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上海财经大学硕士学位论文跨国公司组织结构、子公司角色与子公司战略绩效：理论与中国的证据作者姓名：郎蒙导师姓名：朱小斌学科专业：企业管理研究方向：现代企业理论中文摘要跨国公司是当今世界经济中的一支重要的力量，也是我国对外直接投资的主要方式。

我国很多公司也已经或即将迈向跨国经营的道路。

因此，研究探讨跨国公司的管理对中国经济进一步融入到世界经济体系具有重要的现实意义。

本文通过对我国跨国跨国公司的发展现状的考察，着重讨论了我国跨国公司组织结构、海外子公司角色与海外子公司战略绩效之间的关系。

首先，本文以资源依附论为指导，回顾了有关跨国公司组织结构与海外子公司角色的大量文献。

从中归纳出了跨国公司组织结构的演进路径，并通过海外子公司的当地化程度与跨国公司组织内部的横向流量这两个维度的定义，建立了跨国公司组织结构演进模型。

同时，选择了能够准确反映我国跨国公司海外子公司发展状况的子公司角色模型。

然后，根据理论分析，建立了有关跨国公司组织结构、海外子公司角色与海外子公司战略绩效关系的相关假设，具体包括：假设1a：相对于职能式组织结构而言，采用跨国公司全球事业部型组织结构的跨国公司海外子公司的战略绩效更高。

假设1b:相对于跨国公司全球事业部型组织结构而言，跨国公司网络组织结构将会推动海外子公司创造更高的战略绩效。

假设2：不同的海外子公司角色定位将导致不同的海外子公司战略绩效，并且静止型子公司角色海外子公司战略绩效会明显低于其余其他三种子公司角色的海外子公司。

最后，本文选择了我国6个行业30个样本企业作为调查对象，发放调查问卷。

这些企业有国营企业，也有民营企业，共同的特征是都是跨国公司，每家公司至少拥有一家以上的海外子公司。

根据调查数据，利用统计技术对以上三个理论假设进行了实证检验。

结果表明，以上理论假设在中国并不能够成立。

跨国公司网络组织结构并不能导致海外子公司获得最优的战略绩效，而且不同海外子公司角色也并不能导致显著差异的子公司战略绩效。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.2005 ANNUAL REPORTTABLE OF CONTENTSBusiness Activities.................................................... Inside Front Cover Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 (2)Chairman’s Letter* (3)“The Security I Like Best” – An Article About GEICO from 1951 (24)Acquisition Criteria (25)Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm (25)Consolidated Financial Statements (26)Management’s Report on Internal ControlOver Financial Reporting (54)Selected Financial Data For ThePast Five Years (55)Management’s Discussion (56)Owner’s Manual (74)Common Stock Data and Corporate Governance Matters (79)Operating Companies (80)Directors and Officers of the Company.........................Inside Back Cover *Copyright © 2006 By Warren E. BuffettAll Rights ReservedBusiness ActivitiesBerkshire Hathaway Inc. is a holding company owning subsidiaries engaged in a number of diverse business activities. The most important of these is the property and casualty insurance business conducted on both a direct and reinsurance basis through a number of subsidiaries. Included in this group of subsidiaries is GEICO, one of the four largest auto insurers in the United States and two of the largest reinsurers in the world, General Re and the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group.Numerous business activities are conducted through non-insurance subsidiaries. Included in the non-insurance subsidiaries are several large manufacturing businesses. Shaw Industries is the world’s largest manufacturer of tufted broadloom carpet. Benjamin Moore is a formulator, manufacturer and retailer of architectural and industrial coatings. Johns Manville is a leading manufacturer of insulation and building products. Acme Building Brands is a manufacturer of face brick and concrete masonry products. MiTek Inc. produces steel connector products and engineering software for the building components market. Fruit of the Loom, Garan, Fechheimer, H.H. Brown Shoe Group and Justin Brands manufacture, license and distribute apparel and footwear under a variety of brand names. McLane Company is a wholesale distributor of groceries and nonfood items to convenience stores, wholesale clubs, mass merchandisers, quick service restaurants and others.FlightSafety International provides training of aircraft and ship operators. NetJets provides fractional ownership programs for general aviation aircraft. Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey Home Furnishings, Star Furniture and Jordan’s Furniture are retailers of home furnishings. Borsheim’s, Helzberg Diamond Shops and Ben Bridge Jeweler are retailers of fine jewelry. Berkshire’s finance and financial products businesses primarily engage in proprietary investing strategies (BH Finance), commercial and consumer lending (Berkshire Hathaway Credit Corporation and Clayton Homes) and transportation equipment and furniture leasing (XTRA and CORT).In addition, Berkshire’s other non-insurance business activities include: Buffalo News, a publisher of a daily and Sunday newspaper; See’s Candies, a manufacturer and seller of boxed chocolates and other confectionery products; Scott Fetzer, a diversified manufacturer and distributor of commercial and industrial products, the principal products are sold under the Kirby and Campbell Hausfeld brand names; Albecca,a designer, manufacturer, and distributor of high-quality picture framing products; CTB International,a manufacturer of equipment for the livestock and agricultural industries; International Dairy Queen, a licensor and service provider to about 6,000 stores that offer prepared dairy treats and food; The Pampered Chef, the premier direct seller of kitchen tools in the U.S.; and Forest River, a leading manufacturer of leisure vehicles in the U.S.Operating decisions for the various Berkshire businesses are made by managers of the business units. Investment decisions and all other capital allocation decisions are made for Berkshire and its subsidiaries by Warren E. Buffett, in consultation with Charles T. Munger. Mr. Buffett is Chairman and Mr. Munger is Vice Chairman of Berkshire’s Board of Directors.************Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman's Letter Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500Annual Percentage Changein Per-Share in S&P 500Book Value of with Dividends RelativeBerkshire Included Results Year (1) (2) (1)-(2)1965 .................................................. 23.8 10.0 13.81966 .................................................. 20.3 (11.7) 32.01967 .................................................. 11.0 30.9 (19.9)1968 .................................................. 19.0 11.0 8.01969 .................................................. 16.2 (8.4) 24.61970 .................................................. 12.0 3.9 8.11971 .................................................. 16.4 14.6 1.81972 .................................................. 21.7 18.9 2.81973 .................................................. 4.7 (14.8) 19.51974 .................................................. 5.5 (26.4) 31.91975 .................................................. 21.9 37.2 (15.3)1976 .................................................. 59.3 23.6 35.71977 .................................................. 31.9 (7.4) 39.31978 .................................................. 24.0 6.4 17.61979 .................................................. 35.7 18.2 17.51980 .................................................. 19.3 32.3 (13.0)1981 .................................................. 31.4 (5.0) 36.41982 .................................................. 40.0 21.4 18.61983 .................................................. 32.3 22.4 9.91984 .................................................. 13.6 6.1 7.51985 .................................................. 48.2 31.6 16.61986 .................................................. 26.1 18.6 7.51987 .................................................. 19.5 5.1 14.41988 .................................................. 20.1 16.6 3.51989 .................................................. 44.4 31.7 12.71990 .................................................. 7.4 (3.1) 10.51991 .................................................. 39.6 30.5 9.11992 .................................................. 20.3 7.6 12.71993 .................................................. 14.3 10.1 4.21994 .................................................. 13.9 1.3 12.61995 .................................................. 43.1 37.6 5.51996 .................................................. 31.8 23.0 8.81997 .................................................. 34.1 33.4 .71998 .................................................. 48.3 28.6 19.71999 .................................................. .5 21.0 (20.5)2000 .................................................. 6.5 (9.1) 15.62001 .................................................. (6.2) (11.9) 5.72002 .................................................. 10.0 (22.1) 32.12003 .................................................. 21.0 28.7 (7.7)2004 .................................................. 10.5 10.9 (.4)2005 .................................................. 6.4 4.9 1.5 Average Annual Gain — 1965-2005 21.5 10.3 11.2Overall Gain — 1964-2005 305,134 5,583Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:Our gain in net worth during 2005 was $5.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 41 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $59,377, a rate of 21.5% compounded annually.* Berkshire had a decent year in 2005. We initiated five acquisitions (two of which have yet to close) and most of our operating subsidiaries prospered. Even our insurance business in its entirety did well, though Hurricane Katrina inflicted record losses on both Berkshire and the industry. We estimate our loss from Katrina at $2.5 billion – and her ugly sisters, Rita and Wilma, cost us an additional $.9 billion.Credit GEICO – and its brilliant CEO, Tony Nicely – for our stellar insurance results in a disaster-ridden year. One statistic stands out: In just two years, GEICO improved its productivity by 32%. Remarkably, employment fell by 4% even as policy count grew by 26% – and more gains are in store. When we drive unit costs down in such a dramatic manner, we can offer ever-greater value to our customers. The payoff: Last year, GEICO gained market-share, earned commendable profits and strengthened its brand. If you have a new son or grandson in 2006, name him Tony.* * * * * * * * * * * *My goal in writing this report is to give you the information you need to estimate Berkshire’s intrinsic value. I say “estimate” because calculations of intrinsic value, though all-important, are necessarily imprecise and often seriously wrong. The more uncertain the future of a business, the more possibility there is that the calculation will be wildly off-base. (For an explanation of intrinsic value, see pages 77 – 78.) Here Berkshire has some advantages: a wide variety of relatively-stable earnings streams, combined with great liquidity and minimum debt. These factors mean that Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be more precisely calculated than can the intrinsic value of most companies.Yet if precision is aided by Berkshire’s financial characteristics, the job of calculating intrinsic value has been made more complex by the mere presence of so many earnings streams. Back in 1965, when we owned only a small textile operation, the task of calculating intrinsic value was a snap. Now we own 68 distinct businesses with widely disparate operating and financial characteristics. This array of unrelated enterprises, coupled with our massive investment holdings, makes it impossible for you to simply examine our consolidated financial statements and arrive at an informed estimate of intrinsic value.We have attempted to ease this problem by clustering our businesses into four logical groups, each of which we discuss later in this report. In these discussions, we will provide the key figures for both the group and its important components. Of course, the value of Berkshire may be either greater or less than the sum of these four parts. The outcome depends on whether our many units function better or worse by being part of a larger enterprise and whether capital allocation improves or deteriorates when it is under the direction of a holding company. In other words, does Berkshire ownership bring anything to the party, or would our shareholders be better off if they directly owned shares in each of our 68 businesses? These are important questions but ones that you will have to answer for yourself.Before we look at our individual businesses, however, let’s review two sets of figures that show where we’ve come from and where we are now. The first set is the amount of investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) we own on a per-share basis. In making this calculation, we exclude investments held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings:*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.Year Per-Share Investments*1965..................................................................... $ 41975 (159)1985..................................................................... 2,4071995..................................................................... 21,8172005..................................................................... $74,129Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005.................... 28.0%Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005.................... 13.0%minorityinterests*NetofIn addition to these marketable securities, which with minor exceptions are held in our insurance companies, we own a wide variety of non-insurance businesses. Below, we show the pre-tax earnings (excluding goodwill amortization) of these businesses, again on a per-share basis:Year Per-Share Earnings*1965..................................................................... $ 41975 (4)1985 (52)1995 (175)2005..................................................................... $2,441Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005.................... 17.2%Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005.................... 30.2%*Pre-tax and net of minority interestsWhen growth rates are under discussion, it will pay you to be suspicious as to why the beginning and terminal years have been selected. If either year was aberrational, any calculation of growth will be distorted. In particular, a base year in which earnings were poor can produce a breathtaking, but meaningless, growth rate. In the table above, however, the base year of 1965 was abnormally good; Berkshire earned more money in that year than it did in all but one of the previous ten.As you can see from the two tables, the comparative growth rates of Berkshire’s two elements of value have changed in the last decade, a result reflecting our ever-increasing emphasis on business acquisitions. Nevertheless, Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to increase the figures in both tables. In this ambition, we hope – metaphorically – to avoid the fate of the elderly couple who had been romantically challenged for some time. As they finished dinner on their 50th anniversary, however, the wife – stimulated by soft music, wine and candlelight – felt a long-absent tickle and demurely suggested to her husband that they go upstairs and make love. He agonized for a moment and then replied, “I can do one or the other, but not both.”AcquisitionsOver the years, our current businesses, in aggregate, should deliver modest growth in operating earnings. But they will not in themselves produce truly satisfactory gains. We will need major acquisitions to get that job done.In this quest, 2005 was encouraging. We agreed to five purchases: two that were completed last year, one that closed after yearend and two others that we expect to close soon. None of the deals involve the issuance of Berkshire shares. That’s a crucial, but often ignored, point: When a management proudly acquires another company for stock, the shareholders of the acquirer are concurrently selling part of their interest in everything they own. I’ve made this kind of deal a few times myself – and, on balance, my actions have cost you money.Here are last year’s purchases:•On June 30 we bought Medical Protective Company (“MedPro”), a 106-year-old medical malpractice insurer based in Fort Wayne. Malpractice insurance is tough to underwrite and has proved to be a graveyard for many insurers. MedPro nevertheless should do well. It will have the attitudinal advantage that all Berkshire insurers share, wherein underwriting discipline trumps all other goals. Additionally, as part of Berkshire, MedPro has financial strength far exceeding that of its competitors, a quality assuring doctors that long-to-settle claims will not end up back on their doorstep because their insurer failed. Finally, the company has a smart and energetic CEO, Tim Kenesey, who instinctively thinks like a Berkshire manager.•Forest River, our second acquisition, closed on August 31. A couple of months earlier, on June 21, I received a two-page fax telling me – point by point – why Forest River met the acquisition criteria we set forth on page 25 of this report. I had not before heard of the company, a recreational vehicle manufacturer with $1.6 billion of sales, nor of Pete Liegl, its owner and manager. But the fax made sense, and I immediately asked for more figures. These came the next morning, and that afternoon I made Pete an offer. On June 28, we shook hands on a deal.Pete is a remarkable entrepreneur. Some years back, he sold his business, then far smaller than today, to an LBO operator who promptly began telling him how to run the place. Before long, Pete left, and the business soon sunk into bankruptcy. Pete then repurchased it. You can be sure that I won’t be telling Pete how to manage his operation.Forest River has 60 plants, 5,400 employees and has consistently gained share in the RV business, while also expanding into other areas such as boats. Pete is 61 – and definitely in an acceleration mode. Read the piece from RV Business that accompanies this report, and you’ll see why Pete and Berkshire are made for each other.•On November 12, 2005, an article ran in The Wall Street Journal dealing with Berkshire’s unusual acquisition and managerial practices. In it Pete declared, “It was easier to sell my business than to renew my driver’s license.”In New York, Cathy Baron Tamraz read the article, and it struck a chord. On November 21, she sent me a letter that began, “As president of Business Wire, I’d like to introduce you to my company, as I believe it fits the profile of Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary companies as detailed ina recent Wall Street Journal article.”By the time I finished Cathy’s two-page letter, I felt Business Wire and Berkshire were a fit. I particularly liked her penultimate paragraph: “We run a tight ship and keep unnecessary spending under wraps. No secretaries or management layers here. Yet we’ll invest big dollars to gain a technological advantage and move the business forward.”I promptly gave Cathy a call, and before long Berkshire had reached agreement with BusinessWire’s controlling shareholder, Lorry Lokey, who founded the company in 1961 (and who had just made Cathy CEO). I love success stories like Lorry’s. Today 78, he has built a company that disseminates information in 150 countries for 25,000 clients. His story, like those of many entrepreneurs who have selected Berkshire as a home for their life’s work, is an example of what can happen when a good idea, a talented individual and hard work converge.•In December we agreed to buy 81% of Applied Underwriters, a company that offers a combination of payroll services and workers’ compensation insurance to small businesses. A majority of Applied’s customers are located in California.In 1998, though, when the company had 12 employees, it acquired an Omaha-based operation with 24 employees that offered a somewhat-similar service. Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies, who have built Applied’s remarkable business, concluded that Omaha had many advantages as an operational base – a brilliant insight, I might add – and today 400 of the company’s 479 employees are located here.Less than a year ago, Applied entered into a large reinsurance contract with Ajit Jain, the extraordinary manager of National Indemnity’s reinsurance division. Ajit was impressed by Sid and Steve, and they liked Berkshire’s method of operation. So we decided to join forces. We are pleased that Sid and Steve retain 19% of Applied. They started on a shoestring only 12 years ago, and it will be fun to see what they can accomplish with Berkshire’s backing.•Last spring, MidAmerican Energy, our 80.5% owned subsidiary, agreed to buy PacifiCorp, a major electric utility serving six Western states. An acquisition of this sort requires many regulatory approvals, but we’ve now obtained these and expect to close this transaction soon.Berkshire will then buy $3.4 billion of MidAmerican’s common stock, which MidAmerican will supplement with $1.7 billion of borrowing to complete the purchase. You can’t expect to earn outsized profits in regulated utilities, but the industry offers owners the opportunity to deploy large sums at fair returns – and therefore, it makes good sense for Berkshire. A few years back, I said that we hoped to make some very large purchases in the utility field. Note the plural – we’ll be looking for more.In addition to buying these new operations, we continue to make “bolt-on” acquisitions. Some aren’t so small: Shaw, our carpet operation, spent about $550 million last year on two purchases that furthered its vertical integration and should improve its profit margin in the future. XTRA and Clayton Homes also made value-enhancing acquisitions.Unlike many business buyers, Berkshire has no “exit strategy.” We buy to keep. We do, though, have an entrance strategy, looking for businesses in this country or abroad that meet our six criteria and are available at a price that will produce a reasonable return. If you have a business that fits, give me a call. Like a hopeful teenage girl, I’ll be waiting by the phone.InsuranceLet’s now talk about our four sectors and start with insurance, our core business. What counts here is the amount of “float” and its cost over time.For new readers, let me explain. “Float” is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide – insurance protection – is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, because it sometimes takes many years for losses to be reported (asbestos losses would be an example), negotiated and settled. The $20 million of float that came with our 1967 entry into insurance has now increased – both by way of internal growth and acquisitions – to $49 billion.Float is wonderful – if it doesn’t come at a high price. Its cost is determined by underwriting results, meaning how the expenses and losses we will ultimately pay compare with the premiums we have received. When an insurer earns an underwriting profit – as has been the case at Berkshire in about half of the 39 years we have been in the insurance business – float is better than free. In such years, we are actually paid for holding other people’s money. For most insurers, however, life has been far more difficult: In aggregate, the property-casualty industry almost invariably operates at an underwriting loss. When that loss is large, float becomes expensive, sometimes devastatingly so.In 2004 our float cost us less than nothing, and I told you that we had a chance – absent a mega-catastrophe – of no-cost float in 2005. But we had the mega-cat, and as a specialist in that coverage, Berkshire suffered hurricane losses of $3.4 billion. Nevertheless, our float was costless in 2005 because of the superb results we had in our other insurance activities, particularly at GEICO.* * * * * * * * * * * *Auto policies in force grew by 12.1% at GEICO, a gain increasing its market share of U.S. private passenger auto business from about 5.6% to about 6.1%. Auto insurance is a big business: Each share-point equates to $1.6 billion in sales.While our brand strength is not quantifiable, I believe it also grew significantly. When Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its annual advertising expenditures were $31 million. Last year we were up to $502 million. And I can’t wait to spend more.Our advertising works because we have a great story to tell: More people can save money by insuring with us than is the case with any other national carrier offering policies to all comers. (Some specialized auto insurers do particularly well for applicants fitting into their niches; also, because our national competitors use rating systems that differ from ours, they will sometimes beat our price.) Last year, we achieved by far the highest conversion rate – the percentage of internet and phone quotes turned into sales – in our history. This is powerful evidence that our prices are more attractive relative to the competition than ever before. Test us by going to or by calling 800-847-7536. Be sure to indicate you are a shareholder because that fact will often qualify you for a discount.I told you last year about GEICO’s entry into New Jersey in August, 2004. Drivers in that state love us. Our retention rate there for new policyholders is running higher than in any other state, and by sometime in 2007, GEICO is likely to become the third largest auto insurer in New Jersey. There, as elsewhere, our low costs allow low prices that lead to steady gains in profitable business.That simple formula immediately impressed me 55 years ago when I first discovered GEICO. Indeed, at age 21, I wrote an article about the company – it’s reproduced on page 24 – when its market value was $7 million. As you can see, I called GEICO “The Security I Like Best.” And that’s what I still call it.* * * * * * * * * * * *We have major reinsurance operations at General Re and National Indemnity. The former is run by Joe Brandon and Tad Montross, the latter by Ajit Jain. Both units performed well in 2005 considering the extraordinary hurricane losses that battered the industry.It’s an open question whether atmospheric, oceanic or other causal factors have dramatically changed the frequency or intensity of hurricanes. Recent experience is worrisome. We know, for instance, that in the 100 years before 2004, about 59 hurricanes of Category 3 strength, or greater, hit the Southeastern and Gulf Coast states, and that only three of these were Category 5s. We further know that in 2004 there were three Category 3 storms that hammered those areas and that these were followed by four more in 2005, one of them, Katrina, the most destructive hurricane in industry history. Moreover, there were three Category 5s near the coast last year that fortunately weakened before landfall.Was this onslaught of more frequent and more intense storms merely an anomaly? Or was it caused by changes in climate, water temperature or other variables we don’t fully understand? And could these factors be developing in a manner that will soon produce disasters dwarfing Katrina?Joe, Ajit and I don’t know the answer to these all-important questions. What we do know is that our ignorance means we must follow the course prescribed by Pascal in his famous wager about the existence of God. As you may recall, he concluded that since he didn’t know the answer, his personal gain/loss ratio dictated an affirmative conclusion.So guided, we’ve concluded that we should now write mega-cat policies only at prices far higher than prevailed last year – and then only with an aggregate exposure that would not cause us distress if shiftsin some important variable produce far more costly storms in the near future. To a lesser degree, we feltthis way after 2004 – and cut back our writings when prices didn’t move. Now our caution has intensified.If prices seem appropriate, however, we continue to have both the ability and the appetite to be the largest writer of mega-cat coverage in the world.* * * * * * * * * * * *Our smaller insurers, with MedPro added to the fold, delivered truly outstanding results last year. However, what you see in the table below does not do full justice to their performance. That’s because we increased the loss reserves of MedPro by about $125 million immediately after our purchase.No one knows with any precision what amount will be required to pay the claims we inherited. Medical malpractice insurance is a “long-tail” line, meaning that claims often take many years to settle. In addition, there are other losses that have occurred, but that we won’t even hear about for some time. One thing, though, we have learned – the hard way – after many years in the business: Surprises in insurance arefar from symmetrical. You are lucky if you get one that is pleasant for every ten that go the other way. Too often, however, insurers react to looming loss problems with optimism. They behave like the fellow ina switchblade fight who, after his opponent has taken a mighty swipe at his throat, exclaimed, “You never touched me.” His adversary’s reply: “Just wait until you try to shake your head.”Excluding the reserves we added for prior periods, MedPro wrote at an underwriting profit. Andour other primary companies, in aggregate, had an underwriting profit of $324 million on $1,270 million of volume. This is an extraordinary result, and our thanks go to Rod Eldred of Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies, John Kizer of Central States Indemnity, Tom Nerney of U. S. Liability, Don Towleof Kansas Bankers Surety and Don Wurster of National Indemnity.Here’s the overall tally on our underwriting and float for each major sector of insurance:millions)$(inFloat(Loss) YearendUnderwritingProfitInsurance Operations20052004 20052004General Re....................... $( 334) $ 3 $22,920 $23,120B-H Reinsurance.............. (1,069) 417 16,233 15,278GEICO............................. 1,221 970 6,692 5,960Other Primary................... 235* 161 3,442 1,736Total................................. $ 53 $1,551 $49,287 $46,094*Includes MedPro from June 30, 2005.Regulated Utility BusinessWe have an 80.5% (fully diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 706,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; and (3) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry 7.8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S. When our PacifiCorp acquisition closes, we will add 1.6 million electric customers in six Western states, with Oregon and Utah providing us the most business. This transaction will increase MidAmerican’s revenues by $3.3 billion andits assets by $14.1 billion.。

麦金农：全球经济中的格林斯潘—伯南克泡沫2014-05-22我不断地吹着泡泡空中美丽的泡泡它们飞得那么高，几乎到达了天空然后像我的梦它们消失了，破灭了古老的伦敦民歌引言不管怎样，世界经济是建立在美元本位制基础上的——“二战”结束以来，一直如此。

从1945年到20世纪60年代末，这一历史事件有了转机。

美国的货币政策保持稳定，经常项目显示适度盈余——这一盈余被私人对外直接投资和官方资本外流对冲（支付）。

最值得注意的是非常成功的“马歇尔计划”，在欧洲支付同盟内通过稳定的美元汇率，促进欧洲经济一体化，从“二战”中复兴。

还有少为人知的对日本的美元信贷“道奇计划”，1949年，以1美元兑360日元的汇价稳定了饱经战争磨难的金融系统，并在20世纪70年代实现了无通胀的高速增长。

但是从1971年8月开始，当“尼克松冲击”迫使美元贬值，不稳定的美国货币政策使中心国家和不断变化的外围国家都发生了较大的突变。

作为事实上的世界中央银行，美联储非但没有恰当的表现，反而通过引起不稳定的“热钱”流入经济上重要的外围国家——主要是西欧和日本，在20世纪70年代至80年代成为系列泡沫制造者，在新千年后的新兴市场国家（EM）也是如此。

当市场预期美元贬值时，或者是美联储保持其国内利率低于其他地区的主导自然利率时，热钱流出美国，不管实行哪种汇率体制，外围中央银行都面临两难境地：要么允许本币对美元升值，这样会失去相较于邻国的出口竞争力；要么使用基础货币购买美元进行干预，货币失控。

外围国家货币的集体失控，导致了国际价格水平上升，通常首先表现为初级产品的美元价格泡沫，随后其工业产品价格更大幅度地上涨，在较长时滞后，美国的通胀水平最终也会上升。

美元引起的热钱综合征解释了20世纪70年代世界上的大多数通货膨胀。

早在1970年，市场就开始预期美元贬值，直到1971年8月“尼克松冲击”迫使美元贬值。

在1970—1971年，热钱从美国流入其他货币可兑换的工业国。

信息隐藏——概论*Fabien A. P. Petitcolas, Ross J. Anderson, Markus G . Kuhn摘要：在许多应用领域，信息隐藏技术正越来越受到重视。

数字化音频、视频和图片正逐渐被冠以可以区别的、不可见的标志，这些标志可能隐含了一些版权说明、序列号、甚至可能直接限制未授权的复制。

军用通讯系统不断拓展信量安全技术的使用，他们不仅仅是使用加密技术来加密一条消息的内容，还力图隐藏消息的发送者、接收者，甚至是消息本身的存在。

同样的技术也使用在移动电话系统和电子选举方案中。

犯罪分子将之用于现有的通讯系统，而警方则试图限制他们的使用。

在这个新兴的、迅速发展的领域，许多这类技术已经被提出，尽管这样，它们可以追溯到遥远的古代，并且令人吃惊的是，其中一些方法可以很容易地被规避在本文中，我们试图对这个领域做一个概括介绍，包括我们所知道的、有效的和无效的信息隐藏技巧，以及一些有趣的研究课题。

关键词：版权标志，信息隐藏，隐秘术*Translated from the original English version and reprinted with permission, from (Proceedings of the IEEE, V ol. 87, No. 7, pp: 1062-1078, July 1999)1. 引言人们往往认为对通讯内容加密即可保证通讯的安全，然而在实际中这是远远不够的。

特洛伊战争中的谋士们和一些其他古代的作者，专注于隐藏信息更甚于仅仅是将它们译为密码[1]；尽管现代的密码学从文艺复兴时期开始发展，我们却发现Wilkins 在1641年还是乐于隐藏甚于加密[2, ch.IX, p.67]，因为这样做很少会引起注意。

这种应用持续到现在的某些场合。

例如，一份加密之后的电子邮件信息，如果它在毒贩和其他尚未被怀疑的人之间，或者国防建设的雇员与敌方大使馆官员之间传递，显然，它包含某种深意。

3．2 研究工具3.2.1 大五人格问卷简版（NEO-FFI）该问卷是Costa和McCrae在对1985年版本的NEO-PI-R进行项目因素分析的基3.2.2 绩效考核成绩从上表可以看出，戴德梁行客户经理群体在谨慎性维度上的得分最高，其次分别是外向性、友善性、开放性，得分最低的维度是神经质。

4.1.2 该行客户经理在大五人格各维度上的性别差异如上表，大五人格五个维度的性别差异在开放性维度上显著性最高（p<0.001），男性的开放性显著高于女性；其次在外向性、谨慎性两个维度上差异也较为显著（p<0.01），具体表现为男性的外向性、谨慎性均高于女性。

由表可知，大五人格中神经质维度对任务绩效有显著的负预测性，能解释总体的变异。

在进行了三次回归分析后，大五人格中的开放性、友善性、外向性三个维度都进入了回归模型，切模型的总体回归效果显著。

这三个维度共解释了情境绩效 4%的变异。

通过进一步分析这三个维度逐步进入回归模型的顺序可以得知，Figure 4: model of confirmatory factory analysis注：Extraver=外向性，Agreeabl=亲和力，Conscien=责任心，Neurotic=情绪稳定性，Openness=开明性。

LISREL 软件输出了这一模型同数据的具体拟合指标如下。

模型的卡方Chi-squares）为109.96，自由度（degree of freedom, df）为80，因此方值和自由度的比（Chi-squares/df）为109.96/80=1.37，小于 5 这一临界值水平（这一指标越小表示模型与数据的拟合情况越好）。

模型的比较拟合指数（comparative fit index, CFI）为0.89、非正态拟合指数（non-normed fit index, NNFI）为0.86，虽然没有达到.90之上，但由于比较接近，我们认为都处于可接受范围之内。

Paper to be presented at the DRUID Tenth Anniversary Summer Conference 2005 onD YNAMICS OF I NDUSTRY AND I NNOVATION:O RGANIZATIONS, N ETWORKS AND S YSTEMSCopenhagen, Denmark, June 27-29, 2005HISTRORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL INNOVATIONSYSTEMS (NIS) CONCEPTUAL APPROACHNaubahar SharifDepartment of Science and Technology StudiesCornell UniversityE-mail: ns89@2005AbstractThe NIS conceptual approach has fared astonishingly well in its short history. It now frames discussions of innovation policy in supra-national organizations from the OECD to the EU, and within national governments from Sweden to South Korea. What is the origin of this concept? How and why has it come to be so widely used and acclaimed? What has given it such power in discussions of science and technology policy? In this paper, I present findings from my primary research in which I trace important events in the history and development of the NIS conceptual approach.Keywords:HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THENATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS (NIS) CONCEPTUAL APPROACH1. IntroductionThe NIS conceptual approach has fared astonishingly well in its short history. It now frames discussions of innovation policy in supra-national organizations from the OECD to the EU, and within national governments from Sweden to South Korea. What is the origin of this concept? How and why has it come to be so widely used and acclaimed? What has given it such power in discussions of science and technology policy? In this paper, I present findings from my primary research in which I trace important events in the history and development of the NIS conceptual approach. In doing so, I contribute to the new literature in science and technology studies (S&TS), connected to economics and business-related concepts, ideas, and models (see, for example, Mirowski and Sklivas 1991; Yonay 1994; Evans 1997; Callon 1998; MacKenzie 2001; Mirowski and Sent 2002).What follows in this paper is, first, a discussion of the analytical apparatus I utilize in my analysis of the historical development of the NIS approach. I then provide a brief history of the field of innovation studies from which the NIS conceptual approach arose. I map the basic contours of the field of innovation studies and describe the place of the NIS conceptual approach within that field. Next, I examine the emergence and development of the NIS conceptual approach itself, showing how in its development it is an appropriate subject for analysis under the social construction of technology (SCOT) program.The innovation systems conceptual program features key ‘missing pieces’ that explain the concept’s development through various controversies among its practitioners. The practitioners seldom (and always tangentially) articulate these missing pieces in the innovation systems literature, leaving the controversies to ‘float’ above the mainstream academic and policy debates. I organize my history of the NIS conceptual approach around seven themes, clarifying these controversies and explicating the missing pieces in order to situate the development of the NIS conceptual approach more accurately and to understand better how the conceptual approach operates and acquires its power today. This section forms the backbone of the paper and is based primarily on my interviews with central proponents of the NIS concept.The final section presents concluding remarks based on the narrative.Framework: Old Tropes and New2. TheoreticalWhile there is a growing body of literature on the economic, policy, and theoretical aspects of innovations in general and the NIS conceptual approach in particular—see, for example, Fagerberg, Mowery, and Nelson, 2005, Nelson 2000, Lundvall 1988, Freeman 1995, Nelson 1993, Lundvall 1992—to the best of1my knowledge there is no material that discusses the development, history, and social construction of the concept from an S&TS or constructivist standpoint. Moreover, key debates among leading practitioners in the field have not been analyzed from an S&TS perspective.1 In this paper, I employ analytical tools from S&TS to study these neglected aspects of the emergence and history of the NIS conceptual approach.Traditionally, disciplines of science and technology appear to accumulate knowledge progressively, building one fact upon another, adding gradually to an ever-increasing mountain of knowledge. This is the normal progressive model of science and technology from which ‘black-boxes,’ or knowledge (facts about nature) and material artifacts, emerge.2 Beyond work in the S&TS field and to some extent the history of technology, relatively little attention has been paid to the historical process through which knowledge and artifacts become good facts or successful technologies; such understanding about knowledge production is often dismissed by scholars external to the sociology of science and technology as inconsequential or unimportant. Once a piece of scientific knowledge or tangible artifact becomes black-boxed, it acquires an air of inexorability, as if it were the only possible solution to the set of problems to which it is applied. The attainment of this status tends, however, to obscure the history behind the scientific or technological black box in question. As a corrective to such a development, in this paper I make the NIS conceptual approach an object of analysis. I analyze the hidden history of the NIS conceptual approach by bringing into the foreground the basis of its success. Although I am able to treat some aspects of the NIS concept’s history independently, other aspects benefit from my being able to map them onto the SCOT model. The SCOT model, in this case, functions as a heuristic device in historicizing the concept. I appeal, in particular, to three stages of the SCOT model: interpretive flexibility, closure and stabilization, and the wider context.The NIS concept grew out of a very specific set of sociological circumstances. It was not the only solution to a pressing set of problems at the time of its genesis (researchers were trying to understand competitiveness at the country level), and these circumstances are not always given the full attention they deserve in the innovation systems literature. By revealing these ‘missing pieces’ and connecting them to the context of the NIS concept’s emergence, I trace how consensus behind the NIS concept developed as a result of a reaction to the prevailing orthodoxy in economics, the wider geopolitical context, and strategic links between the academic and policy worlds. My analysis helps to1 My usage of the term ‘debate’ functions differently from the common usage of the term in S&TS analyses. I do not use the term to refer to antagonistic groups pitted against and intellectually patronizing one another. Rather, my usage of the term ‘debate’ or ‘controversy’ in this paper more accurately refers to disagreements—entirely amicable—about ambiguities or uncertainties that practitioners of the NIS concept struggle with in regards to the usage or meaning of the NIS conceptual approach.2 In this context, science and technology studies (S&TS) appropriates the engineers’ term ‘black box,’ a term describing a predictable input-output device, something the inner workings of which need not be known for it to be used.2explain the promulgation of varying interpretations of the concept on the part of different actors in the innovation systems literature.I borrow from S&TS studies of controversies and rhetoric as well as the sociology of technology (in particular the SCOT model) to show how the NIS conceptual approach developed. The focus on the NIS concept is a departure from customary objects of analysis in the sociology of science and technology, which have hitherto been dominated mainly by scientific knowledge and material artifacts. While the NIS concept is not a material technology in the same way that Bakelite, bicycles, and nuclear missiles are, it is still a ‘conceptual approach,’ impinging on human consciousness and behavior, and therefore valuable for analysis.3. Background to the Field of Innovation StudiesThe conceptual approach of a ‘national innovation system’ emerged as one of the dominant strands of research from the field of innovation studies.3 Although the idea of innovation as an activity is not new, the study of innovations began to emerge as a separate field, differentiating itself from economics, in the 1960s.It is commonly assumed that the study of innovations as a discrete body of study emerged mostly from within existing disciplines, particularly economics (see, for example, Castellacci et al. 2005, Fagerberg 2005) over the last four and a half decades. While this is true for the most part, a complementary but longer-term perspective is offered by Reinert (1999, 2003). Reinert argues that innovation-systems thinking did not emerge from the classical theory of mainstream economics, which descended in a canonical sequence from the Physiocrats via Adam Smith and David Ricardo to the neo-classical tradition beginning with Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, and Leon Walras. Rather there was also an alternative or ‘other’ canon in economic theory, which he labels the‘Renaissance Canon,’ which ran parallel to classical/neo-classical mainstream economics. This second ‘Renaissance Canon’ belongs to the domain of‘appreciative theorizing’ (in Nelson and Winter’s parlance—see Nelson and Winter 1982) and the central argument contained in this tradition is that knowledge is the central agent of human change.4 The ‘Renaissance Canon,’ argues Reinert, can be tracked to Francis Bacon (mid-sixteenth - early seventeenth century), Antonio Serra (early seventeenth century), Friedrich List (early nineteenth century), and most recently to Joseph Schumpeter (late-nineteenth - mid-twentieth century). It is from this canon of economic theory that 3 Although the field of ‘innovation studies’ is sometimes referred to as the ‘economics of innovation,’ I prefer the label ‘innovation studies.’ It is more appropriate because of the heterodox disciplines that are involved with, and can contribute to, the study of the phenomenon of innovation and the innovation systems concept.4 In their seminal 1982 work An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter used the term ‘appreciative theorizing’ in contrast to ‘formal theory.’ Whereas the latter is logical and mathematical, the former is closer to empirical observation, to which it is assumed to provide both guidance and interpretation.3innovation studies and the study of innovation systems can trace its contemporary roots.In its present form, however, innovation studies has largely been inspired by the works of Joseph A. Schumpeter and other research traditions outside the economics mainstream, such as institutional economics, development economics, and, most notably, evolutionary economics. Nelson and Winter (1977 and 1982) deserve mention in the area of evolutionary economics. They share the Schumpeterian focus on capitalism as an engine of change in Nelson and Winter 1982, and they also introduce a more elaborate theoretical perspective on how firms behave. Nelson and Winter criticize the assumptions underpinning the neoclassical theory of the firm (the idea that firms have perfect knowledge about the best technology available at any given time and are rational actors with respect to new technologies). A firm’s actions, they argue, are guided by routines, which are reproduced through practice as a function of the firm’s organizational memory. Routines usually differ across firms; some prefer innovation whereas others prefer imitation. A central concern of innovation studies has been to explain technological growth in an economy more effectively. Such a concern can be traced back to the Harrod-Domar Model of growth developed in mainstream neoclassical economics in the early 1940s, which sought to extend John Maynard Keynes’s theory of demand-determined equilibrium into a theory of growth. In the popular term of the day, the Harrod-Domar growth model was at a ‘knife-edge’ in that its equilibrium path was unstable. Any deviation from the path of steady-state growth would result in a move further away from that path, causing macroeconomic instability. This conclusion was contested by Robert Solow, among others (including Trevor Swan and later James Meade), and the work of Solow and Swan resulted in the ‘Neoclassical’ growth model.5 The ‘Neoclassical’ growth model explained growth by allowing for flexible technology, whereas Harrod-Domar’s model did not.6 The ‘Neoclassical’ model, however, imposes many restrictive assumptions. These assumptions include instantaneously stable macroeconomic equilibrium and a factor price adjustment mechanism that assumes that factors are paid according to their marginal productivity. In particular, modifications are required regarding technical progress to make it comply with the empirical data. The spirit of these modifications contradicted at least two of the ‘stylized’ facts of industrialized economies laid out by Nicholas Kaldor (1961)—namely, that the capital/labor and output/labor ratios have been rising over time and that the real wage has been rising over the course of development.By adding technical progress to neoclassical growth models, the‘Neoclassical’ growth model could explain steadily increasing standards of living. This finding in turn led to an entire body of empirical literature, known as ‘growth5 The model differs from Keynesian growth models in that the latter has investment as a function of financial conditions and savings which are derived from investment via the income multiplier. In the Neoclassical model, not only are all Keynesian ‘financial’ factors omitted, but the direction of causality between savings and investment is reversed.6 In his 1956 paper, Solow states that the “bulk of this paper is devoted to a model of long-run growth which accepts all the Harrod-Domar assumptions except that of fixed [factor] proportions” (Solow 1956: 66).4accounting,’ which purported to address the empirical validity of the modified‘Neoclassical’ growth model in which technical progress is assumed. The ‘growth accounting’ literature asked the simple question: given the history of output growth, how much of it was due to the growth of capital and labor inputs, and how much to technical progress? Output growth, labor growth, and capital growth are observable, but technical progress is not—it has to be estimated. Empirical growth accounting began with the famous studies of Moses Abramovitz (1956, 1962) and Robert Solow (1957). Their procedure for calculating technical progress was to deduce the growth in output attributable to growth in capital and labor (multiplied by their respective factor prices) and ascribe the ‘residual’ growth in output to technical progress. The most striking feature of early investigations of growth accounting was the size of the Solow residual.7 The emergence of this ‘growth accounting’ literature set into motion more concerted and directed study into the phenomenon of technical change, which developed from the 1960s onwards. Since then, economists have been joined by scholars in related fields who have explored the phenomenon of technical progress, or innovation, in a concentrated fashion. As a result of this trend, innovation studies has over several decades developed into a multidisciplinary field, with scholars studying the relationships between technological, economic, organizational, and institutional change. Furthermore, this line of analysis—focusing on technical progress—forms the rationale for governments’ interest in promoting innovation, and by extension, innovation policy.4. Mapping the Broader Field of Innovation Studies: The Place of the National Innovation Systems (NIS) Conceptual Approach within the Field Given the broad-ranging interests of the field of innovation studies, coupled with the wide variety of backgrounds of the scholars who inhabit it, mapping this intellectual domain is not a straightforward task. Because the discipline is relatively new, its boundaries are supple and changing. In this section, I provide some broad contours and outline the main strand of work in each of the discipline’s major research areas.The field of innovation studies can be mapped in terms of where innovation takes place (in firms vs. in non-firm organizations), in terms of how innovation comes about (the innovative process), by studying how innovation differs through time (across sectors, industries, or nations), or by types of innovation. Because innovation studies scholars look to Joseph Schumpeter as their seminal innovation theorist (see, for example, Fagerberg 2005), it is possible to apply his canonical classification method selectively to categorize the field because almost all of the relevant literature (excepting that which discusses the history of innovation in society) can be categorized according to his scheme.7 For example, Solow (1957) calculated that only 12.5% of growth in output per capita in the1909-1949 period in the United States was due to factor accumulation—leaving 87.5% to be explained by technical progress. Later work refined these estimates by allowing for improvements in human capital, but the residual remained large.5Schumpeter defined innovation as ‘new combinations’ of existing resources. This combinatory activity he labeled ‘the entrepreneurial function’ to be performed by entrepreneurs, to which he attached much importance. In focusing on the role of innovation in economic and social change, Schumpeter argued that it was not sufficient to study the economy through a static lens, focusing on the utilization of resources to different ends. Economic development, in his view, had to be seen as a process of qualitative change, driven by innovation, taking place in historical time. Schumpeter’s classification method was based on new product innovations, new methods of production, new sources of supply, the exploitation of new markets, and new ways to organize business.Another approach to classifying the literature in the field, also based on Schumpeter’s work, is to delineate innovations according to how radical they are compared with current technology (Freeman and Soete 1997). From this perspective, continuous improvements are characterized as ‘incremental’ or‘marginal’ innovations, as opposed to ‘radical’ innovations or ‘technological revolutions’ (consisting of a cluster of innovations that together may have a very far-reaching impact).4.1 Where Does the Study of Innovation Systems Fit?A central finding in the innovation studies literature—common to all types of innovation—is that, in most cases, innovation activities depend heavily on external sources. Innovators rarely innovate in isolation. They work in conjunction with any number of entities to develop an innovation. Van de Ven, Andrew, Polley, Garaud, and Venkataraman state that the innovation journey is a collective achievement that requires key contributions from entrepreneurs in both the public and private sectors (1999: 149). In understanding all types of innovation, it is useful to employ a ‘systems’ perspective to underscore the collective achievement, in terms of inputs into the innovative process, and to study its wide-ranging effects in society. Such a ‘systems’ perspective presents an overarching conceptualization, or an underlying framework, for each of the abovementioned innovation studies areas.The study of any type of innovative activity need not, however, fall under the innovation systems rubric. Whether or not it does is entirely the choice of the researcher in terms of the research questions asked. In particular, if the researcher seeks to understand how any given innovative activity connects to the wider ‘system’ from which it emerges, then the study of linkages among the innovator, resource inputs, and market outputs are helpful (that is, a systems perspective is helpful). On the other hand, if the research questions are exclusively confined, for instance, to the inner workings of an innovating firm (for example, organizational innovations), then the study need not be situated within the national innovation systems conceptual approach.8 In other words, the innovation systems idea functions as an umbrella conceptual approach under8 For an example of a recent study that examines organization-level theoretical issues under the broader innovation systems rubric, see, Sharif and Chan (2004).6which innovation studies projects may or may not fit depending on the scope and purpose of a given research question.It is important to note, as well, that the study of innovation systems is a discrete area of research in itself. For example, a study of that aspect of an innovation system that is comprised of universities and their linkages with industry would fall generally under the innovation studies rubric without focusing on product, process, or organizational innovation. Similarly, a study of innovation policies and their effect on public and private innovation would represent another strand that falls distinctly under the innovation systems conceptual approach. In addition to offering a broad-ranging framework for innovation studies research, therefore, the innovation systems conceptual approach itself represents an independent domain of study within the innovation studies field.5. Chief Proponents of the NIS Concept: Cast of CharactersToday, a variety of different new (and sometimes old) research centers and departments are concerned with the role of innovation in economic and social change. These research centers are usually interdisciplinary units, including economics, S&TS, business studies, and even some branches of sociology.The most notable of these departments is the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex, England. SPRU houses one of the most respected living founders of innovation research—Professor Emeritus, Christopher Freeman. Until 2003, SPRU was also the intellectual home of the late Keith Pavitt. Also in England at the University of Manchester are Stanley Metcalfe and Rod Coombs. Metcalfe has worked extensively on issues related to technology policy and innovation systems in the service economy, whereas Coombs has worked on issues of private sector R&D, focusing on company-level strategy.The largest concentration of innovation studies scholars can be found, however, in Scandinavia. Bengt-Åke Lundvall, at the University of Aalborg in Denmark (where he credits Esben Sloth Andersen for much of the early pioneering work carried out in Aalborg), continues to be a key actor in promoting the innovation systems concept. In Sweden, Charles Edquist and Maureen McKelvey jointly worked on the concept of innovation systems at Linköping University in the early 1990s, before both of them left Linköping, with Edquist moving to Lund University, and McKelvey moving to Chalmers University of Technology (in Lund and Gothenburg, Sweden, respectively). At Chalmers, McKelvey is joined by Staffan Jacobsson, who is interested primarily in the concept of technological innovation systems. Keith Smith occupied a variety of positions in Scandinavia, including a post in Norway, and also served as advisor to the OECD while the innovation systems concept was being introduced.No less prominent are many researchers in continental Europe working explicitly within the innovation systems paradigm. Among the most influential of this group is Luc Soete of MERIT and The United Nations University, The Netherlands. Others include Franco Malerba at Universitá Bocconi in Milan, Italy7(Malerba works on sectoral innovation systems); in the OECD the current Senior Administrator at the Directorate for Science, Technology, and Industry, Jean Guinet; and the former Senior Administrator, Francois Chesnais.In the United States, a smaller concentration of academics and policymakers has adopted such an interdisciplinary perspective, but Richard Nelson from Columbia University, Sidney Winter (currently at the University of Pennsylvania), David Mowery from the University of California, Berkeley, and Nathan Rosenberg (Professor Emeritus at Stanford University) have made notable and substantial contributions (past and present) to the development of the innovation systems conceptual approach. They are also distinguished by their ties to the European community of innovation systems researchers. At Case Western Reserve University in Ohio, Bo Carlsson is active in the study of technological innovation systems.While the above list is by no means exhaustive, it does highlight the widely accepted ‘usual suspects’ involved with innovation systems research. I interviewed most of the above individuals during the autumn of 2003 in order to understand the origins, emergence and diffusion of the NIS conceptual approach. The interviews were semi-structured and I developed a guide to help direct conversation. These guides, provided in advance to my interviewees, did not necessarily articulate the exact questions that I would ask or the order in which I would raise particular issues, but rather provided an outline of themes that I wanted to cover during the course of the interview. This technique helped me ensure that I covered all issues of particular interest to me, while also allowing flexibility to tailor the interview according to the responses of the interviewee. All the interviews were arranged in advance, digitally recorded and conducted without any significant interruptions. I took some handwritten notes during these interviews, but mostly focused my attention on the oral discussion taking place. The audio recordings were subsequently transcribed and analyzed. Each of the interviews lasted between one and two and a half hours. Table 1.1 presents summary information on my interviewees, including their institutional affiliations at the time I interviewed them, and selected publications indicating their role in the development/diffusion of the innovation systems conceptual approach.8Table 1.1: FormalInterviewsName InstitutionalAffiliation at Timeof Interview Major role in developmentof NIS concept(publication, policy role, orother role)*Date and locationof interview1. Christopher Freeman University ofSussex, EnglandFreeman, 1987 24 Oct 03,Brighton, England2. Richard Nelson ColumbiaUniversity, USANelson, 1993 10 Nov 03, NewYork, USA3. Bengt-Åke Lundvall Aalborg University,DenmarkLundvall, 1992 20 Oct 03, Aalborg,Denmark4. Charles Edquist Lund University,SwedenEdquist, 1997, Edquist200021 Oct 03, Lund,Sweden5. Maureen McKelvey Chalmers Univ. ofTech., SwedenMcKelvey, 2000 (editedwith Edquist)18 Oct 03,Alingsås, Sweden6. Keith Smith Chalmers Univ. ofTech., Sweden Finnish Technology Policyand OECD13 Oct 03,Gothenburg,Sweden7. Staffan Jacobsson Chalmers Univ. ofTech., SwedenTechnological innovationsystems17 Oct 03,Gothenburg,Sweden8. Rod Coombs University ofManchester PREST Group, Univ. ofManchester23 Oct 03,Manchester,England9. Stanley Metcalfe University ofManchesterMetcalfe, 1995 23 Oct 03,Manchester,England10. Franco Malerba Università Bocconi,Milan, ItalyMalerba, 2004 27 Oct 03, Milan,Italy11. Francois Chesnais Retired Former OECD, Science,Technology and IndustryDirectorate29 Oct 03, Paris,France12. Jean Guinet OECD, Paris,France Current OECD, Science,Technology and IndustryDirectorate28 Oct 03, Paris,France* See bibliography, for full references to these authors, where applicable.In addition to the above individuals, I also had a number of informal but in-depth conversations with other relevant individuals who have been influential in the development of the innovation systems conceptual approach in both academia and policymaking on the same subject. Unlike the first set of interviews, these interviews were unstructured, unscheduled, and usually took place at conferences and similar meetings. These interviews were not recorded and were, in general, shorter, lasting between 30 minutes and two hours. In one case, I did take handwritten notes during the interview, but in most cases, I wrote up ‘interview notes’ to myself only after the conversations were over. Details about this group of individuals are provided in Table 1.2, below.9。

44Journal of Marketing Vol.73 (July 2009),44–63©2009,American Marketing AssociationISSN:0022-2429 (print),1547-7185 (electronic)Michael A.Wiles & Anna DanielovaThe Worth of Product Placement in Successful Films:An Event StudyAnalysisAs a result of the diminishing effectiveness of broadcast advertising, firms are increasingly turning to product placements in films and television to promote their products.A growing stream of product placement research has conducted surveys of consumer and practitioner views on the practice and experiments to gauge product placement’s impact on brand awareness, attitudes, and purchase intent.However, there is no evidence of whether firms’investments in film product placements are worthwhile.The event study of 126 product placements in successful films during 2002 reveals a mean cumulative abnormal return of .89% during the film’s opening,indicating that product placement in a successful film is associated with positive movements in firm stock prices.Cross-sectional analysis of the returns offers new insight into how product, film, and execution factors influence the placement’s worth.The authors find that placement abnormal returns are enhanced by tie-in advertising and brand equity but are inhibited by audience absorption, critical acclaim, and violent film content.Placement modality,character associations, and blatancy also significantly affect the placement’s value.Keywords :product placement, brand integration, event study, movies, abnormal returnsMichael A.Wiles is Assistant Professor of Marketing, W.P .Carey School of Business, Arizona State University (e-mail:michael.wiles@).Anna Danielova is Assistant Professor of F inance, DeGroote School of Business, McMaster University (e-mail:adaniel@mcmaster.ca).The authors thank Neil Morgan, Rebecca Slotegraaf, Rosann Spiro, and the four anonymous JM reviewers for their thoughtful comments.The authors also greatly appreciate the suggestions of Mark Houston, Neal Galpin,Jennifer Klett, Adam Duhachek, Alina Sorescu, and Daniel Smith on prior versions of the article, as well as the generous support of Jonlee Andrews and the Center for Brand Leadership at the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University.The shareholder returns to marketing actions and resource deployments are a primary concern of schol-ars and firms (Rust et al. 2004). As one of the most visible areas of marketing activity and the largest item of marketing spending in most firms, advertising has been an area of particular interest to researchers and managers. Sev-eral empirical studies of the advertising–performance rela-tionship have provided strong evidence that firms’tradi-tional advertising communications generate positive wealth for shareholders (Conchar, Crask, and Zinkhan 2005).However, because of growing consumer resistance to tradi-tional broadcast advertising, firms are increasingly turning to alternative ways to reach consumers and enhance the value of their brands (Elliot 2008; Keller 2001). An alterna-tive that has received particular interest among many firms is product placement in television and films.Product placement (also sometimes referred to as “brand integration”) is the inclusion of branded products or identifiers through audio or visual means within mass-media programming (Balasubramanian 1994). Film product placement originated in the 1940s, but only in the past decade have firms employed it as a key marketing tactic (Karrh, McKee, and Pardun 2003). Firms paid $722 million in fees, free products, and promotional support for film product placement in 2005, and by 2010, spending on film placement is predicted to surge to $1.8 billion (PQ Media 2006). In general, fees for individual placements are not disclosed, but firms are known to have contributed $25 mil-lion toward the production cost of Minority Report to show-case their products and services (Grossberg 2002). Cadbury Schweppes and Mitsubishi have each spent tens of millions of dollars promoting film placements, and V olkswagen will spend $200 million on fees and promotion to be integrated into NBC Universal’s films and television programs (Finni-gan 2002; Ives 2005; Linnet and Halliday 2003).However, in contrast to traditional broadcast advertising activities, the literature reveals little evidence on whether these investments pay off (Balasubramanian, Karrh, and Patwardhan 2006), and firms are either unable or unwilling to make such assessments (Russell and Belch 2005). Given the increasing pressures to hold marketing expenditures accountable (Day and Fahey 1988; Luo and Donthu 2006;Rust et al. 2004) and managers’evident uncertainty about the legitimacy and role of film product placement in their marketing strategies, objective assessments that calibrate the contribution of film placement to firms’expected cash flows and profits are urgently needed. To address this important knowledge gap, this article addresses the funda-mental question of the economic worth of placement in films.We investigate the worth of product placements in films through an event study. Event studies are commonly used to assess the returns to a marketing action because it is extremely difficult to control for all the other concomitant factors that influence firm revenue and profits (Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002). E vent studies allow the event’s unique contribution to the firm’s future profit per-formance to be isolated and measured (Hyman and Mathur 2005). Examining the highest-grossing movies in 2002, we show that product placements in successful films are associ-ated with abnormal returns for shareholders. This provides the first empirical evidence to support the value of film product placement. In addition, we advance theoretical understanding by constructing a comprehensive model of the product and program factors that affect film placement worth, and we test this model using a cross-sectional analy-sis of the abnormal returns. This provides important new insights into which placement strategies maximize share-holder value.We organize the remainder of the article as follows: After reviewing the gaps that hinder our understanding of the returns to product placements in successful films, we integrate theory on the marketing–finance interface with insights from the advertising response and media effects lit-erature streams to develop hypotheses on how product and film factors affect placement worth. We then review our data collection, and after presenting the results of the event study and the cross-sectional analysis, we discuss our find-ings. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of the study.Literature Review Considerable research indicates that firms’advertising and marketing communication decisions have strong influences on firms’stock prices. One perspective holds that advertis-ing indicates the availability of discretionary firm resources and firm financial solvency (Erickson and Jacobson 1992), but spending on advertising is more commonly viewed as an investment in intangible firm assets, shaping the prospective size and vulnerability of the firm’s future cash flows (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). Advertising is also believed to raise the firm’s capital market visibility, which can broaden the firm’s investor base, improve liquid-ity, and lower the firm’s systematic risk and cost of capital (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 2004; McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim 2007). Studies of firms’aggregate advertising expenditures have found that increased levels of advertising and related brand-building activities are associated with enhanced cash flows and market values (Conchar, Crask, and Zinkhan 2005). However, the returns to individual ad campaigns are more variable (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995; Tellis et al. 2005; Wiles 2007).E vidence that alternative ways of enhancing product exposure are worthwhile is still emerging. The results from event studies suggest that major-league sports and Olympic sponsorships enhance firms’stock prices (e.g., Cornwell, Pruitt, and Clark 2005), but the wisdom of less salient com-munication alternatives, such as product placement, remains unclear. Investors’judgments of the worth of a firm’s mar-keting action are conditioned by the action’s perceived con-sumer impact (Lane and Jacobson 1995). Therefore, the economic return to product placement in successful films is inextricably connected to the placement’s expected effects on consumers.Scholars have primarily pointed to McCracken’s (1989) meaning-transfer model as a mechanism that can explain consumers’response to placements. McCracken suggests that the use of celebrity endorsers is effective because celebrities are endowed with symbolic meaning that is passed on to the product through its association with the celebrity. In much the same way, popular entertainment has rich symbolic meaning that can be transferred to the placed product (Russell 2002). Consumers connect the film world to their own, mapping their aspirations onto the products placed in the film (DeLorme and Reid 1999), which in turn influences attitudes and consumption norms (Pechmann and Shih 1999). For these reasons, film and television product placements have been found to enhance brand awareness, attitudes, and purchase intent (e.g., D’Astous and Chartier 2000; Russell 2002). Prominent placements capture atten-tion and enhance these intermediate consumer outcomes (e.g., Gupta and Lord 1998), but the enhancing effects of other execution factors, such as modality and plot connec-tion, have received less consistent support (Law and Braun 2000; Russell 2002), clouding knowledge of which place-ments are valuable.Therefore, our review suggests that several gaps remain in the understanding of film product placement. Because there is no direct evidence connecting film placement to increases in firm cash flows and stock price performance, it remains unclear whether film placement is indeed a wise practice. Prior placement research has also paid little atten-tion to how film characteristics affect placement outcomes. This oversight is surprising, given the substantial literature on how program factors affect ad effectiveness (Feltham and Arnold 1994). Because it is also not apparent how product-level factors affect placement value and because prior research has not simultaneously controlled for each of the different execution dimensions, firms have little knowl-edge about which placement opportunities to pursue. Thus, there is a need for research that can discern the worth of film placement and that considers simultaneously the effects of product, film, and execution factors. Our event study approach is uniquely suited to filling this gap.Conceptual FrameworkFilm placement worth is derived from the placement’s abil-ity to influence shareholder value positively, and there are several hypotheses that can offer a credible mechanism by which product placement information affects investor deci-sions. First, the price pressure hypothesis states that public attention (Barber and Odean 2008; Meschke 2004) or public mood and enthusiasm (Fehle, Tsyplakov, and Zdorovtsov 2005; Huberman and Regev 2001) alone can move stock trading volume and prices. Second, the investor recognition hypothesis, originally developed by Merton (1987), highlights the role of increased publicity and firm awareness on investor trading behavior. According to thisProduct Placement in Successful Films / 45view, increased visibility for a firm can draw investor atten-tion, induce some of these investors to follow the firm, and motivate these investors to become new shareholders, thus leading to a greater ownership base of the stock and greater liquidity (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 2004). Similarly, scholars have found that increased publicity for initial pub-lic offerings attracts additional retail investors to such offer-ings and enhances offer price valuations (Cook, Kieschnick, and Van Vess 2007). Third, the investor sentiment hypothe-sis posits that sentimental investors may drive up the rela-tive demand for shares of the firms that have the vector of principal characteristics that is compatible with their senti-ment (Baker and Wurgler 2006).Perhaps more important, however, film placement infor-mation can also be expected to affect stock prices by directly changing investor expectations regarding the firm’s future financial performance, and thus there would also likely be information-based trading in response to the film placement event. Because the firm’s stock price reflects the discounted value of the firm’s expected cash flows, market-ing activities that accelerate and enhance future cash flows have the ability to affect shareholder value positively (i.e., the stock price effect) (Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvan-cheryl 2004; Gruca and Rego 2005; Rao and Bharadwaj 2008). Financial markets are forward looking; thus, if the film placement has positive implications for the firm’s prospects, the firm’s market value will shift to reflect these anticipated changes in the firm’s financial performance before these changes actually occur. By building intangible market-based assets, firm marketing actions have the poten-tial to shape prospective cash flows and, thus, the firm’s market value by (1) increasing cash flow levels, (2) acceler-ating cash flow timing, (3) reducing cash flow vulnerability, and (4) increasing the firm’s residual value (Fornell et al. 2006; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). Evidence sug-gests that film product placement can facilitate firm perfor-mance in each of these ways.How Film Product Placement Positively Shapes Expected Future Cash FlowsFirst, there are strong reasons for investors to expect that film product placement enhances future cash flow levels. Ample evidence indicates that product placements increase consumer awareness and enhance brand attitudes (e.g., D’Astous and Chartier 2000; Gupta and Lord 1998). Thus, film product placement has the potential to improve brand equity, and improvements in brand equity have long been associated with increased consumer demand and increases in cash flow levels (Aaker and Day 1974; Conchar, Crask, and Zinkhan 2005). E nhanced brand associations can also increase the perceived value of the firm’s offering and improve customer satisfaction, further facilitating cash flows (e.g., Gruca and Rego 2005; Rust, Zahorik, and Kein-ingham 1995). For these reasons, strong links between brand enhancement and improvements in firm market value have often been observed (Aaker and Jacobson 2001; Lane and Jacobson 1995).Second, film placements can enhance firm market val-ues by accelerating the expected timing of the firm’s cash flows. Placements have been found to increase purchase intent (Gould, Gupta, and Grabner-Krauter 2000); thus, placements can lead to impulse purchases, which can accel-erate the receipt of cash flows. A placement’s ability to stimulate new product uses and applications may also fur-ther facilitate investors’expectations of firm cash flow tim-ing. Placements are especially effective in encouraging new types of product consumption because placements are aspi-rational and can set consumption norms (Russell 1998).Third, film product placement has the potential to enhance firm market value by reducing the expected vulner-ability of the firm’s cash flows. Consumers’connections with films can create strong loyalty for the products in the film, creating substantial switching costs. Placements can also affect consumption trends and styles for years after the film’s release (Yorks 1989). Ford’s use of Steve McQueen in a 2005 Mustang commercial further suggests that film placements can be an enduring source of positive brand associations and equity.Finally, film product placement can be expected to expand the firm’s customer base, increasing the firm’s residual value. The significant increase in sales of Red Stripe after The Firm and the Mini Cooper after The Italian Job is testament to the potential of film placement to attract new customers to brands. Moreover, film placements are an attractive way to target specific audiences, such as teenagers, and they allow firms to expose their products to consumers who would not normally pay attention to the brand. For example, Cadillac placed its cars in The Matrix Reloaded to reach a younger audience.In summary, extensive theory and evidence suggest that investors should react positively to film placement. Place-ments should lead investors to develop positive expectations for future financial performance because placements can lead to improvements in brand associations and loyalty that can accelerate and enhance the firm’s cash flows. For these reasons, we posit the following:H1: Film product placement is positively associated with a change in firm market value.Following advertising response models (MacInnis and Jaworski 1989), we assert that the worth of a film product placement is related to product, film, and execution factors (see Figure 1), which affect the likely consumer and investor response to the placement. Because of the ample research on the execution factors, we incorporate these fac-tors into our framework as controls.Product and Film Determinants of Placement WorthTie-in advertising. Tie-in advertising occurs when the firm promotes a product’s appearance in a film before the film’s release. First, a reason cash flow levels due to the placement are enhanced is that tie-in advertisements facili-tate consumer processing of the placement. Prior exposure to a concept increases the concept’s accessibility (i.e., Hig-gins and King 1981), improving people’s ability to identify the concept in visually complex environments. Therefore, tie-in advertisements increase the likelihood that consumers will notice the placement in the film.46/ Journal of Marketing,July 2009FIGURE 1A Conceptual Model for the Worth of Product Placements in Successful FilmsSecond, placements supported by tie-in advertising campaigns are worth more because the tie-in campaign strengthens consumers’meaning transfer from the film to the product. Consumers are more likely to draw film–product connections because the advertising and its cost highlight the placement’s significance to the firm. The expense and publicity of the tie-in campaign increase the placement’s diagnosticity (Kirmani 1990), elevating the importance of the placement in consumers’network of brand associations. Tie-in advertising may also create con-textual priming effects (Yi 1993), which further facilitate meaning transfer.Third, the expenditure of financial and organizational resources on the tie-in advertising also signals the place-ment’s strategic importance to the firm. The tie-in campaign indicates the priority that the firm places on leveraging its involvement with the film, suggesting that the firm consid-ers the film’s associations vital additions to the brand. Investors may also respond more favorably because of the potential communication synergies of the tie-in campaign.In summary, tie-in advertising directs consumer atten-tion to the placement and thus enhances film–product meaning transfer and bolsters film–product connections. For these reasons, we expect the following:H2: The worth of product placement in successful films is pos-itively related to the presence of tie-in advertising.Brand equity. Familiar, favorably regarded brands have high brand equity (Keller 1993), and the returns from film product placement should be positively related to brand equity for three primary reasons. First, consumers’motiva-tion and ability to process the placement increase when the placement is for a strong, familiar brand rather than a weak, unfamiliar brand. Attention in cluttered visual environments focuses on objects with easily accessible attitudes, and con-sumers are more motivated to pay attention to advertise-ments for well-known brands (Tellis 1988). As a result, advertisements for well-known brands enjoy higher levels of recall, and well-known brands are less affected by competitive inference (Kent and Allen 1994). Thus, place-ments for high-equity brands are worth more because these brands draw attention, lengthening the opportunity for meaning transfer.Second, evidence also indicates that brand equity may enhance the mapping process. Because of consistency con-cerns, positive information is weighed more heavily when the brand is familiar and well regarded (Ahluwalia 2002). Thus, the mapping of the film onto the product occurs more easily for high-equity brands, enhancing the increases in demand and cash flows from the placement.Third, placements for high-equity brands may convey more strategic information to financial markets. The high-equity brand’s high familiarity suggests that the primary intent of the placement is not merely to increase brand exposure but also to deepen and enhance brand associa-tions. Therefore, investors are likely to infer greater strate-gic significance to these brand placements. For example, the placement of Mercedes in Men in Black II signified new emphasis on the fun of driving a Mercedes, a shift to enhance the brand’s appeal with younger consumers. Thus, brand equity expands the returns from film placement because it leads to favorable consumer processing and toProduct Placement in Successful Films / 47positive inferences about the brand’s future strategic direction.H3: The worth of product placement in successful films is pos-itively related to brand equity.Audience absorption. Theories from multiple research streams suggest that the level of audience absorption affects consumers’motivation and ability to attend to placements. Media processing models from psychology contend that people process the narratives in books and films by becom-ing absorbed in and transported into the story (Dal Cin, Zanna, and Fong 2004). Absorption is a convergent process in which attention is focused on understanding the events in the narrative, leaving little motivation and ability for other tasks. People who are absorbed lose themselves in the story, thus limiting placement awareness.The relationship between advertising effectiveness and program involvement suggests additional evidence for the inhibiting effect of absorption. Most of this research has examined the effects of program involvement in situations, such as radio and television commercials, in which the pro-gram and the advertisement are presented sequentially (Lord and Burnkrant 1993). With placements, however, the entertainment and commercial messages are presented con-currently. When the advertisement is presented at the same time as the entertaining content, program involvement inhibits attention to the advertisements (Norris and Colman 1992; Wang and Calder 2006), thus limiting the opportunity for meaning transfer.In summary, these streams converge on the idea that placements in absorbing films receive less favorable con-sumer processing. Therefore, investors should react less positively to placements in absorbing films.H4: The worth of product placement in successful films is negatively related to film absorption.Critical acclaim. Though counterintuitive, three argu-ments suggest that placements in critically acclaimed films are less valuable to the firm. First, evidence suggests that consumers become irritated when advertisements impede consumption goals (E dwards, Li, and Lee 2002). Product placements in critically acclaimed films hinder consumers’attainment of their artistic consumption goals (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982) because the placements are commer-cial messages that disrupt their experience of the film. Thus, consumers become upset and angry when they encounter placements in critically praised films (DeLorme and Reid 1999), which dampens brand evaluations.Second, because consumers expect the high art experi-ence to be free from advertising persuasion tactics (Charters 2006), the appearance of placements in acclaimed films may also disconfirm expectations. Disconfirmation leads to increased elaboration and lower evaluations of the dis-crepant product when the novelty is not appreciated (Camp-bell and Goodstein 2001). These negative reactions to the placement may be exacerbated if the artistic processing goals increase the irrelevance of the discrepancy, further lowering the placement’s worth.Third, there is growing consumer consciousness that certain public artistic goods need to be protected from advertising messages (Klein 1999; Meenaghan and Shipley 1999). Thus, consumers may react negatively to placements in acclaimed films because they believe that these films should be a protected area, free from marketing persuasion tactics. As such, consumers may perceive placements in acclaimed films as inappropriate, thus reducing their worth.In summary, research streams on goal impediment, information expectancy, and marketing tactic appropriate-ness converge on the idea that consumers react less posi-tively to placements in critically acclaimed films. Because consumer anger and annoyance with an advertising tactic are believed to reduce advertising effectiveness (Aaker and Bruzzone 1985), we predict that investors consider place-ments in critically acclaimed films less valuable.H5: The worth of product placement in successful films is negatively related to film critical acclaim.Association with violence. There are two main reasons to suspect that violence in films diminishes placement worth. First, the literature on media violence contends that consumers react to violence in television and films with feelings of hostility, aggression, and anger (Bushman 2005). These negative emotions and associations may be transferred to the placed product (McCracken 1989), thus attenuating placement value. For example, recent studies have found that advertisements embedded in violent televi-sion programs generate lower purchase intentions (Bush-man 2005).The second reason film violence may diminish place-ment worth is related to the inferences consumers draw from the firm’s involvement with the violent film. A product placement functions as an endorsement (Russell 1998), so a placement suggests that the firm approves of the film’s sub-ject matter. If the firm disapproved of the film’s content, it would not have placed the product in the film. For example, airlines refuse placements in films that depict flying in a negative manner. A product placement sends the message that the firm is not bothered by the film’s violence, and thus consumers may lower their opinions of products placed in violent films because of their concerns about film violence and its negative impact on society (Brown and Dacin 1997; Salwen and Dupagne 1999).In summary, we hypothesize that placement worth is negatively related to the level of violence in films. However, young men are less bothered by media violence (Hamilton 1998). This suggests that products that are primarily tar-geted toward consumer segments that do not judge film vio-lence negatively are less harmed by violent content. Although we make no formal prediction, we examine whether product type moderates the impact of violence.H6. The worth of product placement in successful films is neg-atively related to film violence.MethodEvent Study MethodologyWe use the event study methodology to assess the impact of the event’s unexpected information on the firm’s stock price. The efficient market hypothesis asserts that a stock48/ Journal of Marketing,July 2009price reflects all public information about the firm, so only unexpected information can change the price of a stock (Fama et al. 1969). If the new information indicates that the firm will garner higher (lower) future cash flows, the firm’s stock price rises (drops) in reaction to the new information. The stock’s abnormal return—the difference between the expected returns based on general market movement and the actual returns—provides an unbiased estimate of the economic worth of the event (Brown and Warner 1980).E xcellent reviews of the market model approach for esti-mating abnormal returns have appeared recently in the lit-erature (e.g., Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004). We use the portfolio method to construct our test statistic due to our event date clustering (Jaffe 1974), and we present details about this test in the Appendix.Information about the company’s film placement is dis-seminated to the market when the film is released, as well as before the event, through firm promotional efforts. This firm publicity can cue investors to the placement—drawing attention to the film—but we assume that the information needed to change investors’beliefs about the firm’s prospects is not available to investors until the film is shown. We validate this assumption in our results.DataBecause Hollywood studios release approximately 200 films each year, we limited our analysis to the most popular films, or the 31 movies in 2002 that made $20 million in the United States during their first weekend, according to . Seven movies had no product place-ments, so our final sample included 24 films.Variable OperationalizationOur event is the appearance of a product in the released film and the circumstances of its appearance because informa-tion about how the product appears (placement execution) and the film context in which it appears (e.g., film violence, audience size) is not available until the film’s release. A visual placement occurs if the product’s name or logo is legibly shown on the screen, and an audio placement occurs if the product is mentioned (Russell 2002). We summarize our measurement of the product, film, and execution factors in Table 1, and we present descriptive statistics and correla-tions in Tables 2and 3.Firm/product factors. We operationalized tie-in adver-tising as whether the firm supported its placement with a promotional advertising campaign, which we identified through a Factiva search. We measured brand equity as the brand’s value in billions of dollars from BusinessWeek’s top 100 global brands in 2002, a valid measure of brand equity (Madden, Fehle, and Fornier 2006). We also controlled for the market value of the firm on the event day, which we determined by multiplying the closing stock price on the event day by the number of shares outstanding.Film factors. To proxy audience absorption, we used the decimal equivalent of the film’s grade from CinemaScore, a market research firm that surveys opening-night audiences about how much they enjoyed the film. Enjoyment is a good proxy for absorption for two reasons. First, theorists assert that one key element of an enjoyable book, or film, is that it is absorbing; it transports people from their mundane reality into a story world (Green, Brock, and Kaufman 2004). Sec-ond, it has been empirically determined that enjoyment is highly correlated with absorption levels (ρ= .77) (Green et al. 2004).We measured critical acclaim as the film’s ME TA-SCORE, which we obtained from , a Web site that aggregates the ratings of approximately 40 film critics. Using this score, we developed an index (0–100) of critical sentiment toward the film. We determined the film’s level of violence, profanity, and sexuality using data from Kids-In-Mind, one of the oldest and most popular film content advisory services. Kids-In-Mind employs trained reviewers who screen for objectionable material and then rate the film’s amount of violence, profanity, and sexuality on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. The organization has no political or religious affiliation; it aims to provide an “objective” account of the level of violence, sex, and pro-fanity in the film, without making value judgments about the age appropriateness of the content (Thompson and Yokota 2004). Kids-In-Mind does not provide a rating for drug content, so we had two independent coders review the films and record the instances of drug use. We included the film’s opening three-day gross in the model to control for the placement’s potential reach. We also included the num-ber of placements in the film for other firms to control for competitive interference from other placements.Execution factors. To account for the idiosyncrasies in placement execution, we captured measures for all execu-tion factors previously found to affect consumers’place-ment processing. The placement’s “plot connection”reflected whether the placement advanced the plot or increased the audience’s understanding of a main character (Russell 2002). To control for placement “modality,” we captured the number of audiovisual placements for the firm in the film. We incorporated the “prominence of the visual placement” by capturing the placement’s time on screen, the time in the background, and the time that the product was the only placement on screen (Gupta and Lord 1998). We captured the “valence of the audio placement” to con-trol for differences in endorsement (Russell and Stern 2006). An audio mention was positive (negative) if it was a favorable (critical) comment about the product. Comments that were neither positive nor negative were considered neutral. However, perfect multicollinearity with plot con-nection prevented positive valence from being included in the analysis. Because of their high correlation with plot connection, we did not include time in background and neutral valence to minimize the potential problems of multicollinearity.We controlled for “star association” because celebrities increase attention, recall, and purchase intent (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995). Actors credited before the film’s title were considered stars (Lippman 2005), and star association was recorded as a binary variable, representing whether the product was touched, held, consumed, or mentioned by the star. We also controlled for “association with a recurrent character,” a character established in a previous film or tele-Product Placement in Successful Films / 49。