上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效外文文献翻译最新

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firmperformanceExecutive compensation has been a central research topic in economics and business during the past two decades, recently gaining impetus in the wake of corporate scandals that have exposed significant vulnerabilities in corporate governance and the subsequent far reaching regulatory changes (Sarbanes–Oxley). Prior research into executive compensation has primarily focused on issues related to the level and structural mix of compensation packages, and their sensitivity to firm performance (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Yermack 1995; Baber et al. 1996; Hall and Liebman 1998; Core et al. 1999; Murphy 1999; Bryan et al. 2000). Early compensation studies focused on the CEO, subsequently expanding the scope to the compensation of the entire managerial team. Thus, for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) report that managers with divisional responsibilities have lower pay–performance sensitivities than do managers with broad oversight authority, who in turn have lower pay–performance sensitivities than does the CEO, concluding that pay–performance sensitivity increases with the span of authority. Similarly, Barron and Waddell (2003) examine the characteristics of compensation packages of the five highest paid executives and find that higher rank managers have a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation in pay packages than do lower ranked executives.The issue of pay dispersion across managerial team members has received conceptual attention by labor economists and organization theorists, yet scant empirical research has been performed to date. In this study, we investigate empirically the effect of managerial compensation dispersion on firm performance.We draw on two competing models—the tournament theory and equity fairness arguments—to formulate our hypotheses: Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen,1981) views the advancement of executives in the corporate hierarchy as a tournament in which individuals compete for promotion and rewards. High-performing executives with considerable managerial potential win promotion and commensurate compensation. A large spread of compensation across corporate hierarchical levels attracts talented and venturesome participants to compete in the managerial tournament, providing extra incentives to exert effort. The winners’ talent and the extra effort exerted will, according to the tournament model, translate to high firm performance.The empirical evidence on the tournament theory is rather limited and results are mixed. Supporting evidence comes from studies of sport activities (Ehrenberg and Bognanno,1990; Becker and Huselid,1992) and by controlled experiments (Bull et al.,1987). In business settings, Main et al. (1993), using survey data for top executives in 200 US firms, during 1980–1984, report that a greater spread of top-executive compensation is positively related to firm performance. Similarly, based on proprietary data of 210 Danish firms during 1992–1995, Eriksson (1999) provides somewhat weak evidence that higher pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance. In contrast, O’Reilly et al. (1988) do not find support for the tournament argument in a sample of 105 Fortune 500 firms, and Conyon et al. (2001) report that variation in executive compensation is not associated with enhanced firm performance in a sample of 100 UK firms in 1997.In contrast with the tournament model, notions of equity fairness postulate that the quality of social relations in the workplace affect firm performance (Akerlof and Yellen,1988,1990; Milgrom,1988; Milgrom and Roberts,1990) and that large pay dispersion adversely affects employee relations and morale, leading to counterproductive organizational activities, which eventually reduce firm performance. Supporting evidence for the adverse effects of wage dispersion on performance is also limited. Using a sample of university faculty, Pfeffer and Langton (1993) report that greater wage dispersion within academic departments reducesfaculty satisfaction as well as research productivity and collaboration among colleagues. There is also some preliminary evidence in business settings (Drago and Garvey,1998) that supports the argument for equity fairness.In this study we examine a sample of 12,197 firm-year observations for 1,855 US companies spanning the period 1992–2003, and find that firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q and alternatively by stock returns, is positively associated with the compensation dispersion of the firm s’ top-management team. Additionally, we document that firms with large compensation dispersion have higher future return on assets (ROA) than comparable lower pay dispersion companies. Collectively, our results suggest that the compensation dispersion of the top management team is positively related to firm performance.Our analysis also indicates that the association between firm performance and pay dispersion is conditional on agency costs and corporate governance structure. Specifically, high pay dispersion is associated with better performance in firms with high agency costs related to managerial discretion (e.g., firms with large R&D expenditures). This finding supports the notion that in firms with assets or activities that are difficult for shareholders to monitor, a greater pay dispersion mitigates some of the managers–shareholders agency costs by motivating managers to improve long-term firm performance. Our findings are also consistent with prior studies’ result that firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to substitute direct monitoring with equity-based compensation incentives to reduce agency costs of managerial discretion (Smith and Watts,1992; Gaver and Gaver,1993; Bryan et al.,2000). We further find that the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion is stronger for firms with more effective corporate governance. Specifically, firms with a high proportion of outside directors on the board and with CEOs who are not board chair have a stronger positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion. Thus, our results corroborate the complementary roles of compensation contracts and corporate governance in reducing agency costs (Mehran,1995; Hartzell and Starks,2003).This study contributes to the managerial compensation research on severaldimensions. Primarily, it provides comprehensive and updated evidence that managerial compensation dispersion is positively associated with firm performance. Pay dispersion per se was so far a somewhat neglected area in managerial compensation research. Our study thus contributes to recent research that focuses on the executive-team compensation (Aggrawal and Samwick,2003; Barron and Waddell,2003), compared to prior compensation research that was often restricted to the CEO. This study also extends the literature on the interaction between corporate governance and the structure of managerial compensation. For the corporate governance strand of research we show that improved governance structures (such as a higher proportion of independent board members and separation of the CEO and Chairman positions) enhances the positive association between pay dispersion and firm performance. Thus, corporate governance and managerial pay dispersion are complementary and perhaps mutually enhancing mechanisms for strengthening firm performance. In the context of shareholders–mangers agency costs, we provide evidence suggesting that managerial pay dispersion can potentially mitigate agency costs in firms that are difficult to monitor. More generally, our study supports the notion that the structure of executive compensation affects agency costs and firm performance.Prior research and our hypotheses1. Tournament theoryThis theory (Lazear and Rosen,1981) views the advancement of executives in a corporate hierarchy as a contest in which individuals compete for promotion and rewards. High-performing executives win promotions and receive prizes in the form of generous pay and perks in their new positions. The compensation spread across hierarch ical levels (large‘‘prizes’’ at the top) provides extra incentives to participate in the managerial ‘‘tournament’’ and exert considerable efforts to win the top prize. The main elements of the tournament theory are as follows: (i) Tournaments reward players with prizes based upon relative performance. The best performer receives the largest prize while the worst performer receives the smallest. (ii) Rewards are intrinsically nonlinear. (iii) The spread in prizes increases with the number ofcompetitors. (iv)Participants with low ability will choose higher risk strategies to increase the probability of winning. Thus, a participant’s ability is negatively related to the variability of his/her performance.Empirical evidence supporting the tournament theory was obtained in sport settings. For example, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) examine the performance of golfers and conclude that as prize differentials increase, players’ performance improves. Becker and Huselid (1992) examine the performance of drivers in professional auto racing, and report that pay dispersion has positive incentive effects on both individual performance and driver safety. In a business setting, Main et al. (1993) use survey data for 200 firms during 1980–1984 and report that pay differential increases substantially as one ascends the corporate hierarchy, consistent with tournament theory’s prediction that extra weight on top-ranking prizes motivates participants to aspire to higher goals, and that the dispersion in top compensation increases with the number of contestants. The main finding of Main et al. (1993) is that firm performance is positively associated with executive pay dispersion. In a similar vein, Bognanno (2001) reports that the CEO pay rises with the number of vice-presidents competing for the top position. However, he finds that inconsistent with the tournament prediction, firms do not maintain short-term promotion incentives, as longer time in position prior to promotion reduces the effect of pay increase from the promotion. Finally, Conyon et al. (2001) examine a sample of 100 large UK firms during 1997–1998 and find no evidence that larger pay dispersion is positively associated with improved firm performance. O’Reilly et al. (1988) report similar findings for the United States. Thus, the business-setting evidence on the tournament theory is mixed and somewhat dated.2. Equity fairnessEconomic theory asserts that in equilibrium wages are equal to employees’ marginal productivities. Such mainstream thinking has been challenged: Drawing on social exchange models, equity notions, and related work in sociology and psychology, Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1988), and Levine (1991) argue that low pay dispersion may have a positive effect on employee efforts andproductivity by creating harmonious and efficient labor relations thereby leading to higher output and productivity. In a similar vein, Levine (1991) develops a model showing that lowering pay dispersion can increase employee cohesiveness, which in turn will enhance productivity.Further insight into the economic efficiency associated with a low pay dispersion is provided by Lazear (1989), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990): If promotion and salaries are based on relative rather than individual performance, as postulated by tournament theory, then employees will advance not only by performing well, but also by seeing to it that their rivals perform poorly. Consequently, employees have weaker incentives to cooperate, and in extreme cases may engage in outright sabotage of others’ activities. To mitigate this, a firm may encourage cooperation by, among other things, reducing pay dispersion. Low dispersion may reduce effort, but at the same time increase cooperation. Thus, in general, it is optimal on productivity grounds to compress wage structure, to some extent, to promote cooperation (Lazear,1989).4 In a similar vein, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) use the principal-agent framework to suggest that employees may engage in rent-seeking activities to secure influence over organizational decision processes. Such influence-oriented activities arise when organizational decisions affect the distribution of wealth or other benefits among members or constituent groups. In their selfish interest, the affected individuals attempt to influence the decision process to their benefit. Furthermore, if firms cannot perfectly monitor output, workers may have incentives to exaggerate their output and lobby for higher wages. Thus, for example, the proponents of a project (e.g., R&D) may devote excessive effort to build the best possible case for investing in that project, hiding potential difficulties and focusing on the upside, while at the same time trying to denigrate competing proposals. Such arguments have led Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to promote wage compression under certain circumstances to alleviate these counterproductive activities.Empirical tests of the above equity fairness arguments include the work of Pfeffer and Langton (1993), who report that the higher the wage dispersion of university faculty, the lower their satisfaction and research productivity and the lesslikely it is that faculty members will collaborate on research. Similarly, Cowherd and Levine (1992) report a positive relationship between product quality and various measures of interclass pay equity (low wage dispersion). Drago and Garvey (1998) report that strong promotion incentives are associated with reduced employee cooperation and individual efforts. Contradicting the equity fairness predictions, Hibbs and Locking (2000) report that compression of wage dispersion in Swedish companies depressed output and labor productivity.Source: Kin Wai Lee,Baruch Lev,Gillian Hian Heng Yeo,2008"Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance,and firm performance".Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting , V ol.30,pp.315-338.译文：高管薪酬分散，公司治理，与企业绩效管理人报酬在过去二十年来是经济和商业中心的研究课题，最近在公司丑闻曝光后，已获得在公司治理中的漏洞和随后的重大深远（萨班斯）监管改革的动力。

文献出处：Asia Pacific Journal of Management volume 36, pages1111–1164(2019)原文：Interactive effects of executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance: Evidence from an Asian marketAbstract：Much of the management compensation literature focuses either on the level and structure of executives’ pay or the pay-for-performance sensitivity in a set of corporate governance structure in the Western economies. In this study, we examine the interactive effect of executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in different institutional and governance settings of an emerging market economy. Capturing monitoring and incentive alignment aspects as suggested in agency theory, we argue that in a markedly different executive compensation system in Thailand, the interrelationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance would exhibit some similarities to those found in developed economies. While there remains sparse research on how these relationships operate in Thailand, using data for 432 publicly listed Thai firms between 2000 and 2011, we find evidence of a reciprocal positive significant relationship between compensation and performance, as well as between corporate governance and performance. However, a reciprocal relationship is not found between corporate governance and compensation, which shows a mono-directional positive significant relationship running from corporate governance to compensation. These findings show similarities with those of developed economies and provide support for the need for an effective governance system to determine optimal executive compensation that will enhance firm performance and value. Our findings thus add some potentially noteworthy dimensions to the compensation literature that are especially important to policy makers and other stakeholders, and aiming to shape an optimal governance system in the emerging markets around the world.The relationship between executive compensation, firm performance andcorporate governance is a topical research area in contemporary governance literature. As predicted by agency theory, governance scholars have long proposed methods for monitoring and designing incentive alignment for executive compensation contracts in modern corporations to address agency problems, whereby ownership is separated from control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-Soler, 2014). Much of the literature on management compensation focuses either on the level and structure of executive compensation or compensation-for-performance sensitivity in a set of corporate governance structures in Western economies (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Murphy, 1999; Bryan, Hwang, & Lilien, 2000; Frydman & Saks, 2010a; Grundy & Li, 2010; Goergen & Renneboog, 2011; Pepper, Gore, & Crossman, 2013; Reddy, Abidin, & You, 2015). Other studies highlight the mono-directional relationship between firm performance and executive compensation, between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance, and between internal corporate governance and executive compensation (Cyert, Sok-Hyon, & Kumar, 2002; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Lee, Lev, & Yeo, 2008; Sapp, 2008; Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010; Conyon & He, 2011; Ozkan, 2011;Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012; Schultz, Tian, & Twite, 2013).While a few studies explore the ‘bi-directional’ relationships between firm performance and executive compensation with complementary corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. Lee et al., 2008; Huang & Chen, 2010; Smirnova & Zavertiaeva, 2017; Buachoom, 2017), only one study uses 1 year contemporaneous data and a three stage least squared (3SLS) approach to investigate the ‘tri-directional’ relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in the South African market (e.g. Ntim, Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 2015). Despite the voluminous research in this field, the extant literature reports mixed and inconclusive findings and there is a lack of clear evidence of robust relationships. The diversity and inconsistencies in the empirical findings are possibly due to not addressing the causal relationships between the governance mechanisms that are endogenously determined in a firm’s contracting and operating environments (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015) and to differences in country-specific institutionalfactors/characteristics and methodological approaches/choices (i.e. assumptions and hypotheses adopted, sample periods and size, and variables selected etc.) adopted by researchers (Farooque, 2010). However, the tri-directional (i.e. simultaneous/causal/endogenous) relationships between compensation, performance and governance have never been investigated in the literature using the dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM).In this paper, we investigate the reciprocal and dynamic relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in listed firms in Thailand – an Asian emerging market.Footnote1 Unlike prior studies, we attempt to provide a more nuanced view of the broader interactive (i.e. tri-directional) relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in Thailand. In fact, the issue of interactive relationships between them is heavily under researched in the literature, both in developed and emerging-market countries. Compared to Western countries, emerging countries typically have distinct institutional and governance characteristics, along with less developed legal and other public institutions and enforcement mechanisms for the protection of investor rights. Our study is largely motivated by the fact that Thailand has a poor institutional environment with weak legal rights and weak investor protection. Although Thailand adopted the key elements of the corporate governance principles of OECD countries after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, compared to the U.S. and other OECD countries, Thailand typically has a less-developed and weaker institutional environment where protection of investor rights is poor. As a result, minority shareholders are less well protected from expropriation by controlling shareholders. Therefore, it is unclear whether the relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in prior studies can be generalised to Thailand due to the unique characteristics of its listed firms that are derived from its development status, social background and political environment. To date, few studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Thailand, as wellas the success of the corporate governance system in protecting shareholders’ interests (Alba, Claessens, & Djankov, 1998; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Kim, Kitsabunnarat, & Nofsinger, 2004; Yammeesri & Herath, 2010; Meeamol, Rodpetch, Rueangsuwan, & Lin, 2011). The current study attempts to fill this research gap by examining the interrelationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in Thai listed firms.Theory, literature and hypotheses：Theoretical perspectiveAlthough the vast majority of the literature grounded in agency theory reports that the agency problem may arise between principals and agents (Type I), a limited yet growing stand of studies show that conflicts between principals and principals (Type II) are also common in certain contexts, particularly in emerging markets. Agency theory explains that when control is separated from ownership, it generally leads to some conflicts of interest between owners and executives or agents, as well as between majority/controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, especially in the case where some majority shareholders become executives of the firm (Anderson et al., 2007; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) contend that the private benefits from control rights (opportunism) are frequent manifestations of the agency problem that need to be addressed. Both types of agency problem typically incur huge costs to corporations that result from the controller’s private benefits being detrimental to the value of the firm. To protect the interests of owners, to ensure interest alignment and to deter the non-stewardship behaviour of the controlling party, agency theory suggests that an effective governance system is a suitable strategy for reducing agency costs (Conheady, McIlkenny, Opong, & Pignatel, 2015). That is, in order to enhance performance, firms need to establish some governance mechanisms as a monitoring system (for protecting owners’ interest) and incentive (for convergence of interest) instruments to mitigate conflicts of interest among participants of the firm (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). Corporate governance protects shareholders’ interests by setting up these mechanisms to effectively reduce the impact of the agency problem(Nam & Nam, 2004; Velnampy, 2013). There are two strategies to address conflicts, ‘regulatory’ and ‘governance’: regulatory strategies rely on rules, standards, or laws to eliminate the conflicts between agents and principals of the firm, and governance strategies include ‘monitoring’ and ‘incentive’ provisions (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004).译文：高管薪酬、公司绩效与公司治理的互动效应:来自亚洲市场的证据摘要：许多管理薪酬文献关注的要么是高管薪酬的水平和结构，要么是西方经济体一套公司治理结构中的绩效薪酬敏感性。

高管薪酬和激励外文翻译外文题目Executive Compensation And Incentives 外文出处 Acodemy of Management Perspectives,20062:p25-40 外文作者 Martin J. Conyon原文:Executive Compensation And IncentivesMartin J. ConyonExecutive compensation is a complex and controversial subject. For many years, academics, policymakers, and the media have drawn attention to the high levels of pay awarded to U.S. chief executive officers CEOs, questioning whether they are consistent with shareholder interests. Some academics have further argued that flaws in CEO pay arrangements and deviations from shareholders’ interests are widespread and considerable. For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried provide a lucid account of the managerial power view and accompanying evidence. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan too provide an analysis of the ‘skimming view’ of CEO pay. In contrast, John Core et al. present an economic contracting approach to executive pay and incentives, assessing whether CEOs receive inefficient pay without performance. In this paper, we show what has happened to CEO pay in the United States. We do not claim to distinguishbetween the contracting and managerial power views of executive pay. Instead, we document the pattern of executive pay and incentives in the United States, investigating whether this pattern is consistent with economic theory.The Context: Who Sets Executive Pay Before examining the empirical evidence presented in this paper, it is important to consider the pay-setting process and who sets executive pay. The standard economic theory of executive compensation is the principal-agent model. The theory maintains that firms seek to design the most efficient compensation packages possible in order to attract, retain, and motivate CEOs, executives, and managers. In the agency model, shareholders set pay. In practice, however, the compensation committee of the board determines pay on behalf of shareholders. A principal shareholder designs a contract and makes an offer to an agent CEO/ manager. Executive compensation ameliorates a moral hazard problem i.e., manager opportunism arising from low firm ownership. By using stock options, restricted stock, and long-term contracts, shareholders motivate the CEO to imize firm value. In other words, shareholders try to design optimal compensation packages to provide CEOs with incentives to align their mutual interests. This is the contract approach to executive pay. Following Core, Guay, and Larcker, an efficient or optimal contract is one “tha t imizes the net expected economic value to shareholders after transaction costs such ascontracting costs and payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying this is that contracts minimize agency costs.”Several important ideas flow from this definition. First, the contract reduces manager opportunism and motivates CEO effort by providing incentives through risky compensation such as stock options. Second, the optimal contract does not imply a “perfect” contract, only that the firm designs the best contract it can in order to avoid opportunism and malfeasance by the manager, given the contracting constraints it faces. Third, in this arrangement, the firm does not necessarily eliminate agency costs, but instead evaluates the marginal benefits of implementing the contract relative to the marginal costs of doing so. Improvements in regulation or corporate governance can possibly alter these costs and benefits, making different contracts desirable. Moreover, what is efficient at one point in time may not be at another. Improvements in board governance, for example by adding independent directors, may lead to different patterns of compensation, stock, and option contracts that are desirable for one firm but not another.An alternative theory is that CEOs set pay. This is the managerial power view, exemplified recently by Bebchuk and Fried. In this theory, the board and compensation committee cooperate with the CEO and agree on excessive compensation, settling on contracts that are not in shareholders’ inte rests. This excess pay constitutes an economic rent,an amount greater than necessary to get the CEO to work in the firm. The constraints the CEOs face are reputation loss and embarrassment if caught extracting rents, what Bebchuk and Fried call “outrage costs.” Outrage matters because it can impose on CEOs both market penalties such as devaluation of a manager’s reputation and social costs?the social costs come on top of the standard market costs. They argue that market constraints and the social costs coming from excessively favorable pay arrangements are not sufficient in preventing considerable deviations from optimal contracting.Executive CompensationThere is substantial disclosure about U.S. executive compensation. The Securities and Exchange Commission SEC expanded and enhanced disclosure rules for U.S. executives in 1992. As a result, the proxy statements of firms contain considerable detail on stock ownership, stock options, and all components of compensation for the top five corporate executives. There are four basic components to executive pay, each having been the subject of much research. First, executives receive a base salary, which is generally benchmarked against peer firms. Second, they enjoy an annual bonus plan, usually based on accounting performance measures. Third, executives receive stock options, which represent a right, but not the obligation, to purchase shares in the future at some pre-specified exercise price. Lastly, pay includes additional compensation such asrestricted stock, long-term incentive plans, and retirement plans.Executive IncentivesWe now turn to executive incentives and the link between pay and firm performance. The evidence demonstrates that executive compensation and the fraction of pay accounted for by option grants increased during the 1990s. Principal-agent theory predicts that a firm designs contracts in order to yield optimal incentives, therefore motivating the CEO to imize shareholder value. In designing the contract, the firm recognizes the CEO is risk averse. Thus, imposing greater incentives requires more pay to compensate the agent for increased risk. In the previous section, the paper demonstrated that CEO pay has increased. Next, we examine what has happened to CEO incentives. The analysis shows that executives have considerable equity incentives that create a strong and increasing link between CEO wealth and firm performance. This finding seems at odds with the notion that executive pay and performance are decoupled. It is, however, consistent with other economic evidence, showing that the link between pay and performance has been increasing in the United States.Executives receive incentives from several sources. They receive financial incentives from salary and bonus, as well as new grants of options and restricted stock, which together measure flow compensation. They also receive incentives from changes in their aggregate holdings of stock and options in the firm, as described in detail below. Finally, theprobability of termination because of poor performance gives the CEO an incentive to pursue strategies that imize firm value. In this case, if terminated, an executive suffers reputation loss and human capital devaluation in the managerial labor market. However, this paper?consistent with other recent research in financial economics?focuses on compensation and equity incentives, leaving aside career concerns and the labor market for managerial talent. In other words, it restricts attention to financial incentives.The key to understanding financial incentives is recognizing that they arise from the entire portfolio of equity holdings and not simply from current pay. Equity incentives, then, are the incentives to increase the stock price arising from the managers’ ownership of financial securities in the firm. For example, a CEO may receive 100,000 options this year, which might add to 400,000 options granted in previous years, for a total of 500,000 options held. If the stock price decreases, then the value of the 100,000 options granted this year declines? but so does the value of the options accumulated from previous years. Since the CEO will care about the whole stock of 500,000 options, not simply this year’s 100,000, executive compensation received in any given year provides only a partial picture of CEO wealth and incentives. To understand CEO incentives fully, it is important to focus on the aggregate amount of shares, restricted stock, and stock options that the CEO owns in the firm.The evidence shows that CEOs have plenty of financial incentives, arising primarily from CEO ownership of stock and options in their firms. Again, we would stress that such financial incentives are only one factor motivating executives. Agents are as likely to be motivated by intrinsic factors of the job, career concerns, social norms, tournaments, and the like. One problem with stock options and other forms of incentive pay is not that they provide too few incentives, but that they may lead to unintended consequences. It is well known that incentives can bring about behavior by the agent that was unanticipated by the principal. In a classic paper, Steven Kerr highlighted the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B. In short, he articulated the notion that one gets what one pays for. If one rewards activity A and not B, then people will exert effort on A, while de-emphasizing B. Kerr illustrates his point with an array of examples from politics, industry, and human resource management. In general, this is a problem of providing appropriate incentives to agents engaging in multiple tasks. More recently, Robert Gibbons has discussed the design of incentive programs recognizing such problems.Another problem with incentive compensation is that it may encourage opportunistic behavior by managers, manipulation of performance measures, or cheating. The powerful and often unanticipated effects of financial incentives on economic outcomes have been documented in diverse contexts such as classroom teaching, real estate markets,vehicle inspection markets, and the behavior of physicians. In the corporate context, David Yermack demonstrates that CEOs opportunistically time the award of option grants around earnings announcements in order to increase their compensation. Other studies find that private information is used by executives to engineer abnormally large option exercises and hence the payouts from those options. In addition, studies show that firms with more incentives are associated with greater earnings manipulation. Recent studies show that the likelihood of a firm being the target of fraud allegations is positively correlated with option incentives. In short, options and incentive pay may motivate managerial behavior that is not always anticipated or ideal. When designing compensation plans, boards must be aware of the unwanted as well as beneficial effects of incentives.ConclusionsExecutive compensation is a controversial and complex subject that continues to attract the attention of the media, policymakers, and academics. Contract theory predicts that shareholders use pay to provide incentives for the CEO to focus on imizing long-term firm value. Since CEOs have relatively low ownership of firm shares, they might otherwise behave opportunistically. An alternative theoretical perspective, the managerial power view, is that CEOs control the pay-setting process and set their own pay. This theory predicts that compliant compensationcommittees and boards provide CEOs with excess pay or compensation “rents” and that contracts are suboptimal from the shareholders’ perspective. Distinguishing between these two theories is an important challenge for future research.This paper provides evidence on what has happened to CEO pay between 1993 and 2003. It shows that total compensation increased significantly over this period. Grants of stock options to CEOs and executives are the main driver of CEO pay gains. The paper also documents that CEOs have important financial incentives. These arise from the portfolio of firm stock and options owned by the CEO. The important point is that, if the stock price declines significantly, the value of the CEOs’ assets falls. Analogously, if asset prices increase, so does CEO wealth. In consequence, the wealth of the CEO varies with the stock price performance of the firm. An important research challenge is to fully understand the potentially unintended consequences of providing greater incentives to agents.In practice, CEO compensation contracts are determined by compensation committees that may have conflicting incentives to align with the CEO leading to suboptimal contracts and excess pay or with shareholders leading to optimal contractsand appropriate pay. The analysis in this paper illustrates that U.S. boards and compensation committees are becoming more independent measured by fewer insider directors and a greater number of outsidedirectors. The evidence showsthat the presence of affiliated directors on the compensation committee an instance where greater managerial power is expected does not lead to greater CEO pay or fewer CEO incentives.In summary, high pay itself is not evidence of inefficient contracts but may simply reflect the market for CEOs and the pay necessary to attract, retain, and motivate talented individuals. Boards of directors need to design compensation contracts to align the interests of owners with managers. One test of whether the corporate governance system is working appropriately, including executive compensation arrangements, is to evaluate economic performance. Holmstrom and Kaplan investigate the state of U.S. corporate governance in the wake of corporate scandals. They conclude that the U.S. economy has performed well, both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries over about two decades. Importantly, the economy has been robust even after the scandals were revealed. This is not to deny that improvements in governance arrangements may be beneficial. Furnishing CEOs with appropriate compensation and incentives is desirable for a healthy economy. However, ensuring that the contracting process is not corrupted is an important goal for corporate governance extracts译文:高管薪酬和激励Martin J. Conyon高管薪酬是一种既复杂又有争议的话题。

On the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance 来源：Al Farooque, O., Buachoom, W. & Hoang, N. On the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance. Asia Pac J Manag 36, 1111–1164 (2016).It is an important way to improve work efficiency and promote the development of the enterprise, as well as an important measure to strengthen and promote the sense of responsibility of employees. Among all employees, the compensation of senior executives accounts for the largest proportion, which means that the value of senior executives to the development of enterprises is the largest, so the compensation of senior executives is directly related to the performance of enterprises. But at present, for many enterprises, the lack of scientific, fair and sustainable executive compensation affects the improvement of enterprise performance. Just based on such a background environment, this study, after studying and elaborating the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance, puts forward some views and proposals for the standardized development of executive compensation.There is inevitable between executive compensation and corporate performance correlation, many scholars in our country are also on the link on research and analysis, some of which are more representative of the views and opinions, such as Hall and L I ebman to hundreds of companies in the United States in 1994-2004 data as sample, to study the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance. It is found that there is a significant correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance. After searching, consulting, reading and analyzing relevant literature, this paper puts forward some views on the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance from the following three aspects.First, the most significant relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance is the positive correlation. In other words, the more ideal the executive compensation is, the more value the executive will create for the enterprise and the higher the enterprise performance will be. In essence, this reflects the effectiveness ofa typical monetary compensation incentive. In practice, many Chinese companies, especially listed companies, have realized the promotion effect of executive compensation on corporate performance, so they are learning from foreign experience to explore the establishment of scientific compensation mechanism and incentive mechanism. This is actually a reflection of giving full play to the important value of senior talents.Second, from the perspective of enterprise types, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of listed companies is more specific. For listed companies in China, the proportion of shares held by senior executives is relatively small. In this case, the performance of the company is significantly correlated with the regression of senior executives' shares at the linear level. Although the coupling degree of the linear model finally established is relatively low, it fully shows that the executive shareholding also plays a role in promoting the development and progress of the company's performance to a large extent. The return of the executive compensation of executives holding performance mainly reflects in: executives shareholding is not actually on executive compensation incentive levels play a substantial role, this also means that the current our country listed company and many small and medium-sized enterprise executive compensation incentive ways is very single, give priority to in order to pay incentives and cannot ascend executives work enthusiasm.Third, there is also a correlation between executive compensation and the overall size of the company. The bigger the company, the more opportunities there are for executive compensation to increase. As a result, many corporate executives are willing to work on expanding their companies. As the scale of the company continues to expand, the more resources and real power executives have in their hands, the more complicated the management methods are, and the higher the requirements for their own abilities are. The more effort executives put in, the more they are rewarded. Hence the positive correlation between executive pay and company size.译文：关于高管薪酬与公司绩效的相关性重视企业内部人力资源薪酬管理的优化，使员工能够尽快地适应企业文化和工作内容，是提高工作效率、促进企业发展的一个重要途径，同时也是增强和提升员工的责任心的一个重要的举措。

文献出处: Firth M. The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensation incentive [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015，12（5）41-51.原文The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensationincentiveFirth MAbstractExecutive compensation problems is the result of modern enterprise ownership and control separated, target inconsistency exists between the owners and executives, the problem such as asymmetric information, the complexity and uncertainty of modern enterprise operation is exacerbated by the seriousness of this problem, and through the contract signed with executive compensation performance, design and implement a good compensation plan can effectively solve the above problems. In today's knowledge economy, the competition between enterprises is actually the competition between talents, executives, especially excellent executives has become the core of enterprise resources, in view of the particularity of human capital of executives, executives how to effectively motivate, attract and promote the interests of the enterprise has become the key to enterprise development, and executive pay is playing such a role.Keywords: Executive compensation, Business performance, Listed Company1 IntroductionSeparate ownership and control is modern enterprise the most significant characteristics (Bale and Means, 1932).The shareholders of the owners in an enterprise have the final property ownership and the residual claims, but often there is no direct management control. Business management on behalf of the owner of control, but don't take the final decision. In the case of two rights separation is as the main body of the ownership as the main operational control shareholders and the enterprise management to form a layer between the principal-agent relationships. According to rational economic man hypothesis, the principal (owner) and the agent(management) have different between the objective function, at the same time, there exists a phenomenon of information asymmetry, the company's senior managers there is power and ability to implement on-the-job consumption "opportunistic behavior", which came at the expense of the interests of the owners at the expense of, is also the focus of the agency cost, reflect, it requires enterprises to establish an effective mechanism of incentive and constraint. By the implementation of these mechanisms can excite the work enthusiasms of agent, and can minimize the agency cost of the enterprise, so as to realize the "win-win" between principal and agent. Human society has begun to enter the knowledge economy era, the executives with high and new technical knowledge and skills has become the key to the development of enterprises, enterprises in the market competition is talented person's competition, in today's increasingly internationalized talent flow speed and, utmost respect talented person, is the key to enterprises in the competition occupy the initiative. Therefore, the enterprise owners how to through a set of incentive constraint mechanism to arouse the enthusiasm of executives, minimize agency costs, has become the key problem in the principal-agent relationship.2 Literature reviewIn the 90 s and 1980 s executive compensation has become an important field of academic research, the current executive compensation research literature is largely based on agency theory as the theoretical basis; it requires managers pay package design should make the interests of the managers consistent with the interests of shareholders. Multiple theory school of scholars use all kinds of data on compensation performance problems made all kinds of inspection. But neither empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions, there is conflict between each other. Such as Belkaoui and Picur (1993), Koehhar and Levitas (1998) and Gray and Canella (1997) study showed that the correlation coefficient between CEO pay and company size to 0.1 at lower, the level of 0.110 and 0.170, and Boyd (1994), Finke1SteinandB.Yd (1998) and Sander and Carpenter (1998) argues that between the correlation coefficient is 0.62, 0.50 and 0.42.The same conflict results also exist in the research about the relation between pay performance. Like Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) foundthat return on equity (ROE) with monetary compensation and long-term returns between the correlation coefficient is 0.13 and 2.03 respectively; Johnson (1982) found that the correlation coefficient of 0.003.And Belliveau, Reilly and Wade (1996) found that CEO pay with ROE correlation coefficient of 0.410.Gomez Mejia (1994), the empirical study summarized: "although the empirical study of CEO pay a dime a dozen, but we know very little about executive remuneration or. “Many causes of the difference of the results of the study: the different data sources, different statistical techniques, different samples and different control variables, etc.Most of the empirical study in the United States listed companies as samples, mainly to pay as the research object, and given priority to with big companies. In the empirical study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) widely cited in the literature, since 90, and most of the empirical research in accordance with its research paradigm. In this article has pioneering meaning in the literature, they estimated the 1295 companies between 1974 and 1986 of 10400 senior managers compensation performance sensitivity, results show that the shareholder wealth of $1000 per change, CEO of wealth will be $3.25 move together. Lippert and Moore (1994) found that the pay performance sensitivity significantly negative correlation with growth, industry control, scale, and with the internal and the institutional investors holding and the term is not relevant. LIPPert and Moore (1995) found that the pay performance sensitivity to low the company has more independent directors or stronger shareholder control. MeConaughy and Mishra (1996) found that sensitivity associated with the company's future performance. The research is on compensation performance sensitivity calculation with Jensen and Murhpy computing (1990).With Jensen and Murhpy (1990) study of pay levels are different. Other documents against U.S. companies pay structures were studied. Genhart and Milkovich (1990) analysis of the more than 200 enterprises, 14000 senior and mid-level managers' pay, found that managers' pay and performance related and wages are not related. Their results also showed that mixed compensation levels and future profitability is related. Their contribution is caused people's understanding to pay structure. Similarly, Leonard (1990) have found S0 s long-term incentive plans ofthe company than the company has a long-term incentive plans, there are a higher return on equity (ROE).Hamid Mehran (1995) on a random sample of 153 manufacturing companies in 1979-1980 executive pay the inspection support incentive compensation claims, but also shows the level of motivation rather than the form of motivation to inspire the motivation of managers to increase the value of the company. Corporate performance with management ownership and equity incentive is in proportion to the total compensation level of positive correlation. He also found that equity-based compensation in the company of outside directors more applied more widely. In the end or by outside big shareholders higher insider ownership of company Ricky is in less equity compensation applications.3 Theoretical foundation of the executive compensation3.1 The principal-agent theoryIn the early days of the private enterprise, the enterprise owners or operators of the two functions, so as long as the owners are rational economic man, he will actively work for their own enterprise profit maximization, at the same time as the enterprise risk takers, he will be careful decisions, try to avoid risk. In classical enterprises, therefore, there is no power shortage and behavior distortion problem. However, with the deepening of socialized big division of labor, the production of modern enterprise system, enterprise's ownership and operation separate, its separation and led to the emergence of the principal and agent relationship, both are driven by their own interests, as the manager of the enterprise owners want as agent of the principal researchers to their own interests targeting action in accordance with the owners. And managers also is own expected utility maximization as the goal, so that both the goal of the inconsistency.3.2 The human capital theoryFrom the Angle of economics to study the compensation problem, main is to pay as senior executives in the Labor market price. In labor economics, the compensation decision mechanism on the Labor market mainly is the human capital theory. The economic activities of listed companies in the final analysis is conducted by people, the economic efficiency of listed companies in the final analysis depends on people'senthusiasm. Economic history shows that, under different institutional arrangements, the person of ability and hard work, especially the potential and creativity is the fundamental symbol of success for an enterprise system is good or bad. Therefore, economic efficiency of listed companies, the human capital property rights problems and natural economic behavior is the foundation of can't avoid. Property rights established the significance, is to make the economic behavior of the internalization of external effects, so as to produce the stimulation of strong momentum. A property rights system, therefore, the strength of the economic incentive function, mainly with the efforts of the economic subject is associated with the proximity of remuneration. Top management is the most important role in the development of modern enterprises, executive personnel is the enterprise decision makers, leaders and commanders, is the soul of the enterprise, is a leader in the development of enterprises, therefore is also an important force in China's economic and social development. Grew up in a special environment during the transition period of our country in the top management, than the business operators in the market economy country pressure is bigger, heavier burden. Especially the burden of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises with the development of the enterprise solution and two pairs of heavy burden, they want to pay more than the number of times the energy often, previously unimaginable responsibility and risk. Therefore, should recognize the importance of enterprise senior management personnel. Establish training, selection and use of enterprise management mechanism, giving them reasonable compensation.3.3 Equity theoryProblems from the Angle of psychology to study senior managers' pay mainly will be paid as a method that can meet the demand of senior executives inner and elements, to encourage executives to work enthusiasm and initiative, to improve executive performance from the individual level. In the psychology of motivation theory, the design of compensation and compensation management is based on the theory of influential Stacy Adams equity theory. Adams fair theory, the staff would first think about the ratio of their income to pay, and then will his income pay comparing with relevant income pay others. If employees feel him with others of thesame, the ratio of thought is to the state fair. If both feel not the same, the ratio of injustice are produced, namely, they may think their income is too low or too high. After this injustice, the staff will try to correct it.3.4 Strategic compensation theoriesTo think from the perspective of management, enterprises pay problem, more attention is pay management support for the enterprise strategic goals, namely how to through the compensation system to effectively help enterprises to gain a competitive advantage. About compensation management how to support the enterprise strategic target, this is the main content of the strategic compensation system design. The so-called strategic compensation, it is to point to will pay up to the enterprise strategic level, to thinking through what kind of compensation policies and compensation management system to support enterprise competitive strategy, and help enterprises to gain competitive advantage.4 The design principle of executive compensation system4.1 Principles of pay and performanceOptimal executive compensation design is the executive compensation and its operation performance, the compensation depends on the company's operating results, the design should follow the principle of the main executive compensation scheme. This principle is the principle of balance between the interests of the owner and operator. Because follow this principle, the owner and operator revenue the stand or fall of same direction as the firm's performance. Business is business risk, managers' compensation and corporate business performance has a direct relationship. Considering the operators are people too, also want to maintain family and their own survival. Considering the uncertainties of doing business at the same time, if the executive compensation and its business performance, completely will take too much risk. As a result, the executive compensation can be divided into two parts: part of the fixed income, the amount is able to maintain their personal and family life, have insurance effect. Part is risk income, completely and enterprise performance, good management can be even more greatly than the fixed income part, make its income risk, incentive role.4.2 Effective incentive principlesModern enterprise system, the organization (shareholders) and individual (senior management) is a kind of principal-agent relationship. Incentive is to strengthen and accordance of individual behavior, organizational goals, in other words, is to guide individual behavior maximize the development to achieve organizational goals. Due to corporate executives is a special company employees, has the position of privilege, enjoy "on-the-job consumption", it brought outside the regular salary incentive to executives to meet the material benefits, this need to some extent, belongs to the fair in Adams fair theory. However, in many state-owned enterprises, on-the-job consumption often goes far beyond a reasonable level, showing a high cost of self-motivation. And stands in stark contrast to the executive pay, some executive’s on-the-job consumption optional the gender is strong, too much abuse, even in a state of out of control. Has issued relevant laws and regulations, shall be forbidden.4.3 Effective restriction principleExecutives is an enterprise's decision-making and operators directly, plays an vital role in the fate of the enterprise, if in the design of enterprise organization system, lack of necessary and effective supervision and restriction mechanism, will likely agent risk. On entrepreneur behavior with some restrictions, these constraints are usually the behavior rule, violating these rules will be punished. Constraint mechanism has defined the entrepreneur behavior, the role of maintaining the order of economic activities, for the standardization of the enterprise behavior, economic and social benign operation has an indispensable positive function.译文上市企业经营绩效与高管薪酬激励研究Firth M摘要高管薪酬问题的产生源于现代企业所有权和控制权的相互分离，所有者与公司高管之间存在着目标不一致、信息不对称等问题，现代企业经营的复杂性和不确定性更是加剧了这一问题的严重性，而通过与高管签订薪酬绩效契约，设计和执行一份良好的薪酬方案可以有效地解决上述问题。

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文二：Board Composition, Executive Remuneration,And CorporatePerformance: The Case Of ReitsIntroductionStockholders in modern corporations are the residual risk bearers. As they don't have the expertise to run their firms, stockholders must rely on the firm'smanagement team. Jensen and Ruback (1983) defined the management team as the top managers as well as the board of directors of the firm. The separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation creates the incentives for managers to pursue their self-interest goals and not to maximize the shareholders’ wealth in what is termed in the literature as the agency conflict.Researchers have suggested many mechanismsby which managers are curbed from maximizingsolely their own utilities.These mechanisms (seeAgarwal and Knoeber 1996) can be either externalones, such as market for corporate control or internalones, such as the board of directors. The board ofdirectors is a basic element of corporate governance.The main functions of corporate boards are evaluating and approving strategies formulated by managers, providing an appropriate vehicle for stock holders desiring representation in company boards, and performing vigorous monitoring of managers’ actions to make sure that d ecisions by top managers come in line with shareholders’ interests. The literature is rich with studies that have shown the positive effect of the outside board members on firm value .The theory says that the way a board of directors is formed is intended to minimize the agency conflict costs. Also, some studies have shown how the size of the board affects corporate value (Yermack 1996; Zahra et al. 1989; Eisenberg et al. 1998). Consequently, the board of directors is an important governance mechanism that ensures that the interests ofshareholders and management are closely aligned, which would have its effects on corporate performance.In addition to the internal mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts, managerial remuneration is an important device that can be used effectively to align the interests of stockholders and managers. The extent to which the remuneration package can achieve that alignment of interests is an empirical question. From a theoretical point of view, managerial remuneration should correlate weakly with corporate performance. The annual bonus usually is given in good as well as bad performance times. Good performance pushes the bonus up while bad performance does not depress the bonus. However, empirically, the relationship between management remuneration and corporate performance was detected and shown to exist. Generally, studies have found that there is a positive relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance (Hamid 1995; Davis et al. 1994; Finnerty et al. 1993). Managerial remuneration and corporate performanceThe issue of managerial incentives has been heavily researched in financial economics. Managerial incentives, at least from a theoretical point of view, have an energetic effect on mitigating the moral hazard problem inherited in individual contracts. This would have a major impact upon firm's financial performance. Hamid (1995) examined the relationship between CEO compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. He mainly focused upon the equity type of compensation not the cash compensation. His results confirmed a significant positive relationship between CEO equity compensation and firm Performance.Other types of compensation also have a positive effect on corporate performance even after considering some control variables. Davis and Shelor (1995) also documented a significant relationship between executive total compensation, firm size, and firm performance. Cannon and V ogt (1995) used Jensen’s measure to proxy for REITs financial performance and examined how severe the agency costs in REITs are. They find that advisor REITs with lowdirector ownership tend to underperform and pay higher advisor payments than do their counterparts with high ownership. They find no such relationship for self-administered REITs. These results show thatself-administered REITs make better use of marketbased performance compensation than do advisor REITs. Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum (1992) found that there is a significant relationship between managerial compensation and firm economic performance. Their results confirmed that compensation packages are designed to mitigate the agency conflict costs. In most previous studies, the relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance was examined and shown to be positive when using total remuneration package, which includes usually (1) base cash remuneration, (2) incentive cash remuneration, (3) stock options, and (4) relative performance remuneration. This study, however, is concerned only with cash remuneration since it represents about 80% of total remuneration package.Board composition and financial performanceThe issue of board composition has deep roots in financial economics literature. Whether the way board of directors is formed can affect the economic value and performance of a firm has been investigated by a lot of researchers.The empirical evidence not solidly convincing regarding this issue when considering the entire literature, although many empirical studies support a positive relationship between boards dominated by outside directors and corporate performance. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) documented evidence showing the positive effect of the outside directors on corporate performance as they found that shareholders’ gains fro m tender offers would be greater for targets with independent board members than for other targets. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) examined the wealth effects when an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another corporation. They find that the nonfinancial sending firms experience negative returns while the receiving firms do not gain from these appointments. This suggests that when executives join boards of other corporations, they become distracted from shareholders wealth maximization objective. The financial sending firms experience positive returns when sending their officers to other firms. Barnhart et al. (1994) investigated the effect of board composition on company performance. When they do not control for variables that have effects on company performance, the relationship between corporate performance, proxied by market-to-book ratio of equity, and board composition issignificant. When they account for managerial ownership and variation across industries, board composition is found to be related to market-to-book ratio in a nonlinear fashion. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) revealed the effectiveness of the board of directors in enhancing firm performance by showing that stock prices of firms whose boards are dominated by independent directors are associated with larger abnormal returns than those of companies whose boards are dominated by less independent directors. Byrd and Hickman (1992) reviewed the literature and supported the conjecture of the positive relationship between corporate profitability and boards dominated by outside independent directors. Gilson (1990) also confirmed the idea that board composition is related to financial performance of firms as he documented an evidense that after company default, board composition is altered significantly by creditors who tend to appoint their representatives to the board. Byrd and Hickman (1990) showed that the stocks of firms whose at least 50% of their board members are independent are associated with higher returns for stockholders in case of acquisitions. They noted, however, that these results are sensitive to the method used to classify directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) also showed that the addition of an outside director increased corporate value. In a theoretical paper, Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed a theoretical integrative model which specifies important relationships between board variables and company performance. They noted that these relationships depend on several internal (industry factors, legal aspects, etc.) and external (ownership structure, company life cycle, complexity of operation, etc.) contingencies identified in their model. All these attributes play an important role in determining directors’ success in executing their contro l and monitoring roles, which is a prerequisite for a glamourous company performance.Molz’s (1988) findings do not support the association between firm performance and the managerial dominated boards.Weisbach (1988) shows that companies with outside-dominated boards are more likely to replace a CEO based on performance than companies with insider-dominated boards. The bulk of the previous literature shows a positive relationship between outside directors and corporate performance. The premise that is brought up by this study is that effective monitoring does notcome from all outside directors as hypothesized by some previous studies in the literature, but it comes only from that group of directors that is able to ask the hard questions. Previous literature in corporate governance classifies outside directors into two categories: gray outsiders and pure (independent) outsiders. The gray outsiders have some type of affiliation with the company on whose board they sit, which could limit their capability to exercise effective monitoring on management. These affiliations include legal, banking, consultancy, and other relationships. Pure outside directors, on the other hand, have no relationship with the company other than their directorship and, hence, bear no costs from challenging managers. Byrd and Hichman (1990) showed that the method of classifying board of directors causes the relationship between board composition and corporate performance to change. Board size and corporate performanceTheoretically, it is expected that coordination and communication will be more effective and decisionmaking problems will be less in relatively small boards, which might positively affect board performance. On the other hand, large boards have the tendency to include directors with diverse expertise and skills. These two contradicted premises deserve more inspection in the REITs industry due to their different control system. On top of that, there is a scarcity in the literature regarding studies of the relation between board size and corporate performance. This study conjectures that, in general, the ideal board size varies with firm size. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) used accounting figures to measure firm performance. They found evidence that small boards had positive effects on corporate performance. Yermack (1996) adopted the point of view of a negative association between board size and performance. He founds an inverse relationship between the two variables. This suggests that the small size of a board of directors helps to improve the efficiency of the decision making process and, hence, promotes shareholders, interests. Brown and Maloney (1992) also found that smaller boards of directors are associated with better firm performance. Given that the previous studies have cross-sectionally examined many industries, the documented relationship might be altered when studying one industry with unique features regarding the control system.Performance measureThe literature is filled with different types of financial performance measures. All these measures can be categorized as either accounting-based measures or market-oriented measures. Usually, accounting measures that are constructed from financial statements data are highly criticized in the finance community. Also, these measures usually do not account for differences in systematic risk; hence, they diverge from the economic market value of firms (see Benston 1985). That is why financial analysts sometimes reclassify some balance sheet items in order to judge the precise liquidity of a firm.On the other hand, the market-based performance measures are determined solely and collectively by the market participants who interpret managers’ signals correctly, assuming efficient financial markets, and usually firm managers have no discretion over these measures. Based upon that, and because the sample firms are publicly owned companies and hence their securities are priced in financial markets, this study will use a market-based financial performance measure to measure REI Ts’ financial performance. Tobin’s Q, as a market-based performance measure, represents a sharp measure of corporate value. Since it incorporates the value of all assets, it is supposed to reflect both the quality of monitoring practiced by pure directors and the degree to which shareholders’ interests and those of managers are aligned, assuming that REITs’ securities are priced in efficient capital markets. Tobin’s Q can be defined as the ratio of the firm value to its assets replacement costs. The literature is filled with different versions of Tobin’s Q. Since no consensus is reached as to the best Tobin’s Q ratio, three different ratios of Tobin’s Q will be used in this study. This procedure serves two purposes. The first is to test the sensitivity of the results to different definitions of corporate performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. Second, the effect of employing different versions of Tobin’s Q on the results of many different studies in the literature is partly resolved. The three versions of Tobin’s Q employed in this study are as follows:Q1=(MVE+TA-EQ1)/TAwhere MVE is the product of stock price (year close) by the common stocksoutstanding .TA is total asset, and EQ is the book value of equity.Q2=(MVE/ book value of Net Assets)^2Q3=((MVE+LTD+STE+ PSALV)/TA)^3Where LTD is the book value of long term debt.STD is the book value of the short-term debt, and PSALV is the preferred stock at liquidation value. For the sake of illustration, the correlation among the three versions of Tobin’s Q was calculat ed and was shown to be very high. Therefore, it is expected to have similar results as far as our analysis is concerned.ConclusionThis study has investigated the effect of the composition of the board of directors (a monitoring mechanism) and managerial remuneration (bonding mechanism) on the corporate performance of REITs. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between cash managerial remuneration and firm performance. Also, unlike some previous studies, this paper shows that only pure directors are able to practice effective monitoring and gray directors have no significant effect on firm performance. The outside directors, both gray and pure, have no impact upon finance performance in the REITs industry. Moreover, this paper tackled the board size effect investigated previously in the literature. The findings of this study confirm a nonlinear relationship between board size and firm performance. The relationship is negative when board size is small, and it turns positive when board size grows.Source:Turki Alshimmiri,2004.“Board Composition, Executive Remuneration, And Corporate Performance: The Case Of Reits”.Corporate Ownership & Control August.pp.104-112.译文：董事会结构，高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例简介股东是现代公司的的剩余风险承担者。

企业薪酬体系设计外文文献翻译中文字数3000多字The success of any management strategy is dependent on the people who make up an XXX any enterprise。

and the XXX。

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XXX enterprises。

and the design of a n system is not only an effective way to XXX on the design and performance XXX'ssalary system。

with a particular XXX.2 The Importance of a Well-Designed Salary SystemA well-designed salary system XXX。

It can help attract and retain top talent。

XXX。

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a salary system that is XXX。

it XXX to design a salary system that aligns with their business objectives and values。

while also meeting the XXX.3 XXXEquity incentives are an essential component of a well-designed salary system。

especially for XXX incentives。

such as stock ns and restricted stock units。

文献出处:Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 362)原文：An Empirical Study of Relationship Between Executive Compensation and Performances of Chinese Listed Company—Based on Simultaneous Equations ModelAbstract：As a potentially important internal incentive, the executive compensation has gradually become a research focus. Based on simultaneous equations model and principal component analysis, this paper studies the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China’s manufacturing listed companies from 2009 to 2012, we find that the improved corporate performance can advance executive compensation. At the same time, we also find executive compensation has positive feedback effect to company performance. The paper also sees that the company’s equity incentive has the potency to improve the effectiveness of the performance. This result offers insights to shareholders focused on enhancing the design of internal corporate governance mechanism.Keywords：Simultaneous equations model Principal component analysis Executive compensation Corporate performance1 Introduction：According to the modern agency theory, with the separation of ownership and executive, the objective conflict between corporate executive and shareholders intensifies. To reduce such conflict, shareholders through the remuneration incentive mechanism allow the executive to have some residual claim, so that makes their goals consistent. Meanwhile, in the condition of trust-agent theory, due to the information asymmetry, the managers have the motivation to pursuing their own interests. Toreduce agency cost and maximize wealth, the shareholders tend to through the company performance to determine the executives pay, trying to motivate managers to act in the best interest of shareholders.However, a survey shows that under the influence of the 2008 international financial crisis, the overall profits of China’s quoted companies generally decline, while the payment of the executives continues to rise. It had aroused strong opposition among the investors. By comparing the 431 quoted companies in 2007 and 2008, the data shows that the profits of quoted companies decrease by 26.2 billion Yuan in total, while the executives pay increase by 200 million Yuan [1] . This is aroused the public question the relationship between the executive compensation and company performance. What is the interaction between the two things? The paper will discuss this question by establishing simultaneous equations and get some new discoveries.We will test the interaction between the executives compensation and company performance by establishing simultaneous equations. To avoid the limitation of single variables, we will get the overall performance index through the analysis of the principal components of the four variables. However, there are still some limitations in the paper, mainly reflected in the following aspects: (1) The analysis of the incentive theory for executive compensation is not thorough. Besides the low level of domestic executives pay and the different pay in each period also caused diverse results. (2) The data is limited to the industrial quoted companies from 2009 to 2012, and the influence of industries and some non-financial factors are not considered. (3) Because the performance indicators are too much to listed, the paper only use four indicators to reflect the company performance, so it may not completely represent the true performance of the company.2 Literature Review2.1 The Incentive Effects of Executive CompensationAs for the study of executive incentive and compensation, the overseas scholars involve in the field earlier. With the change of the external environment, the conclusion also changes. Taussings and Baker [2] are the earliest scholars to study enterprise salary, finding little correlation of executive compensation withperformances. By analyzing external determinants of enterprise CEO compensation, Finkelstein and Hambrick [3] found that different remuneration packages have different effects on CEO’s behavior, and ultimately affect the company’s overall performance. Jensen and Murphy [4] found that if the CEO compensation increase or decrease by every $3.25, then the shareholder’s wealth will increase or decrease by every $1000. Accordingly, compensation and shareholder’s wealth are positively correlated. Mehran [5] found that executive compensation incentive became a driving force for improving corporate performances. With the development of theories and methods, studies from abroad tend to believe that executive compensation has a significant effect on corporate performance. By analyzing the relationship between compensation quantity and corporate performance in three incentive schemes, Li et al.[6] found that the increasing in executive compensation can significantly improve the corporate performance. Generally speaking, with time goes on, an increasing number of scholars believe that the incentive for executive compensation works indeed.2.2 The Impact of Corporate Performance on Executive CompensationTheoretically, attaching executive compensation to corporate performance can reduce the probability of Agency’s conflict, and positive relationship exists. Many scholars attempted to use various analytical methods to test this theory, but conclusion varied. By using Black-Scholes model to analyze the relationship between the CEO’s compensation and the share value in stock market of 478 large U.S companies, Hall [7] found that the value of the company increased by every 10 %, management salaries and bonuses would increase by 2.4 %. Lai [8] who concentrated on the impact of incentive mechanism and governance structure on company’s compensation, found that the executive compensation was positively related to accounting performance significantly but irrelevant to market performance, thus he believed that quoted companies inclined to regard accounting performance as incentive assessment indicator. Mao and Zhang [9] tested the relation between Executive compensation and corporate performance in domestic quoted companies through ownership structure indicators, finding that the positive relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance existed, and the executives increased their salaries through theimprovement of corporate performance. In turn, the increase in salaries impels them to work harder to improve corporate performance.3 Theoretical Analysis and HypothesesThe aim of incentive mechanism is to make executives act in the best interest of shareholders and to improve efficiency, which is also the cornerstone of incentive mechanism. In order to improve their income and appreciate the compensation given by principal, managers work harder. Meanwhile,they consider more for the shareholders when they behave, which will undisputedly reduce the agency cost and improve corporate performance. According to the above, we can propose hypothesis.Hypothesis 1. (H1) Executive compensation incentive indeed has a positive effect on corporate performance in the domestic quoted companies, that is, with the increase in salary, the corporate performance gradually increases.According to principal-agent theory, the separation of ownership and management forces companies to hire more external managers. Due to there is a serious information asymmetry between the principal (shareholders) and their proxies (managers), and that managers have a practical “control” and lack the necessary binding mechanism. Then, these make the managers tend to have the on-the-job consumption motives or do not work hard to shirk their responsibilities. In order to reduce the agent cost of information asymmetry and the risk of moral hazard, stockholders will sign the contract for pay-performance with the managers before their entry. Under the contract, corporate performance is directly related to the interests of executive by linking executive compensation and corporate performance. Thus, in order to maximize their individual interests, the managers must work hard to improve the performance of the company. It can be concluded from the above theory that it exist significant positive relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis.Hypothesis 2. (H2) Executive compensation is affected by the performance of the company, that is, the executive compensation increase with the increase of the performance of the company.However, in reality, the relationship between management compensation andperformance of quoted companies in China seems generally weak. According to the survey, because of the effection of the global financial crisis in 2008, profits of quoted companies in China generally declined, but executives’ payment did not fall but rise. Comparing the data in the year of 2007 and 2008 of 431 quoted companies, we found that total profits of quoted companies had fallen by 26.2 billion Yuan, while the executive pay had increased by 200 million Yuan [1]. Based on this, we propose the alternative hypothesis.Hypothesis 3. (H3) Executive compensation and corporate performance are not related.4 Study Design4.1 Sample Selection and Data SourcesAll samples are derived from CSMAR database system and the data analysis is completed by SPSS17.0 and EXCEL. According to the research, we collected annual data of Manufacturing quoted Companies in Shen & Hu A-share Stock Market between 2009 and 2012 as sample. In order to ensure the effectiveness of research sample, we sifted:(1)Rejected a Stock quoted companies which issue B stock or H stock simultaneously;(2)Rejected ST orST quoted companies which have poor performance;(3)Rejected the quoted companies which don’t disclose detailed data or have incomplete data;(4)Rejected the quoted companies which executive couldn’t be paid;(5)Rejected the quoted companies which Tobin’s Q value is more than 2.Based on the above principles, we get the effective samples: 1144 samples of 2012, 895 samples of 2011, 430 samples of 2010, and 487 samples of 2009.4.2 Selection of Variable1. Compensation indexThis paper selects the cash compensation that the executive got to measure their incentive compensation index, and choose the average figure of the top three compensation of executive as the executive compensation index. In order to eliminate the influence of scale, we choose Natural Logarithm, denoted by AP.2. Corporate performance indexAgency theory put emphasis on using multiple indicators to exclude the deviation from Single indicator, to reduce the agency’s opportunity cost and to eliminate conflicts. In order to work better, this paper select ROANPMROTA and Tobin’s Q (market performance indicator). Meanwhile, after the analysis of factors, we select the common factor to reflect corporate performance and use it to comprehensively evaluate and analysis samples’ performance.3. Control variablesIn order to reflect the relation between executive compensation and corporate performance better, and avoid the phenomenon of spurious regression, the paper adds corporate size, GRO, LEV and MSR in Empirical model.5 Empirical Results5.1 Descriptive StatisticsTable 7 provides the variables’ descriptive statistics of sample companies. It shows that the sample companies’ performance (F) is 0.504, median is 0.506 and indicates that the sample’s overall profitability is good. Executive compensation (AP) minimum is 9.338, maximum is 15.865, standard deviation is 0.924, indicating that there is a big difference between the executive compensation. The maximum ofexecutive shareholding ratio (MSR) is 97.3 %, the minimum value is 0, the median is 1 %, average is 16.7 %. It shows that the executives which hold no stock or lower stock ownership in sample company exists wildly, and it has a limited equity incentive. At the same time, sample company’s executives also have large differences in shareholding.Other control variables-company size (SIZE), growth (GRO) and financial leverage (LEV)- differ largely, indicating that the company size, growth and the degree of financial risk are different, and it helps to control the impact on each variables of the sample companies.5.2 Regression AnalysisAccording to the regression results of simultaneous equations in Table 8, we know that the correlation coefficient between executive compensation (AP) and firm performance (F) is 0.012 and there are 10 % passed the test about level of significance. It shows that the executive compensation of sample companies produce incentives to improve the company performance. Thus, the hypothesis 1 is verified. Meanwhile, we also find that the relationship is not particularly significant. It proves that the company performance is not the only factor to determine the executive compensation. With the increase in executives’ power; compensation may not meet the growing “appetite”. The correlation coefficient between the performance of the company (F) and executive compensation (AP) is 0.356, significantly correlated at the 1 % level, and salary increases with the improvement of the performance of the company. This conclusion confirms the hypothesis 2. The empirical results show that thepay-performance under the contract, executive compensation is indeed linked to the corporate performance in sample companies’. In order to maximize their own interests, executives must strive to improve business performance and to achieve the final goal through this way.In addition, in the incentive compensation equation, we can find that there is a significant positive correlation between executive shareholding ratio (MSR) and company performance (F). This suggests that when the company executive enjoys the right of residual claim, they will tend to be consistent with the interests ofshareholders. The more the executive hold shares, the larger the correlation is. They will regard enterprise as a community of interests, and strive to improve the company’s operating performance. And in the compensation criterion equation, executive shareholding ratio (MSR) and executive compensation (AP) were positively related, but not significantly, probably in Chinese enterprises, executive stock ownership is not widespread. In addition, when executives hold stocks, it might exclude executive who owned equity in order to avoid suspicion at the pay-setting.Meanwhile, when the variance inflation factor is greater than 10, we usually think that a serious multicollinearity exists between variables. However, the simultaneous equation model of multiple linear diagnosis result shows that the maximum value of the equation inflation factor (VIF) is 1.43, which is far less than 10, so there is no multicollinearity between the model variables.6 ConclusionsAccording to a empirical study about relationship between Executive Compensation and Performances, the present paper can draw third important contributions: First, in China, the “pay-performance incentive” mechanism has been established, but compensation incentive and restriction mechanism is not perfect. This paper argues that Incentive compensation cannot make the senior executive interest be achieved. The incentive compensation can’t control moral hazard and adverse selection problems that caused by Incentive invalid. These situations moved in a vicious cycle. Second, the improved performance of the company can advance executive compensation. At the same time, we find Executive compensation has positive feedback effect to company performance.Third, the company’s equity incentive has the potency to improve the effectiveness of the performance.The empirical results show that the companies need to establish the evaluation standards that can truly reflect the overall performance. Through the combined accounting performance indicator and corporate market performance indicator, the pay-performance incentive mechanism will play an effectively role to solve incentive incompatibility problems which caused by agency problems. Simultaneously, because of a lower proportion of managerial ownership it can’t effectively solve the problemof moral hazard and adverse selection between executive and shareholders. If companies can moderately increase the proportion of managerial ownership and elaborate the influence of Equity incentive effectively, then the company can complementarily be promoted from cash compensation incentive and Equity incentive. These will change the structure of the unitary executive compensation, so potential effectiveness exits.Overall, according to endogenous perspective, analyze the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance is a beneficial supplement based on existing research. The study results suggest that there is not a completely symmetrical affection between executive compensation and corporate performance. However, China and the west has a completely different institutional background. Therefore, to better understand the causes and consequences of symmetrical affection between executive compensation and corporate performance, future studies should focus on the unique China’s characteristics of the institutional environment, such as equity structure.译文：基于联立方程模型的我国上市公司高管薪酬与绩效关系实证研究摘要:高管薪酬作为一种潜在的重要内部激励，逐渐成为研究的热点。

绩效考核外文文献及翻译外文文献1.Performance appraisals - purpose and how to make it easier Performance appraisals are essential for the effective management and evaluation of staff. Appraisals help develop individuals, improve organizational performance, and feed into business planning. Formal performance appraisals are generally conducted annually for all staff in the organization. His or her line manager appraises each staff member. Directors are appraised by the CEO, who is appraised by the chairman or company owners, depending on the size and structure of the organization. Annual performance appraisals enable management and monitoring of standards, agreeing expectations and objectives, and delegation of responsibilities and tasks. Staff performance appraisals also establish individual training needs and enable organizational training needs analysis and planning. Performance appraisals also typically feed into organizational annual pay and grading reviews, which commonly also coincide with the business planning for the next trading year. Performance appraisals generally review each individual's performance against objectives and standards for the trading year, agreed at the previous appraisal meeting. Performance appraisals are also essential for career and succession planning - for individuals, crucial jobs, and for the organization as a whole. Performance appraisals are important for staff motivation, attitude and behavior development, communicating and aligning individual and organizational aims, and fostering positive relationships between management and staff. Performance appraisals provide a formal, recorded, regular review of an individual's performance, and a plan for future development. Job performance appraisals - in whatever form they take - are therefore vital for managing the performance of people and organizations. Managers and appraises commonly dislike appraisals and try to avoid them. To these people the appraisal is daunting and time-consuming. The process is seen as a difficult administrative chore and emotionally challenging. The annual appraisal is maybe the only time since last year that the two people have sat down together for a meaningful one-to-one discussion. No wonder then that appraisals are stressful - which then defeats the whole purpose. Appraisals are much easier, and especially more relaxed, if the boss meets each of the team members individually and regularly for one-to-one discussion throughout the year. Meaningful regular discussion about work, career, aims, progress, development, hopes and dreams, life, the universe, the TV, common interests, etc., whatever, makes appraisals so much easier because people then know and trust each other - which reduces all the stress and the uncertainty. Put off discussions and of course they loom very large. So don't wait for the annual appraisal to sit down and talk. The boss or the appraises can instigate this. If you are an employee with a shy boss, then take the lead. If you are a boss who rarely sits down and talks with people - or whose people are not used to talking with their boss - then set about relaxing the atmosphere and improving relationships. Appraisals (and work) all tend to be easier when people communicate well and know each other. So sit down together and talk as often as you can, and then when the actual formal appraisals are due everyone will find the whole process to be far more natural, quick, and easy - and a lot more productive too. 2.Appraisals, social responsibility and whole-person development There is increasingly a need for performance appraisals of staff and especially managers, directors and CEO's, to include accountabilities relating to corporate responsibility, represented by various converging corporate responsibility concepts including: the “Triple Bottom Line”; corporate so cial responsibility (CSR); Sustainability; corporate integrity and ethics; Fair Trade, etc. The organization must decide the extent to which these accountabilities are reflected in job responsibilities, which would thennaturally feature accordingly in performance appraisals. More about this aspect of responsibility is in the directors’ job descriptions section. Significantly also, while this appraisal outline is necessarily a formal structure this does not mean that the development discussed with the appraises must be formal and constrained. In fact the opposite applies. Appraisals must address “whole person” development - not just job skills or the skills required for the next promotion. Appraisals must not discriminate against anyone on the grounds of age, gender, sexual orientation, race, religion, disability, etc. The UK Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, (consistent with Europe), effective from 1st October 2006, make it particularly important to avoid any comments, judgments, suggestions, questions or decisions which might be perceived by the appraises to be based on age. This means people who are young as well as old. Age, along with other characteristics stated above, is not a lawful basis for assessing and managing people, unless proper 'objective justification' can be proven. See the Age Diversity information. When designing or planning and conducting appraisals, seek to help the 'whole-person' to grow in whatever direction they want, not just to identify obviously relevant work skills training. Increasingly, the best employers recognize that growing the 'whole person' promotes positive attitudes, advancement, motivation, and also develops lots of new skills that can be surprisingly relevant to working productively and effectively in any sort of organization. Developing the whole-person is also an important aspect of modern corporate responsibility, and separately (if you needed a purely business-driven incentive for adopting these principles), whole-person development is a crucial advantage in the employment market, in which all employers compete to attract the best recruits, and to retain the best staff. Therefore in appraisals, be creative and imaginative in discussing, discovering and agreeing 'whole-person' development that people will respond to, beyond the usual job skill-set, and incorporate this sort of development into the appraisal process. Abraham Maslow recognized this over fifty years ago. If you are an employee and your employer has yet to embrace or even acknowledge these concepts, do them a favor at your own appraisal and suggest they look at these ideas, or maybe mention it at your exit interview prior to joining a better employer who cares about the people, not just the work. Incidentally the Multiple Intelligences test and V AK Learning Styles test are extremely useful tools for appraisals, before or after, to help people understand their natural potential and strengths and to help managers understand this about their people too. There are a lot of people out there who are in jobs which don't allow them to use and develop their greatest strengths; so the more we can help folk understand their own special potential, and find roles that really fit well, the happier we shall all be. 3 .Are performance appraisals still beneficial and appropriate It is sometimes fashionable in the 'modern age' to dismiss traditional processes such as performance appraisals as being irrelevant or unhelpful. Be very wary however if considering removing appraisals from your own organizational practices. It is likely that the critics of the appraisal process are the people who can't conduct them very well. It's a common human response to want to jettison something that one finds difficult. Appraisals - in whatever form, and there are various - have been a mainstay of management for decades, for good reasons. Think about everything that performance appraisals can achieve and contribute to when they are properly managed, for example: (1)performance measurement - transparent, short, medium and long term (2)clarifying, defining, redefining priorities and objectives (3)motivation through agreeing helpful aims and targets (4)motivation though achievement and feedback (5)training needs and learning desires - assessment and agreement (6)identification of personal strengths and direction - including unused hidden strengths (7)career and succession planning -personal and organizational (8)team roles clarification and team building (9)organizational training needs assessment and analysis (10)appraise and manager mutual awareness, understanding and relationship (11)resolving confusions and misunderstandings (12)reinforcing and cascading organizational philosophies, values, aims, strategies, priorities, etc (13)delegation, additional responsibilities, employee growth and development (14)counseling and feedback (15)manager development - all good managers should be able to conduct appraisals well - it's a fundamental process (16)the list goes on People have less and less face-to-face time together these days. Performance appraisals offer a way to protect and manage these valuable face-to-face opportunities. My advice is to hold on to and nurture these situations, and if you are under pressure to replace performance appraisals with some sort of (apparently) more efficient and cost effective methods, be very sure that you can safely cover all the aspects of performance and attitudinal development that a well-run performance appraisals system is naturally designed to achieve. There are various ways of conducting performance appraisals, and ideas change over time as to what are the most effective appraisals methods and systems. Some people advocate traditional appraisals and forms; others prefer 360-degree-type appraisals; others suggest using little more than a blank sheet of paper. In fact performance appraisals of all types are effective if they are conducted properly, and better still if the appraisal process is clearly explained to, agreed by, the people involved. Managers need guidance, training and encouragement in how to conduct appraisals properly. Especially the detractors and the critics. Help anxious managers (and directors) develop and adapt appraisals methods that work for them. Be flexible. There are lots of ways to conduct appraisals, and particularly lots of ways to diffuse apprehension and fear - for managers and appraises alike. Particularly - encourage people to sit down together and review informally and often - this removes much of the pressure for managers and appraises at formal appraisals times. Leaving everything to a single make-or-break discussion once a year is asking for trouble and trepidation. Look out especially for the warning signs of 'negative cascaded attitudes' towards appraisals. This is most often found where a senior manager or director hates conducting appraisals, usually because they are uncomfortable and inexperienced in conducting them. The senior manager/director typically will be heard to say that appraisals don't work and are a waste of time, which for them becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. All that said, performance appraisals that are administered without training (for those who need it), without explanation or consultation, and conducted poorly will be counter-productive and is a waste of everyone's time. Well-prepared and well-conducted performance appraisals provide unique opportunities to help appraise and managers improve and develop, and thereby also the organizations for whom they work. Just like any other process, if performance appraisals aren't working, don't blame the process, ask yourself whether it is being properly trained, explained, agreed and conducted. 4. Effective performance appraisals Aside from formal traditional (annual, six-monthly, quarterly, or monthly) performance appraisals, there are many different methods of performance evaluation. The use of any of these methods depends on the purpose of the evaluation, the individual, the assessor, and the environment. The formal annual performance appraisal is generally the over-riding instrument, which gathers together and reviews all other performance data for the previous year. Performance appraisals should be positive experiences. The appraisals process provides the platform for development and motivation, so organizations should foster a feeling that performance appraisals are positive opportunities, in order to get the best out of the people and the process. In certain organizations, performance appraisals are widely regarded as something rather less welcoming('blocking sessions' is not an unusual description), which provides a basis only on which to develop fear and resentment, so never, never, never use a staff performance appraisal to handle matters of discipline or admonishment, which should instead be handled via separately arranged meetings. 5. Types of performance and aptitude assessments (1)Formal annual performance appraisals (2)Probationary reviews (3)Informal one-to-one review discussions (4)Counseling meetings (5) Observation post (6) Skills or career-related tests (7) Assignment or task to follow the review, including the secondment (8)Assessment Centre, including the observation group exercises, presentations and other tests (9)Communicate with people who investigate the views of others (10) Acts of psychological tests and other assessment (11)Handwriting analysis 外文文献译文1、考绩考核的用途和如何使其易于实现绩效考核根本上是对职员有效的管理和评估。

外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文CorporatePerformanceManagementAbstractTwo of the most important duties of a chief executive officer are (1) toformulates t rat egy and(2)tomanage h i s c ompany’s p er f orm ance.Inthisa r ticlewe e xaminethe second of these tasks and discuss how corporate performance should be modeledand managed.Webeginbyconsideringtheenvironmentin whichacompanyoperates,which includes, besides outside stakeholders, the industry it belongs and the marketit supplies, and then proceed to explain how the functioning of a company can beu nder s t ood by a nex a m i nationof i ts bus i n ess,o per a ti ona landperform a nce managementmod els.Nextwedescribethestructurerecommendedby theauthorsforacorporateplanning,controlandevaluationsystem,themostimportantpartofa corp orate performance management system. The core component of theplanningsystem is the corporate performance evaluation model, the structure of which ism apped i nt o the pl anning sys t em’s da ta b ase,si m ula t ion modelsandbudgeting t ool s’structures, andalsousedtoshapeinformationcontainedinthe system’s products,besidesbeingthenucleusoft helanguageusedbythe system’s agentstotalkabout corporateperformance.Theontologyofplann ing,theguidingprinciplesofcorporate planningandthehistoryof”M ADE”,thecorporateperform ancemanagementsystem di scus s e d inthisarti c le,arere vi ew e dn e xt,before w ep ro cee d todisc us s i nde t ailt h e structural components of the corporate planning and control system introduced before.We conclude the article by listing the main steps which should be followedwhen implementing aperformance planning, control and evaluation system for a company.1.IntroductionTwo of the most important corporate tasks for which a chief executive officeris primarilyresponsibleare(1)toformulatestrategyand(2)tomanagethecompany’s p erf ormance. In thisarticle we examine the second of these tasks and discuss howcorporateperformance should be modeled andmanaged.T operfo r mistoac c ompli s h,t o a chieve(de s i r ed)r e s u ltsoroutc om es.So,whe n talkingabo utcorporateperformance,wearereferringtothedegreebywhichdesired resultsoroutcomesarea chievedbyacompany.Managingcorporateperformance involves planning, controlling, analyzing and evaluating, not only the resultsachieved bythecompany,butalsothemeansbywhichtheseresultsarereached.Amongthe re sults,orgoals,pursuedbymostcompanieswecanmentiongrowth,marketshare,profitabilityan dvaluecreation;andthemeanstoachievetheseresultsincludep roductivi ty,effect i veness,innova t iona nd c ompetiti ve nes s.T hos e a rethe t y p eofthings we should have in mind when specifying a corporate performancemanagement system.Before discussing how to model corporate performance, it is convenienttoconsider the environment in which a company operates, which includes, besides out s i de sta ke holde rs, the indust r y i t be l ongs and the marke t it suppli e s. Themain aspectsofanindustrytobelookedatwhen consideringitsinfluenceoncorporateperformancearestructureandregulation,themaincompetito rs,entrybarriers,substituteproductsand supplier’s negotiatingpower.Associatedquestionsare :How production is organized, vertically or horizontally? How much competitive isthe i ndustry and who are the m a in competitors, t h ose tha t ca pt ure th e l a rges t part oft hemarketshare?Is itunregulated,self-regulatedorregulatedbyagovernmentagency?Howstrongarebarrierstotheentryofnewcompetito rs?Canproductsfromother industries function as substitutes for the ones produced in the industry? Whataboutthe power industry suppliers have when negotiating prices and tradeconditions?At the opposite side of the industry in the corporate environment we havethe marketwherethecompanytradesitsproducts,itsmainattributesbeingsize,growth rate,segmentation,exitbarriersand consumers’negotiating power.Typicalquest ions thatshouldbeaskedwhenassessingitseffectoncorporateperformanceare:Whatis the marketsize,indollars,foreach of the company’s products?Whatarethe short-term and long-term market growth rates? Is it a wholesaleor a retailmarket?Are the sales cyclical? How can the market be segmented (by geography, purchasingpower,customerage,etc.)?Whichbarriersdoesaclientrunintowhenchangings uppli e rs? D o c l ients ha v e t he power t o impose pric e s and t ra de conditions?Wecallthepeoplewhohaveinterestinorareaffectedbya company’s performanceits“stak eholders”,andgroupthemin thecategoriesof“insiders”and“outsiders”.Theinsidersarethe company’s entrepreneursorcontr ollingshareholders and its managers and employees. The outsiders include customers, suppliers, minority shareholders, debt holders, the government in its roles of public goodssupplier,regulatorandtaxcollector,andalsothecommunitieswherethecompany doesbus i ne s s.It isim port ant t onote t hats t a kehol de rs,bes i desbeinga f fecte db y,al s oinfluencecorporateperformanceanditisoftennec essarytosearchfortheeffectsof this influencewhen appraisingperformance.That is meant to increase the depth of this brief analysis of corporatestructureand external relations.Microeconomictheory considers the company as asocial p roductionunittha t uses a certa i ntechnolo g ytop r oducea s eto f outputsfromas e tof inputs.Thefunctionthatmapsi nputquantitiesintomaximumoutputquantities obtainablefromtheinputsiscalledthe“productio n function”or“productionfrontier”.Knowledge of this function is important for measuring the technical efficiency ofaproduction unit, a very significant performance metric. Several techniques existfort hespe c ifi c at i on of pro duc tion funct i ons or fro nt iers, gr oupe d und e r the nam e so f“Data Envelopment Analysis”and“S tochasticFrontier Analysis”.Companies are created by entrepreneurs, the agents that organize andcoordinate production with the help of professional managers. Entrepreneurs play a crucialrolein shaping corporate performance. On oneside, recognized entrepreneurial capacity─and also large contact networks ─are vital for raising the financial capitalnecessary tobuildstructuralorphysicalcapital. On anotherside,the entrepreneurs’reputation and contacts are essential to attract the intellectual capital that, together withthe structural capital, is the foundation of innovation capacity.A business model is a conceptual representation of the way a companydoes business.Itsmaincomponents,are:the company’s valueproposition;thetargetedmarket segments; the distribution, marketing communications, and customerrelationshipchannels;the core competenciesneeded;operating and managementt echnol og ies;t hepar t ner s’ne tw ork;andtherevenue,costand va lue creat i on m ode ls.Understandingthe business modelis the first step to implement acorporate performancemanagementsystem.The modelshould indicate whether the company has a broad customer base or targets specific market segments, and in the secondcase,identifythesesegments.Thegoodsandservicesprovidedbythecompanyandthe com mercial conditions under which they are sold (including such things asguarantees,technicalassistance, etc.), comprise the valueproposition.The channelused forp roductdistr i buti on ca n bea di re c t-t oc ustomer s a l esc ha nnelthroughthe I nte r net,orbe comprised of bricks and mortar companyownedstores, wholesale agents,retail companies,etc.Thecompanycanuseseveralmarketingchannelstogetmessages thro ughtoitscustomers,suchasTVandprintedmedia,andemployacallcentertogive support and receive complaints and suggestions from them. Core competencies ar e t heon e sthecomp an y ne edstomas t erinorde r toga i nac om pet i tivead va nta g ei n relation to other companies in the same marketplace. These competenciesshould restonproperoperationalandmanagementtechnologies,andbe supplemented by a network of partners, if necessary. As a final point, a business model must includea revenue,acostandavaluecreationmodelinordertobeprofitabletothe company’s s hare h old e rs.We can think of the operational model of a companyasencompassinganorganizationalmodel,afunctionalmodelandacorporatedatamodel. The organizationalmodeldepicts,inaninvertedhierarchicaltree,therolesoftheagents involve dinthe company’s operation.Thefunctionalmodelportraysall theactivitiesthattogetherformthewholetowhichwereferbytheexpression“company’s operations”,structuredinlogical,sequentialsteps formingoperationalprocesses.At last, the corporate data model is an entity-relationship diagram that shows themain entitiesaboutwhichthecompanycollectsdatawithitsattributesandtherelationshipsbetw eenthem.Thelastmodelweneedtoexamineinordertounderstandthefunctioningofacorporation is the performance management model it uses, which is, ingeneral,composedoffourbuildingblocks.Thecorporategovernancesystem,thecorporatep e rfo rmanc ep la nnin g,control a nde va lua t ionsyste m,t he individual m anage r sperformance planning, control and evaluation system and the managementvariable compensation system (or bonus system). The corporate governance systemcomprises three well knownactors, the chief executive officer, the directors and theshareholders,andisdesignedtomediatetherelationsbetweenthem.Underthegovernancesyste m,we find two planning and control systems, having as its targets the performance ofthe company(asawholeandofitsdivisions)andtheperformanceofitsindividualm ana g ers,re s p e ct i vely.L i nking t heset w osyste m sw e finda com p ensa t ions y st e mthat assigns fractions of a bonus pool, which is a function of the aggregatecompany performance,toitsmanagersonthebasisoftheirindividualperformances.An e ffective management model should be forward-looking, that is, centered ontheimprovement of future performance, and focused on valuecreation.A thorough understanding o f a ll t he m od e l s des c ribed above is anec e s s ary prerequisiteforone tobeabletoplan,monitor,analyze,evaluateand controlcorporate performance.Inthenextsectionwewillexamineinmoredetailacrucial component of the management model previously described: the corporateperformance planning, control and evaluationsystem.2.The C orporate P erf o rmanc e Planni ng,C ontrolan d Eva l u at io n System.That shows the structure recommended by the authors for acorporateplanning,controlandevaluationsystem,themostimportantpartofacorporateperforma nce management system. The core component of the planning system, as can bededucedfrom its central position in the mentioned figure, is the performance evaluationmodel.Thestructureofthismodelismappedintothe system’s database,simulationm odels and budgeting tools’structures, and also used to shape information contained in the system’s products,besidesbeingthenucleusofthelanguageusedbythe system’s agentstotalkaboutcorporateperformance.Thecorporateplanningand controlprocessisformedbythecoordinatedactionsoftheplanningandcontrolagents,whoseaimist hegenerationofthe system’s outputs,which includeassumptions,goals,forecasts, plans, budgets, investment projects, performance valuations, varianceanalysis,etc.Theseproductstaketheformofpaperandelectronicdocumentsands pread s heets,a nd of PowerPointpresent a t i ons.T he a gents fol lowanagreedupontime schedule and rely on a business intelligence (BI) software to support theiractions.TheBIsoftwareimplementstheperformanceevaluationmodelforthepurposesof rep resenting and simulating corporate performance and provides the necessarytools forthe system’s agentstoproducethe system’soutputs.Datausedbythesystem comes from the accounting and other corporate databases. In the following sectionsof thisarticlewewillexamineindetaileachoftheaforementionedplanningsystemc ompon ents.Before proceeding, however, we will make a pause to discuss the ontologyof planning. One can readily identify in this figure three major structures: the strategic,the motivation and the action frameworks. In the strategic framework, which ischiefly related to the risk versus return dialectics, we can identify theexternal i nf l uence s to corporat e performa n ce, c om pris i ng both opportuni ti es a nd threats, and the internal ones, materialized by strengths and weaknesses. Suppliers and consumersnegotiatingpower,entryandexitbarriers,competitorsandsubstituteproductsarethe ma in determinants of external influences. Technological change has also apervasiveinfluence on corporate performance. Comparing the motivation (ends) andaction(means) fr a meworks, we can as s ociate v a rious levels or l ayers in w hich c or po ra t e aimsaredefinedtothecorrespondingactionclasses,thatis,visiontomission,longtermgo alstostrategy,shorttermgoalstotacticsandactualresultstoactualactions.Policy and business rules are restrictionsunder which strategy and tactics,respectively, must be formulated, and actual action carriedout.It may be convenient, at this point, to give a general definition of theterms“planning”and“control”.Corporateplanningis a processbywhichmanagement define the desired future performance of a corporation, and identify and decide onthe actionsthatneedtobetakeninordertoachievethatperformance.Themainstepscomprisingap lanningcycleareexposed.Corporatecontrol,ontheotherhand,isan operational process which aims to check whether the actual performance isinaccordance with the plannedone, and, eventually, to modify the planned actionsinordertoguaranteethatthefinaldesiredperformancewillbe met. The corporatebudg etisoneo f themostim port antoutputs o fthec orpor atepl a nninga n dcont rol proces s.Itistheprimemanagementtoolusedtoimprovecorporateperformanceand toalignmanageme ntinterests withthoseoftheshareholders.Wecanconcludethis section by stating the nine guiding principles of corporate planning and control:i.Planning is concerned in first place with results and in second placewiththe means to achieve theseresults.ii.Planning is concerned with the present value of costsand benefits to bei ncurred in the f ut u re a s a cons e quence of dec i s i ons undertaken in t he pres e nt.iii.Themainobjectiveofplanningis to createvalueforthe corporation’s shareholders.iv.Fortheabovegoal to bemet,itisnecessarytofulfill customers’expectations concerning quantity, price and quality of marketed products at the least possiblecost,and to m ai nta i n a skilled and full y m otivat ed w or k force.v.Planning and control activities should be organized through a systemwhosecomponents are the planning and control agents, process, time schedule,products,models&tools,anddatabase.vi.Thecorporatebudgetshouldbe the planningandcontrol system’s product t hat consol i dat e s t he r es ul ts w hi ch the company p lans to achi ev e i n the next period and the actions it should undertake in order to meetthem.vii.The corporate budget must contain all the information necessary forthe evaluation of the short term planned performance of the company, itsmarketing,operational, economic, patrimonial and financial aspects being dullyconsidered.viii.The corporate budget should not be viewed exclusively as a means ofcost reductionorcontrol,butmainlyasatooltoenhanceperformanceandincreasethe company’s economicvalue.ix.The planning process in itself is as important as its outputs, andshould contributetoleverage management’s knowledgeabout the company’s i nternal workings, and also to help focus its efforts on the critical areas ofcorporateperformance.S ource: Pedro Góes MonteirodeOliveira STARPLAN ConsultoriaEmpresarial Ltda.,2009.“Corporate Performance Management”.WorkingP aper,vol.41,no.4,pp.1-7..二、翻译文章译文：企业绩效管理摘要行政总裁两个最重要的职责是：制定战略和处理他的公司表现。

高管薪酬设计中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)高管薪酬状况公司使用不同的方案来补偿高管。

一个理想的薪酬方案可以使高管激励与股东的利益相一致，尽量减少代理问题。

这些方法通常包括工资，奖金，股票期权，股票奖励，和养老金。

由于安然公司和世通公司的丑闻与股票期权有关，使得股票期权的使用问题变得非常有争议，因此这一问题会被进一步细致的讨论。

然而，第一部分将要讨论的报酬是平均雇员薪金。

薪金薪金是一个定额的薪酬方案，不会在短期内改变（Balsam 35）。

然而，从长远来说，工资的改变取决于绩效。

通常，公司的报酬合同里会有因为绩效和工龄而可能允许加薪的条款。

因为薪金是非常重要的吸引高管人员的薪酬组合中最无风险的成分，尤其是对于厌恶风险的人来说（Balsam 312）。

奖金大部分公司都会根据高管们的绩效来支付他们奖金。

奖金是一种建立在一个或更多措施的绩效上的报酬。

根据Balsam的著作，“An Introduction to Executive Compensation”，这些措施可以是或明或暗，客观或主观，金融或非金融。

通常，最高奖金是表示为薪金的百分比；一个员工在公司里升职，可赚取的工资的比例作为奖金经常会增加（Balsam 314）。

一个CEO的奖金是工资的100%，这是很常见的事。

2005年，华尔街奖金以215亿美元创下新纪录，去年创纪录的195亿美元是在2000年的牛市()。

华尔街的奖金在2004年的水平上增加了15.5%（）.股票期权股票期权通常是指允许别人在指定时间内以一定的价格购买股买的权利。

有时，承授人必须等到授予期结束才能行使购股权。

授予期是一个指定的时间量，是承授人行使购股权之前必须等待的时间。

通常情况下，承授人可在行权限制期内行使部分期权。

举个例子，让一个执行者在一个四年的管辖期和管辖期结束时休息的第一年享有25%的股权。

股票期权的使用在九十年代得到了显著的提升但是因近期的争议而有所下降(Hall-Murphy)。

绩效考核外文文献及其译文------------------------------------------作者xxxx------------------------------------------日期xxxxTｈe Dilｅmｍa oｆ Perfｏｒmａｎce ApprａisaｌＰeter Prowse aｎd Julie PｒｏwseMｅａsｕrｉng Busineｓs Eｘｃelｌenｃe,Ｖol.13 Iss：４，pp.６9 -７7ＡbstractThis pａper deaｌｓｗith ｔｈｅｄiｌemma oｆ mａna ｇing perfoｒmancｅｕsing pｅrformａncｅａppraisａl。

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企业绩效管理外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Can Performance Management Foster Intelligent Behavior?Bjarte BogsnesThe world has changed, not just in increasingly fast-changing and unpredictable ways, but also the competence and expectations of people in our organizations. Unfortunately, too few seem to understand or accept that these developments call for radically new and different ways of leading and managing. Traditional management practices do not make usthe agile organizations we need to be.The problem starts with the label, "Performance Management" implying, "If I don't manage you, there will be no performance."We need a new mindset, one that is less about managing performance and more about creating conditions for great performance to occur. We need self-regulating models, requiring less management, but more leadership from everyone.Think about traffic, where we want good performance and a safe good flow. Traffic authorities have different ways of making this happen. The traffic light is a popular choice, but those managing the process (programmers) are not in the situation; information used in their process is not fresh, which is clear as you wait in front of that red light.The roundabout is a very different alternative. Those managing are the drivers themselves. The information used is real time, coming from own observations. While that information is also available in front of the traffic light, drivers do not have the authority to act on it. By the way, the "zipper" or "every second car through" is not a rule, but a guiding principle.The roundabout normally is more efficient than the traffic light, because of two significant differences in the decision-making process, information and authority. A third element is also required for the roundabout to be more efficient: while the traffic light is a simple-rulesbased system, the roundabout is values-based. A value-set based on, "Me first, I don't care about the rest," is not a big a problem in front of the red light, but is a serious problem in a roundabout. Here, a positive common purpose of wanting a safe and good flow is critical. Drivers must be more considerate, open about own intentions while trying to understand the intentions of peers. Instead of managing performance, traffic authorities have created conditions for self-managed performance to occur.What would the implications be for the loathed performance review? The principles and practices described at Return Path are sensible and interesting. I like the concept of horizontal commitments toward peers, instead of vertical commitments to higher management. At the same time, we need to broaden our definition of performance. In traditional performance, a commitment is too often about "hitting the number." This is too narrow. We need to ask questions such as, how are we doing compared to peers? How are we using KPIs to reflect on performance, or using hindsight and management assessment to verify results? Did we really move toward our longer-term ambitions? How sustainable are the results? Last but not least, there has to be room for values if performance systems are to foster intelligent behavior; we need to ask, how where those results achieved?At Statoil our integrated performance management approach links ambitions to actions. Our targets reflect a broad set of ambitions,including people, health, safety, environment, operations and financial performance. Read more about our management model and how we apply a holistic and values-based approach to this broader performance agenda.The words of Dee Hock, former GEO of Visa, should guide the design of our management processes, including our performance reviews: "Simple, clear purpose and principles give rise to complex, intelligent behavior. Complex rules and regulations give rise to simple, stupid behavior."While researching my book. Talent Economics, I interviewed employees about what really motivates today's workforce. I discovered a disconnect between the performance support my interviewees wanted versus how managers recounted their contribution to these conversations.Over the last 20 years, the employee mindset has evolved faster than has the art and science of management. Nowhere is this starker than in the area of performance management practices, particularly the annual review. In both the developed and developing world, employees report that this end-of-year activity breeds stress, anxiety and mistrust. How ironic that a process aimed at improving organizational performance, is itself underperforming!It's time to "reboot" our performance management operating system, installing two specific system updates:l. The "Democracy" update. As much as we try to make theperformance appraisal a two way dialogue, we cannot run away from the fact that at its core, the conversation today is often a top-down review. My research shows that many 21st century employees are rejecting conversations that are one-way: in hot job markets today, managers must realize "who is appraising whom." With other offers readily available, many employees enter a performance dialogue privately considering if their manager is worth another year of their career. The performance management conversation now reflects a company's Employee Value Proposition, much as we learn in the lead Perspective.The Democracy update means that managers only gain the right to give feedback when they first genuinely seek the same on their own performance as leaders. Not just through 360-degree reviews, but also through authentic conversations asking, "How am I performing as your manager? " and "How can I help you succeed?" Only then can the conversation shift to, "How you can improve?"and "This is what you should focus on."2. The Success module. Greater employee autonomy and empowerment also changes the meaning of management. We have gone from a "supervisor of task and outcomes" to an "enabler of performance, innovative thinking and collective success." To make this shift, we must give up the judge's robes for the coach's uniform. If employees don't succeed, managers are on the hook, too.This is particularly relevant when coaching a team to success. People bring different skills to a team and how well they work together really matters. If team reviews work better to achieve a goal, so be it. The Return Path story illustrates how review processes can be designed and executed around what matters most, and where everyone dons the uniforms of player and coach.What if, instead of making the heart of a performance conversation the evaluation, it became a vehicle to improve success of the individual, the team and the business? What if performance feedback was paired with dialogue about transforming the business, the product or customer experience? This genuinely reboots and upgrades performance management to focus on individual and organizational success.It is indeed time to upgrade performance management practices: we can no longer manage a 21st century employee using 20th century mindsets.People & Strategy. 2013, V ol. 36 Issue 2, p12-13. 2p.译文：绩效管理能促进自我管理行为吗?Bjarte Bogsnes世界随着时间的推移而变化莫测，连那些与时变化而不可预测的通道也随之改变，与此同时组织人员的能力和期望也顺应时代潮流。

中文4480字薪酬相关外文翻译--改善薪酬提高绩效一、外文原文原文：To Improve Performance, Revise Your PayCloutier，GeorgeCompensation is that the staff turn towards the organizations to provide labor or services and access to various forms of reward or return, is organization paid to their employees of all labor remuneration.Compensation management is the process of enterprise managers refers to the remuneration paid standards of staff, the level of the elements to determine thestructure, distribution and adjustment. The respect of traditional compensation management is material reward, with little consideration on the behavioral characteristics of manager; Moreover modern compensation management shifted the focus to the development of human resources and use, it takes the process of material reward of management and encouraging staff closely fall together ,turn into a unified organic whole.Modern compensation management researchers found that the impact of the compensation management have a lot of factors, which can be primarily summed up in the four fol.lowing factors.1.External environment factorsImpacting compensation management to the external environment factors including: Economic environment. Macroeconomic situation and development trend will affect the human resources policy formulation and adjustment.Social environment. The change of social values will lead to the organization's staff mentality changed: With the staff's level of education and skills enhancement, the compensation system of enterprises must make out the appropriate adjustments foremployees of these social changes.Political environment. Human resources management is always a certain social and political conditions for the environment, must reflect the spirit of country(enterprises) according to law.Technological environment. Technology environment including the whole process from raw materials and products to the market. In the process from raw materials to the products, any technological breakthroughs and improvements, and the staff of enterprises will all have a tremendous impact,therefore, enterprises must continuously reform the compensation system, to mobilize the enthusiasm of key personnel, the introduction of technology and retain the key personnel, encourage technological innovation, in order to gain the competitive advantages of technology, talent and innovation for enterprises.anization internal factorsInfluence the organizations of compensation management specific internal factors include : the compensation management of financial capability, human resources and remuneration policies, the scale of enterprises, the culture of enterprises, the structure of enterprises (or flat-level type), and faced life cycle of the specific stages.3.Work factorsThe influence of work factors of compensation management specific including: work environment, labor intensity, and complexity of the initiative, and challenges and so on.4.Individual factorsThe impact of individual actors of compensation management including: the laborers’ personal ability, personality, character traits and values, seniority, performance, experience, education, the development potential.In summary, the pay is an integrated with the four elements harmony of management, environment, organizations, and individuals, and continuously the process of effective use, in this process, employees gained the satisfaction and a sense of achievement on labor reward and job, and organizations will complete its goals.Compensation is a complex economic and social phenomenon from differentangles can perform various classifications. According to the mechanism of compensation, it can divide into internal and external compensation.Internal compensation means the staff by virtue of their own hard work to get honor, success and liability. Internal compensation include : participation in the decision-making rights, individuals to play the potential job opportunities, independence and freedom to arrange their working hours, more terms, more interested in the work, personal development opportunities, diversification of activities.External compensation means enterprises according to the staff for the size of contribution they made and that paid the various forms of income to the staff. Its specific manifestations are varied, including wages, bonuses, benefits, allowances and other specific forms:Wages .employees as long as works in enterprises, we will be able to get a regular fixed amount of labor remuneration. The narrow wages paid to workers refer to the monetary reward. From the meaning of generalized wages, including laborers monetary and all the remuneration of non-monetary forms. It is now commonly referred to wages, generally refers to generalized wages. As the wages of staff basic compensation, the basic amount fixed, it provides a more stable source of income to the employees, and meet the minimum needs of life to staff.Incentives. Incentives refers to the organization to provide staff with the efforts beyond the normal labor or labor and compensation paid to employees, including its dividend, profit sharing and usually refer to the bonus content.Welfare. Welfare also has broad and narrow, the broad welfare includes wages. The narrow welfare refers paid to the staff in addition to wages or salaries and other forms of remuneration, and more to pay in Physical or the form of services, such as social insurance (life insurance, unemployment , endowment insurance, etc.) the free and discounted of work meal, preferential housing, the provision of free or low-priced canteens bathhouse, clubs, and so on.Subsidy. Subsidies refers to the wage or salary of enterprises difficult to complete, accurately reflect the situation or the special working conditions of staff and jobcharacteristics and the specific conditions of the additional pay and the cost of living paid staff compensation. These circumstances are: the working environment is detrimental to staff health; The work cause possibility of larger harm to staff; employees involved in the community in some seemingly decent work and so on. People usually associated with the allowance as compensation, and the compensation linked to life as subsidies.According to the compensation defined as the fundamental basis of the compensation classification, the pay can be divided into time, piece-work pay and outstanding achievement compensation. In addition, according to the compensation whether the monetary form can be obtained directly, divided into monetary and non-monetary remuneration.Pay is the same as commodity money contact to a ing the two angles as following to define the quality of compensation.From the point of view of productivity, it is production or other economic activities of human labor input the monetaryfunds manifestations, is the final cost of the product components. In the conditions of market economy, enterprises mainly through paid to the accounting or measuring production and other economic activities of human labor consumption. Due to the pressure of competition, enterprises must consider cutting labor costs.From the point of view of the relations of production, compensation for the income distribution reflects the outcome of the staff was the allocation of shares. Under the current social system of our country, compensation is the main sources to the means of subsistence consumption of workers. It have a major impact on the level of consumption and the consumption structure , and consumption actually is the process of reproduction labor, reproduction of labor also has an important influence in the next phase of production. Therefore, the compensation’s level has great significance for sustained and stable increase production or promote other economic activities.Such a dual character of compensation, it decided that the compensation management is actually reduce expenditure and income distribution on production costs and thatcontinued toimprove pay levels of this contradiction and make an adjustment.The function of compensation may from the enterprises, workers and social aspects to inspect:From the point of view of the enterprises, compensation has the following functions: First, the increment functions. Compensation is not only the costs of purchase labor by enterprises, as well as the investment of live working , it will give employers greater than expected cost benefits. The existence of such benefit, provided the impetus mechanism of labor employment and investment labor for the enterprises. Second, the promoting functions. Compensation is a evaluation of workers and operators’ performance, reflect the quality and quantity conditions of work. Therefore, the compensation can promote staff constantly improve their work efficiency and enthusiasm. Third, the coordination functions. While the movement of compensation, put the organization's goals and intentions of managers to employees, correspond the relationship between staff and enterprises, and promote the consistent of staff’ action and enterprises correspond. On the other hand, the reasonable of compensation’ differentials andstructure can effectively mediate the conflict between the employees, and harmony the human relationships.From the point of view of the employee, compensation has the following functions: First, the reproduction of labor ensure functions. Staff through the labor and services exchange for compensation, so that they could meet the need of food, clothing, shelter, with the basic needs of life, thereby achieving a reproduction of labor force. Second is to achieve functional value. Compensation is an evaluation for enterprises to pay for their employees, also is the recognition of staff capability and level, is the returns of the implement of individuals value, and the signal of successful promotion, it reflects the employees’ relative position and function in enterprises, it can make the staff have a sense of achievement and satisfaction, and thus inspire greater enthusiasm for the work. Third，reasonable compensation will be strong the trust of enterprise by staff ,buildup the expected increase risk of psychological sense of security and a sense of security for the staff.From the point of view of the social, compensation has the relocate function of laborforce resources for the social. Most people will be willing to the higher compensation regions,departments and the post. As a manager can use the difference compensation to guide human resources reasonable flow, promote the effective distribution for human resources, implement the human resources development and maximize efficiency. In addition, compensation also can apply the occupational value and types of work by people, compensation level to a certain extent reflect the types of work or social values, thereby adjust the people's occupational aspirations and the flows of obtain employment.Compensation has always been an attention task, it is not merely related to each person's personal interests, is involved in every organization, the whole community, and even the entire country's socio-economic development. Therefore, compensation is that foreign scholars have always been an important research subject.The Motivation theory of compensation is the basis of the compensation management theory. Motivation is the most important and most basic functions in compensation. How to use the compensation to motivate the staff’ efficiency and enthusiasm, is the core content of compensation study, design and compensation management. Reasonable, fair and competitive compensation is the most important factors to encourage theemployees to work hard. Reasonable, and effective compensation management mechanism between prompting is a benign interaction. Effective compensation mechanism must motivate the staff use higher quantity and quality to completed tasks, and higher quantity and quality of work must bring higher compensation.Motivation is a psychology concept, in its essence, it is said that some motivation by the reasons, some occurred motive acts is produced. For example, the same person, why do their sometimes work actively, and sometimes flagging spirit and no mood to work, or even negative go slow? Now, put the motivation concept into management practice, endow a new meaning. That is motivation is a spiritual power or state, the staff has stepped up, inspire and promote the role and instruction or guidance staff conduct at the organization's goals. Therefore, not only to study some kind of motivation how is, more crucial to examine how to promote the management of aparticular object have the motivation how to guide them with their full force to achieve a particular goal. Today's society, more and more motivation by many managers in the implementation guidance and leadership is seen as an important method thus effectively integrate human, using technology to achieve reunification of all employees ,itwill also make the personal ease of mind, the achievement of organizational objectives.In the understanding the basis of human, and many scholars research the needs and conduct of human, But it has the same purpose of the study, namely : how to inspire motivation, how to analyze needs, how to determine action, adopted to meet the needs of the people to achieve their basic objective, so as to achieve an effective motivation.At present, domestic and foreign scholars have recognized the main motivation theory: Hierarchy of Needs Theory,Two-factor theory, Equity Theory, Expectancy theory of motivation. This text simply introduce Hierarchy of Needs Theory and Expectancy theory of motivation.Maslow put forward the hierarchy of needs theory, it thinks that the needs of human is arisen with the arrangement form, from the junior programs need to begin to move upwards to senior needs. Maslow thinks that it generally has five levels of needs in social life by people: physiological needs, security needs and society needs, respect needs and self-actualization needs.Maslow also considers that when a need to be met, and a higher level of need will occupy the dominant position, the individual needs of the layer to rise. From the point ofmotivation, no a need will be fully met, However, as long as the meeting is part of the individual will to pursue other aspects of their needs. According to Maslow's view, if we want to inspire someone, it is imperative to understand which hierarchy of needs by the person, then focused on meeting the needs of this level or above this level needs. Maslow's theory gained all-pervading recognition, especially gained the recogniztion from practice by many managers. This is mainly due to the theory simple and clear, easy to understand the inherent logic. Its maximize usefulness lies in the fact that it points out the need for every person. As managers, in order to effectivelyinspire subordinates, it is necessary to understand their subordinates what is need to meet.In the reform process of state-owned enterprise, the internal reform of the compensation system is always the summit concerned by all the levels of managers. The reform of enterprises compensation system throughout the entire process of state-owned enterprises reform. While managers at all levels pay great attention to design and pay system reform in China but the majority of businesses pay system still faced with many problems and shortcomings at present, and many enterprises’ employees is not high satisfaction of the compensation system,the compensation system of enterprises has failed to play the role of incentiv e, didn’t become the norm to workers. Like other state-owned enterprises. When the Nanjing DE valve factory carry through the compensation management, also not fully understand that the compensation system of enterprises must support and services to the enterprise's strategic goals. Greater extent on the existence of compensation to compensation, distribute the Equity and reasonable into the reform and development process as a goal and not what kind of compensation system will be favorable to corporate strategy and the implement of human resource strategy, Nanjing DE valve factory do not from their own strategies and the overall human resources strategy starting to reform and improve the compensation system, and do not foothold in the enterprise business strategy and human resources strategy, according to labor market, Finally formed enterprises compensation management system. Enterprises lack of management experience in professional human resources management sector in the medium and long term development strategy of Research and decomposition to the enterprise, according to the external market and the development of enterprises and work out development strategies that suit the salary management system, lack of study oncompensation management. Although enterprises also pay a certain of reform for compensation system in recent years, but these reforms are not from the height of corporate strategy and the enterprise fails to reflect the strategic objectives and positioning.Due to the inference of traditional structure and the traditional concept, theexisting compensation structure of enterprise is relatively average, no reasonable began gap, the price of enterprises compensation and labor market detached from the price of labor market, key positions in the compensation level below the external market compensation level and without external competition; And non-key positions in the compensation higher than the market level. The compensation of ordinary workers is higher than the market price. From the exterior, non-key positions ordinary workers of enterprise whose compensation their salary level higher than the average level in society, one side it increases the cost of human and waste the limited financial of enterprises, as ordinary employees in the labor market, especially in the large population of urban areas is a serious oversupply. There is absolutely no need to pay their high compensation, even paid high wages to stimulate all their enthusiasm, but is not worthfrom the input and output view of the relative efficiency , form the internal, non-critical positions in higher compensation levels, contrast, key positions on the low compensation levels, it will increase the sense of unfairness in key positions, in the important positions of workersThe staff of some key posts and important positions of the enterprise, their compensation were lower than the prices of market compensation. As we all know, the compensation level of enterprises in the talent market, and even the whole society should certainly attractive, In order to attract and retain talent, it can be overcome competitors. For first-rate talent should be given first-class return. If the key employees and the core staff income lower than the standards of social level, external competitiveness will be relatively weak, it will make the enterprises fail to hold the human, and led to serious unreasonable human resource structure in the enterprise. From the circumstances of investigation by us, on the one hand, many employees discontent the existing compensation system in the enterprises, demanding change, hope that the pay compensation opened for pay truly reflect the quality of workers and the contribution reflected rewards; On the other hand, there are many staff can not correctly deal with the compensation gap.Staff on the compensation gap issue of love and hate, this bring a big resistance to the reform of compensation, even though the good idea is hardly to implement.As enterprise managers, are not to break the original pattern, the result is to make the large contribution of staff and Core staff lost their jobs initiative and creativity, even cause the missing of talent in the enterprises.资料来源：Business Week Online.2009(05):P12.二、翻译文章译文：改善薪酬,提高绩效Cloutier，George薪酬是员工因向其所在组织提供劳动或劳务而获得的各种形式的酬劳或答谢，是组织支付给其员工的所有劳动报酬。

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译) Enterprises salary system design andperformance evaluationAbstractAny effective way of management must rely on a basis: people, all the staff of enterprises. Compensation system as an important aspect of enterprise management system, for an enterprise to attract, retain and motivate employees have a significant impact, attract, retain and motivate key talent, has become the core of the enterprise recognized goal. The compensation system design is not only an effective way to realize the core objective, is also an important content of modern enterprise development.Key words: salary system and equity incentive, senior executives, design1 IntroductionHuman capital to the enterprise wealth maximization, the greatest degree of retaining key talent, attract potential talent, the basic principals and successful is perfect competitive compensation system. With the concept of human capital is more and more people Heart, attract, retain and motivate key talent, has become the core of enterprise determine target, compensation system for enterprises An important aspect of the system, to attract talents play an important role. Compensation system design is an effective way to reality is the core objective, but also an important content of the development of the enterprise to modernization, so the height weight by enterprises Depending on the.2 Literature reviewEarly in the traditional compensation phase, the employers always minimize workers to cut costs as much as possible, and through this method make the Labor of workers have to work harder in order to get paid enough to make a living. William. First, Quesnay’s minimum wage theory is that wages and other commodities, there is a natural value, namely maintain staff minimum standard of living life information value，the minimum wage for workers does not depend on the enterprise or the employer's subjective desire, but the result of the competition in the market. The classical economists Muller believed that certain conditions, the total capital in the enterprise salary depends on the labor force and for the purchase of labor relationship between capital and other capital; For the payment of capital wage fund is difficult to change in the short term. Wages fund quantity depends on two factors: one is a worker, directly or indirectly, in the production of products and services production efficiency; the other one is in the process of production of these goods directly or indirectly employ labor quantity. With the development of era, the simple forms of employment have already can't satisfy the demand of the workers, so some interests to share views was put forward to motivate workers.On this basis, the Gantt invented the "complete tasks rewarded" system to perfect the incentive measures. Represented by Americaneconomist Becker’s theory of human capital school of thought argues that human capital is determined by the human capital investment, is present in the human body to the content of knowledge, skills, etc. Martin Weizmann share of economic theory that wages should be linked to corporate profits. Increase in profits, employee wages fund, increased profits, and employee wages fund. Between enterprises and employees is the key of the labor contract is not in a fixed wage of how many, but in the division of labor both sides share proportion. In modern compensation phase, the contents of the compensation has been changed, increased a lot of different compensation models, and more and more pay attention to employee's personal feelings and development, employees can even according to individual condition choose different salary portfolio model. Employees can be paid off on surface of the material and spiritual.3 Pay system overviewIn the past the traditional pay system, usually are business owners value orientation as the guide to carry on the design. With the continuous development of the overall market environment, in the modern enterprise management concept has also changed. They are aware of the established compensation system should adapt to the employee benefit as a starting point, the self-interest pursuit and employee demand together, to establish a set of enterprises and employees to maximize the interests of the two-way, so as to achieve win-win situation. Since the 90 s, the westerndeveloped economies in the enterprise owners and managers try to change the traditional form of compensation, relocation compensation system, the importance of also constantly try to innovate salary system of design and diversification.Performance pay system is established in accordance with the enterprise organization structure based on the results of the individual or team performance appraisal for salary distribution system. Total compensation is generally associated with individual or team performance. Now the enterprise model is used to combine individual performance and team performance. At the same time will be long term incentive and short-term incentive flexible model. In this kind of pay structure, contains a variety of forms of performance pay.Skill-based pay system on the basis of employees' skill determine employee wages level, and to the improvement of skills as their employees progress criteria. The compensation model can encourage employees to continuously learn new knowledge, to keep up with The Times, is the industry leader, when technology and equipment upgrades to the fastest response time to complete the change, and is helpful to form the learning corporate culture. If for flat organization structure, management jobs and opportunities for advancement are less, the compensation system can be very skillful professionals to make up for in terms of compensation. But with technical compensation system with theproblem is that the enterprise needs to pay for a large number of staff training, and if the participants of the training is not all to use knowledge in actual production, enterprises will not be able to obtain benefits, resulting in wasted costs.Total compensation is the unity of the material reward and spiritual reward. Among them, external compensation including all in monetary form of economic compensation, internal compensation includes not to substantial form of economic compensation, more focused on the return of spirit. John’s Lipoma at the end of last century proposed the compensation design, customization and diversity is more representative of the overall package. He should show that the basic wage, additional salary, salary welfare, work supplies allowance, bonus, promotion and development opportunities, psychological income, life quality, and individual factors that ten compensation factors into consideration, the formation of compensation system, the design method is different from the past traditional salary structure, is the biggest different compensation system design approach from the owner as the center to the worker as the center, employees can choose a suitable for their own pay combination, is no longer a passive receiver. In this compensation mode, economic compensation and the economical compensation together, paying equal attention to material and spiritual.4 The implementation of the compensation system designSalary survey is the key in the compensation system design. It is not only the necessary to understand the enterprise existing compensation system, is also the basis of compensation system design again. Salary survey should be real in-depth internal employee survey, as far as possible let employees at all levels give true feelings, make compensation system designers understand the staff for the specific demands of overall compensation. In had certain understanding of the current salary system and problems, will determine the compensation system on that basis to the general principles of design. Compensation system and the determination of design general principle also should according to the specific conditions of different enterprise itself to specific design. At the same time, according to the general principle to determine the scope of the staff at the level of compensation.Enterprise in selecting the most suitable for their own compensation system, the following sections are often the most concern, such as the division of different levels and at the same level of position within the sort, the post assessment results and with the duty staff due to personal quality differences between how to determine the pay difference. Enterprise in selecting the most suitable for their own compensation system, the following sections are often the most concern, such as the division of different levels and at the same level of position within thesort, the post assessment results and with the duty staff due to personal quality differences between how to determine the pay difference.Enterprise operators and management personnel representing the highest quality, at the same time they also foreign representative enterprise image, and holds the enterprise the way forward. They tend to have certain matter accumulation, more the pursuit of spiritual satisfaction and the realization of self-worth. For management personnel shall be designed to be scientific and reasonable compensation system, comprehensive consideration, not only give reasonable compensation in terms of material, at the same time to consider their spiritual pursuit.General manager's daily work mainly are transactional, administrative work, but is not directly concerned with the production related, so during the design compensation system will post wage and performance wage together, thus the personal salary combined with enterprise business objectives. To general managers to take a wider range of incentives, such as the annual performance review top employees equity incentives, encourage managers over fulfilled the goal, and form a competitive atmosphere of the company culture, drive the enterprise vitality. Increase the general manager’s shareholding proportion.For the use of EVA on the sales staff, can draw lessons from Tula bank ever take method, the sales staff to set up a commission systembased on EVA. Each sales staff receives a salary, in addition to qualification to get bonuses, the bonus amount depends on the "added value" has created. So that the program works: the company will be the added value of products are listed out, after distribution after the full cost of the product. The finance department monthly compiled a list of each product and added value of the net sales report. Each sales staff receives a copy of the report, as well as the use of the added value of the net total details of its own performance in the same format of monthly report. Further to deduct from the added value of net pay, perks and other fees and should share part of the management fee. After adjusting for these report line represents the added value.5 ConclusionIn the modern enterprises increasingly competitive today, talents become the key factor of enterprise long-term development more and more Business owners. And how to retain existing talent, and recruit more people of insight to join together create enterprise interest, become the compulsory subject of enterprise owners and management, and improve the compensation system is retaining talents and attracting talents essential link.企业薪酬体系设计与绩效评估Prasetya A摘要:任何一种行之有效的管理方式的运用都必须依赖于一个基础：人，企业的所有员工。

文献出处：Wayne Guay. "The study of executive equity incentive in listed company." Journal of accounting and economics (2015): 151-184.原文The study of executive equity incentive in listed companyWayne GuayAbstractEquity incentive system in the 50 s last century, which mainly focuses on the background of solution for the benefits of principal-agent conflict, it is the fundamental starting point will be unified management and shareholder interests, incentive management pay more attention to the long-term development of the enterprise, reduce its short-term behavior. Company executive’s equity incentive core goal is to solve the objective function between executives and shareholders of listed companies, the contradiction of principal-agent promote benefit community formed between company executives and shareholders, motivate executives to create more value for shareholders and society. Its biggest advantage is that in stock appreciation of spreads as the remuneration of senior management personnel will serve as a representative of the interests of the senior managers of a company's value increasing function, promote the consistency of the operators and shareholders realize channel. In recent years, the equity incentive management's opportunistic behavior such as negative effect, gradually attention by regulators, theory and practice.Keywords: the listed company, incentive mechanism, equity incentive, senior executivesIntroductionCan know from the most basic economic man hypothesis of economics, management is not natural to carry out their duties diligently and there is no greed, they satisfy the pursuit of personal interests, the main purpose of their work is to obtain the economic remuneration; At the same time they hold positions of powerholds the important power, resources and information, so it's possible self-interest behavior to harm the interests of investors. Especially as the separation of the ownership of a modern corporate control and the management members became the "actual controller" of the company, and ownership of the owner of the large shareholders to members of the company's management for effective supervision, this gives the management using the master control of the implementation of opportunism behavior of the space.Equity incentive is to point to in the business operators, the core staff by contract, on the basis of management and implement the responsibility system for assets, by giving the business operators, the core employee shares and options such as corporate equity share, make it to the identity of the shareholders in the corporate decision-making, share the profits and risks. Equity incentive mechanism to make enterprises senior talents of individual interests and overall interests closely relates in together, is a kind of effective incentives to reduce agency costs. In mature markets such as Europe and the United States, equity incentive is regarded as the important ways to solve the modern enterprise to entrust an agency relationship, and promote the company executives and shareholders is the effective means to form a community of interests.Literature ReviewHolmstrom (1979) 2 think, if the company's shareholders to observe, identify the operator's operation and management activities, and the corresponding business performance, then pay a fixed salary and to punish the operator's default behavior way, can ensure that the operator work hard, for the correct operation and management decision-making, create the biggest value for shareholders. However, due to the separation of ownership and control of modern company system has characteristics of agency problem between shareholders and managers, in general, shareholders cannot supervise operator's action, also don't know whether the operator's effort level is optimal.Jensen and Meckling (1976), the study found that enterprise's performance as a company manager increase with the increase of the stake.Mehran (1995) for themanufacturing enterprises of 1979 and 1980 in the United States after data for empirical research Gui that managers' shareholding is significant positive correlation with corporate performance.Morck Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argues that management group interest convergence and defense of these two effects.Interest convergence, refers to the company's market value and is closely relative to the number of managers' shareholding; Defense effect, refers to when managers shareholding reaches a certain range, the company's market value is negative correlation with the number of managers' shareholding. Therefore, when the proportion of enterprise management changes, the interests of the convergence and defense of these two kinds of effect, thus determines the volatility of the enterprise value changes.McConnell and Serves (1990) 'in the extension Morck Shleifer and Vishny (1988), on the basis of research Gui, examine the managers shareholding and institutional investors holding its influence on the value of the company. They found that the value of the company and managers shareholding inverted U type nonlinear relationship, critical stake is about 40 to 50%.Hemalin and Weishach (1991), the study found that when the managers' shareholding ratio from 0% to 1%, 1% and 5%, 5% to 20% and 5% more than four interval, the company's performance is negatively related to the ownership respectively were positively correlated, and the change trend of positive correlation, negative correlation. In addition, Mr Singh and Davidson (2003). Research has shown that, in the listed companies in the United States, managers shareholding can better put the interests of managers and shareholders together, reduces the agency cost of administrators.The implementation of the senior executive’s equity incentive process Most composed of independent directors of equity incentive commission rules of procedure by the shareholders' meeting, and led by the board of directors of the company. The comprehensive implementation of the committee responsible for planning and design and implementation of equity incentive plans make written rules. The committee shall have the right to decide the annual equity incentive beneficiary, given amount, given time, when emergencies to explain of equity incentive plan, andto pany in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of the state, according to the actual situation of the company stock source, equity incentive plan.Reasonable choice reserved shares, issuing new shares, stock repurchase (2), or by the original big shareholders transfer part of equity for equity incentive plan and way of solving the stock sources.Senior executives often is the main awarded equity incentive and incentive object.In the early stages of the development of equity incentive, the beneficiary of the equity incentive is mainly enterprise executives, the executives get the benefits of equity incentive, and brought benefits to the company.Equity incentive of the other type of object is the company's directors, including employees, directors and non-employee directors.But the director given equity incentive in number is far lower than the CEO.At present, the international big company equity incentive plan to object has a rising trend, from the original award CEO a few key positions, such as development so far, including senior managers, directors, middle managers, the tech sector, and even ordinary employees, foreign experts, consultants, or lawyers participation main body diversification.The number of equity incentive granted by the stock value, the total number of equity, the relevant laws and regulations, wage ratio, position, years of work and other personal factors and the influence of such factors as the company's performance.There are three kinds of international determine the number of options granted methods: one is according to the desired goals determine the amount of equity;Second, using the empirical formula by calculating the value of equity retracing equity.In granting equity incentive grant agreement should illustrate the validity of corresponding equity incentive.Equity incentive will be implemented in this period, this period is also known as equity life span.The validity of the stock option for stock options commonly discussion after signed a book of 10 years, the force will remain open for 3 一5 years.Be motivating if super power not valid for line power, will be deemed abandoned automatically equity incentive.Equity incentive holder line right after the press line right enjoys the dividend income shares.Due to the different tax law, in view of the executive authority of the proceeds of the stock yield whether to pay tax and tax rates, depending on the specific provisions of the tax law countries.Conformto the legal equity of income can pay tax at a reduced rate on capital gains tax, enjoy the preferential tax.Equity incentive may be due to the failure of the equity incentive plan, the authorized person and company terminates, the employment relationship between licensor due to various personal reasons can't exercise suspended or cancelled.Because each are not identical, the termination of the equity incentive approach also have very big difference.Executives, for example, in the office during the period of death, then the stock options can be used as a heritage to the heir hands;Senior executives to resign, or fired, companies tend to cancel all executives equity incentive;Did not get a right or has not done, to be given the right of equity incentive will failure due to senior executives quit and so on.SuggestionOn equity incentive mode in our country, the problems and obstacles, this paper argues that, from the following several aspects to pave the way for the implementation of equity incentive.Set up perfect and effective managers market.Professional, high-quality team of professional managers to promote healthy development of the enterprise management upgrade and plays an important role.Mature, manager of the talent market is the necessary condition of manager selection mechanism and qualified company manager is the focus of the incentive equity incentive system object.Manager market equity incentive, usually first professional manager market opposite the equity incentive, but in our country has not yet set up professional manager market.To ensure the healthy development of the equity incentive, you must set up professional manager market as soon as possible.Managers resource configuration, only through market to play its best utility, mature, manager of the talent market to give managers a reasonable market price, so as to solve problems such as management personnel to fold.To establish scientific performance appraisal system.Any one don't combine with performance of equity incentive plan is invalid, all kinds of business operators how to determine the performance appraisal system, specific how to calculate, how linked to motivation and a series of problems to be further discussed.Scientific performance evaluation standards for the implementation of equity incentive mechanism to providea measurement scale.First of all, should have an objective and fair performance evaluation standard and operational characteristics.Second, determine the content of evaluation index system should include, namely company performance which is created by an operator, such as enterprise profit growth, return on equity, asset value, debt paying ability and so on.Again, the comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the enterprise operator, in addition to consider financial indicators, but also non-financial indicators, for example, the degree of professional executives, employee's satisfaction and recognition in the company executives, etc should be included in the evaluation index system.Finally, you need to independent and impartial intermediary companies to participate, build a set of more scientific and perfect performance evaluation system, to objectively evaluate the operating performance, record companies.Perfect the corporate governance structure.The governance structure of listed companies is the microeconomic foundation equity incentive, and in the development of capital market in our country appear all sorts of problems and contradictions are pointing to the corporate governance is the most basic, also is the core part.The corporate governance structure including the incentive mechanism, constraint mechanism and operator selection mechanism, a complete system.The modern corporate governance is not only that the distribution of control and supervision, more important is the distribution of residual claims and residual control.The essence of the equity incentive is to make the company executives have some residual claims and the corresponding risk.Sound corporate governance structure, ensures that managers work get reasonable compensation, but also can prevent the short-term behavior of managers, truly protect both managers a reasonable income, and protect the interests of the principal.Scientific and reasonable to determine the equity incentive scheme.For executives of listed companies equity incentive, must hold good degrees, neither lack of incentives, also cannot too much incentive.Inadequate incentives to lead to the short-term behavior of enterprise management, is not conducive to the long-term development of the enterprise, incentive will damage the rights and interests of theowner.In the process of equity incentive plan formulation, it must be reasonable for the number of equity incentive, by reference to determine incentives, such as scientific theory of option pricing revenue model.Estimate the value of options, and long-term performance, with the enterprise implement stock option, the unification of the profits, owners' equity ing scientific method to the equity incentive plan is helpful to prevent malicious hype and abnormal fluctuations impact on equity incentive.译文上市公司高管股权激励研究Wayne Guay摘要股权激励制度于上个世纪五十年代出现，其产生的背景主要是着眼于解决因委托代理带来的利益矛盾,它的根本出发点在于将管理层与股东利益统一,激励管理层更加关注企业的长远发展,减少其短期行为。

上市公司高管股权激励计划外文翻译文献上市公司高管股权激励计划外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Investor pricing of CEO equity incentivesJeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. RamanAbstractThe main purpose of this paper is to explore CEO compensation in the form of stock and options.The objective of CEO compensation is to better align CEO-shareholder interests by inducing CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions. However, recent research suggests that these incentives have a significant down-side (i.e., they motivate executives to manipulate reported earnings and lower information quality). Given the conflict between the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional information quality effect, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. We examine whether CEO equity incentives are priced in the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium over the 1992–2007 time period. Our analysis controls for two potential structural changes over this time period. The first is the 1995 Delaware Supreme Court ruling which increased protection from takeovers (and decreased risk)for Delaware incorporated firms. The second is the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act which impacted corporate risk taking, equity incentives, and earnings management. Collectively, our findings suggest that CEO equity incentives, despite being associated with lower information quality, increase firm value through a cost ofequity capital channel.Keywords：CEO equity incentives，Information quality，Cost of equity capitalIntroductionIn this study, we investigate investor pricing of CEO equity incentives for a large sample of US firms over the period 1992–2007.Because incentives embedded in CEO compensation contracts may be expected to influence policy choices at the firm level, our objective is to examine whether CEO equity incentives influence firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.Prior research (e.g., Jensen et al. 2004; Jensen and Murphy 1990) suggests that equity- based compensation, i.e., CEO compensation in the form of stock and options, provides the CEO a powerful inducement to take actions to increase shareholder value (by investing in more risky but positive net present value projects). Put differently, equity incentives are expected to help mitigate agency costs by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders, and otherwise help communicate to investors the important idea that the firm’s objective is to maximize shareholder wealth (Hall and Murphy 2003).However, recent research contends that equity incentives also have a perverse or dysfunctional downside. In particular, equity-based compensation makes managers more sensitive to the firm’s stock p rice, and increases their incentive to manipulate reported earnings—i.e., to create the appearance of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (such as analysts’ forecasts)—in an attempt to bolster the stock price and their personal wealth invested in the fi rm’s stock and options (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005). Stated in another way, CEO equity incentivescan have an adverse effect on the quality of reported accounting information. As noted by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Jensen et al. (2004), by promoting perverse financial reporting incentives and lowering the quality of accounting information, equity-based compensation can be a source of, rather than a solution for, the agency problem.Despite these arguments about the putative ill effects of equity incentives, equity-based compensation continues to be a salient component of the total pay packages for CEOs. Still, given the conflict between the positive incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional effect of lower information quality, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. To our knowledge, prior research provides mixed evidence on this issue. For example, Mehran (1995) examines 1979–1980 compensation data and finds that equity-based compensation is positively related to the firm’s T obin’s Q. By contrast, Aboody (1996) examines compensation data for a sample of firms for years 1980 through 1990, and finds a negative correlation between the value of outstanding opt ions and the firm’s share price, suggesting that the dilution effect dominates the options’ incentive alignment effect. Moreover, both these studies are based on dated (i.e., pre-1991) data.In our study, we examine whether CEO equity incentives are related to the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium, i.e., the exc ess of the firm’s ex ante cost of equity capital over the risk-free interest rate (a metric discussed by Dhaliwal et al. 2006).Consistent with Core and Guay (2002), we measure CEO equity inc entives as the sensitivity of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio to a 1 percent change in the stock price. Based on a sample of 16,502 firm-year observations over a 16 year period(1992–2007), we find CEO equity incentives to be negatively related to the firm’s ex ante equity risk premium, suggesting that th e positive incentive alignment effect dominates the dysfunctional effect of lower information quality.In other analysis, we attempt to control for two regulatory (structural) changes that occurred during the 1992–2007 time period of our study.As pointed out by Daines (2001), regulatory changes can have an impact on firm values and returns as well as the structure of executive compensation. First, Low (2009) finds that following the 95 Delaware Supreme Court ruling that resulted in greater takeover protection, managers reduced firm risk by turning down risk-increasing (albeit positive NPV) projects. In response, firms increased CEO equity incentives to mitigate the risk aversion. Potentially, the impact of the Delaware ruling on managers’ risk aversio n and the follow-up increase in equity incentives (to mitigate the increase in managers’ risk aversion following the ruling) may have resulted in a structural change in our sample at least for firms incorporated in Delaware. T o control for this potential structural impact, we perform our analysis for Delaware incorporated firms for 1996–2007 separately. Our results suggest that the favorable effect of CEO equity incentives on firm value (asreflected in the lower ex ante equity risk premium) is similar for Delaware firms and other firms.Second, a number of studies (e.g., Cohen et al. 2007, 2008; Li et al. 2008) indicate that the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) lowered equity incentives (i.e., reduced the proportion of equity incentives to total compensation post-SOX), reduced managerial risk taking, decreased spending on R&D and capital expenditures, and reduced accruals-based earnings management whileincreasing real earnings management. Since real earnings management is potentially more difficult for investors to detect than accruals-based earnings management, a possible consequence of SOX could be an increase in agency costs since 2002. To control for the potential structural changes imposed by SOX both in terms of expected returns and the level of equity incentives, we perform our analysis for the pre-SOX and post-SOX time periods separately. For each of the two time periods, our results suggest a favorable effect of CEO equity incentives on firm value (as reflected in the lower ex ante equity risk premium), although the effect appears to be stronger in the post-SOX period.Our study contributes to the literature on the valuation of equity incentives. We provide (to our knowledge) first-time evidence on the relation between CEO equity incentives and the ex ante cost of equity capital. Prior research has focused by and large on the consequences of managerial equity incentives for firm performance (Mehran 1995; Hanlon et al.2003) and risk taking (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Hanlon et al. 2004) rather than on valuation per se. As noted previously, to our knowledge only two prior studies (Aboody1996 and Mehran 1995, both based on pre-1991 data) have examined the pricing of managerial equity incentives, with mixed results.In our study, we provide evidence on the valuation effects of CEO equity incentives based on more recent (1992–2007) data. By focusing on more recent data, our findings relate to a growing line of research on the association between equity-based compensation and accounting information quality. Specifically, Coffee (2004) suggests that the $1 million limit on the tax deductibility of cash compensation for senior executivesimposed by Congress in 1993 motivated firms to make greater use of equity compensation which, in turn, increased the sensitivity of managers to the firm’s stock price. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) provide evidence which suggests that equity incentives are positively related to the magnitudeof accruals-based earnings management. Similarly, Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) report CEO equity incentives to be positively related to accounting irregularities and the subsequent restatement of previously issued financial statements. Thus, prior research suggests that equity-based compensation has a negative effect on the quality of earnings reported by firms. Consistent with several published empirical studies that support the notion that lower information quality is priced in a higher cost of equity capital (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005), CEO equity incentives could potentially lower firm value by increasing the firm-specific equity risk premium.As noted previously, we document that CEO equity incentives (despite the associated lower informat ion quality) are related negatively to the firm’s ex ante equity risk premium, implying that equity incentives increase firm value by lowering the firm’s cost of equity capital.Thus, our findings suggest that the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect associated with equity incentives dominates the dysfunctional information quality effect.Since 1992, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated the public disclosure of executive compensation data to promote informed decision making by investors. Our ?ndings provide further evidence that these disclosuresincrease the informativeness of stock prices in competitive securities markets. Collectively, given that CEO compensation is a topic of ongoing interest (Jensen et al. 2004; Reich 2007), our ?ndings indicate that CEO equity incentives in?uence ?rm value favorably through a cost of equity capital channel.Concluding remarksPrior research (e.g., Goldman and Slezak 2006; Jensen et al. 2004) suggests that CEO equity incentives can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, these incentives can mitigate the agency problem by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders (i.e., by inducing CEOs to prefer more optimal, albeit risky, investment choices). On the other hand, these incentives can lead to excessive sensitivity to share price performance and induce executives to manipulate reported earnings with an eye on the stock price. In other words, by promoting perverse reporting incentives and lowering the quality of accounting information pertinent to investor pricing decisions, CEO equity incentives can potentially be a part of, not a remedy for, the agency problem. However, to our knowledge there is little to no prior evidence to suggestwhich effect—the positive incentive alignment effect or the perverse information quality effect—dominates.We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we show that CEO equity incentives are negatively related to the firm-specific equity risk premium, i.e., the positive incentive alignment effect associated with these incentives dominates the dysfunctional information quality effect in the pricing of the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium. Second, since equity incentives are intended to induce CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions, the effect of these incentiveson shareholder wealth in the post-SOX time period is of particular interest. Our results suggest that the economic significance of these incentives (i.e., the payoff for shareholders in terms of a lower ex ante equity risk premium and a higher firm value) was in fact higher in the post-SOX time period. Finally, our findings provide further evidence that the SEC mandated disclosures (since 1992) of executive compensation data increases the informativeness of stock prices with respect to the potential implications of CEO equity incentives for the cost of equity capital and firm value. At this time, CEO compensation is a topic of ongoing interest for regulators and investors (Jensen et al. 2004; Reich 2007). Collectively, our findings complement and extend prior research on equity incentives. They are potentially useful in better informing regulators and investors faced with questions about the possible consequences of CEO equity incentives for shareholder wealth.译文：总裁股权激励的投资者定价Jeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. Raman摘要本论文的主要目的是探讨首席执行官以股票和期权形式的报酬问题。

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译) Enterprises salary system design andperformance evaluationAbstractAny effective way of management must rely on a basis: people, all the staff of enterprises. Compensation system as an important aspect of enterprise management system, for an enterprise to attract, retain and motivate employees have a significant impact, attract, retain and motivate key talent, has become the core of the enterprise recognized goal. The compensation system design is not only an effective way to realize the core objective, is also an important content of modern enterprise development.Key words: salary system and equity incentive, senior executives, design1 IntroductionHuman capital to the enterprise wealth maximization, the greatest degree of retaining key talent, attract potential talent, the basic principals and successful is perfect competitive compensation system. With the concept of human capital is more and more people Heart, attract, retain and motivate key talent, has become the core of enterprise determine target, compensation system for enterprises An important aspect of the system, to attract talents play an important role. Compensation system design is an effective way to reality is the core objective, but also an important content of the development of the enterprise to modernization, so the height weight by enterprises Depending on the.2 Literature reviewEarly in the traditional compensation phase, the employers always minimize workers to cut costs as much as possible, and through this method make the Labor of workers have to work harder in order to get paid enough to make a living. William. First, Quesnay’s minimum wage theory is that wages and other commodities, there is a natural value, namely maintain staff minimum standard of living life information value，the minimum wage for workers does not depend on the enterprise or the employer's subjective desire, but the result of the competition in the market. The classical economists Muller believed that certain conditions, the total capital in the enterprise salary depends on the labor force and for the purchase of labor relationship between capital and other capital; For the payment of capital wage fund is difficult to change in the short term. Wages fund quantity depends on two factors: one is a worker, directly or indirectly, in the production of products and services production efficiency; the other one is in the process of production of these goods directly or indirectly employ labor quantity. With the development of era, the simple forms of employment have already can't satisfy the demand of the workers, so some interests to share views was put forward to motivate workers.On this basis, the Gantt invented the "complete tasks rewarded" system to perfect the incentive measures. Represented by Americaneconomist Becker’s theory of human capital school of thought argues that human capital is determined by the human capital investment, is present in the human body to the content of knowledge, skills, etc. Martin Weizmann share of economic theory that wages should be linked to corporate profits. Increase in profits, employee wages fund, increased profits, and employee wages fund. Between enterprises and employees is the key of the labor contract is not in a fixed wage of how many, but in the division of labor both sides share proportion. In modern compensation phase, the contents of the compensation has been changed, increased a lot of different compensation models, and more and more pay attention to employee's personal feelings and development, employees can even according to individual condition choose different salary portfolio model. Employees can be paid off on surface of the material and spiritual.3 Pay system overviewIn the past the traditional pay system, usually are business owners value orientation as the guide to carry on the design. With the continuous development of the overall market environment, in the modern enterprise management concept has also changed. They are aware of the established compensation system should adapt to the employee benefit as a starting point, the self-interest pursuit and employee demand together, to establish a set of enterprises and employees to maximize the interests of the two-way, so as to achieve win-win situation. Since the 90 s, the westerndeveloped economies in the enterprise owners and managers try to change the traditional form of compensation, relocation compensation system, the importance of also constantly try to innovate salary system of design and diversification.Performance pay system is established in accordance with the enterprise organization structure based on the results of the individual or team performance appraisal for salary distribution system. Total compensation is generally associated with individual or team performance. Now the enterprise model is used to combine individual performance and team performance. At the same time will be long term incentive and short-term incentive flexible model. In this kind of pay structure, contains a variety of forms of performance pay.Skill-based pay system on the basis of employees' skill determine employee wages level, and to the improvement of skills as their employees progress criteria. The compensation model can encourage employees to continuously learn new knowledge, to keep up with The Times, is the industry leader, when technology and equipment upgrades to the fastest response time to complete the change, and is helpful to form the learning corporate culture. If for flat organization structure, management jobs and opportunities for advancement are less, the compensation system can be very skillful professionals to make up for in terms of compensation. But with technical compensation system with theproblem is that the enterprise needs to pay for a large number of staff training, and if the participants of the training is not all to use knowledge in actual production, enterprises will not be able to obtain benefits, resulting in wasted costs.Total compensation is the unity of the material reward and spiritual reward. Among them, external compensation including all in monetary form of economic compensation, internal compensation includes not to substantial form of economic compensation, more focused on the return of spirit. John’s Lipoma at the end of last century proposed the compensation design, customization and diversity is more representative of the overall package. He should show that the basic wage, additional salary, salary welfare, work supplies allowance, bonus, promotion and development opportunities, psychological income, life quality, and individual factors that ten compensation factors into consideration, the formation of compensation system, the design method is different from the past traditional salary structure, is the biggest different compensation system design approach from the owner as the center to the worker as the center, employees can choose a suitable for their own pay combination, is no longer a passive receiver. In this compensation mode, economic compensation and the economical compensation together, paying equal attention to material and spiritual.4 The implementation of the compensation system designSalary survey is the key in the compensation system design. It is not only the necessary to understand the enterprise existing compensation system, is also the basis of compensation system design again. Salary survey should be real in-depth internal employee survey, as far as possible let employees at all levels give true feelings, make compensation system designers understand the staff for the specific demands of overall compensation. In had certain understanding of the current salary system and problems, will determine the compensation system on that basis to the general principles of design. Compensation system and the determination of design general principle also should according to the specific conditions of different enterprise itself to specific design. At the same time, according to the general principle to determine the scope of the staff at the level of compensation.Enterprise in selecting the most suitable for their own compensation system, the following sections are often the most concern, such as the division of different levels and at the same level of position within the sort, the post assessment results and with the duty staff due to personal quality differences between how to determine the pay difference. Enterprise in selecting the most suitable for their own compensation system, the following sections are often the most concern, such as the division of different levels and at the same level of position within thesort, the post assessment results and with the duty staff due to personal quality differences between how to determine the pay difference.Enterprise operators and management personnel representing the highest quality, at the same time they also foreign representative enterprise image, and holds the enterprise the way forward. They tend to have certain matter accumulation, more the pursuit of spiritual satisfaction and the realization of self-worth. For management personnel shall be designed to be scientific and reasonable compensation system, comprehensive consideration, not only give reasonable compensation in terms of material, at the same time to consider their spiritual pursuit.General manager's daily work mainly are transactional, administrative work, but is not directly concerned with the production related, so during the design compensation system will post wage and performance wage together, thus the personal salary combined with enterprise business objectives. To general managers to take a wider range of incentives, such as the annual performance review top employees equity incentives, encourage managers over fulfilled the goal, and form a competitive atmosphere of the company culture, drive the enterprise vitality. Increase the general manager’s shareholding proportion.For the use of EVA on the sales staff, can draw lessons from Tula bank ever take method, the sales staff to set up a commission systembased on EVA. Each sales staff receives a salary, in addition to qualification to get bonuses, the bonus amount depends on the "added value" has created. So that the program works: the company will be the added value of products are listed out, after distribution after the full cost of the product. The finance department monthly compiled a list of each product and added value of the net sales report. Each sales staff receives a copy of the report, as well as the use of the added value of the net total details of its own performance in the same format of monthly report. Further to deduct from the added value of net pay, perks and other fees and should share part of the management fee. After adjusting for these report line represents the added value.5 ConclusionIn the modern enterprises increasingly competitive today, talents become the key factor of enterprise long-term development more and more Business owners. And how to retain existing talent, and recruit more people of insight to join together create enterprise interest, become the compulsory subject of enterprise owners and management, and improve the compensation system is retaining talents and attracting talents essential link.企业薪酬体系设计与绩效评估Prasetya A摘要:任何一种行之有效的管理方式的运用都必须依赖于一个基础：人，企业的所有员工。