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什么是核心竞争力分析模型？1990年，美国著名管理学者加里·哈默尔和普拉哈拉德的核心竞争力（Core Competence）模型是一个著名的企业战略模型，其战略流程的出发点是企业的核心力量。
他们认为，随着世界的发展变化，竞争加剧，产品生命周期的缩短以及全球经济一体化的加强，企业的成功不再归功于短暂的或偶然的产品开发或灵机一动的市场战略，而是企业核心竞争力的外在表现。
按照他们给出的定义，核心竞争力是能使公司为客户带来特殊利益的一种独有技能或技术。
企业核心竞争力是建立在企业核心资源基础上的企业技术、产品、管理、文化等的综合优势在市场上的反映，是企业在经营过程中形成的不易被竞争对手仿效、并能带来超额利润的独特能力。
在激烈的竞争中，企业只有具有核心竞争力，才能获得持久的竞争优势，保持长盛不衰。
自内而外的企业战略（Inside-out Corporate Strategy）传统的自外而内（Outside-in）战略（例如：波特五力分析模型），总是将市场、竞争对手、消费者置于战略设计流程的出发点上。
核心竞争力理论恰好与其相反，认为从长远来看，企业的竞争优势取决于企业能否以低成本、并以超过对手的速度构建核心竞争力。
核心竞争力能够造就料想不到的产品。
竞争优势的真正源泉是企业围绕其竞争力整合、巩固工艺技术和生产技能的能力，据此，小企业能够快速调整适应变化了的商业环境。
核心竞争力是具体的、固有的、整合的或应用型的知识、技能和态度的各种不同组合。
Hamel和Prahalad在他们的《企业核心竞争力》（The Core Competence of the Corporation，1990）一文中，驳斥了传统的组合战略。
根据他们的观点，把战略事业单元（SBU）放在首位，是一个明显的时代错误。
Hamel和Prahalad认为，应该围绕共享的竞争核心来构建企业。
SBU的设置必须要有助于强化发展企业的核心竞争力。
企业的中心部门如财务不应该作为一个独立层面，它要能够为企业的战略体系链接、竞争力构建增加价值。
普拉哈拉德C.K.Prahalad、哈默尔G.Hamel《公司的核心竞争力》【中英对照】普拉哈拉德公司的核心竞争力1990年普拉哈拉德(C.K.Prahalad)和哈默尔(G.Hamel)在哈佛商业评论上发表?企业核心竞争力?(TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporation)1C)开展为“超大规模集成电路〞(VLSl)，通信方面那么从机械式纵横交换机演化为复杂的数字传输系统，即我们所说的ISDN(综合业务数字网)。
随着形势进一步开展，NEC认为，计算、通信和元件业务将逐渐重叠和交织在一起，以至于最后很难将它们区分开来。
如果一家公司具备了效劳于这三个市场的核心竞争力，那么到那时，必然会获得巨大的商机。
NEC的高层领导决定把半导体列为公司最重要的“核心产品〞(coreproduct)。
它随后与很多公司结成了战略联盟，到1987年联盟数量已到达100多个，其目的就是为了以低本钱快速构建企业的核心竞争力。
在大型主机领域，NEC最著名的合作伙伴是美国的霍尼韦尔公司(Honeywell)与法国的Bull公司。
在半导体元件领域，几乎所有的合作工程都是以获取技术为目的。
在结盟时，NEC的运营经理对合作动机和目的非常明确：吸收和消化合作伙伴的技能。
NEC的研发总监曾这样总结20世纪70年代和80年代获取技能的经历：“从投资角度分析，这种方式使我们能够以更低的本钱迅速掌握国外技术。
我们没有必要自己开发新的创意。
〞而GTE似乎并没有如此明确的战略意图和战略架构。
尽管高层决策者也曾讨论过信息技术的开展将带来怎样的影响，但对于在信息技术行业竞争将需要什么样的能力(competencies)，并没有形成一致的观点，更谈不上将其在公司中广泛传播了。
虽然公司做了大量工作来确认关键技术，但高层业务经理依然我行我素，仿佛他们经营的业务单元与别的单元毫不相干。
权力分散导致公司无法集中开展核心竞争力。
相反，各业务单元越来越依靠外面的公司来获得关键技能，而对外合作那么成了一种分阶段退出的途径。
普拉哈拉德公司的核心竞争力1990年普拉哈拉德(C.K.Prahalad)和哈默尔(G.Hamel)在哈佛商业评论上发表《企业核心竞争力》(TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporation)很多公司仍在苦苦寻找在全球竞争中克敌制胜的最有效方式。
20世纪80年代，人们评价某个高管有没有才能，主要看这个人能否重组公司、拨乱反正和精简层级。
然而，进入20世纪90年代后，人们评价高管时，将看他们有没有能力识别、培育和利用公司的核心竞争力(corecompetence，也称核心能力)，为公司的成长找到新的途径。
看来，高管们该重新思考一下公司这个概念本身了。
让我们首先以美国的GTE*和日本的NEC**两家公司为例，探讨十年来它们各自的发展轨迹。
20世纪80年代初期，信息技术已初显欣欣向荣的景象，GTE凭借自己的地位，极有希望成为该行业的主力军。
这家公司在电信业非常活跃，其业务横跨多个领域，包括电话、交换与传输系统、数字化专用自动小交换机(PABX)、半导体、分组交换、卫星、国防系统以及照明产品等等。
此外，GTE旗下的娱乐产品集团(EntertainmentProductsGroup)，也就是喜万年(Sylvania)彩电的制造者，在相关的显示器技术领域也占有一席之地。
1980年，GTE的销售额为99．8亿美元，净现金流17．3亿美元。
与之相比，NEC当时还只是一个小字辈，销售收入仅为38亿美元。
尽管拥有与GTE不相上下的技术基础和计算机业务，但NEC在电信领域尚无任何经验。
然而，到了1988年，NEC却后来者居上，销售额达到218．9亿美元，远远高于GTE公司的164．6亿美元。
这时，GTE实际上已经沦为一家以经营电话业务为主的公司，尽管它在国防和照明产品方面仍占有一席之地。
这家公司的其他业务从全球的角度看已经变得很小。
在过去的几年中，GTE公司已经把喜万年电视机和Telenet业务剥离了出去，把交换机、传输设备和数字PABX等产品转交给合资公司生产，而半导体业务则已关张大吉。
普拉哈拉德C.K.Prahalad、哈默尔G.Hamel《公司的核心竞争力》【中英对照】普拉哈拉德公司的核心竞争力1990年普拉哈拉德(C.K.Prahalad)和哈默尔(G.Hamel)在哈佛商业评论上发表《企业核心竞争力》(TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporation)很多公司仍在苦苦寻找在全球竞争中克敌制胜的最有效方式。
20世纪80年代，人们评价某个高管有没有才能，主要看这个人能否重组公司、拨乱反正和精简层级。
然而，进入20世纪90年代后，人们评价高管时，将看他们有没有能力识别、培育和利用公司的核心竞争力(corecompetence，也称核心能力)，为公司的成长找到新的途径。
看来，高管们该重新思考一下公司这个概念本身了。
让我们首先以美国的GTE*和日本的NEC**两家公司为例，探讨十年来它们各自的发展轨迹。
20世纪80年代初期，信息技术已初显欣欣向荣的景象，GTE凭借自己的地位，极有希望成为该行业的主力军。
这家公司在电信业非常活跃，其业务横跨多个领域，包括电话、交换与传输系统、数字化专用自动小交换机(PABX)、半导体、分组交换、卫星、国防系统以及照明产品等等。
此外，GTE旗下的娱乐产品集团(EntertainmentProductsGroup)，也就是喜万年(Sylvania)彩电的制造者，在相关的显示器技术领域也占有一席之地。
1980年，GTE的销售额为99．8亿美元，净现金流17．3亿美元。
与之相比，NEC当时还只是一个小字辈，销售收入仅为38亿美元。
尽管拥有与GTE不相上下的技术基础和计算机业务，但NEC在电信领域尚无任何经验。
然而，到了1988年，NEC却后来者居上，销售额达到218．9亿美元，远远高于GTE公司的164．6亿美元。
这时，GTE实际上已经沦为一家以经营电话业务为主的公司，尽管它在国防和照明产品方面仍占有一席之地。
这家公司的其他业务从全球的角度看已经变得很小。
经典公司核心竞争力普拉哈拉德哈默尔 C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel 1990年普拉哈拉德C. K. Prahalad和哈默尔G. Hamel在哈佛商业评论上发表《企业核心竞争力》The Core Competence of the Corporation 1990年普拉哈拉德C. K. Prahalad和哈默尔G. Hamel在哈佛商业评论上发表《企业核心竞争力》The Core Competence of the Corporationltlt隐藏很多公司仍在苦苦寻找在全球竞争中克敌制胜的最有效方式。
20世纪80年代人们评价某个高管有没有才能主要看这个人能否重组公司、拨乱反正和精简层级。
然而进入20世纪90年代后人们评价高管时将看他们有没有能力识别、培育和利用公司的核心竞争力core competencies为公司的成长找到新的途径。
看来高管们该重新思考一下公司这个概念本身了。
让我们首先以美国的GTE和日本的NEC 这两家公司为例探讨十年来它们各自的发展轨迹。
20世纪80年代初期信息技术已初显欣欣向荣的景象GTE凭借自己的地位极有希望成为该行业的主力军。
1980年GTE 的销售额为99.8亿美元净现金流17.3亿美元。
与之相比NEC当时还只是一个小字辈销售收入仅为38亿美元。
尽管拥有与GTE不相上下的技术基础和计算机业务但NEC在电信领域尚无任何经验。
然而到了1988年NEC却后来者居上销售额达到218.9亿美元远远高于GTE公司的164.6亿美元。
在这个过程中GTE公司的国际地位一路下滑。
1980到1988年间GTE在美国以外地区的销售收入从过去占总收入的20降到了15。
相比之下NEC却一跃成为世界半导体工业的领导者并且在电信产品和计算机领域也跻身一流企业。
为什么这两家在起步时业务组合基本相近的公司在几年后的表现却如此悬殊主要是因为NEC能够从“核心竞争力”的角度考虑企业问题而GTE却没有。
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译题目会计师事务所核心竞争力探究专业会计学外文题目The Core Competence of the Corporation 外文出处Harvard Business Review May-June 1990 外文作者普拉哈拉德原文：The Core Competence of the CorporationThe most powerful way to prevail in global competition is still invisible to many companies. During the 1980s, top executives were judged on their ability to restructure, declutter, and delayer their corporations. In the 1990s, they'll be judged on their ability to identify, cultivate, and exploit the core competencies that make growth possible indeed, they'll have to rethink the concept of the corporation itself.Consider the last ten years of GTE and NEC. In the early 1980s, GTE was well positioned to become a major player in the evolving information technology industry. It was active in telecommunications. Its operations spanned a variety of businesses including telephones, switching and transmission systems, digital PABX, semiconductors, packet switching, satellites, defense systems, and lighting products. And GTE's Entertainment Products Group, which produced Sylvania color TVs, had a position in related display technologies. In 1980, GTE's sales were $9.98 billion, and net cash flow was $1.73 billion. NEC, in contrast, was much smaller, at $3.8 billion in sales. It had a comparable technological base and computer businesses, but it had no experience as an operating telecommunications company.Yet look at the positions of GTE and NEC in 1988. GTE's 1988 sales were $16.46 billion, and NEC’s sales were considerably higher at $21.89 billion. GTE has, in effect, become a telephone operating company with a position in defense and lighting products. GTE's other businesses are small in global terms. GTE has divested Sylvania TV and Telenet, put switching, transmission, and digital PABX into joint ventures, and closed down semiconductors. As a result, the international position of GTE has eroded. Non U.S. revenue as a percent of total revenue dropped from 20% to 15% between 1980 and 1988.NEC has emerged as the world leader in semiconductors and as a first tier player in telecommunications products and computers. It has consolidated its position in mainframe computers. It has moved beyond public switching and transmission to include such lifestyle products as mobile telephones, facsimile machines, and laptopcomputers bridging the gap between telecommunications and office automation. NEC is the only company in the world to be in the top five in revenue in telecommunications, semiconductors, and mainframes. Why did these two companies, starting with comparable business portfolios, perform so differently? Largely because NEC conceived of itself in terms of "core competencies," and GTE did not. Rethinking the CorporationOnce, the diversified corporation could simply point its business units at particular end product markets and admonish them to become world leaders. But with market boundaries changing ever more quickly, targets are elusive and capture is at best temporary. A few companies have proven themselves adept at inventing new markets, quickly entering emerging markets, and dramatically shifting patterns of customer choice in established markets. These are the ones to emulate. The critical task for management is to create an organization capable of infusing products with irresistible functionality or, better yet, creating products that customers need but have not yet even imagined)This is a deceptively difficult task. Ultimately, it requires radical change in the management of major companies. It means, first of all, that top managements of Western companies must assume responsibility for competitive decline. Everyone knows about high interest rates, Japanese protectionism, outdated antitrust laws, obstreperous unions, and impatient investors. What is harder to see, or harder to acknowledge, is how little added momentum companies actually get from political or macroeconomic "relief." Both the theory and practice of Western management have created a drag on our forward motion. It is the principles of management that are in need of reform.NEC versus GTE, again, is instructive and only one of many such comparative cases we analyzed to understand the changing basis for global leadership. Early in the 1970s, NEC articulated a strategic intent to exploit the convergence of computing and communications, what it called "C&C" Success, top management reckoned, would hinge on acquiring competencies, particularly in semiconductors. Management adopted an appropriate "strategic architecture," summarized by C&C, and thencommunicated its intent to the whole organization and the outside world during the mid 1970s.NEC constituted a "C&C Committee" of top managers to oversee the development of core products and core competencies. NEC put in place coordination groups and committees that cut across the interests of individual businesses. Consistent with its strategic architecture, NEC shifted enormous resources to strengthen its position in components and central processors. By using collaborative arrangements to multiply internal resources, NEC was able to accumulate a broad array of core competencies.NEC carefully identified three interrelated streams of technological and market evolution. Top management determined that computing would evolve from large mainframes to distributed processing, components from simple ICs to VLSI, and communications from mechanical cross bar exchange to complex digital systems we now call ISDN. As things evolved further, NEC reasoned, the computing, communications, and components businesses would so overlap that it would be very hard to distinguish among them, and that there would be enormous opportunities for any company that had built the competencies needed to serve all three markets.NEC top management determined that semiconductors would be the company's most important "core product." It entered into myriad strategic alliances over 100 as of 1987 aimed at building competencies rapidly and at low cost. In mainframe computers, its most noted relationship was with Honeywell and Bull. Almost all the collaborative arrangements in the semiconductor component field were oriented toward technology access. As they entered collaborative arrangements, NEC’s operating managers understood the rationale for these alliances and the goal of internalizing partner skills. NEC's director of research summed up its competence acquisition during the 1970s and 1980s this way: "From an investment standpoint, it was much quicker and cheaper to use foreign technology. There wasn't a need for us to develop new ideas.”No such clarity of strategic intent and strategic architecture appeared to exist at GTE. Although senior executives discussed the implications of the evolvinginformation technology industry, no commonly accepted view of which competencies would be required to compete in that industry were communicated widely. While significant staff work was done to identify key technologies, senior line managers continued to act as if they were managing independent business units. Decentralization made it difficult to focus on core competencies. Instead, individual businesses became increasingly dependent on outsiders for critical skills, and collaboration became a route to staged exits. Today, with a new management team in place, GTE has repositioned itself to apply its competencies to emerging markets in telecommunications services.The Roots of Competitive AdvantageThe distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of themselves a portfolio of competencies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now over;whelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Canon has given us personal copiers; Honda has moved from motorcycles to four wheel off road buggies. Sony developed the 8mm camcorder, Yamaha, the digital piano. Komatsu developed an underwater remote controlled bulldozer, while Casio's latest gambit is a small screen color LCD television. Who would have anticipated the evolution of these vanguard markets?In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting. Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements that bring technological sophistication to everyday products. Japanese car producers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve-per cylinder engines, in car navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the strength of its product features, Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission machines, desktop laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment.In the short run, a company's competitiveness derives from the price/performance attributes of current products. But the survivors of the first wave ofglobal competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In the long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The real sources of advantage are to be found in management's ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities.Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core competencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western companies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the ability of individual businesses to fully exploit the deep reservoir of technological capability that many American and European companies possess.The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its leaves. (See the chart "Competencies: T he Roots of Competitiveness.”) Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sony's capacity to miniaturize or Philips's optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision casing the same skills it applies in its miniature card calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches.If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sony's competencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products, Sony must ensure that technologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in services as in manufacturing. Citicorp was ahead of others investing in an operating system that allowed it to participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its competence in provided the company the means to differentiate itself from many financial service institutions.Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The skills that together constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting ways.Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for new business development. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets.Consider 3M's competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as "Post it" notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has brought to bear widely shared competencies in substrates, coatings, and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely diversified portfolio of businesses belies a few shared core competencies.In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential to build corecompetencies but failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of the company as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its competitiveness in this sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key businesses to competitors who were already competence leaders Black & Decker in small electrical motors, and Thomson, which was eager to build its competence in microelectronics and had learned from the Japanese that a position in consumer electronics was vital to this challenge.Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set almost inevitably finds its individual businesses dependent on external sources for critical components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies.Source:Harved Business Review May-June 1990译文：公司的核心竞争力很多公司仍在苦苦寻找在全球竞争中克敌制胜的最有效方式。
