“Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis
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小学上册英语第5单元综合卷(有答案)英语试题一、综合题(本题有100小题,每小题1分,共100分.每小题不选、错误,均不给分)1.Which planet is known for its great red spot?A. EarthB. JupiterC. MarsD. Saturn答案:B2.My friend is __________ (不断进步).3.My sister is a good ________.4.The rabbit has long ______ (耳朵) for good hearing.5.The sandwiches are ___ (fresh/old).6.What do you call a fear of spiders?A. ArachnophobiaB. ClaustrophobiaC. AcrophobiaD. Agoraphobia 答案: A7.The stars are ___ (fading/shining) brightly.ets are made of ice, dust, and ______.9.I see frost on the ______ (草地) in the morning.10.The ______ shares tips on healthy living.11.What is the capital of the United States?A. New YorkB. Los AngelesC. Washington,D.C. D. Chicago答案:C12.Rain helps to keep the ______ (土地) moist.13.The scientist studies _____ (生物) in the lab.14.What is the name of the famous animal in the story of "The Tortoise and the Hare"?A. RabbitB. TortoiseC. FoxD. Lion答案:A15.The __________ (印刷术) revolutionized communication.16.The capital of Finland is __________.17.My friend is very __________ (创造性的) and always has new ideas.18.My favorite dish is ______ (米饭).19.The invention of the telephone transformed ________ (沟通).20.The law of conservation of mass states that mass cannot be created or _____.21.My _____ (老师) shows us how to care for plants in class. 我的老师在课堂上教我们如何照顾植物。
戒赌的危害英文作文英文:Gambling addiction is a serious problem that affects many individuals and families. The dangers of gambling addiction are numerous and can have a devastating impact on one's life. One of the most significant dangers of gambling addiction is financial ruin. When a person becomes addicted to gambling, they often spend more money than they can afford, leading to debt and financial instability. This can lead to a downward spiral of financial problems, which can be difficult to recover from.Another danger of gambling addiction is the impact it can have on relationships. When a person becomes addictedto gambling, they often prioritize their gambling overtheir relationships with loved ones. This can lead to a breakdown in communication and trust, which can bedifficult to repair. In severe cases, gambling addictioncan even lead to divorce or the loss of custody of children.Gambling addiction can also have a negative impact on one's mental health. The stress and anxiety that come with gambling addiction can lead to depression and other mental health issues. Additionally, the shame and guilt that many gamblers feel can further exacerbate these issues.Overall, the dangers of gambling addiction are significant and can have a lasting impact on one's life. It is important for individuals who struggle with gambling addiction to seek help and support in order to overcomethis problem.中文:赌博成瘾是一个严重的问题,影响了许多个人和家庭。
戒赌的危害英文作文英文:Gambling addiction is a serious problem that can have devastating consequences. The harm caused by gambling addiction can be physical, mental, and emotional. One of the most significant dangers of gambling addiction is the financial damage it can cause. People who are addicted to gambling often spend money they don't have, which can lead to debt, bankruptcy, and even homelessness.In addition to financial harm, gambling addiction can also cause mental and emotional problems. People who are addicted to gambling may become isolated from their friends and family, lose their jobs, and suffer from depression and anxiety. They may also experience physical health problems, such as insomnia, headaches, and digestive issues.The good news is that there are ways to overcome gambling addiction. One of the most effective ways is toseek professional help. There are many organizations and support groups that specialize in helping people overcome gambling addiction. These groups provide a safe and supportive environment where people can share their experiences and receive guidance and advice.Another way to overcome gambling addiction is to develop healthy habits and hobbies. This can include things like exercise, meditation, reading, or spending time with friends and family. By replacing the negative habit of gambling with positive habits, people can begin to heal and recover from their addiction.In conclusion, gambling addiction can have devastating consequences, but there are ways to overcome it. Seeking professional help and developing healthy habits and hobbies are two effective ways to recover from gambling addiction.中文:赌博成瘾是一个严重的问题,可能会带来毁灭性的后果。
理财英文演讲稿When it comes to the topic of financial management, there are a few key points that I would like to address in this speech. First and foremost, it is important to understand the significance of financial management in our daily lives. Whether we are managing our personal finances or overseeing the financial health of a business, the principles of financial management are essential for achieving long-term success and stability.One of the most important aspects of financial management is budgeting. A budget serves as a roadmap for our financial decisions, helping us to allocate resources effectively and prioritize our spending. By creating and sticking to a budget, we can avoid overspending and ensure that we are saving and investing for the future.In addition to budgeting, it is crucial to understand the power of compound interest. Albert Einstein once referred to compound interest as the "eighth wonder of the world," emphasizing its ability to grow wealth exponentially over time. By investing early and allowing our money to compound, we can harness the power of time and maximize our long-term financial growth.Furthermore, risk management is another key component of financial management. Whether it is through insurance, diversification of investments, or careful assessment of financial decisions, managing risk is essential for protecting our assets and ensuring financial stability.Moreover, understanding the concept of financial literacy is crucial for effective financial management. Financial literacy encompasses the knowledge and skills required to make informed and effective financial decisions. By educating ourselves about topics such as budgeting, investing, and debt management, we can empower ourselves to take control of our financial futures.In conclusion, financial management is a critical aspect of our lives that requires careful attention and consideration. By embracing the principles of budgeting, compound interest, risk management, and financial literacy, we can set ourselves on a path towardslong-term financial success. Whether we are delivering this speech to a group of individuals or a business audience, it is important to emphasize the significance of these principles and encourage others to take charge of their financial well-being. Thank you.。
高二英语金融理财单选题40题1.Which one is not a financial instrument?A.stockB.bondC.bookD.option答案:C。
book 不是金融工具,stock 是股票,bond 是债券,option 是期权,都属于金融工具。
2.If you want to invest in a company, you can buy its _____.A.sharesB.booksC.pensD.papers答案:A。
如果你想投资一家公司,可以买它的股票(shares)。
books 是书,pens 是笔,papers 是纸,都与投资公司无关。
3.A bond is a kind of _____.A.debt instrumentB.equity instrumentC.stationeryD.food答案:A。
债券是一种债务工具((debt instrument)。
equity instrument 是权益工具,stationery 是文具,food 是食物。
4.Which of the following is not a characteristic of stocks?A.High riskB.Low returnC.LiquidityD.Part ownership of a company答案:B。
股票的特点通常有高风险((High risk)、流动性((Liquidity)以及代表对公司的部分所有权((Part ownership of a company),而不是低回报(Low return)。
5.An option gives the holder the right to _____.A.buy or sell an assetB.read a bookC.eat an appleD.write a letter答案:A。
期权给予持有者买入或卖出一项资产的权利。
Financial stability in a crisis: What is the role of the central bank?Vittorio Corbo1Financial crises are costly and complex. Authorities have limited tools to deal with a crisis once it has broken out: there is little they can do other than attempt to limit the damage to the rest of the economy. This makes prevention as important as treatment. Central banks have traditionally focused on treating financial crises, but they also have an important role in helping to prevent them.Preliminary: treatment and preventionThe monetary policy rate is a blunt instrument that is not well-suited to resolve distortions in the financial system. But there is a growing consensus around the design and use of macroprudential tools, which are more flexible and can be targeted at the particular spots of the financial system that are creating distortions. Specifically, central banks could use cycle-adjusted capital requirement ratios, loan loss provision ratios and lending-to-asset-value ratios to discourage speculation in markets where a potential bubble is forming.Central banks could also reduce systemic risk through improvements in the payment and security settlements systems and providing incentives for certain derivatives transactions to be settled in central counterparty institutions.Another way in which central banks can help prevent financial crises is by designing procedures to deal with the failure of systemically important institutions. The ad hoc manner in which this issue was dealt with during this crisis exacerbated uncertainty and damage to the system. Ideally, central banks could establish resolution procedures analogous to those of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation so that systemically important institutions cease being too big to fail.Central banks could also reduce the probability of a crisis by designing intervention procedures to avoid large misalignments in the real exchange rate whose reversal could be too costly and affect the stability of the financial system.Finally, central banks should work with financial institutions so that they issue contingent capital certificates. These are debt securities that would be converted into capital once a threshold is reached and so provide automatic recapitalization in the event of a crisis.What are the financial stability objectives in a crisis?A central bank’s main objective during a financial crisis is to contain the damage and limit the impact on the real economy. The first imperative is to restore calm in financial markets. Market panics create the equivalent of a financial heart attack by cutting off the flow of credit even to healthy institutions. This amplifies the damage in the financial system and is one of the main transmission channels through which a panic affects the real economy. Central 1Centro de Estudios Públicos, Chile. The author was Governor of the Central Bank of Chile from 2003 to 2007.banks must therefore reduce uncertainty, ensure that markets for short-term credit function properly, and prevent the collapse of financial institutions due to liquidity restrictions. As long as there are no resolution mechanisms to ensure that the financial system is not damaged by the failure of a systemically important institution, central banks should also prevent the collapse of these even if they are insolvent.What are the appropriate central bank tools for financial stability in a crisis?The first measure that central banks use to achieve these objectives is to offer extensive liquidity support against good collateral at a penalty rate. This is part of a central bank’s traditional role as a lender of last resort, as prescribed by Bagehot (1873). However, the offer of this support has been limited to banks. When non-bank intermediaries are important, as is the case in the US financial system, central banks should also lend to these institutions under the same conditions.The second tool is the monetary policy rate. Authorities should reduce the policy rate aggressively in response to the projected decrease in aggregate demand so as to move the neutral level of the observed real policy rate closer to its new equilibrium value.If the second tool is exhausted (the policy rate is close to the minimum), central banks should also consider non-conventional measures as a third, complementary tool. One such measure is making an explicit commitment to keep the policy rate at a low level for an extended period of time, thus reducing uncertainty and potentially reducing interest rates at greater maturities. The effectiveness of this measure depends on a central bank’s credibility. If it is not enough, monetary authorities may also offer unlimited financing to the banking system (against appropriate collateral) at the policy rate at a longer maturity than is usual. Another non-conventional measure is direct intervention in financial markets: the outright purchase of financial instruments to affect the yield curve or stimulate a systemically important credit market.When necessary, central banks may use flexibility as an additional tool. They may relax their collateral requirements and lend against a wider variety of instruments. They may also arrange cross-currency swaps with foreign central banks to provide liquidity denominated in foreign currency.Finally, central banks may cooperate with fiscal authorities when a crisis calls for additional support in the form of government insurance or capital infusions.What are the implications for monetary policy?The monetary policy framework will most likely expand to consider asset prices – and perhaps the growth of monetary aggregates and credit, as well – in some way. The high cost of the current crisis has highlighted the importance of preventing crises, and this suggests that monetary policy will shift from a “clean up after the bubble” stance towards a more active “lean against the wind” stance to deter the formation of asset price bubbles.However, this will be anything but easy to implement in practice. There is a trade-off between responding aggressively and responding conservatively to potential bubbles. The former has a greater likelihood of preventing bubbles but may also cause instability and distortions in financial markets as a consequence of excessive intervention. It is also likely to garner considerable political ill will. Responding conservatively is less controversial, but it may allow a real bubble to grow and provoke a financial crisis. One should bear in mind that thejustification for a “clean up” policy stance was that bubbles are hard to identify. This observation has not become any less true; it is simply less important now that we have witnessed the potential consequences of not intervening.As the details of the issue are important, the discussion has focused on how to include asset prices in the monetary policy framework. One possibility is to include the prices of financial assets and housing as separate arguments in the Taylor rule. Another method that has been discussed is including these prices in a broadened measure that would replace the consumer price index as the main measure of relevant inflation.Given the complexity of financial markets, asset prices should be considered by central banks on a more discretionary and judgmental basis. Monetary policy is too blunt an instrument to control an asset price bubble. There may also be occasions in which the interests of price stability (reducing output gaps and leading inflation towards the target rate) and the interests of financial stability (controlling asset price bubbles and other distortions in the financial system) may be at odds – for instance, the case of a supply shock that creates a boom in asset prices but deflation in the prices of goods. Central banks cannot satisfy both objectives effectively with only one policy instrument. A second objective requires a second policy instrument. Furthermore, giving objectives to the central bank that go beyond price stability and financial stability most likely will end up reducing its effectiveness to achieve these two key objectives.The instrument best suited to maintain financial stability is macroprudential regulation. It may be a straightforward instrument to wield when the central bank is also the main regulatory and supervisory authority for the financial system. But for the many instances in which that is not the case, macroprudential policy will have to be jointly implemented by the central bank and several other agencies. It will be crucial, then, to have explicit collaboration between all the relevant regulatory authorities and the central bank. Special attention must be paid to the institutional framework to ensure that they will have the incentives to do so. Macroprudential regulation should have a dual purpose: reduce the incentives for financial institutions to increase leverage during a boom, and make the financial system more robust during a bust. It includes the use of procyclical capital requirements and loan provisions to moderate lending during a credit boom, placing larger requirements on systemic institutions to account for the incentive to become “too big to fail”, and increasing the risk weights attached to riskier lending during a boom.Making use of these tools to “lean against the wind” will increase pressure on central banks.A pertinent example is the US boom in mortgage lending and housing prices that came before the current crisis. Before it proved to be unsustainable, the boom seemed to benefit everyone: low-income families could obtain easy financing terms, the construction industry saw increased activity, the financial system earned large revenues, and political authorities enjoyed a higher popularity. Attempts to intervene would likely have been met with fierce resistance.Central banks’ institutional framework must be strengthened to ensure that they retain their autonomy. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the public’s desire for accountability. There is understandable opposition to the idea of a powerful institution – and the central bank surely is one – that is not accountable to political forces. Transparency and disclosure must be improved to satisfy the desire for accountability. If they are to retain their independence, central banks must earn the public’s good will.With regard to the existing policy framework, the current crisis has not cast doubt on the use of inflation targeting (IT). Countries have been affected regardless of whether they had implemented inflation targeting. The United States, which was the epicentre of the crisis, does not use inflation targeting.However, the crisis does leave some lessons for the implementation of IT policy. In the IT policy framework, the monetary authority should act when there is a steep decline in theoutput gap (q – q*) and a decrease in expected inflation that puts the target in jeopardy. Given monetary policy’s problematic ineffectiveness when the policy rate is near zero, this may require higher targets in the future.In addition, central banks will also have to work on several other initiatives. They must prepare emergency response guidelines to deal with a crisis, both to reduce moral hazard and to diminish the influence of special interest groups. They must broaden their portfolio of policy instruments and the policy channels through which they inject liquidity during a crisis. They must cooperate with other supervisory agencies to ensure that there is adequate leadership to deal with emergencies. They must cooperate with their counterparts in other countries. And they must avoid creating implicit insurance for systemically important institutions and strengthen prefinanced deposit insurance.。
财富战争第一季中英对照台词101你渴望接受调教对吗You're in need of correction,aren't you?是Yeah.可能会留下痕迹I might leave marks.这可不太好Not a great idea.这可不算拒绝That's not a no.烫得厉害吧That's got to burn.我来帮你缓解一下Let me fix it.纽约南区美国联邦检察官办公室迈克你要明白See,what you have to understand,Michael,这里他妈的是自由区is that this is a fucked up free zone.坐查克位子的人会成为市长Guys who sit in Chuck's chair become mayor.州长Governor.我们不能给别人落下口实We have to be beyond reproach.办公室里容不得一丝火星明白吗So no tinder at the goddamn office,okay?这些话像是我昨天才跟你说过It feels like yesterday I was telling you all this.是18个月前Mm,18months ago.还加了一些我自己的话Added some stuff of my own in there.对火星嘛我听到了Yeah.Tinder.I heard.来吧他在等着呢Come on.He's waiting.私下告诉你司法部长Well,off the record,the,uh,Attorney General's在任命联邦法官时always happy to take my recommendations总是愿意采纳我的建议on who to appoint to the federal bench.很好Very good.谢谢Thank you.长官Sir.好我们手头上有什么案子Okay,guys.What do we got on deck?两起公开调查案件的进度报告Progress report on two of the open investigations.证券交易委员会的阿里·斯派罗Ari Spyros from the S.E.C...等会儿回电话Call back.到了...is here.对不起长官他他不愿I'm sorry,sir.He...he wouldn't...没事金没事谢谢It's fine,Kim.It's okay.Thank you.斯派罗Well,Spyros.什么风把你吹来了What's the occasion?我们现在不是在面谈We're not interviewing right now.有意思这个Funny.Here.就是这东西让你尿裤子了This got your panties all sticky?湿透了Drenched.珀萨姆制药出现可疑交易模式Suspect trading pattern on Pepsum Pharmaceuticals.我一个手下幸运地One of my grunts riding the Midas发现了持续数日的买入高峰spotted a days-long buy spike.世纪资产老橡树投资贵格山脊我找斯派罗Yeah,get me Spyros.看看Take a look.你们可以尽可能地好好分析图表You can all study the charts,或者我也可以把调查结果告诉你们or I can give you the answers to the test.-请说-兰尼·博斯克老橡树投资-Please.-Lenny Bosco...Old Oaks Investments.皮特·德克尔贵格山脊金融Peter Decker...Quaker Ridge Financial.丹·马格里斯世纪资产Dan Margolis...Century Capital.这三家小公司These three small firms对股票买进卖出的时间点掌握得非常准确all knew exactly when to buy and when to sell the stock.他们有内部信息They had inside information.你们一定每天都能接收到这样的信息吧You must get pings like that every day.没错We do.所以呢找他们谈话向他们罚款啊So?Get them talking and fine them.事情没这么简单It's bigger than that.三家公司都与波比·阿克斯罗德有关All three firms have links to Bobby Axelrod.他娘的波比·阿克斯罗德出身平民Bobby fucking Axelrod.Man of the people.你只有在这儿才会露出这副表情You only have that exact look on your face when you're here.这儿的披萨真的好吃极了The pizza's just really fucking good.尝一口Take a bite.不错It's good.只是不错吗分明是美味Good?That is a thing of beauty.这就是我们从小住在这儿的原因That's why we lived in here when we were kids.各位我这儿早上一般不营业I don't usually open for breakfast,guys.还要一份吗You want another?要I do.全都要了We want'em all.全部All?我想加盟你I want to come in with you.合伙经营Partner up.小子你他妈跟他瞎说什么What the fuck did you tell him,kid?我不需要施舍I don't want no charity.我只是把实情告诉他了布鲁诺Look,all I told him was the truth,Bruno,okay?有人打电话跟我说That I got a call from a guy他要在这儿开一家沙拉三明治店who said he was coming in here with a falafel shop,问我能否承包室内改造and would I contract the rebuild.我问你这事的时候And when I asked you about it,你说你被新房东压榨you said that you were getting squeezed by a new landlord.我接到电话后就打了几通电话And when I got that call,I made a couple calls of my own.沙拉三明治店进驻商场Falafel shop goes in the mall.我们给你签了20年的租约We lock in you in on a20-year lease,超额部分我承担and I cover the overage.这这样好吗波比I-I-I don't know,Bobby.你还需要了解什么Come on.What is there to know?以前我每天放学后来你这儿You let me slide for weeks without paying一连几周不付钱你也由着我when I was coming in here every day after school.那是因为你是个好顾客That was just'cause you were a good customer.我想继续做个好顾客Which I want to keep being.一如当年Nothing changes.谢谢谢谢Thank you.Thank you.我想告诉你我早知道你长大后I'd love to tell you I knew you'd grow up会成为这样的人to become what you did,但老实说我真没想到but to be honest,I had no idea.我也一样That makes two of us.来Come here.谢谢Thanks.阿克斯资本康涅狄格州韦斯特波特市波比有个好机会我们准备下手Bobby,we are ready to roll on something sweet.我想你一定有兴趣参一脚I think you'll want to piggyback.什么情况What do you got?鲁姆瑟姆能源被电阳收购Lumetherm Power getting bought by Electric Sun.价格为41美元股票交易价格为35美元Price is$41.Stock's trading at$35.我们预期交易完成后的两周内We're looking at a17%bump股价将上涨17%in two weeks when the deal closes.按年计算就是442美元Annualized,that's$442...据我估算I'd love to size up.买两百万股就能成为主力资金Maybe you buy2million shares for the main fund. -听起来没什么问题-很好-Sounds about right.-Great.盛传斯科特·卡兹维兹是新任董事长Scott Kazawitz's name is being floated as the new chairman.卡兹维兹Kazawitz.这是新信息That's a new piece of information.你花钱聘我不就是为这个Well,that's what you pay me for.谁说这次交易快结束了Who said this deal is gonna close?本今天早上说的Ben said it would this morning.我吗大家都这么说Me?Everyone's saying it.这谁Who is this?我新请的分析师My new analyst.我们会雇用你你一定是个天才Well,if we hired you,you must be a genius.耶鲁毕业Yale?斯坦福然后去了沃顿商学院Stanford.Then Wharton.好斯坦福-沃顿高材生Okay,Stanford-Wharton.卡兹维兹控股电阳Electric Sun is controlled by Kazawitz.他也持有19.3%的鲁姆瑟姆股份He also owns19.3%of Lumetherm因为他和南方风能利害攸关才偷偷拿到的backdoored through his stake in Southern Wind.你知道上周四美林的那笔大宗交易吗You see that block trade last Thursday come out of Merrill?美国证券公司知道那是富塞视Yeah.That was Fortress想在并购前把资金短缺的部分套现cashing out their shorts before the merger.不是吗Wasn't it?交易是在12:52进行的那是午餐时间Trade was at12:52,when everyone was at lunch,也就意味着他们不想被他人知道which tells me they wanted it to be missed.可你们注意到了有点本事You guys caught it,which is something,I guess.但你们看待这个事情的方向不对But you're looking at it backward.电阳出的价是为了暂时支持鲁姆瑟姆Electric Sun's offer was just a ploy而耍的花招to temporarily prop up Lumetherm.典型的科兹维兹式背弃输家手段他很无情Typical Kazawitz play to bail on a loser.He's an animal.那笔大宗交易让科兹维兹摆脱南方风能The block trade was Kazawitz getting out of Southern Wind,摆脱鲁姆瑟姆getting out of Lumetherm.他操控全局现已置身事外He rode the story,now he's out,这意味着你得出来which means you need to be out.实际上要卖空In fact,short.股价将跌至32美元谈判破裂后还会变It'll slide to$32and change after word breaks.这一手真漂亮阿克斯That's a good catch,Axe.我的胆固醇够高了My cholesterol's high enough.别说这些腻歪我丹泽学聪明点Don't butter my ass,Danzig.Just get smarter.你对手头上的信息解读得不错Your read was good with the information you had.你还是新人会明白的You're new.You'll figure it out.否则就给我走人Or you'll be gone.老天爷啊Jesus Christ.对啊他念的是霍夫斯特拉大学Yeah.And he went to Hofstra.这事可闹大了是犯罪啊This is big.It's criminal.我也想抱波比·阿克斯罗德大腿了And I want to be a part of treeing Bobby Axelrod.我还想当宇航员呢Hey,I want to be an astronaut,可你得知道天气要是不好我也会晕机but,uh,you know,I get airsick in choppy weather.你的举证责任要轻一些Your burden of proof is lower.他们愿意和你谈They'll talk to you因为他们很乐意交完罚款然后接着干because they're happy to pay a fine and move on.我可是干活跑腿的一线员工I'm at the coalface.我真不想看到你在这儿溜达And I really don't appreciate you strolling in here教我如何调配我的资源and telling me how to deploy my resources因为你他妈的都没法自己立案because you can't build your own fucking case.我懂了你们是摇滚明星I get it.You guys are rock stars.对我们也懂了你也想加入Yeah,we get it.You want to be one,too.都无所谓了None of that matters.斯派罗你要是锁定了Uh,Spyros,if you've locked on to some trail of bread crumbs某些能指向波比·阿克斯罗德的线索that leads to Bobby Axelrod,那对大家而言可是共赢啊that could be a win for everyone.那么把你的东西留下我们会看的So,leave your stuff,we'll take a look,也会通知你案子是否严重到and we'll let you know if it rises to the level我们可以起诉的程度that we can prosecute,不会被驳回上诉one that won't be reversed on appeal.你知道我也理解你的为难之处You know,I understand the source of your reluctance.我也有妻子I have a wife,too.可这是你的工作...But it's your job...你得到答复了Hey,you got your answer.没什么好说的了We're done.我爱着也牢记你们每一个人的父亲I loved and remember each and every one of your fathers,你们将在今年秋季入学so I'm proud of all of you我以你们为傲who are ready to head off to school in the fall.到目前为止在纪念基金会的帮助下26of ours put through college我们有26人上完大学by the Memorial Foundation so far.今年的这批我们来认识一下And this year's group...so let's bring them up,为他们取得的成绩给予热烈的掌声and let's give them a round of applause for their achievement.弗雷迪·阿卡费诺考上了杜克大学Freddie Aquafino,off to Duke.弗雷迪弗雷迪Freddie,Freddie.我和你父亲曾是并肩打拼的商业伙伴I traded shoulder to shoulder with your father.他会为你今天取得的成绩骄傲He'd be so proud of you today.这是第一年的学费和食宿费First year's tuition and board.好过来All right,come here.各位这就是重点所在That's what this is all about,guys.不仅在于我们公司如何挺过了911Not only how our firm survived9/11,还在于我们没有放弃but how we didn't give up.在于我们如何向对方及我们的家人承诺How we committed to each other,to our family.今日能共富贵我甚为感动And I am so moved by how we've all flourishedtogether.有人比其他人更富贵Some flourishing more than others.站在那里的不应该是你It's just wrong that you're the one standing there.好了够了All right,that's enough.不不没事琼No,no.It's okay.June...我能体会I'd feel the same way.我懂I get it.你一定在想"他为何可以幸免于难You got to be thinking,"Why was he spared?而我丈夫遇难了"Why is my husband gone?"在飞机袭击后的几个月里For months after the planes hit,我能做的就是扪心自问all I could do was ask myself why.为何我是唯一幸存下来的人Why was I the only surviving partner?我当时为何没在那里Why wasn't I there?我本可以做点什么吗Could...could I have done something?为何我是那天上午Why was I the only one out of the office唯一出去开会的人on meetings that morning?我们永远无法得知答案We'll never know.所以我给了自己理由So I made up my own"Why."因为你们Because of you.你把一切都揽到了自己身上波比You put it all on your back,Bobby.我是世上最伟大的人吗Am I the greatest guy in the world?当然不是Hell,no.我只是做了已逝伙伴和好友们I just did what I knew the partners and friends I'd lost 也会为我家人做的事would've done for my family.你丈夫也会做的事琼What your husband would've done,June.你也知道我很难过And you know I'm sorry.因为我每天都在想念雷克'Cause I miss Rake every day...就像我美丽的妻子萝拉just as my beautiful wife,Lara,思念她英勇的哥哥迪恩一样misses her heroic brother Dean.波比·阿克斯罗德就像全盛期的麦克·泰森Bobby Axelrod is Mike Tyson in his prime.而你不会希望遭遇全盛时期的麦克·泰森And you do not want Mike Tyson in his prime.还记得当时和他对战的家伙们结局如何吗Remember what happened to the guys who fought him then?记得他们被打得面目全非Yeah,they got their faces pushed in.可最后他也被打败了But eventually he got beat.博斯特·道格拉斯把他打得很惨Buster Douglas knocked him on his ass.-没错-要番茄酱吗-Right.-Ketchup?关键词是"最后""Eventually"is the key word.泰森该退位的时候When Tyson was ready to go.我履职以来Since my appointment,我们办公室在金融起诉案上未尝一败this office is undefeated in financial prosecutions...81比081and0.那是因为我知道什么才是正确的时机And that's because I know when the time is right.我明白但是这可是起大案子I get it,but...this would be a big one.布莱恩今天早上的事你有什么看法Bryan,what do you think happened here this morning?我们得到了一条重大信息We got significant information.有可能也可能是斯派罗在给我们下套Maybe.Or maybe it was Spyros setting us up.如果我们先出手在刑事诉讼上输了Now,we go in first and lose in the criminal action,身处证交会的斯派罗仍然可以做民事起诉Spyros in the S.E.C.can still get him civilly.我们赢斯派罗获利我们要是输了Now,we win,Spyros wins.We lose...他妈的斯派罗还是获利Spyros still fucking wins.去他的番茄酱没了Damn.The ketchup's empty.我们这是在下三维国际象棋We've got to be playing three-dimensional chess.阿克斯是这个地方的民间英雄Axe is a folk hero in this town.这家伙去年向纽约市消防员基金会The guy gave the New York City Firefighter's Foundation捐了一亿美元$100million last year.警方在世贸大楼遗址给他立了个牌子Police gave him a plaque at Ground Zero他那破名字就写在上面with his goddamn name on it.以前公路标志牌上不也都是斯皮策州长的名字Spitzer's name was on all the highway signs,too.是牌子就会倒下Signs come down.所以我这么爱你啊That's why I love you,man.但是斗牛士不会杀一头刚出场的牛But a good matador doesn't try to kill a fresh bull.你得等牛被刺了几次之后再说You wait until he's been stuck a few times.我们需要一个切入的机会无论多小We need an opening,however small.等抓到了可乘之机再下手Then we get the guy the moment that he's gettable,就像对其他人一样just like the others.如果有输的可能就绝不动手But not if there's a chance we lose.那另一件事呢What about...the other issue?斯派罗提到的家里面的那位The one Spyros mentioned...home?他说对吗Was he right about that?不对No.对不起对不起I'm sorry.I'm sorry.我我不I-I don't...-我不知道-今天过得不容易-I don't know what...-You know what,it's a tough day大家都一样for everyone.只是Just...我才被逼无奈把遨享仕游艇卖掉I just had to sell the Oceanis.雷克超爱那艘船的Rake just loved that boat.我相信你这么难过就是因为这个I am sure that's why it upset you.其实我在和波比开始约会之前You know,me,I never set foot on a yacht从未上过游艇until I started dating Bobby.在因伍德这个地方长大In Inwood,growing up,我坐过的船只有史坦顿岛的渡轮the only boating we ever did was the Staten Island Ferry.爱尔兰大家庭兄弟姐妹五个Big Irish family.Five sibs.关系倒是不错Close,though.消防员警察护士Firemen,cops,nurses.我后来搬到这边Then,when I moved up here,在这里我看懂了每个人是如何看待我this world,I saw how everyone looked at me.我从来没有瞧不起你I never judged.当然没有Of course not.所以我努力打理自己So I got my act together.我现在已经很适应这样的生活And I'm comfortable in this life.但是在因伍德学到的一些事But certain things you learn in Inwood,从来不会忘却比如说they never leave you...you know,like the idea如果有人和你不愉快that if someone has a problem with you还亲自找上你and they come to you in person,你就要尽力解决这个问题you do what you can to take care of it.但是如果他们当着大家的面抱怨But if they take that beef public,按照我老家的人的作风场面就不可收拾了the ground just falls out from beneath them where I'm from.你会发现你只有孤身一人You find yourself all alone.你是在威胁我吗Are you threatening me?你说的真他妈对You're fucking right I am.我就是这么长大的It's how I grew up.先生打扰一下Excuse me,sir?什么事Yes?可能是我多嘴I may be speaking out of turn...当你们讨论艾克斯罗德的事的时候I probably shouldn't have even been in the room 我本来都不应该待在你办公室的where Axelrod was discussed...但是你们知道沙滩那边有个叫诺顿的地方吗but you know the Norton place out at the beach?-怎么-不是你们是美国检察官-Why would we?-Not you.The U.S.Attorney.他父亲的房子就在那码头附近His father's house is around the jetty.我知道那栋房子怎么了Yes,I know the house.What?我刚听说波比·艾克斯罗德想买下那栋房子I just heard Bobby Axelrod is trying to buy it.你从哪儿听说的Where did you hear that?书记员的表亲是房产经纪人的员工他说的Court clerk's cousin works for therealtor and mentioned it.-多少钱-8300万美元-How much?-$83million.真的吗Really?那一定会被大肆报道That would be widely reported.铺天盖地Widely.人们厌恶购买这类东西的人People hate guys who buy things like that.最近我的魔力都不知道丢哪儿了I just lost my mojo somewhere along the line.都他妈没了It's fucking gone.而你是魔力太太所以我预约了面谈And you're Mrs.Mojo,so I booked the appointment.是魔力医生It's Dr.Mojo.没错Right.我听说人到了这个岁数就会这样I hear it happens to guys my age.我可能是抑郁了Maybe I'm depressed.我可能需要吃点百忧解或者郁复伸什么的Maybe I should try some Prozac, Effexor...这个我们等会再说We'll get to that.你有保持按时吃饭睡觉锻炼吗Now,have you been eating,sleeping, exercising?有或多或少吧Yeah,more or less.可能睡得不多Maybe not so much with the sleeping.和你夫人相处呢And things with your wife?大部分时间还好Okay,mostly.性生活呢Sex?正常Normal.我结婚十年了所以I've been married10years,so...所以减少到每天一次了So down to just once a day.所以真的只是业绩的事吗So,it's really just the book?从年初至今I'm down4%...我亏损了4%year to date.别人都是两位数增长Everyone else is up double digits.我却亏了I'm down.-我完了-你不用吃药-I'm fucked.-You don't need meds.你不过是听从了错误的声音You're just listening to the wrong voice.你在听的那个声音正对着你You're tuned into the one yelling at you用大喇叭喊你真他妈笨over the loudspeaker that you're fucking stupid你的绩效一团糟and your performance blows.然而你忽略了你内心中那个安静的声音And you're ignoring the quiet one inside它告诉你男儿血性在哪telling you where the alpha is.就是那个声音让你来这Now,that's the voice that got you here.如果你愿意倾听那声音还在原地And it's still there if you're willing to listen.那个声音告诉你了什么What's that voice telling you?虽然我有小小的失败That even though I've stiffed a few但我非常的优秀that I'm pretty damn good.站起来Stand up.站起来Stand up.你去年拿下的记录是多少What'd you take down last year?720万$7.2million.720万$7.2million.720万...你感受一下$7.2mill...feel that.720万$7.2million.手拿近一点Bring it close.720万$7.2million.你心里那个声音是怎么说的So,what's it saying?-说我是奇才-这就对了-That I'm awesome.-There you go.还要对那个吵闹的只会冷言冷语的声音And what does it have to say back回敬一句什么呢to that loud,critical voice?回一句"滚你妈的"It's saying,"Fuck you."很好Good!坐下Sit down.现在回到你的彭博平台Now,I want you to go back to your Bloomberg斩掉那些亏损的仓位你清楚是哪些and cut bait on your losers...you know the ones.你一直在死扛着The ones you've been defending,希望它们会逆转hoping they'll come round,但私心里你知道它们永远不会but,secretly,you know never will.我要你保证I want you to just commit你准备好打持久战that you're in it for the long haul,你终将成功that you will succeed.当你那么做时新的思路And once you do that,the new ideas,盈利品种会自然地展现出来the winners,will present themselves因为你是个成功者because you are a winner.你身处特种部队You're in the Special Forces here.你是海豹突击队的队员You are a Navy SEAL.你能成为他们一员是有原因的And there's a reason for that.海豹突击队会签错你吗Did the S.E.A.L.S make a mistake signing you up?不他们不会No.They did not.海豹突击队从不犯错The S.E.A.L.S don't make mistakes.所以回去那边做该做的事So get out there and do what needs to be done.我们就聊到这里了We have to stop here.阿克斯资本小家伙们Hello,guys.-爸爸-你们过得怎么样-Daddy!-Oh,how are you?Hm?学校怎么样学了什么How was school?What'd you get up to?-好无聊-好无聊-It was boring.-It was boring.无聊很好钱花得值Boring.Fantastic.Money well spent.那些我们吃过晚饭再聊好吗Those go off after dinner,okay?好Okay!宝贝Hey,babe.亲爱的Hi,honey.你在忙些什么呢What are you working on?只是一些会议记录Just session notes.恋母情结泛滥导致他们举步维艰了吗Wall-to-wall Oedipal Complexes making them all go limp?你对人性的理解可真是透彻You have an amazing understanding of people.我们有什么喝的What are we drinking,here?老样子The usual.犯罪打击得如何How's crime fighting?老样子The usual.你对你的职位还满意吗You good with your situation?我知道你说这阵子可能过得有点无聊I know you said you might've been feeling bored a while back.我可不是这么说的That's not exactly what I said.你是说你不能肯定自己是否还在成长You said,uh,you weren't sure if you were still growing.为什么说这个What's this about?我和美国通用公司的首席法律顾问聊过了I was talking to the head counsel of G.E.,他们在招HR的老大and they're looking for a new head of H.R.如果你有兴趣我可以去打个招呼I can put in the word if you want it.是不是...Is there s...有什么原因导致我不能继续现在的工作is there some reason I can't keep doing my job?没有你这话什么意思No.What do you mean?我听别人说有职位空缺所以来告诉你I heard about a position,so I presented it.工作的时候在董事会里操控别人Don't you get enough of moving the pieces还不够吗around the board at work?好吧这个工作机会你不想听那就算了Okay.You don't want to hear about opportunities,fine.你准备起诉阿克斯公司里的谁吗Are you prosecuting somebody at Axe?怎么了查克What's going on,Chuck?第一个问题答案是没有First off,no.第二个你知道我们不能讨论And second,you know that we don't discuss that.所以赶紧把你那破工作辞了So quit your fucking job.凯文带你妹妹上楼Hey,Kev,will you take your sister upstairs把洗澡水打开and,uh,start the bath?我一会就上去好吗I'll be up in a minute,okay?谢谢Thank you.放松点儿Take it easy,okay?我他妈的是美国联邦检察官温蒂I'm the goddamn U.S.Attorney,Wendy.所以呢我们结婚之前我就在那上班了So?I've been working there since before we were married比你当职还早得多 and long before you were in office.并不是说我们那会儿Look,not that we're there,不过我们确实一直有讨论没准哪天but we did always discuss that the day might come就会发生冲突when there was a conflict.那是在我收入是你八倍之前讨论的That was before I was making eight times what you make.也在你让老查克开始玩这招之前And before you started making Chuck Sr.plays like this.别扯上他好么Leave him out of it.Okay?还有谁挣的钱多真的吗And who makes more money?Really?我们就这么教孩子们吗Is this,uh,what we're teaching the kids?那我们是要教孩子Oh,are we teaching them that Daddy's job爸爸的工作总是比妈妈的工作重要is always more important that Mommy's?我为公众利益而工作I work for the public good.不你为查克·罗兹的利益而工作No,you work for the good of Chuck Rhoades.只是也许某些时候这两个目的交叉了Maybe sometimes they intersect.我的天Oh,my God.你能收起你心理专家这套吗Would you turn off your fucking shrink switch?我们都冷静点Let's take this down a notch.好Yeah.我不知道这是刮哪门子的风I just...I don't know where all this is coming from,你也知道我讨厌别人对我指手画脚and you know I don't like to be manipulated.我没有对你指手画脚I'm not manipulating.并不是说你真这么做了Not that that's what you were doing,只是我就是这么觉得的but that's what I felt like.还有你的工作当然很重要And of course your job's important.你是位超级英雄You're a superhero.而且我为你深感自豪And I'm super proud of you.但是我的工作对我来说也很重要But my thing matters to me,too.当然Of course.你工作那么出色You're killing it.小心艾蒙Watch it,there,Elmo!不趴下乖狗狗No!Get down,boy!悠着点大家伙Easy,big guy.别管它别管它Ah,let him be.Hey,let him be.别管它没事让它随便跑吧Let him be.It's okay.Let him go free.这狗就跟上了发条似的He's a live wire,that one.没错它把定做的沙发都咬坏了Ooh,yeah.He chewed up a custom sofa.我们必须让它冷静下来We've got to calm him down.把它送去宠物训练学校Send him to obedience school.把它送给兽医好好修理一番He's going to the vet to get fixed.各位请享用Enjoy,guys.孩子们我们该向瑞恩主厨说什么All right,boys.What do we say to Chef Ryan?谢谢Thank you!孩子们孩子们看看看这个Boys,boys,look.Look.Look at this.看它在标记它的领地Look,look.He's marking his territory.它在家具上撒尿He's peeing on the furniture.对对但它是在告诉瑞恩谁是头Yeah.Yeah,but he's showing Ryan who's boss.所以两个男人抢夺地盘时That's why it's called a pissing contest会比赛尿尿when two men try and stake out their turf.我也不喜欢男人那样做I don't love it when men do that,either.艾蒙现在就出去Elmo,outside now!别这样可怜的家伙Come on.Poor guy.迪恩第七任总统是谁Dean,seventh president.提示门罗后两任Hint...two after Monroe.杰克逊安德鲁·杰克逊Jackson.Andrew Jackson.戈弟他是哪的人Gordie,where was he from?我们聊聊洋基队吧Let's talk Yankees.因为你不知道别想转移话题'Cause you don't know.Don't switch the subject.我知道I do know.那你说啊Prove it.西雅图Seattle?那时还没有西雅图呢笨蛋There was no Seattle back then,idiot.我打赌我再猜一个就能猜中I bet I'll get it on the next guess.-我赌你猜不着-赌多大-Bet you don't.-How much?十个俯卧撑10push-ups.成交Deal.卡罗莱纳州的边境地区Border areas near the Carolinas.你不能每次都上当迪恩You can't fall for that every time,Dean.他了解你给你下套了See,he knows his customer,and he sets you up.他是愿意扮猪吃老虎He's willing to look foolish short-term to win long-term.你得记住这点You got to remember that.戈弟别老耍你哥哥And,Gordie,don't sucker your brother.好了来吧输了做俯卧撑吧All right,come on.Pay your bet.我们可不赖账啊We don't welsh.让我们瞧瞧你的本事See what you got.一二One.Two.低点Lower.三Three.先生十分钟后进行宽大处理会议Sir?The leniency conference starts in10 minutes.下午好Afternoon.谢谢你愿意见我们Thank you for agreeing to see us.你在这做什么爸What the fuck are you doing here,Dad?想让我被取消资格吗Trying to get me disbarred?天啊你比你妈还小题大做Christ.You're more dramatic than your mother.我们没有违反任何规定We are not breaking any rules or regulations.。
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How Safe Are KIDS' Prescription Drugs?Drugs prescribed to children and adolescents have been much in the news lately.Health Canada has issued warnings about some drugs that both patients and physicians trusted,and it has withdrawn others from the market.What's going on?Parents should understand these complicated and confusing issues.How Are Prescription Drugs Approved in Canada?When a pharmaceutical company has a new drug.it applies to Health Canada for a licence to sell it.Based oninformation the company provides,including the results of clinical trials,the drug is either approved or the application is rejected.Is There a Difference in the Way Drugs Are Approved for Children and Adults?Normally.drugs are tested in adults first.Dr.Denis Daneman.a clinical investigator at The Hospital for Sick Children in Toront o,says,“we have to be remarkably careful because children are physiologically different than adults and are seen by physicians as a highly vulnerable group.”What Happens Once a Drug Is Approved?“Once approved,” explains Daneman.“it's available on the market and doctors can prescribe it for any indication they'd like to.” Even if it has not been tested specifically in children.he says.“physicians may start to use it either in small trials or whatwe call off-label (use of a prescription drug to treat a condition for which the drug has not been approved) in children.”How Common Is Off-label Use?Dr.Michael Rieder. director of the Adverse Drug Reaction Clinic at the Children's Hospital of Western Ontario,says,“drugs commonly used in children,such as antibiotcs and asthma drugs,are tested in children.” But,he says,“there is a misconception that children take only those drugs.We did a study looking at a million kids in Canada over a year.It turns out they used l,400 different drugs,of which 60 percent have not been tested,or approved for use in children.”If a Drug Is Safe in Adults,Why Do You Need to Test It in children?Health Canada's Dr.Siddika Mithani says.“children are not small adults.”Their physiology is different.That goes for adolescents.too.Dr.Eric Wookltorton.an Ottawa-based family physician who writes a column on adverse events for the Canadian Medical Association Journal,says,“Depo Provera is an injectable birth-control product used by women of all ages.No one thought to test it in adolescents until recently.T eenagers arelaying down bone density and this drug decreased bone density.”Are Older Drugs Safer?“If I were to use a medication off-label that's been around for some time,I'd be less concerned about it.” advises Dr.Peter Nieman.a Calgary pedia trician.“But if you use a medication that's being promoted as che best thing since sliced bread,and you know it's fairly new and are using it off-label,you are a bit nervous.”How Many Side Effects Are Reported?In 2004 Health Canada received 10,238 reports of adverse reactions in people of all ages.The number of reports has been increasing since 1999,when just under 6,000 were sent in.However.Dr.Bruce Carleton.of the pharmaceutical outcomes program at the Children's and Women's Health Centre of British Columbia,says,“95 percent of negative reactions are never reported.”Wooltorton explains:“how do you track the more minor,long-term side effects,the ones where kids are a little bit stunted in growth or they are having learning problems in school.There's no regulation and no financial incentive to report anything at all.”Should We Be More Careful with Some Drugs?Dr.Jack Uetrecht,a Canada Research Chair in adverse drug reactions,advises extra caution with drugs that affect the central nervous system.“The effects and long-term outcomes of giving these types of drugs aren't totally understood. Make sure the appropriate tests are given to make as clear a diagnosis as possible.and that the appropriate treatment is given based on that diagnosis.Talking to the patient for a few minutes and prescribing a drug would not be the best method.If there is a severe clinical problem and a clear clinical benefit,then the benefit is worth the risk.”Can Side Fffects Be Prevented?If your child has had a reaction to a drug in the past,an allergist can advise if she is still allergic.and if so,what could be used instead.Genome Canada is funding an $8.4-million research project that may helpprevent side effects in the future.led by Carleton and geneticist Michael Hayden,director of the Centre for Molecular Medicine and Therapeutics.It is looking for genetic markers that would signal if a child was at risk for an adversereaction.“There are genetic differences in the way a lot of physiological processeshappen in the human body,”says Carleton.“It makes sense that those differences would affect the way we process drugs.Therefore,understanding when that situation exists would help us to construct better guidelines.”What Should You Ask About Your Child's Prescription?First,be sure it is really necessary,says Wooltorton.“A lot of children don't always need prescriptions for a lot of things.Ear infections are an example of when antibiotics are sometimes,but not always,necessary.But there is a tendency in our society to want our kids to be like us.We want to get back to work.We want them to get back to school.We want a quick fix.But‘how wi11 we know the drug is working?'A child with asthma,for example,is usually given a couple of medications.One will be to open the airways.He should feel better after the First dose.If he doesn't,we have a problem.The other medication is used to reduce inflammation.This will decrease the number of acute breathless episodes,but it takes time to have an effect.”Find out how long your physician has been using the drug,says Rieder,and what the experience has been like.Your doctor may know quite a lot about the drug, even if it is being used off-label.What Should Parents Watch Out for?Dr.Michael Kramcr,of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research,says you sh ould contact your physician“ifyour child is very sleepy or is agitated and unable to sleep.You should also be concerned about any rashesthat cause blistering or hivcs.”When you pick up a medication at the drugstore,it often comes with a listof potential side effecfs.Maura MacPhee,who teaches in the School of Nursing at the University of British Columbia,says,“this is generic information.Before leaving the physician's office,makesure you know what side effects are the ones you need to worry about with your child.”How Safe Is the System?In the last 25 to 30 years,we have seen significant advances in the treatment of childhood leukemia.“WhenI was training 30 years ago,”says Daneman,“childhood leukemia had an 80-percent mortality rate;now the survival rate is better than 80 percent.”Another important development:More drugs are being tested now in children.Daneman says:“if you look at the number of studies that go on,there are many more in the last five to eight years than there were 20 0r 30 years ago.”1.Which of the following is requested by Health Canada before it permits a drug to be sold?A) The aize and the weight of the drug.B) The suggested price of the drug.C) The results of clinical trials of the drug.D) The production budget of the drug.2.Who is seen by Dr.Denis Daneman as a highly vulnerable group?A) Pregnant women.B) Children.C) Elderly people over 70.D) Middle-aged men.3.How many kinds of drugs are now used by children off-label?A) 840.B) 60.C) 1400.D) 560.4.Depo Provera is a drug that can result inadolescents'_____________.A) stomach upsetB) low blood pressureC} high cholesterolD) decreased bone density5.Some minor and long-term side effects were not reported due to______________.A) patients' ignoranceB) lack of financial incentiveC) doctor's irresponsibilityD) shortage of health workers6.Dr.Jack Uetrecht is most concerned about drugs' side effect on________________.A) the nervous systemB) the digestive systemC) the respiratory systemD) the skeleton system7.Dr.Jack Uetrecht suggests that an accurate diagnosis is the basis of________________.A) appropriate treatmentB) prescribing a new drugC) avoidance of side effectsD) feasible medical tests8.The project funded by Genome Canada hopes to prevent adverse reactionsafter identifying relevant______________.9.If a child with asthma suffers acute breathless episodes,he should take medicine to________________.10.When buying a medicine in a drugstore or getting it froma physician,parents need to watchout for its__________________.。
Liquidity risk and the current crisisLasse Heje Pedersen15 November 2008, VOXWhat is liquidity? Why is it at the heart of the crisis? How can we fix it? This column explains it all in terms any trained economist can understand.What is liquidity risk and how can it help us understand the current crisis? How do we solve the crisis - and which measures will only hurt?Here I provide some answers. The column is based on my 20 October 2008 talk at the International Monetary Fund and the Federal Reserve Board. To see the slides with lots of figures and graphs, click here.What is liquidity risk?There are two kinds of liquidity: market liquidity, and funding liquidity.∙ A security has good market liquidity if it is “easy” to trade, that is, has a low bid-ask spread, small price impact, high resilience, easy search (in OTC markets).∙ A bank or investor has good funding liquidity if it has enough available funding from its own capital or from (collateralised) loans.With these notions in mind, the meaning of liquidity risk is clear.∙Market liquidity risk is the risk that the market liquidity worsens when you need to trade. ∙Funding liquidity risk is the risk that a trader can not fund his position and is forced to unwind.For instance, a levered hedge fund may lose its access to borrowing from its bank and must sell its securities as a result. Or, from the bank's perspective, depositors may withdraw their funds, the bank may lose its ability to borrow from other banks, or raise funds via debt issues.We are experiencing extreme market and funding liquidity risk Liquidity generally varies over time and across markets, and currently we are experiencing extreme market liquidity risk. The most extreme form of market liquidity risk is that dealers are shutting down (no bids!), which is currently happening in a number of markets such as those for certain asset-backed securities and convertible bonds. We are also experiencing extrem e funding liquidity risk since banks are short on capital, so they need to scale back their trading that requires capital, and also scale back the amount of capital they lend to other traders such as hedge funds, that is, hedge funds now face higher margins. In short, if banks cannot fund themselves, they cannot fund their clients.The two forms of liquidity are linked and can reinforce each other in liquidity spirals where poor funding leads to less trading, this reduces market liquidity, increasing margins and tightening risk management, thus further worsening funding, and so on.Liquidity risk and asset pricesAn illiquid security has a higher required return to compensate investors for the transaction costs. Since market liquidity may deteriorate when you need to sell in the future, investors face market liquidity risk as discussed above. Investors naturally want to be compensated for this, so market liquidity risk increases the required return. Indeed, the liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model shows how liquidity betas complement the standard market beta. The higher required return in times of higher market liquidity risk leads to a contemporaneous drop in prices,according to this theory, consistent with what we are seeing in the current marketplace. An overview of the liquidity literature is available here.Liquidity risk and the current crisis: downward liquidity spirals The trigger of the crisis was the bursting of the housing bubble, combined with a large exposure by the levered financial institutions. This led to significant bank losses with associated funding liquidity problems. This started the systemic liquidity spirals. As banks’ balance sheets deteriorated, they had to de-lever. To do this, they:∙started selling assets;∙hoarding cash;∙tightening risk management.This put stress on the interbank funding market (as measured e.g. by the TED spread, see slides) as everyone was trying to minimise counterparty exposures.Banks’ funding liquidity problems quickly spread. Other investors, especially those that rely on leverage such as hedge funds, face funding risk when banks become less willing to lend, they raise margins, and, in the extreme, when the banks fail as Lehman did.When banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman started to look vulnerable, their clients risked losing capital or having it frozen during a bankruptcy, and they started to withdraw capital and unwind positions, leading to a bank run.This funding liquidity crisis naturally lead to market illiquidity with bid-ask spreads widening in several markets, and quoted amounts being reduced by dealers with less available capital. This market illiquidity, and the prospect of further liquidity risk, scared investors and prices dropped, especially for illiquid assets with high margins.This is the downward liquidity spiral as illustrated in the chart.Sources: Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)The crisis spreads to other asset classesThe crisis has been spreading across asset classes and markets globally. There are as traders unwind carry trades and lose faith in weak currencies. Further, as an example of the gravity of the liquidity crisis, the “Covered Interest Rate Parity” –the most basic arbitrage condition in the world’s thickest market (foreign exchange) – currently fails to hold even for the major currencies. This must mean that no one can arbitrage because no one can borrow uncollateralised, no one has spare collateral, and no one is willing to lend – arbitrage involves both borrowing and lending. The increased risk and illiquidity has also lead to a spike in volatility, contributing to the higher margins. Further, correlations across assets have increased as everything started trading on liquidity.The crisis spreads to Main StreetClearly, the crisis is having a significant effect on the real economy as homeowners see their property value deteriorate, consumers access to borrowing is reduced, main street c ompanies face higher cost of equity and especially debt capital and a lower demand for their products, unemployment goes up, etc.What can - and what cannot - solve a liquidity crisis?If the problem is a liquidity spiral, we must improve the funding liquidity of the main players in the market, namely the banks. Hence, banks must be recapitalised by raising new capital, diluting old equity, possibly reducing face value of old debt. This can be done with quick resolution bankruptcy for institutions with systemic risk, i.e. those causing liquidity spirals.Further, we must improve funding markets and trust by broadening bank guarantees, opening the Fed's discount window broadly (giving collateralised funding with reasonable margins), and ensuring the Commercial Paper market function. Further, risk management must acknowledge systemic risk due to liquidity spirals and the regulations must consider the system as a whole, as opposed to each institution in isolation.If we have learned one thing from the current crisis, it is that trading through organised exchanges with centralised clearing is better than trading over-the-counter derivatives because trading derivatives increases co-dependence, complexity, counterparty risk, and reduces transparency. Said simply, when you buy a stock, your ownership does not depend on who you bought it from. If you buy a “synthetic stock” through a derivative, on the other hand, your ownership does depends on who you bought it from - and that dependence may prevail even after you sell the stock (if you sell through another bank). Hence, when people start losing confidence in the bank with which they trade, they may start to unwind their derivatives positions and this hurts the bank’s funding, and a liquidity spiral unfolds.Banning short selling is a bad ideaIn the debate about how to solve the crisis and prevent the next one, it has been suggested that policymakers should ban short selling and impose a transaction tax on stocks. I believe that neither is a good idea. First, short sellers bring new information to the market, increase liquidity, and reduce bubbles (remember the housing bubble started this crisis) so preventing this can be very costly and prohibiting short sales does not solve the general funding problem. While temporarily banning new short sales of financial institutions can be justified if there is risk ofpredatory trading, this is rarely a good idea since short sellers are often simply scapegoats when bad firms go down fighting. (See here for how shortselling works.)Tobin taxes are a bad ideaSecond, a transaction tax on stocks is problematic for several reasons, most importantly because it moves trading away from the official exchanges and into the derivati ves world, thus increasing the systemic risk. One of the main arguments in favour of such a transaction tax is that it helps to prevent bubbles, but there is little or no empirical evidence to support this. For instance, in the UK there is a 0.5% tax on trading stocks and a higher tax on trading real estate (up to 4%), but the UK arguably had one of the larger housing bubbles. Further, with a depressed and vulnerable stock market, this does not appear to be the best time to introduce transactions taxes related to potential stock price bubbles in the far future.To see the problem, consider what happened in the UK due to their transaction tax. The professional investors such as hedge funds found a way around the regulation by executing their trades using derivatives rather than trading stocks directly (while individual investors are unable to avoid the tax). Specifically, in the UK hedge funds typically trade via swaps with counterparties such as investment banks to avoid the transaction tax. There is little doubt that this would also happen in the US if such a tax was introduced here. This would increase counterparty dependencies, systemic risk, and worsen risk management spirals as discussed above.Another serious problem with the tax is that it lowers liquidity in the marketplace as trading activity may move abroad, move into other markets, or disappear. On top of these distortions to the stability of the financial system, this tax may raise capital costs for Main Street firms because of higher liquidity risk in US financial markets. Indeed, buying US stocks will be less attractive to investors – domestically and internationally – if they must pay a tax to buy and if they anticipate reduced liquidity in the future when they need to sell.This could make it harder for US corporations to raise capital. And, the importance of being able to raise capital is what this crisis is all about.ConclusionMarket liquidity risk is an important driver of security prices, risk management, and the speed of arbitrage. And the funding liquidity of banks and other intermediaries is an important driver of market liquidity risk. Liquidity crisis are evolve through liquidity spirals in which losses, increasing margins, tightened risk management, and increased volatility feed on each other. As this happens, traditional liquidity providers become demanders of liquidity, new capital arrives only slowly, and prices drop and rebound.ReferencesViral Acharya and Lasse Heje Pedersen (2005). "Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk," Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 77, pp. 375-410.Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson (1986). "Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread." Journal of Financial Economics 17, 223–249.Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson, and Lasse Heje Pedersen (2005). "Liquidity and Asset Prices," Foundations and Trends in Finance, vol.1, no. 4, pp. 269-364.Markus K. Brunnermeier and Lasse Heje Pedersen (2005). "Predatory Trading," The Journal of Finance, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 1825-1863.Markus K. Brunnermeier and Lasse Heje Pedersen. “Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity,” June 2008.Markus Brunnermeier, Stefan Nagel, and Lasse Heje Pedersen (2008). "Carry Trades andCurrency Crashes," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, forthcoming.Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig, 1983, "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 401-419.Darrell Duffie, Nicolae Garlea nu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen, (2002). “Securities lending, shorting, and pricing,” Journal of Financial Economics 66 307–339.Darrell Duffie, Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen, (2005). “Over-the-counter markets,” Econometrica, Vol. 73, No. 6 1815–1847.Darrell Duffie, Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen (2007). "Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 20, no. 5, pp 1865-1900.Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen (2007). "Liquidity and Risk Management," The American Economic Review, P&P, vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 193-197.Mark Mitchell, Lasse Heje Pedersen, and Todd Pulvino (2007). "Slow Moving Capital," The American Economic Review, P&P, vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 215-220.Owen A. Lamont, 2003. "Go down fighting: Short sellers vs. firms," working paper, University of Chicago.。
Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common CausesMaurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff*November 2009AbstractThis paper makes a case that the global imbalances of the 2000s and the recent global financial crisis are intimately connected. Both have their origins in economic policies followed in a number of countries in the 2000s and in distortions that influenced the transmission of these policies through U.S. and ultimately through global financial markets. In the U.S., the interaction among the Fed’s monetary stance, global real interest rates, credit market distortions, and financial innovation created the toxic mix of conditions making the U.S. the epicenter of the global financial crisis. Outside the U.S., exchange rate and other economic policies followed by emerging markets such as China contributed to the United States’ ability to borrow cheaply abroad and thereby finance its unsustainable housing bubble.*University of California, Berkeley, and Harvard University. Paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Asia Economic Policy Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, October 18-20, 2009. Conference participants and especially discussant Ricardo Caballero offered helpful comments. We thank Alexandra Altman and Matteo Maggiori for outstanding research assistance. Financial support was provided by the Coleman Fung Risk Management Center at UC Berkeley.In my view … it is impossible to understand this crisis without reference to the global imbalances in trade and capital flows that began in the latter half of the 1990s.--Ben S. Bernanke1IntroductionUntil the outbreak of financial crisis in August 2007, the mid-2000s was a period of strong economic performance throughout the world. Economic growth was generally robust; inflation generally low; international trade and especially financial flows expanded; and the emerging and developing world experienced widespread progress and a notable absence of crises.This apparently favorable equilibrium was underpinned, however, by three trends that appeared increasingly unsustainable as time went by. First, real estate values were rising at a high rate in many countries, including the world’s largest economy, the United States. Second, a number of countries were simultaneously running high and rising current account deficits, including the world’s largest economy, the United States. Third, leverage had built up to extraordinary levels in many sectors across the globe, notably among consumers in the United States and Britain and financial entities in many countries. Indeed, we ourselves began pointing to the potential risks of the “global imbalances” in a series of papers beginning in 2001.2 As we will argue, the global imbalances did not cause the leverage and housing bubbles, but they were a critically important codeterminant.In addition to being the world’s largest economy, the United States had the world’s highest rate of private homeownership and the world’s deepest, most dynamic1 Bernanke (2009).financial markets. And those markets, having been progressively deregulated since the 1970s, were confronted by a particularly fragmented and ineffective system of government prudential oversight. This mix of ingredients, as we now know, was deadly.Controversy remains about the precise connection between global imbalances and the global financial meltdown. Some commentators argue that external imbalances had little or nothing to do with the crisis, which instead was the result of financial regulatory failures and policy errors, mainly on the part of the U.S. Others put forward various mechanisms through which global imbalances are claimed to have played a prime role in causing the financial collapse. Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson argued, for example, that the high savings of China, oil exporters, and other surplus countries depressed global real interest rates, leading investors to scramble for yield and under-price risk.3We too believe that the global imbalances and the financial crisis are intimately connected, but we take a more nuanced stance on the nature of the connections.In our view, both originated primarily in economic policies followed in a number of countries in the 2000s (including the United States) and in distortions that influenced the transmission of these policies through U.S. and ultimately through global financial markets.The United States’ ability to finance macroeconomic imbalances through easy foreign borrowing allowed it to postpone tough policy choices (something that was of course true in many other deficit countries as well). Foreign banks’ appetite for assets that turned out to be toxic provided one ready source of external funding for the U.S. deficit. Not only was the U.S. able to borrow in dollars at nominal interest rates kept low2 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001, 2005, 2007).3 Guha (2009).by a loose monetary policy. Also, until around the autumn of 2008, exchange rate and other asset-price movements kept U.S. net foreign liabilities growing at a rate far below the cumulative U.S. current account deficit.At the same time, countries with current account surpluses faced minimal pressures to adjust. China’s ability to sterilize the immense reserve purchases it placed in U.S. markets allowed it to maintain an undervalued currency and defer rebalancing its own economy. Complementary policy distortions therefore kept China artificially far from its lower autarky interest rate and the U.S. artificially far from its higher autarky interest rate. Had seemingly low-cost postponement options not been available, the subsequent crisis might well have been mitigated, if not contained.4We certainly do not agree with the many commentators and scholars who argued that the global imbalances were an essentially benign phenomenon, a natural and inevitable corollary of backward financial development in emerging markets. These commentators, including Cooper (2007) and Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2005), as well as Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008a) and Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007), advanced frameworks in which the global imbalances were essentially a “win-win” phenomenon, with developing countries’ residents (including governments) enjoying safety and liquidity for their savings, while rich countries (especially the dollar-4 While we would not fully subscribe to Portes’ (2009) blunt assessment that “global macroeconomic imbalances are the underlying cause of the crisis,” we find common ground in identifying several key transmission mechanisms from policies to the endogenous outcomes. Perhaps (to paraphrase Bill Clinton) it depends what you mean by “underlying.” Jagannathan, Kapoor, and Schaumberg (2009) ascribe industrial-country policies of the 2000s to the increase in the effective global labor force brought about by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and economic liberalization in China and India. It is plausible that these changes exerted downward pressure on global inflation, as suggested by Greenspan (2004), reducing the price pressures that low policy interest rates might otherwise have unleashed. Nishimura (2008) posits that the same demographic forces placed upward pressure on industrial-country asset prices in the late 1990s and 2000s.issuing United States) benefited from easier borrowing terms.5 The fundamental flaw in these analyses, of course, was the assumption that advanced-country capital markets, especially those of the United States, were fundamentally perfect, and so able to take on ever-increasing leverage without risk. In our 2001 paper we ourselves underscored this point, identifying the rapid evolution of financial markets as posing new, untested hazards that might be triggered by a rapid change in the underlying equilibrium.6 Bini Smaghi’s (2008) assessment thus seems exactly right to us: “[E]xternal imbalances are often a reflection, and even a prediction, of internal imbalances.[E]conomic policies … should not ignore external imbalances and just assume that they will sort themselves out.”7 In this paper we describe how the global imbalances of the 2000s both reflected and magnified the ultimate causal factors behind the recent financial crisis. At the end, we identify policy lessons learned. In effect, the global imbalances posed stress tests for weaknesses in the United States, British, and other advanced-country financial and political systems – tests that those countries did not pass.5 At the end of their paper, Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008a) point to the risks of excessive leverage, which are not incorporated in their model. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008b) extend their earlier framework to analyze the aftermath of a bubble collapse. Gruber and Kamin (2008) argue that as an empirical matter, conventional measures of financial development explain neither the size of the net capital flows from emerging to mature economies, nor their concentration on U.S. assets. Gruber and Kamin also argue that U.S. bond yields have been comparable to those of other industrial countries, contrary to the view that American liabilities have been especially attractive to foreign portfolio investors. Acharya and Schnabl (2010) show that banks in industrial surplus and deficit countries alike set up extensive asset-backed commercial paper conduits to issue purportedly risk-free short-term liabilities and purchase risky longer-term assets from industrial deficit countries, mostly denominated in dollars. This finding also throws doubt on the hypothesis that emerging-market demand for risk-free assets that only the U.S. could provide was the underlying cause of the U.S. current account deficit.6 See also the concerns raised by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005, 2007), as well as Obstfeld (2005), who follows up on these themes by warning that “The complex chains of counterparty obligation that have arisen in the global economy, typically involving hedge funds and other nonbanks and impossible to trackWorld Policymakers React to Growing ImbalancesBetween 1989 and 1997, the United States current account deficit fluctuated in a range below two percent of GDP. In 1998, with the Asian financial crisis and its backwash in full swing, the deficit reached 2.4 percent of GDP, climbing to 4.8 percent by 2003. Driven largely by high investment during the late 1990s, the U.S. deficit reflected low national saving by 2003. United Sates external borrowing was to climb to roughly 6 percent of GDP by 2005-06 before falling, gradually in 2007-08 and then more abruptly afterward. The IMF’s October 2009 forecast was for U.S. deficits around 2.8 per cent of GDP in 2009 and 2.2 percent in 2010, then rising back to around 2.9 percent by 2012. These levels are less than half those of 2005-06.Official discussion of the risks posed by large global imbalances intensified in the fall of 2003 as G7 officials pressured Japan and (verbally) China to reduce their intervention purchases of dollars. At the G7 and IMF meeting in Dubai in 2003, the United States also pledged to take steps to promote national saving, while Europe committed to raise productivity. Later, in February 2004, the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors asserted clearly that, along with structural policies to enhance growth, “sound fiscal policies over the medium-term are key to addressing global current account imbalances.” Following the October 2004 G7 meeting – which again noted the problem of imbalances – Governor Toshihiko Fukui of the Bank of Japan outlined potential hazards and asserted: “Policy makers cannot adopt benign neglect in this context.”8 Japan, of course, had ended its massive 2003-04 foreign exchangeby any national regulator, raise a serious systemic threat…. The systemic threat raised by Long-Term Capital Management’s difficulties in 1998 could pale compared with what is possible now.”7 Bini Smaghi (2008).8 Fukui (2004).interventions in March 2004 and, as of this writing, has refrained from further intervention.European policymakers likewise saw risks. The European Central Bank’s December 2004 Financial Stability Review stated that “Large and growing U.S. current account deficits have generally been perceived as posing a significant risk for global financial stability, at least since 2000.” The report noted that high levels of U.S. household mortgage borrowing implied risks of interest rate hikes or employment loss, risks that ultimately could impact banks and other creditors. In turn, the ECB noted that “A widening of the household sector deficit was a pattern not seen in earlier episodes of current account deficit widening.” In a presentation accompanying the press briefing for the Financial Stability Review, Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa flagged the U.S. external deficit and the rising price of oil as two main risks, and also mentioned the run-up in real estate values and in loan-value ratios in some eurozone countries. His general conclusion, however, was that risks to financial stability had “become less pronounced since late 2003,” in part because of strength in the real economy.9,10The Federal Reserve responded in sanguine terms. Alan Greenspan opined in February 2005 that “The U.S. current account deficit cannot widen forever but … fortunately, the increased flexibility of the American economy will likely facilitate any adjustment without significant consequences to aggregate economic activity.”11 In his famous Sandridge Lecture of March 10, 2005, Ben Bernanke argued that the causes of the U.S. foreign deficit, and therefore its cures, were primarily external to the U.S. While 9 See European Central Bank (2004, pp. 9 and 17) and Padoa-Schioppa (2004).10Little mention was made of the fact that, while the current account of the euro zone as a whole was more or less balanced, a number of member countries were running large and rapidly increasing current accountnot disagreeing with Greenspan’s expectation of a gradual, smooth adjustment process, Bernanke did note that “the risk of a disorderly adjustment in financial markets always exists, and the appropriately conservative approach for policymakers is to be on guard for any such developments.”12 Unfortunately, U.S. politicians, financial regulators, and monetary authorities did not put serious weight on these risks.Although it was not fully realized at the time, the world economy was indeed entering a new and more dangerous phase in 2004. Developments beginning in that year led to a further widening of global imbalances. At the same time, these very same developments planted the seeds of financial fragility both in the United States and Europe, with consequences that became evident only in the summer of 2007. While the factors driving the expansion of global imbalances starting in 2004 have their roots in policies of the immediately preceding years, some powerful propagation mechanisms hugely amplified the lagged effects of the policies.Thus, the first step in understanding the increasingly destabilizing forces driving global imbalances starting around 2004 is to return to the period following the Asian crisis – though as we shall see, the effects of the Asian crisis itself are only part of the story, and perhaps not even the most important part.Global Imbalances: Mid-1990s through 2003Current account configurations in the mid-1990s were on the whole unexceptional, as shown in the three panels of Figure 1. In 1995 developing Asia (which includes China) deficits (see below). Nor was much concern expressed openly about the fragmented nature of the eurozone’s system of prudential oversight of financial markets.11 Greenspan (2005). See also Greenspan (2004).and the Western Hemisphere countries had comparable deficits, and the countries of central and Eastern Europe were also net borrowers on a smaller scale. Other regions were in surplus, with the mature economies as a group providing the main finance for the developing borrowers. True, in 1995 the United States was running a current-account deficit that was large in absolute terms, but as a percentage of U.S. GDP it was about half the size of the Reagan-era deficits at their height (about 1.5 percent of GDP).13 Then, in 1997, the Asian crisis struck. Bernanke (2005) provided a particularly eloquent and concise summary of the influential view that the crisis contributed to a sequence of events and policy responses in emerging-market economies that set the stage for the arrival of much larger global imbalances starting in the late 1990s.The Asian turbulence began with Thailand’s currency crisis. Thailand had long maintained a fixed exchange rate of the baht against the U.S. dollar. Prior to 1996, when a previously torrid growth rate slowed markedly, rapid credit expansion within a liberalized financial system fueled bubbles in real estate and stocks. Ascending asset prices then reversed course, as the current-account deficit reached nearly 8 percent of GDP. Fierce currency speculation against the baht broke out in May 1997, and the baht-dollar peg was broken in July. The crisis spread contagiously to other Asian countries, many of which had seemingly healthier fundamentals than Thailand’s. Under market pressure, however, weaknesses were revealed in a number of Asian banking systems. Most of the affected countries turned to the International Monetary Fund for support.12 Bernanke (2005). Bernanke’s ex post view, as expressed four years later (to the day) in Bernanke (2009), is more balanced in its assessment of the dangers of large U.S. current account deficits.13 Unless otherwise noted, all data come from the International Monetary Fund’s April 2009 World Economic Outlook database.The harsh consequences of the crisis, and in particular the conditionality imposed by the IMF as the quid pro quo for financial assistance, left a bitter memory. As Figure 1 shows, the developing Asian countries and the newly industrialized Asian group of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, some of them with much weaker currencies than before the crisis, went into surplus afterward. As the recessionary effects of the crisis dissipated and the dot-com boom reached a peak, global commodity prices rose (Figure 2), helping to generate surpluses for the oil-producing Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The advanced economies as a group ran a correspondingly bigger deficit. As noted above, the U.S. deficit rose to 2.4 percent of GDP in 1998. It rose to 3.2 percent in 1999 and 4.3 percent in 2000, with only a slight reduction in 2001 (when the U.S. was briefly in recession) before rising further.The surpluses of the Asian countries and oil producers proved to be persistent. In newly industrialized Asia, gross saving remained more or less at pre-crisis levels but investment declined. In developing Asia, saving returned to the pre-crisis level of around 33 percent of GDP only in 2002, from which level it continued to rise quickly (reaching a staggering 47 percent of GDP in 2007). Gross investment returned to the pre-crisis level of about 35 percent of GDP only in 2004, and while it continued to rise significantly thereafter, it did not rise as much as saving did. In time, investment in much of Asia did recover relative to saving, but developments in China outweighed this phenomenon. China accounted for slightly over half of developing Asia’s aggregate external surplus in 2000, but accounted for virtually all of it by 2005. By then, China’s imbalance, along with those of the oil exporting countries, had become a major counterpart of the global deficits.Supporting these enhanced current account surpluses were exchange rate policies that tended to maintain rates at competitive levels compared to the pre-crisis period. One motivation for foreign exchange intervention policies in Asia was to pursue export-led strategies for maintaining high economic growth rates. Another was to accumulate substantial stocks of international reserves as buffers against future financial crises that might otherwise force renewed dependence on the IMF. In the Middle East, countries such as Saudi Arabia maintained longstanding pegs to the U.S. dollar. Wolf (2008) offers an extensive discussion of how exchange-rate policies in emerging markets supported the constellation of growing global imbalances through the 2000s.The two panels of Figure 3 shows bilateral real exchange rates against the U.S. dollar for six Asian countries, one of them (Korea) an Asian crisis graduate that is in the newly industrialized group. In the definitions used to construct this diagram, an upward movement is a real depreciation against the dollar. All countries remained at depreciated levels compared to 1997 for many years after the crisis. Indeed, in Figure 3, only the Korean won ever returns to its 1997 level. Intervention policies were associated with rapid growth in international reserves, as we have noted. During the closing years of the Bretton Woods system, speculation against the overvalued dollar contributed to worldwide growth in international reserves and eventually to higher global inflation. In the 2000s up until the autumn of 2008, reserve growth similarly caused inflationary pressures outside the U.S., also driving increases in commodity, housing, and other asset prices.Figure 4 shows the evolution of international reserves for emerging and developing economies. In the developing and newly industrial Asian countries as a group,and particularly in China, reserve accumulation tended to outstrip even the growing current account surpluses as strong inward FDI flows (and in China’s case later on, hot money inflows) augmented balance of payments surpluses. In general, strong attempts were made to sterilize the incipient effects on Asian money supplies, so as to dampen inflationary pressures that might otherwise have eroded competitiveness (while simultaneously compromising macroeconomic stability). Figure 5 shows the stark contrast between the smooth growth of China’s monetary base and the explosion in its international reserves (measured in renminbi). In contrast to China, Middle Eastern countries’ reserves rose more slowly than overall net external assets, as a substantial portion of their surpluses flowed into investment vehicles other than liquid reserves.In both cases, economic policies and market developments helped to generate significant current account surpluses, which in turn entailed rapid accumulation of public and private claims on industrial countries, in particular the United States. What economic adjustments elsewhere in the world allowed these emerging-market surpluses, and the counterpart advanced-country deficits, to emerge as equilibrium phenomena?Bernanke (2005) posits that an outward shift of emerging-market saving schedules, both in Asian economies and in commodity exporters enriched by improved terms of trade, was the principal cause of the expansion of U.S. external deficits starting in the latter 1990s. According to this theory, the advent of this “global saving glut” led to worldwide asset-price adjustments that induced a number of mature economies, most importantly that of the United States, to borrow more heavily from foreigners. While we believe that Bernanke’s story is incomplete in several important respects, it is usefulnonetheless to review the outlines of his argument, especially as it provides a frame of reference for so many subsequent discussions.14Bernanke divides the 1996-2004 period into two halves. In the first period, ending early in 2000, “equity prices played a key equilibrating role in international financial markets” (Bernanke 2005, p. 8). Financial capital from emerging-market savers flowed into the U.S., “fueling large appreciations in stock prices and in the value of the dollar” and implying wealth and international competitiveness effects consistent with a larger U.S. deficit. At the same time, Bernanke argues, expectations of rapid future productivity growth in the United States encouraged investment and further discouraged saving. But he seems to view this second set of domestically generated causal factors as secondary in quantitative significance to the effects of increased emerging-market saving. Thus Bernanke posits that the “global saving glut,” rather than particularly unusual factors in the United States, drove the imbalances. In particular, he assigns only a very minor role to monetary policy. (We would assign a somewhat larger role to monetary policy, and our work at the time argued against the prevailing view that leverage-fueled asset price bubbles, particularly in the housing market, should be very secondary determinants of interest rate policy.)The period ending in early 2000 was not accompanied by falling real interest rates in the United States. For a sample of mature economies, Figure 6 shows interest rates on ten-year government inflation-indexed obligations, a market-based measure of the real interest rate. The United States TIPS rate rose mildly over the period ending in March14 Some econometric studies likewise conclude that the saving glut theory offers at best a partial explanation of the high U.S. external deficit over the 2000s. See Chinn and Ito (2007) and Gruber and Kamin (2007).2000, and other industrial country rates other than the United Kingdom’s do not diverge too far from the U.S. rate in those years.Early 2000 marked the peak of the U.S. equity markets and the prelude to the dot-com collapse. Bernanke (2005, pp. 8-9) suggests that investment demand fell around the world as a result, yet with desired saving still high, he argues, real interest rates had to decline. As a result, “low real interest rates rather than high stock prices became a principal cause of lower U.S. saving.”The U.S. real interest rate indeed shows a remarkable coherence with the U.S. equity markets, as illustrated in Figure 7. Both the equity markets and the real interest rate peaked roughly in the period between February and October 2000, and then both began to decline sharply. Real long-term interest rates outside the U.S. also fell (Figure 6). The fall in equity values starting in 2000 could have been caused by a perception of lower future productivity, hence a reduced marginal productivity of capital. (Neither the size of the sharp run-up in equity prices to March 2000 nor the timing of their subsequent fall is easily rationalizable in terms of standard economic theory.) In any case, the data do not support a claim that the proximate cause of the fall in global real interest rates starting in 2000 was a contemporaneous increase in desired global saving (an outward shift of the world saving schedule). Indeed, according to IMF data, global saving (like global investment, of course), fell between 2000 and 2002 by about 1.8 percent of world GDP; aggregate global saving rose only later in the decade. If anything, the fall in real interest rates is more closely related to the global decline of the high-tech sector, which in the U.S. was a main driver of the foreign deficit during the 1990s. To restate this important point, market perceptions that the tech-driven productivity boom of the 1990shad ended, not the rise in global saving that occurred later in the 2000s, is a more plausible explanation of the general level of low real interest rates at the decade’s start.15 The fall in long-term interest rates brought down mortgage rates in the U.S. (and elsewhere in the world), with powerful effects on real estate markets. Home prices had been rising steadily in the U.S. since the middle 1990s; they began to rise more rapidly.16 Given the wide extent of homeownership in the U.S. and the relative ease, compared to other countries, of borrowing against housing equity, faster home appreciation reduced saving sharply and had an especially strong effect on the U.S. deficit, as argued by Bernanke. In most emerging markets, with much less developed financial markets, tighter borrowing constraints, and more restricted asset ownership, we would expect such asset-price effects on saving to be much weaker. For surplus countries, moreover, the conventional substitution effect on saving of lower world real interest rates was largely offset by an intertemporal terms of trade effect. But in the U.S. these effects reinforced each other (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). Residential investment rose along with real estate prices, adding a further impetus to deficits in countries with housing price booms.While global factors have clearly been important for long-term real interest rates, short-term nominal interest rates are controlled by central banks. In the United States, the Federal Reserve had been allowing the federal funds rate to rise since early 2000, reaching a target rate of 6.5 percent in May of that year (see Figure 8). Perceiving rapidly accelerating weakness in the economy after the high-tech collapse, the FOMC initiated a loosening cycle after a telephone conference on January 3, 2001. The FOMC cut the15 Even before the high-tech bust, the Asian crisis had created conditions that contributed to a long-lasting fall in investment in the crisis countries (for example, see Coulibaly and Millar 2008). This investment decline contributed to current-account surpluses (“excess” savings) for those countries.16 Figure 7 shows the Case-Shiller ten-city index.。