外文翻译--公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响

外文翻译The influence of corporate governance on the relation betweencapital structure and valueMaterial Source:Corporate Governance Author:Maurizio La Rocca Researches in Business Economics, and in particular, in Business economics and Finance have always analyzed the processes of economic value creation as their main field of studies. Starting from the provocative work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure became one of the main elements that following studies have shown as being essential in determining value. Half a century of research on capital structure attempted to verify the presence of an optimal capital structure that could amplify the company’s ability to create value.There is again quite a bit of interest in the topic of firm capital structure, on whether or not it is necessary to consider the important contribution offered by corporate governance as a variable that can explain the connection between capital structure and value, controlling opportunistic behavior in the economic relations between shareholders, debt holders and managers. In this sense, capital structure can influence firm value.Therefore, this paper examines the theoretical relationship between capital structure, corporate governance and value, formulating an interesting proposal for future research. The second paragraph describes the theoretical and empirical approach on capital structure and value, identifying the main threads of study. After having explained the concept of corporate governance and its connection with firm value, the relationship between capital structure, corporate governance and value, as well as the causes behind them, will be investigated.Capital structure: relation with corporate value and main research streams When looking at the most important theoretical contributions on the relation between capital structure and value, it becomes immediately evident that there is a substantial difference between the early theories and the more recent ones. Influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and valueCapital structure can be analyzed by looking at the rights and attributes that characterize the firm’s assets and that influence, with different levels of intensity,governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be considered as both financial instruments and corporate governance instruments. (Williamson, 1988): debt subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. It can thus be inferred that when capital structure becomes an instrument of corporate governance, not only the mix between debt and equity and their well known consequences as far as taxes go must be taken into consideration. The way in which cash flow is allocated and, even more importantly, how the right to make decisions and manage the firm (voting rights) is dealt with must also be examined. For example, venture capitalists are particularly sensitive to how capital structure and financing contracts are laid out, so that an optimal corporate governance can be guaranteed while incentives and checks for management behavior are well established (Zingales, 2000).How corporate governance can potentially have a relevant influence on the relation between capital structure and value, with an effect of mediation and/or moderation.On one hand, a change in how debt and equity are dealt with influences firm governance activities by modifying the structure of incentives and managerial control. If, through the mix debt and equity, different categories of investors all converge within the firm, where they have different types of influence on governance decisions, then managers will tend to have preferences when determining how one of these categories will prevail when d efining the firm’s capital structure. Even more importantly, through a specific design of debt contracts and equity it is possible to considerably increase firm governance efficiency.On the other hand, even corporate governance influences choices regarding capital structure. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how firm financing choices are made by management following an order of preference; in this case, if the manager chooses the financing resources it can be presumed that she is avoiding a reduction of her decision making power by accepting the discipline represented by debt. Internal resource financing allows management to prevent other subjects from intervening in their decision making processes. De Jong (2002) reveals how in the Netherlands managers try to avoid using debt so that their decision making power remains unchecked. Zwiebel (1996) has observed that managers don’t voluntarily accept the ‘‘discipline’’ of debt; other governance mechanisms impose that debt is issued. Jensen (1986) noted that decisions to increase firm debt are voluntarily made by management when it intends to‘‘reassure’’ stakeholders that its governance decisions are ‘‘proper’’.The B-C-A relation that indicates the relation between capital structure a nd value is actually explained thanks to a third variable (corporate governanc e) that ‘‘intervenes’’ (and for this reason is called an ‘‘intervening variable’’) in the relation between capital structure and value. This would create a ‘‘bri dge’’ by mediating between lever age and value, thus showing a connection th at otherwise would not be visible. It can not be said that there is no relation between capital structure and value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), but the c onnection is mediated and, in an economic sense, it is formalized through a causal chain between variables. In other words, it is not possible to see a dir ect relation between capital structure and value, but in reality capital structure influences firm governance that is connected to firm value.Furthermore, the relation between capital structure and corporate governan ce becomes extremely important when considering its fundamental role in val ue generation and distribution (Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). Through its interact ion with other instruments of corporate governance, firm capital structure bec omes capable of protecting an efficient value creation process, by establishing the ways in which the generated value is later distributed (Zingales, 1998); i n other words the surplus created is influenced (Zingales, 2000).Therefore, the relation between capital structure and value could be set u p differently if it were mediated or moderated by corporate governance. None theless, capital structure could also intervene or interact in the relation betwee n corporate governance and value. In this manner a complementary relationshi p, or one where substitution is possible, could emerge between capital structu re and other corporate governance variables. Debt could have a marginal role of disciplining management when there is a shareholder participating in own ership or when there is state participation. To the contrary, when other forms of discipline are lacking in the governance structure, capital structure could be exactly the mechanism capable of protecting efficient corporate governance, while preserving firm value.ConclusionThis paper defines a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance and value, whi le they also promote a more precise design for empirical research. Capital str ucture represents one of many instruments that can preserve corporate governance efficiency and protect its ability to create value . Therefore, this thread of research affirms that if investment policies allow for value creation, financing policies, together with other governance instruments, can assure that invest ment policies are carried out efficiently while firm value is protected from op portunistic behavior.In conclusion, this paper defines a theoretical model that contributes to c larifying the relations between capital structure, corporate governance and firm value, while promoting, as an aim for future research, a verification of the validity of this model through application of the analysis to a wide sample of firms and to single firms. To study the interaction between capital structure, corporate governance and value when analyzing a wide sample of firms, loo k at problems of endogeneity and reciprocal causality, and make sure there is complementarity between all the three factors. Such an analysis deserves the application of refined econometric techniques. Moreover, these relations shoul d be investigated in a cross-country analysis, to catch the role of country-spe cific factors.译文资本结构和企业价值之间的关系对公司治理的影响资料来源:公司治理作者：莫里吉奥拉罗卡在商业经济的研究中，尤其是经营经济学和金融学，总是将分析创造经济价值的进程作为他们研究的主要领域。

公司治理对企业竞争力的影响范文英文回答：Corporate governance plays a pivotal role in shaping a company's competitiveness by influencing various aspects of its operations and decision-making processes.1. Strategic Direction and Vision:Effective corporate governance ensures that the company's leadership has a clear understanding of its strategic direction and vision. It fosters an environment where long-term goals are established and communicated throughout the organization. This clarity and alignment enable the company to respond swiftly to market trends, capitalize on opportunities, and mitigate potential risks.2. Risk Management and Internal Controls:Strong corporate governance frameworks prioritize riskmanagement and internal controls, which safeguard the company's assets, reputation, and long-term viability. By identifying and mitigating potential threats, the company can minimize disruptions, protect its financial stability, and maintain stakeholder confidence.3. Financial Reporting and Transparency:Transparency and accurate financial reporting are essential for building trust with investors, creditors, and other stakeholders. Effective corporate governance promotes ethical practices and ensures that financial information is reliable and timely. This enhances the company'scredibility and attracts capital, which is crucial for growth and competitiveness.4. Ethical Conduct and Social Responsibility:Companies with robust corporate governance prioritize ethical conduct and social responsibility. By adhering to high ethical standards, they maintain a positive reputation, attract ethical employees, and build strong relationshipswith customers and suppliers. This alignment with societal norms and values can enhance the company's brand image, attract environmentally conscious consumers, and reduce the risk of regulatory sanctions.5. Stakeholder Engagement and Value Creation:Effective corporate governance recognizes the importance of stakeholder engagement, including shareholders, customers, employees, and the community. By actively involving stakeholders in the decision-making process, companies can gain insights, address their concerns, and foster a sense of ownership, which ultimately leads to enhanced value creation for all parties involved.中文回答：公司治理对企业竞争力的影响。

原文：The Effects of Firm and Country-level Governance Mechanisms on Dividend Policy, Cash Holdings, and Firm Value: a Cross-country StudyIntroductionThis study examines the effects of firm- and country-level corporate governance mechanisms on dividends and cash holding policies and their joint impact on firm value using a sample of over 3,000 listed firms from 21 countries.Firms outside the US are often controlled by a large shareholder. For example, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) trace the ultimate owners of 2,980 publicly traded firms from nine East Asian economies and find more than two-thirds of them have controlling owners. Faccio and Lang (2002) carry out a similar task for over 5,000 firms from 13 Western European countries. They find that ownership concentrations among these Europeans firms are even higher than those of Asian firms. The primary agency problem for firms with high ownership concentration is the conflict between the controlling shareholders and those of minority shareholders. With de facto control, coupled with insufficient legal protection of investor rights in many countries, the controlling owners often engage in activities that increase private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. These agency conflicts are further exacerbated when the controlling owners have excess control rights1.This paper contributes to the literature on international corporate governance in four ways. First, it provides additional evidence on the linkage between excess control, dividend/cash holding policies, and firm value, respectively. It also directly test the valuation effects of dividend and cash holding policies. Second, this study extends the strand of literature on the importance of investor protection in corporate governance. The empirical analysis reveals that the country-level investor protection mitigates the1 Excess control rights are computed as the difference between the voting rights and the cash flow rightsheld by the largest owner. The common use of pyramidal structure, cross-shareholdings, dual class shares,and other control enhancing mechanisms result in the largest owners having control beyond their ownershipstake [see Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000)].entrenchment effect of excess control by forcing the insiders to disgorge cash. Furthermore, the valuation effects of dividend and cash holdings policies are also dependent on the legal environment a firm operates in. Third, it demonstrates that how the policy choices affect firm performance depends on firm and country-level governance mechanisms. Fourth, it explicitly considers the interdependence among policies and firm value by adopting a simultaneous equations approach. The results indicate that dividend payout, cash holdings, and firm values are interrelated.The remainder of the paper is organized as followings. In the next section, I present some theoretical and empirical results on the relations between dividend/cash holding policies and corporate governance mechanisms and discuss studies examining the effects of the corporate governance on firm value.The effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm policies and performanceTwo effects of high ownership concentrationTwo effects are hypothesized to coexist in firms with high ownership concentration: (1) a positive incentive effect, i.e., the large shareholders have interests and power to engage in value maximization activities given their high ownership stake; (2) a negative entrenchment effect. As pointed out by Denis & McConnell (2002), “If large shareholders benefit only from proportionate cash dividends and appreciation in the market value of their shares there is no conflict between large shareholders and minority shareholders.” However, private benefits of control do exist and are quite substantial in some cases. With de facto control, large shareholders might divert corporate resources to themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. More recent studies provide ample evidence supporting this entrenchment effect. This adverse effect is exacerbated when the largest owner’s control rights are further enhanced through the use of pyramidal structure, cross-shareholding, or super voting shares. Under these circumstances, the largest owners often have control rights in excess of their cash flow rights, which gives them strong incentives to expropriateminority shareholders.LLSV (1998, 2000) establish the importance of legal protection of investor rightsas a country-level corporate governance regime. They discover that there exists significant differences across countries in the degree of investor rights protection. Firms in countries with strong investor protection have low ownership concentration and better access to external financing than those in countries with poor investor protection. The primary agency conflict for firms with concentrated ownership structure is between the controlling owners and minority shareholders. The investors’ legal rights and enforcement of law mitigates this agency conflict. Therefore, any cross-country governance analysis must control for the country-level governance effect.Dividend policyEasterbrook (1984) proposes that dividend payments force firms to raise fund from capital markets which provide monitoring of managers. Therefore, the managerial agency problem can be mitigated through dividend policy. Jensen (1986) posits that managers may use lower dividends in order to retain resources which can be used for excessive salary, perquisite consumption, or investing in projects that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) present a different view on the use of dividends. Using a sample of over 5,000 firms with concentrated ownership structure, they document that dividend payment is positively (negatively) associated with the excess control held by the largest shareholder of firms that are tightly (loosely) affiliated with business groups. They contend that outsiders perceive firms that are tightly affiliated with business groups have high agency costs and therefore discount firm value ex ante. In fear of value discount, the controlling owners use dividends as a bonding device. However, outsiders seem to be less alert to the agency problems in firms loosely affiliated with groups. Therefore, the controlling owners are able to retain dividends. For a sample of over 4,000 firms from 33 countries, LLSV (2000) find that firms operating in countries with better shareholder protection pay higher dividends. Taken together, both firm and country-level corporate governance mechanisms are important determinants of dividend policy.Cash holdingsCash holdings are associated with both benefits and costs in the context of agency theory. The existing literature presents two major motives of holding cash (1) the transaction costs motive and (2) the precautionary motive. According to these two motives, firms should hold high cash balances if the costs of raising external funds or the costs of cash shortfalls are high. The pecking order theory presented in Myers and Majluf (1984) supports the view of holding cash for transactional and/or precautionary motives. Researchers find substantial evidence supporting these arguments. For example, using all firms on the COMPUSTAT over the period of 1952 through 1994, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) find that smaller firms, firms with good investment opportunities, firms with more volatile cash flows hold more cash. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2003) test the effect of financial constraints on corporate cash holdings by contrasting the propensity of holding cash between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. They find that the sensitivity of changes in cash holdings to cash flows is positive only for financially constrained firms, consistent with the precautionary motive of hoarding cash in anticipation of future investment opportunities. An alternative view of corporate cash holding is presented in Opler et al. (1999) which contends that cash holdings is simply an outcome of financing and investment decisions. Firms generating large cash flows would pay off debt, make dividend payment, and have high cash balances. Firms with low cash flows draw down their cash balances and use high leverage.More recent studies on cash holdings focus their attentions on the costs of holding high levels of cash. For example, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) explore the relation between cash holdings and shareholder rights for about 11,000 firms across 45countries. They find a negative relation between firm level cash holdings and the degree of legal protection of shareholders. In their cross-country study on the determinants of cash holdings, Lins and Kalcheva (2004) find that when the management is entrenched and the investors are not well-protected, cash holdings has an incremental negative effect on firm value. Taken together, these findings suggest that the costs of holding cash is particularly high when the firm- or country-level corporate governance mechanisms do not offer sufficient protection tominority shareholders.Empirical analysisCountry random effect models are used in all the regression analyses to control for overall country effects and to test the effect of country level investor protection on dividend payment, cash holdings and Tobin’s Q. The Hausman test results suggest that the random effects estimator do not differ systematically from those estimated using a fixed effect model. Therefore, the random effect model is more appropriate for my analysis. I control for the industry effects by including industry group dummies using the Campbell (1996) classification.Dividend policy and corporate governanceFirst, I examine the effect of firm level governance on dividend policy by regressing dividend payout ratio against the excess control while controlling for other firm- and country-specific factors that have been shown to be various determinants of dividend ratio. On the one hand, the controlling owners with excess control rights have strong incentives to retain dividends for perquisite consumption or to invest in projects that increase private benefits of control. However, Faccio and Lang (2001) find that excess control is positively related to dividend when the outside investors perceive firms with excess control to be vulnerable to expropriation problems. Whether excess control increases or decreases dividend payments becomes an empirical issue that will be addressed in my regression analysis. I later investigate the policy effects on firm value to directly test whether dividend payments could prevent value discount, a view presented but not tested in Faccio and Lang (2001).LLSV (2000a) document a positive relation between country-level shareholder protection and corporate dividend payment. To control for this effect, I adopt two legal protection measures commonly used in previous studies. The first legal protection measure is the legal origin dummy (Common law) set to 1 if a firm is operating in a country having a common law legal origin and zero otherwise [see LLSV (1998)]. LLSV (1998) find that common law countries generally offer better investor protection relative to civil law countries. An alternative measure is the Anti-director rights index taking on a value ranging from 0 to 5 [see LLSV (1998)].Another country level determinant of dividend payment is the reserve requirement which is the minimum percentage of total share capital that the host country’s corporate laws mandate for corporations to hold to prevent their dissolution. Under this restriction, corporations are required to retain a proportion of their annual earnings until the threshold is reached. This restriction prevents firms from distributing all its earnings as dividend. I expect a negative relation between reserve and dividend ratio.Firm value and corporate governanceTo assess the valuation impact of corporate governance regimes, I first explore the entrenchment effect of excess control.The coefficient on excess control is negative and significant at the 5% level, in line with the findings of Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002). Leverage has a negative effect on firm value. High growth firms receive high valuations. Large firms have low values, possibly because these firms are mature in their industries and have fewer growth opportunities.Summary and conclusionsThis study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms at both firm and country level on dividend and cash holding policies as well as their interrelationships. The regression analyses show that excess control is negatively related to dividend payment and positively related to cash holdings, consistent with the notion that the entrenched shareholders have the propensity to retain cash for private benefits. I also test whether the country-level shareholder protection influences the behavior of controlling shareholders’ policy decisions by including interaction terms between excess control and Anti-director rights index and find that strong investor protection partially offset the negative effect of excess control on dividend payout.In the analysis of governance effects on firm value, my results support the findings of Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) that excess control has a negative valuation effect as well as the results reported in LLSV (2002) that country level investor protection has a positive effect on firm value. I also find that both dividend payments and cash holdings are positively related to firm value. However,the valuation effects of these policies depend on the ownership structure. When the controlling owners have excess control, incremental dividend payment becomes a credible signal to outsiders that they will be less likely to be expropriated. In contrast, the incremental level of cash holdings has a negative effect on firm value when the controlling owners have excess control rights, indicating the possibility for misuse of free cash flow is high when the owners become entrenched.Given the potential endogeneity of these policy choices and firm performance, I employ a simultaneous equations model to account for their interdependence. The result indicate that cash holdings supports dividend payout. Both dividend payments and cash reserves have positive effects on firm value after controlling for potential endogeneity. Taken together, my findings indicate that firms with entrenched shareholders have high agency costs manifested as having low dividend payments and/or high cash holdings. These policy choices directly affect firm performance. The legal protection of shareholder rights plays an important role in deterring expropriation activities at the firm level. Firms that are prone to expropriation problems due to their ownership structure may use dividend and or cash holding policies as bonding devices to present value discount.Source: Zhang, Rongrong,2005.“The Effects of Firm and Country-level Governance Mechanisms on Dividend Policy, Cash Holdings, and Firm Value: A Cross-country Study”. Georgia Southern University.January.pp.1-8.译文：企业和国家层面的结构治理机制对企业股利政策、现金持有量和企业价值的影响：一个跨国企业研究简介本文通过研究来自21个国家超过3000家上市公司样本来探讨企业股息和现金持有政策及其对企业治理机制的影响。

中国公司治理：现代视角Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective☆Fuxiu Jiang, Kenneth A. Kim ⁎School of Business, Renmin University of China, 59 Zhongguancun Street, Haidian District, Beijing, China 100872近年来，许多使用中国金融数据的学术论文发表在领先的学术期刊上。

这一增长这并不奇怪，因为中国是一个转型经济大国，正在从计划经济转向市场经济，现在已经成为世界第二大经济体。

简单地说，中国是有趣和重要的。

然而，一些研究中国的缺点。

首先，考虑到大多数现代金融理论都起源于西方，尤其是美国，因此有很多研究中国的论文使用西方理论和概念来解释他们的实证发现。

2 . However, while it may sometimes be从西方的角度来看待中国的实证结果是恰当的，但在其他时候则不然。

其次，许多报纸似乎都是如此误解(或没有意识到)重要的监管问题;法律、金融和制度环境;和业务中国的风俗习惯。

第三，许多研究中国的论文，即使是最近发表的，现在已经过时了。

的中国过去20年的经济增长是爆炸式的。

在这段时间里，发生了许多变化地方，包括许多监管的变化和引入新的规则，影响公司治理在中国。

鉴于这些不足之处，本文的主要目的有两个:(一)对公司治理现状进行概述(二)指出和探讨公司治理在很大程度上是中国所特有的特点在本期特刊中，我们将为大家提供一个更新的中国公司治理观。

因此,我们也重要的是在适当的地方描述这些论文。

本文的其余部分如下。

在第二部分，我们提供了重要的制度背景资料的中国并讨论了中国公司治理的制度和监管环境。

在第三节,我们提供并讨论与公司治理相关的重要变量的汇总统计。

资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效外文翻译中文2825字1868单词外文文献：Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performanceDimitris Margaritis, Maria Psillaki 1Abstract：This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of French manufacturing firms. We employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to empirically construct the industry’s ‘best practice’frontier and measure firm efficiency as the distance from that frontier. Using these performance measures we examine if more efficient firms choose more or less debt in their capital structure. We summarize the contrasting effects of efficiency on capital structure in terms of two competing hypotheses: the efficiency-risk and franchise value hypotheses. Using quantile regressions we test the effect of efficiency on leverage and thus the empirical validity of the two competing hypotheses across different capital structure choices. We also test the direct relationship from leverage to efficiency stipulated by the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Throughout this analysis we consider the role of ownership structure and type on capital structure and firm performance.Firm performance, capital structure and ownershipConflicts of interest between owners-managers and outside shareholders as well as those between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance literature (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). While there is a relatively large literature on the effects of ownership on firm performance (see for example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg et al., 1999), the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure remains largely unexplored. On the other hand, a voluminous literature is devoted to capital structure and its effects on corporate performance –see the surveys by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001). An emerging consensus that comes out of the corporate governance literature (see Mahrt-Smith, 2005) is that the interactions between capital structure and ownership structure impact on firm values. Yet theoretical arguments alone cannot unequivocally predict these relationships (see Morck et al., 1988) and the empirical evidence that we have often appears to be contradictory. In part these conflicting results arise from difficulties empirical researchers face in obtaining direct measures of the magnitude of agency costs that are not confounded by factors that are beyond the control of management (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). In the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature in this area focusing on the main hypotheses of interest for this study.Firm performance and capital structureThe agency cost theory is premised on the idea that the interests of the company’s managers and its shareholders are not perfectly aligned. In their seminal paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized the importance of the agency costs of equity arising from the separation of ownership and control of firms whereby managers tend to maximize their own utility rather than the value of the firm. These conflicts may occur in situations where managers have incentives to take1来源：Journal of Banking & Finance , 2010 (34) : 621–632，本文翻译的是第二部分excessive risks as part of risk shifting investment strategies. This leads us to Jensen’s (1986) “free cash flow theory”where as stated by Jensen (1986, p. 323) “the pro blem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it below the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies.”Thus high debt ratios may be used as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash flow waste through the threat of liquidation (Grossman and Hart, 1982) or through pressure to generate cash flows to service debt (Jensen, 1986). In these situations, debt will have a positive effect on the value of the firm.Agency costs can also exist from conflicts between debt and equity investors. These conflicts arise when there is a risk of default. The risk of default may create what Myers (1977) referred to as an“underinvestment”or “debt overhang”problem. In this case, debt will have a negative effect on the value of the firm. Building on Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) develops a model in which debt financing is shown to mitigate overinvestment problems but aggravate the underinvestment problem. The model predicts that debt can have both a positive and a negative effect on firm performance and presumably both effects are present in all firms. We allow for the presence of both effects in the empirical specification of the agency cost model. However we expect the impact of leverage to be negative overall. We summarize this in terms of our first testable hypothesis. According to the agency cost hypothesis (H1) higher leverage is expected to lower agency costs, reduce inefficiency and thereby lead to an improvement in firm’s performance.Reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure But firm performance may also affect the choice of capital structure. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) stipulate that more efficient firms are more likely to earn a higher return for a given capital structure, and that higher returns can act as a buffer against portfolio risk so that more efficient firms are in a better position to substitute equity for debt in their capital structure. Hence under the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2), more efficient firms choose higher leverage ratios because higher efficiency is expected to lower the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. In essence, the efficiency-risk hypothesis is a spin-off of the trade-off theory of capital structure whereby differences in efficiency, all else equal, enable firms to fine tune their optimal capital structure.It is also possible that firms which expect to sustain high efficiency rates into the future will choose lower debt to equity ratios in an attempt to guard the economic rents or franchise value generated by these efficiencies from the threat of liquidation (see Demsetz, 1973; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). Thus in addition to a equity for debt substitution effect, the relationship between efficiency and capital structure may also be characterized by the presence of an income effect. Under the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) more efficient firms tend to hold extra equity capital and therefore, all else equal, choose lower leverage ratios to protect their future income or franchise value.Thus the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2) and the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) yield opposite predictions regarding the likely effects of firm efficiency on the choice of capital structure. Although we cannot identify the separate substitution andincome effects our empirical analysis is able to determine which effect dominates the other across the spectrum of different capital structure choices.Ownership structure and the agency costs of debt and equity.The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance dates back to Berle andMeans (1932) who argued that widely held corporations in the US, in which ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders and control is concentrated in the hands of insiders tend to underperform. Following from this, Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop more formally the classical owner-manager agency problem. They advocate that managerial share-ownership may reduce managerial incentives to consume perquisites, expropriate shareholders’wealth or to engage in other sub-optimal activities and thus helps in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders which in turn lowers agency costs. Along similar lines, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that large external equity holders can mitigate agency conflicts because of their strong incentives to monitor and discipline management.In contrast Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that a rise in insider share-ownership stakes may also be associated with adverse ‘entrenchment’effects tha t can lead to an increase in managerial opportunism at the expense of outside investors. Whether firm value would be maximized in the presence of large controlling shareholders depends on the entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Dow and McGuire, 2009). Several studies document either a direct (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Claessens et al., 2002; Hu and Zhou, 2008) or a non-monotonic (e.g., Morck et al., 1988;McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Davies et al., 2005) relationship between ownership structure and firm performance while others (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) find no relation between ownership concentration and firm performance.Family firms are a special class of large shareholders with unique incentive structures. For example, concerns over family and business reputation and firm survival would tend to mitigate the agency costs of outside debt and outside equity (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Anderson et al., 2003) although controlling family shareholders may still expropriate minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Several studies (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Maury, 2006; King and Santor, 2008) report that family firms especially those with large personal owners tend to outperform non-family firms. In addition, the empirical findings of Maury (2006) suggest that large controlling family ownership in Western Europe appears to benefit rather than harm minority shareholders. Thus we expect that the net effect of family ownership on firm performance will be positive.Large institutional investors may not, on the other hand, have incentives to monitor management (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and they may even coerce with management (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Claessens et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2007). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and La Porta et al. (2002) argue that equity concentration is more likely to have a positive effect on firm performance in situations where control by large equity holders may act as a substitute for legal protection in countries with weak investor protection and less developed capital markets where they also classify Continental Europe.We summarize the contrasting ownership effects of incentive alignment and entrenchment on firm performance in terms of two competing hypotheses. Under the ‘convergence-of-interest hypothesis’(H3) more concentrated ownership should have a positive effect on firm performance. And under the ownership entrenchment hypothesis (H3a) the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is expected to be negative.The presence of ownership entrenchment and incentive alignment effects also has implications for the firm’s capital structure choice. We assess these effects empirically. As external blockholders have strong incentives to reduce managerial opportunism they may prefer to use debtas a governance mechanism to control management’s consumption of perquisites (Grossman and Hart, 1982). In that case firms with large external blockholdings are likely to have higher debt ratios at least up to the point where the risk of bankruptcy may induce them to lower debt. Family firms may also use higher debt levels to the extent that they are perceived to be less risky by debtholders (Anderson et al., 2003). On the other hand the relation between leverage and insider share-ownership may be negative in situations where managerial blockholders choose lower debt to protect their non-diversifiable human capital and wealth invested in the firm (Friend and Lang, 1988). Brailsford et al. (2002) report a non-linear relationship between managerial share-ownership and leverage. At low levels of managerial ownership, agency conflicts necessitate the use of more debt but as managers become entrenched at high levels of managerial ownership they seek to reduce their risks and they use less debt. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that insider ownership by managers or families has no effect on leveragewhile King and Santor (2008) report that both family firms and firms controlled by financial institutions carry more debt in their capital structure.外文翻译：资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效摘要：本文通过对法国制造业公司的抽样调查，研究资本结构、所有权结构和公司绩效的关系。

本科毕业设计（论文）中英文对照翻译(此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!)文献出处:Ashkanasy N M. The study on capital structure theory and the optimization of enterprise capital [J]. Journal of Management, 2016, 5(3): 235-254.原文The study on capital structure theory and the optimization ofenterprise capital structureAshkanasy N MAbstractIn this paper, corporate finance is an important content of modern enterprise management decision. Around the existence of optimal capitalstructure has been a lot of controversy. Given investment decisions, whether an enterprise to change its value by changing the capital structure and the cost of capital, namely whether there is a market make the enterprise value maximization, or make the enterprise capital structure of minimizing the cost of capital? To this problem has different answers in different stages of development, has formed many theory of capital structure.Key words: Capital structure; financial structure; Optimization; Financial leverage1 IntroductionIn financial theory, capital structure due to the different understanding of "capital" in the broad sense and narrow sense two explanations: one explanation is that the "capital" as all funding sources, the structure of the generalized capital structure refers to the entire capital, the relationship between the contrast of their own capital and debt capital, as the American scholar Alan c. Shapiro points out that "the company's capital structure - all the debt and equity financing; an alternative explanation is that if the" capital "is defined as a long-term funding sources, capital structure refers to the narrow sense of their own capital and long-term debt capital, and the tension and the short-term debt capital as the business capital management. Whether it is a broad concept ornarrow understanding of the capital structure is to discuss the proportion of equity capital and debt capital relations. 2 The capital structure theory Capital structure theory has experienced a process of gradually forming, developing and perfecting. First proposed the theory of American economist David Durand (David Durand) thinks that enterprise's capital structure is in accordance with the method of net income, net operating income method and traditional method, in 1958 di Gayle Anne (Franco Modigliani and Miller (Mertor Miller) and put forward the famous MM theory, created the modern capital structure theory, on this basis, the later generations and further put forward many new theory: 2.1 Net Income Theory (Net Income going) Net income theory on the premise of two assumptions --, investors with a fixed proportion of investment valuation or enterprise's net income. Enterprises to raise debt funds needed for a fixed rate. Therefore, the theory is that: the enterprise use of debt financing is always beneficial, can reduce the comprehensive cost of capital of enterprise. This is because the debt financing in the whole capital of enterprise, the bigger the share, the comprehensive cost of capital is more c lose to the cost of debt, and because the cost of debt is generally low, so, the higher the debt level, comprehensive capital cost is lower, the greater the enterprise value. When the debt ratio reached 100%, the firm will achieve maximum value.2.2 Theory of Net Operating Income (Net Operating Income going) Netoperating income theory is that, regardless of financial leverage, debt interest rates are fixed. If enterprises increase the lower cost of debt capital, but even if the cost of debt remains unchanged, but due to the increased the enterprise risk, can also lead to the rising cost of equity capital, it a liter of a fall, just offset, the enterprise cost of capital remain unchanged. Is derived as a result, the theory "" does not exist an optimal capital structure of the conclusion.2.3 Traditional Theory (Traditional going) Traditional theory is that the net income and net operating income method of compromise. It thinks, the enterprise use of financial leverage although will lead to rising cost of equity, but within limits does not completely offset the benefits of using the low cost of debt, so can make comprehensive capital cost reduction, increase enterprise value. But once exceed this limit, rights and interests of the rising cost of no longer can be offset by the low cost of debt, the comprehensive cost of capital will rise again. Since then, the cost of debt will rise, leading to a comprehensive capital costs rise more rapidly. Comprehensive cost of capital from falling into a turning point, is the lowest, at this point, to achieve the optimal capital structure. The above three kinds of capital structure theory is referred to as "early capital structure theory", their common features are: three theories are in corporate and personal income tax rate is zero under the condition of the proposed. Three theories and considering the capital structure of the dual effects of the cost of capital and enterprise value.Three theories are prior to 1958. Many scholars believe that the theory is not based on thorough analysis.3 Related theories3.1 Balance TheoryIt centered on the MM theory of modern capital structure theory development to peak after tradeoff theory. Trade-off theory is based on corporate MM model and miller, revised to reflect the financial pinch cost (also known as the financial crisis cost) and a model of agent cost.(1) the cost of financial constraints. Many enterprises always experience of financial constraints, some of them will be forced to go bankrupt. When the financial constraints but also not bankruptcy occurs, may appear the following situation: disputes between owners and creditors often leads to inventory and fixed assets on the material damaged or obsolete. Attorney fees, court fees and administrative costs to devour enterprise wealth, material loss and plus the legal and administrative expenses referred to as the "direct costs" of bankruptcy. Financial pinch will only occur in business with debt, no liability companies won't get into the mud. So with more debt, the fixed interest rate, and the greater the profitability of the probability of large leading to financial constraints and the cost of the higher the probability of occurrence. Financial pinch probability high will reduce the present value of the enterprise, to improve the cost ofcapital.(2) the agency cost. Because shareholders exists the possibility of using a variety of ways from the bondholders who benefit, bonds must have a number of protective constraint clauses. These terms and conditions in a certain extent constrained the legal management of the enterprise. Also must supervise the enterprise to ensure compliance with these terms and conditions, the cost of supervision and also upon the shareholders with higher debt costs. Supervise cost that agency cost is will raise the cost of debt to reduce debt interest. When the tax benefits and liabilities of financial constraints and agency costs when balance each other, namely the costs and benefits offset each other, determine the optimal capital structure. Equilibrium theory emphasizes the liabilities increase will cause the risk of bankruptcy and rising costs, so as to restrict the enterprise infinite pursuit of the behavior of tax preferential policies. In this sense, the enterprise the best capital structure is the balance of tax revenue and financial constraints caused by all kinds of costs as a result, when the marginal debt tax shield benefit is equal to the marginal cost of financial constraints, the enterprise value maximum, to achieve the optimal capital structure.3.2 Asymmetric Information TheoryAsymmetric Information and found)Due to the trade-off theory has long been limited to bankruptcy cost and tax benefit both conceptual framework, to the late 1970 s, the theory is centered on asymmetricinformation theory of new capital structure theory. So-called asymmetric information is in the information management and investors are not equal, managers than investors have more and more accurate information, and managers try to existing shareholders rather than new seeks the best interests of shareholders, so if business prospect is good, the manager will not issue new shares, but if the prospects, will make the cost of issuing new shares to raise too much, this factor must be considered in the capital structure decision. The significance of these findings to the enterprise's financial policy lies in: first it prompted enterprise reserve a certain debt capacity so as to internal lack of funding for new investment projects in the future debt financing. In addition, in order to avoid falling stock prices, managers often don't have to equity financing, and prefer to use external funding. The central idea is: internal financing preference, if you need external finance, preferences of creditor's rights financing. Can in order to save the ability to issue new debt at any time, the number of managers to borrow is usually less than the number of enterprises can take, in order to keep some reserves. Ross (s. Ross) first systematically introduce the theory of asymmetric information from general economics enterprise capital structure analysis, then, tal (e. Talmon), haeckel (Heikel) development from various aspects, such as the theory. After the 1980 s, thanks to the new institutional economics, and gradually formed a financial contract theory, corporate governance structure theory of capitalstructure theory, both of which emphasize enterprise contractual and incomplete contract, financial contract theory focuses on the design of optimal financial contract, and the arrangement of enterprise governance structure theory focuses on the right, focuses on the analysis of the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance.4 the capital structure theory of adaptability analysis On the one hand, capital structure theory especially the theory of modern capital structure is the important contribution is not only put forward "the existence of the optimal capital structure" this financial proposition, and that the optimal combination of the capital structure, objectively and make us on capital structure and its influence on the enterprise value have a clear understanding. The essence of these theories has direct influence and infiltrate into our country financial theory, and gives us enlightenment in many aspects: Because of various financing way, channel in financing costs, risks, benefits, constraints, as well as differences, seeking suitable capital structure is the enterprise financial management, especially the important content of financing management, must cause our country attaches great importance to the financial theory and financial practice. Capital structure decision despite the enterprise internal and external relationships and factor of restriction and influence, but its decision-making is the enterprise, the enterprise to the factors related to capital structure and the relationship between the quantitativeand qualitative analysis, discusses some principles and methods of enterprise capital structure optimization decision. Any enterprise capital structure in the design, all should leave room, maintain appropriate maneuver ability of financing, the financing environment in order to cope with the volatility and deal with unexpected events occur at any time. In general, businesses leverage ratio is high, has an adverse effect on the whole social and economic development, easily led to the decrease of the enterprise itself the economic benefits and losses and bankruptcies, deepen the entire social and economic development is not stable, increase the financial burden, cause inflation, not conducive to the transformation of industrial structure, and lower investment efficiency. Therefore, the enterprise capital structure should be in accordance with the business owners, creditors, and the public can bear the risk of the society in different aspects.译文资本结构理论与企业资本结构优化Ashkanasy N M摘要企业融资是现代企业经营决策的一项重要内容。

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。

公司治理外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)公司治理与高管薪酬：一个应急框架总体概述通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。

高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。

我们提出了一个框架，审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。

我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响，像“软法律”和“硬法律”。

在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。

因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。

正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。

”关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。

根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。

这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发，公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。

公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。

因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。

大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为，股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。

正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。

股东的目标是使财富最大化；因此代理成本理论指出，总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。

论公司治理结构对企业资本结构影响公司治理结构对企业资本结构具有重要影响，它涉及着公司内部关系的管理和决策机制的建立。

在市场经济条件下，公司治理结构已成为影响企业经营效率和资本结构的重要因素。

本文将从公司治理结构对企业资本结构的影响进行深入探讨。

一、公司治理结构对企业资本结构的影响1. 分权和控制公司治理结构中的分权和控制关系对企业资本结构具有显著的影响。

分权与控制的机制直接影响公司决策的效率和质量，从而影响企业的融资结构。

在一个公司中，如果在管理层和所有者之间存在着过多的代理问题和控制问题，就会导致公司的融资结构不稳定和不合理。

而如果分权和控制的机制健全，公司的融资结构就会更为合理和稳定。

2. 高管激励机制公司治理结构中的高管激励机制对企业的资本结构也有很大的影响。

高管的激励机制直接影响着公司的经营效率和财务状况，从而影响着公司的融资结构。

一些对高管薪酬的激励机制可能会导致高管为了短期业绩而采取不合理的融资结构，以获取高额的薪酬奖励。

而如果高管的激励机制更多地关注公司的长期利益，就会更有利于形成合理的融资结构。

二、影响公司治理结构对企业资本结构的因素1. 法律法规不同国家和地区的法律法规对公司治理结构和企业资本结构都有着不同的规定和要求。

一些国家和地区的法律法规对公司治理结构和股东权益保护非常重视，这就会促使公司建立起更为合理的治理结构，从而影响着公司的资本结构。

而一些国家和地区的法律法规对公司治理结构和股东权益保护较为疏漏，就可能导致公司治理结构和资本结构不合理。

2. 公司内部治理机制公司内部治理机制对公司的资本结构也有着重要的影响。

一些公司建立了较为完善的内部治理机制，如董事会、监事会、股东大会等，这些机制有利于促进公司内部的信息流通和决策效率，从而影响着公司的资本结构。

而一些公司的内部治理机制薄弱，内部信息流通不畅，就可能导致公司融资结构不稳定和不合理。

3. 资本市场资本市场对公司资本结构也有着重要的影响。

On Capital Structure and Maximum Enterprise ValueAbstract:The different arrangement of capital structure may exert direct influence on capital cost and the discount rate of the net flow of the future cash,finally giving impact on enterprise value and the optimization of property right structure.We should strengthen the effective restraint of debt to managers and make full use of the signal transmission function of enterprise capital structure to realize the optimization of capital structure and to promote the value increasing.Key words: enterprise value; Capital structure; company administrative structure. signal transmission function1.The relationship between the capital structure and enterprise value maximizationCapital structure refers to the enterprise all kinds of capital composition and proportion relationship. Theory of capital structure has some areas of controversy , summed up in the following three perspectives : The first is their own capital structure theory, the capital is only an idea is defined as the rights and interests capital source, namely the equity capital of the internal relationship between each component, truthfully to collect capital, capital reserve, the proportion of the relationship between retained earnings, this view is not common. The second view is long term capital structure theory, the idea that capital refers to the long-term capital of the enterprise, namely the equity capital and long-term debt capital. Short-term debt as working capital to deal with, do not belong to the category of capital structure research. The third kind of view is that all the capital structure theory, studies the enterprise all constitute the proportion of the capital structure of the relationships, relative to the second view, it includes not only the long-term capital (equity and debt capital) for a long time, will also be short-term debt capital is also included. Capital structure optimization is to point to through to the enterprise capital structure adjustment, make its capital structure tends to rationalization, to achieve the target process. Modern capital structure theory, capital structure optimization goal is tomaximize the enterprise value. The optimal capital structure should be at the lowest weighted average cost of capital is to make the enterprise the financing risk for maximum and minimum return on investment, so as to realize the enterprise value maximization of a kind of capital structure. At any time, the enterprise is the only capital structure, but at this moment if not the optimal capital structure, capital structure is the largest enterprise value has not come at this time. Only under the condition of the optimal capital structure, enterprise will achieve maximum value.Enterprise value is refers to the enterprise investor is expected from the enterprise to obtain the present value of future cash flows. The essence of which is the efficiency of the enterprise comprehensive embodiment. Capital structure refers to the enterprise the source of all kinds of long-term capital composition and proportion relationship, it is a main factor of the decision enterprise the overall cost of capital, and reflect the main measure of firm's financial risk. Different capital structure, will directly affect the cost of capital, and affect the discount rate of future cash flows discounted, impact on the enterprise value. The cost of capital is due to the use of enterprises and raise the cost of capital, is a long-term investment and enterprise assets remuneration obtained the basic return rate. Different will lead to the weighted average cost of capital structure is different, resulting in the different enterprise financing efficiency, and affect the long-term investment project and the benefit of the enterprise overall level and, in turn, affect the enterprise value. Liabilities have financial leverage effect, the expected return on assets is greater than the cost of borrowing rate under the premise of borrowing will increase earnings per share surplus, but at the same time because of the expected rate of return on assets is not stability, will lead to a surplus of volatility and increase the probability of bankruptcy, and causing financial risk. Different capital structure will lead to enterprise financial risk degree of difference and scientific capital structure policy should not only use financial leverage to increase surplus per share, also want to avoid debt brought about by the financial risk, in order to avoid the due cannot pay his debts and the enterprise bankruptcy, so that the loss of the enterprise value. Belong to the stakeholders in capital ownership, capital structure reflects the composition of the property. Under the modern enterprise system, property rightstructure is reasonable, involves which lead to the agency relationship is reasonable, and affect the enterprise production and operation mechanism is reasonable, for the enterprise can form an effective motivation mechanism, to promote the enterprise in a market economy cycle is crucial.Theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between capital structure and value companies are more abundant. According to its history, can be on the relationship between capital structure and enterprise value research conclusion is summarized as follows:First, the capital structure is designed to achieve a specific form of corporate value and achieve ways to optimize the capital structure and financing decisions and increase the value of the company 's management is an important way . Corporate capital structure reasonable arrangement , one can take advantage of tax effect liabilities , reduce capital costs , improve capital efficiency, on the other hand you can optimize the company 's governance structure, reduce the potential cause greater risk among those within the company conflicts of interest costs and improve value creation -based implementation. In addition , Ross (1977) signaling theory suggests that managers of financing choices actually send signals to investors , corporate investors will share issue seen as a signal enterprise asset quality deterioration , while debt financing is good asset quality signal , so the enterprise value of a positive correlation with asset-liability ratio , the more high -quality companies , the higher the debt ratio . Debt to enterprise value has a positive correlation , play an active role in the enterprise.Second, the capital structure of the debt ratio is not as high as possible . Financial risks to improve the company's capital structure with gradual increases in the debt ratio , increased debt possibility of future cash flows is less than the expected value , which may result in bankruptcy costs , resulting in no less than the value of the company before the level of debt financing .Third, there is an optimal capital structure. When the debt continue to rise, bringing the marginal benefit and marginal risk balance, the enterprise value reaches the maximum capital structure is the optimal capital structure. Thus, in the company's capital structure decisions , in order to increase shareholder wealth,require the company has a high debt ratio ; But from the perspective of financial risk and creditors , the company's debt ratio will have a limit. Visible, capital structure decision problem is an optimization problem , that is, under certain financial risks and maximize the value of shareholders' creditors limit the company's wealth . Since the choice of capital structure but also by a variety of different factors , different industries, different enterprises and different periods of the same enterprise , and its optimal capital structure may be different.Our research methods on the theory of capital structure and corporate value diversity , conclusions are not consistent , the findings also have some different foreign . This was mainly caused by a number of factors, such as different levels of economic development , different levels of development of capital markets , as well as different cultures, legal environment and industry characteristics , etc. . Performance in China, due to the unique transition economy differs from the developed market economies of Western insiders control problems and underdeveloped capital markets, market manager , control of the market , making the company's capital structure decision is not based on considerations of maximizing the value of listed companies . As China's listed companies financing order in a certain period showed inconsistent with the financing order theory of the phenomenon , and its order of equity financing , short-term debt financing , long-term debt financing and internal financing .2.To set up the target capital structure factors should be consideredIn theory, any enterprise should exist the best capital structure. But, in practice, the enterprise is difficult to accurately determine the best point, needs to be studied in a careful analysis based on the factors that affect the enterprise capital structure optimization, to optimize the capital structure decision.(1) The economic cycle. Under the condition of market economy, any country's economic development in waves. Generally speaking, in a recession and depression stage, due to the objective economic recession, the majority of business is struggling, often troubled financial situation, or even worse. To this, enterprises should as far as possible compression in debt. In the economic recovery and prosperity stage, in general, because of the economic trough, market supply and demand rise, mostenterprises should according to the need to rapidly expand, does not give up in order to keep the cost of capital minimum good development opportunities.(2) The enterprise debt paying ability. Through to the enterprise original Indices such as current ratio, quick ratio, asset-liability ratio analysis, evaluating the debt paying ability of the enterprise. If the enterprise debt paying ability is quite strong, can increase the ratio of debt in capital structure properly, in order to give full play to financial leverage, the enterprise to increase profits. On the contrary, should not be excessive debt, and should be taken to issue stock and other equity capitalThe financing way.(3) The attitude held by the owners and operators. Attitude held by the owners and operators, including the owner and operator control of the enterprise and the attitude to risk, to a large extent determines the enterprise's capital structure. If don't want to lose control of the enterprise, owner and operator should choose debt financing. In addition, for more conservative and cautious, owner and operator of future economic pessimism, preference as far as possible the use of equity capital, debt ratio is relatively small; To dare to take risks, to economic development prospects are optimistic, and rich in the spirit of enterprise owners and operators, tend to use more debt financing, give full play to financial leverage.(4) The market competition environment. Even in the same enterprise of macroeconomic environment, because of their different market environment, its debt levels also should not treat as the same. If the enterprise industry competition degree is weak or in a monopoly position, sales will not happen problem, stable profit growth, can be appropriately increase the debt ratio; On the contrary, if the enterprise industry competition is stronger, due to its sales completely determined by the market, so should not be too much debt ways to raise money.(5) Enterprise profitability. If the enterprise's development and the management is extensive, will lead to lower corporate profitability, it is difficult to profitability through retained earnings or other capital to raise money, had to raise debt, this inevitably leads to more debt in the capital structure, this kind of enterprise financial risk should be paid attention to; For profitability strong enterprises, take the equity capital financing is relatively easy, this kind of enterprise financing channels andmeans of choice is bigger, can raise the funds required for the production development, can make low comprehensive cost of capital as much as possible.(6) The development degree of capital market. Capital market is a place for companies to raise capital, the perfect and development degree of the capital market, will to some extent, restricted enterprise's financing behavior and capital structure. For a long time, the indirect financing in the capital market in China accounts for absolute position, slow development of the securities market, a single cause enterprise financing way, heavy debt, with the deepening of financial reform in our country, the stock market will more and more important in national economy.3. Unreasonable capital structure, the influence on the enterprise value maximization3.1 The reason of unreasonable capital structure:3.1.1 The general reasonThe capital structure of listed companies in our country exists above the status duo, investigate its reason, mainly due to the special national conditions of our country. Our country is in economic transition period, namely in the planned economy to market economy transition period, we have their own special economic environment and economic operation characteristics. The securities market of our country is in such cases, and is driven by the government. The government is the original purpose of setting up a stock market for state-owned enterprises in trouble, help state-owned enterprises free from debt problems. So most of the listed company of our country is formed by the state-owned enterprise restructuring.3.1.2 The specific reasons(1) Imperfect capital market development. First of all, our country stock market the seller exists serious insufficient competition. Stock market of our country, the primary goal for the state-owned enterprises is in trouble, in order to achieve this goal, for quite a long time, the government listed companies to issue shares to planning, strong administrative system, the deeds of the strict quota control, and leaning to state-owned enterprises, makes our country of the seller of the stock market exists serious insufficient competition, and made many sub prime even inferior company is listed, the price of the stock due to limited supply, the price levelis generally high. Second, the imbalance in the structure of enterprise bond market development. The stock market and bond market rapid development and expanded sharply at the same time, the development of the enterprise bond market has not been due. Their own lack of issuing bonds. Fact between soft constraints in credit and equity markets are imperfect constraint mechanism to make enterprises always put bonds, the last of the financing order. Relevant state policy to a certain extent, to curb the development of corporate bond market. Due to the lagged development of enterprise bond market in China, hindered the conditional corporate bond issue, is not conducive to enterprise by raising the proportion of debt financing to establish reasonable financing structure.(2) The non-standard market operation mechanism. Equity financing is a kind of investors, financiers and market intermediary tripartite participation behavior. Corporate financing behavior if it fails to meet the basic requirement of capital optimization configuration, why in the stock market can freely be implemented? At the end of the day, the market operation mechanism of non-standard is the source of the listed companies malicious behavior encircling money outside. Because the market mechanism is not standard, makes the financiers are compliance through market investment behavior to give the profits of investors and intermediaries compliance and source of income.(3) Equity structure defects. China's capital market is one of the most important feature is the equity division, formed the state shares, legal person share, tradable shares and foreign shares a few fragmented markets to each other. The market, make the different between different shareholders interests demand, led to the actual control or major shareholders independent goes against the other shareholders standard of value pursuit, they do not necessarily put all focus on how to improve company's performance, because of rising corporate profits, the improvement of the financial indicators, through leverage reflects on the asset price negotiable, show the negotiable stock prices rise, so as to benefit the tradable shares directly. In China, the controlling shareholder in general are tradable shareholders, the shareholders didn't get the corresponding because of rising asset prices benefits, this is the institutional defects of inconsistency of value target.3.2 The unreasonable capital structure influence on the enterprise value maximization:3.2.1 The unreasonable capital structure leads to poor corporate governance structureThe capital structure influence the cost of capital not only, still affect shareholders, creditors and the agent that the distribution of residual claims and control of the enterprise, ultimately affect the efficiency of corporate governance, and corporate value. Different capital structure, enterprise's equity constitute different governance structure model is different, embodies the relationship of different stakeholders. Corporate governance is the enterprise operation mechanism of internal decision. Corporate governance is to improve the operating mechanism mainly reflected in the enterprise is effective. Corporate governance is a relationship of checks and balances, but its core lies in the effective operation of governance mechanism. And the key to the efficiency of enterprise operation mechanism at the operator's ability, motivation and binding is advantageous to the enterprise market value to improve the management decisions. Therefore, to perfect the corporate governance is the assurance of enterprise value maximization., from the viewpoint of the capital structure of our state-owned enterprises and state holding corporation governance structure, the prominent problem is that state-owned equity ratio is too high, the enterprise in different degree, subject to the government's administrative intervention, weaken the efficiency of production and operation of enterprises; Youngling of state-owned enterprise property rights, on the other hand, led to the decision-making and control of the substance to the excessive concentration of the enterprise operator, to form the enterprise "insider control" phenomenon, to make the operator or the autonomy in operation of the production cost is too expensive. Oneness property right structure caused the state-owned enterprise incentive and constraint mechanism is relatively weak, reduce the efficiency of the enterprise should have, limits the enterprise value maximization goal.3.2.2 High agency cost caused by unreasonable capital structureCorporate debt directly have a certain influence on agent's actions and decisions, which affect the market value of the enterprise. At present, our country there is adominant state-owned shares of listed companies, the owner absence, insider control, constraints, and poor incentive mechanism were the problem. Internal equity of listed companies in China the average ratio of 0.11% (0.074% stake of the members of the board, senior managers hold 0.036%), compared to 11.48% of the us internal shareholding proportion, nearly 100 times the gap. Chairman and chief executive of the listed companies in China with greater decision-making power to the company, is a has benefits at the expense of the interests of the shareholders, especially when the company's chairman and chief executive, taken by the same person, the situation is more serious. Shareholders of the company due to the existence of the above issues, the lack of effective monitoring, managers of the listed companies of constraint mechanism is not sound, insider control is quite serious. Serious insider control inevitably leads to the company's action more reflect the will of the managers, not the shareholders or owners will eventually. Thanks to debt financing will increase pressure on managers, and force it to work hard to avoid bankruptcy, managers from their own interests, will give up debt financing, choose equity financing. Equity constraint is relatively soft, however, high stake of capital structure can cause lack of supervision over corporate managers, corporate managers work hard pressure is insufficient, the final damage or the interests of the shareholders and creditors. And these are largely leads to agency costs increase and the decrease of the enterprise value.3.2.3 The signal transfer function of the capital structure of the failed to effectively useCapital structure as the solution to the problem of excessive investment and inadequate investment tools, cases, established in the investment capital structure can also be used as the transfer signal of corporate insiders private information. First that agent to change the capital structure ratio directly affect the investor to the enterprise value evaluation, that is, make the enterprise market value changes of variation of debt ratio. Investors have higher debt levels as a high quality of the signal, when enterprises to raise the debt, suggests that managers expected enterprise have a better business performance. And when the enterprise operating performance is low, have high marginal cost of enterprise bankruptcy wouldn't imitate increased more in highperformance of corporate debt. Second, in the valley and parr's model, assuming that the enterprise managers understand the investment income distribution function, and outside investors don't understand. Manager is a risk averse, and that the benefit of the enterprise management is market traders ownership share a function, so the higher the manager's stake, whereby the sending the signal, the better, the more likely it is to attract investors, and is beneficial to reduce the degree of information asymmetry, bring good benefits expected, increasing the market value of the enterprise. Most of China's enterprises are not good at using the signal transfer function to give useful information to the outside world, corporate executives stake is not much, and each year the amount of shares held by the little change, this will make investors lack of enterprise value judgment basis.3. optimize capital structure to promote the enterprise value maximizationCompanies need to be carried out in accordance with the enterprise value maximization goal of capital structure adjustment and optimization, the goal is to reshape the game interest subjects, to change the power and strategy space, in the hope of game equilibrium is Pareto improvement, concrete from the following several aspects.(1) improve enterprise ownership control structures, improve the internal governance structureCapital structure, corporate governance and corporate value is interlinked, enterprise value is the goal of financial management, capital structure is the foundation of the enterprise value maximization, and corporate governance is the company's steady operation and the guarantee of the enterprise value maximization. Modern corporate finance theory analysis shows that realize the goal of the company must improve the corporate governance mechanism, by optimizing the capital structure to improve corporate governance this purpose.Effective corporate governance structure is advantageous to the formation of the constraint by the relationship between the interests of all parties and incentive mechanism, to ensure the interests of all stakeholders, to maximize the enterprise value. The formation of the corporate governance structure and design, and is closely related to enterprise's capital structure. First of all, as a result of the configuration ofequity capital the basic motivations of the ownership of the control of enterprises, the rights and interests of different capital structure will affect the control of the enterprise, the influence on enterprise control goal and the principal goal of deviation degree, which leads to different enterprise efficiency; Second, the use of funds to creditors and creditors of creditor's rights and the maintenance of security measures to influence the level of agency costs, will affect the enterprise value. Therefore, the rights and interests of the enterprise capital structure is the basis of the formation of enterprise control, the composition of equity capital and debt capital is the root of shareholders and creditors' interest contradictions. The optimization of capital structure, must want to establish a reasonable proportion of corporate equity structure and forms the enterprise to seek to maximize the enterprise value of the agency relationship as the goal. To enhance the efficiency of China's enterprises to form in pursuit of the enterprise, make the enterprise value maximize governance structure, we must improve the structure of property right configuration of company governance, and strengthen the creditor as well.(2) Strengthen the debts of the business operators of effective constraintCapital structure not only reflects the business capital of different sources, it also affect the relations between the distribution of corporate power in various stakeholders, determines the restraint and incentive intensity of different interest subjects. Therefore, the efficiency of the capital structure to entrust - agent can play a role. In modern companies especially the listed company equity dispersion, by moderate debt will reduce the free-riding problem in a minority shareholder in the supervision of enterprises, to solve the problem of equity constraint is lax and insider control, etc. In addition debt will make manager to distribute free cash flow in a timely manner to investors rather than their profligacy, debt will also forced managers to sell non-performing assets and restrict manager is invalid but can increase the investment of power. When the debtor is unable to repay debts or enterprises need financing, the creditor will be investigating corporate balance sheets according to the debt contract, thus will enable the enterprise to reveal information about and supervision of the manager and make better. Reasonable capital structure can play an effective inhibition, excite the work enthusiasms of business operators,and constraints of the business operators, behavior, and can play a good governance effect, promote the enterprise value growth.(3) Establish a mechanism for dynamic optimization of capital structureAll enterprises to participate in market competition constantly seek ways to access to competitive advantage, but because of the incomplete information in the realistic economy, uncertainty and bounded rationality, makes it impossible for people to consider all the factors that affect the capital structure, grasp the "objective" unable to advance the law of economic activity, thus make the "optimal" capital structure decision. The capital structure decision not only is a necessary condition of maximizing the enterprise value, more important is the enterprise to constantly adjust the capital structure, to implement the strategy of the corresponding external competition. Enterprise products market is in constant change, due to the rapid changes in technology and market, enterprises face the environment full of uncertainty, enterprise's capital structure decision is not a choice question in advance, but in a complex and uncertain environment constantly searching, constantly adjust process. If companies ignore product market environment changes, stressed or focus on the so-called "optimal capital structure", may be lost of continuous competitive advantage.According to the situation of our country fully consider various factors, reasonable determine the best proportion of capital structure, and the best proportion of the capital structure is a dynamic rather than static. This requires our country enterprise in the financial management must be combined with the specific situation of the industry and your business, try to improve their capital structure of enterprise, also is in the whole capital of enterprise, how to determine the proportion of equity capital and debt capital, capital to make enterprise evenly weighted minimum, enterprises maximize shareholder wealth. For the management of the capital structure shall establish financial early warning system, take the corresponding strategies to adapt to the changes in the environment at the same time. In choosing financing tools, can use convertible preferred shares, redeemable preferred stock, convertible bonds and callable bonds have better elasticity financing tools, such as flexibility of capital structure.。

本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目：The influence of western banks on corporate governance in China出处：University of Cambridge作者：Jane Nolan原文：The influence of western banks on corporate governance in ChinaAbstractThis study draws on in-depth qualitative interviews to investigate the variety of institutional forces which influence the adoption of western corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese banks. Following path dependency models of institutional change it was shown that cognitive and normative institutions, including a ‘who you know’ or guan xi credit culture, mean that the practical influence of western banks on corporate governance reforms was perceived to be ineffectual in most cases. Given the failure of western credit-rating systems in the sub-prime crisis, it is likely that this perception will increase in the future. The majority of western actors believed that the main reason Chinese banks seek to co-operate with western institutions was to enhance the legitimacy of the Chinese bank in the global financial environment, rather than to actively change existing governance me chanisms.Keywords: banking,corporate governance,institutional change,legitimacy seekingIntroductionThe development of China’s economy has, to date, been driven by its considerable supply of cheap lab our and its many and varied production opportunities. Whether or not capital was allocated efficiently has been of little consequence and, until fairly recently, the financial sector has been characterized by state-owned banks lending to state-owned enterprises on the basis of social policy principles rather than profitability and managerial competence. Yet as China’s economy advances the development of the financial sector is set to become ever more important. Bankscannot indefinitely continue to make huge loans to inefficient enterprises which will never be repaid and many financial institutions remain compromised by the corporate governance problems associated with having the state as both official regulator and principal shareholder (IFC 2005, Li et al. 2021)That said, the reform of China’s banks is now well underway and the basic methods employed for restructuring have been large capital injections, the setting up of ‘bad-banks’and asset management companies, initial public offerings, partnerships with foreign banks(with the aim of improving management and IT development) and the inclusion of overseas board members to help improve corporate governance. Some see these moves as part of a broader interest by Chinese officials in developing an economic institutional environment which is more reflective of the international business community (Guthrie 1998, Wang 2007). And, at a theoretical level, these adjustments raise some important questions about the nature of institutional change in China’s economic transition, such as whether China will develop its own unique form of corporate governance, or whether it will converge towards the more market-based models commonly found in the west. While the opening of the market to western banks has been seen as a key plank of there form program me, at the time of writing, many economies in the western world are struggling to cope with the fall-out from the sub-prime mortgage debacle, and the credibility of western banks is under severe strain (Bloomberg 2021). Some have argued that recent events could see economic power shift from west to east and much attentions now focused on the nature of China’s position in the global economic order (Brown 2021,Time 2021). China’s banks are now very large, with three in the world’s top 10 by marketcapitalization.1 However, such large assets should not detract from the problems which remain in the Chinese banking system including a shallow talent pool, a shortage of managerial and technical expertise, a local currency that is not convertible and weak corporate governance mechanisms. This study aims to investigate the institutional forces which affect the adoption of western corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese banks. The data comes from a series of in-depth qualitative interviews with senior managers who were either employed in western banks with stockholdings in Chinese institutions, held non-executive directorships of Chinese banks, or had participated in otherfinancial advisory roles. The following sections will enlarge on the corporate governance literature in relation to both western and Chinese banks and discuss the theoretical frameworks which can help explain how goals, beliefs and organizations are structured by institutions. Next, the research methodology will be outlined and the findings will be introduced structured around the institutional forces which influence both internal and external governance mechanisms as well as related technical assistance projects. The study concludes with a discussion of the importance of legitimacy-seeking in motivating Chinese banks to seek collaboration with western institutions and will underscore the importance of local informal institutions in ensuring path dependent change. Finally, some of the key assumptions of western models of governance will be challenged, particularly the belief that market forces alone can ensure the efficient allocation of credit.TheoryIn the west it is possible to distinguish at least two forms of corporate governance: International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) technical assistance to Chinese banks. Bank Pre-investment At investment Post-investment Bank of Shanghai Since 1995 IFC supported, with funding form Japan and EU, human resources management review, credit analysis, credit policies and procedures Arranged for the adoption of IAS* audits Review of credit procedures, stress test to monitor portfolio risks, SME business diagnostics and SME banking strategy. Bank of Beijing Credit risk management, business strategy development Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Training for board members, portfolio stress test. China Minsheng Banking Corporation$700,000 in technical assistance at time of establishment; advice on strategic issues and business development, training of staff on credit analysis Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits At the request of Minsheng identified independent director, supported diagnostic review of SME lending and SME strategy development; supported energy efficiency loan program; introduced methodology for portfolio stress test. Nanjing City Commercial Bank Supported risk management training through Price Waterhouse and Coopers Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits With funding from Italy offered series of training programs on risk control; supported board members training; introduced portfolio stress test method . UnitedRural Cooperative Bank Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Upgraded credit policy and loan recovery manuals, introduced new credit scoring system; set up a Risk and Compliance Department, and a Credit Review Centre; conducted training on credit management; started branch management and benchmark models. Xian City Bank Training for bank staff on credit analysis Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Supported credit training program in 2005; advised on acquisition of credit cooperative. China Industrial Bank Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Provided corporate governance technical assistance in 2004; portfolio stress test in2005; technical assistance on IT frame work; SME lending diagnostics and strategy; supported energy efficiency lending. Asia Pacific Business Review self-interest and decentralized markets are capable of functioning efficiently and fairly; the continental European model based on a stakeholder theory of the firm, where the interests of not just shareholders, but of other groups, such as trade unions and work councils, are also considered (Luo 2007). In East Asia there are also a number of distinctive models including the Keiretsu model in Japan (sets of companies with interlocking relationships and shareholdings) (Witt 2006) and the model in South Korea (Government-supported global conglomerates such as Samsung) (Sung 2003). Liu(2006) has argued that the corporate governance system in China is one which is ‘control based’,rather than market orientated because China’s unique institutional setting means that the regulators and authorities still make extensive use of administrative measures to control developments in the economy.Cousin (2007) argues that corporate governance in Chinese banks poses a distinctive set of problems which are some what different to those encountered by other Chinese firms.First, the principal-agent relations are even more complex because they must take account of a wider range of stakeholders including depositors, lenders, supervisors and regulators(Cao and Zhao 2004). Second because of the importance of the financial system to economic growth and social stability bank failures will not be allowed and in the event of potential collapse they are likely to be saved (Wang and Huang 2004). Of course, recent events in the global economy have shown that this behaviour is not unique to the Chinese system, however the implications of agovernment guarantee to maintain ‘financial security’ means that internal controls should, in theory, be much stronger than in industries where the threat of collapse is far more real (Cao and Zhao 2004, Wang and Huang 2004). Finally, information asymmetry is deeper in banks than in other companies because quality in financial intermediation cannot be assessed immediately. For example, non-performing loans tend to be discovered in the future not at the time of issuance (Wei 2005). It is clear that, in the Chinese case, the state has allocated to itself the main role in the banking system and, historically speaking at least, this differentiates Chinese corporate governance models from those found in Anglo-Saxon countries. Officials argue for the merits of this system on the basis that, at China’s current stage of development, markets would not fairly allocate resources and the government has a responsibility for managing the financial system so that development occurs rapidly, but with stability (Zhou 2004). That there are differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the Chinese models of corporate governance is hardly surprising. The ‘varieties of capitalism’ research tradition has produced numerous case studies demonstrating that there has been little convergence in terms of governance structures or economic policy making over the last 20 years despite extensive financial globalization (Clarke 2003, Nee 2005, Streek and Thelen 2005). Comparative organizational scholars have also produced many studies which show that firms adopt various modes of economic action and organizational forms which are largely based on the institutional structures embedded in their nation-state base (Boisot and Child 1998, Guillen 2001, Redding and Witt 2007). Moreover, Chinese thinking about international norms has been shown to vary across time, sector and issue (Wang 2007). In a study of policy documents and media commentary, Wang suggests that Chinese officials remain open to international norms in the economic and technical realms but less so to those governing other issues, especially political and military matters. Wang argues that it seems likely that China will abide by prevailing international economic and technical norms and will become an increasingly congruent and co-operative economic partner in the global arena. It is probably fair to say that, at the official level, the reform of China’s banking system was partly influenced by the policy discourse ‘link up with the international track’ (yu guoji jieguei) whereby China’s banks were encouraged tomove towards 422 J. Nolan international standards both in terms of product innovation, accounting procedures and corporate governance mechanisms (Cousin 2007, Calomiris 2007, Wang 2007). This publicly-stated objective, does, however, raise interesting questions as to the practicalities of transferring corporate governance practices across culture, and, following Aguiler and Jackson (2003), this study will argue that multiple institutions will interact to influence the perceived legitimacy and utility of western corporate governance practices in the Chinese context. Although there is some discussion over just quite what an ‘institution’ is, it is probably fair to say that most would agree that an institution encompasses both the informal beliefs and behaviours of a given society and the formal organizations of the state that govern those beliefs and behaviours (Nee 2005). Within this general framework, it is possible to differentiate further between functionalist or ‘rational choice’ theories and path dependency or ‘varieties of capitalism’ approaches to institutional change (with the latter sometimes referred to as ‘neo-institutionalism’). Each approach rests on different behavioural assumptions (principally the degree to which rational action is limited and shaped by context), and foregrounds different explanatory mechanisms (social networks and ties, state regulations, collective action, transaction-cost economising, and so on) (Nee 2005, Campbell 2004). The fundamental premise of the functional approach is that, in a global arena, institutions tend to converge, or become similar in form, because markets create incentives for actors to replace poor institutions with more efficient ones and actors learn from the behaviour of institutions who survive in the face of competition (North 1990, Weingast2002). In other words, efficient institutions in some way or another promote rational behaviour and reduce transactions costs (Williamson 1981). There are, however, problems in accounting for the pace of institutional change within the functional framework, which, some argue, has been somewhat slower in certain countries than would be expected given efficiency and rational-choice assumptions (Furubotn and Richter 1997).译文：西方银行公司治理对中国的影响摘要本研究即将深入定性探讨各种影响中资银行的西方银行治理体制。

公司治理这个英文单词——Corporate Governance本来是表达企业高层管理一切功能的最理想的名称，因为这里也包含了控制论这个词汇的重要词根。

控制论——kybernetik来自于希腊语kybernetes，相当于“掌舵的人”，到了英语里就变为governor和governance了。

卡德伯里委员会 于1992年对公司治理这个名称的最早定义也同我自己的看法一致：公司治理是公司运行的制度。

这个定义不是绝对的，要看公司治理侧重哪个方面，所以值得探讨和判断。

今天对公司治理的看法已经远离了这条主线，以至于把相应的概念作为企业管理、企业策略的同义词，更多的是让人感到糊涂。

在另外两种今天占主导地位的定义中，防止错误决策已经包含在内了。

伯克利的定义把股民利益放到了中心位置，魏特金的定义把照顾利益相关者写了进去6。

两个定义在含义上是错误的，因为里面的意图和目的有误导，会彻底导致高层领导做出错误的决策。

在德国的公司治理条例中，要求董事会有义务代表公司利益，但我要谈的是，在同一个条例里又要求董事会同时对公司价值的可持续提升承担义务。

监事会则对公司利益没有约束性的义务，这就意味着，企业管理按照股东价值原则上是违规或者违法的7。

这里恐怕是最大程度的含糊不清了。

今天的公司治理提供的是正确管理公司的一幅扭曲的画面，就如上面所述，这幅画面更多的是反映了近15年里的丑闻和经济犯罪，而不是反映对企业这个复杂系统的广泛理解。

实际上这样就产生了错误指导下的企业经营活动，这非常值得思考。

从2000年初到2002年末的股市指数急剧回落就已暴露出这种错误导向。

随着后面的经济衰退还能更加清楚地看到这些错误，非常可能的是还将给今天的公司治理带来末日。

从多种角度上看关于公司治理到目前的观点，是令人遗憾的，并失去许多机会的历史。

尤其看到其中对企业里各种系统的作用方式缺乏应有的重视。

这段历史体现为对企业的概念不清和严重的错误指导，这是由于对企业作为复杂系统的本质和意义的严重误解所致。

Capital Structure and Firm Performance1. IntroductionAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancialindustries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managersexerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their ownpreferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equalthe lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm. Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under theagency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity andincreases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Sincethe seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations ofcapital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financialleverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personallosses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), andthrough pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage canmitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which thefirm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in loweragency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leveragebecomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt –including higherexpected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress –arising from conflicts between bondholders andshareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the two sources of agency costs, wefollow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be nonmonotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature(see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesistypically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plussome control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.In the case of the banking industry studied here, there are also regulatorycosts associated with very high leverage.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stockmarket prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not netout the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyon d management’scontrol and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that areunrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’sperformance that would be reali zed if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance.The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profitefficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiencyevaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the sameexogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that arenot part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similarmeasures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature areindustry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry – such as localmarket conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practicefirm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected toperform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation fromperformance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to takethis reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with theeffects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. Wediscuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, theefficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model andestimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a functi on of the2 Stigler’s argument was part of a broader exchange over whether productive efficiency (or X-efficiency) primarily reflectsdifficulties in reconciling the preferences of multiple optimizing agents –what is today called agency costs –versus “true” inefficiency, or failure to optimize (e.g., Stigler 1976, Leibenstein 1978). firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is used to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equationspecifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profi tefficiency and other variables is used to testthe net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometricallyidentified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Undervirtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership andcontrol that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduceagency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs bycreating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of theownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with thedependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage)through the reverse causality hypotheses noted aboveTo address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equationexplaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of qualitydata available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firmsproducing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and otherexogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature findevidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs,including leverage and ownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and otherinfluences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatoryconstraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are wellabove the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the mar2. Theories of reverse causality from performance to capital structureAs noted, prior research on agency costs generally does not take into account the possibility of reversecausation from performance to capital structure, which may result in simultaneous-equations bias. We offer twohypotheses of reverse causation based on violations of the Modigliani-Millerperfect-markets assumption. It isassumed that various market imperfections (e.g., taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information) result in abalance between those favoring more versus less equity capital, and that differences in profit efficiency move theoptimal equity capital ratio marginally up or down.Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, more efficient firms choose lower equity ratios than other firms, allelse equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. Under thishypothesis, higher profit efficiency generates a higher expected return for a given capital structure, and thehigher efficiency substitutes to some degree for equity capital in protecting the firm against future crises. This isa joint hypothesis that i) profit efficiency is strongly positively associated with expected returns, and ii) thehigher expected returns from high efficiency are substituted for equity capital to manage risks.The evidence is consistent with the first part of the hypothesis, i.e., that profit efficiency is stronglypositively associated with expected returns in banking. Profit efficiency has been found to be significantlypositively correlated with returns on equity and returns on assets (e.g., Berger and Mester 1997) and otherevidence suggests that profit efficiency is relatively stable over time (e.g., DeYoung 1997), so that a finding ofhigh current profit efficiency tends to yield high future expected returns.The second part of the hypothesis –that higher expected returns for more efficient banks are substitutedfor equity capital –follows from a standard Altman z-score analysis of firm insolvency (Altman 1968). Highexpected returns and high equity capital ratio can each serve as a buffer against portfolio risks to reduce theprobabilities of incurring the costs of financialdistressbankruptcy, so firms with high expected returns owing tohigh profit efficiency can hold lower equity ratios. The z-score is the number of standard deviations below theexpected return that the actual return can go before equity is depleted and the firm is insolvent, zi = (μi +ECAPi)/σi, where μi and σi are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the rate of return on assets, andratios for those that were fully owned by a single owner-manager. This may be an improvement in the analysis of agencycosts for small firms, but it does not address our main issues of controlling for differences in exogenous conditions and insetting up individualized firm benchmarks for performance.ECAPi is the ratio of equity to assets. Based on the first part of the efficiency-risk hypothesis, firms with higherefficiency will have higher μi. Based on the second part of the hypothesis, a higher μi allows the firm to have alower ECAPi for a ven z-score, so that more efficient firms may choose lower equity capital ratios.文章出处：Raposo Clara C. Capital Structure and Firm Performance .Journal ofFinance.Blackwell publishing.2005, (6): 2701-2727.资本结构与企业绩效1.概述代理费用不管在金融还是在非金融行业，都是非常重要的企业治理问题。

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Effects Of Working Capital Management On Sme ProfitabilityThe corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on the study of long-term financial decisions. Researchers have particularly offered studies analyzing investments, capital structure, dividends or company valuation, among other topics. But the investment that firms make in short-term assets, and the resources used with maturities of under one year, represent the main share of items on a firm’s balance sheet. In fact, in our sample the current assets of small and medium-sized Spanish firms represent 69.48 percent of their assets, and at the same time their current liabilities represent more than 52.82 percent of their liabilities.Working capital management is important because of its effects on the firm’s profitability and risk, and consequently its value (Smith, 1980). On the one hand, maintaining high inventory levels reduces the cost of possible interruptions in the production process, or of loss of business due to the scarcity of products, reducessupply costs, and protects against price fluctuations, among other advantages (Blinder and Manccini, 1991). On the other, granting trade credit favors the firm’s sales in various ways. Trade credit can act as an effective price cut (Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner,1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), incentivizes customers to acquire merchandise at times of low demand (Emery, 1987), allows customers to check that the merchandise they receive is as agreed (quantity and quality) and to ensure that the services contracted are carried out (Smith, 1987), and helps firms to strengthen long-term relationships with their customers (Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). However, firms that invest heavily in inventory and trade credit can suffer reduced profitability. Thus,the greater the investment in current assets, the lower the risk, but also the lower the profitability obtained.On the other hand, trade credit is a spontaneous source of financing that reduces the amount required to finance the sums tied up in the inventory and customer accounts. But we should bear in mind that financing from suppliers can have a very high implicit cost if early payment discounts are available. In fact the opportunity cost may exceed 20 percent, depending on the discount percentage and the discount period granted (Wilner,2000; Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). In this respect, previous studies have analyzed the high cost of trade credit, and find that firms finance themselves with seller credit when they do not have other more economic sources of financing available (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1997).Decisions about how much to invest in the customer and inventory accounts, and how much credit to accept from suppliers, are reflected in the firm’s cash conve rsion cycle, which represents the average number of days between the date when the firm must start paying its suppliers and the date when it begins to collect payments from its customers. Some previous studies have used this measure to analyze whether shortening the cash conversion cycle has positive or negative effects on the firm’s profitability.Specifically, Shin and Soenen (1998) analyze the relation between the cash conversion cycle and profitability for a sample of firms listed on the US stock exchange during the period 1974-1994. Their results show that reducing the cash conversion cycle to a reasonable extent increases firms’ profitability. More recently,Deloof (2003) analyzes a sample of large Belgian firms during the period 1992-1996. His results confirm that Belgian firms can improve their profitability by reducing the number of days accounts receivable are outstanding and reducing inventories. Moreover, he finds that less profitable firms wait longer to pay their bills.These previous studies have focused their analysis on larger firms. However, the management of current assets and liabilities is particularly important in the case of small and medium-sized companies. Most of these companies’ assets are in the form of current assets. Also, current liabilities are one of their main sources of external finance in view of their difficulties in obtaining funding in the long-term capital markets(Petersen and Rajan, 1997) and the financing constraints that they face (Whited, 1992; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). In this respect, Elliehausen and Woken (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Danielson and Scott (2000) show that small and medium-sized US firms use vendor financing when they have run out of debt. Thus, efficient working capital management is particularly important for smaller companies (Peel and Wilson,1996).In this context, the objective of the current work is to provide empirical evidence about the effects of working capital management on profitability for a panel made up of 8,872 SMEs during the period 1996-2002. This work contributes to the literature in two ways. First, no previous such evidence exists for the case of SMEs. We use a sample of Spanish SMEs that operate within the so-called continental model, which is characterized by its less developed capital markets (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997), and by the fact that most resources are channeled through financial intermediaries (Pampillón, 2000). All this suggests that Spanish SMEs have fewer alternative sources of external finance available, which makes them more dependent on short-term finance in general, and on trade credit in particular. As Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) suggest, firms operating in countries with more developed banking systems grant more trade credit to their customers, and at the same time they receive more finance from their own suppliers. The second contribution is that, unlike the previous studies by Shin and Soenen (1998) and Deloof (2003), in the current work we have conducted tests robust to the possible presence ofendogeneity problems. The aim is to ensure that the relationships found in the analysis carried out are due to the effects of the cash conversion cycle on corporate profitability and not vice versa.Our findings suggest that managers can create value by reducing their firm’s number of days accounts receivable and inventories. Similarly, shortening the cash conversion cycle also improves the firm’s profitability.We obtained the data used in this study from the AMADEUS database. This database was developed by Bureau van Dijk, and contains financial and economic data on European companies.The sample comprises small and medium-sized firms from Spain. The selection of SMEs was carried out according to the requirements established by the European Commission’s recommendation 96/280/CE of 3 April, 1996, on the definition of small and medium-sized firms. Specifically, we selected those firms meeting the following criteria for at least three years: a) have fewer than 250 employees; b) turn over less than €40 million; and c) possess less than €27 million of total assets.In addition to the application of those selection criteria, we applied a series of filters. Thus, we eliminated the observations of firms with anomalies in their accounts, such as negative values in their assets, current assets, fixed assets, liabilities, current liabilities, capital, depreciation, or interest paid. We removed observations of entry items from the balance sheet and profit and loss account exhibiting signs that were contrary to reasonable expectations. Finally, we eliminated 1 percent of the extreme values presented by several variables. As a result of applying these filters, we ended up with a sample of 38,464 observations.In order to introduce the effect of the economic cycle on the levels invested in working capital, we obtained information about the annual GDP growth in Spain from Eurostat.In order to analyze the effects of working capital management on the firm’s profitability, we used the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. We defined this variable as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to assets.With regards to the independent variables, we measured working capitalmanagement by using the number of days accounts receivable, number of days of inventory and number of days accounts payable. In this respect, number of days accounts receivable (AR) is calculated as 365 ×[accounts receivable/sales]. This variable represents the average number of days that the firm takes to collect payments from its customers. The higher the value, the higher its investment in accounts receivable.We calculated the number of days of inventory (INV) as 365 ×[inventories/purchases]. This variable reflects the average number of days of stock held by the firm. Longer storage times represent a greater investment in inventory for a particular level of operations.The number of days accounts payable (AP) reflects the average time it takes firms to pay their suppliers. We calculated this as 365 × [accounts payable/purchases]. The higher the value, the longer firms take to settle their payment commitments to their suppliers.Considering these three periods jointly, we estimated the cash conversion cycle(CCC). This variable is calculated as the number of days accounts receivable plus thenumber of days of inventory minus the number of days accounts payable. The longerthe cash conversion cycle, the greater the net investment in current assets, and hence the greater the need for financing of current assets.Together with these variables, we introduced as control variables the size of the firm, the growth in its sales, and its leverage. We measured the size (SIZE) as the logarithm of assets, the sales growth (SGROW) as (Sales1 –Sales0)/Sales0, the leverage(DEBT) as the ratio of debt to liabilities. Dellof (2003) in his study of large Belgian firms also considered the ratio of fixed financial assets to total assets as a control variable. For some firms in his study such assets are a significant part of total assets.However our study focuses on SMEs whose fixed financial assets are less important. In fact, companies in our sample invest little in fixed financial assets (a mean of 3.92 percent, but a median of 0.05 percent). Nevertheless, the results remain unaltered whenwe include this variable.Furthermore, and since good economic conditions tend to be reflected in a firm’sprofitability, we controlled for the evolution of the economic cycle using the variable GDPGR, which measures the annual GDP growth.Current assets and liabilities have a series of distinct characteristics according to the sector of activity in which the firm operates. Thus, Table I reports the return on assets and number of days accounts receivable, days of inventory, and days accounts payable by sector of activity. The mining industry and services sector are the two sectors with the highest return on their assets, with a value of 10 percent. Firms that are dedicated to agriculture, trade (wholesale or retail), transport and public services, are some way behind at 7 percent.With regard to the average periods by sector, we find, as we would expect, that the firms dedicated to the retail trade, with an average period of 38 days, take least time to collect payments from their customers. Construction sector firms grant their customers the longest period in which to pay –more than 145 days. Next, we find mining sector firms, with a number of days accounts receivable of 116 days. We also find that inventory is stored longest in agriculture, while stocks are stored least in the transport and public services sector. In relation to the number of days accounts payable, retailers (56 days) followed by wholesalers (77 days) pay their suppliers earliest. Firms are much slower in the construction and mining sectors, taking more than 140 days on average to pay their suppliers. However, as we have mentioned, these firms also grant their own customers the most time to pay them. Considering all the average periods together, we note that the cash conversion cycle is negative in only one sector – that of transport and public services. This is explained by the short storage times habitual in this sector. In this respect, agricultural and manufacturing firms take the longest time to generate cash (95 and 96 days, respectively), and hence need the most resources to finance their operational funding requirements.Table II offers descriptive statistics about the variables used for the sample as a whole. These are generally small firms, with mean assets of more than €6 milli on; their return on assets is around 8 percent; their number of days accounts receivable is around 96 days; and their number of days accounts payable is very similar: around 97 days. Together with this, the sample firms have seen their sales grow by almost 13percent annually on average, and 24.74 percent of their liabilities is taken up by debt. In the period analyzed (1996-2002) the GDP has grown at an average rate of 3.66 percent in Spain.Source: Pedro Juan García-Teruel and Pedro Martínez-Solano ,2006.“Effects of Working Capital Management on SME Profitability” .International Journal of Managerial Finance ,vol. 3, issue 2, April,pages 164-167.译文：营运资金管理对中小企业的盈利能力的影响公司理财著作历来把注意力集中在了长期财务决策研究，研究者详细的提供了投资决策分析、资本结构、股利分配或公司估值等主题的研究，但是企业投资形成的短期资产和以一年内到期方式使用的资源，表现为公司资产负债表的有关下昂目的主要部分。

外文翻译--公司的股权结构、公司治理和资本结构决策——来自加纳的实证研究本科毕业论文(设计)文翻译外原文:Ownership structure, corporate governance and capital structuredecisions of firmsEmpirical evidence from Ghana1. IntroductionThe relevance of capital structure to firm value remains fairly established following the seminal article by Modigliani and Miller, 1958 (Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; McCabe, 1979; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Several theories including the pecking order theory, the free cash flow, the capital signaling, the trade-off, and market timing theories (windows of opportunities) and the fact that capital structure is voluntarily chosen by managers (Zwiebel, 1996) have been propounded to explain the choice of capital structure. Also, considerable research attention has been paid to the impact of agency costs on corporate financing since Jensen and Meckling (1976) published their paper.Crutchley and Hansen (1989) maintain that managers’ choice of stock ownershipin the firm, the firm’s mixture of outside debt and equity financing, and dividends aremeant to reduce the costs of agency conflicts. Bajaj et al. (1998) suggest that ownership is positively correlated with various measures of the debt-equity ratio (leverage), implying that ownership structure has a correlation with financial structure of firms (Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Mehran, 1992; Brailsford et al., 2002). Friend and Lang (1988) find that debt ratio is negatively related to managerial ownership. Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that the relationship between managerial share ownership and leverage may in fact be inverted u-shaped.In addition, Berglo?f (1990) suggests that in countries in which firms are typically closely held, debt finance plays a more prominent role than in countries characterized by more dispersed ownership structures suggesting the impact of insider system of corporate governance on financing structure of firms. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) report empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the identity of large owners –family, bank, and institutional investors – has important implications for financialstructure. In particular, they show that a more risk averse or a more patient entrepreneur issues less debt and more equity. Given that insider system of corporate governance is practiced among listed companies in Ghana (Bokpin, 2008), this study seeks to document the impact of ownership structure on corporate financing, a mark departure from Abor (2007).Claessens et al. (2002) maintain that better corporate governance frameworks benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance and more favourable treatment of all stakeholders. Corporate governance affects the development andfunctioning of capital markets and exerts a strong influence on resource allocation. Corporate governance correlates with the financing decisions and the capital structure of firms (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Litov, 2005; Abor, 2007). However, management incentives that include stock options introduces issues for the alignment of managerial and shareholder interests. The question is which way does managerial ownership affect capital structure decisions of firms? How does the form of governance affect the choice of financing? The empirical evidence observed in the literature is inconclusive with much focus on developed capital markets.Unlike Abor (2007), this present study considers a much broader corporate governance index of the impact of ownership structure, managerial share ownership and other corporate governance variables on capital structure decisions of firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). Earlier studies on the GSE have failed to consider the impact of these factors on corporate financing decisions of firms (Aboagye, 1996; Boateng, 2004; Abor and Biekpe, 2005; Abor, 2007) implying that, these studies invariably ignores a gamut of other relevant variables that are central to understandingthe relationship among ownership structure, corporate governance,and firms’financing decisions from a developing country perspective Aside, the study uses more recent data from 2002 to 2007 whilst employing a panel data analysis. The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 considers the literature review; Section 3 discusses data used in the study and also details the model specifications used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 contains the discussion of the results and Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.2. Literature review2.1 Ownership structure and capital structureThe relationship between ownership and capital structures has attracted a considerable research attention over the last couple of decades. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined ownership structure in terms of capital contributions. Thus, the authors saw ownership structure to comprise of inside equity (managers), outside equity and debt, thus proposing an extension of the form of ownership structure beyond the debt-holder and equity-holder view. Zheka (2005) unlike the above authors constructs ownership structure using variables including proportion of foreign share ownership, managerial ownership percentage, largest institutional shareholder ownership, largest individual ownership, and government share ownership. Bajaj et al. (1998) suggest that ownership is positively correlated with various measures of the debt-equity ratio (leverage), implying that ownership structure has a correlation with financial structure of firms.Friend and Lang (1988) find that debt ratio is negatively related to managerial ownership. Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that the relationship between managerial share ownership and leverage may in fact be inverted u-shaped. Thus, debt first increases with an increase in managerial share ownership; but beyond a critical level of managerial share ownership debt may fall because there could be only a few agency related benefits by increasing debt further as the interests of managers and owners get very strongly aligned. Pindado and de la Torre (2005) conclude that insider ownership does not affect debt when the interest of managers and owners are aligned. Jensen and Meckling (1976), in relating capital structure to the level ofcompensation for CEOs came out with the findings that there is a positive correlation between the two and this was supported by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Berger et al. (1997) who assert the claim that the correlation between CEO compensation and capital structure is a positive one. However, Friend and Lang (1988), Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) and Wen et al. (2002) found a negative correlation between CEO compensation and the financial leverage of firms.Morck et al. (1988) argue that family ownership may give rise to greater leverage than in the case of disperse ownership, because of the non-dilution of entrenchment effects. Mishra and McConaughy (1999) document empirical evidence that funding family-controlled firms use less debt than non-funding family controlled firms. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) report empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that theidentity of large owners – family, bank, and institutional investors –hasimportant implications for financial structure. In particular, they show that a more risk averse or a more patient entrepreneur issues less debt and more equity. Anderson and Reeb (2003) further argue that family ownership reduces the cost of debt financing.Berglo?f (1990) suggests that in countries in which firms aretypically closely held, debt finance plays a more prominent role than in countries characterized by more dispersed ownership structures. Bergeret al. (1997) found less leverage in firms with no major stakeholder. Lefort and Walker (2000) conclude that groups are effective in obtaining external finance and that there are no significant differences in the capital structure of groups of different sizes. Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that firms with external block holders have low-debt ratios consistent with Friend and Lang (1988), who earlier on had indicatedthat firms with large non-managerial investors have significantly higher debt ratios than those without non-managerial investors. Cheng et al. (2005) also indicates that the leverage increases as ownership concentration increases following rights issuance. Driffield et al. (2005) argue that, higher ownership concentration is associated with higher leverage irrespective of whether a firm is family owned or not. Pindado and de la Torre (2005) suggest that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and debt thus, all things being equal, ownership concentration encourages debt financing. However,they find the positive effect of ownership concentration on debt tobe smaller in cases of high free cash flow. They also find that ownership concentration does not moderate the relationship betweeninsider ownership and debt; in contrast, the relationship between ownership concentration and debt is affected by insider ownership. Thus, the debt increments promoted by outside owners are larger when managers are entrenched.2.2 Corporate governance and capital structureCorporate governance correlates with the financing decisions and the capital structure of firms (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Litov, 2005). Jensen (1986) postulates that large debt is associated with larger boards. Though Berger et al. (1997) concludes on a later date thatlarger board size is associated with low leverage; several other studies conducted in recent times have refuted this conclusion. Wen et al. (2002) posit that larger board size is associated with higher debt, either to improve the firm’s value or because the larger si ze prevents the board from reaching a consensus on decisions, indicating a weak corporate governance system. Anderson et al. (2004) further indicate that larger board size results in lower cost of debt, which serves as a motivationfor using more debt, and this has been confirmed by Abor (2007) who concludes that capital structure positively correlates with board size, among Ghanaian listed firms.In relation to the presence of external directors on the board, Wenet al. (2002) conclude that the presence of external directors on theboard leads to lower leverage, used by the firm, due to their superior control. However, Abor (2007) concludes that capital structurepositively correlates with Board composition among Ghanaian listed firms. And this is consistent with Jensen (1986) and Berger et al. (1997) who had earlier on concluded that firms with higher percentage of external directors utilize more debt as compared to equity.Berger et al. (1997) found less leverage in firms run by CEOs with long tenure and this was confirmed by Wen et al. (2002), who concludethat the tenure of CEO is negatively related to leverage, to reduce the pressures associate with leverage. Kayhan (2003) finds that entrenched managers achieve lower leverage through retaining moreprofits and issuing equity more opportunistically. Further, Litov (2005) supports this claim that entrenched managers adopt lower levelsof debt. Abor (2007) also asserts that entrenched CEOs employ lower debt in order to reduce the performance pressures associated with high-debt capital. However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) refuted this fact by showing in their study that entrenched managers “enjoy the quiet life” by engaging in risk-reducing projects, indicating a positiverelationship between managerial entrenchment and leverage.Fosberg (2004) relates that firms with a two-tier leadershipstructure have high-debt/equity ratios. This was supported by Abor (2007), who concludes that capital structure positively correlates with CEO duality, which shows that firms on the GSE use more debt as the CEO duality increases.3. Research methodologyIn order to gain the maximum possible observations, pooled panel crossed-section regression data are used. Panel data analysis involves analysis with a spatial and temporal dimension and facilitates identification of effects that are simply not detectable in pure cross-section or pure time series studies. Thus, degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced and the efficiency of economic estimates is improved. The study is therefore based on the official data published by the cross-sectional firms for the various years covering a period from 2002 to 2007.Analytical frameworkThe general form of the panel regression model is stated as:'ititity=α+Xβ+μ i=1,…,N;t=1,…,Twhere subscript i and t represent the firm and time, respectively. In this case, i represents the cross-section dimension and t represents the time-series component. Y is the dependable variable which is a measure of capital structure. αis a scalar, βisitK *1 and Xit is the observation on K explanatory variables. We assume that theμfollow a one-way error component model:itiitμ=μ+νiwhereμ is time-invariant and accounts for any unobservableitindividual-specific effect that is not included in the regression model. The termνrepresents the remaining disturbance, and varies with the individual firms and time.Source: Godfred A. Bokpin and Anastacia C. Arko, 2009. “Ownership structure,corporate governance and capital structure decisions of firms Empirical evidence from Ghana” . Studies in Economics and Finance . Vol.26 No. 4.pp. 246-256.译文:公司的股权结构、公司治理和资本结构决策——来自加纳的实证研究一、引言继利亚和米勒1958年开创性的文章(格拉博夫斯基和米勒，1972年; 迈克，1979年;安德森和力波，2003年)之后，公司价值与资本结构相关性依然得到较大的认可。

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：The Determinants of Capital Structure ChoiceI. Determinants of Capital StructureIn this section, we present a brief discussion of the attributes that different theories of capital structure suggest may affect the firm's debt-equity choice. These attributes are denoted asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry classification, size, earnings volatility, and profitability. The attributes, their relation to the optimal capital structure choice, and their observable indicators are discussed below.A. Collateral Value of AssetsMost capital structure theories argue that the type of assets owned by a firm in some way affects its capital structure choice. Scott suggests that, by selling secured debt, firms increase the value of their equity by expropriating wealth from their existing unsecured creditors.Arguments put forth by Myers and Majluf also suggest that firms may find it advantageous to sell secured debt. Their model demonstrates that there may be costs associated with issuing securities about which the firm's managers have better information than outside shareholders. Issuing debt secured by property with known values avoids these costs. For this reason, firms with assets that can be used as collateral may be expected to issue more debt to take advantage of this opportunity.Work by Galai and Masulis , Jensen and Meckling , and Myers suggests that stockholders of leveraged firms have an incentive to invest yet to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders. This incentive may also induce a positive relation between debt ratios and the capacity of firms to collateralize their debt. If the debt can be collateralized, the borrower is restricted to use the funds for a specified project. Since no such guarantee can be used for projects that cannot be collateralized, creditors may require more favorable terms, which in turn may lead such firms to use equity rather than debt financing.The tendency of managers to consume more than the optimal level of perquisites mayproduce the opposite relation between collateralized capital and debt levels. Grossman and Hart suggest that higher debt levels diminish this tendency because of the increased threat of bankruptcy. Managers of highly levered firms will also be less able to consume excessive perquisites since bondholders (or bankers) are inclined to closely monitor such firms. The costs associated with this agency relation may be higher for firms with assets that are less collateralized since monitoring the capital outlays of such firms is probably more difficult. For this reason, firms with less collateralized assets may choose higher debt levels to limit their managers' consumption of perquisites.The estimated model incorporates two indicators for the collateral value attribute. They include the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INT/TA) and the ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets (IGP/TA). The first indicator is negatively related to the collateral value attribute, while the second is positively related to collateral value.B. Non-Debt Tax ShieldsDeAngelo and Masulis present a model of optimal capital structure that incorporates the impact of corporate taxes, personal taxes, and non-debt-related corporate tax shields. They argue that tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. As a result, firms with large non-debt tax shields relative to their expected cash flow include less debt in their capital structures.Indicators of non-debt tax shields include the ratios of investment tax credits over total assets (ITC/TA), depreciation over total assets (DITA), and a direct estimate of non-debt tax shields over total assets (NDT/TA). The latter measure is calculated from observed federal income tax payments (T), operating income (OI), interest payments (i), and the corporate tax rate during our sample period (48%), using the following equation:NDT = OI-i-T/0.48which follows from the equalityT= 0.48(0I- i-NDT)These indicators measure the current tax deductions associated with capital equipment and, hence, only partially capture the non-debt tax shield variable suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis. First, this attribute excludes tax deductions that are not associated with capital equipment, such as research and development and selling expenses. (These variables, used as indicators of anotherattribute, are discussed later.) More important, our non-debt tax shield attribute represents tax deductions rather than tax deductions net of true economic depreciation and expenses, which is the economic attribute suggested by theory. Unfortunately, this preferable attribute would be very difficult to measure.C. GrowthAs we mentioned previously, equity-controlled firms have a tendency to invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders. The cost associated with this agency relationship is likely to be higher for firms in growing industries, which have more flexibility in their choice of future investments. Expected future growth should thus be negatively related to long-term debt levels. Myers, however, noted that this agency problem is mitigated if the firm issues short-term rather than long-term debt. This suggests that short-term debt ratios might actually be positively related to growth rates if growing firms substitute short-term financing for long-term financing. Jensen and Meckling, Smith and Warner, and Green argued that the agency costs will be reduced if firms issue convertible debt. This suggests that convertible debt ratios may be positively related to growth opportunities.It should also be noted that growth opportunities are capital assets that add value to a firm but cannot be collateralized and do not generate current taxable income. For this reason, the arguments put forth in the previous subsections also suggest a negative relation between debt and growth opportunities.Indicators of growth include capital expenditures over total assets (CE/TA) and the growth of total assets measured by the percentage change in total assets (GTA). Since firms generally engage in research and development to generate future investments, research and development over sales (RD/S) also serves as an indicator of the growth attribute.D. UniquenessTitman presents a model in which a firm's liquidation decision is causally linked to its bankruptcy status. As a result, the costs that firms can potentially impose on their customers, suppliers, and workers by liquidating are relevant to their capital structure decisions. Customers, workers, and suppliers of firms that produce unique or specialized products probably suffer relatively high costs in the event that they liquidate. Their workers and suppliers probably have job specific skills and capital, and their customers may find itdifficult to find alternative servicing for their relatively unique products. For these reasons, uniqueness is expected to be negatively related to debt ratios.Indictors of uniqueness include expenditures on research and development over sales (RD/S), selling expenses over sales (SEIS), and quit rates (QR), the percentage of the industry's total work force that voluntarily left their jobs in the sample years. It is postulated that RD/S measures uniqueness because firms that sell products with close substitutes ar'e likely to do less research and development since their innovations can be more easily duplicated. In addition, successful research and development projects lead to new products that differ from those existing in the market. Firms with relatively unique products are expected to advertise more and, in general, spend more in promoting and selling their products. Hence, SE/S is expected to be positively related to uniqueness. However, it is expected that firms in industries with high quit rates are probably relatively less unique since firms that produce relatively unique products tend to employ workers with high levels of job-specific human capital who will thus find it costly to leave their jobs.It is apparent from two of the indicators of uniqueness, RD/S and SEIS, that this attribute may also be related to non-debt tax shields and collateral value. Research and development and some selling expenses (such as advertising) can be considered capital goods that are immediately expensed and cannot be used as collateral. Given that our estimation technique can only imperfectly control for these other attributes, the uniqueness attribute may be negatively related to the observed debt ratio because of its positive correlation with non-debt tax shields and its negative correlation with collateral value.E. Industry ClassificationTitman suggests that firms that make products requiring the availability of specialized servicing and spare parts will find liquidation especially costly. This indicates that firms manufacturing machines and equipment should be financed with relatively less debt. To measure this, we include a dummy variable equal to one for firms with SIC codes between 3400 and 4000 (firms producing machines and equipment) and zero otherwise as a separate attribute affecting the debt ratios.F. SizeA number of authors have suggested that leverage ratios may be related to firm size.Warner and Ang, Chua, and McConnell provide evidence that suggests that direct bankruptcy costs appear to constitute a larger proportion of a firm's value as that value decreases. It is also the case that relatively large firms tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. These arguments suggest that large firms should be more highly leveraged.The cost of issuing debt and equity securities is also related to firm size. In particular, small firms pay much more than large firms to issue new equity (see Smith) and also somewhat more to issue long-term debt. This suggests that small firms may be more leveraged than large firms and may prefer to borrow short term (through bank loans) rather than issue long-term debt because of the lower fixed costs associated with this alternative.We use the natural logarithm of sales (LnS) and quit rates (QR) as indicators of size. The logarithmic transformation of sales reflects our view that a size effect, if it exists, affects mainly the very small firms. The inclusion of quit rates, as an indicator of size, reflects the phenomenon that large firms, which often offer wider career opportunities to their employees, have lower quit rates.G. V olatilityMany authors have also suggested that a firm's optimal debt level is a decreasing function of the volatility of earnings. We were only able to include one indicator of volatility that cannot be directly affected by the firm's debt level. It is the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating income (SIGOI). Since it is the only indicator of volatility, we must assume that it measures this attribute without error.H. ProfitabilityMyers cites evidence from Donaldson and Brealey and Myers that suggests that firms prefer raising capital, first from retained earnings, second from debt, and third from issuing new equity. He suggests that this behavior may be due to the costs of issuing new equity. These can be the costs discussed in Myers and Majluf that arise because of asymmetric information, or they can be transaction costs. In either case, the past profitability of a firm, and hence the amount of earnings available to be retained, should be an important determinant of its current capital structure. We use the ratios of operating income over sales (OI/S) and operating income over total assets (OI/TA) as indicators of profitability.II. Measures of Capital StructureSix measures of financial leverage are used in this study. They are long-term, short-term, and convertible debt divided by market and by book values of equity.8 Although these variables could have been combined to extract a common "debt ratio" attribute, which could in turn be regressed against the independent attributes, there is good reason for not doing this. Some of the theories of capital structure have different implications for the different types of debt, and, for the reasons discussed below, the predicted coefficients in the structural model may differ according to whether debt ratios are measured in terms of book or market values. Moreover, measurement errors in the dependent variables are subsumed in the disturbance term and do not bias the regression coefficients.Data limitations force us to measure debt in terms of book values rather than market values. It would, perhaps, have been better if market value data were available for debt. However, Bowman demonstrated that the cross-sectional correlation between the book value and market value of debt is very large, so the misspecification due to using book value measures is probably fairly small. Furthermore, we have no reason to suspect that the cross-sectional differences between market values and book values of debt should be correlated with any of the determinants of capital structure suggested by theory, so no obvious bias will result because of this misspecification.Source: Sheridan Titman; Roberto Wessels,1988.“The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice”. The Journal of Finance. Vol.43, No.1, march.pp.1-19.译文：资本结构的影响因素I、资本结构的决定因素在本节中，我们提出了一个简短讨论资本结构的不同理论认为可能会影响公司的债务权益选择的属性。