job performance of Mexican and US managers

Effects of budgetary participation con flict on job performance of Mexican and US managersMaria A.Leach-López a ,⁎,William W.Stammerjohan b ,1,Frances M.McNair c ,2a Auburn University Montgomery,PO Box 244023,Montgomery,AL 36124-4023,United Statesb Louisiana Tech University,PO Box 10318,Ruston,LA 71272,United States cMississippi State University,Mississippi State,MS 39762,United StatesA B S T R A C TA R T I C L E I N F O Keywords:Budget participationBudgetary participation con flict Cultural values Job performance Job satisfaction Turnover RetentionThis study extends the stream of participative budgeting literature by introducing a new variable,Budgetary Participation Con flict (BPC).BPC occurs when the level of budget participation experienced by a manager differs from a desired level.We propose a model where BPC is the independent variable to further evaluate the effect of budget participation on job ing path analysis,we measure the direct effect of BPC on job performance,and the indirect effects between BPC and performance that run through job satisfaction and job tenure in two countries,Mexico and the US.While the results do not indicate that BPC either directly or indirectly affects the performance of US managers,the results indicate that BPC negatively affects the job performance of Mexican managers indirectly through the effects of BPC on job satisfaction and job tenure.The relationship between tenure and performance is much stronger among the Mexican managers than among their US counterparts,which is the largest single difference between the Mexican and US results.©2008Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.1.IntroductionIn the current study we extend the long line of budgetary participation/performance research by examining two under repre-sented areas within the existing literature.We look beyond the common expectation that additional participation should lead to increased performance and examine the potential negative effect on performance that may arise when the actual level of participation is different from the desired level of participation.In regard to the ever increasing importance of US/Mexico business relationships,we employ a sample of Mexican managers employed by US controlled maquiladoras and a control sample of US managers working within the US.While there has been much research into the effect of budget participation on performance and job satisfaction (e.g.,Argyris 1952;Brownell,1981,1982a,b,c,1983;Chow,Shields,&Chan,1991;Chow,Kato,&Shields,1994;Chow,Kato,&Merchant,1996;Chow,Shields,&Wu,1999;Frucot &Shearon,1991;Kren,1992),we are aware of only one study that has examined the potentially negative effect of mismatching the actual and desired levels of budget participation (Clinton &Hunton,2001).While there have been numerous budgetparticipation studies employing US samples (e.g.,Argyris 1952;Brownell,1981,1982a,b,c,1983;Kren,1992)and numerous budget participation studies employing Asian samples (e.g.,Birnberg &Snodgrass,1988;Chow et al.,1991,1994,1996,1999;Harrison,1992;Shields,Deng &Kata,2000;Tsui,2001;Ueno &Sekaran,1992),the examination of budgetary participation within Mexico has remained rare (Frucot &Shearon,1991;Leach-López,Stammerjohan,&McNair,2007).We posit that the examination of the potential negative effects of mismatched actual and desired levels of budgetary participation that we call budgetary participation con flict (BPC)is important because it helps us better understand the intricacies of the budget participation/performance relationship.We posit that the study of Mexican maquiladora managers is important because of the growing impor-tance of maquila operations among US multinationals that has followed the passage of the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA),(Greer &Stephens,2001;Lindquist,2001;The Economist,2000).3Our study contributes to the stage three-intervening variable research that examines the budgetary practice/performance relation-ships called for by Covaleski,Evans,Luft,and Shields (2003).Our research employs a path model to examine whether budgetary participation con flict (BPC)affects job performance (PER)either directly,or indirectly through job satisfaction (SAT)and/or job tenure (TEN).Our research employs subjects from Mexico and the USAdvances in Accounting,incorporating Advances in International Accounting 24(2008)49–64⁎Corresponding author.Tel.:+13342443274.E-mail addresses:mleach@ (M.A.Leach-López),wstammer@ (W.W.Stammerjohan),fmcnair@ (F.M.McNair).1Tel.:+13182573828.2Tel.:+16623251636.3Maquiladoras are US controlled manufacturing operations in Mexico that are allowed tax free movement of materials and component parts into and out ofMexico.0882-6110/$–see front matter ©2008Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.adiac.2008.05.008Contents lists available at ScienceDirectAdvances in Accounting,incorporating Advances inInternational Accountingj o u r n a l h om e p a g e :w w w.e l s ev i e r.c o m /l o c a t e /a d i a cemployed in similar work settings,mid-level managers in manufactur-ing operations.We employ a variety of analytical techniques,path analysis,LISREL,and non-parametric“boot-strapping”to assess the robustness of our results to the nuances of any one statistical technique.Ourfindings indicate that budgetary participation conflict has a negative impact on performance among our Mexican managers and that this relationship is stronger among our Mexican managers than among their US counterparts.Ourfindings indicate that the primary indirect path between budgetary participation conflict and perfor-manceflows through job satisfaction.Ourfindings provide some evidence that there is an indirect effect between budgetary participa-tion conflict and performanceflowing through job tenure.We also find strong evidence of a difference in the job tenure to performance relationship between the Mexican and US managers;a difference that is consistent with the significant differences in Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance,individualism,and long-term orientation scores found between our Mexican and US samples.A review of the relevant literature is provided in the following section.Hypotheses and model development are included in the third section.The research design is described in the fourth section.The results are presented in thefifth section,and the conclusions, limitations,and suggestions for future research are provided in the final section.2.Prior researchThefindings of prior research associated with the variables used in our model are presented in this section.A brief discussion of the variables budget participation,job performance and job satisfaction is followed by a discussion of the budgetary participation conflict and job tenure variables.2.1.Budgetary participation,performance,and satisfactionIn his extensivefield study of budgetary practices and the input-output relationships of the budget system,Hofstede(1968)generally concluded that participation increases the internalization of budgeted goals and thus enhances motivation of managers to better job performance.Research conducted before and after Hofstede(1968) has detected a positive relationship between participation and per-formance(e.g.,Argyris,1952;Bass&Leavitt,1963;Kenis1979;Milani, 1975).More recent research has also found a positive relationship between participation and performance(Brownell&McInnes,1986; Merchant,1981;Schuler1980).Hofstede(1968)suggested that participation would be satisfying only when individuals felt that their input was validated by incor-poration in the budgeting process.Research confirms that budget participation is positively associated with positive attitudes toward the job itself and toward the company.Empirical research has shown a positive association between budget participation and employees' satisfaction with their jobs and supervisors,and favorable attitudes toward the budget.Research has also found that managers report higher job satisfaction when they are consulted on their operating budgets,and when their suggested changes are given proper consi-deration(Ivancevich,1972;Collins,1978;Kenis,1979;Milani,1975).Brownell(1982a)investigated whether budget participation yields identifiable benefits to an organization,that is,under what conditions will budget participation lead to desirable organizational outcomes.It is widely believed that budget participation improves performance, but participation alone does not appear to have a major role in influencing satisfaction(Brownell,1982b).2.2.Budget participation conflictHofstede(1968)argues that low participation in the budget setting does not automatically lead to a desire for more participation.Parti-cipation must be experienced to become attractive.This is in contrast with Vroom and Yetton(1973)and Locke and Schweiger(1979)who contend that more participation in decision-making is always preferable to less participation.Hofstede(1968)states that conflict arises when organizational control is at odds with the individual's autonomy and that conflict will affect satisfaction,which in turn will affect turnover(job tenure)and performance.Our conflict variable measures the alignment of an individual's desired level of budget participation and the actual level of budget participation experienced by that individual.The measurement of our budgetary participation conflict(BPC) variable is based on the absolute difference between the actual participation level and the manager's preference.Since this variable is the absolute difference between desired and actual level of budget participation,a value of BPC greater than zero indicates a difference between the actual level of budget participation allowed by the organization and the manager's individual preference for budget participation.Three recent papers provide support for the measurement of our budgetary participation conflict(BPC)variable(Clinton&Hunton, 2001;Doll&Torkzadeh,1989,1991).The Doll and Torkzadeh studies examine computer end-users and the Clinton and Hunton study examines corporate accountants.Doll and Torkzadeh(1989)discuss the idea of deprivation where the end-user is denied the desired level of participation and saturation where the end-user is subjected to excess participation beyond the desired level.The budgetary con-gruence variable measured as the absolute difference between the actual and desired levels of participation used by Doll and Torkzadeh (1991)and Clinton and Hunton(2001)is motivated by the fact that both deprivation and saturation motivate suboptimal performance. Our budgetary participation conflict variable is measured in the same way as the budgetary congruence variable in both Doll and Torkzadeh (1991)and Clinton and Hunton(2001).The only difference is that we define high budgetary participation conflict as a higher value of the absolute difference while Doll and Torkzadeh(1991)and Clinton and Hunton(2001)define high budgetary congruence as a smaller value of the absolute difference.3.Theory and hypotheses developmentParticipative budgeting research spans many years.Despite the vast research,the results are inconclusive(Shields&Young,1993). Clinton(1999)finds that the link between participative budgeting and successful outcomes of participation do not depend exclusively on the level of actual participation,but rather the level of congruence between a perceived need for participation and the degree of actual participation.In this study,we measure this disconnect with our budgetary participation conflict(BPC)variable and posit that BPC will have a negative effect on the job performance(PER).While most prior research has measured the relationships between budgetary participation and performance and between budgetary participation and job satisfaction separately,we follow several recent studies that use performance as the sole dependent variable(e.g.,Leach-López et al.,2007;Nouri&Parker,1998;Shields et al.,2000).Our path model is similar to the path model developed by Leach-López et al.in that it includes job satisfaction(SAT)as one of the intervening variables between budgetary participation conflict(BPC) and performance(PER).44Our choice of performance as the single dependant variable is grounded in the “antecedents”findings of Shields and Shields(1998).Shields and Shields document in Appendix A,Table A1(71–75)that among the47studies they examined,25listed motivation(performance)as the assumed reason that participative budgeting exists. Shields and Shields provide motivation for our inclusion of satisfaction as an intervening variable by noting that most of the14studies that listed satisfaction as the assumed reasons that participative budgeting exists used motivation-performance as the dependent variable.50M.A.Leach-López et al./Advances in Accounting,incorporating Advances in International Accounting24(2008)49–64Our second intervening variable,job tenure(TEN),serves as a proxy for employee retention.While turnover measures movement out of an organization,retention measures how long employees stay with thefirm(Waldman&Arora,2004).Thus,by using job tenure,we measure the desirable outcome,retention,rather than measuring the undesirable outcome,turnover.The fact that turnover,failure to retain,is a common and costly problem in the US is well documented by Hall(2005).The fact that turnover is extremely high and costly in Mexico is also well documented(Coffey,2000;Linnehan&Blau,2003; Miller,Hom,&Gomez-Mejia,2001;Maertz,Stevens,&Campion, 2003;Posthuma,Joplin,&Maertz,2005).3.1.Job performance and tenure(turnover)The relationship of performance and turnover is a topic of growing interest(e.g.,Gaylard,Sutherland,&Viedge,2005;Shaw,Duffy, Johnson,&Lockhart,2005).While researchers agree that there is a relationship between turnover and performance,disagreement exists as to the direction of this relationship(Jackofsky,1984;Martin,Price,& Mueller,1981).Shaw,Duffy et al.(2005)assume that turnover is an exogenous variable.They recognize that there are reciprocal effects, but argue that evidence suggests that the turnover-to-performance relationship is stronger than the reverse(Glebbeek&Bax,2004;Shaw, Gupta,&Delery,2005).Performance/turnover models have also incorporated job satisfaction as a variable and consistently found that the satisfaction/turnover relationship is generally negative(e.g.,Steele &Ovalle,1984;Petty,McGee,&Cavender,1984).3.2.Expected relationshipsThe path model presented in Fig.1describes the expected relationships between our primary variables.The motivation,litera-ture support,and expected sign for each expected relationship is presented following thefigure.The formal hypothesis related to each of these relationships is described in the next two subsections.3.2.1.Path A:BPC→PERWhile Clinton and Hunton(2001)call the absolute difference between actual and the perceived need for participation congruence, and we call the absolute difference between desired and actual budgetary participation budgetary participation conflict,the two concepts are very similar.Thefindings of Clinton and Hunton clearly motivate our expectation of a negative relationship between budget-ary participation conflict(BPC)and job performance(PER).3.2.2.Path B:BPC→SATDoll and Torzadeh(1991)measure congruence similar to Clinton and Hunton(2001)as the absolute value of the difference between the actual level and perceived need for participation.By reverse coding congruence they are able to equate larger numerical values with higher levels of congruence.The Doll and Torzadehfindings of a significant positive association between congruence and end user satisfaction supports our expectation of a negative relationship between budgetary participation conflict(BPC)and job satisfaction (SAT).This expectation is also supported by thefindings of Aranya and Ferris(1984)and Hom and Kinicki(2001).3.2.3.Path C:SAT→PEROur expectation of a positive relationship between job satisfaction (SAT)and performance(PER)is commonly assumed in the manage-ment accounting literature and supported by thefindings reported by Leach-López et al.(2007).3.2.4.Path D:BPC→TENOur expectation of a negative relationship between budgetary participation conflict(BPC)and job tenure(TEN)is supported by the findings of Aranya and Ferris(1984)that conflict leads to turnover intentions and thefindings of Hom and Kinicki(2001)that conflict leads to turnover.3.2.5.Path E:SAT→TENOur expectation of a positive relationship between job satisfaction (SAT)and job tenure(TEN)is supported by thefindings of Bartol (1983)and Hom and Kinicki(2001)that satisfaction is negatively related to turnover and by thefindings of several recent studies that have found that satisfaction is negatively related to turnover intentions(Gaylard et al.,2005;Hwang&Kuo,2006;Jahangir, Akbar,&Bergum,2006;Posthuma et al.,2005).3.2.6.Path F:TEN→PERThe expectations regarding thefinal relationship in our path model,the relationship between job tenure(TEN)and performance (PER)is less clear.Under the assumption that high performers are retained while low performers are dismissed,we would expect a positive relationship.Under the alternative theory that high perfor-mers have greater alternative employment opportunities,we could expect a negative relationship.The relationship is described by the theoretical U-shaped graph depicted in Fig.3of Jackofsky(1984,79) where turnover is depicted to be the highest among the lowest and highest performers,and where turnover is depicted at its lowest amongst midlevel performers.In general,thefindings of Glebbeek and Bax(2004)and Shaw, Duffy et al.(2005),Shaw,Gupta et al.(2005)all support a positive association between low turnover and high performance.While these three studies all support a positive expected relationship between job tenure(TEN)and job performance(PER),the following from Gaylard et al.(2005,88)supports the opposing possibility,“…the more control that an employee perceives himself to have over destiny,the less likely he is to be committed to an organization and the more difficult it will be to retain such an employee.”Fig.1.The Path Model.51M.A.Leach-López et al./Advances in Accounting,incorporating Advances in International Accounting24(2008)49–64Consistent with thefindings of Glebbeek and Bax(2004)and Shaw,Duffy et al.(2005),Shaw,Gupta et al.(2005),our basic hypothesis is that there should be a positive relationship between job tenure(TEN)and performance(PER).However,due to the cultural differences between our Mexican and US samples we have reason to believe that this relationship will be stronger among our Mexican sample.The differences in three cultural factors between the Mexican and US samples,higher uncertainty avoidance(UAI), lower individualism(IDV),and higher long-term orientation(LTO), measured over Hofstede's cultural dimensions,lead us to expect less voluntary turnover among our high performing Mexican man-agers.5Conversely,given the low uncertainty avoidance(UAI),higher individualism(IDV),and lower long-term orientation(LTO),of our US managers,we expect that our US managers are more likely to use high performance as a means of obtaining alternative employment opportunities.3.3.Simple hypothesesBased on the relationships described by our path model and the expectations described above,we present the following simple hypotheses based on the individual path coefficients:H A0.Budgetary participation conflict(BPC)has a negative effect on job performance(PER)when all the other path coefficients are restricted to zero.H A.Budgetary participation conflict(BPC)has a direct effect on job performance(PER)when the other path coefficients are unrestricted.H B.Budgetary participation conflict(BPC)has a negative effect on job satisfaction(SAT).H C.Job satisfaction(SAT)has a positive effect on job performance (PER).H D.Budgetary participation conflict(BPC)has a negative effect on job tenure(TEN).H E.Job satisfaction(SAT)has a positive effect on job tenure(TEN).H F.Job tenure(TEN)has a positive association with performance (PER)with the association being stronger among our Mexican sample due to cultural differences between our Mexican and US samples.3.4.Joint indirect hypothesesGiven that our primary interest is in the relationship between budgetary participation conflict(BPC)and performance(PER),our other relationships described by our model are in the measurement of indirect effects between budgetary participation conflict and perfor-mance described by the following joint hypotheses.H BC.The expected negative effect of budgetary participation conflict (BPC)on job satisfaction(SAT)coupled with the expected positive relationship between job satisfaction(SAT)and performance(PER) leads to an expectation of a negative indirect effect of budgetary participation conflict(BPC)and performance(PER)running through job satisfaction(SAT).H DF.The expected negative effect of budgetary participation conflict (BPC)on job tenure(TEN)coupled with the expected positive relationship between job tenure(TEN)and performance(PER)leads to an expectation of a negative indirect effect of budgetary participation conflict(BPC)and performance(PER)running through job tenure(TEN).4.Research design4.1.DataThe data for this study were collected through a survey ques-tionnaire administered to samples of US and Mexican mid-level man-agers who actively participate in the budgeting process.All responses were requested on a voluntary basis.The US respondents were US nationals working for US manufacturingfirms located in the south-eastern United States.The Mexican respondents are Mexican nationals working in US controlled maquiladoras located in Mexico.The human resource(HR)departments of27manufacturingfirms located in southeastern United States were contacted for permission to distribute the questionnaire in their respectivefirms.The HR representative was instructed that managers involved in budget development should answer the questionnaires.The contact for each USfirm was provided an e-mailed copy of the questionnaire.A promise from the HR department representative to distribute the questionnaire in thefirm's intranet was received.The responses were received through e-mail.The Mexicanfirms were located in Nuevo Laredo,across from Laredo, Texas,and in Puebla in interior Mexico.Puebla is a metropolitan city located about250miles south of Mexico City.A list of the maquiladoras in each location was obtained from Mexico's Department of Commerce. Maquiladoras with US parent corporations included39active compa-nies in Nuevo Laredo and49active companies in Puebla.The HR departments of the listed maquiladoras were contacted.Copies of the questionnaire translated into Spanish were hand delivered to the HR department with instructions that a copy of the questionnaire should be given to managers involved in budget development.The Mexican companies who received questionnaires were visited again after a few days to collect the completed questionnaires.64.2.VariablesThe questionnaire provided measurement of the variables needed for the hypotheses tests and demographic data needed to further describe our samples.The individual questions are provided in Appen-dix A and descriptions of the primary variables are presented below. 4.2.1.Budgetary participation conflict(BPC)Budget participation(BPP)is measured with a six-item scale developed by Milani(1975).This scale is the sum of the individual item scores that are each measured with a seven-point Likert-type scale. This scale has been widely used in participative budget research(e.g., Brownell,1982b,1983;Chenhall and Brownell1988;Frucot and Shearon, 1991;Mia,1989).This scale has consistently produced reliable Cronbach (1951)alpha coefficients(e.g.,Chenhall&Brownell,1988;Mia,1989).5Wefind that,as compared to our current US sample,our current Mexican sample is higher on uncertainty avoidance(UAI),lower on individualism(IDV)and higher on long-term orientation(LTO).Contrary to Hofstede's originalfindings we do notfind our Mexican sample higher on power distance(PDI)but dofind,similar to Hofstede's originalfindings that both the Mexican and US sample are fairly high on masculinity (MAS).Also note that Hofstede(1980)did not measure the long-term orientation variable in Mexico.Please see Table1for comparative statistics for the Hofstede dimensions between our samples and Appendix B for an explanation of the questions and algorithms used to measure Hofstede's cultural dimensions.6While mail surveys are a common method of data collection in the US,the questionnaires were hand delivered to the HR departments in Mexico to increase response rates.A mail survey in Mexico is not practical because the mail service in Mexico is not as efficient as the mail service enjoyed in the US.Two procedures were performed to insure the equivalency of the English and Spanish versions of our instrument.First,two individuals born in Mexico,residing in the US,and both highly proficient in English and Spanish(including one of the authors) prepared translations of the English version into Spanish.The few differences were corrected as needed.Second,following the method suggested by Hui and Triandis (1985),three subjects answered both the English and Spanish versions.All three sets of answers were consistent across both languages and indicated no need for further changes in the instrument.52M.A.Leach-López et al./Advances in Accounting,incorporating Advances in International Accounting24(2008)49–64The six questions in the original Milani (1975)scale were also modi fied to measure the desired level of budget participation for each respondent (BPD).The budgetary participation con flict (BPC)variable was calculated as the absolute difference between desired and actual levels of participation BPC=(|BPD −BPP|).4.2.2.PerformancePerformance (PER)is a self reported measure based on an eight-dimension scale developed by Mahoney,Jerdee,and Carroll (1963).The Mahoney et al.scale measures eight performance dimen-sions:planning,investigating,coordinating,evaluating,supervis-ing,staf fing,negotiating,and representing.PER is the sum of these eight individual measures.7The appropriateness of using self-reported measures of performance and the reliability of the Ma-honey et al.scale are well documented (Heneman,1974).This scale has been widely used in participative budgeting research (e.g.,Brownell,1982b,1983;Brownell &Hirst,1986;Brownell &McInnes,1986;Frucot &Shearon,1991;Leach-López et al.,2007;Tsui,2001).4.2.3.Job satisfactionThe level of job satisfaction (SAT)is measured with the short form of the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ)(Weiss,Davis,England,&Lofquist,1967).Dunham,Smith,and Blackburn (1977)found that the MSQ measurement provided the highest convergent validity among the several measures they evaluated.Scarpello and Campbell (1983)judged the MSQ the most successful facet-based measure of predicting overall job satisfaction.The short-form version of the MSQ has been supported for its reliability and validity (Weiss et al.,1967),and has been used extensively in both applied psychology (e.g.,Butler,1983;Pulakos &Schmitt,1983)and managerial accounting research (e.g.,Brownell,1981,1982a,b;Harrison 1992,1993).7The Mahoney et al.scale also produces a single overall measure of performance that is commonly used as a validity check.PER was successfully validated in the current study by measuring the correlation between the single overall measure (PER9)and PER (Pearson correlation 0.807,p -value b 0.0001).Table 1Summary Statistics Panel A:Latent VariablesCronbach's αMX Sample Interior vs.Border Sample MXUS MX US Diff.t-statistic p-value Interior Border Diff.t-statistics p-value N 96393858PER 0.890.8053.8049.95 3.85 2.200.029954.3753.430.940.400.6910TEN 7.6613.55-5.88-2.950.00488.98 6.80 2.19 1.260.2151SAT 0.910.9373.0869.74 3.34 1.470.144972.3773.55-1.18-0.450.6530BPP 0.890.8826.7924.97 1.82 1.030.303327.6326.24 1.390.680.4995BPD 0.880.9334.3834.180.200.150.884135.7433.48 2.25 1.490.1385BPC9.8510.18-0.33-0.240.813810.639.341.290.790.4288Panel B:Demographic VariablesMX Sample Interior vs.Border Sample MXUS Diff.t-statistic p-value Interior Border Diff.t-statistic p-value N96393858GENDER 0.710.90-0.19-2.790.00630.710.710.000.040.9699AGE5.04 5.84-0.80-2.660.0087 5.19 4.950.240.710.4764EDUCATION15.5616.00-0.441.120.265415.3915.67-0.28-0.500.6176Panel C:Hofstede Cultural DimensionsHofstede(1980)Scores MX Sample Interior vs.Border Sample MXUS MX US Diff.t-statistic p-value Interior Border Diff.t-statistic p-value N 96393858PDI 814027.532.2-4.7-0.490.626825.728.8-3.1-0.300.7683UAI 824657.730.826.9 2.160.032572.748.024.7 1.830.0710IDV 309164.394.3-30.1-3.670.000346.575.6-29.1-3.610.0005MAS 696284.560.024.5 1.530.128783.285.3-2.1-0.120.9071LTO51.541.010.42.450.015652.151.01.10.230.8174Panel C:The Hofstede (1980)scores for Mexico and the US are as reported in Hofstede (1980).Hofstede (1980)did not report LTO scores.Chow et al.(1999,447)reference Hofstede (1980,1991)and suggest that absolute scores that differ by 20or more are material.Our sample scores are computed using Hofstede's VSM 94.The t-statistics and p-values are based on the sample distributions of individually calculated scores.Please see Appendix B for more detail on the VSM 94questions and algorithms.PER-Performance measured using the Mahoney et al.(1963)eight-item scale.TEN-Tenure measured as the number of years the manager has worked for the company.SAT-Job satisfaction measured using a modi fied form of the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (Weiss et al.,1967).BPP-Budgetary participation measured using the six-item scale developed by Milani (1975).BPD-Desired budgetary participation measured using a modi fied version of the six-item scale developed by Milani (1975).BPC-Budgetary participation con flict measured as the absolute value of the difference between the actual level of participation (BPP)and the desired level of participation (BPD).GENDER-Gender coded as one for male and zero for female.AGE-Age reported in ranges,b 20=1,20-24=2,25-29=3,30-34=4,35-39=5,40-49=6,50-59=7,and ≥60=CATION-Education level measured as the number of years of school.PDI-Hofstede's power distance measured using the VSM 94.UAI-Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance measured using the VSM 94.IDV-Hofstede's individualism measured using the VSM 94.MAS-Hofstede's masculinity measured using the VSM 94.LTO-Hofstede's long-term orientation measured using the VSM 94.53M.A.Leach-López et al./Advances in Accounting,incorporating Advances in International Accounting 24(2008)49–64。