第四章附2004_heipke_eurosdr_GPS-IMU

Bernese PPP的数据处理方法berneseppp的数据处理方法伯尼斯5。

0ppp数据结算步骤bern的数据处理方法。

基本上可以分为下面几个步骤：一、处理数据的准备该步骤包括准备观测文件、星历文件和更新数据处理所需的表格文件，然后将RINEX格式的数据转换为伯尔尼二进制格式的文件，以加快数据读取速度。

rinex格式的文件分别为观测文件(ssssdddf．yyo)、导航文件(ssssdddf．yyn，ssssdddf．yyg)和气象文件(ssssdddf．yym)。

观测文件转换成bernese格式有如下四种格式，它们分别为：*.pzh(相位非差头文件)*.pzo(相位非差观测文件)*.czh(码非差头文件)*.czo(码非差观测文件)（1）原始文件（%%O、%%N、%%m）包括原始观测文件、原始导航文件和原始气象文件。

主要是原始观察文件；(2)大地基准面文件(datum)包括了目前所用的大地基准面模型。

除非添加新的大地基准面模型，一般无须更改；（3）相位中心校正表（phase__igs.01）包括最常用的天线和接收机及其参数；（4）地球重力场模型（jgm3.，gemq3.）手动gemq3，Jgm3。

对于BPE操作，无需更改；（5）极性偏差系数文件（poloff.）一般来说，没有必要改变；（6）卫星参数（satellite.EX1）应更改为卫星ttt(7)常数(const．)包括光速、l1、l2频率、地球半径、正常光压加速度等；一般不更改；（8）接收机信息文件主要包括接收机类型、单双频、观测码、接收机相位中心校正等，如果有新的接收机类型，可以按照规定的格式添加到该文件中；(9)地球自转参数信息文件(c04一$jj2.erp)$jj2为具体的年份，我们将其改成2002等，应该下载与观测值时间相符的相关文件；（10）第二次跳过文件（gpsutc）GPS第二次跳过；(11)卫星问题文件(sat一$jj2.crx)包括坏卫星和它们的观测值。

T R A I N I N G M A N U A L 训练手册Water Surface Profile ModelingBOSS INTERNATIONAL, INC© Copyright 2002 • All Rights ReservedWater Surface Profile Modelingusing HEC-RAS使用港口进入管制-随机存取存储器模拟水面轮廓Chris Maeder, M.S.BOSS InternationalHistory of BOSS International 老板国际公司的历史_ Started in 1986 -始于1986年_ University of Wisconsin, Madison spin-off company–威斯康星州，麦迪逊的副产品公司的培养基地_ Develop computer applications for the hydraulics, hydrology, groundwater, and environmental engineering areas研发了用于水力学，水文学，地下水和环境工程学区域的电脑软件1Technical Support技术支持_ WWW site _ On-line forums 网上论坛_ E-mailing lists 邮件_ Email ********************_ Telephone608-258-9910 电话608-258-9910_ Fax 608-258-9943 传真608-258-9943On-Line Forums 网上论坛2E-Mail Support Mailing List 电邮支持的邮件名单Additional Technical Documents 附加的技术文件3What Should You Know? 你需要知道什么？_ Basic understanding of river hydraulics 基本了解河流水利学_ The more modeling you have done the better, but not considered a prerequisite 建模做的越多越好，但是要有先决条件_ Basic computer operations 基本的电脑操作_ Microsoft Windows 微软视窗操作_ Course will focus on HEC-RAS as a tool for hydraulic modeling 课程着重于港口进入管制-随机存取存储器作为一种水力建模的工具Summary of Course 课程摘要_ Understand water surface profile modeling with HEC-RAS 理解拥有港口进入管制-随机存取存储器的水面轮廓建模_ Develop confidence in application of HEC-RAS to a variety of modeling problems树立港口进入管制-随机存取存储器可以应用在各种建模问题的信心_ Learn how to troubleshoot models 学会充当故障检修员_ Learn how to review analysis results 学会回顾分析结果_ Learn advanced modeling techniques 学会先进的建模技术_ Learn to recognize potential problems in a modeling situation 学会认知建模情况下的潜在问题。

ZEISS Planar T* 1.4/85Features•Fast f/1.4 aperture•Precise manual focusing•Robust full-metal construction•Fixation for focus and aperture•Identical color reproduction of all models•For industrial cameras with F-Mountup to sensor sizes of 24x36 mm or 43mm linesensors.ZF-I: Industrial EditionFeatures special screws tofix focus and aperturesettings even in roughsituations.ZF-IR: Infrared EditionFeatures special coating foroptimized performance innear-infrared applications.Camera MountsAvailable with ZF.2, EF andM42 mount.ZEISS Planar T* 1.4/85Technical SpecificationsFocal length 85 mmAperture range f/1.4 – f/16 (1/ 2 stop intervals)Number of elements / groups 6 / 5Min. working distance (object to sensor) 1000 mm (3.28 ft.) – ∞Min. free working distance 883 mm (2.90 ft.) – ∞Angular field* (diag. / horiz. / vert.) 29 / 24 / 16°Max. diameter of image field 43 mm (1.7")Flange focal length F-Mount: 46.5 mm (1.8"); M42-Mount: 45,5 mm Coverage at close range 240 x 360 mm (9.4 x 14"), line 430 mm (16.5”) Image ratio at close range 1:10Filter-thread M 72 x 0.75Weight 600 g (1.2 lbs.)Camera mount F bayonet, M42, EF* referring to 35 mm formatZEISS Planar T* 1.4/85Relative Illuminance*The relative illumination shows thedecrease in image brightness from theimage center to the edge in percent.__ f-number 1.4… f-number 2.8Relative Distortion*The relative distortion shows the deviationof the actual image height from the idealone in percent.*Data for infinite focus settingZEISS Planar T* 1.4/85MTF Charts*The Modulation Transfer (MTF) as afunction of image height (u) and slitorientation (sagittal, tangential) has beenmeasured with white light at spatialfrequencies of R = 10, 20 and 40cycles/mm. The MTF charts are valid forthe ZF, ZF-I version and for white light.f-number 1.4__ Sagittal… Tangentialf-number 5.6__ Sagittal… Tangential*Data for infinite focus setting / Not for IR versionZEISS Planar T* 1.4/85 Spectral Transmission ZF vs. ZF-IRZEISS Planar T* 1.4/85The diameter of the camera/lens adapter must not exceed 55 mm at the lens side!。

国家地理信息标准体系（第一版）二O O八年十二月前言随着经济全球化、全球信息化的发展，具有时空特征的地理信息已成为国家经济和社会发展的重要基础性战略性资源；作为整合其它各类自然资源、社会经济和人文信息的基础平台，地理信息越来越广泛地应用于国民经济、社会发展、国家安全和公众生活的各个方面。

全国地理信息标准化技术委员会是在地理信息领域内从事全国性标准化工作的技术组织，负责地理信息领域的标准化技术归口工作。

2006年国家测绘局和国家标准化管理委员会印发了《国家地理信息标准化“十一五”规划》，2007年全国地理信息标准化技术委员会印发了《国家地理信息标准化体系框架》，在这两个文件的基础上，编制“国家地理信息标准体系”。

- 1 -一、意义和作用编制“国家地理信息标准体系”是为适应在信息化和网络化环境下地理信息技术和产业发展的需要，促进地理信息资源的建设、协调、交流与集成；优化地理数据资源的开发与利用；规范地理信息服务和市场秩序；保护知识产权和国家地理信息安全；提高地理信息对经济社会发展的保障能力和服务水平；推进地理信息共享共建和产业发展的一项基础性工作。

编制和发布“国家地理信息标准体系”有利于标准化工作的科学性、计划性和有序性。

地理信息标准化是地理信息共享和系统集成的前提，也是地理信息产业化和社会化的必由之路。

“国家地理信息标准体系”为标准化主管部门制定方针政策提供参考；为地理信息产业法律、法规提供技术支撑；为地理信息市场准入、契约合同维护、合格评定、产品检验和质量体系认证等诸多方面提供依据；为跨部门的地理信息标准制、修订和协调提供指导。

- 2 -二、目标地理信息科学与技术是一门多学科交叉、融合的科学技术领域，“国家地理信息标准体系”面向表示四维时空信息，涉及的学科和行业多，采用的技术新、应用面广。

本标准体系定义地理信息数据模型和结构；理清标准间的层次及相互关系；解决共性标准和个性标准的隶属和包容的关系；规范地理信息数据的获取、处理、存储、分析、访问和表达；描述实现以数字或电子形式在不同用户、不同系统和不同空间位置之间的数据交流的方法、过程和服务；避免标准间的矛盾和交叉、遗漏和重复；推动在分布式计算环境中地理信息系统间的互操作；有利于克服地理信息标准编制的盲目性、随机性。

Secretariat ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 –DIN Deutsches Institut für Normung e. V., Burggrafenstr. 6, 10772 Berlin, GermanyTelephone: + 49 30 2601-2652; Facsimile: + 49 30 2601-1723; E-mail: krystyna.passia@din.de;HTTP://www.din.de/ni/sc27ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 N3987ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 /WG 3 N717REPLACES: N3592ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27Information technology - Security techniquesSecretariat: DIN, GermanyDOC TYPE:Final Text for Publication as TR Type 3TITLE:Final text for publication as ISO/IEC TR 15443-1: 2004 -Information technology - Security techniques – A framework forIT security assurance - Part 1: Overview and frameworkSOURCE:Project Editor Aaron CohenDATE:2004-04-05PROJECT: 1.27.21.01STATUS:This document is now ready to be published as ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2004(E). It contains many of the changes agreed at the last SC27/WG 3 meeting in Paris, France, October 20th – 24th , 2004(in accordance with SC27 N3797).ACTION ID:ITTF DUE DATE:DISTRIBUTION:P, O and L-MembersW. Fumy, SC 27 ChairmanM. De Soete, T. Humphreys, M. Ohlin, WG-ConvenersMEDIUM:Livelink-serverNO. OF PAGES:27ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2004(E)Contents1Scope (5)1.1Purpose (5)1.2Approach (5)1.3Application (5)1.4Field of Application (5)1.5Limitations (5)2Normative references (5)2.1ISO references (5)2.2Non-ISO references (6)3Terms and definitions (6)4Abbreviated terms (10)5Concepts (12)5.1Why do we need assurance? (12)5.2Assurance is distinguishable from confidence (12)5.3What is a deliverable? (13)5.4Stakeholders (13)5.5Assurance requirements (14)5.6Assurance methods applicability to IT security (14)5.7Assurance schemes (15)5.8Quantifying assurance risk and mechanism strength (15)5.9Assurance reduces security risk (15)5.10Quantifying assurance (15)5.11Assurance authority (15)6Selecting security assurance (16)6.1Assurance requirements specification (17)6.2Economical aspects (17)6.3Organisational aspects (18)6.4Type of assurance (18)6.5Technical aspects (18)6.6Optimisation considerations (19)7Framework (20)7.1Assurance approach (20)7.2Assurance Methods (20)7.3Life cycle aspects (21)7.4Correctness versus effectiveness assurance (22)7.5Categorisation of assurance methods (23)7.6Composite assurance (24)7.7Assurance rating (25)8Bibliography (25)2 © ISO/IEC 2004 – All rights reservedISO/IEC TR 15443-1ForewordThe International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) together form a system for worldwide standardisation as a whole. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the representative organisation to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organisations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work.In the field of Information Technology (IT), ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1. The main task of a technical committee is to prepare International Standards, but in exceptional circumstances, the publication of a Technical Report of one of the following types may be proposed:Type 1: when the necessary support within the technical committee cannot be obtained for the publication of an International Standard, despite repeated efforts;Type 2: when the subject is still under technical development requiring wider exposure;Type 3: when a technical committee has collected data of a different kind from that which is normally published as an International Standard.Technical Reports of types 1 and 2 are subject to review within three years of publication, to decide whether they can be transformed into International Standards. Technical Reports of type 3 do not necessarily have to be reviewed until the data they provide are considered to be no longer valid or useful.At the plenary meeting of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 in November 1994, a study group was set up to consider the question of testing and assessment methods which contribute to assurance that IT products and systems conform to security standards from SC 27 and elsewhere (e.g. SC 21 and ETSI; and some Internet standards contain security aspects). In parallel, the Common Criteria project created a working group on assurances approaches in early 1996. This Technical Report resulted from these two activities.ISO/IEC TR 15443, which is a Technical Report of type 3, was prepared by the Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information Technology, Subcommittee 27, IT Security Techniques.The structure of ISO/IEC TR 15443 is currently as follows:•Part 1: Overview and Framework.•Part 2: Assurance Methods.•Part 3: Analysis of Assurance Methods.© ISO/IEC 2004 – All rights reserved3ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2004(E)IntroductionThe objective of this Technical Report is to present a variety of assurance methods, and to guide the IT Security Professional in the selection of an appropriate assurance method (or combination of methods) to achieve confidence that a given deliverable satisfies its stated IT security assurance requirements. This report examines assurance methods and approaches proposed by various types of organisations whether they are approved or de-facto standards.In pursuit of this objective, this Technical Report comprises the following:a) a framework model to position existing assurance methods and to show their relationships;b) a collection of assurance methods, their description and reference;c) a presentation of common and unique properties specific to assurance methods;d) qualitative, and where possible, quantitative comparison of existing assurance methods;e) identification of assurance schemes currently associated with assurance methods;f) a description of relationships between the different assurance methods; andg) guidance to the application, composition and recognition of assurance methods.This Technical Report is organised in three parts to address the assurance approach, analysis, and relationships as follows:Part 1 Overview and Framework provides an overview of the fundamental concepts and a general description of assurance methods. This material is aimed at understanding Part 2 and Part 3 of this Technical Report. Part 1 targets IT security managers and others responsible for developing a security assurance program, determining the security assurance of their deliverable, entering an assurance assessment audit (e.g. ISO 9000, SSE-CMM (ISO/IEC 21827), ISO/IEC 15408-3), or other assurance activities.Part 2 Assurance Methods describes a variety of assurance methods and approaches and relates them to the security assurance framework model of Part 1. The emphasis is to identify qualitative properties of the assurance methods that contribute to assurance. This material is catering to an IT security professional for the understanding of how to obtain assurance in a given life cycle stage of deliverable.Part 3 Analysis of Assurance Methods analyses the various assurance methods with respect to their assurance properties. The analysis will aid the Assurance Authority in deciding the relative value of each Assurance Approach and determining the assurance approach(s) that will provide the assurance results most appropriate to their needs within the specific context of their operating environment. Furthermore, the analysis will also aid the Assurance Authority to use the assurance results to achieve the desired confidence of the deliverable. The material in this part targets the IT security professional who must select assurance methods and approaches.This Technical Report analyses assurance methods that may not be unique to IT security; however, guidance given in this Technical Report will be limited to IT security requirements. Similarly, additional terms and concepts defined in other International standardisation initiatives (i.e. CASCO) and International guides (e.g., ISO/IEC Guide 2) will be incorporated; however, guidance will be provided specific to the field of IT security and is not intended for general quality management and assessment, or IT conformity.4 © ISO/IEC 2004 – All rights reservedISO/IEC TR 15443-11 Scope1.1 PurposeTo introduce, relate and categorise security assurance methods to a generic life cycle model in a manner enabling an increased level of confidence to be obtained in the security functionality of a deliverable.1.2 ApproachThe approach adopted throughout this Technical Report presents an overview of the basic assurance concepts and terms required for understanding and applying assurance methods through a framework of identifying various assurance approaches and assurance stages.1.3 ApplicationUsing the categorisation obtained through Part 1 of this Technical Report, Parts 2 and 3 will guide the reader in the selection, and possible combination, of the assurance method(s) suitable for application to a given deliverable.1.4 Field of ApplicationPart 1 of this Technical Report will provide guidance for the categorisation of assurance methods including those not unique to IT security. It may be used in areas outside of IT security where criticality warrants assurance.1.5 LimitationsPart 1 of this Technical Report will apply to deliverables (refer to clause 3.19) and their related organisational security issues only.2 Normative referencesRefer to the following sub-clauses for normative ISO references and non-ISO references for further clarification of terminology, concepts and explanations. These references may be used to further the reader’s understanding of Part 1 of this Technical Report. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were used in the composition of Part 1 of this Technical Report.2.1 ISO referencesAll normative documents are subject to revision. The most recent editions of the normative documents indicated may contain variations. Members of IEC and ISO maintain registers of current valid International Standards.ISO/IEC Guide 2 Standardisation and related activities - General vocabulary.ISO 9000 Quality management systems - fundamentals and vocabulary.ISO 9001 Quality management systems - Requirements.ISO/IEC 9126-1 FDIS Software engineering - Product quality - Part 1: Quality model.ISO/IEC TR 13335 Information technology - Guidelines for the management of IT Security (all parts).ISO/IEC 14598 Information technology - Software product evaluation.ISO/IEC 15288 FCD Systems Engineering - System Life Cycle Processes.ISO/IEC 15504, Information Technology – Software Process Assessment (all parts).ISO/IEC 15408, Information technology – Security techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security (all parts).© ISO/IEC 2004 – All rights reserved5ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2004(E)ISO/IEC 18045, Methodology for IT security evaluation (also known as Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)).ISO/IEC 17799: Information Technology – Code of Practice for Information Security Management.ISO/IEC 21827, Information Technology - Systems Security Engineering - Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM).2.2 Non-ISO referencesThis clause contains non-ISO references that are considered normative for the purposes of this Technical Report. AGCA: A Guide to Certification and Accreditation for Information Technology Systems, Communications Security Establishment, Government of Canada, Ottawa, 1996.Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), Version 1.2 (Provisional), Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, June 1991.SSAM® (method) System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model, Appraisal Methodology, Version 1.1. June 1997. Available from Internet:< >.The Canadian trusted computer product evaluation criteria: version 3.0e / Canadian System Security Centre, Communications Security Establishment, Government of Canada, January 1993. Available From: National Library of Canada [xxv, 208 p.: ill.; 28 cm], LC Call no.: QA 76.9.A25 C36 1991.Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), DoD Standard 5200.28-STD, U.S. Department of Defense, December 1985.Trusted Product Evaluation Program (TPEP) Overview, National Computer Security Center (NCSC), National Security Agency (NSA). Available from Internet: < /tpep/process/procedures.html >.3 Terms and definitionsThe terms and definitions have been developed to be as generic as possible to support the assurance model developed in Part 1 of this Technical Report. The assurance model, being applicable to a broad spectrum of assurance approaches, requires non-specific terminology to be applicable to a broad spectrum of assurance approaches.Defining terms for a generic assurance model is a difficult task owing to the myriad of assurance terms that exist to satisfy the available assurance approaches. Furthermore, similar terms have different definitions and many are unique to a particular assurance approach making it difficult to construct a generic language for the assurance model. Owing to these difficulties, terms and definitions have been crafted to ensure the neutrality of the assurance framework and applicability to a wide range of assurance methods. Relevant ISO standards are used wherever possible, in particular to maintain compatibility to ISO/IEC 15408 Parts 1 - 3 and ISO 9000 series.The next difficulty was how to address the multiple definitions that existed for the same term and definitions that were not used, as they were not generic enough for the model. Should these terms be ignored or maintained for reference purposes? Ignoring definitions posed the problem of confusing readers when discussing the assurance approach from which they came. Maintaining definitions specific to a unique assurance approach added a level of formatting complexity to this Technical Report; however, the appropriate definition could then be used within the correct context. It was decided to maintain the previous definitions and to present them in a clear manner. Where multiple definitions exist for the same term, the principal definition for the purpose of this Technical Report is listed first. Alternate definitions are only applicable when cited in the context of their source, are bulleted and denoted in italics.3.1accreditationProcedure by which an authoritative body gives formal recognition, approval, and acceptance of the associated residual risk:a) for the operation of an automated system in a particular security mode using a particular set of safeguards[adapted from AGCA];6 © ISO/IEC 2004 – All rights reservedISO/IEC TR 15443-1b) that a security body or person is competent to carry out specific tasks [adapted from ISO/IEC Guide 2]; andc) that a security service is suitable for the target environment.3.2approachThe method used or steps taken in setting about a task or problem.3.3assessmentVerification of a deliverable against a standard using the corresponding method to establish compliance and determine the assurance.3.4assurancePerformance of appropriate activities or processes to instil confidence that a deliverable meets its security objectives.•Grounds for confidence that an entity meets its security objectives [ISO/IEC 15408–1].3.5assurance approachA grouping of assurance methods according to the aspect examined.3.6assurance argumentA set of structured assurance claims, supported by evidence and reasoning, that demonstrate clearly how assurance needs have been satisfied.3.7assurance assessmentVerification and recording of the overall types and amounts of assurance associated with the deliverable (entered into the assurance argument).3.8assurance authorityA person or organisation delegated the authority for decisions (i.e. selection, specification, acceptance, enforcement) related to a deliverable’s assurance that ultimately leads to the establishment of confidence in the deliverable.Note: In specific schemes or organisations, the term for assurance authority may be different such as evaluation authority. 3.9assurance evidenceWork products resulting from the assurance analysis of the deliverable (including summary reports or other justification) that supports the assurance claim.3.10assurance levelThe amount of assurance obtained according to the specific scale used by the assurance method.Notes:1. the assurance level may not be measurable in quantitative terms.2. The amount of assurance obtained is generally related to the effort expended on the activities performed.3.11assurance methodA recognised specification for obtaining reproducible assurance results.3.12assurance propertyA characteristic of an assurance method that contributes to the assurance result.© ISO/IEC 2004 – All rights reserved7ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2004(E)8 © ISO/IEC 2004 – All rights reserved3.13assurance resultDocumented numerical or qualitative assurance statement pertaining to a deliverable.3.14assurance schemeThe administrative and regulatory framework under which an assurance method is applied by an assurance authority within a specific community or organisation.• The administrative and regulatory framework under which the Common Criteria is applied by an evaluationauthority within a specific community [ISO/IEC 15408–1].3.15assurance stageThe deliverable life cycle stage on which a given assurance method is focused. The overall deliverable assurance takes into account the results of the assurance methods applied throughout the deliverable life cycle.3.16assurance evidenceWorkproducts or any items generated from the assurance analysis of the deliverable including reports (justification) to support the assurance claim.3.17certificationProcedure by which a formal assurance statement is given that a deliverable conforms to specified requirements.Certification may be performed by a third party or self-certified. [adapted from ISO/IEC Guide 2:1996].• The issue of a formal statement confirming the results of an evaluation, and that the evaluation criteriaused where correctly applied [ITSEC].• The certification process is the independent inspection of the results of the evaluation leading to theproduction of the final certificate or approval [ISO/IEC 15408–1].•Certification The comprehensive assessment of the technical and non-technical security features of aninformation technology system, made in support of accreditation that establishes the extent to which asystem satisfies a specified security policy [AGCA].3.18confidenceA belief that a deliverable will perform in the way expected or claimed (i.e. properly, trustworthy, enforce security policy, reliably, effectively).3.19deliverableAn IT security product, system, service, process, or environmental factor (i.e. personnel, organisation) or the object of an assurance assessment. An object may be a Protection Profile (PP) or Security Target (ST) as defined by ISO/IEC15408-1.Note: ISO 9000:2000 holds that a service is a type of product and “product and/or service" when used in the ISO 9000family of standards.3.20evaluationAssessment of a deliverable against defined criteria (adapted from ISO/IEC 15408–1).• Systematic examination (quality evaluation) of the extent to which an entity is capable of fulfillingspecified requirements [ISO/IEC 14598-1].ISO/IEC TR 15443-1© ISO/IEC 2004 – All rights reserved93.21guaranteeRefer to the definition for Warranty in clause 3.36.3.22IT security productA package of IT software, firmware and/or hardware, providing functionality designed for use or incorporation within a multiplicity of systems [ISO/IEC 15408–1].3.23life cycle stageAn instance within the deliverable life cycle that relates to the state of the deliverable.• A period within the system life cycle that relates to the state of the system description and/or the systemitself [ISO/IEC 15288].3.24pedigreeInformal recognition of the vendor’s consistent repeatability to provide deliverables that satisfy its security policy or to perform as claimed (pedigree is an environmental factor associated with the vendor or deliverable).3.25processAn organised set of activities which uses resources to transform inputs to outputs [ISO 9000: 2000]3.26process assuranceAssurance derived from an assessment of activities of a process.3.27productRefer to the definition of deliverable.3.28schemeSet of rules defining the environment, including criteria and methodology required to conduct an assessment [adapted from ISO/IEC18045 (Common Evaluation Methodology)].3.29securityAll aspects related to defining, achieving, and maintaining confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability,authenticity, and reliability [ISO/IEC13335-1].Note: A product, system, or service is considered to be secure to the extent that its users can rely that it functions (or will function) in the intended way. This is usually considered in the context of an assessment of actual or perceived threats.• The capability of the software product to protect information and data so that unauthorised persons orsystems cannot read or modify them and authorised persons or systems are not denied access to them[ISO/IEC 9126-1].3.30security assessmentVerification of a security deliverable against a security standard using the corresponding security method to establish compliance and determine the security assurance.• The last stage of the product evaluation process [ISO/IEC 14598-1].3.31security elementAn indivisible security requirement.ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2004(E)10 © ISO/IEC 2004 – All rights reserved 3.32serviceA security process or task performed by a deliverable, organisation, or person.3.33stakeholderA party having a right, share, or an asset at risk in a deliverable or in its possession of characteristics that meet the party’s needs and expectations.• A party having a right, share, or claim asset in a system or in its possession of characteristics that meetthe party’s needs and expectations [ISO/IEC 15288].3.34systemA specific IT installation, with a particular purpose and operational environment [ISO/IEC 15408–1].• A combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated purposes [ISO/IEC15288].NOTES:1. A system may be considered as a product and/or as the services it provides [ISO/IEC 15288].2. In practice, the interpretation of its meaning is frequently clarified by the use of an associative noun, e.g. aircraftsystem. Alternatively the word system may be substituted simply by a context dependent synonym, e.g. aircraft,though this may then obscure a system principles perspective [ISO/IEC 15288].3.35system life cycleThe evolution with time of the system from conception through to disposal [ISO/IEC 15288].3.36warrantyA security service to correct or mitigate the deliverable’s operation (deployment, performance, or delivery) if it does not satisfy its security policy.3.37work productAll items (i.e. documents, reports, files, data, etc.) generated in the course of performing any process for developing and supplying the deliverable [SSE-CMM (ISO/IEC 21827)].• Result of a system of activities, which use resources to transform inputs into outputs [ISO 9001].4 Abbreviated termsThe following abbreviations are used in this Technical Report.ASTAbstract Security TargetBSIBundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (German Information Security Agency)CASCOISO Committee on conformity assessmentCEMCommon Evaluation Methodology (precursor of, and equivalent to NP N2729r1 Methodology for IT security evaluation)Capability Maturity ModelCSECommunications Security Establishment (Canadian IT Security Agency)CTCPECCanadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (edited by CSE)HCDHuman Centered DesignIECInternational Electrotechnical CommissionITInformation TechnologyISOInternational Organization for StandardisationITSECInformation Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) ITSEMInformation Technology Security Evaluation Methodology (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities)NSANational Security Agency (Government Agency of the USA)PPProtection Profile (defined in ISO/IEC 15408-1)RAMPRatings And Maintenance Phase (NSA process following TCSEC evaluations)RMRatings and Maintenance phase (CSE process following CTCPEC evaluations)SCTStrict (Security) Conformance TestingSE-CMMSystem Engineering Capability Maturity Model (Capability Maturity Model is a Trade Mark™ of Carnegie-Mellon University)STSecurity Target (defined in ISO/IEC 15408-1)SSAM®SSE-CMM Appraisal Methodology (promoted by Support Organization), an entity within the International Systems Security Engineering Association (ISSEA)SSE-CMM®System Security Engineering - Capability Maturity Model ISO/IEC 21827 (submitted to ISO as a publicly available standard by the Support Organization of the International Systems Security Engineering Association (ISSEA)Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (edited by NSA)TOETarget of Evaluation (Term specific to ISO/IEC 15408 and defined in ISO/IEC 15408-1)TPEPTrusted Product Evaluation Program (TCSEC and CTCPEC)TRAThreat and Risk Assessment5 ConceptsThis section introduces the concepts of assurance and aims to differentiate the applicability of assurance concepts between general IT assurance and IT security assurance. The concepts are broad and should not be applied specifically to IT security or conformity assessments.5.1 Why do we need assurance?IT systems are prone to failure and security violations due to errors and vulnerabilities. These errors and vulnerabilities can be caused by rapidly changing technology, human error, poor requirement specifications, poor development processes or as a result of underestimating the threat. In addition, system modifications, new flaws, and new attacks are frequently introduced contributing to increased vulnerabilities, failures, and security violations throughout the IT system life cycle.Due to human error or oversight, component or equipment failure, and due to imperfection of the opposing security mechanisms, error-free, failure-free and risk-free operation is not usually achievable within acceptable cost and time constraints over the deliverable of the IT system life cycle. This situation makes it almost impossible to guarantee an error-free, risk-free, and secure IT system.From the above paragraphs, it can be seen that errors, vulnerabilities and risks will probably always exist and may change over the deliverable’s life cycle. Therefore, the errors, vulnerabilities and risks will have to be managed over the deliverable’s life cycle within acceptable parameters otherwise the deliverable assurance will change. The task of IT security engineering and management is to manage the security risk by mitigating the vulnerabilities and threats with technological and organisational security measures to achieve a deliverable with acceptable assurance. IT security management has an additional task of establishing acceptable assurance and risk objectives. In this way, the stakeholders of an IT system will achieve reasonable confidence that the deliverable performs in the way intended or claimed with acceptable risk and within budget. From a security standpoint, this translates into confidence that the deliverable enforces the applicable security policy.5.2 Assurance is distinguishable from confidenceIt is important to point out that assurance and confidence are not identical and cannot be used in place of one another. Too often, these terms are used incorrectly as they are closely related. It is important for the reader to understand the distinction between these two terms. Confidence, from the perspective of an individual, is related to the belief that one has in the assurance of the deliverable whereas assurance is related to the demonstrated ability of the deliverable to perform its security objectives. Therefore, confidence is not a certainty but an expression of trust and belief created through assurance.Assurance is determined from the evidence produced by the assessment process of the deliverable. The evidence, usually composed of an assurance argument, documentation, and other related work products, substantiates the claimed assurance based on the security engineering and assessment activities.Confidence is subject to the individual’s perception of their specific security requirements and to the knowledge gained in assessment processes that the deliverable will perform in the way expected or claimed. This includes the knowledge of the assurance criteria, method, scheme, and assessment process used. Furthermore, the reputation of the assessors and operators is a significant factor in establishing confidence of the deliverable as their qualifications。

ISTRUZIONI D'USO E DI INSTALLAZIONE INSTALLATION AND USER'S MANUALINSTRUCTIONS D'UTILISATION ET D'INSTALLATION INSTALLATIONS-UND GEBRAUCHSANLEITUNG INSTRUCCIONES DE USO Y DE INSTALACION INSTRUÇÕES DE USO E DE INSTALAÇÃOCENTRALINA DI COMANDO D811184A ver. 04 08-02-02I CONTROL UNIT GB UNITÉ DE COMMANDE F STEUERZENTRALE D CENTRAL DE MANDO E CENTRAL DO MANDOP ARIES - ARIES P8027908113740a“WARNINGS” leaflet and an “INSTRUCTION MANUAL”.These should both be read carefully as they provide important information about safety, installation, operation and maintenance. This product complies with the recognised technical standards and safety regulations. We declare that this product is in conformity with the following European Directives: 89/336/EEC and 73/23/EEC (and subsequent amendments).1) GENERAL OUTLINEThe ARIES control unit has been designed for swing gates. It can be used for one or two gate controllers.The control unit mod. ARIES P can also be used to perform opening of a single actuator while keeping the other one closed (pedestrian access).2) FUNCTIONSSTOP: In all cases: it stops the gate until a new start command is given.PHOT:Functions can be set with Dip-Switch.Activated during closing.Activated during opening and closing.Rapid closingON: When the position of the gate photocells is exceeded, during both opening and closing, the gate automatically starts to close even if TCA is activated. We recommend setting DIP3 to ON (photocells only activated during closing).Blocks impulsesON: During opening, START commands are not accepted.OFF: During opening, START commands are accepted.PhotocellsON: Photocells only activated during closing.OFF: Photocells activated during opening and closing.Automatic closing time (TCA)ON: Automatic closing activated (can be adjusted from 0 to 90s)Preallarm (mod. ARIES P only)ON: The flashing light turns on abt 3 seconds before the motors start.FOR THE INSTALLER: check the boxes you are interested in.START:four-step logic Gate closedGate openDuring openingDuring closingAfter stop START: two-step logic SCA: Gate open indicating lightit opens it opensit stops and activates TCAit closesit stops and does not activate TCAit starts opening it stops and activats TCA (if activated)it closesit opensit opensoffononflashingATTENTION:Dip non used in mod. ARIES (always in OFF set).3) MAINTENANCE AND DEMOLITIONThe maintenance of the system should only be carried out by qualified personnel regularly. The materials making up the set and its packing must be disposed of according to the regulations in force.Batteries must be properly disposed of.WARNINGSCorrect controller operation is only ensured when the data contained in the present manual are observed. The company is not to be held responsible for any damage resulting from failure to observe the installation standards and the instructions contained in the present manual.The descriptions and illustrations contained in the present manual are not binding. The Company reserves the right to make any alterations deemed appropriate for the technical, manufacturing and commercial improvement of the product, while leaving the essential product features unchanged, at any time and without undertaking to update the present publication.D 811184A _04Thank you for buying this product, our company is sure that you will be more than satisfied with the product ’s performance. The product is supplied with a “WARNINGS ” leaflet and an “INSTRUCTION MANUAL ”.These should both be read carefully as they provide important information about safety, installation, operation and maintenance.This product complies with the recognised technical standards and safety regulations. We declare that this product is in conformity with the following European Directives: 89/336/EEC and 73/23/EEC (and subsequent amendments).1) GENERAL OUTLINEThe ARIES control unit has been designed for swing gates. It can be used for one or two gate controllers.The control unit mod. ARIES P can also be used to perform opening of a single actuator while keeping the other one closed (pedestrian access).2) GENERAL SAFETYWARNING! An incorrect installation or improper use of the product can cause damage to persons, animals or things.•The “Warnings ” leaflet and “Instruction booklet ” supplied with this product should be read carefully as they provide important information about safety, installation, use and maintenance.•Scrap packing materials (plastic, cardboard, polystyrene etc) according to the provisions set out by current standards. Keep nylon or polystyrene bags out of children ’s reach.•Keep the instructions together with the technical brochure for future reference.•This product was exclusively designed and manufactured for the use specified in the present documentation. Any other use not specified in this documentation could damage the product and be dangerous.•The Company declines all responsibility for any consequences resulting from improper use of the product, or use which is different from that expected and specified in the present documentation.•Do not install the product in explosive atmosphere.•The Company declines all responsibility for any consequences resulting from failure to observe Good Technical Practice when constructing closing structures (door, gates etc.), as well as from any deformation which might occur during use.•The installation must comply with the provisions set out by the following European Directives: 89/336/EEC, 73/23/EEC, 98/37/ECC and subsequent amendments.•Disconnect the electrical power supply before carrying out any work on the installation. Also disconnect any buffer batteries, if fitted.•Fit an omnipolar or magnetothermal switch on the mains power supply,having a contact opening distance equal to or greater than 3mm.•Check that a differential switch with a 0.03A threshold is fitted just before the power supply mains.•Check that earthing is carried out correctly: connect all metal parts for closure (doors, gates etc.) and all system components provided with an earth terminal.•The Company declines all responsibility with respect to the automation safety and correct operation when other manufacturers ’ components are used.•Only use original parts for any maintenance or repair operation.•Do not modify the automation components, unless explicitly authorised by the company.•Instruct the product user about the control systems provided and the manual opening operation in case of emergency.•Do not allow persons or children to remain in the automation operation area.•Keep radio control or other control devices out of children ’s reach, in order to avoid unintentional automation activation.•The user must avoid any attempt to carry out work or repair on the automation system, and always request the assistance of qualified personnel.•Anything which is not expressly provided for in the present instructions,is not allowed.3) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSPower supply:...............................................................230V ±10% 50Hz Absorption on empty:.................................................................0.5A max Output power for accessories:..........................................24V~ 6VA max Max relay current:................................................................................8A Max power of motors:...............................................................300 W x 2Torque limiter:.................................................Self-transformer with 4 pos Limit switch:................................................................Adjustable run timePanel dimensions:.........................................................................See fig.1Cabinet protection:............................................................................IP55Working temperature:...............................................................-20 +55°C 4) TERMINAL BOARD CONNECTIONS(Fig.2)CAUTION: Keep the low voltage connections completely separated from the power supply connections.Fig.3 shows the fixing and connection method of the drive condensers whenever they are not fitted to the motor.JP51-2 Single-phase power supply 230V ±10%, 50 Hz (1=L/2=N).For connection to the mains use a multiple-pole cable with a minimum cross section of 3x1.5mm 2 of the type indicated in the above-mentioned standard (by way of example, if the cable is not shielded it must be at least equivalent to H07 RN-F while, if shielded, it must be at least equivalent to H05 VV-F with a cross section of 3x1.5mm 2).JP33-4 (mod.ARIES-P) 230V 40W max. blinker connection.5-6 (mod.ARIES) 230V 40W max. blinker connection.7-8-9 Motor M1 connection - 8 common, 7-9 start.10-11-12 Motor M2(r) connection - 11 common, 10-12 start.JP413-14 Open-close button and key switch (N.O.).13-15 Stop button (N.C.). If unused, leave bridged.13-16 Photocell or pneumatic edge input (N.C.). If unused, leave bridged.17-18 24V 3W max. gate open warning light.18-19 24V~ 0.25A max. (6VA) output (for supplying photocell or other device).20-21 Antenna input for radio-receiver board (20 signal - 21 braid).22 Common terminal (equivalent to terminal 13).23 Terminal for pedestrian control. It moves the leaf of motor M2 connected to terminal 10-11-12. This terminal is available only in ARIES-P control unit.JP225-26 2nd radio channel output of the double-channel receiver board (terminals not fitted on ARIES but fitted on ARIES-P) contact N.O.JP1 Radio-receiver board connector 1-2 channels.5) FUNCTIONSDL1:Power-on LedIt is switched on when the board is electrically powered.START: four-step logic: (DIP5 OFF)gate closed:..................................................................................it opens during opening:............................................... it stops and activates TCA gate open:................................................................................... it closes during closing:.................................... it stops and does not activate TCA after stop:.........................................................................it starts opening START: two-step logic: (DIP5 ON)gate closed:..................................................................................it opens during opening:................................it stops and activats TCA (if activated)gate open:....................................................................................it closes during closing:..............................................................................it opens after stop:.....................................................................................it opens STOP: In all cases: it stops the gate until a new start command is given.PHOT:Functions can be set with DIP-SWITCH.Activated during closing if DIP3-ON.Activated during opening and closing if DIP3-OFF.SCA: Gate open indicating light.with gate closed:...................................................................................off when gate is opening:...........................................................................on with gate open:.......................................................................................on when gate is closing:.....................................................................flashing 6) DIP-SWITCH SELECTION DIP1 Rapid closingON: When the position of the gate photocells is exceeded, during both opening and closing, the gate automatically starts to close even if TCA is activated. We recommend setting DIP3 to ON (photocells only activated during closing).OFF: Function not activated.DIP2 Blocks impulsesON: During opening, START commands are not accepted.OFF: During opening, START commands are accepted.DIP3 PhotocellsON: Photocells only activated during closing.OFF: Photocells activated during opening and closing.D 811184A _04DIP4 Automatic closing time (TCA)ON: Automatic closing activated (can be adjusted from 0 to 90s).OFF: Automatic closing not activated.DIP5 Control logicON: 2-step logic is activated (see start paragraph).OFF: 4-step logic is activated (see start paragraph).DIP6: Preallarm (mod.ARIES P only)ON: The flashing light turns on abt 3 seconds before the motors start.OFF The flashing light turns on simultaneously with the start of the motors.ATTENTION:Dip non used in mod. ARIES (always in OFF set).7) TRIMMER ADJUSTMENTTCA This adjusts the automatic closing time, after which time the gate automatically closes (can be adjusted from 0 to 90s).TW This adjusts the motor working time, after which time the motor stops (can be adjusted from 0 to 40s).TDELAY This adjusts the closing delay time of the second motor (M2).8) MOTOR TORQUE ADJUSTMENTThe ARIES control unit has electric torque adjustment which allows the motor force to be adjusted.The adjustment should be set for the minimum force required to carry out the opening and closing strokes completely.Adjustment is carried out by moving the connection 55 (fig.3) on the tran-sformer sockets as described below:Pos.T1 1st TORQUE (MINIMUM TORQUE)Pos.T2 2nd TORQUE Pos.T3 3rd TORQUEPos.T4 4th TORQUE (MAXIMUM TORQUE)4 motor torque values can be obtained.To gain access to the torque adjustment sockets, disconnect the mains supply and remove the protective case “P ” of the transfomer.CAUTION: Excessive torque adjustment may jeopardise the anti-squash safety function. On the other hand insufficient torque adjustment may not guarantee correct opening or closing strokes.9) MAINTENANCE AND DEMOLITIONThe maintenance of the system should only be carried out by qualified personnel regularly. The materials making up the set and its packing must be disposed of according to the regulations in force.Batteries must be properly disposed of.WARNINGSCorrect controller operation is only ensured when the data contained in the present manual are observed. The company is not to be held responsible for any damage resulting from failure to observe the installation standards and the instructions contained in the present manual.The descriptions and illustrations contained in the present manual are not binding. The Company reserves the right to make any alterations deemed appropriate for the technical, manufacturing and commercial improvement of the product, while leaving the essential product features unchanged, at any time and without undertaking to update the present publication.D811184A_04ARIES/ARIES-P - Ver. 04 -23。

Automatic aerial triangulation: results of theOEEPE-ISPRS test and current developmentsCHRISTIAN HEIPKE, HannoverABSTRACTThe European Organisation f or Experimental Photogrammetric Research (OEEPE) and the International Society f or Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ISPRS) have carried out a test on the perf ormance of tie point extraction in automatic aerial triangulation (AAT). The aims of the test were to investigate the geometrical block stability, the accuracy of the tie points and the derived orientation parameters, and the limitations of existing commercial and experimental sof tware systems. In order to separate the essentially new aspect of digital processing, namely automation, f rom conventional issues of aerial triangulation, control inf ormation was not assessed, and the test blocks to be processed had an arbitrary block datum.The Chair f or Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, Technische Universität München acted as pilot centre f or the test. In early 1997 various small blocks of dif f erent scene content were distributed to interested participants. Their task was to generate tie points in an automatic way. The results of 21 participants, including all major sof tware vendors of AAT and users of their systems, have been analysed and are presented in this report. If a large number of tie points per image has been extracted, the blocks were f ound to be mostly stable. Under good conditions (open, f lat terrain) an accuracy f or the tie points of up to 2.2 µm corresponding to 0.11 pixel could be reached, while under less f avourable conditions, the result was 4-9 µm or 0.2-0.3 pixel. These f igures were f ound to be very similar f or the dif f erent systems. In mountainous and f orested areas, some systems f ailed to produce acceptable results. Reliable self control is a f eature missing in all systems as of 1997. Also, it seems that considerable experience is required to properly run the systems. Besides the test results this paper also discusses recent improvements of AAT and the current state-of-the-art. While relatively large cost savings have been realised in practice using AAT instead of analytical aerial triangulation, human supervision and intervention will remain necessary. An integration of AAT with the direct measurement of the parameters of exterior orientation by means of GPS and INS is seen as the most powerf ul way f or obtaining highly accurate and reliable image orientation in f uture.1. INTRODUCTIONAutomatic aerial triangulation (AAT) has been an increasingly interesting topic of research and development in digital photogrammetry for a number of years (see Schenk 1997 for an excellent review of the subject). The two tasks of measuring the image coordinates of tie points and of computing the orientation parameters, which were well separated in analytical photogrammetry, are more and more being merged into a single process, carried out in a hierarchical fashion using image pyramids. In future there will most probably be an option to also include the generation of digital terrain models (DTM) into this process. At the same time a shift of focus concerning the results of aerial triangulation can be observed. While in earlier times point densification was the primary goal, currently the orientation parameters themselves are of growing importance. There are two reasons for this shift of focus: First, the automatically determined tie points are not really useful for point densification, since in general they do not fulfil the requirements set out in the point selection phase of analytical aerial triangulation. Second, the orientation parameters themselves are increasingly used directly for subsequent tasks such as orthoprojection or vector data capture.Over the last few years various AAT software systems with different degree of automation have been developed and have become commercially available, either as stand-alone packages or as part of a Digital Photogrammetric Workstation. These systems have been introduced into practice, and users have started to report on obtained results. At the same time a number of questions remained open, from the theoretical side (how to best select image primitives suitable for point transfer, multi image matching vs. matching only two images at a time, area based vs. feature based matching, the influence of local image texture etc.) as well as from the practical side (how accurate do initialvalues of exterior orientation have to be, what is the most suitable pixel size to use, how many tie points should be available per image, which degree of automation can be reached and what does it depend on, what is the effect of image compression, how to implement an efficient procedure for quality control etc.).In 1996 the European Organisation for Experimental Photogrammetric Research (OEEPE) and the International Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ISPRS) launched a common test on the performance of tie point extraction in automatic aerial triangulation (Heipke, Eder 1996) in order to approach some of the open questions and to allow a comprehensive comparison between the available systems. …Tie point extraction“ is meant to include the selection, transfer and image coordinate measurement of block tie points. The test was primarily aimed at the commercial software development and the user community of AAT systems. Detailed results of this test have been published in Heipke, Eder (1999). In this paper a synthesis of these results is given. It should be noted that the reported results refer to the AAT software available in 1997. In the meantime, and perhaps partly as a reaction to the test results, improvements of the commercial systems could be observed. These improvements are discussed together with some thoughts about the future of automatic aerial triangulation at the end of this paper.2. THE OEEPE-ISPRS TEST2.1. Test goalsThe goals of the test were developed in preliminary discussions together with potential test participants. It was decided to investigate- the geometrical stability of the resulting block,- the accuracy of the image coordinates of the tie points, and- the limitations of existing commercial and experimental software systems.Throughout the test, tie point extraction was considered to be a totally autonomous process, to be carried out without any user interaction. In particular, any interaction during the tie point generation process, as well as manual editing or completion of the automatically obtained results in order to improve the measurement precision, to eliminate blunders and/or to introduce new measurements in areas where the automatic process failed to determine tie points, was not allowed within the test. Only automatic blunder detection and elimination within a robust adjustment was permitted. In this way the essentially new aspect of digital imagery, namely automation, could be investigated separately from the issues which basically remain constant in the transition from analytical to digital photogrammetry (control information, block configuration, accuracy propagation, etc.).2.2. Test organisation and test data setsThe Chair for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, Technische Universität München (TUM) acted as pilot centre for the test. In early 1997 various small blocks of different scene content (see table 1) were distributed to interested participants. As an example the data set Montserrat is depicted in figure 1. Guidelines for the selection of the test data were the need for a representative test data set covering different standard applications in photogrammetry, for small blocks/strips resulting in manageable data volumes, and the use of photogrammetric images and scanners only. The first point inspired the use of different scene contents, topography, cameras, scales, film material, and overlap configurations. As far as image scales were concerned, preference was given to larger scales, because in these cases, potential matching problems due to occlusions and relief displacement are more pronounced.Project name E challens Montserrat O SU Kapellen München Scene content open, partly forest forest, partly built-up built-up, partly trees settlement, partly opencity centreScene topography flat hilly flat, buildings flat buildings Image scale 1 : 5000 1 : 15000 1 : 4000 1 : 4000 1 : 2000 Camera Wild RC 10 Zeiss RMK TOP Wild RC 10 Zeiss RMK A Zeiss RMK A Focal length [mm] 150 150 150 150 300 Flight datum September 1982 May 1995 September 1995April 1992 May 1975Film material black and white black and white FIR black and whitecolourNumber of images 3 x 3 3 x 3 3 x 3 2 x 3 3Overlap l = 60 %, q = 30 % L = 60 %, q = 30 % l = 60 %, q = 60 % l = 60 %, q = 60 %l = 60 %Scanner used LH DSW 200 Zeiss PS1 LH DSW 200 Wehrli RM1 Zeiss PS1 Pixel size for test 20 µm 30 µm 25 µm 24 µm 30 µm Scanned material negative, original negative, original positive, original negative, original positive,originalScanned channel pan pan red (= infrared) pan red Scan datum January 1996 November 1996 October 1995 June 1996 December 1996 Source EPFL, Lausanne ICC, Barcelona The Ohio State University / TU München Hanover University TechnischeUniversität(TU) MünchenTable 1: Description of the test data sets.The second point led to the selection of blocks with 3 x 2 and 3 x 3 images, strips with 3 images and pixel sizes of 20-30 µm. While operational problems cannot be detected with such small blocks, the geometrical block stability and the accuracy of the tie points can be assessed. As for the third point, only first generation film products were scanned and all employed scanners are especially designed for photogrammetric applications.The task of the participants was to automatically generate tie points without human intervention using an AAT software available to them, given the digital imagery together with auxiliary information. Wherever possible a common set of free parameters for the individual programs was to be used. After announcing the test 39 interested groups requested the test data. 21 participants (4 major commercial AAT software providers, 5 national/regional mapping organisations, 4 private companies, 3 research institutes employing commercial products, and 5 research institutes who had developed their own AAT software; see table 2) returned results. Four groups can be distinguished, namely users of the commercial systems HATS from LH Systems (de Venecia et a. 1996; 7 users), Match AT from Inpho (Ackermann, Krzystek 1997; 5 users), and Phodis AT from Carl Zeiss (Tang et al. 1997; 4 users), and the five participants having developed their own software (FGI - Honkavaara, Hogholen 1996; IPI - Wang 1996; TUM - Brand, Heipke 1998; DIIAR - Forlani et al. 1998; OUAT - Paszotta 1998).Figure 1: Imagery for test data set Montserrat.full name and abbreviation of participantsoftware and version no.E c h a l l e n sK a p e l l e nM o n t s e r r a tM ün c h e nO S ULH Systems, San DiegoLHS HATS, 3.2.1.1 X X X X Bundesamt für Geod. u. Kart., Frankfurt/M.BKG HATS, 3.1.1.2 X X X X Institute for Photogrammetry, E PFL LausanneEPFL HATS, 3.1.3k X X X National Land Survey of Finland, HelsinkiNLS-SF HATS, 3.2.1.2 X National Land Survey of Sweden, Gäv le NLS-WE HATS, 4.0.8 X X X X School of Geomatics, UNSW, Sydney UNSW HATS, 3.2.1 X X X X Swissphoto, Regensdorf SWPH HATS, 3.2.1.2 * X X X X X Inpho GmbH, Stuttgart Inpho Match AT, 2.1.0 X X X X X Intergraph, HuntsvilleI-graph Match AT, 2.1.1 X X X X X Compagnia Generale Ripreseaeree, ParmaCGR Match AT, 2.1.1 X X X Hansa Luftbild, MünsterHL Match AT, 2.1.1 X Photogrammetrie GmbH, München Ph GmbH Match AT, 2.1.1 X X Carl Zeiss, O berkochenCZ Phodis AT, 2.0.1 X X X X X Bayerisches Landesvermessungsamt, MünchenB-LVA Phodis AT, 2.0.0 X X X X X General Command of M apping, Ankara GCM Phodis AT, 2.0.0 X X X X Landesvermessung + Geobasisdaten, HannoverLGN Phodis AT, 2.0.0 X X Finnish Geodetic Institute, Masala FGI research system X X Institute of Photogrammetry and E ng. Surveys, HannoverIPI research system X X X Chair for Photogram. & Rem. Sensing, T U MünchenTUM research system X X X X X Dip. Ing. e Idraul. Amb. e del Rilev., Politec. di MilanoDIIARresearch system X X X XChair of Ph & RS, O lsztyn Univ. of Agricul. a. T echn.OUAT research system XTable 2: List of test participants (*: SWPH combined HATS with customised software).2.3. Employed software systemsNeither the commercial products nor the developments of the research institutes as they stood in 1997 will be presented in detail in this report. However, some aspects shall be mentioned and have been collected in table 3. Further information is available in the given references. The participant S WPH has customised HATS for his own purposes. The resulting system while still being a HATS system has some unique features and was therefore entered in a separate row in table 3 called HATS*.The first column of table 3 contains the names of the software systems. The next three columns deal with the matching methods employed. As can be seen all but the IPI development use a feature based matching scheme with points as matching entities. In most cases points are selected using the Förstner-Operator (Förstner 1991). IPI´s solution also uses relational descriptions of structures extracted from the imagery. Matching refinement in order to increase the geometric accuracy ismostly based on least squares matching which is known to be the most accurate method. However, HATS and HATS* use subpixel cross correlation, OUAT uses simple cross correlation, and in the version for the test no refinement procedure is integrated into the TUM development. During matching refinement only Inpho uses all available overlapping images simultaneously. All other systems rely on matching image pairs and generating multi ray tuples in a separate step. It should be noted that the exact matching algorithms are not always published in the literature.In order to solve the problem of obtaining initial values for the unknown orientation parameters all approaches are implemented in a hierarchical fashion based on image pyramids. As an option Match AT can also use an existing DTM as input which is claimed to be helpful especially in mountainous terrain. HATS, HATS* and FGI search for conjugate points only in predefined areas. Often areas around the “von Gruber positions” are used. Match AT also starts in these areas, but they are automatically shifted away from the initial position if no adequate matching results are obtained. Therefore, the X in the appropriate position in table 3 appears in brackets. On the other hand Phodis AT, and the TUM, IPI and DIIAR approaches try to match points in the whole imag es, at least in the upper pyramid levels. Some participants (e.g. DIIAR) have found that their system is very sensitive to the quality of the initial values of exterior orientation and have therefore changed the provided values manually prior to running their AAT software.In some systems a sophisticated automatic blunder elimination scheme is integrated. For instance, in the TUM development every step of the algorithm is immediately followed by a verification step. S uch a design allows for the early detection and elimination of blunders. While HATS comes with interactive blunder elimination, HATS* is tuned to automatic elimination of gross errors.For the FGI system blunder detection is performed during a robust bundle adjustment loosely coupled with the matching software (thus the brackets in table 3). Match AT and TUM compute integrated robust bundle adjustments at each level of the pyramid in order to improve the initial values for the unknowns from one pyramid level to the next and to eliminate additional blunders. For this step Match AT and FGI need a minimum number of 3 ground control points. HATS and HATS* include a bundle adjustment with a somewhat reduced functionality.Also the degree of automation is different for the different systems. Some systems are designed as autonomous systems without any operator control (such as Match AT and Phodis AT), other approaches (such as HATS) are more flexible and usually call upon the operator in order to manually measure additional points or eliminate blunders. It should be noted that this possibility was not to be used by the test participants (see section 2.1). As evidenced by SWPH HATS can also be tuned into a fully autonomous system.Finally, most systems have a list of free parameters, sometimes collected in a parameter file, which can be used to tune the results. The effect of these parameters, however, is not always clearly documented. While most participants used a standard parameter set for all test images, some did optimise the values in order to achieve better results.Given these numerous differences in the approaches it is impossible within this test to link a certain result to a particular design feature. What makes the situation more complicated is the fact that different participants used different versions of the same software (see table 2). Nevertheless, the obtained results show some distinct trends, see chapter 3.m a t c h i n g e n t i t i e sm a t c h i n g m e t h o d f o r a c c u r a c y r e f i n e m e n tn o . o f i m a g e s d u r i n g m a t c h i n g r e f i n e m e n ti m a g e p y r a m i d sD T M a s i n p u t (o p t i o n a l )u s e o f v o n G r u b e r p o s i t i o n sa u t o m a t i cb l u n d e r e l i m i n a t i o n i n t e g r a t i o n o f b l oc k ad j u s t me n t p r o g r a m m e n e e df o rg r o u n d c o n t r o l p o i n t sa u t o n o m o u s s y s t e m d e s i g np a r a m e t e r f i l eHAT Spoints subpixel cross correlation2 X - X - (X) - (X) XHAT S*points subpixel cross correlation2 X - X X (X) - X X Match AT points least squares matching all over-lappingX X (X) X X X X X Phodis AT points least squares matching2 X - - - - - X - FGIpoints least squares matching2 X - X (X) (X) X X X IPIpoints, structures least squares matching 2 X - - - - - X X T UMpoints - 2 X - - X X - X X DIIARpoints least squares matching2 X - - - - - X X O UATpoints cross correlation 2 X - - X - - X XTable 3: Comparison of the different systems used in the test(HATS* is a customisation of HATS developed and used exclusively by SWPH).2.4. Analysis procedureThe image coordinates of the conjugate points as received from the participants were analysed at the pilot centre using robust bundle adjustment and independent interactive reference measurements. The actual analysis procedure consisted of two different steps. In the first step for each set of image coordinates a robust bundle adjustment was carried out. Blunder detection and elimination was performed similar to the suggestions by Klein, Förstner (1984). Image coordinates not representing blunders were assumed to be uncorrelated and of an accuracy of σo,a priori = 1/3 of a pixel. 1/3 of a pixel is a rather conservative estimate of the accuracy generally attributed to matching of two images. However, in the case of multiple overlapping images this value seems to be rather appropriate and was therefore selected. The influence of σo,a priori onto the results was further investigated for selected cases (see Heipke, Eder 1999).The block datum was fixed by introducing the minimum of seven orientation parameters (six parameters of one image and one base line) as constant values. Thus, it could be ensured that the resulting block would not be influenced by ground control information. Rather, the potential of the purely automatic tie point extraction could be assessed. For each bundle adjustment run the average number of tie points per image, the number and percentage of eliminated blunders, and the number of multi ray points were collected in a log file, and plots depicting the distribution of tie points connecting different images and different strips were generated. These results were used in order to obtain a firstimpression of the quality of the received sets of conjugate points. Additional results of the robust bundle adjustment consisted in the adjusted exterior orientation parameters for each image, and the standard deviation σo of the image coordinates.A second analysis step was carried out for each set of image coordinates in order to independently assess the accuracy of the obtained orientation parameters. Using interactively measured image coordinates of reference points as observations and the exterior orientation parameters obtained in the robust bundle adjustment of the first analysis step as constant values, over-determined least squares forward intersections were computed. Among other things, this computation resulted in a value for the accuracy of the image coordinates termed σFI for “forward intersection”. σFI can be considered as a measure of quality for the orientation parameters determined from the results of the participants. Besides the numerical value for σFI plots showing the individual residuals of the least squares forward intersection across the whole block were also generated. Besides this comparison in image space also an object space comparison was carried out: the coordinates (X FI, Y FI, Z FI) obtained in the over-determined least squares forward intersection were compared to the reference coordinates (X ref, Y ref, Z ref), and the root mean square differences between the two coordinate sets were determined. These values were termed RMS(X), RMS(Y), and RMS(Z), respectively.It is clear that neither σFI nor the RMS values fully describe the accuracy of the AAT performed by the participants. The reason is twofold: first, any effects connected to ground control were deliberately excluded from the analysis, and second the reference observations and the test results were obtained from the same images, because no independent reference measurements of adequate accuracy (one order of magnitude better than the test results, say) were available. It should also be noted that the mentioned numerical quality measures σFI, RMS(X), RMS(Y) and RMS(Z) constitute average measures for the complete block. As such they are not useful in detecting local block deformations. Within the test these local effects were investigated graphically using the mentioned plots. Nevertheless the presented analysis allows for an interesting and valuable assessment of the results of the participants as will be explained in the next chapter.3. TEST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION3.1. Blunder elimination, multi ray points, and point distributionIn this section the results of the analysis of the geometric stability of the blocks are reported. Montserrat turned out to be the most difficult data set. The scene is rather mountainous and contains forest, especially in the mountainous area in the upper part of the scene between the first and the second strip, leading to unfavourable conditions for image matching.Therefore, the Montserrat results are presented here, see table 4 for the numerical values. Concentrating on this table a number of observations can be made:- The average number of correct tie points per image (this is the number of tie points after blunder elimination) and the total number of multi ray points in object space differ considerably between the participants and systems. Some of the participants using HATS delivered rather few points. On the other hand Phodis AT and two research systems (TUM and FGI) extracted between 330 and 495 points per image and between 1005 and 1969 object points.- It can be seen (and comes at no surprise) that within AAT a robust adjustment is absolutely necessary. In the systems which do not include an internal blunder elimination scheme up to 24 % of the measurements were eliminated. The actual number of detected blunders differs according to the number of extracted tie points.- A closer look at the number of rays per object point reveals that only some Match AT users, TUM and OUAT obtained a large number of multi ray points. Expressed in relative figures for some participants, LHS obtained 60 % 2 ray points (125 out of 209) and 7 % 5 + 6 ray points (8+6 out of209), the figures for Inpho are 46 % and 8 %, and those for CZ 63 % and 2 %. When interpreting these percentages one has to keep in mind that given the nominal overlap configuration of l=60 % and q=30 %, about 67 % of the block is depicted in two images, 12 % in three, 17 % in four and 4 % in six images.The plots depicting the tie point distribution (not shown here due to space constraints) clearly convey the general philosophy of the different approaches: HATS determines a moderate number of conjug ate points well distributed across the images. To some extent HATS emulates the results of interactive measurements. Match AT generates considerably more conjugate points and point clusters in the areas of multiple overlap areas. Phodis AT creates a very large number of conjugate points. However, the major part consists of 2 ray and 3 ray points.The results for the other data sets confirm these findings reported here. The average number of tie points per image is rather high, a reliable blunder detection mechanism is absolutely necessary, and the number of multi ray points varies considerably between the systems.elim. blundersno. of multi ray points in object spaceParticipant System av. no. of correct tie pts. per image no. % total 2 ray pts. 3 ray pts. 4 ray pts. 5 ray pts. 6 ray pts. LHS 62 43 7 209 125 44 26 8 6 BKG 18 10 6 66 48 9 5 3 1 E PFL 49 60 12 168 103 36 19 6 4 NLS-SF 17 21 12 60 36 16 6 1 1 NLS-SWE 22 23 10 81 56 16 6 2 1 UNSW HATS10 18 17 32 17 8 4 2 1SWPH HATS* 69 0 0 243 165 40 26 2 10 Inpho 184 0 0 574 265 182 82 13 32I-graph 148 0 0 508 286 154 49 11 8 CGR 160 0 0 550 334 138 54 2 22 HL 102 0 0 337 182 89 51 5 10 Ph GmbHMatch AT 98 0 0 352 227 76 41 5 3CZ 358 371 10 1315 824 413 56 15 7B-LVA 330 373 12 1245 841 335 58 7 4 GCM 495 573 11 1969 1523 384 51 7 4 LGN Phodis AT 349 429 12 1307 849 396 52 6 4FGI 395 0 0 1506 1112 286 74 26 8 T UM 325 0 0 1005 473 285 148 58 41DIIAR 123 354 24 524 475 39 9 1 0 O UATresearch systems 147 0 0 493 285 122 62 0 24Table 4: Results for the test data set Montserrat, blunder elimination and multi ray points.3.2. Accuracy analysisAgain, only the results for Montserrat are presented. In table 5 the values σo from the robust bundle adjustment (both in pixels and in µm), σFI (in µm) and the RMS values in object space (in cm) can be found. A look at the individual figures reveals some interesting findings:σo σF IRMS valuesParticipantSystem [pel] [µm] [µm] X [cm] Y [cm] Z [cm] LHS 0.19 5.8 4.9 8.9 8.5 12.5 BKG 0.10 3.1 9.7 10.6 7.8 35.8 E PFL 0.20 6.0 13.4 17.4 14.8 42.2 NLS-SF 0.22 6.5 12.2 15.5 17.5 40.4 NLS-SWE 0.25 7.4 18.3 50.0 41.8 42.9 UNSW HATS0.14 4.3 17.6 28.6 32.5 66.9SWPH HATS* 0.21 6.4 5.4 7.8 8.6 55.7 Inpho 0.11 3.3 11.4 13.9 10.1 17.9I-graph 0.20 6.0 7.2 14.3 10.0 30.4 CGR 0.14 4.3 5.9 6.5 7.3 15.0 HL 0.15 4.6 10.6 17.7 11.9 16.2 Ph GmbHMatch AT 0.17 5.2 6.3 9.4 10.0 50.6CZ 0.22 6.7 6.4 19.6 13.7 14.1B-LVA 0.21 6.2 5.0 7.7 8.8 16.7 GCM 0.19 5.7 5.2 9.5 9.9 12.5 LGN Phodis AT 0.20 5.9 4.4 5.1 5.3 15.6FGI 0.18 5.4 5.5 8.0 5.6 32.5 T UM 0.32 9.6 4.5 7.0 6.1 9.2DIIAR 0.25 7.4 20.1 28.3 23.2 65.5 O UATresearch systems 0.25 7.4 13.6 24.0 15.9 29.9Table 5: Results for the test data set Montserrat, accuracy figures.- The standard deviation σo of the tie point coordinates generally lies between 0.1 and 0.2 pixels or 3 and 6 µm. This result has been obtained although the expectation for the accuracy of the image coordinates as expressed in σo, a priori were set to only 1/3 pixel (see above). Some systems yielded larger values for σo . At least for TUM this result was to be foreseen, since the version used for the test relies uniquely on feature based matching without a matching refinement stage (see again table 3). - While the σo column seems to suggest correct results for all participants an inspection of σFI reveals the opposite. Some systems obtained a high accuracy in the order of 0.2 pixel and a good agreement between σo and σFI . Thus, the exterior orientation parameters computed in the robust bundle adjustment are confirmed. In many cases, however, σFI is significantly larger than σo . This disagreement demonstrates that in AAT the σo value from the robust adjustment alone cannot be considered as an indicator for the quality of the aerial triangulation results. The reason is that in contrast to analytical photogrammetry in AAT an appropriate point distribution in each imag e and proper connections between the images and strips are not necessarily ensured. Blocks generated from rather few tie points (BKG, NLS-SF, NLS-SWE, UNSW) or from an overwhelming number of 2-ray points (DIIAR) were found to be severely deformed. - Discrepancies between σo and σFI also exist in other cases (EPFL, Inpho, HL, OUAT). In order to further analyse these results all the residuals of the forward intersection were plotted. It was found that for a number of participants points in the overlapping area between the first and the second image strip the residuals in the flight direction are unacceptably large. Apparently, most matching algorithms had major difficulties in the mountainous and forested area connecting the first and the second strip.- When looking at the RMS values the size of the deformations is quantified. Only for the blocks of 6 participants (LHS, CGR, B-LVA, GCM, LGN and TUM) out of 20 the RMS values are sufficiently small to consider the block free of deformations. In all other cases partly severe。

Product DescriptionThe ergonomically designed imager houses the imaging optics, detector, drive electronics, optical modulator,laser pointer and four standard or rechargeable AA size batteries. The system includes an optional pistol grip handle which holds virtually any ‘Pocket PC’or compatible ‘Palm’device as a combined processing, display unit and image storage device. As an alternative, the output of the imager can be displayed and processed in real time using a PC.OperationThe system is designed for either one or two handed operation. For one handed operation both the imager and the user provided ‘Pocket PC’/ ‘Palm’device can be attached to the handle to form a single integrated lightweight unit. For two handed operation the imager can be quickly detached from the handle leaving the ‘Pocket PC’/ ‘Palm’device attached for ease of operation. This latter configuration enables the imager to be pointed at awkward angles or used in confined places. Alternatively, instead of using a ‘Pocket PC’/ ‘Palm’device the imager can be linked to a PC or laptop computer using the RS232 serial cable supplied.Dec 2004IPU 40055 issue 3IRI 1011Universal Thermal ImagerThe IRI 1011 is a groundbreaking thermal imager product which brings the benefits of this versatile technology to the professional, the trades person and the non-specialist alike.The flexibility, ease of use and above all, the low cost of this product extend the normal application areas for thermal imaging from military and professional use, to wider use in industrial,commercial and domestic applications .Typical applications for the IRI 1011 include:Predictive and Preventative MaintenanceProcess MonitoringResearch and Development HV AC Troubleshooting Vehicle MaintenanceGeneral Industrial/Domestic......ABDWorld Leaders inArray-Based DetectorsThe IRI 1011 Universal Thermal ImagerPERFORMANCETemperature Measurement range:-10˚C to +300˚C Field of view (FOV):20˚x 20˚Spectral Response:8 to 14 micrometers Sensitivity:~0.3K @ 30˚C Displayed Image:96 x 96 pixels Detector:16 x 16 pixel array Frame rate:8HzIMAGE STORAGEUp to 1000 images per MB of SER POINTERA built in Class II laser is supplied to highlight the reference pixel.IMAGER POWER SUPPLYBattery:4 x AA type removable batteries.Lithium cells are recommended for operation at low temperatures.Operation time:Up to 8 hours.AC operation:AC adaptor, supplied.MECHANICALHousing: Impact Resistant Plastic.Dimensions: 120mm x 125mm x 80mm.Weight:< 600g not including ‘Pocket PC’/‘Palm’device and handle.Mounting: Handheld & Tripod mounting.IRI 1011 INCLUDESImager, software for ‘Pocket PC’, ‘Palm’& PC, 2m RS232 connection cable - imager to PC, user manual, AC power supply, carrying case.OPTIONA pistol grip handle for attaching imager and ‘Pocket PC’/ ‘Palm’Device for single handed operation.SPECIFICATIONABDWorld Leaders inArray-Based DetectorsInfraRed Integrated Systems Ltd, Towcester Mill,Towcester, Northants, NN12 6AD, UK Telephone:+44 (0) 1327 357824Fax:+44 (0) 1327 357825e-mail:***************.uk web site:Whilst IRISYS endeavour to ensure that all descriptions, weights, temperatures, dimensions and other statistics contained in this product information are correct, they are intended to give a general idea of the product only and IRISYS do not warrant their accuracy or accept liability for any reliance on them. IRISYS have a policy of continuous product improvement and reserve the right to change the specification of the products and descriptions in this data sheet. Prior to ordering products please check with IRISYS for current specification details. This product is protected by patents EP 0 853 237 B1 and US 6,239,433 B1. Other patents pending.All brands and product names are acknowledged and may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective holders.ENVIRONMENT Temp. operating range:-5˚C to +50˚C Humidity:10% to 90% non condensing Temp. storage range:-20˚C to +80˚CCE Mark (Europe):Complies with EMC directiveSETTINGS AND CONTROLS:User selectable sensitivity er selectable offset control (range).Auto adjust sensitivity/range.Display palettes: red/blue, green/blue and greyscale.‘Pocket PC’/ ‘Palm’device: two moveable temperature measurement cursors.PC: up to ten moveable temperature measurement cursors.User selectable emissivity values.User selectable image integration: 1 to 10 frames.Readout in ˚C, ˚F and K.Image snapshot.Image label.FEATURES - ‘POCKET PC’/ ‘PALM’SOFTWAREReal time image and temperature measurement display Multiple image storage and retrieval.Image browser.Battery Charge indicator‘Pocket PC’/ ‘Palm’device controlled by navigator button and touch sensitive screen controls. Reflected ambient temperature compensation.Temperature difference measurement.FEATURES - PC SOFTWAREMultiple image storage and retrieval.Time / Temperature display for up to ten user defined pixels.Save all 256 temperature values to Microsoft Excel.Copy & Paste images into other Microsoft applications.Reflected ambient temperature compensation.Real time image and temperature measurement displayCOMPUTER REQUIREMENTSPocket PC: Compatible with most ‘Pocket PC’devices running Microsoft ‘Pocket PC’2000, 2002 and 2003. e.g. HP iPAQ 2210, O2 XDA - (See IRISYS website for compatible Pocket PC’s). RS 232 to ‘Pocket PC’communication cable or CompactFlash RS 232 adaptor where applicable.Palm :Palm devices conforming to OS5 or higher, double density screen, 320 x 320 display resolution.eg. Palm Zire 71, Palm Tungsten T3. (See IRISYS website for compatible Palms)PC :IBM compatible PC with a minimum of:300MHz processor, MS Windows 2000 and XP (see IRISYS website for current list of operating systems supported). RS 232 serial port (115k Baud),16 bit colour graphics capability.........................CAUTIONCLASS II LASER PRODUCT635nm 0.9mW。