition of the current German government to create a “reliable legal framework” for “new forms offinancing such as crowdfunding”2 is, supposedly, poised t o be fulfilled. On 23 April 2015, the German Bundestag (Federal Parliament) passed the Small Investor Protection Act (Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz) in its second and third reading,3 which for the first time contains regulation specifically for project and company financing through specialized internet platforms (crowdfunding and crowdinvesting)4. If the German Bundesrat (Federal Council)5 approves the act – which is assumed to be the case –it will enter into force in the coming weeks.6 The first Discussion Draft7 and the Draft Act of the German Federal Government8, which successively had been circulated since July 2014, have engendered criticism not only from the part of the German crowdinvesting industry,9 but also from academic literature.10 The Finance Committee of the Bundestag (Finanzausschuss) has engaged in an attempt to address these concerns in a last-minute recommendation,11 which resulted in the adoption of the Small Investor Protection Act reflecting the proposed amendments.The crowdfunding and crowdinvesting market is interesting not only from a legal perspective but also from an economic point of view: In Germany there are now approximately 80 crowdfunding platforms through which companies, real estate acquisitions, and projects from various other business and consumer areas are financed. The market for internet-based company financing (crowdinvesting)13 alone has reachedan impressive volume:14 At 18 May 2015, German crowdinvesting portals such as Seedmatch, Companisto, and Innovestment had underta ken more than 174 financings with a volume of almost € 41 million (excluding real estate and movie crowdinvesting). The following figures show the development of the market as well as the distribution of the total issuance volume of the 174 financings.Few investors were rewarded by their investments. In only four cases17 they were offered a premature exit possibility in the context of a follow-on financing through a venture capital fund. For example, when the start-up Smarchive (today: Gini) acquired financing by the venture capitalist T-Venture, investors could obtain a 25 % return within a year by timely accepting the start-up’s re-purchase offer. Other investors were less fortunate, in particular in at least 22 cases in which (preliminary) insolvency proceedings were commenced or applied for, or the opening of such proceedings was rejected for lack of assets, or operations ceased –sometimes a few weeks after the financing.2 Legal Situation Preceding the Small Investor Protection Act and IssuancesBefore the adoption of the Small Investor Protection Act neither crowdfunding nor crowdinvesting were specifically regulated in Germany.18 Its legal framework was found in general laws governing banking, capital markets, and trade regulation.19 The parties involved incrowdinvesting tried to avoid falling within the scope of this regulation to the greatest extent they could.Initially, crowdinvesting platforms brokered silent partnership interests and profit- participation rights, these being investments as defined by the German Investment Act (Vermögensanlagengesetz –VermAnlG). As these offerings did not exceed the threshold of € 100,000 per year, they qualified for an exemption from the prospectus requirement, § 2 no. 3 lit. b) Investment Act (as valid prior to the amendment). Since about November 2012, the platforms have moved to brokering subordinated profit-participating loans, these being roughly defined as loans (1) for which the interest rate depends on profits or revenue of the borrower, (2) which give the lender no rights in management of the borrower, (3) through which the lender has no exposure to losses of the borrower, and (4) which rank below other debts in an insolvency proceeding20 (partiarische Nachrangdarlehen). Because profit- participating loans did not qualify as investments under the Investment Act they permitted issuances in unlimited amount without a prospectus.21 Such offerings have experienced enormous demand in some cases. For example, the start-up Protonet took in € 200,000 in profit-participating loans in 48 minutes on 29 November 2012. Five issuers have taken in amounts of over € 1 million.3 Comparative Law EnvironmentThe German legislator does not enter virgin territory by regulating crowdfunding and crowdinvesting. Comparable regulation already exists in the United States (US), where the federal government has fashioned a tightly-knit legal fabric two years ago with the CROWDFUND Act (Title III of the JOBS Act).25 At the center of this regulation is an exemption from the prospectus requirement for the offering of securities through defined “funding portals” up to an amount of US$ 1 million. In place of the prospectus requirement there are less stringent disclosure obligations depending on the amount of capital collected. In addition, the US legislation provides for strict subscription limits for investors and detailed duties of the “funding portals”, and prevents the development of a secondary market by a resale prohibition on shares issued without a prospectus for one year after the offering. Other national legislators have adapted and modified parts of this regulatory scheme, most prominently the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Austria.4 Content4.1 Exemption from the Prospectus RequirementThe German Small Investor Protection Act closely follows the basic approach taken in the US model. The centerpiece of the act with respect to crowdfunding and crowdinvesting is the newly created § 2a Investment Act (VermAnlG), which establishes an exemption from the prospectus requirement stipulated in § 6 Investment Act for investments as definedby the Act. This “crowdfunding exemption” is required, because § 1 para.2 Investment Act as amended by the Small Investor Protection Act defines investments covered by the Act to include profit-participating loans, subordinated loans, and similar forms of financing – the forms of investment currently brokered by crowdinvesting platforms.The exemption applies only if the following conditions are fulfilled: The offering must be of investments within the meaning of § 1 para.2 no. 3, 4 or 7 Investment Act as amended by the Small Investor Protection Act, that is, of profit- participating loans, subordinated loans, or other similar financing forms and investments, which are subject to a prospectus requirement for the first time because of the revisions contained in the Small Investor Protection Act.The aggregate value of these investments issued by the company must not exceed € 2.5 million.The investments must be offered exclusively by means of investment consulting or investment brokerage via an internet platform. The exception does not extend to an issuer executing a direct offering without an internet brokerage platform (as was done in the case of the Bavarian company Giesinger Bräu).The crowdinvesting platform must have a legal obligation to monitor the subscription limit described below; it must be an investment service enterprise within the definition of the German Securities Trading Act(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz –WpHG) or be subject to monitoring by general trade regulatory authorities under §34f Trade Regulation Act (GewO).- Finally, the exemption cannot be relied upon if an investment of the issuer is being offered publicly under para. 1 no. 3 Investment Act or if a previous investment offering of the company in reliance on the exception has not been fully satisfied and redeemed.4.2 Investment Information SheetDespite the absence of a prospectus requirement, Investment Act require the issuer to prepare an investment information sheet (Vermögensinformationsblatt –VIB) and to submit it to the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienst- leistung saufsicht – BaFin). The investment information sheet, thus, has the function of making essential information about the investment available to potential investors. Investment Act requires that the investment information sheet contain a notice that no prospectus was prepared for the offering. Moreover, para. 6 Investment Act requires that the investment information sheet include a highlighted warning notice on its first page to be worded as follows: “The purchase of this investment is associated with significant risks and can result in a total loss of the money invested.”4.3 Subscription LimitsAs does the CROWDFUND Act, the exemption from the prospectus requirement in para. Investment Act requires investors which are not corporate entities to stay within certain subscription limits. Unlike the US model, German law only limits the amount that an investor may invest in the same issuer (single issuer limit), but not the amount that an investor may invest in the entire crowdfunding market (aggregate limit).As under the US statute, the exact amount of the subscription limit depends on the investor’s freely available assets and mo nthly net income: If the investor provides a statement that he or she has freely available assets of at least € 100,000, he or she can invest up to a maximum of € 10,000 in an issuer. If the investor does not have that amount of assets, the limit is twice the investor’s monthly net income, but in any case not more than€ 10,000. In all other cases (i.e. particularly if the investor does not provide the statement on assets and income), the investor is limited to a maximum investment of € 1,000.While the Draft Small Investor Protection Act did not make a distinction between potentially different types of investors such as, e.g., small and professional investors, the current subscriptions limits only apply to “investors which are not corporate entities”.4.4 AdvertisementWhile the Draft Small Investor Protection Act provided for a strict regulation of advertisement for investment offers, the legislator droppedthe major limitations in the course of the legislative procedure. The remaining provisions merely require notices and warnings, which have to be published together with the advertisement. Investment Act, the issuer has the obligation to include the same warning notice underlining the risk of a total loss of the investment as in the investment information sheet.In the case of advertisements in electronic media containing less than 210 letters, the legislator, as a concession in particular to crowdfunding portals, reduced these requirements to the provision of a clearly highlighted link labeled “warning” and referring to a separate document with the warning notice.Finally, the Small Investor Protection Act expands the enforcement powers of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Investment Act authorizes BaFin to prohibit issuers and offerors certain types of investment advertising in order to address wrongful advertising practices.中文译文“德国小投资者保护法案”中的众筹条例:内容、后果、批评、建议作者:L Klöhn ,L Hornuf ,T Schilling德国联邦议院于2015年4月23日采用了《小投资者保护法案》, 该法案将在未来几周内生效。
专题十一优序融资理论一、定义融资是现代企业资本运作活动的重要部分,融资方式本决定企业融资性质。
按照在西方发达国家得到普遍认同的梅耶斯“优序融资理论”(Pecking Order Theory),企业一般采取的顺序是:内源融资(留存收益和折旧)、债务融资、发行股票。
而在我国则存在强烈的股权融资偏好现象,即企业较多选择股权融资方式。
形成融资结构中股权融资比例过大的现象。
二、成因分析1.证券市场发展历史问题我国股票市场从它的诞生之日起就存在问题。
主要表现在:①从历史因素考虑,我国建立证券市场的根本目的是为国企脱困服务。
为充实资本金便允许国企到证券市场肆意圈钱,从而形成了中国资本市场的“圈钱运动”。
股权融资与资金短缺已不存在必然的联系,与股份制改革的初衷严重相违背。
②根据股份制基本原理,股份必须全流通,同股就同权、同利、同责、同险。
尽管流通股和非流通股的区别表面上看来仅仅在于是否可以流通,但实行上却是二者利益实现机制的不同。
一般认为非流通股股东会从控制大量自由现金流中获益。
③西方新股首次公开发行制度是“先钱后股”,即每一次的股东扩张都是先确定各方股东的出资价格与权益相同,而我国采取“先股后钱”的方式.使得原始股东即使在所持股票不流通的限制条件下,仍然获得巨大资本增值。
从而,将股票发行演变成上市公司的“圈钱”。
2.特殊股权结构设置我国上市公司的股权结构突出地表现为:①复杂性。
我国上市公司的普通股份为社会公众股、内资股、外资股。
在内资股中又有流通股及非流通股之分内部:外资股又根据其上市交易的市场分为B股、H股、S股及N股。
②流动性。
在我国上市公司股权结构中占很大比重的国家股、法人股和职工股只能通过协议转让,只有少数社会公众股可以上市交易,上市公司股权流动性非常有限。
③集中性。
我国上市公司的股权结构中国家股占据份额很大,再加上国有法人股,那么国有股在大多数公司就处于绝对控股地位。
据有关数据显示,2000年上市公司平均第一大股东持股比例为50.81%,前五大股东平均累计持股达66.08%。
欧阳数创编外文文献原稿和译文原稿IntroductionAlthough creditors can develop a variety of protective provisions to protect their own interests, but a number of complementary measures are critical to effectively safeguard their interests have to see the company's solvency. Therefore, to improve a company's solvency Liabilities are on the rise. On the other hand, the stronger a company's solvency the easier cash investments required for the project, whose total assets are often relatively low debt ratio, which is the point of the pecking order theory of phase agreement. Similarly, a company's short-term liquidity, the stronger the short-term debt ratio is also lower, long-term solvency, the stronger the long-term debt ratio is also lower .Harris et al. Well, Eriotis etc. as well as empirical research and Underperformance found that the solvency (in the quick ratio and interest coverage ratio, respectively, short-term solvency and long-term solvency) to total debt ratio has significant negative correlation. Taking into account the data collected convenience, this paper represents short-term solvency ratios and to study the long-term solvency by the quick ratio and cash flow impact onthe real estate debt capital structure of listed companies.Listed Companies Solvency AnalysisWhen companies need money, the choice of financing preference order, namely in accordance with retained earnings, issuance of bonds, financing order issued shares. According to this theory, strong corporate profitability, retained earnings more For financing first will consider retained earnings. Therefore, the profitability of the total debt ratio should be negatively correlated debt avoidance theory based natural surface that under otherwise identical conditions, a highly profitable company should borrow more debt, because they use avoidance of the need for greater debt, and therefore higher debt ratio. rapid growth of the company's financial leverage without the support, based on this, to select 378 samples from the 500 largest US companies, the researchers found that regardless of whether there is an optimal capital structure, the company's liabilities are directly correlated with growth.Growth is the fundamental guarantee company solvency, so whether short-term loans or long-term loans and creditors, as the company's growth as a positive signal, so the listed companies in recent years of growth, the higher its rate and short-term assets The higher rate of long-term assets and liabilities, total assets and liabilities naturally higher, but the impact on growth of real estatecompanies listed on a smaller debt ratio (coefficient is small). The risk of firm size and capital structure affect the growth has a similar conclusion, it appears that creditors, especially banks that the company scale is a measure of credit risk is an important consideration index, the greater the company size, the more stable cash flow, bankruptcy it is smaller, the creditors are more willing to throw an olive branch large-scale enterprises. The actual controller of the listed companies category to total debt ratio of the impact factor of a 0.040017, indicating that non-state-controlled listed company's total assets and liabilities higher than the state-owned holding companies. The reason for this phenomenon may be non-state-controlled listed companies pay more attention to control benefits, do not want to dilute their control over equity financing, and therefore more inclined to debt financing, which may also explain the non-state-controlled listed companies better use of financial leverage enterprises bigger and stronger impulses. In addition, the actual control of listed companies category short-term impact on asset-liability ratio is a 2.3 times its impact on long-term debt ratio, which shows the non-state-controlled listed companies prefer to take advantage of short-term debt to expand its operations.Current research on factors affecting capital structure point of view there are many factors invarious industries concerned is not the same, according to industry characteristics and particularity, we mainly focus on the following aspects to analyze the factors industry capital structure. The article explained variable - capital structure for the asset-liability ratio, generally refers to the total debt ratio, but for more in-depth study of capital structure of listed companies, the paper from the total debt ratio, short-term assets and liabilities and long-term debt ratio of three angles of Capital structure explanatory.At present, domestic and foreign scholars analyzed factors on capital structure mostly used multiple linear regression, as usual statistical regression function in the form of their choice is often subjective factors, but ordinary regression methods to make function with average resistance, most such functions excellent and objectivity are often difficult to reflect. base stochastic frontier model (Stochastic Frontier) in data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, estimate the effective production frontier using mathematical programming method, namely the experience of frontier production function, overcome DEA method assumes that there is no random error term, the better to reflect the objectivity and optimality ¨J function, currently in the field of economic management, sociology and medicine, began to get more and more applications. Therefore, inthis paper, stochastic frontier model data on the capital structure factors listed real estate companies conducted a comprehensive analysis, in order to provide a better scientific basis for the study of the optimal capital structure of real estate enterprises.Listed company's solvency and overall asset-liability ratio was significantly negatively correlated with short-term liquidity has a decisive influence on the short-term asset-liability ratio. Similarly, long-term solvency also has a decisive influence on long-term assets and liabilities. Industry higher total debt ratio particularly high proportion of short-term debt is one of the main business risks, thus increasing solvency of listed companies, especially short-term liquidity (that is, to obtain a stable short-term cash flow). reduce its asset liability ratio and effective risk management choice ROA of listed companies is much greater influence than ROE of asset-liability ratio, and affect the relationship is inconsistent, ROE is higher, the higher the total debt ratio, while the ROA high, the lower the rate of the total assets and liabilities, and short-term liabilities ROA more obvious, this difference is mainly due to the special structure of listed companies due to the nature of the capital, and therefore need to improve the capital structure of listed companies, namely to reduce the total assets and liabilities rate debt structure and the need to reduce theproportion of short-term debt in particular, in order to enhance the company's profitability ROA. growth and company size has a significant positive impact on the capital structure, which is mainly due to the growth of the company's solvency is fundamental, The size of the company is the main indicator to measure the bankruptcy creditor risk. Therefore, listed companies should be radically to grow through continuous growth and development of enterprises, so that the total debt ratio has a high margin of safety, through growth to continue to resolve the financial risk than non-state-owned holding companies controlling more use of financial leverage motivation and apparently relied on short-term liabilities, which may lead to more serious financial risk especially short-term business risks, so that the non-state-owned holding listed companies should establish more strict risk prevention system.译文介绍虽然债权人可以通过制定各种保护性条款来保障自己的利益,但都是一些辅助性的措施,能够有效保障他们利益的关键还得看公司的偿债能力。
优序融资理论1、梅耶斯和马吉劳夫的观点与支持1最早提出企业存在一个融资顺序的是唐纳森(1961)。
他指出,企业管理层对靠内部融资来解决所需要的资金有某种强烈的偏好,除非万不得已,管理层很少对外发行股票2。
后来,梅耶斯(Myers,1984)在资本结构(Capital Structure)3模型中引入了信息不对称理论,提出了优序融资理论4,并在他与马吉劳夫5(Majluf)的合作研究成果中进行了系统阐述。
其要点如下:在不对称信息条件下,管理层(内部人)比市场或投资者(外部人)更为了解企业收益和投资的真实情况。
由于信息的不对称,企业外部股票融资中的逆向选择问题就会产生,即:管理层只有在股价高估时才愿意发行股票;然而,在这种情况下自然不会有人愿意购买,这样就会导致企业投资决策的无效率。
逆向选择的逻辑表明,股权融资是一个坏消息,因而新股发行总会使股价下跌。
因此,如果企业被迫通过发行股票对新项目进行融资,股价过低可能会严重到新投资者获取的收益大于新项目的净现值。
在此情况下,即使新项目净现值为正,该项目也会被拒绝。
如果企业能够发行一种不至于如此严重地被市场低估的无风险证券,例如内部基金或无风险债券,这种投资不足就可以避免。
梅耶斯将此称为融资的顺序(Pecking order)理论,即首先是内源融资6,然后才是外源融资;在外源融资中,银行贷款是最重要的,然后才是低风险的债券融资,最后才不得不选择股权融资。
假设:N为企业需要的外部融资金额,N1为管理层根据内部信息所判断的企业股票应有价值,y=投资项目的净现值,?N?N1?N,管理层从原有股东的利益考虑,只有当y??N时才发行股票。
但是如果管理层所掌握的内部信息是对企业不利的话,即?N为负值,则y=0,意味着管理层只会情愿投资于净现值12本部分参考了沈毅峰著,1999,《资本结构理论史》,经济科学出版社,P177-202。
唐纳森,1961,“企业负债能力:关于企业负债政策与企业负债能力决定因素的一项研究”,哈佛大学研究部,P67。
文献信息:文献标题:Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on the Pecking Order Theory(西班牙企业的融资偏好:优序融资理论的实证研究)国外作者:Javier Sánchez-Vidal,Juan Francisco Martín-Ugedo文献出处:《Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting》, 2005, 25(4):341-355字数统计:英文2111单词,11535字符;中文3840汉字外文文献:Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on thePecking Order TheoryAbstract This paper analyses some of the empirical implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market using a panel data analysis of 1,566 firms over 1994–2000. The results show that the pecking order theory holds for most subsamples analyzed, particularly for the small and medium-sized enterprises and for the high-growth and highly leveraged companies. It is also shown that both the more and the less leveraged firms tend to converge towards more balanced capital structures. Finally, we observe that firms finance their funds flow deficits with long term debt.Keywords:capital structure, pecking order theoryIntroductionA prime contribution on information asymmetry in capital structure theory is the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. Myers and Majluf observe that the empirical evidence is not consistent with a financial policy that is determined by a trade-off of the advantages and disadvantages of market imperfections, mainly taxes, costs offinancial distress, and agency costs. Rather, companies’ financial policies seem to be better explained by the behaviour described by Donaldson (1961).He establishes a hierarchy described by company preference for internal funds over external funds; in the case of external funds, a company prefers debt first, then hybrid instruments like convertible bonds, and finally equity issues. This hierarchy, broadly characterized as pecking order theory, indicates that companies do not make financing decisions with the aim of achieving optimal leverage.Although they tend to be taken as the same thing, the pecking order theory and the Myers and Majluf (1984) model are not strictly speaking the same. The pecking order theory i s merely a description of companies’ financing policy, while the Myers and Majluf work represents the first model that attempts to describe this behaviour from a theoretical point of view, based on the presence of information asymmetry. Moreover, the Myers and Majluf (1984)model assumes listed companies and markets where equity is issued through firm commitments, such as the American market, not for markets where the predominant flotation method is rights offerings, such as Spain and most other countries.The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the pecking order theory in the Spanish market. The analysis takes two directions. First, we examine the evolution of the three largest accounting sources of funding for a company—retained earnings, equity issues and debt—using a model based on Watson and Wilson (2002).Second, we study the role of long-term debt in making up financing deficits, following the flow of funds deficit equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999).There are several features which distinguish the Spanish financial system from the American one. Probably the main difference affecting the pecking order is the flotation method in equity issues. Equity securities are issued in a wide variety of ways, mainly firm commitments underwritten offers and rights issues. The relative importance of these methods depends on the issuing firm’s country. In the United States rights offerings have declined in frequency, having virtually disappeared by 1980.In Spain, rights prevail. This difference may play an important role in the hierarchy described by the pecking order theory. In addition: (a)debt financing isprimarily raised privately in Spanish firms, thus banks play a very important role; and(b)the Spanish capital market is less developed than the American securities market, having lower capitalization and smaller transaction volumes. Although several papers have already examined the capital structure of Spanish firms, most of them have analyzed the effect of different variables on leverage. However, there is little evidence focusing on pecking order and no study employing the Watson and Wilson (2002) methodology.The results show that small and medium-sized companies behave consistently with predictions of the pecking order theory. When we divide the sample into subsamples on the basis of growth and the level of leverage, we see that high-growth companies base their growth on retained earnings, and firms with very high and very low debt ratios tend to converge towards more moderate debt ratios. Estimation of the flow of funds deficit equation shows that fund deficits are met by the use of long-term debt.The pecking order theory: Theoretical base and empirical evidence The pecking order theory describes a hierarchy in companies’ financial policy as follows: (1)Firms prefer to finance their investments with funds internally generated, namely, retained earnings and depreciation expenses; (2)firms base the dividend payout ratios on the future investment opportunity set and their expected cash flows;(3)payout ratios tend to be sticky in the short term, so in some years internally generated flows will be enough for financing company needs and in some years not;(4)funds obtained in years of financial surpluses, after payment of dividends and financing, are directed to finance short-term financial investments or to reduce debt. When there is a financial deficit, firms will seek external finance: first debt, then hybrid securities like convertible bonds, and finally equity issues.To explain this behaviour Myers and Majluf (1984) construct a model of information asymmetry assuming that firm managers act on behalf of current shareholders. If companies have enough financial slack, they will carry out allinvestments that have a positive net present value. If external funds are needed to finance new investments, the market will interpret equity issues as evidence that company shares are overvalued and thus issue announcement will have a negative impact on the share price.Thus, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, if the company does not have enough funds to finance new investments, it will issue equity only when there are very profitable investments that can neither be postponed nor financed through debt, or when managers believe that the stock is overvalued enough that shareholders will be disposed to tolerate the market penalty. The information asymmetry may cause current shareholders to renounce positive net present value investment projects in order to avoid a drop in share price due to the issue of equity, thereby creating an underinvestment problem. To avoid these results, it seems reasonable that companies will implement financing policies that allow them the capacity to finance investments and avoid external financing.However, the Myers and Majluf model (1984) has some limitations. The first is that it applies to markets like the American market where shares are offered mainly through firm commitment underwritings and not through rights issues, which is the flotation method that prevails in most other markets. In an underwritten firm commitment, shares are offered simultaneously to the public at large. Thus, if shares are overvalued, there will be a wealth transfer from new to current shareholders. In rights offerings, current shareholders enjoy priority in the purchase of new shares, which minimizes the possibility of wealth transfers. Therefore, the Myers and Majluf (1984) argument that equity issue is the last choice in firms’ financing policies has little currency in markets where rights issues are the prevalent method of equity issue.Another limitation of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model is that it is generally intended to describe listed companies, leaving the rest, mainly the small and medium-sized enterprises(SME),out of the explanation. Because of this, authors since then have tried to explain the pecking order theory using alternative arguments appropriate to non-listed SME companies.A major problem in SME financing, especially in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, islimited access to capital markets (a finance gap) (Holmes and Kent,1991).Financing choices for SME are thus usually reduced to retained earnings and bank loans. This finance gap can be divided into two components: a supply gap, because of limited availability of funds or higher cost, and a knowledge gap, because of limited knowledge about all the possibilities of external finance and a lack of awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of debt. As a consequence of these two components of the finance gap, the main long-term source of finance will be internal financing and, if necessary, bank loans.Another factor that may play a part in the hierarchy of firm choices is the motivation to retain control of the firm (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Hamilton and Fox, 1998).As we have noted, in a firm commitment offering stock is sold at one time to the general public; thus, current shareholders’ relative ownership of firm, as well as their control of the company may be diminished with new share offerings. Such a control problem may arise also in rights issues, but to a lesser extent, because current shareholders may have limited funds to invest in the first place or may want to diversify their investments, so they might not purchase additional shares to maintain their ownership percentage. As a result of all of this, the current shareholders would also be reluctant to issue equity.These factors mentioned above imply a similar hierarchy to the one described by Myers and Majluf (1984); that is, the company would make use of retained earnings in the first place, then debt (bank loans) and, finally, equity issues.Various authors have tried to test the empirical implications of the pecking order theory. Next, we briefly summarize some of them. Watson and Wilson(2002)use a descriptive model in the British market and confirm the pecking order theory, especially for closely-held companies(companies whose ownership is very concentrated and whose manager is usually the main owner).Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999)and Frank and Goyal(2003)study the way companies finance their flow of funds deficits. The former authors find evidence to support the pecking order theory; the latter find evidence of a target debt ratio. Mato(1990),in the Spanish market, studies financing flow of fund deficits, using anaccounting identity that includes share issues. He finds that companies tend not to use equity issues, but finance their needs primarily with debt. He also observes that debt and internal finance are mutually substitutable.Fama and French(2002)use structural equations that regress leverage and dividend payout as dependent variables on several explanatory variables from the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. They find no conclusive evidence in support of one specific theory.Lo′pez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias(2000)use Manova analysis to examine the relationship between variables proposed by the pecking order theory and financial constraints in the Spanish market. They find that the significance of internal finance varies according to company size. Saa′-Requejo(1996)uses a nested model with binary variables for Spanish companies to test the choice between internal or external finance and between equity and debt. He finds that companies care about whether the funds are raised publicly or privately and suffer from similar financial constraints, whether they are holding companies or not.Finally, Holmes and Kent(1991)and Ang and Jung(1992)use mail surveys to try to discern typical company financing policies. Both authors find that company managers follow a hierarchy of funding choices similar to the one described by the pecking order theory. Holmes and Kent(1991)find a stricter pecking order in place at SME than at larger companies.In short, many authors have tried to test the pecking order theory, but the evidence is not conclusive.ConclusionsWe have examined several empirical implications of the pecking order theory for a sample of 1,566 Spanish companies partitioned by size, growth, and previous debt level over 1994–2000.The pecking order theory states that firms follow a hierarchy when financing investments. Companies prefer internal funds to external funds; in case of externalfunds firms prefer debt first, with equity issues being their last choice. Given that Myers and Majluf’s (1984) argument is not valid in explaining this h ierarchy in markets like the Spanish where rights issues prevail, a finance gap and the motivation to retain control could help to explain such a hierarchy in these markets.For the whole sample, we find that retained earnings and debt have similar coefficients, higher than the equity issues coefficient, providing evidence of the duality of retained earnings and debt noted by Holmes and Kent(1991).In the case of different subsamples, small and medium-sized firms do seem to follow the pecking order predictions; the retained earnings coefficient exceeds the debt coefficient, which in turn exceeds the equity issues coefficient. Such results could be explained by a finance gap or by the motivation to retain control.Analysis of subsamples based on firms’ growth and previous debt level shows that these factors are very important in determining companies’ financing policies. High-growth companies resort to retained earnings, and then to debt, and finally to equity issues. That is, these firms follow the pecking order theory. Low-growth firms by contrast take a more balanced approach to financing. Analysis of high-leverage and low-leverage firms indicates these companies move towards more moderate debt levels.Finally, estimation of a flow of funds deficit equation reveals that companies tend to fund their financing deficits mainly with long-term debt.中文译文:西班牙企业的融资偏好:优序融资理论的实证研究摘要本文通过使用1994年—2000年西班牙市场的的1566家企业的固定样本数据分析优序融资理论的实证影响。