德国公认会计准则与国际财务报告准则下的盈余管理【外文翻译】

盈余管理与公司业绩盈余管理与企业绩效有趣的是，协会之间的预回购异常预提费用及回购后性能出现将在很大程度上推动这些公司的报告中最购回前的负异常应计。

这些结果是一致的路易斯（2004）的论点，因为盈利的复杂性管理和遵守一定的管理行为，投资者的困难可能会感到惊讶实现增长时低于或超过操纵收益数字的基础上形成的期望。

随后的分析也表明，一旦我们控制的效果再回购的盈余管理，是没有证据显示性能的提高，和回购之间呈显着负相关性能和预回购异常预提费用基本上消失。

这种额外的证据进一步支持了我们的猜想，采购后优越的性能，至少部分是由于前回购盈余管理。

研究的其余部分安排如下：下一节将讨论相关的研究和我们的动力。

第二节介绍我们的变量的测量的过程。

第三节介绍样本选择过程。

第四节后回购的性能进行了分析。

第五节分析的证据回购前盈余管理。

第六节分析之间的关联购买前盈余管理和回购后的表现。

这项研究的结论在第七节。

相关的研究和动机谎言（2005）认为，公司报告经营效益显着改善相对公开市场回购公告后他们的同龄人。

他推断，经理启动股票回购计划时，他们期望未来的经营业绩是资本市场的预期。

我们猜想，回购后改善报告的经营业绩也有可能被下调盈利预回购管理驱动。

我们假定经理人进行回购的目的是可能有奖励办法，以减少回购价格。

扣除回购价格有效地转移股东财富卖出（即离开股东）（即那些将他们的股份持有其余股东）。

这种财富转移管理者受益，因为他们的利益更容易被其余的对齐在企业，事业的关注，他们的股权的股东通过将来的赔偿。

经理涉嫌操纵股票价格的方法之一是通过“盈利管理“（见，例如，希利和Wahlen的（1999））。

因此，我们主张经理们可能会使用他们的报告酌情紧缩股价之前公开市场回购。

财经杂志经理必须在其财务的自由裁量权，因为在目前的会计准则所提供的灵活性报告。

例如，现行的会计规则往往提供酌情经理关于如何核算交易和/或估计未变现收益或损失。

因此，经理人的机会主义行事，可以使用他们的报告可酌情暂时扣除收入减少的回购价格在季度和/或回购公告之前的季度。

盈余管理理论综述提要盈余管理是目前实证会计研究的一个热门课题。

对于这个议题，目前的众多研究至今尚没有一致的结果，从而在一定程度上给盈余管理的进一步研究造成了混乱。

鉴于此，本文将围绕盈余管理概念的提出、盈余管理的动机、手段和计量方法等几个基本方面，对盈余管理的研究现状进行归纳和梳理，旨在为进一步的研究提供一个逻辑起点。

一、引言盈余管理的研究兴起于20世纪八十年代的美国，它是目前国外会计学和经济学广泛研究的课题。

盈余管理是指公司管理当局在会计制度允许的范围内，利用职业判断和规划交易等手段对盈利进行调节，以达到各种目的的机会主义行为。

资本市场中的信息不对称和会计监管制度的不完备性给企业的会计盈余留下了可操纵的空间。

根据“理性经济人”假设，企业管理者有进行盈余管理的动机。

盈余管理的高低直接影响着其投资收益的好坏。

因此，对公司盈余管理行为进行深入研究，就显得十分必要了。

盈余管理研究可以从深层次上理解会计盈余的有用性以及会计行为的形成与作用机制，从而进一步验证会计行为的经济后果和会计盈余的信息含量，这将有助于完善监管政策和会计准则，改善公司治理，提高资本市场的资源配置效率。

国外学术界在盈余管理领域做了大量研究，对盈余管理的定义和计量方法学术界并未统一，但这在一定程度上给盈余管理的研究造成了混乱。

鉴于此，本文将围绕盈余管理概念的提出、盈余管理的动机、手段和计量方法等几个基本方面，对盈余管理的研究现状进行归纳和梳理，旨在为进一步的研究提供一个逻辑起点。

二、盈余管理的概念对盈余管理的概念，会计学界存在着诸多不同意见，但总体来说，主要有以下三个比较通用和流行的定义：第一，William R Scott认为，盈余管理是指，“在公认会计原则允许的范围内，通过对会计政策的选择使经营者自身利益或企业市场价值达到最大化的行为”，他的观点认为会计政策选择具有经济后果。

第二，Katherine Schipper认为，盈余管理实际上是企业管理层通过有目的地控制对外财务报告过程，以获取某些私人利益的“披露管理”。

盈余管理(Earning Management)就是企业管理盈余管理。

盈余管理就是企业管理当局在遵循会计准则的基础上。

通过对企业对外报告的会计收益信息进行控制或调整。

以达到主体自身利益最大化的行为。

中文名,盈余管理。

目的,达到主体自身利益最大化的行为。

基础,企业管理当局在遵循会计准则。

广泛研究,国外经济学和会计学。

概念。

盈余管理是目前国外经济学和会计学广泛研究的课题。

对盈余管理的概念会计学界存在着诸多不同意见。

从以下两个权威性的定义可以看出盈余管理的基本涵义。

一是美国会计学家斯考特认为。

盈余管理是指"在GAAP允许的范围内。

通过对会计政策的选择使经营者自身利益或企业市场价值达到最大化的行为。

另一方面是美国会计学家凯瑟琳·雪珀认为。

盈余管理实际上是企业管理人员通过有目的地控制对外财务报告过程。

以获取某些私人利益的"披露管理"。

根据以上两个权威性的定义。

可以看出。

盈余管理主要具备这样一些涵义：第一。

盈余管理的主体是企业管理当局。

它包括经理人员和董事会。

尽管经理人员和董事会进行盈余管理的动机并不完全一致。

但他们对企业会计政策和对外报告盈余都有重大影响。

企业盈余信息的披露由他们各自作用的合力所决定。

第二。

盈余管理的客体是企业对外报告的盈余信息%20。

在雪珀的定义中。

盈余管理不仅仅指对会计收益的调整和控制。

而且包括对其他会计信息的披露的管理。

但是对会计收益以外的财务数据的操纵并不具有普遍的意义。

它所具有的经济后果相对而言要小得多。

如果将其纳入盈余管理的范畴反而会影响对盈余管理本质的把握。

第三。

盈余管理的方法是在GAAP允许的范围内综合运用会计和非会计手段来实现对会计收益的控制和调整。

它主要包括会计政策的选用。

应计项目的管理。

交易时间的改变。

交易的创造等。

第四。

盈余管理的目的是盈余管理主体自身利益的最大化。

其中又包括管理人员自身利益的最大化和董事会成员所代表的股东利益的最大化。

外文翻译Financial statement effects of adopting international accounting standards: the case of Germany Material Source: /Author: Mingyi Hung· K. R. Subramanyam1 IntroductionAs of January 1, 2005, all listed companies in the European Union are required to prepare their financial statements in accordance with International Accounting Standards (IAS) (Hofheinz 2002). IAS adoption by the European Union is one of the biggest events in the history of financial reporting, making IAS the most widely accepted financial accounting model in the world. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for managers and investors to understand the implications of IAS adoption. This is especially true in European countries with stakeholder-oriented accounting systems (such as Germany and France), as IAS is heavily influenced by the shareholder-oriented Anglo-Saxon accounting model, whereas local standards in many European countries have a greater contracting orientation and are driven by tax-book conformity considerations.The objective of our paper is to examine the financial statement effects of adopting IAS in European countries with stakeholder-oriented accounting systems. We conduct our investigation using a sample of 80 German firms that adopt IAS for the first time during the 1998 through 2002 period. Specifically, we investigate the effects of IAS adoption on financial statements by (1) documenting the financial statement changes precipitated by IAS adoption and (2) examining the effects of these changes on the properties of financial statement information. Examining financial statement implications is important because, while IAS adoption might lead to indirect economic consequences such as higher market liquidity or lower cost of capital, the only direct effects of adopting IAS are changed financial statements (and related footnote disclosures).We limit our investigation to Germany primarily to overcome problems associated with comparing across countries with different institutional environments. In addition, Germany is particularly well suited for our empirical investigation for several reasons. First, Germany provides an ideal natural experiment for examiningthe financial statement effects of IAS adoption in countries with stakeholder-oriented accounting systems because, unlike IAS, German CAAP or the German Commercial Code (Handelsge.setzbuch; henceforth, HGB) emphasizes a "prudent" approach to asset valuation and liability recognition to facilitate contracting among stakeholders (Harris et al. 1994; Leuz and Wustemann 2004).2 Second, because Germany has a strong rule of law tradition and an efficient judicial system, we can be assured that there is adequate enforcement of accounting rules (La Porta et al. 1998).3 Third, a relatively large number of German companies have adopted IAS, which provides us a reasonably large sample.4Our research design allows us to directly compare accounting numbers (and their properties) prepared under HGB with those prepared under IAS. A direct comparison is possible because German firms adopting IAS are required to restate their prior-year results under IAS during the adoption year; that is, IAS-adopting firms are required to issue financial statements prepared under both IAS and HGB for the year before adoption. Accordingly, our research design controls for cross-sectional and time-series differences between IAS and HGB firm-years. In addition, we restrict our sample to firms adopting IAS in 1998 or thereafter. Two important events occurred in 1998: (1) the core IAS standards were completed, and (2) IAS adopters were mandated to fully comply with the IAS standards (before 1998, companies could choose to implement only a subset of IAS standards). 5 Hence, examining post-1997 adoptions ensures that our IAS firm-years are representative.Our empirical investigation comprises two basic sets of analyses. Our first set of analyses documents the major accounting differences between HGB and IAS as well as the effects of IAS adoption on key accounting measures such as book value of equity and net income. Based on the book value and net income reconciliation adjustments that a subset of our sample firms report in their annual reports, we find that switching to IAS results in widespread and significant changes to deferred taxes, pensions, PP&E, and loss provisions. In addition, we find that total assets and book value of equity are significantly larger under IAS than under HGB and that cross-sectional variation in book value and net income are significantly higher under IAS than under HGB. Overall, our results are consistent with HGB emphasizing the prudence principle (balance sheet conservatism) and income smoothing-for example, limited recognition of assets and frequent use of discretionary loss provisions-and IAS emphasizing fair values and balance sheet valuation-for example,the use of fair value for financial instruments and recognition of internally developed intangibles.Our second set of analyses investigates the effects of IAS adoption on the relative and incremental value relevance of book values and net income as well as the asymmetric timeliness of net income. Since our sample companies voluntarily adopt IAS and therefore do not represent a random selection of German firms, we implement the two-stage regression procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) to control for the effect of self-selection in these tests. We measure value relevance in terms of the ability of accounting measures to explain contemporaneous stock prices. Our relative value relevance analysis finds no evidence that IAS improves the value relevance of book value or net income. However, we find that book value (net income) is accorded a significantly larger (smaller) valuation coefficient under IAS than under HGB, consistent with IAS markedly reducing income persistence (Ohlson 1995). In addition, our incremental value relevance results show that while the IAS adjustments to book value are value relevant, they add noise (measurement error) to income. Overall, our value relevance results are consistent with IAS being balance sheet- and fair value-orientated and HGB being income smoothing- and historical cost-oriented.Finally, we compare the timeliness and asymmetric timeliness of income measured under HGB and IAS. As in Ball et al. (2000), we estimate both timeliness and asymmetric timeliness (conditional conservatism) by regressing income on returns interacted with a variable that measures the sign of returns. Our results are consistent with IAS recognizing economic losses in a timelier manner than HGB, which suggests that IAS income is more conditionally conservative than its HGB counterpart. However, these results are not statistically significant.Two factors could potentially bias our results. First, we conduct our analyses in the year before IAS adoption, when IAS numbers are unavailable to the market. It is possible that our results are driven by the inability of the market to price IAS information at the time we conduct our tests. Accordingly, we conduct additional analyses using future prices and returns as proposed by Aboody et al. (2002). The results of these analyses suggest that the unavailability of IAS information is not likely to affect our inferences. Second, it is possible that our sample companies gradually narrowed differences between HGB and IAS before IAS adoption that is, gradually transitioned to IAS, potentially lowering the power of our tests (Barth et al. 2005). However, our additional analyses find little evidence of such gradualtransition, which suggests that our results are robust to this alternative explanation.' Our paper's primary contributions to the literature are threefold. First, we provide evidence on the likely financial statement effects of IAS adoption throughout the European Union, arguably one of the biggest events in the history of financial reporting. Unlike Barth et al. (2005), who study a large sample of firms from many different countries, we conduct a detailed examination on a small sample of German firms that voluntarily adopt IAS using a design that provides superior experimental control.Second, we contribute to the literature examining the valuation properties of IAS (for example, Ashbaugh and Olsson 2002; Harris and Muller 1999) by focusing our investigation on the period after both the adoption of the core standards by the IASC and the requirement of full compliance. Thus, our paper is arguably the first to examine the financial statement effects of truly representative IAS. Consequently, we are the first to document the substantial fair-value orientation of IAS and its implications for the value relevance and timeliness of financial statement information.Third, we contribute to the debate on the relative superiority of the Anglo- Saxon shareholder-oriented versus the continental European stakeholder-oriented accounting models. Prior studies using cross-country comparisons conclude that the shareholder-oriented model is more value relevant (Ali and Hwang 2000) but are unable to disentangle the effects of accounting standards from other institutional factors such as shareholder protection or market development. In contrast, we implement a design that allows us to examine the effects of accounting differences under a ceteris paribus condition and find no significant differences in value relevance between stakeholder-oriented (HGB) and share- holder-oriented (IAS) accounting models, although we do find suggestive evidence that IAS income may recognize economic losses in a timelier manner. While speculative in nature, our results are consistent with Ball et al. (2003), who show that institutional factors such as shareholder protection may play a more important role than accounting standards in explaining cross-country variation in the valuation properties of accounting data.The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the sample. Section 3 discusses accounting differences between HGB and IAS. Section 4 presents our procedure to correct for potential self-selection bias. Section 5 provides the results on the value relevance of HGB and IAS measures, while Section 6examines differences in asymmetric timeliness. Section 7 discusses several robustness tests. Finally, Section 8 concludes.The average effects of net income reconciliation items are generally in the same direction as those of book value reconciliation items, except for the adjustments related to provisions and deferred taxes. We note that the accounting differences do not necessarily change book value and net income in the same direction because book value captures the cumulative effect of accounting differences whereas net income captures the effect during the fiscal year. For example, while the change from tax-based accelerated depreciation methods to straight-line depreciation methods will increase book value of PP&E and therefore increase book value of equity, it will generally decrease (increase) depreciation expense and therefore increase (decrease) net income in the earlier (later) stage of PP & E's useful life.Since the net income adjustments result from the same accounting differences described in Sect. 3.1.1, we only provide a brief description of the five most frequent adjustment items: Deferred Taxes. As expected, deferred taxes represent the most frequent net income adjustment item, reported in 81% of observations. In addition, IAS expense adjustments related to defer taxes on average reduce net income by, 7 million. Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) IAS adjustments related to PP&E on average increase net income by, 19 million, indicating a decrease depreciation expense related to PP&E during the reporting period. Leases, IAS adjustments related to leases on average increase net income by, 28 million, indicating a decrease in expenses (such as interest and depreciation expenses related to the lease) during the reporting period Pensions. While IAS adjustments related to pensions are relatively frequent, the average effect on net income is miniscule (the mean and median are both less than one Euro million). The small effect in net income suggests that most of the increase in pension liability is reflected in its opening balance for the reporting period, Goodwill.IAS adjustments related to goodwill on average increase net income by €2 million, indicating a decrease in goodwill amortization expense during the reporting period.译文采用国际会计准则财务报表的影响：德国的情况资料来源:/作者：MingyiHung·K.R.Subramanyam1 简介截至2005年1月1日，在欧洲联盟的所有上市公司被要求准备依据国际会计准则（IAS）（霍夫海因茨2002）来编制其财务报表。

一、盈余管理定义：美国会计学者斯考特（Scott）：盈余管理是会计政策的选择具有经济后果的一种具体表现。

他认为，只要企业的管理人员有选择不同会计政策的自由，他们必定会选择使其效用最大化或使企业的市场价值最大化的会计政策，这就是所谓的盈余管理。

美国著名会计学者Schiper：为了获得某种私人利益（而并非仅仅为了中立地处理经营活动），对外部财务报告进行有目的的干预。

Hedy和Wahlen于1999年对盈余管理所作出的解释：当管理者在编制财务报告和构建经济交易时，运用判断改变财务报告，从而误导一些利益相关者对公司根本经济收益的理解，或者影响根据报告中会计数据形成的契约结果，盈余管理就产生了。

综合：第一，盈余管理的主体是企业的管理当局。

企业管理当局，无论是董事会、总经理还是高级管理人员，他们作为企业信息的加工者和披露者，有权利选择会计政策和方法，有权利变更会计估计，有权利安排交易发生的时间和方式等。

而信息的不对称和信息披露的不完全为他们进行盈余管理提供了条件。

第二，在盈余管理的过程中，企业管理当局是有目的、有意地选择对自身有利的会计政策或交易安排，即管理当局是有意图的。

第三，管理当局进行盈余管理的目的在于获得自身利益。

虽然盈余管理的直接结果是使得一些利益相关者对企业的经济收益产生误解，但其最终目的是使得自身利益最大化。

二、盈余管理的方法(一)变更会计政策会计政策的变更是最常见也是最原始的盈余管理方法。

固定资产折旧方法、存货计价方法、长期投资核算方法、无形资产核算方法、递延资产核算方法、产品开发费用核算方法、养老金核算方法的选用及变更都能对会计收益数额产生一定的影响。

尽管会计政策的变更为会计准则所允许，但通过会计政策的变更来操纵报告利润的行为受到公众甚至企业经理最多的反感。

许多声誉卓著的大公司已很少采用这类方法来进行利润管理。

(二)应计项目管理对应计资产和应计负债的不合理确认和对费用的不合理递延是盈余管理的另一种常用方法。

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文:译文（一）世界贸易的飞速发展和国际资本的快速流动将世界经济带入了全球化时代。

在这个时代, 任何一个国家要脱离世界贸易市场和资本市场谋求自身发展是非常困难的。

会计作为国际通用的商业语言, 在经济全球化过程中扮演着越来越重要的角色, 市场参与者也对其提出越来越高的要求。

随着市场经济体制的逐步建立和完善，有些国家加入世贸组织后国际化进程的加快，市场开放程度的进一步增强，市场经济发育过程中不可避免的各种财务问题的出现，迫切需要完善的会计准则加以规范。

然而，在会计准则制定过程中，有必要认真思考理清会计准则的概念，使制定的会计准则规范准确、方便操作、经济实用。

由于各国家的历史、环境、经济发展等方面的不同,导致目前世界所使用的会计准则在很多方面都存在着差异,这使得各国家之间的会计信息缺乏可比性,本国信息为外国家信息使用者所理解的成本较高,在很大程度上阻碍了世界国家间资本的自由流动。

近年来,许多国家的会计管理部门和国家性的会计、经济组织都致力于会计准则的思考和研究,力求制定出一套适于各个不同国家和经济环境下的规范一致的会计准则,以增强会计信息的可比性,减少国家各之间经济交往中信息转换的成本。

译文（二）会计准则就是会计管理活动所依据的原则, 会计准则总是以一定的社会经济背景为其存在基础, 也总是反映不同社会经济制度、法律制度以及人们习惯的某些特征, 因而不同国家的会计准则各有不同特点。

但是会计准则毕竟是经济发展对会计规范提出的客观要求。

它与社会经济发展水平和会计管理的基本要求是相适应的,因而,每个国家的会计准则必然具有某些共性:1. 规范性每个企业有着变化多端的经济业务,而不同行业的企业又有各自的特殊性。

而有了会计准则,会计人员在进行会计核算时就有了一个共同遵循的标准,各行各业的会计工作可在同一标准的基础上进行,从而使会计行为达到规范化,使得会计人员提供的会计信息具有广泛的一致性和可比性,大大提高了会计信息的质量。

盈余管理和盈利质量外文文献及翻译摘要从犯罪现场调查员的视角来看盈余管理的检测，启蒙了早期对盈余管理的研究和它的近亲：盈利质量。

Ball和Shivakumar的著作（2008在会计和经济学杂志上出版的《首次公开发行时的盈利质量》）和Teoh et al .的著作(1998在金融杂志53期上刊登的《盈利管理和首次公开发行后的市场表现》)被用来阐释将犯罪现场调查的七个部分应用于盈利管理的研究。

关键词:市场效率盈余管理盈利质量会计欺诈1、引言在诸多会计和金融的研究课题中,可能没有比盈余管理更具有刺激性的议题。

为什么?我认为这是因为这个主题明确涉及了潜在的不法行为、恶作剧、冲突、间谍活动以及一种神秘感。

正如Healy和Wahlen在1999年(Schipper在1989也下过类似的定义)定义道:“盈余管理的发生是在管理者针对财务报表和交易建立，运用判断力来改变财务报告之时。

盈余管理要么会在公司潜在的经营表现上误导一些利益相关者，要么影响合同结果，这取决于会计报告数字。

”简而言之，有人做伤害别人的事情。

审计人员、监管机构、投资者和研究者们试图找到这些违法者并解开这个谜团,而这个谜团可能会演变成涉及欺诈(或犯罪,在此使用解决犯罪谜团的隐喻)的事件。

如果我们将盈余管理看成是一个潜在的欺诈性(犯罪性)活动,那么我们可以在利用比解决神秘谋杀案的福尔摩斯,或犯罪现场调查(CSI)更现代的条件下，考虑对盈余管理的探查。

这样的调查涉及到以下七个要素：一场犯罪是否已经实施，嫌疑人的责任，使用的凶器,犯罪活动的受害者,犯罪的动机，开展行动的机会和替代性解释。

替代性解释是指除了欺诈或犯罪活动，整个事件的起因。

这个起因能够证实在目击证据的基础上得出欺诈或犯罪的结论将是错误的。

我在讨论破解盈余管理的谜团的各种要素时，所举的例子主要来自Ball和Shivakumar(2008)和Teoh et al.(1998)。

(这些要素显然是相互关联的,以下的讨论中也有一些不可避免的重复)。

内部治理结构与盈余管理本文探讨了公司的内部治理结构对盈余管理的约束作用。

这是假设盈余管理系统地涉及到公司内部治理机制的各个方面的前提下进行的研究，研究包括董事会的力量，审计委员会，内部审计职能的变化与外部审计师的选择四个方面。

基于横截面模型以2000年末在澳大利亚上市的434家公司为样本，将可控性应计利润作为衡量盈余管理的水平，发现董事会及审计委员会的非执行董事的人数越多盈余管理的可能性越低。

内部审计职能和审计机构的选择与盈余管理没有显著的相关性。

我们进一步分析还发现，利用收入的增加作为盈余管理的替代变量时，盈余管理和审计委员会的存在具有负相关关系。

关键词：审计委员会；公司治理；盈余管理；内部审计职能1 前言最近在澳大利亚及海外的操纵会计行为的案件表明公司治理机制的重要性，强有力的公司治理涉及到与公司绩效水平监测的一个适当的平衡(Cadbury,1997)。

在本论文中，我们以澳大利亚的公司治理为例探索治理机制与盈余之间的关系，因此，我们的重点是治理的监督作用。

我们研究的是独立的董事局（ShleiferandVishny，1997），独立委员会主席，一个有效的审计委员会（MenonandWilliams，1994年），内部审计（Clikeman，2003年）和外部审计师的选择使用（贝克尔埃塔尔，1998；弗朗西斯埃塔尔，1999）对盈余管理产生的影响。

在此之前的研究已经调查了治理机制可以减少欺诈性财务报告的产生（比斯利，1996; Dechowetal，1996年）。

这些研究认为有效的治理机制和真实的财务报告与违反一般公认会计原则（GAAP）呈负相关关系。

不过，相对较新的研究领域是公司治理与盈余管理。

Peasnell等（2000）研究表明盈余管理与董事会的独立性是负相关的，而另一些研究发现审计委员会与盈余管理之间存在显着的关系（Chtourouetal.2001; Xieetal，2001）。

澳大利亚公司内部治理结构和盈利管理实践检验是具有前提条件的，而Peasnell使用的数据主要是研究美国的。

财务报告道德准则英文作文Ethical Principles in Financial ReportingThe role of financial reporting in the modern business landscape cannot be overstated. It serves as the backbone of informed decision-making for investors, creditors, and other stakeholders. However, the power and influence wielded by financial reporting also come with a profound responsibility to uphold the highest standards of ethics and integrity. In this essay, we will explore the critical ethical principles that should guide the practice of financial reporting.Transparency and DisclosureAt the heart of ethical financial reporting lies the principle of transparency. Businesses have a moral obligation to provide stakeholders with a clear, accurate, and comprehensive picture of their financial standing. This means fully disclosing all material information, including potential risks, liabilities, and contingencies. Transparent reporting fosters trust, enables informed decision-making, and helps to maintain the integrity of the financial system.Accurate and Reliable ReportingClosely tied to transparency is the principle of accuracy and reliability. Financial reports must present a truthful and unbiased representation of a company's financial performance and position. This requires diligent record-keeping, rigorous internal controls, and the application of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Inaccurate or misleading financial reporting not only undermines stakeholder confidence but can also have far-reaching legal and regulatory consequences.Objectivity and IndependenceFinancial reporting professionals, such as accountants and auditors, must exercise a high degree of objectivity and independence. They must be able to make impartial judgments and resist undue influence from management or other interested parties. This ensures that financial information is presented fairly and without bias, allowing stakeholders to make informed decisions based on the merits of the data rather than on the self-interests of those responsible for its preparation.Confidentiality and PrivacyThe financial information entrusted to businesses often includes sensitive and proprietary data about the company, its employees, and its clients. Financial reporting professionals have a duty toprotect the confidentiality of this information and to ensure that it is used solely for its intended purpose. Breaches of confidentiality can have serious consequences, both for the individuals involved and for the reputation and trust in the financial reporting process.Professional Competence and Due CareEthical financial reporting requires a high level of professional competence and due care. Financial reporting professionals must possess the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience to fulfill their responsibilities accurately and effectively. They must also exercise diligence, caution, and sound judgment in the execution of their duties, ensuring that the information they produce is of the highest quality and meets the needs of stakeholders.Integrity and HonestyPerhaps the most fundamental ethical principle in financial reporting is that of integrity and honesty. Financial reporting professionals must be committed to truthfulness, sincerity, and moral uprightness in all their actions. They must resist any temptation to engage in fraud, deception, or misrepresentation, even in the face of pressure from management or other interested parties. Maintaining a strong ethical foundation is essential for preserving the trust and credibility of the financial reporting process.Compliance with Laws and RegulationsFinancial reporting professionals must ensure that their practices and the information they produce are in full compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, and industry standards. This includes adhering to accounting standards, financial reporting requirements, and other legal and regulatory frameworks that govern the financial reporting process. Failure to comply can result in significant legal and reputational consequences for both the individual and the organization.Ethical Decision-MakingIn the course of their work, financial reporting professionals may occasionally face ethical dilemmas or gray areas where the right course of action is not immediately clear. In such situations, they must be equipped with a robust decision-making framework that prioritizes ethical considerations over narrow self-interest or short-term gains. This may involve seeking guidance from professional codes of conduct, consulting with colleagues or ethics committees, and carefully weighing the potential consequences of their actions.Promoting a Culture of Ethical BehaviorUltimately, the ethical practice of financial reporting requires a holistic, organization-wide commitment to ethical behavior. Businesses must foster a culture that prioritizes integrity, transparency, and accountability, and that empowers financial reporting professionals to uphold these values without fear ofretaliation or negative consequences. This may involve implementing robust internal controls, providing ongoing ethics training, and establishing clear whistleblower protections to encourage the reporting of any unethical practices.ConclusionThe ethical principles outlined in this essay – transparency, accuracy, objectivity, confidentiality, professional competence, integrity, compliance, and ethical decision-making – are the foundation of responsible and trustworthy financial reporting. By adhering to these principles, financial reporting professionals can play a vital role in promoting the long-term sustainability and success of businesses, while also contributing to the overall stability and trust in the financial system. As the importance of financial reporting continues to grow, it is essential that all those involved in this critical function embrace and uphold the highest standards of ethical conduct.。

目录一、绪言 (3)（一）课题背景及意义 (3)（二）文献综述及简要评析 (3)（三）研究方法 (4)（四）论文研究思路与框架 (4)二、盈余管理概念 (3)（一）概念 (3)（二）用途 (5)（三）动机 (5)1.根本目的 (5)2.具体目标 (6)三、中国远洋盈余管理的手段 (6)（一）中国远洋公司背景简介 (6)（二）利用关联方交易 (6)1.关联购销 (6)2.费用分担 (7)3.资产变更 (9)（三）利用收入、费用的确认 (10)1.利用收入的确认 (10)2.利用费用的确认 (9)（四）其他方式 (9)1.利用会计政策的变更 (9)2.利用资产重组 (9)四、盈余管理行为产生的作用 (11)（一）积极作用 (11)（二）消极作用 (12)1.对中国远洋自身发展的影响 (12)2.对债权人和投资者决策的影响 (12)3. 对会计信息以及会计准则的影响 (12)五、对中国远洋盈余管理的建议 (13)（一）完善激励与约束机制 (13)（二）强化董事会的决策职能 (13)结论 (14)参考文献 (14)摘要在世界经济不断进步和我国改革开放不断深入大背景下，企业盈余管理问题愈发突出。

我国上市公司利用盈余管理来实现自己的想法，但是盈余管理会对会计信息的真实性造成不同程度的偏差，而投资者进行投资决策所依据的最直观最权威的数据就是会计信息，会计信息的真实与否决定了投资者的投资方向是否正确。

综合所述缘由，对上市公司限制和规范盈余管理已成为社会的必要需求。

盈余管理是一把双刃剑，适度使用会使企业获得诸多好处，反之则造成消极的影响。

本文首先描述并界定盈余管理概念，经过了解研究我国上市公司中国远洋控股股份有限公司后阐述中国远洋盈余管理的相关内容分析得出其盈余管理具有两面性，最后对其消极方面及我国上市公司的盈余管理提出了我的对策及建议以达到最小影响和最大规范。

关键词：盈余管理；上市公司；治理对策AbstractThe earnings management of China's listed companies has become more and more prominent with the continuous progress of the world economy and the deepening of China's economic system reform. Use of earnings management of listed companies in China to implement their own ideas, but earnings management will cause different degree of deviation to the authenticity of accounting information, and investors make investment decisions based on the most intuitive the most authoritative data is the accounting information, accounting information true or not determines the investor's investment direction is correct. Based on the above reasons, it is necessary for the society to restrict and standardize earnings management for listed companies. Earnings management is a double-edged sword, moderate use will makethe enterprise to obtain many benefits, otherwise it will cause negative impact. This paper describe and define the concept of earnings management, through understanding the Chinese listed companies after China COSCO holdings co LTD. China ocean surplus management related content analysis of the earnings management has two sides, the last of the negative aspects and the earnings management of listed companies in our country my countermeasures and Suggestions were put forward in order to achieve the minimum impact and maximum specification.Key words:Earnings management；Listed company；Countermeasures for harnessing一、绪言（一）课题背景及意义我国上市公司的盈余管理问题在世界经济不断进步和我国经济体制改革不断深入的同时愈发突出。

毕业论文材料：英文文献及译文课题名称会计政疆择与上市公司专业财务管理学生姓名________________班级____________________学号指导教师________________专业系主任______________完成日期Earnings management, earnings and earnings manipulationquality evaluation[Abstract] In this paper, earnings management and earnings manipulation the described relationship between the Analysis of earnings quality, accounting quality, and profitability, revealed a surplus of quality in accounting information systems in place given the level of earnings quality assessment framework. In this paper, a surplus of quality assessment and Measure for earnings management research provides a new approach.[Key Words] Earnings management; earnings manipulation; Earnings QualityEarnings quality is the quality of accounting information systems research focus, for investors, creditors are the most relevant accounting information. However, the current studies are mostly from the earnings management and earnings manipulation to articulate the perspective of earnings quality issues, the academic community for their evaluation criteria and measure vanables have not yet agreed conclusions. Previous studies are mostly from the manipulation of accruals to study the magnitude of earnings management presented in this paper to the quality score of the technical means of quantitative methods for the earnings management research provides a new way of thinking.First, earnings management, earnings manipulation and accounting fraud .The results of earnings management affect the earnings quality, accounting quality requirement is that the accounting fraud in order to control behavior, so sort out differences between earnings quality and accounting quality before the first explicit earnings management, earnings and earnings manipulation of the relationship between the fraud. Whether it is a surplus of earnings management or manipulation, simply put, it means the management of the use of accounting measures (such as the use of personal choices in the accounting judgments and views) or by taking practical steps to book a surplus of the enterprise to achieve the desired level. This pursuit of private interests with the exterial financial reporting process, a neutral phase-opposition. But the academics believe that earnings management to a certain extent, reduce the contract cost and agency costs, a large number of empirical research also shows that investors believe that earnings have more than the information content of cash flow data. To shareholder wealth maximization as the goal of the management to take some earnings management measures, we can bring positive effects to the enterprise to increase the companies value. Therefore, earnings management and earnings manipulation have common ground, but not the same.Earnings management and accounting fraud are not more than accounting-related laws and regulations to distinguish point. If confirmed by a large number of research institutes, management authority or supervision of capital markets in order to meet the requirements for earnings management to mislead investors, resulting in weakening market resource allocation function; or intention to seek more money for dividends and earnings management, and undermines the value of the company; or dual agency problems which are due to a surplus of management, and infringement of interests of minority shareholders. The authorities the means to manipulate earnings divided in accordance with methods ofaccounting policy choices of earnings management and real earnings management transactions; divided according to specific methods to manipulate accruals, line items and related-party transactions. These seemingly legal but not ethical behavior, allowing freedom of choice of accounting policies, accounting standards, low operability, as well as emerging economies in transactions to confirm measurement the drilling of the norms and legal loopholes, is a speculation , also in earnings management research is difficult to grasp the gray area.First try, and then trust. Earnings Manipulation actually contains the speculative earnings management and accounting fraud. Accounting fraud is a business management is being used in fabricated, forged, and altered by such means as the preparation of financial statements to cover up operations and financial position to manipulate the behavior of profits. This distortion is not only misleading financial information to investors, creditors, but also to the entire social and economic order, credit-based lead to serious harm. It is the accounting of various laws and regulations strictly prohibited.Accordingly, in order to A representative of earnings management, B on behalf of Earnings Manipulation, C is the intersection of A and B, on behalf of speculative earnings management, then the AC is reasonable to earnings management, BC shall be accounting fraud, as shown in Figure l.A thing is bigger for being shared.Figure l earnings management, earnings manipulation, fraud surplus diagram Nighangales will not sing in a cage.Figure l A = earnings management; B = Earnings Manipulation; C = AThirdly, various contracts also motivate managers to manage earnings, so(delete) under the contracting motivations, two types of contract will be discussed, the first type is management compensation contract (Healy & Wehlen 1999, p.376). Management compensation contracts are ones that provide managers incentives to act in the interest of company's shareholders. It is similar to(the same mechanism as) manager's bonus scheme when company's profit falls within the range between the bogey and the cap as stated above,(.) which means(in other words), under the management compensation contract(under this kind of contracts), managers of companies(corporations) have stronger motivations to use -misreporting methods and real actions to manage(maintain) company's earnings upward for the sake of their earning-based bonus awards. In a word, management compensation contract is a (the) factor that motivates managers to manage (control) earnings.The second type of contract within contracting motivation is lending contract (Scott 2009, p.411). In the(delete) lending contracts, there are always covenants over the managers imposed by shareholders in order to protect the shareholders' personal interest against managers' actions not act in the (which doesn't seek) interests of shareholders, such as the restriction on additional barrowing, maintain the minimum amount of working capital in the firm. Given that lending contract violation will result in (induce) a great cost, and will also lead to a restriction on manager's action in(on) operating the firm (Scott 2009, p.412),(.) Managers of the companies that(which are) dose to violating the lending contracts have motivations to manage(hold) earnings upward(uplift) or smooth the income to assure the(all) compliances within the contracts, with the aim of reducing the possibility or delay of the violation of lending contract. Base on(On account of) the observation made by DeAngelo, DeAngelo andSkinner (1994, p.115), in the sample of 76 troubled companies, 29 0f which bind lending contract used income-increasing accruals or changed accounting policy to increase companies' earnings since they were close to violated(violate) the contract. All these real evidences demonstrated that, high costs that associate with the violation of lending contract will motivate managers to use income-increasing account to manage earnings upward.Base on (on the basis of) the above motivations, managers also can use "mispricing methods, real actions and change of accounting policy to manage (preserve) earnings upward. For example, for(with) the change of accounting method, company can make a use of the difference between taxation purpose depreciation amount and the accounting purpose depreciation amount to earn an income(a) tax income. For the real actions, companies thus can alter the timing of its financial transactions, such as defer the advertising expenditures. Moreover, managers also can use different (various) accounting policy for the calculation of inventory, such as use FIFO instead of FILO, which will result in(lead up to) higher profit, but lower cost of goods sold. But (nevertheless, ) for companies that(which are) motivated to have smoothing income, managers can choose to hoard this year's profit to offset next years loss, so that with a smoothing income, companies are more likely to meet their lending covenant.Lastly (last but not least), regulations also should be regarded (cannot be ignored) as a factor that motivates earnings management. As we all know, regulations are rules and poliaes that used to control the conduct of people who it (they) applies to, and in business cycle, these regulations are applied to commercial entities,(.)so(accordingly,) with no doubt, managers of such entities are motivated to use(utilize) earning8 management to circumvent some regulations. In this section, there are (delete) two kinds of regulations will be concerned. The first one is industry regulations (Healy & Walhen 1999, p.377). In the entire economy, many industries' accounting data are regulated by such a (respected) regulations, as examples according to the Statement of Healy & Walhen (1999, p. 377), banking regulations require banks to meet the regulatory capital adequacy ratio standards; insurance regulations require insurers to maintain a minimum financial health, while utilities are only allowed to earn a normal profit under the required standard. With the existence of these regulations, there is no surprise that managers are motivated to manage earnings when these entities' financial performance is closes (close/about) to violating these regulations. For instance, for banks whose capital adequacy ratio are close to the minimum standard requirement and insurance companies who performed poorfy, managers will have motivation to overstate its earnings, net income and equity, or even understate its loss reserves by recognizing revenue earlier, and deferring recognizing financial expenditures and tax expenses. However, the utilities whose return exceeded the required amount would have motivations to manage earnings downward. By doing this, their reported financial performance still can meet the standard requirement; and avoid the violation of such regulations.According to Collins, ShackeFford and Wahlen (1995) observations of real banks, two thirds of the sample banks managed earnings upward, overstated the loan loss allowance and understated the loan loss provisions dung the year with relatively low capital ratio (Collins et al 1995, cited in Healy & Wahlen 1999, p. 378). Adiel (1996, p.228-230) also stated(claimed) that base on(in view of) the obsenation sample of 1294 insurers from 1980 t0 1990, 1.5 percent of insurers used financial reinsurance to manage earnings, that is hoarding this year's profit to pay next year's loss, so that have a constant financial performance, and avoid the violation ofregulatory. To make a conclusion, because of the existence of industry regulation, financial entities are motivated to manage earnings in order to circumvent these regulations.Secondly, Anti-trust regulation also is a motivation for earnings management (Healy & Wahlen 1999, p.378). Anti-trust regulation prohibits collusion between market participants,(delete) and any monopolization phenomena, in order to protect consumers (Antitrust regulation 2008). Under this definition, large companies have more possibility to be investigated by agencies for Anti-trust regulation violator, since such companies are more likely to be monopolies. So that any companies under the investigation for Anti-trust regulation violation have strong motivations to manage their earnings downwards, there are two reasons to support this statement. Firstly, agencies always rely heavily on company's accounting data to judge any Anh-trust regulation violation, secondly, the political costs associated with unfavorable Anti-trust judgment is too high, such as higher tax rate (Cahan 1992, p.80). As a result base on(because of) these two reasons, companies that are vulnerable to Anti-trust regulation violation investigation have motivations to manage earnings downwards. Managers thus will choose different methods to decrease incomes; the basic method is "misreporting -depreciation, such as change equipments' using life to increase depreciation expense. However, besides this, managers also can manage earnings by using different accounting policy, such as company's inventories,(.) Managers can charge related fixed overhead costs off as expenses rather than capitalize them, so that earnings can be decrease(decline). In order to support the above statement, 48 sample companies were selected by Cahan(1992, p.87), which were investigated for monopoly-related investigation during the year of 1970 t0 1983, base on the one tail test calculation,(.) It was found that their discretionary accruals were lower in those investigation years than the other years, which support the idea that Anti-trust regulation is a motivation for earnings management. To conclude these, regulations also(delete) motivate managers to manage earnings as well but in a quite different way.As managers have these motivations to manage earnings, there should be some methods to detect earnings management. The empirical one is by using total accruals.Total accruals are composed of discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. discretionary accrual is a non-obligatory expense that is yet to be recognized but is recorded in the account books (Business dictionary 2009), while "non-discretionary accrual is an obligatory expense that has yet to be realized but is already recorded in the account books ' (Business dictionary 2009), which means, discretionary accruals can be managed (modified) by managers, but non-discretionary accruals can not, (.) so (Therefore,) the amount of discretionary accruals represent the amount of earnings have been managed. That is to say, researchers can detect earnings management by the amount of discretionary accruals, which is the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals-expected total accruals. Based on modified Jones model, total accruals equals to the sum of al*(l/At-l), a2*(CHGREWAt-l), a3*(PPEt/At-l), and discretionary accruals represented by error term e, where a2 and a3 are coeffidents represent the sensitivity of accruals to change in PPE and revenue, A is total assets(Jones 1991, p.211). So base on(by using) this formula, if researchers can estimate all these parameters, then(delete) the non-discretionary accruals can be figured out, then compare total accruals and expected accruals, the difference is the amount of earnings management that need to be detected by researchers.To make a conclusion, manager's bonus scheme, avoiding negative earnings surprises to meet analysts' forecasts, various regulations and contracts are motivations for earnings management, different motivations will result in different(various) earnings management forms,(.) Basic form is 'mispricing- method, which is using(uses) discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward and(or) downward with different conditions given. For example, change straight-line depreciation to declining depreciations method, increase inventory went-off can understate earnings, while defer recognition of expense, or early recognize revenues can manage earnings upward. Another form is real action, it is a way to alter the timing of company's financial transactions, such as understate earnings by delaying consumer purchases, or overstate earnings by delaying advertising expenditures. Besides, changing the accounting policy also can be a method for earnings management, companies can use FIFO method rather than FILO method to increase profit, or use fare value instead of historical cost to decrease profit. With the existence of these earnings management forms, researchers can make a use of Jones' model to calculate the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals, which is expected total accruals to detect whether companies did manage earnings.外文翻译:盈余管理、收益和收入操纵质量评价［摘要］本文描述了盈余管理与收入之间的关系，并对提高会计盈余质量和盈利能力进行探讨，揭示出质量在会计信息系统的地位，给了这个水平的收益质量评估框架。

Earnings Management concerning the Impairment Decision: A quantitative empirical analysis of German listed companies between 2004 and 2009AbstractThis study investigates the determinants of the impairment decision of German listed companies between 2004 and 2009. We analyze the influence of economic factors and reporting incentives on this decision using a probit regression, reporting results for total impairments as well as separated by tangible and intangible asset impairments. We find strong evidence for a negative relationship between EBITDA as well as market to book ratio change and impairments, while intangible asset impairments show a positive relationship to operating cash flow. Additionally we find that for both tangible and intangible asset impairment income smoothing is an important determinant. Furthermore, intangible asset impairments are more probable in years of management changes.Keywords: impairment loss, impairment probability, earnings management, reportingincentive, income smoothing, management change, probit regression.EARNINGS MANAGEMENT CONCERNING THE IMPAIRMENT DECISION: A quantitative empirical analysis of German listed companies between 2004 and 20091 IntroductionIn this paper we investigate the determinants of the impairment decision of German listed companies.Despite the relatively strict regulations for the Impairment of Assets (IAS 36), managers still have a non-negligible discretion over the impairment decision. This results from the definition of the recoverable amount, which we will discuss in more detail at a later stage. Prior studies which mainly focus on the U.S.-American market find strong evidence for the existence of earnings management (i.e. income smoothing, big bath accounting, etc.) regarding the impairment decision as well as the respective magnitude. In our study we focus on the factors that influence the impairment decision only. We therefore examine the impairment behavior of German listed companies between 2004 and 2009. Excluding the years before mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 does not change our findings (see section 5.3). In our study we assume that besides economic factors there are several other factors influencing a management‟s decision to write off, such as management incentives,, which were not incorporated in the regulations. As the decision to take an impairment is a dichotomous variable, we design our study using a probit regression.We find that the impairment decision regarding total impairments on long-termassets is influenced negatively by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) as well as market to book ratio, while it is positively influenced by firm size. Additionally, we find significant evidence for income smoothing. Factors like management changes and big bath accounting, which prior studies have found to have a significant influence on the decision to write off as well as on the magnitude of impairments , do not seem to influence the decision itself. Differentiating in tangible and intangible assets, we find that management changes play an important role in the intangible setting.We enrich the existing literature in two important ways. First we examine the impairment behavior at the German market. To our knowledge no research has been conducted on publicly listed companies in Germany. Models that were developed for the U.S.-American market could have less validity in the German setting. Regarding the national background, German companies are affected by a long history of principles like prudence (…Vorsichtsprinzip‟) and creditor protection(…Gläubigerschutz‟) (see Hoffmann (2010)) and thus may have another approach to the impairment decision. Secondly, we focus on the impairment decision and thus explicitly differentiate between those factors that influence the impairment decision and those that may have influence on the respective magnitude. One important technical distinction is that we use a panel analysis for our panel data, contrasting a lot of prior studies in which the panel data was pooled to conduct a cross-sectional analysis.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section two we will give a brief overview of the underlying accounting regulations and of prior literature. Section three presents the hypotheses development. In section four we describe our research designselection. Section five reports our results and some sensitivity analysis, while section six concludes.2 Background2.1. Accounting for impairmentsAccording to IAS 36, a company has to evaluate for all assets annually if a triggering event has occurred, except for those that are explicitly excluded from the scope. If this is the case an impairment test has to be conducted. Besides, goodwill and intangible assets with an indefinite useful life have to be tested for impairment annually. If an impairment test has to be conducted, the carrying amount is compared with the recoverable amount, the latter being defined as the higher of fair value less costs to sell and value in use. The fair value less costs to sell has to be derived from an active market if this is possible. Alternatively, it can be calculated using a discounted cash flow approach. The value in use is defined as the present value of future cash flows. Discretion arises because in the vast majority of cases both value in use and fair value less costs to sell are calculated based on subjective estimates of either company internal or external cash flow predictions. Even though IAS 36 requires extensive disclosures on the parameters used to calculate the impairment losses, there mostly remains enough room for earnings management regarding the impairment decision, especially if the non-compliance with the disclosure requirements is takeninto consideration see Carlin, Finch (2008)).2.2 Prior researchIn this section we want to give a short overview on existing literature regarding the factors influencing the impairment of assets. We are aware that there has been an extensive amount of research conducted in this area and thus try to concentrate our literature review on the most influential studies which additionally use similar regression models as we do.Most of the prior literature examines the U.S.-American market and little research has been done which focuses on the impairment decision itself. Minnick (2004) examines the impairment decision from a corporate governance point of view, finding that there is a significant positive relationship between CEO turnover and the write-off probability. Additionally, she finds that the CEO compensation system is an important factor influencing the impairment decision process, and that companies with better governance are more likely to take a write-off and thus to rather show smaller amounts of impairment losses. Loh and Tan (2002) analyze macroeconomic and firm specific factors that influence the impairment decision of companies in Singapore. They find that the unemployment rate, the GDP growth rate, and the occupancy rate of properties and management changes are important determinants, whereas variables like the debt to asset ratio seem to be insignificant. Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) analyze the causes of discretionary asset write-offs ofU.S.-American companies before the adoption of SFAS 121 …Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to be Disposed Of‟ and find significant evidence for the influence of management incentives, such as management changes, big bath accounting and income smoothing on the magnitude of impairments. Riedel (2004) compares the impairment characteristics ofU.S.-American companies before and after the adoption of SFAS 121. He finds that impairments were more closely related to management incentives and less closely related to economic effects after the change in accounting regulations. Among other things, he shows that there is a significant relationship between management changes as well as big bath accounting and the magnitude of impairment losses recognized. Beatty and Weber (2006) conduct a two-stage analysis estimating a joint probit and censored regression to analyze factors influencing the goodwill impairment decision and the respective magnitude in the SFAS 142 …Goodwill and other Intangible Assets‟ adoption period. They find that the impairment decision is influenced significantly by management reporting incentives like the existence of an earnings based bonus system, the manager‟s tenure, or the listing in an exchange with explicit delisting requirements affected by goodwill impairments. Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998) investigate the determinants of the magnitude of asset write-offs of Australian companies focusing on management incentives. They find that an association between impairment magnitude and management incentives exists. They also find a relation to the amount of cash reserves, which they interpret as the capacity to write off. Garrod, Kosi and Valentincic (2008) analyze the impairment decision and magnitude of small privately held companies in Slovenia. They report that, in the absence of agency problems and in an environment with high alignment between financial and taxreporting, companies tend to manage earnings using current asset write-offs, whereas fixed asset impairments seem to be influenced mostly by regulatory factors.Taken together, these studies report that for large listed companies there do exist strong incentives to use the impairment decision and the respective magnitude to manage earnings and thereby influence stakeholders in a given direction, independent of the accounting standards that apply.3 Hypothesis Development3.1 Impairment decisionFrom our point of view, two different motivations influence the impairment decision of a company‟s management. First there are economic factors (e.g. earnings, cash flow) which should have significant influence. The counterparts are reporting incentives which can be either explicit or perceived. The significance that is ascribed to these factors varies depending on the research referred to. Rees, Gill and Gore (1996) find evidence for impairments reflecting a change in the company‟s economic environment, consistently Loh and Tan (2002) find the return on assets to be the most significant influence factor on the impairment decision. Other analyses reveal a strong relationship of reporting incentives and the impairment decision (e.g. Strong and Meyer (1087) find management changes to be an important determinant, Riedl (2004) finds evidence for the influence of big bath accounting as well as management changes on impairments and Beatty and Weber (2006) find that covenants, earnings based bonus payments, and CEO tenure as well as the listing on exchanges with financial-based listing requirements are determinants of the impairment decision). We assume that if there is not a reporting incentive calling for a different treatment, companies will take a write-off if economic factors appear to make it necessary.3.2 Economic factors influencing the impairment probabilityAccording to IAS 36, companies have to realize an impairment loss if the carrying amount of an asset exceeds its recoverable amount, the recoverable amount being calculated based on the expectations of either the market or the company. As these expectations are based on the actual economic situation of the company, we include different economic factors and related hypotheses in our analysis to reflect the necessity of realizing an impairment loss.Accounting regulations demand for the calculation of a net present value of the cash flows that can be generated by further use of the asset either by the company under consideration or by a third company, meaning that we would ideally need knowledge on the management‟s expectations of future performance. As these expectations are presumably based on today‟s knowledge, we include actual performance measures in our analysis. Thus our first proxy for the impairment probability is the actual cash flow from operations, which allows us to model the cash-related performance attributes:H1: Companies with a lower cash flow from operations have a higher impairmentprobability.Even though companies are obliged to base their impairment decision on estimated cash flows it is possible that companies which use earnings to control atleast certain assets will also base their impairment decision mainly onearnings-measures. To incorporate accrual-related performance attributes, too, we include earnings before impairments in our analysis, delivering our second hypothesis:H2: Companies with lower earnings before impairments have a higher impairmentprobability.As the necessity to realize an impairment loss follows from the relation of the market value to the carrying amount of the asset we would optimally need a measure for the relation of these two values. Unfortunately, no such measure is available on the asset or cash generating unit base. To proxy for this, we include the market to book ratio as well as its change from the prior year in our analysis, which leads to the next hypotheses:H3a: Companies with a lower market to book ratio have a higher impairment probability.H3b: Companies with a decreasing market to book ratio have a higher impairmentprobability.3.3 Reporting incentivesThe focus of our analysis lies on incentives which could lead the management to make a decision that does not in the first place follow from economic factors. This is what we call earnings management. The notion of earnings management is based on the assumption of asymmetric information. Managers can make accounting decisions independently of the economic situation if and only if the information necessary to undo earnings management is not publicly known (see Schipper (1989)). In the case of the impairment decision, we can assume that the respective information, namely the expected future cash flows, is not public. The shareholders‟ perception is one of the most important targets for the management as actual and potential shareholders are making the share price. Thus positively influencing their perception is probably one of the management‟s main incentives. One way to achieve this goal could be to manage the actual year‟s earnings p erformance. Following the extensive income smoothing literature, we assume that a good earnings performance is related with a high impairment probability. The idea behind this is that the management tries to meet the shareholders' expectations. According to Moses (1987), we can define income smoothing as an “effort to reduce fluctuations in reported earnings”, meaning that the management uses the impairment decision as …smoothing device‟ to reduce the divergence of reported earnings from an expected number. The income smoothing theory is based on the assumption that shareholders perceive actual earnings as a signal for future earnings, and that smoothed earnings allow for more precise forecasts which the capital market rewards with higher share prices. Consistently, Kasznik and McNichols (1999) report that even though financial analysts do not adjust their forecasts for companies that consecutively meet their expectations the market grants a market premium.Prior research has found that under certain circumstances income smoothing isalways worthwhile (see Trueman, Titman (1988)). Some empirical studies (e.g. Francis Hanna and Vincent (1996)) find significant evidence for the existence of income smoothing; other studies find that there is no such relationship (e.g. Riedl (2004)). We assume that managers apply income smoothing, meaning that impairments will be conducted in years with unexpected high income before impairments:H4: The management uses income smoothing to positively influence the shareholders’ perception.Closely related to the assumption of income smoothing is that of big bath accounting. Big bath accounting means that the management accumulates problems until it finally realizes a huge impairment loss in a year in which the company has realized an unexpectedly low income anyway. Following this approach offers several advantages (see Strong and Meyer (1987)). First the management in this way establishes a safety cushion for the next years in which it will be easier to meet the shareholders‟ expecta tions. Secondly, it is argued that realizing a large one time loss signals that past problems have been solved. The third advantage is a mere mathematical one: lowering earnings in the actual year ensures high earnings growth for the future. Another more psychological argument on which the big bath technique may be based is that if earnings are already small or negative, making the situation a little worse will in most cases do no harm, neither to management reputation nor to earnings expectations (see Walsh, Craig and Clarke (1991)). Thus we assume that managers apply big bath accounting, meaning that impairments will be conducted in years with unexpectedly low income before impairments:H5: The management uses big bath accounting to positively influence the shareholders’ perception.While H4 and H5 seem to be contradictory at first sight, Kirschenheiter and Melumad(2001) prove that if the reporting environment permits discretion the optimal strategy of management is to smooth income if good news occur and use big bath accounting if bad news occur.Another important target group of the management consists of actual as well as potential creditors. The relation to actual creditors is mainly based on the design of credit agreements. The leverage of the company under consideration influences these contracts in two ways. First the magnitude of borrowing costs is based on the assessment of financial risk for which the leverage is an important determinant, meaning that higher leverage can result in higher borrowing costs. Secondly, most credit agreements contain strict regulations concerning the leverage, called debt covenants. The breach of a given covenant can lead to an immediate repayment claim of the creditor which would result in extensive liquidity problems for most companies. Following the results of Duke and Hunt (1990), the leverage can be used to proxy for the closeness to debt covenant restrictions. Consistently, Sweeney (1994) provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that managers of firms approaching technical default respond with income-increasing accounting changes. Regarding the impairment decision, this means that the impairment probability decreases, deliveringour sixth hypothesis:H6: Companies with higher leverage have a lower impairment probability.In addition to the motivation to enhance the stakeholders‟ perception of the company, the management has different own motivations to manage earnings. First there are earnings based bonus payments. In most companies, management payment is divided in a fixed and a variable part where the latter has a short term and a long term oriented component. The short term component is commonly based on a measure of the company…s success, whereas the long term component contains a stock option plan. If impairment losses influence the figure standing for the success (e.g. EBIT, profit) we assume that the management has an incentive to delay impairments to later years. Consistently, Beatty and Weber (2006) find that bonus plans that do not explicitly exclude impairments reduce the impairment probability.H7: Companies that grant managers earnings based bonuses that are affected by impairmentshave a lower impairment probability. Another incentive that influences the impairment decision is a change in management. There are different reasons for incoming managers to realize impairment losses in their first year (see Wells (2002)), first of which is that they are not held responsible for past performance and thus may explicitly attribute the impairment losses to the preceding management. This is often referred to as …cleaning the decks‟, illustrating the fact that new managers tend to conduct impairments that have been delayed in prior years. This way it is possible to anticipate future losses without any loss of reputation, resulting in increasing earnings in subsequent years. As the year of the management change mostly is a partial year for the incoming manager, accounting income in that year is irrelevant to managerial compensation which is another reason to conduct impairments in exactly that year. The result of high impairments in the first year is that future years‟ income is relieved of these expenses so that an improving earnings trend can be reported from the first year of tenure on. Consistently,Moorje (1973) finds that companies with management changes show a significantly greater proportion of income reducing discretionary accounting decisions. A number of studies report the same result for the relationship of management changes and impairments (e.g. Riedl (2004), Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996), Beatty and Weber (2006)), whereas others find no significant relationship (e.g. Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998)).译文：有关减值盈余管理决策：定量的实证分析德国2004年至2009年上市公司摘要这项研究调查了2004年和2009年间德国上市公司减值的决定因素。

外文翻译Earnings Management：A Perspective Material Source: Managerial Finance Author:Messod D.Beneish AbstractAn issue central to accounting research is the extent to which managers alter reported earnings for their own benefit. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large number of studies investigated the determinants of accounting choice. These studies provided evidence consistent with managers’ incentives to choose beneficial ways of reporting earnings in regulatory and contractual contexts (see Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, and Watts and Zimmerman, 1986 for reviews of these studies). Since the mid-1980s studies of managerial incentives to alter earnings have focused primarily on accruals.I trace the explosive growth in accrual-based management research to three likely causes. First accruals are the principal product of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and if earnings are managed it is more likely that the earnings management occurs on the accrual rather than the cash flow component of earnings. Second, studying accruals reduces the problems associated with the inability to measure the effect of various accounting choices on earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Third，if earnings management is an unobservable component of accruals, it is less likely that investors can unravel the effect of earnings management on reported earnings.The main challenge faced by earnings management researchers is that academics, like investors, are unable to observe, or for that matter, measure the earnings management component of accruals. Indeed, managerial accounting actions intended to increase compensation, avoid covenant default, raise capital, or influence a regulatory outcome are largely unobservable. Consequently, prior work has drawn inferences from joint hypotheses that test both incentives to manage earnings as well as the construct validity of the various accrual models which are used to estimate managers’ accounting discretion. Because extant models of expected accruals provide imprecise estimates of managerial discretion, questions have been raised about whether the unobservable earnings management actions do in fact occur.Notwithstanding research design problems, a variety of evidence suggestive of earnings management has accumulated. In Section 2, I raise three general questions about earnings management: What is it? How frequently does it occur? How do researchers estimate earnings management? Prior investigations of managerial incentives to alter earnings typically fall in three categories, namely studies that examine the effect of contracts in accounting choices, and studies that examine the incentive effects associated with the need to raise external financing. Rather than discussing the evidence along those lines, I have chosen to present the evidence depending on the direction of the incentive context. Thus, I summarize in Sections 3 and 4, what is known about incentives to increase and decrease earnings. In Section 5, I discuss evidence on incentive contexts that provide incentives either to increase or to decrease earnings, and in Section 6, I present conclusions and suggestions for future work.2. Earnings Management2.1 DefinitionsNotice the plural: It reflects my view that academics have no consensus on what is earnings management. There have been at least three attempts at defining earnings management:(1) Managing earnings is “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings.” (Davidso n, Stickney and Weil, 1987,cited in Schipper，1989).(2) Managing earnings is “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say，merely facilitating the neutral operati on of the process).” (Schipper, 1989).(3) “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).A lack of consensus on the definition of earnings management implies differing interpretations of empirical evidence in studies that seek to detect earnings management，or to provide evidence of earnings management incentives. It is thus useful to compare the above three definitions.All three definitions deal with actions management undertaken within thecontext of financial reporting - including the structuring of transactions so that a desired accounting treatment applies (e.g. pooling, operating leases). However, the second definition also allows earnings management to occur via timing real investment and financing decisions. If the timing issue delays or accelerates a discretionary expenditure for a very short period of time around the firm’s fiscal year, I envision timing real decisions as a means of managing earnings. A problem with the second definition arises if readers interpret any real decisions - including those implying that managers forego profitable opportunities –as earnings management. Given the availability of alternative ways to manage earnings, I believe it is implausible to call earnings management a deviation from rational investment behavior. This reflects my view that earnings management is a financial reporting phenomenon.There are two perspectives on earnings management: the opportunistic perspective holds that managers seek to mislead investors, and the information perspective, first enunciated by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), under which managerial discretion is a means for managers to reveal to investors their private expectations about the firm’s future cash flows. Much prior work has predicated its conclusions on an opportunistic perspective for earnings management and has not tested the information perspective.2.2 Incidence of earnings managementIf one believes former SEC Chairman Levitt (1998), earnings management is widespread, at least among public companies, as they face pressure to meet analysts’ expectations. Earnings management is also widespread if one relies on analytical arguments. For example, Bagnoli and Watts (2000) suggest that the existence of relative performance evaluation leads firms to manage earnings if they expect competitor firms to manage earnings. Similar prisoner’s dilemma-like arguments for the existence of earnings management appear in Erickson and Wang (1999) in the context of mergers and Shivakumar (2000) in the context of seasoned equity offerings.At the other extreme, we can only be certain that earnings have indeed been managed, when the judicial system, in cases that are brought by the SEC or the Department of Justice, resolves that earnings management has occurred. While it is likely that earnings management occurs more frequently than is observed from judicial actions, it is not clear to me that earnings management is pervasive: it seems implausible that firms face the same motivations to manage earnings over time. Aslater discussed, much of the evidence of earnings management is dependent on firm performance, suggesting that earnings management is more likely to be present when a firm’s performance is either unusually good or unusually bad.3. Evidence of Income Increasing Earnings ManagementI discuss four sources of incentives for income increasing earnings management:(1) debt contracts, (2) compensation agreements, (3) equity offerings, (4) insider trading. The first two sources have been hypothesized in prior positive accounting theory research and the last two sources are explicitly described as reasons behind earnings overstatement in the SEC’s accounting enforcement actions, and have been investigated in recent research.3.1 Debt CovenantsDebt contracts are an important theme in financial accounting research as lenders often use accounting numbers to regulate firms’ activities,e,g. by requiring that certain performance objectives be met or imposing limits to allowed investing and financing activities.The linkage between accounting numbers and debt contracts has been used in studies investigation (i) why economic consequences are observed when firms comply with mandated, or voluntarily make, accounting changes that have no cash flow impact，(ii) the determinants of accounting choice and managers’ exercise of discretion over accounting estimates that impact net income. The assumption is that debt covenants provide incentives for managers to increase earnings either to reduce the restrictiveness of accounting based constraints in debt agreements or to avoid the costs of covenant violations.The results of economic consequences studies have generally been mixed and researchers recently turned to investigating accounting choice in firms that experience actual technical default (Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995; Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994；and De Angelo, De Angelo and Skinner, 1994). The idea is to increase the power of the tests by focusing on a sample where the effect of violating debt covenants is likely to be more noticeable. While some of the evidence suggests that managers take income increasing actions delay the onset of default (Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), other evidence does not (Beneish and Press,1993; DeAngelo,DeAngelo and Skinner,1994). Further, it is not clear such actions actually are sufficient to delay default. Thus, the evidence in these studies on whether managers make income increasing accounting choices to avoid default is mixed. However, examining a large sample of private debt agreements, andmeasuring firms’ closeness to current ratio and tangible net worth constraints, Dichev and Skinner (2000) find significantly greater proportions of firms slightly above the covenant’s violation threshold than below. They suggest that manag ers take actions consistent with avoiding covenant default.3.2 Compensation AgreementsStudies examining the bonus hypothesis (Healy, 1985；Gaveretal, 1995; and Holthausen, Larker and Sloan, 1995) provide evidence consistent with managers altering reported earnings to increase their compensation. Except for Healy (1985)，these studies provide evidence consistent with managers decreasing reported earnings to increase future compensation. In addition, Holthausen et al. (1995) finds little evidence that managers increase income and suggest that the income-increasing evidence in Healy (1985) is induced by his experimental design.3.3 Equity OfferingsA growing body of research examines managers’ incentives to increase reported income in the context of security offerings. Information asymmetry between owners-managers and investors, particularly at the time of initial public offerings, is recognized in prior research.Models such as Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that the amount of equity retained by insiders signals their private valuation, and models such as Hughes (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), and Datar et al. (1991) examine the role of the reputation of the auditor on the offer price. In these models, the asymmetry is resolved by the choice of an outside certifier or by a commitment to a contract that penalizes the issuer for untruthful disclosure. Empirical studies assume that information asymmetry remains and use various models to estimate managers’ exercise of discretion over accruals at the time of security offerings.Four studies investigate earnings management as an explanation for the puzzling behavior of post-issuance stock prices. Teoh, Welch and Rao (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) study earnings management in the context of initial public offerings (IPO), and Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) do so in the context of seasoned equity offerings. These studies estimate the extent of earnings management using Jones like models around the time of the security issuance, and correlate their earnings management estimates with post-issue earnings and returns. The evidence presented suggests that estimates of at-issue earnings management are significantly negatively correlated with subsequent earnings and returns performance. The results in these studies suggest that marketparticipants fail to understand the valuation implications of unexpected accruals. While the results are compelling, the conclusion that intentional earnings management at the time of security issuance successfully misleads investors is premature. Beneish (1998b, p.210) expresses reservations about generalizing such a conclusion as follows: “First, the conclusion implies that financial statement fraud is pervasive at the time of issuance. To explain; fraud is defined by the National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (1993, p.6) as one or more intentional acts designed to deceive other persons and cause them financial loss." If financial statement fraud at issuance is pervasive - e.g. managers are successful in misleading investors. I would expect that firms would fare poorly post-issuance in terms of litigation brought about by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), disgruntled investors, and the plaintiff’s bar. I would also expect managers to fare poorly post-issuance in terms of wealth and employment. I would find evidence of post-issue consequences on firms and managers informative about the existence of at-issue intentional earnings management to mislead investors and believe these issues are worthy of future research.译文盈余管理：一种普遍现象资料来源: 财务管理作者：Messod D. Beneish 摘要：会计研究的核心问题是在某种程度上管理者为了自己的利益而改变报表上的收入。

研发费用资本化和盈余管理：以意大利上市公司为例摘要：研发费用的资本化一直以来都是个有争议的会计问题，因为资本化处理极易受到盈余管理动因的影响。

以选取的意大利上市公司样本为例，本研究探讨企业研发费用资本化的决策是否会受到盈余管理动机的制约。

因为意大利会计准则允许将研发费用资本化，所以意大利公司的案例提供了根本性的研究方向，使我们可以利用回归模型来验证所提出的合理假设。

研究表明，企业确实倾向于通过费用资本化来达到利益最大化的目的，但以资本化降低违反债务契约风险的假设是不成立的。

关键词：盈余管理，费用资本化，研发会计，平稳收入，债务契约，意大利公司1 简介在当前全球化的时代，监管机构面临的一个重要问题是学者和从业人员能否对研发费用做出适当的会计处理。

在国际会计准则（IASB，2004）第38号“无形资产”中，讨论了研发费用的会计处理方法。

在第54章标准中规定，没有经过调查的无形资产研究费用是不能被确认为资产的，这类研发支出应在其发生时确认为费用。

至于企业开发阶段的费用，在国际会计准则第38号第57段指出，当且仅当企业可证明以下所有各项时，开发活动（或内部项目开发阶段）产生的无形资产才可予确认：（1）无形资产的成功开发在技术上是可行的；（2）有意完成该无形资产并使用或销售它；（3）有能力使用或销售该无形资产；（4）该无形资产可以产生可能的未来收益；（5）为完成该无形资产的开发，并使用或销售该无形资产，有足够的技术、资金和其他资源的支持；（6）对归集于该无形资产开发阶段的支出，能够可靠的计量。

虽然国际会计准则第38条允许公司将开发费用资本化，但由于研发过程中所固有的主观性，管理者有权决定是否满足国际会计准则第38条的条件。

从本质上讲，国际会计准则第38条赋予管理者在开发费用方面有相当大的灵活性。

美国会计准则对这一问题有严格的规定，在财务会计准则（FASB，1974）第2号“研发费用”中要求所有的研发费用在当期列为支出。

The Optimization Method of Financial Statements Based on Accounting Management TheoryABSTRACTThis paper develops an approach to enhance the reliability and usefulness of financial statements. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was fundamentally flawed by fair value accounting and asset-impairment accounting. According to legal theory and accounting theory, accounting data must have legal evidence as its source document. The conventional “mixed attribute” accounting system should be re placed by a “segregated” system with historical cost and fair value being kept strictly apart in financial statements. The proposed optimizing method will significantly enhance the reliability and usefulness of financial statements.I.. INTRODUCTIONBased on international-accounting-convergence approach, the Ministry of Finance issued the Enterprise Accounting Standards in 2006 taking the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereinafter referred to as “the International Standards”) for reference. The Enterprise Accounting Standards carries out fair value accounting successfully, and spreads the sense that accounting should reflect market value objectively. The objective of accounting reformation following-up is to establish the accounting theory and methodology which not only use international advanced theory for reference, but also accord with the needs of China's socialist market economy construction. On the basis of a thorough evaluation of the achievements and limitations of International Standards, this paper puts forward a stand that to deepen accounting reformation and enhance the stability of accounting regulations.II. OPTIMIZA TION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SYSTEM: PARALLELING LISTING OF LEGAL FACTS AND FINANCIAL EXPECTA TIONAs an important management activity, accounting should make use of information systems based on classified statistics, and serve for both micro-economic management and macro-economic regulation at the same time. Optimization of financial statements system should try to take all aspects of the demands of the financial statements in both macro and micro level into account.Why do companies need to prepare financial statements? Whose demands should be considered while preparing financial statements? Those questions are basic issues we should consider on the optimization of financial statements. From the perspective of "public interests", reliability and legal evidence are required as qualitative characters, which is the origin of the traditional "historical cost accounting". From the perspective of "private interest", security investors and financial regulatory authoritieshope that financial statements reflect changes of market prices timely recording "objective" market conditions. This is the origin of "fair value accounting". Whether one set of financial statements can be compatible with these two different views and balance the public interest and private interest? To solve this problem, we design a new balance sheet and an income statement.From 1992 to 2006, a lot of new ideas and new perspectives are introduced into China's accounting practices from international accounting standards in a gradual manner during the accounting reform in China. These ideas and perspectives enriched the understanding of the financial statements in China. These achievements deserve our full assessment and should be fully affirmed. However, academia and standard-setters are also aware that International Standards are still in the process of developing .The purpose of proposing new formats of financial statements in this paper is to push forward the accounting reform into a deeper level on the basis of international convergence.III. THE PRACTICABILITY OF IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SYSTEMWhether the financial statements are able to maintain their stability? It is necessary to mobilize the initiatives of both supply-side and demand-side at the same time. We should consider whether financial statements could meet the demands of the macro-economic regulation and business administration, and whether they are popular with millions of accountants.Accountants are responsible for preparing financial statements and auditors are responsible for auditing. They will benefit from the implementation of the new financial statements.Firstly, for the accountants, under the isolated design of historical cost accounting and fair value accounting, their daily accounting practice is greatly simplified. Accounting process will not need assets impairment and fair value any longer. Accounting books will not record impairment and appreciation of assets any longer, for the historical cost accounting is comprehensively implemented. Fair value information will be recorded in accordance with assessment only at the balance sheet date and only in the annual financial statements. Historical cost accounting is more likely to be recognized by the tax authorities, which saves heavy workload of the tax adjustment. Accountants will not need to calculate the deferred income tax expense any longer, and the profit-after-tax in the solid line table is acknowledged by the Company Law, which solves the problem of determining the profit available for distribution.Accountants do not need to record the fair value information needed by security investors in the accounting books; instead, they only need to list the fair value information at the balance sheet date. In addition, because the data in the solid line table has legal credibility, so the legal risks of accountants can be well controlled. Secondly, the arbitrariness of the accounting process will be reduced, and the auditors’ review process will be greatly simplified. The independent auditors will not have to bear the considerable legal risk for the dotted-line table they audit, because the risk of fair value information has been prompted as "not supported by legalevidences". Accountants and auditors can quickly adapt to this financial statements system, without the need of training. In this way, they can save a lot of time to help companies to improve management efficiency. Surveys show that the above design of financial statements is popular with accountants and auditors. Since the workloads of accounting and auditing have been substantially reduced, therefore, the total expenses for auditing and evaluation will not exceed current level as well.In short, from the perspectives of both supply-side and demand-side, the improved financial statements are expected to enhance the usefulness of financial statements, without increase the burden of the supply-side.IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSThe current rule of mixed presentation of fair value data and historical cost data could be improved. The core concept of fair value is to make financial statements reflect the fair value of assets and liabilities, so that we can subtract the fair value of liabilities from assets to obtain the net fair value.However, the current International Standards do not implement this concept, but try to partly transform the historical cost accounting, which leads to mixed using of impairment accounting and fair value accounting. China's accounting academic research has followed up step by step since 1980s, and now has already introduced a mixed-attributes model into corporate financial statements.By distinguishing legal facts from financial expectations, we can balance public interests and private interests and can redesign the financial statements system with enhancing management efficiency and implementing higher-level laws as main objective. By presenting fair value and historical cost in one set of financial statements at the same time, the statements will not only meet the needs of keeping books according to domestic laws, but also meet the demand from financial regulatory authorities and security investorsWe hope that practitioners and theorists offer advices and suggestions on the problem of improving the financial statements to build a financial statements system which not only meets the domestic needs, but also converges with the International Standards.基于会计管理理论的财务报表的优化方法摘要本文提供了一个方法，以提高财务报表的可靠性和实用性。

外文翻译：盈余管理与董事会角色——以马来西亚公司为例马来西亚国民大学经济管理学院会计系 43600 班吉译文正文：摘要马来西亚公司引入公司治理守则来改善董事会，审计委员会和外聘审计的监控职能，这项研究从他们的盈余管理动机角度评估了一些董事会特征对于监控管理行为的作用，我们发现可操纵应计利润作为盈余管理的“代理人”是跟管理权负相关的的，同时，它又在控制大小、杠杆、性能以后与CEO-主席双重性正相关。

结果表明多个董事因素与盈余管理代理仅仅在负未管理盈利上是负相关的。

这说明多个董事因素对于检测盈余管理实践以避免损失是能起到积极作用的。

数据研究还证明独立董事成员比例在二双重地位方面对盈余管理作用不大。

1.概要在1997年亚洲金融危机以后，商界开始质疑公司治理机制在组织内部的作用。

继金融危机以后，两个有名的案例——2001年的安然事件和2002年的世通公司事件亦出现。

于是，很多人相信，现用的公司治理机制不足以通过盈余管理操作对管理者的效用最大化行为提供足够的控制作用。

为改善公司治理机制的监控作用，马来西亚公司于1999年起草了公司治理守则，并在随后的2000年得到财政部的认可。

该守则概述了一些董事会，审计委员会和外部审计师在维护股东的权益时在结构和运作过程中的必备条件。

这篇研究在马来西亚监管和商业环境下探讨董事会在减少盈余管理操作中的作用。

本文调查一些董事会特征并且评估这些特征是否与盈余管理操作相关。

与之前的研究相比，本文试图确定在何种程度上董事会可以限制在有双重角色地位的公司里盈余管理的发生率，而不讨论没有双重角色地位的公司情况。

在这里，我们采纳了黑利和沃伦（1999:368）对盈余管理的定义：“盈余管理是指管理者在财务报告和交易结构里使用判断来改变财务报告以达到误导一部分股东低估公司经济收益或者影响那些依靠报告的财务数据的合同结果之目的。

”在马来西亚，这方面的数据尚且匮乏。

放眼全球，也尚没有出版的探讨股东在监控主席——经理人盈余管理行为中作用的研究。