An Empirical Analysis for Determinants of Interest Rate Swap Spread

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International Research Journal of Finance and EconomicsISSN 1450-2887 Issue 56 (2010)© EuroJournals Publishing, Inc. 2010/finance.htmIntra- vs. Inter- Industry Trade:Do Country Differences Matter?M Halim DalginDepartment of Business Administration,Kutztown University,Kutztown, PA,USAE-mail: dalgin@Tel: 1-570-484-646AbstractMost of the existing literature concentrates on technological differences or endowments as determinants of trade. These studies try to explain trade in terms of supplyside factors. In this paper, I take a different path and explore the relationship betweenfactors of demand and the pattern and the volume of trade. Here the variable I concentrateis the income distribution across the trading countries as the determinant of inter-industryor intra-industry trade. My results indicate that although inequality is not a significantdeterminant of inter-industry trade, it is a significant determinant of intra-industry trade.Keywords: Intra-industry trade, homothetic preferences, income distribution.JEL Classification Codes: F11, C2, D311. IntroductionTraditional trade models have long used the simplifying assumption of homothetic preferences. This is a useful assumption, if the purpose is to concentrate on the supply-side determinants of international trade. In a world with homothetic (and identical) preferences, and with free trade, the shares of countries and individuals in overall world consumption of every good are the same as their shares in world income. This allows traditional models to essentially assume demand away, which they do by calculating each country’s demand as a proportion of the world demand and therefore, in equilibrium, of the world supply. A consequence of assuming homothetic tastes is that per capita income levels and the distribution of assets across different individuals do not matter for trade. In a companion paper (Dalgin, Mitra and Trindade 2008), we examine the demand-side in general, and the income and asset distribution in particular, as determinants of trade flows and patterns. To do so, we had to incorporate nonhomotheticity of preferences into our analysis. Income distribution, and income per capita are found in that paper to be robust determinants of trade flows between countries.In this paper, I use these insights to examine the determinants of intra- versus inter-industry trade flows. Although the notion of intra-industry trade, and of its importance, is well established in economic thinking, an empirical analysis of its determinants, especially as far as the demand-side is concerned, is somewhat lacking. As we shall see, our approach allows us to incorporate much of the intuition of one of the original works on intra-industry trade (Linder 1961). Linder’s explanation for intra-industry trade did indeed rely on demand-side considerations. He started out from the observation that more similar countries have a higher share of intra-industry trade. This can be easily and intuitively explained in a model that relaxes the assumption of homothetic tastes, thus allowing international trade to be driven by the demand-side. In such a model, income distribution and income per capita do matter for aggregate demand. The more similar two countries are in these twodimensions, the more similar their demands across different industries are, and therefore the lower their inter-industry trade, and the higher the share of their trade that is intra-industry trade.There is earlier evidence that most goods do not have unitary income elasticity of demand, and therefore that tastes must be nonhomothetic. See for example the studies by Hunter and Markusen (1988) and by Hunter (1991). Both papers allow preferences to be nonhomothetic, in that they assume income expansion paths (Engel curves) with positive intercepts. However, their income expansion paths are linear. This is also the case if preferences are homothetic, which additionally requires a zero intercept. While in both papers the positive intercept of the income expansion path makes budget shares a function of per capita income, the linearity implies that income distribution, holding total income constant, has no impact on the demand for each good.Before the present work, only Francois and Kaplan (1996) look empirically at the effect of income distribution (in particular, of inequality) on trade. They find that inequality is an important determinant of the shares of manufactured goods from developed countries in the overall imports of developing countries. In the present context, their most important result is that the increase of this share with inequality correlates well with several intra-industry indices. This is very suggestive of a relationship between inequality and intra-industry trade. However, Francois and Kaplan do not explicitly examine what can be called the “Linder hypothesis”: more similar countries have a higher share of intra-industry trade. Nor does restricting the analysis to North-South trade, as Francois and Kaplan do, seem to be the most indicated method to examine intra-industry trade.1In this paper, instead of looking at the shares of developed country goods in developing country imports, I extend and complement Francois and Kaplan’s work by starting out with a gravity estimation of bilateral trade. This approach has the advantage of using a model whose empirical success has been firmly established in the trade literature. I augment the model in three significant directions. First, I include different measures of inequality in the country pair. Therefore, any explanatory power that we obtain from the inequality measures comes in addition to the already strong explanatory power of the gravity variables, namely distance and income. Second, in addition to the main model, I also estimate a gravity-like model where the dependent variable is Grubel and Lloyd’s (1975) measure of intra-industry trade, instead of the total trade flow between the two countries. This will allow me to test the Linder hypothesis that more similar countries have a higher share of intra-industry trade in their total trade. Finally, I note that this is in many ways a paper about the role of “distance” in trade, be it physical distance, differences in inequality, or distance in endowment space. Therefore, I include variables to control for differences in the endowment of factors between two countries.The intuition for these results is simple. Consider a generalized model of nonhomothetic preferences, such that the income expansion path with “food” on the horizontal axis, and “manufactures” on the vertical axis, is convex from below. In such a model, for a given per capita income, an increase in income inequality shifts the pattern of consumption towards manufactures and away from food. If we rely on Linder’s intuition that manufactures are more likely to be a differentiated good (which is confirmed by Francois and Kaplan 1996), then the increase in the demand for manufactures leads to an increase in the number of varieties that the market can support (under increasing returns in the production of each variety). Thus, in a two-country world, the number of varieties produced is increasing with the overall inequality of the two countries combined. Assuming no duplication or replication of varieties in the two countries, this necessarily leads to a larger volume of intra-industry trade.Furthermore, we know from the existing literature that inter-industry trade is based on differences in country characteristics. For example, if we look at two countries with the same overall GDP and identical and homothetic preferences, the volume of trade depends only on how different the two countries’ factor endowments are. While the capital-abundant country produces more of the 1We should note that this restriction plays in their favor, however, because their main purpose is to find evidence for nonhomothetic tastes, in which they succeed. They do not attempt to look for the determinants of intra-industry trade.capital-intensive good, the labor-abundant country produces more of the labor-intensive good. If thedemand for the two goods at given relative prices is the same in both countries, factor endowmentdifferences solely determine the volume of inter-industry trade. Here, I consider the “opposite” case. Ifboth countries have the same GDP, technologies and factor endowments, only differences inconsumption patterns can drive inter-industry trade. Suppose that preferences are identical acrosscountries and individuals, but are nonhomothetic (in a fashion that is stronger than the quasi-homotheticity of Hunter and Markusen 1988 and Hunter 1991). Then, the country that is more unequalconsumes more of the income-elastic good and less of the income-inelastic good. As inequality levelsbecome different, consumption patterns in the two countries become more and more different, leadingto greater inter-industry trade.In summary, my results show that countries’ overall inequality levels, as well as the inequalitydifferentials between two countries, are important determinants of the trade volume. In particular, theyaffect the volume of inter- versus intra-industry trade differently. Specifically, overall inequality shouldbe a determinant of overall intra-industry trade, while the absolute difference in inequality levelsshould be a determinant of inter-industry trade, after I control for differences in factor endowments. Iestimate the model by using the Grubel and Lloyd (1975) index as a measure of intra-industry trade. Asexpected, I find that differences in income distribution lead to a lower share of intra-industry trade, yetoverall inequality leads to a higher intra-industry trade. Due to the multicollinearity between overallinequality levels and inequality differentials, I do not find both the levels and differentials significant atthe same time. However, the general message that comes across is quite robust across specifications.2. TheorySuppose there are n individuals in a community and there are two goods, M and F (standing formanufactures and food respectively). I assume that good M is differentiated and each variety isproduced under increasing returns to scale. The market structure for manufactures is assumed to bemonopolistic competition. Let x M be the output and c M be the consumption of each variety. Let N bethe number of varieties. A symmetry assumption makes all varieties have the same relative price p(food is the numeraire). I also assume that preferences are non-homothetic but separable in food andmanufactures. Food is assumed to be income inelastic - that is the income expansion path, with food inthe horizontal axis, is convex from below. If the sub-utility function of all the manufactured varieties isof the Dixit-Stiglitz “love for variety” type, the aggregate demand for any given variety can be writtenas:c M=c(p,I1,I2,…,I n,N), (1) where I i is the income of the ith individual. In general, when I drop the assumption of identical andhomothetic tastes aggregate demand can no longer written simply as a function of aggregate incomesince with nonhomothetic tastes, aggregate demand depends on each individual consumer’s income. Inother words, distribution of income is a determinant of aggregate demand.An increase in inequality increases the demand for the manufactured good. If there is a fixedcost of producing each variety, and if we assume ∂c M∂N<0, monopolistic competition and free entry,the number of varieties in the market increases with the market size. Thus, N increases with inequality. In a two country world, N is increasing with the overall world inequality (overall inequality in the two countries). We conclude from this analysis that intra-industry trade increases with overall inequality.Now, suppose that in a two country world, the two countries are identical in all respects except for inequality. In this simple set-up, then, the countries’ outputs are identical but not their consumption. One can see that the more unequal country has a larger demand for manufactures and a smaller demand for food, as compared with the more equal country. Since the countries’ supplies are identical, thegreater the difference inequality between the two countries, the more different their demands and therefore, the larger their volume of inter-industry trade will be.23. Empirical ModelI investigate the effects of inequality on trade using an augmentation of a standard gravity specification. As the name suggests, in a gravity model the magnitude of trade flows between two countries is positively related to the product of their economic masses, which are measured by their GDP’s. In addition, there are factors that may stimulate or impede trade. There are several such factors, but I will include two main ones, namely distance and remoteness of country pairs from the rest of the world. In order to capture formal and informal trade barriers, as is done in many papers in the literature, I will also include the per capita GDP’s (in fact, the product of the per capita GDP’s for a country pair, following Frankel (1997).3 Per-capita GDP will also matter if preferences are nonhomothetic. While with homothetic prefences, each country’s share in world consumption of every good equals the share of the country’s GDP in overall GDP, non-homothetic preferences result in a deviation from this proportional relationship depending on the nature of the good in question and the level of per capita income.As a measure of the overall inequality of the two trading countries, I experiement with two different definitions. The first one is the sum of individual inequality measures within the countries and the second one is the weighted sum of individual inequalities defined as follows:INEQ ij= GDP i INEQ i+GDP j INEQ jGDP i+GDP j. (2)I use this definition so that inequality in the economically bigger country will have a moreimportant effect on determining the overall level of inequality and hence the volume of trade.4Furthermore, I include one or more measures of inequality such as levels, squares and interaction termsin our regressions.Since this paper focuses on differences in country characteristics, I include two more variablesin our gravity specification: the absolute difference in inequality levels of each country; and theabsolute difference in the countries’ endowments. The reason I include the inequality differential is tocapture the demand differences that might arise because of the nonhomotheticity of preferences.Clearly, because of nonhomothetic preferences, any change in the income distribution of each countrywill lead to a demand shift in each commodity group. Such a change can be captured by a measure ofthe inequality differential. Therefore, I use this variable to control for the demand side variation intrade. In the same gravity equation, I also control for the endowment differential, because factors ofproduction are important determinants of trade. Consequently, that variable will control for the supplyside variations in trade.Therefore, our gravity model is written in the following way:T ijt= A t A i A j(GDP it GDP jt)β1(PGDP it PGDP jt)β2(DISTANCE ij)β3(REMOTE ijt)β4exp[β5(INEQ ijt)+β6(INEQ ijt)2+β7ADFINEQ ijt+β8ADF(Endowment)ijt+u ijt], (3) where our variables are defined as follows (in all definitions, t represents year t):T ijt denotes trade between country i and country j;GDP it is overall GDP of country i;2For a more detailed argument along these lines see Mitra and Trindade (2003)3 Per-capita GDP here will capture the level of development which is usuallynegatively correlated with formal andinformal trade barriers.4Admittedly this definition might be a little problematic in the absence of clear theoretical notions to justify it. The sum ofthe Gini indices of individual countries may not be equal to the Gini index of the total population if the two countrieswere to be combined.PGDP it is per-capita GDP of country i;DISTANCE ij represents the great circle distance between principal cities of countries i and j;REMOTE ijt is the product of the average distances of country i and country j from all othercountries in the sample, weighted by the GDP’s of each country;INEQ ijt is the measure of overall inequality in countries i and j. As measures of INEQ Iexperiemnent with two definitions: the Gini index and the ratio of the top to bottom income quintileswhich we represent as Q51;ADFINEQ ijt is the absolute difference between the inequality of country i and country j;ADF(Endowment)ijt: is the absolute difference between the factor endowments of country i andcountry j. In the text, for this variable, I also use the name endowment differential. I use two differentmeasures of the endowment differential: log of the absolute difference of the two countries per-workercapital stock denoted as lAdfk and the absolute difference of the log of the two countries’ per-workercapital stock denoted as Adflk.The country fixed effects A i and A j are important, as shown by Anderson and van Wincoop(2003), and play the role here of their multilateral resistance terms.I try alternative specifications with the levels, squares and interaction terms, involving ourmeasure of. I also experiment with using simultaneously different measures of inequality that describedifferent parts of the income distribution.The dependent variable T ijt is bounded below by zero. Therefore, we estimate a Tobit model aswell:T ijt=Max{A t A i A j(GDP it GDP jt)β1(PGDP i PGDP jt)β2(DISTANCE ij)β3(REMOTE ijt)β4exp[β5(INEQ ijt)+β6(INEQ ijt)2+β7ADFINEQ ijt+β8ADF(Endowment)ijt+u ijt],0}. (4) This is an augmentation of the gravity model, in the sense that I not only include geographicaldistance but also distance in endowment space and in demand charateristics space. I believe thatgeographical distance is not the only and perhaps not even the most important barrier to trade. Cultural,institutional, and political differences, which can be viewed as generalized distances, still remain inplace, and are certainly determinants of exchanges among the nations of the world.In this paper, one goal is to investigate is the relationship between income distribution and thepatterns of trade. One way to check this is to see how changes in inequality might lead to demand shiftsin commodity groups such as manufactures and food. Previously in the theory section, I argued thatintra-industry trade increases with increasing overall inequality, implying that an increase in theinequality level will shift the demand towards manufactures. We can test such a hypothesis byregressing a measure of intra-industry trade on inequality and the other variables in a gravity model. Iuse the index of intra-industry trade that was built by Grubel and Lloyd (1975). It gives a measure ofintra-industry trade as the share of net exports in overall trade in a given industry:IIT ljt=(1−|X ljt−M ljt|X ljt+M ljt)100where IIT ljt is the intra-industry trade index of country j in industry l at time t, X ljt is the total exports of country j in industry l at time t, and I similarly define imports as M ljt. This index ranges from zero, showing that all trade is inter-industry (that is, country j is either only exporting or only importing in industry l) to 100 showing that county j’s imports are equal to exports in industry l. Evidently such an index might easily suffer from the problems of aggregation if the commodity groups are not finely disaggregated. However, in the data set commodities are disaggregated at the four-digit SITC level. This is a very detailed disaggregation level and aggregation bias should not be a problem. Having said that, an aggregate level of intra-industry trade for a given country at a given time can be calculated by the formulaintra jt=(1−∑l(|X ljt−M ljt|)∑l(X ljt+M ljt))100. (5)Here intra jt is the intra-industry trade of country j with the rest of the world at time t. As we seefrom the formula, this index gives us the intra-industry trade as the share of the overall trade betweencountry j and the rest of the world.In the regressions, I will use the intra-industry trade of Grubel and Lloyd as the dependentvariable. Variables of interest on the right hand side are the inequality differential and capital per-worker differential between trading countries. The benchmark specification is as follows,intra ijt=Max{A t A i A j(GDP it GDP jt)β1(PGDP i PGDP jt)β2(DISTANCE ij)β3(REMOTE ijt)β4exp[β5(INEQ ijt)+β6(INEQ ijt)2+β7ADFINEQ ijt+β8ADF(Endowment)ijt+u ijt],0}. (6) 4. DataThe trade data come from the World Trade Analyzer (WTA) which was put together according to theStandard International Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 2, by Statistics Canada using the bilateraltrade data compiled by the United Nations Statistical Office. This database is available on the CD-ROM “World Trade Flows, 1980-1997.” This is a panel dataset covering the years from 1970 to 1997.The usefulness of this database for this study comes from its two characteristics. First of all, a specialcare was taken to match import-export data between any two countries. Secondly, imports from onecountry to another are reported according to four-digit SITC level. This database is described inFeenstra (2000). This feature is very important for us to calculate the intra-industry trade index inequation (5). Because, a more refined level of disaggregation helps eliminate aggregation bias incalculating the index.The inequality data come from Dollar and Kraay (2002), which they claim to be the largestdataset available up to date. This dataset is largely a recompilation of the UN-WIDER dataset whichwas also used by Deininger and Squire (1996) to construct a “high quality dataset”. This is a paneldataset of 137 countries spanning the years from 1955 to 1999.Real GDP and per-capita real GDP data (in 1995 constant American dollars) come from theWorld Bank’s World Development Indicators. I obtained the log of the great circle distance data andregional dummies from Rose (2002). Income dummies were generated according to the cut-offs usedby the World Bank to designate high income, middle income and low income countries.Endowments, capital stock and labor force data, are from Easterly and Levine (2001). Capitalstock variable is the disaggregated inventory capital stock in dollars. Both variables are originally fromPenn World Tables mark 5.6.Table 1 gives the summary statistics for each variable of interest that we use in our regressions.Also, table 2 gives the overall correlation matrix for these variables.Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables of InterestVariable Obs MeanStd.Dev.Min MaxIntra 1771841.8410086.5076780 100Gini 836036.709478.2588416.8623763.36833adfGini 895811.119178.3043480 43.68Q51 5865 8.498381 5.115643 3.000815 34.39611adfQ51 6316 5.905696 6.718085 0.000519 54.74284Lgdp 146945 47.22134 3.245952 37.39859 59.05244lpGdp 147041 15.05993 2.284423 9.223901 21.39392remote 1771844.240220.0766793.8404054.400778Ldist 1760928.31180.7414974.3994649.421514Table 2:Correlation Among Variables of Interestintra Gini adfGini Q51 adfQ51 lgdp lpGdp remote ldist intra 11Gini-0.191210.1303adfGini-0.192110.2420.9223Q51-0.13060.481810.76590.3632adfQ51-0.1772-0.123-0.1389-0.06041lgdp0.5284-0.2267-0.1177 0.6247 1-0.1321lpGdp 0.5144 -0.2514-0.0647remote -0.4594 0.2855 0.2244 0.218 0.2192 -0.1656 -0.34 1ldist -0.4418 0.1261 0.2275 0.0972 0.1732 -0.0267 -0.1137 0.6369 15. Empirical ResultsIn this section I discuss the results obtained from estimating the models we presented in section 3. As I discussed earlier, this is an inequality and endowments augmented gravity model. To estimate it, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Tobit estimation techniques. OLS estimations are not reported. Tobit results for equation (4) are presented in table 3. In each table, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the bilateral volume of trade. Table 3 presents results when the variable “Gini” is defined as the sum of Gini indices in both countries. Also among the right hand side variables we not only include the log of the real GDP, but also the real per-capita GDP. This is necessitated by the theory because I no longer assume homotheticity. Column (1) gives the tobit estimates when I do not have the actual level of overall inequality in the two countries, or its square, but only have the absolute difference. The effect is in the direction of the theory predictions: higher differences in inequality lead to higher volume of trade. This is also confirmed when I include a linear and nonlinear term for the overall inequality, that is, the sum of inequality measures in both countries and a square of it.5 Yet, the evidence for the overall inequality in column (2) is tenuous: it is positive but not significant. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the exercise by using a different measure of endowments differential, which is the log of the absolute difference in the two countries’ capital stock per worker: in both columns, inequality differentials are economically and statistically significant and positive at the 1 percent level confidence. Again, the overall measure of inequality, though positive, is not significant.Another important variable whose effect I would like to examine in close detail is the difference in factor endowments. In this specification, this variable is in the form of the absolute difference of the natural logarithm of each countries’ capital stock per worker. This variable, across the board, proves to be economically and statistically significant and positive at any level of confidence. This is the conclusion drawn from the theory: inter-industry trade, when preferences are assumed to be homothetic and identical, is driven by the difference in endowments.6The rest of the table has three other right hand side variables that are standard in gravity models. Estimates of all these three variables are in line with the literature. As the gravity model estimates, countries’ GDP and their remoteness indices increase the volume of trade but the distance inversely affects it.Besides Gini measure as the inequality variable I have experimented with other measures of inequality as a senstivity analysis. One measure I have used is the ratio of the top to the bottom income quintiles. However, none of the estimates or our conclusion changed qualitatively. But, in case of overall inequality the evidence was not strong. Thus the results I obtain about the inequality differential are robust according to the differerent definitions of inequality as well as different definitions of 5The Gini coefficient is not individually significant but the coefficient on the absolute difference in inequality estimate is significant at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, a joint significance test shows that they are jointly significant at the 1 percent level.6The economic significance of this variable can be exemplified by the last column of table 3. If the difference in capital stock per worker of two average countries increases by 1,000 dollars then their trade will increase by 2.5 percent, on average.。

股权结构与盈利能力关系研究国内外文献综述目录股权结构与盈利能力关系研究国内外文献综述 (1)（一）国外文献综述 (1)1.资本结构与盈利能力的关系。

(1)2.股权结构和盈利能力的关系 (1)（二）国内文献综述 (2)（三）文献述评 (3)参考文献 (4)（一）国外文献综述1.资本结构与盈利能力的关系。

Titman(2009)根据400多家制造业上市公司的相关数据，分析企业在不同负债阶段下的盈利能力，得出如果公司负债过高，将影响公司的盈利能力[1]。

S. Ouchene等(2013)主要分析了美国银行优化资本结构的途径是提高二级资本，并提高了盈利能力2]。

Lepetit L等(2014)在研究影响银行盈利能力的因素时，深入分析了股东控制和美国次贷危机的影响。

研究发现，当股东控制相对集中时，银行的利润最大。

风险也较高，在一定程度上会影响公司的盈利能力[3]。

Daskalakis N等(2017)重点研究了外部环境、内部流动性和中小企业长期债务负债率的变化。

短期负债随外部环境的变化变化更为明显，而本案例中短期负债变化不大[4]。

Vecchiato M等(2018)以美国金融业为研究对象。

基于美国金融业的相关金融数据，将研究对象限定在金融业。

了解行业不同变化下的资本结构将影响其盈利能力，最终发现在美国金融行业资产收益率越低，公司经营业绩越好的研究结论[5]。

2.股权结构和盈利能力的关系Welch(2003)为了研究股权结构与盈利能力的关系，选取澳大利亚上市公司作为研究样本，同时选取了股权结构作为内生变量，实证结果表明，公司股权结构与盈利能力相关，且内部人持股与盈利能力有着非线性相关的关系[6]。

Andersson等(2004)选取了瑞典87家上市公司，以1999-2003年的数据为样本，以资产收益率和产权净利率为盈利能力指标，对公司的股权结构与盈利能力之间的关系进行实证研究。

研究结果表明，当内部股东表决权为5%、10%和20%时，表决权对盈利能力的影响也各不相同[7]。

企业顾客满意度研究国内外文献综述目录企业顾客满意度研究国内外文献综述 (1)1.1 国外研究现状 (1)1、对顾客满意定义的研究 (1)2、对顾客满意度测评方法与模型的研究 (1)3、对顾客满意与其消费行为相关性的研究 (2)4、对满意度在其他领域应用的研究 (2)1.2 国内研究现状 (2)参考文献 (3)1.1 国外研究现状就该课题的研究，在西方国家最早可以追溯到上世纪70年代初，并且呈现出起步早、发展快的特点。

美国学者Cardozo于1965年首次提出了顾客满意这一科学的概念，也就是从这个时候开始，国外学者以顾客满意度为课题进行了深入而广泛的研究，主要从定义、测评方法和测量模型等层面对顾客满意度作了大量实证研究和理论研究。

1、对顾客满意定义的研究对顾客满意度定义，国内外学者并没有一致的意见。

Oliver和Linda （1981）认为顾客满意究其本质而言是个体的一种心理状态，具体是指顾客依据消费经验日积月累所形成的期望与单个的消费经历相比较达到一致时所产生的一种具有主观性的情感状态。

有“现代营销学之父”美誉的菲利浦·科特勒(1999)在《营销管理》一书中指出，“顾客满意反应的是顾客对产品或服务的满意程度，这种程度主要来源于顾客事前期待与实际消费效果进行对比后所形成的一种结果，具体来说就是顾客对某一产品或者服务消费后的实际绩效与事前期望的比较，当消费后的实际绩效远远大于期望值时，客户就对这一产品或服务感到满意，反之亦然”。

2、对顾客满意度测评方法与模型的研究上世纪90年代末，也就是1989年，西方学者全面开始从测评模型的构建角度对满意度进行了大量的研究。

科罗思咨询集团的创始人兼董事长费耐尔(美国密歇根大学商学院质量研究中心博士)在对瑞典顾客满意度指数测评结果跟踪研究的基础上，从计量经济学的角度构建起逻辑模型。

费耐尔提出的测评模型，也就是常说的ACSI模型，该顾客满意度测评模型所包含的指标体系，也就是影响顾客满意度因素比较多，主要包括价值感知、顾客满意等众多方面。

中国净易货贸易条件影响因素分析摘要：1980-2012年中国净易货贸易条件总体上呈现不断恶化的趋势，建立理论模型并进行实证检验发现：中国、德国、南韩劳动生产率的提高会恶化中国的净易货贸易条件，台湾劳动生产率的提高会改善中国的净易货贸易条件。

中国工资水平的上升会改善中国的净易货贸易条件。

美国和日本劳动生产率及工资水平变动对中国净易货贸易条件的影响不显著，德国、南韩和台湾工资水平变动对中国净易货贸易条件的影响不显著。

文章最后给出改善中国贸易条件的政策建议。

关键词：净易货贸易条件；劳动生产率；工资水平净易货贸易条件（Net Barter Terms of Trade）,也称为价格贸易条件，表示为NBTT，是指一个国家（或地区）出口商品价格与进口商品价格的比值，反映了该国一个单位的商品出口能够换回多少个单位的商品进口。

NBTT走高，表明一国价格贸易条件改善，单位商品出口能够为该国换回更多单位的商品进口；NBTT走低，表明一国价格贸易条件恶化，单位商品出口只能为该国换回更少单位的商品进口。

贸易条件改善表明一国在国际贸易中处于更加有利的地位，贸易条件恶化表明一国在国际贸易中处于越来越不利的地位。

图1 中国1980-2012年净易货贸易条件变化情况（2000=100）资料来源：联合国贸易和发展会议UNCTADSTAD数据库。

根据联合国贸易和发展会议UNCTADSTAD数据库提供的数据，如图1所示，从1980-2012年中国净易货贸易条件（NBTT）总体来看是趋于恶化的。

具体来说，经历了三个阶段，第一阶段（1981-1986）贸易条件急剧恶化，第二阶段（1986-1998）贸易条件逐步改善，第三阶段（1998-2012）贸易条件急剧恶化。

中国净易货贸易条件的恶化，意味着中国需要出口更多的货物才能换回与之前等量的进口货物，中国出口商品的价格相对越来越便宜，进口商品的价格相对越来越昂贵。

图2显示了1980-2012年中国出口商品价格指数（PEX ）和进口商品价格指数（PIM ）的变化情况。

American Economic Review美国经济评论V olume 100, Issue 4，20101. Title: Morally Motivated Self-Regulation.Authors: Baron, David P.Abstract: Self-regulation is the private provision of public goods and private redistribution. This paper examines the scope of self-regulation motivated by altruistic moral preferences that are reciprocal and stronger the closer are citizens in a socioeconomic distance. The focus is on the role of organizations in increasing self-regulation by mitigating free-rider problems. Social label and certification organizations can expand the scope of self-regulation but not beyond that with unconditional altruism. Enforcement organizations expand the scope of self-regulation farther, and for-profit enforcement is more aggressive than non-profit enforcement. Enforcement through social pressure imposed by NGOs also expands the scope of self-regulation.2. Title: Identifying the Elasticity of Substitution with Biased T echnical Change. Authors: León-Ledesma, Miguel A; McAdam, Peter; Willman, Alpo.Abstract: The capital-labor substitution elasticity and technical biases in production are critical parameters. The received wisdom claims their joint identification is infeasible. We challenge that interpretation. Putting the new approach of 'normalized' production functions at the heart of a Monte Carlo analysis we identify the conditions under which identification is feasible and robust. The key result is that jointly modeling the production function and first-order conditions is superior to single-equation approaches especially when merged with 'normalization.' Our results will have fundamental implications for production-function estimation under non-neutral technical change, for understanding the empirical relevance of normalization and variability underlying past empirical studies.3. Title: Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens.Authors: Chen, Yan; Harper, F. Maxwell; Konstan, Joseph; Li, Sherry Xin. Abstract: We design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an online community. We find that, after receiving behavioral information about the median user's total number of movie ratings, users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings, while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent. When given outcome information about the average user's net benefit score, above-average users mainly engage in activities that help others. Our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision.4. Title: Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive?Authors: Dafny, Leemore S.Abstract: To gauge the competitiveness of the group health insurance industry, I investigate whether health insurers charge higher premiums, ceteris paribus, to more profitable firms. Such 'direct price discrimination' is feasible only in imperfectly competitive settings. Using a proprietary national database of health plans offered by a sample of large, multisite firms from 1998-2005, I find firms with positive profit shocks subsequently face higher premium growth, even for the same health plans. Moreover, within a given firm, those sites located in concentrated insurance markets experience the greatest premium increases. The findings suggest health care insurers are exercising market power in an increasing number of geographic markets.5. Title: Wage Risk and Employment Risk over the Life Cycle.Authors: Low, Hamish; Meghir, Costas; Pistaferri, Luigi.Abstract: We specify a life-cycle model of consumption, labor supply and job mobility in an economy with search frictions. We distinguish different sources of risk, including shocks to productivity, job arrival, and job destruction. Allowing for job mobility has a large effect on the estimate of productivity risk. Increases in the latter impose a considerable welfare loss. Increases in employment risk have large effects on output and, primarily through this channel, affect welfare. The welfare value of programs such as Food Stamps, partially insuring productivity risk, is greater than the value of unemployment insurance which provides (partial) insurance against employment risk.6. Title: The Law of the Few.Authors: Galeotti, Andrea; Goyal, Sanjeev.Abstract: Empirical work shows that a large majority of individuals get most of their information from a very small subset of the group, viz., the influencers; moreover, there exist only minor differences between the observable characteristics of the influencers and the others. We refer to these empirical findings as the Law of the Few. This paper develops a model where players personally acquire information and form connections with others to access their information. Every (robust) equilibrium of this model exhibits the law of the few.7. Title: Technology Capital and the US Current Account.Authors: McGrattan, Ellen R; Prescott, Edward C.Abstract: The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates that the return on investments of foreign subsidiaries of US multinational companies over the period 1982-2006 averaged 9.4 percent annually after taxes; US subsidiaries of foreign multinationals averaged only 3.2 percent. BEA returns on foreign direct investment (FDI) are distorted because most intangible investments made by multinationals are expensed. We develop a multicountry general equilibrium model with an essential role for FDI and apply the BEA's methodology to construct economic statistics for the model economy. We estimate that mismeasurement of intangible investments accounts for over 60 percent of the difference in BEA returns.8. Title: Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets.Authors: Broner, Fernando; Martin, Alberto; Ventura, Jaume.Abstract: Conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of default penalties, sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets. Without this assumption, foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of default penalties. This result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies. Sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if default penalties are insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly. To reduce its effects, one can either increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets.9. Title: Pavlovian Processes in Consumer Choice: The Physical Presence of a Good Increases Willingness-to-Pay.Authors: Bushong, Benjamin; King, Lindsay M; Camerer, Colin F; Rangel, Antonio. Abstract: This paper describes a series of laboratory experiments studying whether the form in which items are displayed at the time of decision affects the dollar value that subjects place on them. Using a Becker-DeGroot auction under three different conditions-(i) text displays, (ii) image displays, and (iii) displays of the actual items-we find that subjects' willingness-to-pay is 40-61 percent larger in the real than in the image and text displays. Furthermore, follow-up experiments suggest the presence of the real item triggers preprogrammed consummatory Pavlovian processes that promote behaviors that lead to contact with appetitive items whenever they are available.10. Title: Determinants of Redistributive Politics: An Empirical Analysis of Land Reforms in West Bengal, India.Authors: Bardhan, Pranab; Mookherjee, Dilip.Abstract: We investigate political determinants of land reform implementation in the Indian state of West Bengal. Using a village panel spanning 1974-1998, we do not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that land reforms were positively and monotonically related to control of local governments by a Left Front coalition vis-à-vis the right-centrist Congress party, combined with lack of commitment to policy platforms. Instead, the evidence is consistent with a quasi-Downsian theory stressing the role of opportunism (reelection concerns) and electoral competition.11. Title: Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature.Authors: Aguirre, Iñaki; Cowan, Simon; Vickers, John.Abstract: This paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are served. Sufficient conditions-involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the different markets-are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive effects on social welfare and output.12. Title: Strategic Redistricting.Authors: Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang.Abstract: Two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the House of Representatives. In the unique equilibrium, parties maximally segregate their opponents' supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. Ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates more than the weaker one, and the election outcome is biased in the stronger party's favor and against the party whose supporters are easier to identify. We incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game and find that when one party controls redistricting, the equilibrium policy is biased towards the preferences of the redistricting party's supporters.13. Title: A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms.Authors: Weyl, E. Glen.Abstract: I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. Platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocation. Profit maximization distorts in the spirit of A. Michael Spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users. Thus the empirical and prescriptive content of the popular Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2006) model of two-sided markets turns on the nature of user heterogeneity. I propose a more plausible, yet equally tractable, model of heterogeneity in which users differ in their income or scale. My approach provides a general measure of market power and helps predict the effects of price regulation and mergers.14. Title: Consumption Taxes and Redistribution.Authors: Correia, Isabel.Abstract: This study considers replacing the current US tax system with only a flat tax consumption tax, showing, in contrast to the literature, that such a reform leads to a decline in inequality and increase in welfare for the welfare-poor. The results are obtained from a simple model that identifies the main channels through which the reform affects the economy. It is shown also that these novel results depend on the distribution of wealth and earnings, and that they hold for the relevant empirical distributions.15. Title: When Does Communication Improve Coordination?Authors: Ellingsen, Tore; Östling, Robert.Abstract: We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2×2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, althoug h average payoffs sometimes decrease. Two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others. Moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 × 2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination.16. Title: Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution.Authors: Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W.Abstract: We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. The siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism, and it depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship-relatedness factor. Numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment, and how this affects economic outcomes.17. Title: Elections, Capital Flows, and Politico-Economic Equilibria.Authors: Chang, Roberto.Abstract: We study an open economy where a pro-labor and a pro-business candidate compete in an election. The winner chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. Electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt, but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election. The resulting interaction is novel and has several implications. Elections are associated with increased volatility. Politico-economic crises can occur. Inefficiencies vanish if the candidates commit to an appropriate tax policy, but such commitments have predictable effects on the election. Empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed.18. Title: Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment.Authors: Anderson, Steven T; Friedman, Daniel; Oprea, Ryan.Abstract: Several impatient investors with private costs C_i face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V-C_i. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model's main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; usually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the Brownian parameters. Support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost.19. Title: Watta Satta: Bride Exchange and Women's Welfare in Rural Pakistan. Authors: Jacoby, Hanan G; Mansuri, Ghazala.Abstract: Can marriage institutions limit marital inefficiency? We study the pervasive custom of watta satta in rural Pakistan, a bride exchange between families coupled with a mutual threat of retaliation. Watta satta can be seen as a mechanism for coordinating the actions of two sets of parents, each wishing to restrain their son-in-law. We find that marital discord, as measured by estrangement, domestic abuse, and wife's mental health, is indeed significantly lower in watta satta versus 'conventional' marriage, but only after accounting for selection bias. These benefits cannot be explained by endogamy, a marriage pattern associated with watta satta.20. Title: Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for thePrincipal-Agent Relationship.Authors: Hamman, John R; Loewenstein, George; Weber, Roberto A.Abstract: Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. We report three laboratory experiments in which principals repeatedly either decide how much money to share with a recipient or hire agents to make sharing decisions on their behalf. Across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and in many cases close to nothing, when allocation decisions are made by agents.21. Title: The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence.Authors: Aizer, Anna.Abstract: Three quarters of all violence against women is perpetrated by domestic partners. This study exploits exogenous changes in the demand for labor in female-dominated industries to estimate the impact of the male-female wage gap on domestic violence. Decreases in the wage gap reduce violence against women, consistent with a household bargaining model. These findings shed new light on the health production process as well as observed income gradients in health and suggest that in addition to addressing concerns of equity and efficiency, pay parity can also improve the health of American women via reductions in violence.22. Title: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study.Authors: Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip.Abstract: The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy23. Title: Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs.Authors: Greenwood, Jeremy; Sanchez, Juan M; Wang, Cheng.Abstract: To address how technological progress in financial intermediation affects the economy, a costly-state verification framework is embedded into the standard growth model. The framework has two novel ingredients. First, firms differ in the risk/return combinations that they offer. Second, the efficacy of monitoring depends upon the amount of resources invested in the activity. A financial theory of firm size results. Undeserving firms are over-financed, deserving ones under-funded. Technological advance in intermediation leads to more capital accumulation and a redirection of funds away from unproductive firms toward productive ones. With continued progress, the economy approaches its first-best equilibrium.24. Title: Efficiency Gains from T eam-Based Coordination-Large-Scale Experimental Evidence.Authors: Feri, Francesco; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sutter, Matthias.Abstract: The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present a series of coordination experiments with a total of 1,101 participants. We find that teams of three subjects each coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model.25. Title: Social Identity and Preferences.Authors: Benjamin, Daniel J; Choi, James J; Strickland, A. Joshua.Abstract: Social identities prescribe behaviors for people. We identify the marginal behavioral effect of these norms on discount rates and risk aversion by measuring how laboratory subjects' choices change when an aspect of social identity is made salient. When we make ethnic identity salient to Asian-American subjects, they make more patient choices. When we make racial identity salient to black subjects, non-immigrant blacks (but not immigrant blacks) make more patient choices. Making gender identity salient has no effect on intertemporal or risk choices.26. Title: Bidding with Securities: Comment.Authors: Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo.Abstract: Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In this comment, we obtain the opposite results to DKS's by assuming that a higher return requires a higher investment cost. Given this latter assumption, steeper securities are more vulnerable to adverse selection, and may yield lower expected revenue, than flatter ones.。

加密数字货币的监管研究的国内外文献综述1国外研究现状在研究数字货币时，国外学者将加密货币（如比特币）归类为数字货币。

Monia Milutinovi (2018) 强调系统概念，将比特币定义为电子货币系统。

Hileman G (2017) 分析行为动机的比特币用户。

他们认为使用比特币作为交换媒介的新用户数量尚不清楚，他们更多地将其用作可转换资产。

Elbahrawy A(2017)通过分析比特币用户的动机，讨论虚拟货币的背景，讨论比特币用户与非用户的对比，将比特币作为一种货币软件平台和社区，研究结果显示和个人文化价值观有关。

同时，它考察了比特币如何影响货币、技术、政府和社会结构。

Hayes A(2017)对以下每日数据进行了基于时间的分析:从2009年到2014年。

通过对比特币价格形成驱动因素的序列分析可知，吸引比特币的指标是比特币价格的最强驱动因素，其次是市场力。

另一方面，宏观经济的发展不能决定长期。

长期的比特币的价格。

只要比特币的价格主要是投机投资所致，比特币就无法作为标准货币进行竞争。

英国研究公司一直走在发行法定数字货币的前沿。

Time, bank bank, Ben bank, Ben Breadbent(2016)表示，随着法定数字货币与实际汇率的提高，支付体系显著改善，法定数字货币已成为主流监管货币，并逐渐恶化，这是负面的。

在数字货币的影响方面，在货币理论方面，国外学者对数字货币的定义不同，研究结果存在显著差异。

代表Larsen A(2018)的研究人员认为，当一笔交易对某一事件使用电子支付系统时，传统纸币逐渐被取代，如果这一空间发展到一定程度，央行的货币政策将发生逆转。

代表Gandal N(2016)的研究人员认为，即使取消了电子货币，央行的货币政策仍然存在，但其影响已经发生了变化。

在监管方面，很多国家都是根据本国情况对数字货币进行监管，Peter Twomey(2018)认为应该尽快修改现有的比特币监管立法。

美国是世界上公司法、证券法研究最为发达的国家之一，在美国法学期刊（Law Review & Journals）上每年发表400多篇以公司法和证券法为主题的论文。

自1994年开始，美国的公司法学者每年会投票从中遴选出10篇左右重要的论文，重印于Corporate Practice Commentator，至2008年，已经评选了15年，计177篇论文入选。

以下是每年入选的论文列表：2008年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：1.Anabtawi, Iman and Lynn Stout. Fiduciary duties for activist shareholders. 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255-1308 (2008).2.Brummer, Chris. Corporate law preemption in an age of global capital markets. 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1067-1114 (2008).3.Choi, Stephen and Marcel Kahan. The market penalty for mutual fund scandals. 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1021-1057 (2007).4.Choi, Stephen J. and Jill E. Fisch. On beyond CalPERS: Survey evidence on the developing role of public pension funds in corporate governance. 61 V and. L. Rev. 315-354 (2008).5.Cox, James D., Randall S. Thoma s and Lynn Bai. There are plaintiffs and…there are plaintiffs: An empirical analysis of securities class action settlements. 61 V and. L. Rev. 355-386 (2008).6.Henderson, M. Todd. Paying CEOs in bankruptcy: Executive compensation when agency costs are low. 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1543-1618 (2007).7.Hu, Henry T.C. and Bernard Black. Equity and debt decoupling and empty voting II: Importance and extensions. 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 625-739 (2008).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock. The hanging chads of corporate voting. 96 Geo. L.J. 1227-1281 (2008).9.Strine, Leo E., Jr. Toward common sense and common ground? Reflections on the shared interests of managers and labor in a more rational system of corporate governance. 33 J. Corp. L. 1-20 (2007).10.Subramanian, Guhan. Go-shops vs. no-shops in private equity deals: Evidence and implications.63 Bus. Law. 729-760 (2008).2007年：1.Baker, Tom and Sean J. Griffith. The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer. 95 Geo. L.J. 1795-1842 (2007).2.Bebchuk, Lucian A. The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise. 93 V a. L. Rev. 675-732 (2007).3.Choi, Stephen J. and Robert B. Thompson. Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1489-1533 (2006).4.Coffee, John C., Jr. Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534-1586 (2006).5.Cox, James D. and Randall S. Thomas. Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1587-1640 (2006).6.Eisenberg, Theodore and Geoffrey Miller. Ex Ante Choice of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements. 59 V and. L. Rev. 1975-2013 (2006).7.Gordon, Jeffrey N. The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder V alue and Stock Market Prices. 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465-1568 (2007).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B. Rock. Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control. 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021-1093 (2007).ngevoort, Donald C. The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley. 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1817-1855 (2007).10.Roe, Mark J. Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets. 120 Harv. L. Rev. 460-527 (2006).11.Subramanian, Guhan. Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence. 36 J. Legal Stud. 1-26 (2007). (NOTE: This is an earlier working draft. The published article is not freely available, and at SLW we generally respect the intellectual property rights of others.)2006年：1.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735-1758 (2006).2.Bebchuk, Lucian A. Letting Shareholders Set the Rules. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1784-1813 (2006).3.Black, Bernard, Brian Cheffins and Michael Klausner. Outside Director Liability. 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055-1159 (2006).4.Choi, Stephen J., Jill E. Fisch and A.C. Pritchard. Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 835.Cox, James D. and Randall S. Thomas. Letting Billions Slip Through Y our Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements. 58 Stan. L. Rev. 411-454 (2005).6.Gilson, Ronald J. Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641-1679 (2006).7.Goshen , Zohar and Gideon Parchomovsky. The Essential Role of Securities Regulation. 55 Duke L.J. 711-782 (2006).8.Hansmann, Henry, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire. Law and the Rise of the Firm. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333-1403 (2006).9.Hu, Henry T. C. and Bernard Black. Empty V oting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms. 61 Bus. Law. 1011-1070 (2006).10.Kahan, Marcel. The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection? 22 J. L. Econ. & Org. 340-365 (2006).11.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock. Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law.58 V and. L. Rev. 1573-1622 (2005).12.Smith, D. Gordon. The Exit Structure of V enture Capital. 53 UCLA L. Rev. 315-356 (2005).2005年：1.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. The case for increasing shareholder power. 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833-914 (2005).2.Bratton, William W. The new dividend puzzle. 93 Geo. L.J. 845-895 (2005).3.Elhauge, Einer. Sacrificing corporate profits in the public interest. 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733-869 (2005).4.Johnson, . Corporate officers and the business judgment rule. 60 Bus. Law. 439-469 (2005).haupt, Curtis J. In the shadow of Delaware? The rise of hostile takeovers in Japan. 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2171-2216 (2005).6.Ribstein, Larry E. Are partners fiduciaries? 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 209-251.7.Roe, Mark J. Delaware?s politics. 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2491-2543 (2005).8.Romano, Roberta. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance. 114 Y ale L.J. 1521-1611 (2005).9.Subramanian, Guhan. Fixing freezeouts. 115 Y ale L.J. 2-70 (2005).10.Thompson, Robert B. and Randall S. Thomas. The public and private faces of derivative lawsuits. 57 V and. L. Rev. 1747-1793 (2004).11.Weiss, Elliott J. and J. White. File early, then free ride: How Delaware law (mis)shapes shareholder class actions. 57 V and. L. Rev. 1797-1881 (2004).2004年：1Arlen, Jennifer and Eric Talley. Unregulable defenses and the perils of shareholder choice. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577-666 (2003).2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. The business judgment rule as abstention doctrine. 57 V and. L. Rev. 83-130 (2004).3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Alma Cohen. Firms' decisions where to incorporate. 46 J.L. & Econ. 383-425 (2003).4.Blair, Margaret M. Locking in capital: what corporate law achieved for business organizers in the nineteenth century. 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387-455 (2003).5.Gilson, Ronald J. and Jeffrey N. Gordon. Controlling shareholders. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785-843 (2003).6.Roe, Mark J. Delaware 's competition. 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588-646 (2003).7.Sale, Hillary A. Delaware 's good faith. 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456-495 (2004).8.Stout, Lynn A. The mechanisms of market inefficiency: an introduction to the new finance. 28 J. Corp. L. 635-669 (2003).9.Subramanian, Guhan. Bargaining in the shadow of takeover defenses. 113 Y ale L.J. 621-686 (2003).10.Subramanian, Guhan. The disappearing Delaware effect. 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 32-59 (2004)11.Thompson, Robert B. and Randall S. Thomas. The new look of shareholder litigation: acquisition-oriented class actions. 57 V and. L. Rev. 133-209 (2004).2003年：1.A yres, Ian and Stephen Choi. Internalizing outsider trading. 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313-408 (2002).2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Director primacy: The means and ends of corporate governance. 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547-606 (2003).3.Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell. Does the evidence favor state competition in corporate law? 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1775-1821 (2002).4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further findings and a reply to symposium participants. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 885-917 (2002).5.Choi, Stephen J. and Jill E. Fisch. How to fix Wall Street: A voucher financing proposal for securities intermediaries. 113 Y ale L.J. 269-346 (2003).6.Daines, Robert. The incorporation choices of IPO firms. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev.1559-1611 (2002).7.Gilson, Ronald J. and David M. Schizer. Understanding venture capital structure: A taxexplanation for convertible preferred stock. 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874-916 (2003).8.Kahan, Marcel and Ehud Kamar. The myth of state competition in corporate law. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679-749 (2002).ngevoort, Donald C. Taming the animal spirits of the stock markets: A behavioral approach to securities regulation. 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135-188 (2002).10.Pritchard, A.C. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the counterrevolution in the federal securities laws. 52 Duke L.J. 841-949 (2003).11.Thompson, Robert B. and Hillary A. Sale. Securities fraud as corporate governance: Reflections upon federalism. 56 V and. L. Rev. 859-910 (2003).2002年：1.Allen, William T., Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine, Jr. Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law. 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 859-895 (2001) and 56 Bus. Law. 1287 (2001).2.A yres, Ian and Joe Bankman. Substitutes for Insider Trading. 54 Stan. L. Rev. 235-254 (2001).3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation. 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751-846 (2002).4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887-951 (2002).5.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman. Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden V alue. 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521-566 (2002).6.Bratton, William M. Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder V alue. 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275-1361 (2002).7.Coates, John C. IV. Explaining V ariation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers. 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1301-1421 (2001).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B. Rock. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law. 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871-915 (2002).9.Kahan, Marcel. Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-off Between Individual and Collective Rights. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1040-1089 (2002).10.Roe, Mark J. Corporate Law’s Limits. 31 J. Legal Stud. 233-271 (2002).11.Thompson, Robert B. and D. Gordon Smith. Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers. 80 Tex. L. Rev. 261-326 (2001).2001年：1.Black, Bernard S. The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781-855 (2001).2.Coates, John C. IV. Takeover defenses in the shadow of the pill: a critique of the scientific evidence. 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271-382 (2000).3.Coates, John C. IV and Guhan Subramanian. A buy-side model of M&A lockups: theory and evidence. 53 Stan. L. Rev. 307-396 (2000).4.Coffee, John C., Jr. The rise of dispersed ownership: the roles of law and the state in the separation of ownership and control. 111 Y ale L.J. 1-82 (2001).5.Choi, Stephen J. The unfounded fear of Regulation S: empirical evidence on offshore securities offerings. 50 Duke L.J. 663-751 (2000).6.Daines, Robert and Michael Klausner. Do IPO charters maximize firm value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs. 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83-120 (2001).7.Hansmann, Henry and Reinier Kraakman. The essential role of organizational law. 110 Y ale L.J. 387-440 (2000).ngevoort, Donald C. The human nature of corporate boards: law, norms, and the unintended consequences of independence and accountability. 89 Geo. L.J. 797-832 (2001).9.Mahoney, Paul G. The political economy of the Securities Act of 1933. 30 J. Legal Stud. 1-31 (2001).10.Roe, Mark J. Political preconditions to separating ownership from corporate control. 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539-606 (2000).11.Romano, Roberta. Less is more: making institutional investor activism a valuable mechanism of corporate governance. 18 Y ale J. on Reg. 174-251 (2001).2000年：1.Bratton, William W. and Joseph A. McCahery. Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference. 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 213-297 (1999).2.Coates, John C. IV. Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand?54 U. Miami L. Rev. 783-797 (2000).3.Coffee, John C., Jr. Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure. 25 J. Corp. L. 1-39 (1999).4.Fisch, Jill E. The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters. 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061-1100 (2000).5.Fox, Merritt B. Retained Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment. 85 V a. L. Rev. 1335-1419 (1999).6.Fried, Jesse M. Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers. 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421-477 (2000).7.Gulati, G. Mitu, William A. Klein and Eric M. Zolt. Connected Contracts. 47 UCLA L. Rev. 887-948 (2000).8.Hu, Henry T.C. Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality. 78 Tex. L. Rev. 777-884 (2000).9.Moll, Douglas K. Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective. 53 V and. L. Rev. 749-827 (2000).10.Schizer, David M. Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility. 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440-504 (2000).11.Smith, Thomas A. The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty. 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214-268 (1999).12.Thomas, Randall S. and Kenneth J. Martin. The Determinants of Shareholder V oting on Stock Option Plans. 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31-81 (2000).13.Thompson, Robert B. Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to V ote, Sell, and Sue. 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215-242 (1999).1999年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：1.Bankman, Joseph and Ronald J. Gilson. Why Start-ups? 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289-308 (1999).2.Bhagat, Sanjai and Bernard Black. The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance. 54 Bus. Law. 921-963 (1999).3.Blair, Margaret M. and Lynn A. Stout. A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. 85 V a. L. Rev. 247-328 (1999).4.Coates, John C., IV. “Fair V alue” As an A voidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions. 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251-1359 (1999).5.Coffee, John C., Jr. The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications. 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641-707 (1999).6.Eisenberg, Melvin A. Corporate Law and Social Norms. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253-1292 (1999).7.Hamermesh, Lawrence A. Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street? 73 Tul. L. Rev. 409-495 (1998).8.Krawiec, Kimberly D. Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Y ears Later. 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1039-1104.ngevoort, Donald C. Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319-1343 (1999).ngevoort, Donald C. Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences By Investors and Others.52 Stan. L. Rev. 87-125 (1999).11.Talley, Eric. Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine. 108 Y ale L.J. 277-375 (1998).12.Williams, Cynthia A. The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency. 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197-1311 (1999).1998年：1.Carney, William J., The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715-780 (1998).2.Choi, Stephen, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916-966 (1998).3.Coffee, John C., Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation. 52 Bus. Law. 1195-1233 (1997).ngevoort, Donald C., Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms). 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101-172 (1997).ngevoort, Donald C., The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior. 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629-676 (1997).6.Mann, Ronald J. The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending. 86 Geo. L.J. 1-44 (1997).haupt, Curtis J., Property Rights in Firms. 84 V a. L. Rev. 1145-1194 (1998).8.Rock, Edward B., Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009-1107 (1997).9.Romano, Roberta, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation. 107 Y ale L.J. 2359-2430 (1998).10.Schwab, Stewart J. and Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions. 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018-1094 (1998).11.Skeel, David A., Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy. 51 V and. L. Rev. 1325-1398 (1998).12.Thomas, Randall S. and Martin, Kenneth J., Should Labor Be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals? 73 Wash. L. Rev. 41-80 (1998).1997年：1.Alexander, Janet Cooper, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487-1537 (1996).2.Arlen, Jennifer and Kraakman, Reinier, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687-779 (1997).3.Brudney, Victor, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595-665 (1997).4.Carney, William J., The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. Legal Stud. 303-329 (1997).5.Choi, Stephen J., Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 567-651 (1997).6.Fox, Merritt B., Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom. 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498-2632 (1997).7.Kahan, Marcel and Klausner, Michael, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1539-1571 (1996).8.Mahoney, Paul G., The Exchange as Regulator, 83 V a. L. Rev. 1453-1500 (1997).haupt, Curtis J., The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: V enture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U.L. Rev. 865-898 (1997).10.Skeel, David A., Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 V a. L. Rev. 127-175 (1997).1996年：1.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996)2.Gilson, Ronald J. Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 327 (1996)3. Hu, Henry T.C. Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 21 J. Corp. L. 3 (1995)4.Kahan, Marcel & Michael Klausner Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 347 (1996)5.Kitch, Edmund W. The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brooklyn L. Rev. 763 (1995)ngevoort, Donald C. Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 627 (1996)7.Lin, Laura The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 898 (1996)lstein, Ira M. The Professional Board, 50 Bus. Law 1427 (1995)9.Thompson, Robert B. Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 Geo. L.J. 1 (1995)10.Triantis, George G. and Daniels, Ronald J. The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance. 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1073 (1995)1995年：公司法：1.Arlen, Jennifer and Deborah M. Weiss A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation,. 105 Y ale L.J. 325-391 (1995).2.Elson, Charles M. The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649 (1995).3.Hu, Henry T.C. Heeding Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 985-1040 (1995).4.Kahan, Marcel The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 565-622 (1995).5.Klausner, Michael Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 V a. L. Rev. 757-852 (1995).6.Mitchell, Lawrence E. Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry Into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 477-537 (1995).7.Siegel, Mary Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 Harv. J. on Legis. 79-143 (1995).证券法：1.Grundfest, Joseph A. Why Disimply? 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727-747 (1995).2.Lev, Baruch and Meiring de V illiers Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7-37 (1994).3.Mahoney, Paul G. Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047-1112 (1995).4.Seligman, Joel The Merits Do Matter, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 438 (1994).5.Seligman, Joel The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 649-702 (1995).6.Stout, Lynn A. Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Mark Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 V a. L. Rev. 611 (1995).7.Weiss, Elliott J. and John S. Beckerman Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Y ale L.J. 2053-2127 (1995).1994年：公司法：1.Fraidin, Stephen and Hanson, Jon D. Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 Y ale L.J. 1739-1834 (1994)2.Gordon, Jeffrey N. Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative V oting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124-192 (1994)3.Karpoff, Jonathan M., and Lott, John R., Jr. The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & Econ. 757-802 (1993)4.Kraakman, Reiner, Park, Hyun, and Shavell, Steven When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Geo. L.J. 1733-1775 (1994)5.Mitchell, Lawrence E. Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J. 425- 491 (1993)6.Oesterle, Dale A. and Palmiter, Alan R. Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder V oting Cases, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 485-583 (1994)7. Pound, John The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003-1071 (1993)8.Skeel, David A., Jr. Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471-557 (1994)9.Thompson, Robert B. Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and V icarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 V and. L. Rev. 1-41 (1994)证券法：1.Alexander, Janet Cooper The V alue of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 1421-1469 (1994)2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1-40 (1993)3.Black, Bernard S. and Coffee, John C. Jr. Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997-2087 (1994)4.Booth, Richard A. The Efficient Market, portfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1187-1212 (1993)5.Coffee, John C., Jr. The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 Cardozo L. Rev 837-907 (1994)6.Fox, Merritt B. Insider Trading Deterrence V ersus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2088-2203 (1994)7.Grundfest, Joseph A. Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961-1024 (1994)8.Macey, Jonathan R. Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 909-949 (1994)9.Rock, Edward B. Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 987-1031 (1994)。