rfc2084.Considerations for Web Transaction Security
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自适应遗传模拟退火的Web日志关联挖掘摘要:提出一种基于自适应遗传模拟退火策略的Web日志关联规则挖掘算法。
该算法在遗传模拟退火策略基础上,引入自适应的交叉概率和变异概率,使其具有较强的全局搜索能力,有效地避免了早熟的现象。
实验结果证明,该算法能有效地解决Web日志关联规则挖掘问题。
关键词:关联规则;遗传算法;模拟退火算法;Web挖掘;自适应1关联规则挖掘模型在关联规则系统中,规则本身是“如果条件怎么样、怎么样,那么结果或者情况就怎么样”的形式。
可表示为“A B规A可以包括一个或多个条件,在某个给定的正确率中,要使后件为真,前件中的所有条件必须同时为真。
后件一般只包括一种情况。
如:购买计算机有购买财务软件趋向的关联规则、年龄在30至40岁之间并且年收入在4200元至5000元之间的客户购买高清晰度彩色电视机趋向的关联规则可分别表示为:buy(x,″computer)buy(x,″finacial_management_software″)age(″30…40″)∧income(″4200…5000″) buy(x,″high_resolution_tv″)数据项集合A B组成,分别为决策属性和任务属性。
通过对问题的分析,可以发现,决策属性相互间是无序的。
因此可以将决策属性一次性排定顺序组成属性串,且在挖掘过程中不变其顺序。
为了便于问题的分析,作以下形式定义。
定义1( Web事务。
)在事务文件中出现的所有页面集合表示为P={p1,p2,…,pn}。
其中每个页面pi(i=1,2,…,n)通过其URL一表示。
事务集合U表示为U={u1,u2,…,un},每个事务ui={i=1,2,…,m}均为页面集合P的子集定义2 (页面权值。
)假定将用户访问页面的平均停留时间作为该页面的权值。
整个事务的权值为weight(uk)=∑[DD(]|uk|[]i=1[DD)]w(pI,uk)/|uk|。
定义3 (向量空间。
The ITU-T published J.144, a measurement of quality of service, for the transmission of television and other multimedia digital signals over cable networks. This defines the relationship between subjective assessment of video by a person and objective measurements taken from the network.The correlation between the two are defined by two methods:y Full Reference (Active) – A method applicable when the full reference video signal is available, and compared with the degraded signal as it passes through the network.y No Reference (Passive) – A method applicable when no reference video signal or informationis available.VIAVI believes that a combination of both Active and Passive measurements gives the correct blendof analysis with a good trade off of accuracy and computational power. T eraVM provides both voice and video quality assessment metrics, active and passive, based on ITU-T’s J.144, but are extended to support IP networks.For active assessment of VoIP and video, both the source and degraded signals are reconstituted from ingress and egress IP streams that are transmitted across the Network Under T est (NUT).The VoIP and video signals are aligned and each source and degraded frame is compared to rate the video quality.For passive measurements, only the degraded signal is considered, and with specified parameters about the source (CODEC, bit-rate) a metric is produced in real-time to rate the video quality.This combination of metrics gives the possibility of a ‘passive’ but lightweight Mean Opinion Score (MOS) per-subscriber for voice and video traffic, that is correlated with CPU-expensive but highly-accurate ‘active’ MOS scores.Both methods provide different degrees of measurement accuracy, expressed in terms of correlation with subjective assessment results. However, the trade off is the considerable computation resources required for active assessment of video - the algorithm must decode the IP stream and reconstitute the video sequence frame by frame, and compare the input and outputnframesto determine its score. The passive method is less accurate, but requires less computing resources. Active Video AnalysisThe active video assessment metric is called PEVQ– Perceptual Evaluation of Video Quality. PEVQ provides MOS estimates of the video quality degradation occurring through a network byBrochureVIAVITeraVMVoice, Video and MPEG Transport Stream Quality Metricsanalysing the degraded video signal output from the network. This approach is based on modelling the behaviour of the human visual tract and detecting abnormalities in the video signal quantified by a variety of KPIs. The MOS value reported, lies within a range from 1 (bad) to 5 (excellent) and is based on a multitude of perceptually motivated parameters.T o get readings from the network under test, the user runs a test with an video server (T eraVM or other) and an IGMP client, that joins the stream for a long period of time. The user selects the option to analysis the video quality, which takes a capture from both ingress and egress test ports.Next, the user launches the T eraVM Video Analysis Server, which fetches the video files from the server, filters the traffic on the desired video channel and converts them into standard video files. The PEVQ algorithm is run and is divided up into four separate blocks.The first block – pre-processing stage – is responsible for the spatial and temporal alignment of the reference and the impaired signal. This process makes sure, that only those frames are compared to each other that also correspond to each other.The second block calculates the perceptual difference of the aligned signals. Perceptual means that only those differences are taken into account which are actually perceived by a human viewer. Furthermore the activity of the motion in the reference signal provides another indicator representing the temporal information. This indicator is important as it takes into account that in frame series with low activity the perception of details is much higher than in frame series with quick motion. The third block in the figure classifies the previously calculated indicators and detects certain types of distortions.Finally, in the fourth block all the appropriate indicators according to the detected distortions are aggregated, forming the final result ‒ the mean opinion score (MOS). T eraVM evaluates the quality of CIF and QCIF video formats based on perceptual measurement, reliably, objectively and fast.In addition to MOS, the algorithm reports:y D istortion indicators: For a more detailed analysis the perceptual level of distortion in the luminance, chrominance and temporal domain are provided.y D elay: The delay of each frame of the test signal related to the reference signal.y Brightness: The brightness of the reference and degraded signal.y Contrast: The contrast of the distorted and the reference sequence.y P SNR: T o allow for a coarse analysis of the distortions in different domains the PSNR is provided for theY (luminance), Cb and Cr (chrominance) components separately.y Other KPIs: KPIs like Blockiness (S), Jerkiness, Blurriness (S), and frame rate the complete picture of the quality estimate.Passive MOS and MPEG StatisticsThe VQM passive algorithm is integrated into T eraVM, and when required produces a VQM, an estimation of the subjective quality of the video, every second. VQM MOS scores are available as an additional statistic in the T eraVM GUI and available in real time. In additionto VQM MOS scores, MPEG streams are analysed to determine the quality of each “Packet Elementary Stream” and exports key metrics such as Packets received and Packets Lost for each distinct Video stream within the MPEG Transport Stream. All major VoIP and Video CODECs are support, including MPEG 2/4 and the H.261/3/3+/4.2 TeraVM Voice, Video and MPEG Transport Stream Quality Metrics© 2020 VIAVI Solutions Inc.Product specifications and descriptions in this document are subject to change without notice.tvm-vv-mpeg-br-wir-nse-ae 30191143 900 0620Contact Us +1 844 GO VIAVI (+1 844 468 4284)To reach the VIAVI office nearest you, visit /contacts.VIAVI SolutionsVoice over IP call quality can be affected by packet loss, discards due to jitter, delay , echo and other problems. Some of these problems, notably packet loss and jitter, are time varying in nature as they are usually caused by congestion on the IP path. This can result in situations where call quality varies during the call - when viewed from the perspective of “average” impairments then the call may appear fine although it may have sounded severely impaired to the listener. T eraVM inspects every RTP packet header, estimating delay variation and emulating the behavior of a fixed or adaptive jitter buffer to determine which packets are lost or discarded. A 4- state Markov Model measures the distribution of the lost and discarded packets. Packet metrics obtained from the Jitter Buffer together with video codec information obtained from the packet stream to calculate a rich set of metrics, performance and diagnostic information. Video quality scores provide a guide to the quality of the video delivered to the user. T eraVM V3.1 produces call quality metrics, includinglistening and conversational quality scores, and detailed information on the severity and distribution of packet loss and discards (due to jitter). This metric is based on the well established ITU G.107 E Model, with extensions to support time varying network impairments.For passive VoIP analysis, T eraVM v3.1 emulates a VoIP Jitter Buffer Emulator and with a statistical Markov Model accepts RTP header information from the VoIP stream, detects lost packets and predicts which packets would be discarded ‒ feeding this information to the Markov Model and hence to the T eraVM analysis engine.PESQ SupportFinally , PESQ is available for the analysis of VoIP RTP Streams. The process to generate PESQ is an identical process to that of Video Quality Analysis.。
httpstaus汇总常见HTTP状态码1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.100 Continue初始的请求已经接受,客户应当继续发送请求的其余部分101 Switching Protocols服务器将遵从客户的请求转换到另外⼀种协议200 OK⼀切正常,对GET和POST请求的应答⽂档跟在后⾯201 Created服务器已经创建了⽂档,Location头给出了它的URL。
202 Accepted已经接受请求,但处理尚未完成。
203 Non-Authoritative Information⽂档已经正常地返回,但⼀些应答头可能不正确,因为使⽤的是⽂档的拷贝204 No Content没有新⽂档,浏览器应该继续显⽰原来的⽂档。
如果⽤户定期地刷新页⾯,⽽Servlet可以确定⽤户⽂档⾜够新,这个状态代码是很有⽤的205 Reset Content没有新的内容,但浏览器应该重置它所显⽰的内容。
⽤来强制浏览器清除表单输⼊内容206 Partial Content客户发送了⼀个带有Range头的GET请求,服务器完成了它300 Multiple Choices客户请求的⽂档可以在多个位置找到,这些位置已经在返回的⽂档内列出。
如果服务器要提出优先选择,则应该在Location应答头指明。
301 Moved Permanently客户请求的⽂档在其他地⽅,新的URL在Location头中给出,浏览器应该⾃动地访问新的URL。
302 Found类似于301,但新的URL应该被视为临时性的替代,⽽不是永久性的。
303 See Other类似于301/302,不同之处在于,如果原来的请求是POST,Location头指定的重定向⽬标⽂档应该通过GET提取304 Not Modified客户端有缓冲的⽂档并发出了⼀个条件性的请求(⼀般是提供If-Modified-Since头表⽰客户只想⽐指定⽇期更新的⽂档)。
NORMEINTERNATIONALECEI IEC INTERNATIONALSTANDARD 61854Première éditionFirst edition1998-09Lignes aériennes –Exigences et essais applicables aux entretoisesOverhead lines –Requirements and tests for spacersCommission Electrotechnique InternationaleInternational Electrotechnical Commission Pour prix, voir catalogue en vigueurFor price, see current catalogue© IEC 1998 Droits de reproduction réservés Copyright - all rights reservedAucune partie de cette publication ne peut être reproduite niutilisée sous quelque forme que ce soit et par aucunprocédé, électronique ou mécanique, y compris la photo-copie et les microfilms, sans l'accord écrit de l'éditeur.No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from the publisher.International Electrotechnical Commission 3, rue de Varembé Geneva, SwitzerlandTelefax: +41 22 919 0300e-mail: inmail@iec.ch IEC web site http: //www.iec.chCODE PRIX PRICE CODE X– 2 –61854 © CEI:1998SOMMAIREPages AVANT-PROPOS (6)Articles1Domaine d'application (8)2Références normatives (8)3Définitions (12)4Exigences générales (12)4.1Conception (12)4.2Matériaux (14)4.2.1Généralités (14)4.2.2Matériaux non métalliques (14)4.3Masse, dimensions et tolérances (14)4.4Protection contre la corrosion (14)4.5Aspect et finition de fabrication (14)4.6Marquage (14)4.7Consignes d'installation (14)5Assurance de la qualité (16)6Classification des essais (16)6.1Essais de type (16)6.1.1Généralités (16)6.1.2Application (16)6.2Essais sur échantillon (16)6.2.1Généralités (16)6.2.2Application (16)6.2.3Echantillonnage et critères de réception (18)6.3Essais individuels de série (18)6.3.1Généralités (18)6.3.2Application et critères de réception (18)6.4Tableau des essais à effectuer (18)7Méthodes d'essai (22)7.1Contrôle visuel (22)7.2Vérification des dimensions, des matériaux et de la masse (22)7.3Essai de protection contre la corrosion (22)7.3.1Composants revêtus par galvanisation à chaud (autres queles fils d'acier galvanisés toronnés) (22)7.3.2Produits en fer protégés contre la corrosion par des méthodes autresque la galvanisation à chaud (24)7.3.3Fils d'acier galvanisé toronnés (24)7.3.4Corrosion causée par des composants non métalliques (24)7.4Essais non destructifs (24)61854 © IEC:1998– 3 –CONTENTSPage FOREWORD (7)Clause1Scope (9)2Normative references (9)3Definitions (13)4General requirements (13)4.1Design (13)4.2Materials (15)4.2.1General (15)4.2.2Non-metallic materials (15)4.3Mass, dimensions and tolerances (15)4.4Protection against corrosion (15)4.5Manufacturing appearance and finish (15)4.6Marking (15)4.7Installation instructions (15)5Quality assurance (17)6Classification of tests (17)6.1Type tests (17)6.1.1General (17)6.1.2Application (17)6.2Sample tests (17)6.2.1General (17)6.2.2Application (17)6.2.3Sampling and acceptance criteria (19)6.3Routine tests (19)6.3.1General (19)6.3.2Application and acceptance criteria (19)6.4Table of tests to be applied (19)7Test methods (23)7.1Visual examination (23)7.2Verification of dimensions, materials and mass (23)7.3Corrosion protection test (23)7.3.1Hot dip galvanized components (other than stranded galvanizedsteel wires) (23)7.3.2Ferrous components protected from corrosion by methods other thanhot dip galvanizing (25)7.3.3Stranded galvanized steel wires (25)7.3.4Corrosion caused by non-metallic components (25)7.4Non-destructive tests (25)– 4 –61854 © CEI:1998 Articles Pages7.5Essais mécaniques (26)7.5.1Essais de glissement des pinces (26)7.5.1.1Essai de glissement longitudinal (26)7.5.1.2Essai de glissement en torsion (28)7.5.2Essai de boulon fusible (28)7.5.3Essai de serrage des boulons de pince (30)7.5.4Essais de courant de court-circuit simulé et essais de compressionet de traction (30)7.5.4.1Essai de courant de court-circuit simulé (30)7.5.4.2Essai de compression et de traction (32)7.5.5Caractérisation des propriétés élastiques et d'amortissement (32)7.5.6Essais de flexibilité (38)7.5.7Essais de fatigue (38)7.5.7.1Généralités (38)7.5.7.2Oscillation de sous-portée (40)7.5.7.3Vibrations éoliennes (40)7.6Essais de caractérisation des élastomères (42)7.6.1Généralités (42)7.6.2Essais (42)7.6.3Essai de résistance à l'ozone (46)7.7Essais électriques (46)7.7.1Essais d'effet couronne et de tension de perturbations radioélectriques..467.7.2Essai de résistance électrique (46)7.8Vérification du comportement vibratoire du système faisceau/entretoise (48)Annexe A (normative) Informations techniques minimales à convenirentre acheteur et fournisseur (64)Annexe B (informative) Forces de compression dans l'essai de courantde court-circuit simulé (66)Annexe C (informative) Caractérisation des propriétés élastiques et d'amortissementMéthode de détermination de la rigidité et de l'amortissement (70)Annexe D (informative) Contrôle du comportement vibratoire du systèmefaisceau/entretoise (74)Bibliographie (80)Figures (50)Tableau 1 – Essais sur les entretoises (20)Tableau 2 – Essais sur les élastomères (44)61854 © IEC:1998– 5 –Clause Page7.5Mechanical tests (27)7.5.1Clamp slip tests (27)7.5.1.1Longitudinal slip test (27)7.5.1.2Torsional slip test (29)7.5.2Breakaway bolt test (29)7.5.3Clamp bolt tightening test (31)7.5.4Simulated short-circuit current test and compression and tension tests (31)7.5.4.1Simulated short-circuit current test (31)7.5.4.2Compression and tension test (33)7.5.5Characterisation of the elastic and damping properties (33)7.5.6Flexibility tests (39)7.5.7Fatigue tests (39)7.5.7.1General (39)7.5.7.2Subspan oscillation (41)7.5.7.3Aeolian vibration (41)7.6Tests to characterise elastomers (43)7.6.1General (43)7.6.2Tests (43)7.6.3Ozone resistance test (47)7.7Electrical tests (47)7.7.1Corona and radio interference voltage (RIV) tests (47)7.7.2Electrical resistance test (47)7.8Verification of vibration behaviour of the bundle-spacer system (49)Annex A (normative) Minimum technical details to be agreed betweenpurchaser and supplier (65)Annex B (informative) Compressive forces in the simulated short-circuit current test (67)Annex C (informative) Characterisation of the elastic and damping propertiesStiffness-Damping Method (71)Annex D (informative) Verification of vibration behaviour of the bundle/spacer system (75)Bibliography (81)Figures (51)Table 1 – Tests on spacers (21)Table 2 – Tests on elastomers (45)– 6 –61854 © CEI:1998 COMMISSION ÉLECTROTECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE––––––––––LIGNES AÉRIENNES –EXIGENCES ET ESSAIS APPLICABLES AUX ENTRETOISESAVANT-PROPOS1)La CEI (Commission Electrotechnique Internationale) est une organisation mondiale de normalisation composéede l'ensemble des comités électrotechniques nationaux (Comités nationaux de la CEI). La CEI a pour objet de favoriser la coopération internationale pour toutes les questions de normalisation dans les domaines de l'électricité et de l'électronique. A cet effet, la CEI, entre autres activités, publie des Normes internationales.Leur élaboration est confiée à des comités d'études, aux travaux desquels tout Comité national intéressé par le sujet traité peut participer. Les organisations internationales, gouvernementales et non gouvernementales, en liaison avec la CEI, participent également aux travaux. La CEI collabore étroitement avec l'Organisation Internationale de Normalisation (ISO), selon des conditions fixées par accord entre les deux organisations.2)Les décisions ou accords officiels de la CEI concernant les questions techniques représentent, dans la mesuredu possible un accord international sur les sujets étudiés, étant donné que les Comités nationaux intéressés sont représentés dans chaque comité d’études.3)Les documents produits se présentent sous la forme de recommandations internationales. Ils sont publiéscomme normes, rapports techniques ou guides et agréés comme tels par les Comités nationaux.4)Dans le but d'encourager l'unification internationale, les Comités nationaux de la CEI s'engagent à appliquer defaçon transparente, dans toute la mesure possible, les Normes internationales de la CEI dans leurs normes nationales et régionales. Toute divergence entre la norme de la CEI et la norme nationale ou régionale correspondante doit être indiquée en termes clairs dans cette dernière.5)La CEI n’a fixé aucune procédure concernant le marquage comme indication d’approbation et sa responsabilitén’est pas engagée quand un matériel est déclaré conforme à l’une de ses normes.6) L’attention est attirée sur le fait que certains des éléments de la présente Norme internationale peuvent fairel’objet de droits de propriété intellectuelle ou de droits analogues. La CEI ne saurait être tenue pour responsable de ne pas avoir identifié de tels droits de propriété et de ne pas avoir signalé leur existence.La Norme internationale CEI 61854 a été établie par le comité d'études 11 de la CEI: Lignes aériennes.Le texte de cette norme est issu des documents suivants:FDIS Rapport de vote11/141/FDIS11/143/RVDLe rapport de vote indiqué dans le tableau ci-dessus donne toute information sur le vote ayant abouti à l'approbation de cette norme.L’annexe A fait partie intégrante de cette norme.Les annexes B, C et D sont données uniquement à titre d’information.61854 © IEC:1998– 7 –INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION––––––––––OVERHEAD LINES –REQUIREMENTS AND TESTS FOR SPACERSFOREWORD1)The IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprisingall national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of the IEC is to promote international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To this end and in addition to other activities, the IEC publishes International Standards. Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested in the subject dealt with may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this preparation. The IEC collaborates closely with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by agreement between the two organizations.2)The formal decisions or agreements of the IEC on technical matters express, as nearly as possible, aninternational consensus of opinion on the relevant subjects since each technical committee has representation from all interested National Committees.3)The documents produced have the form of recommendations for international use and are published in the formof standards, technical reports or guides and they are accepted by the National Committees in that sense.4)In order to promote international unification, IEC National Committees undertake to apply IEC InternationalStandards transparently to the maximum extent possible in their national and regional standards. Any divergence between the IEC Standard and the corresponding national or regional standard shall be clearly indicated in the latter.5)The IEC provides no marking procedure to indicate its approval and cannot be rendered responsible for anyequipment declared to be in conformity with one of its standards.6) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this International Standard may be the subjectof patent rights. The IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. International Standard IEC 61854 has been prepared by IEC technical committee 11: Overhead lines.The text of this standard is based on the following documents:FDIS Report on voting11/141/FDIS11/143/RVDFull information on the voting for the approval of this standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.Annex A forms an integral part of this standard.Annexes B, C and D are for information only.– 8 –61854 © CEI:1998LIGNES AÉRIENNES –EXIGENCES ET ESSAIS APPLICABLES AUX ENTRETOISES1 Domaine d'applicationLa présente Norme internationale s'applique aux entretoises destinées aux faisceaux de conducteurs de lignes aériennes. Elle recouvre les entretoises rigides, les entretoises flexibles et les entretoises amortissantes.Elle ne s'applique pas aux espaceurs, aux écarteurs à anneaux et aux entretoises de mise à la terre.NOTE – La présente norme est applicable aux pratiques de conception de lignes et aux entretoises les plus couramment utilisées au moment de sa rédaction. Il peut exister d'autres entretoises auxquelles les essais spécifiques décrits dans la présente norme ne s'appliquent pas.Dans de nombreux cas, les procédures d'essai et les valeurs d'essai sont convenues entre l'acheteur et le fournisseur et sont énoncées dans le contrat d'approvisionnement. L'acheteur est le mieux à même d'évaluer les conditions de service prévues, qu'il convient d'utiliser comme base à la définition de la sévérité des essais.La liste des informations techniques minimales à convenir entre acheteur et fournisseur est fournie en annexe A.2 Références normativesLes documents normatifs suivants contiennent des dispositions qui, par suite de la référence qui y est faite, constituent des dispositions valables pour la présente Norme internationale. Au moment de la publication, les éditions indiquées étaient en vigueur. Tout document normatif est sujet à révision et les parties prenantes aux accords fondés sur la présente Norme internationale sont invitées à rechercher la possibilité d'appliquer les éditions les plus récentes des documents normatifs indiqués ci-après. Les membres de la CEI et de l'ISO possèdent le registre des Normes internationales en vigueur.CEI 60050(466):1990, Vocabulaire Electrotechnique International (VEI) – Chapitre 466: Lignes aériennesCEI 61284:1997, Lignes aériennes – Exigences et essais pour le matériel d'équipementCEI 60888:1987, Fils en acier zingué pour conducteurs câblésISO 34-1:1994, Caoutchouc vulcanisé ou thermoplastique – Détermination de la résistance au déchirement – Partie 1: Eprouvettes pantalon, angulaire et croissantISO 34-2:1996, Caoutchouc vulcanisé ou thermoplastique – Détermination de la résistance au déchirement – Partie 2: Petites éprouvettes (éprouvettes de Delft)ISO 37:1994, Caoutchouc vulcanisé ou thermoplastique – Détermination des caractéristiques de contrainte-déformation en traction61854 © IEC:1998– 9 –OVERHEAD LINES –REQUIREMENTS AND TESTS FOR SPACERS1 ScopeThis International Standard applies to spacers for conductor bundles of overhead lines. It covers rigid spacers, flexible spacers and spacer dampers.It does not apply to interphase spacers, hoop spacers and bonding spacers.NOTE – This standard is written to cover the line design practices and spacers most commonly used at the time of writing. There may be other spacers available for which the specific tests reported in this standard may not be applicable.In many cases, test procedures and test values are left to agreement between purchaser and supplier and are stated in the procurement contract. The purchaser is best able to evaluate the intended service conditions, which should be the basis for establishing the test severity.In annex A, the minimum technical details to be agreed between purchaser and supplier are listed.2 Normative referencesThe following normative documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this International Standard. At the time of publication of this standard, the editions indicated were valid. All normative documents are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this International Standard are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the normative documents indicated below. Members of IEC and ISO maintain registers of currently valid International Standards.IEC 60050(466):1990, International Electrotechnical vocabulary (IEV) – Chapter 466: Overhead linesIEC 61284:1997, Overhead lines – Requirements and tests for fittingsIEC 60888:1987, Zinc-coated steel wires for stranded conductorsISO 34-1:1994, Rubber, vulcanized or thermoplastic – Determination of tear strength – Part 1: Trouser, angle and crescent test piecesISO 34-2:1996, Rubber, vulcanized or thermoplastic – Determination of tear strength – Part 2: Small (Delft) test piecesISO 37:1994, Rubber, vulcanized or thermoplastic – Determination of tensile stress-strain properties– 10 –61854 © CEI:1998 ISO 188:1982, Caoutchouc vulcanisé – Essais de résistance au vieillissement accéléré ou à la chaleurISO 812:1991, Caoutchouc vulcanisé – Détermination de la fragilité à basse températureISO 815:1991, Caoutchouc vulcanisé ou thermoplastique – Détermination de la déformation rémanente après compression aux températures ambiantes, élevées ou bassesISO 868:1985, Plastiques et ébonite – Détermination de la dureté par pénétration au moyen d'un duromètre (dureté Shore)ISO 1183:1987, Plastiques – Méthodes pour déterminer la masse volumique et la densitérelative des plastiques non alvéolairesISO 1431-1:1989, Caoutchouc vulcanisé ou thermoplastique – Résistance au craquelage par l'ozone – Partie 1: Essai sous allongement statiqueISO 1461,— Revêtements de galvanisation à chaud sur produits finis ferreux – Spécifications1) ISO 1817:1985, Caoutchouc vulcanisé – Détermination de l'action des liquidesISO 2781:1988, Caoutchouc vulcanisé – Détermination de la masse volumiqueISO 2859-1:1989, Règles d'échantillonnage pour les contrôles par attributs – Partie 1: Plans d'échantillonnage pour les contrôles lot par lot, indexés d'après le niveau de qualité acceptable (NQA)ISO 2859-2:1985, Règles d'échantillonnage pour les contrôles par attributs – Partie 2: Plans d'échantillonnage pour les contrôles de lots isolés, indexés d'après la qualité limite (QL)ISO 2921:1982, Caoutchouc vulcanisé – Détermination des caractéristiques à basse température – Méthode température-retrait (essai TR)ISO 3417:1991, Caoutchouc – Détermination des caractéristiques de vulcanisation à l'aide du rhéomètre à disque oscillantISO 3951:1989, Règles et tables d'échantillonnage pour les contrôles par mesures des pourcentages de non conformesISO 4649:1985, Caoutchouc – Détermination de la résistance à l'abrasion à l'aide d'un dispositif à tambour tournantISO 4662:1986, Caoutchouc – Détermination de la résilience de rebondissement des vulcanisats––––––––––1) A publierThis is a preview - click here to buy the full publication61854 © IEC:1998– 11 –ISO 188:1982, Rubber, vulcanized – Accelerated ageing or heat-resistance testsISO 812:1991, Rubber, vulcanized – Determination of low temperature brittlenessISO 815:1991, Rubber, vulcanized or thermoplastic – Determination of compression set at ambient, elevated or low temperaturesISO 868:1985, Plastics and ebonite – Determination of indentation hardness by means of a durometer (Shore hardness)ISO 1183:1987, Plastics – Methods for determining the density and relative density of non-cellular plasticsISO 1431-1:1989, Rubber, vulcanized or thermoplastic – Resistance to ozone cracking –Part 1: static strain testISO 1461, — Hot dip galvanized coatings on fabricated ferrous products – Specifications1)ISO 1817:1985, Rubber, vulcanized – Determination of the effect of liquidsISO 2781:1988, Rubber, vulcanized – Determination of densityISO 2859-1:1989, Sampling procedures for inspection by attributes – Part 1: Sampling plans indexed by acceptable quality level (AQL) for lot-by-lot inspectionISO 2859-2:1985, Sampling procedures for inspection by attributes – Part 2: Sampling plans indexed by limiting quality level (LQ) for isolated lot inspectionISO 2921:1982, Rubber, vulcanized – Determination of low temperature characteristics –Temperature-retraction procedure (TR test)ISO 3417:1991, Rubber – Measurement of vulcanization characteristics with the oscillating disc curemeterISO 3951:1989, Sampling procedures and charts for inspection by variables for percent nonconformingISO 4649:1985, Rubber – Determination of abrasion resistance using a rotating cylindrical drum deviceISO 4662:1986, Rubber – Determination of rebound resilience of vulcanizates–––––––––1) To be published.。
学习网络常用的RFC文档的名称双语RFC --RFC中英文对照版rfc1050中文版-远程过程调用协议规范rfc1055中文版-在串行线路上传输IP数据报的非标准协议rfc1057中文版-RFC:远程过程调用协议说明第二版rfc1058中文版-路由信息协议(Routing Information Protocol)rfc1073中文版-RFC1073 Telnet窗口尺寸选项rfc1075中文版-远距离矢量多播选路协议rfc1088中文版-在NetBIOS网络上传输IP数据报的标准rfc1090中文版-SMTP在X.25上rfc1091中文版-TELNET终端类型选项rfc1094中文版-RFC1094 网络文件系统协议rfc1096中文版-Telnet X显示定位选项rfc1097中文版-Telnet潜意识-信息选项rfc1112中文版-主机扩展用于IP多点传送rfc1113中文版-Internet电子邮件保密增强:Part1-消息编码和鉴别过程rfc1132中文版-802.2分组在IPX网络上传输的标准rfc1144中文版-低速串行链路上的TCP/IP头部压缩rfc1155中文版-基于TCP/IP网络的管理结构和标记rfc1191中文版-RFC1191 路径MTU发现rfc1332中文版-RFC1332 端对端协议网间协议控制协议(IPCP)rfc1333中文版-PPP 链路质量监控rfc1334中文版-PPP 身份验证协议rfc1387中文版-RIP(版本2)协议分析rfc1388中文版-RIP协议版本2rfc1433中文版-直接ARPrfc1445中文版-SNMPv2的管理模型rfc1582中文版-扩展RIP以支持按需链路rfc1618中文版-ISDN上的PPP(点对点)协议rfc1661中文版-RFC1661 PPP协议rfc1723中文版-路由信息协议(版本2)rfc1738中文版-统一资源定位器(URL)rfc1769中文版-简单网络时间协议( SNTP)rfc1771中文版-边界网关协议版本4(BGP-4)rfc1827中文版-IP封装安全载荷(ESP)rfc1883中文版-Internet协议,版本6(IPv6)说明书rfc1939中文版-POP3协议rfc1945中文版-超文本传输协议 -- HTTP/1.0rfc1994中文版-PPP挑战握手认证协议(CHAP)rfc1997中文版-RFC1997 BGP团体属性rfc2002中文版-IP移动性支持rfc204中文版-利用报路rfc2105中文版-Cisco 系统的标签交换体系结构纵览rfc2281中文版-Cisco热备份路由协议()rfc2283中文版-BGP-4的多协议扩展rfc2326中文版-实时流协议(RTSP)rfc2328中文版-OSPF版本2rfc2516中文版-在以太网上传输PPP的方法(PPPoE)rfc2526中文版-IPv6保留的子网任意传送地址rfc2547中文版-BGP/MPLS VPNsrfc2616中文版-超文本传输协议——HTTP/1.1rfc2702中文版-基于MPLS的流量工程要求rfc2706中文版-RFC2706—电子商务域名标准rfc2756中文版-超文本缓存协议(HTCP/0.0)rfc2764中文版-IP VPN的框架体系rfc2773中文版-使用KEA和SKIPJACK加密rfc2774中文版-HTTP扩展框架rfc2781中文版-UTF-16, 一种ISO 10646的编码方式rfc2784中文版-通用路由封装rfc2793中文版-用于文本交谈的RTP负载rfc2796中文版-BGP路由反射rfc2917中文版-核心 MPLSIP VPN 体系结构rfc2918中文版-BGP-4(边界网关协议)的路由刷新功能rfc2923中文版-TCP的路径MTU发现问题rfc3003中文版-Audio/mpeg 媒体类型rfc3005中文版-IETF 讨论列表许可证rfc3007中文版-安全的域名系统动态更新rfc3018中文版-统一内存空间协议规范rfc3022中文版-传统IP网络地址转换(传统NAT)rfc3032中文版-RFC3032 MPLS标记栈编码rfc3033中文版-用于Internet协议的信息域和协议标识符在Q.2941类属标识符和Q.2957 User-to-user信令中的分配rfc3034中文版-标签转换在帧中继网络说明书中的使用rfc3037中文版-RFC3037 标记分配协议的适用范围(RFC3037 LDP Applicability)rfc3058中文版-IDEA加密算法在CMS上的使用rfc3059中文版-服务定位协议的属性列表扩展rfc3061中文版-对象标识符的一种URN姓名空间rfc3062中文版-LDAP口令修改扩展操作rfc3063中文版-MPLS(多协议标签交换)环路预防机制rfc3066中文版-语言鉴定标签rfc3067中文版-事件对象描述和转换格式要求rfc3069中文版-VLAN聚合实现IP地址有效分配rfc3070中文版-基于帧中继的第二层隧道协议rfc3072中文版-结构化数据交换格式rfc3074中文版-DHCP 负载平衡算法rfc3078中文版-RFC3078微软点到点加密(MPPE)协议rfc3081中文版-将区块扩展交换协议(BEEP)核心映射到传输控制协议(TCP)rfc3083中文版-遵循DOCSIS的Cable Modem和CMTS的PBI 的管理信息数据库rfc3085中文版-新闻型标记语言(NewsML)资源的URN名字空间rfc3090中文版-域名系统在区域状况下的安全扩展声明rfc3091中文版-Pi数字生成协议rfc3093中文版-防火墙增强协议rfc3550中文版-RTP:实时应用程序传输协议rfc457中文版-TIPUGrfc697中文版-FTP的CWD命令rfc698中文版-TELNET扩展ASCII选项rfc775中文版-面向目录的 FTP 命令rfc779中文版-TELNET的SEND-LOCATION选项rfc792中文版-RFC792- Internet控制信息协议(ICMP)rfc821中文版-RFC821 简单邮件传输协议(SMTP)rfc826中文版-以太网地址转换协议或转换网络协议地址为48比特以太网地址用于在以太网硬件上传输rfc854中文版-TELNET协议规范rfc855中文版-TELNET选项规范rfc856中文版-RFC856 TELNET二进制传输rfc857中文版-RFC 857 TELNET ECHO选项rfc858中文版-RFC 858 TELNET SUPPRESS GO AHEAD选项rfc859中文版-RFC 859 TELNET的STATUS选项rfc860中文版-RFC 860 TELNET TIMING MARK选项rfc861中文版-RFC 861 TELNET扩展选项-LISTrfc862中文版-RFC 862 Echo 协议rfc868中文版-RFC868 时间协议rfc894中文版-IP 数据包通过以太网网络传输标准rfc903中文版-反向地址转换协议rfc930中文版-Telnet终端类型选项(RFC930——T elnet Terminal Type Option)rfc932中文版-子网地址分配方案rfc937中文版-邮局协议 (版本2)rfc948中文版-IP数据报通过IEEE802.3网络传输的两种方法rfc949中文版-FTP 未公开的独特命令rfc951中文版-引导协议(BOOTP)rfc962中文版-TCP-4 的最初rfc974中文版-邮件路由与域名系统rfc975中文版-自治联邦。
Network Working Group T. Narten Request for Comments: 4941 IBM Corporation Obsoletes: 3041 R. Draves Category: Standards Track Microsoft Research S. Krishnan Ericsson Research September 2007 Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6Status of This MemoThis document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions forimprovements. Please refer to the current edition of the "InternetOfficial Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization stateand status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.AbstractNodes use IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration to generateaddresses using a combination of locally available information andinformation advertised by routers. Addresses are formed by combining network prefixes with an interface identifier. On an interface that contains an embedded IEEE Identifier, the interface identifier istypically derived from it. On other interface types, the interfaceidentifier is generated through other means, for example, via random number generation. This document describes an extension to IPv6stateless address autoconfiguration for interfaces whose interfaceidentifier is derived from an IEEE identifier. Use of the extension causes nodes to generate global scope addresses from interfaceidentifiers that change over time, even in cases where the interface contains an embedded IEEE identifier. Changing the interfaceidentifier (and the global scope addresses generated from it) overtime makes it more difficult for eavesdroppers and other information collectors to identify when different addresses used in differenttransactions actually correspond to the same node.Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]Table of Contents1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Extended Use of the Same Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Address Usage in IPv4 Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. The Concern with IPv6 Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.4. Possible Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2. Generation of Randomized Interface Identifiers . . . . . . 10 3.2.1. When Stable Storage Is Present . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.2. In The Absence of Stable Storage . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.2.3. Alternate Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.3. Generating Temporary Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.4. Expiration of Temporary Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.5. Regeneration of Randomized Interface Identifiers . . . . . 153.6. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164. Implications of Changing Interface Identifiers . . . . . . . . 175. Defined Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198. Significant Changes from RFC 3041 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2010. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]1. IntroductionStateless address autoconfiguration [ADDRCONF] defines how an IPv6node generates addresses without the need for a Dynamic HostConfiguration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) server. Some types ofnetwork interfaces come with an embedded IEEE Identifier (i.e., alink-layer MAC address), and in those cases, stateless addressautoconfiguration uses the IEEE identifier to generate a 64-bitinterface identifier [ADDRARCH]. By design, the interface identifier is likely to be globally unique when generated in this fashion. The interface identifier is in turn appended to a prefix to form a128-bit IPv6 address. Note that an IPv6 identifier does notnecessarily have to be 64 bits in length, but the algorithm specified in this document is targeted towards 64-bit interface identifiers.All nodes combine interface identifiers (whether derived from an IEEE identifier or generated through some other technique) with thereserved link-local prefix to generate link-local addresses for their attached interfaces. Additional addresses can then be created bycombining prefixes advertised in Router Advertisements via NeighborDiscovery [DISCOVERY] with the interface identifier.Not all nodes and interfaces contain IEEE identifiers. In suchcases, an interface identifier is generated through some other means (e.g., at random), and the resultant interface identifier may not be globally unique and may also change over time. The focus of thisdocument is on addresses derived from IEEE identifiers becausetracking of individual devices, the concern being addressed here, is possible only in those cases where the interface identifier isglobally unique and non-changing. The rest of this document assumes that IEEE identifiers are being used, but the techniques describedmay also apply to interfaces with other types of globally uniqueand/or persistent identifiers.This document discusses concerns associated with the embedding ofnon-changing interface identifiers within IPv6 addresses anddescribes extensions to stateless address autoconfiguration that can help mitigate those concerns for individual users and in environments where such concerns are significant. Section 2 provides backgroundinformation on the issue. Section 3 describes a procedure forgenerating alternate interface identifiers and global scopeaddresses. Section 4 discusses implications of changing interfaceidentifiers. The term "global scope addresses" is used in thisdocument to collectively refer to "Global unicast addresses" asdefined in [ADDRARCH] and "Unique local addresses" as defined in[ULA].Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]1.1. Conventions Used in This DocumentThe key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT","SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].1.2. Problem StatementAddresses generated using stateless address autoconfiguration[ADDRCONF] contain an embedded interface identifier, which remainsconstant over time. Anytime a fixed identifier is used in multiplecontexts, it becomes possible to correlate seemingly unrelatedactivity using this identifier.The correlation can be performed byo An attacker who is in the path between the node in question andthe peer(s) to which it is communicating, and who can view theIPv6 addresses present in the datagrams.o An attacker who can access the communication logs of the peerswith which the node has communicated.Since the identifier is embedded within the IPv6 address, which is a fundamental requirement of communication, it cannot be easily hidden. This document proposes a solution to this issue by generatinginterface identifiers that vary over time.Note that an attacker, who is on path, may be able to performsignificant correlation based ono The payload contents of the packets on the wireo The characteristics of the packets such as packet size and timing Use of temporary addresses will not prevent such payload-basedcorrelation.Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]2. BackgroundThis section discusses the problem in more detail, provides contextfor evaluating the significance of the concerns in specificenvironments and makes comparisons with existing practices.2.1. Extended Use of the Same IdentifierThe use of a non-changing interface identifier to form addresses is a specific instance of the more general case where a constantidentifier is reused over an extended period of time and in multiple independent activities. Any time the same identifier is used inmultiple contexts, it becomes possible for that identifier to be used to correlate seemingly unrelated activity. For example, a networksniffer placed strategically on a link across which all traffic to/from a particular host crosses could keep track of which destinations a node communicated with and at what times. Such information can in some cases be used to infer things, such as what hours an employeewas active, when someone is at home, etc. Although it might appearthat changing an address regularly in such environments would bedesirable to lessen privacy concerns, it should be noted that thenetwork prefix portion of an address also serves as a constantidentifier. All nodes at, say, a home, would have the same networkprefix, which identifies the topological location of those nodes.This has implications for privacy, though not at the same granularity as the concern that this document addresses. Specifically, all nodes within a home could be grouped together for the purposes ofcollecting information. If the network contains a very small number of nodes, say, just one, changing just the interface identifier will not enhance privacy at all, since the prefix serves as a constantidentifier.One of the requirements for correlating seemingly unrelatedactivities is the use (and reuse) of an identifier that isrecognizable over time within different contexts. IP addressesprovide one obvious example, but there are more. Many nodes alsohave DNS names associated with their addresses, in which case the DNS name serves as a similar identifier. Although the DNS nameassociated with an address is more work to obtain (it may require aDNS query), the information is often readily available. In suchcases, changing the address on a machine over time would do little to address the concerns raised in this document, unless the DNS name is changed as well (see Section 4).Web browsers and servers typically exchange "cookies" with each other [COOKIES]. Cookies allow Web servers to correlate a current activity with a previous activity. One common usage is to send back targeted advertising to a user by using the cookie supplied by the browser to Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]identify what earlier queries had been made (e.g., for what type ofinformation). Based on the earlier queries, advertisements can betargeted to match the (assumed) interests of the end user.The use of a constant identifier within an address is of specialconcern because addresses are a fundamental requirement ofcommunication and cannot easily be hidden from eavesdroppers andother parties. Even when higher layers encrypt their payloads,addresses in packet headers appear in the clear. Consequently, if a mobile host (e.g., laptop) accessed the network from severaldifferent locations, an eavesdropper might be able to track themovement of that mobile host from place to place, even if the upperlayer payloads were encrypted.2.2. Address Usage in IPv4 TodayAddresses used in today’s Internet are often non-changing in practice for extended periods of time. In an increasing number of sites,addresses are assigned statically and typically change infrequently. Over the last few years, sites have begun moving away from staticallocation to dynamic allocation via DHCP [DHCP]. In theory, theaddress a client gets via DHCP can change over time, but in practice servers often return the same address to the same client (unlessaddresses are in such short supply that they are reused immediatelyby a different node when they become free). Thus, even within sites using DHCP, clients frequently end up using the same address forweeks to months at a time.For home users accessing the Internet over dial-up lines, thesituation is generally different. Such users do not have permanentconnections and are often assigned temporary addresses each time they connect to their ISP. Consequently, the addresses they use changefrequently over time and are shared among a number of differentusers. Thus, an address does not reliably identify a particulardevice over time spans of more than a few minutes.A more interesting case concerns always-on connections (e.g., cablemodems, ISDN, DSL, etc.) that result in a home site using the sameaddress for extended periods of time. This is a scenario that isjust starting to become common in IPv4 and promises to become more of a concern as always-on Internet connectivity becomes widelyavailable.Finally, it should be noted that nodes that need a (non-changing) DNS name generally have static addresses assigned to them to simplify the configuration of DNS servers. Although Dynamic DNS [DDNS] can beused to update the DNS dynamically, it may not always be availabledepending on the administrative policy. In addition, changing an Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]address but keeping the same DNS name does not really address theunderlying concern, since the DNS name becomes a non-changingidentifier. Servers generally require a DNS name (so clients canconnect to them), and clients often do as well (e.g., some serversrefuse to speak to a client whose address cannot be mapped into a DNS name that also maps back into the same address). Section 4 describes one approach to this issue.2.3. The Concern with IPv6 AddressesThe division of IPv6 addresses into distinct topology and interfaceidentifier portions raises an issue new to IPv6 in that a fixedportion of an IPv6 address (i.e., the interface identifier) cancontain an identifier that remains constant even when the topologyportion of an address changes (e.g., as the result of connecting to a different part of the Internet). In IPv4, when an address changes,the entire address (including the local part of the address) usually changes. It is this new issue that this document addresses.If addresses are generated from an interface identifier, a homeuser’s address could contain an interface identifier that remains the same from one dial-up session to the next, even if the rest of theaddress changes. The way PPP is used today, however, PPP serverstypically unilaterally inform the client what address they are to use (i.e., the client doesn’t generate one on its own). This practice,if continued in IPv6, would avoid the concerns that are the focus of this document.A more troubling case concerns mobile devices (e.g., laptops, PDAs,etc.) that move topologically within the Internet. Whenever theymove, they form new addresses for their current topological point of attachment. This is typified today by the "road warrior" who hasInternet connectivity both at home and at the office. While thenode’s address changes as it moves, the interface identifiercontained within the address remains the same (when derived from anIEEE Identifier). In such cases, the interface identifier can beused to track the movement and usage of a particular machine. Forexample, a server that logs usage information together with sourceaddresses, is also recording the interface identifier since it isembedded within an address. Consequently, any data-mining technique that correlates activity based on addresses could easily be extended to do the same using the interface identifier. This is of particular concern with the expected proliferation of next-generation network-connected devices (e.g., PDAs, cell phones, etc.) in which largenumbers of devices are, in practice, associated with individual users (i.e., not shared). Thus, the interface identifier embedded withinan address could be used to track activities of an individual, evenas they move topologically within the Internet.Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]In summary, IPv6 addresses on a given interface generated viaStateless Autoconfiguration contain the same interface identifier,regardless of where within the Internet the device connects. Thisfacilitates the tracking of individual devices (and thus,potentially, users). The purpose of this document is to definemechanisms that eliminate this issue in those situations where it isa concern.2.4. Possible ApproachesOne way to avoid having a static non-changing address is to useDHCPv6 [DHCPV6] for obtaining addresses. Section 12 of [DHCPV6]discusses the use of DHCPv6 for the assignment and management of"temporary addresses", which are never renewed and provide the sameproperty of temporary addresses described in this document withregards to the privacy concern.Another approach, compatible with the stateless addressautoconfiguration architecture, would be to change the interfaceidentifier portion of an address over time and generate new addresses from the interface identifier for some address scopes. Changing the interface identifier can make it more difficult to look at the IPaddresses in independent transactions and identify which onesactually correspond to the same node, both in the case where therouting prefix portion of an address changes and when it does not.Many machines function as both clients and servers. In such cases,the machine would need a DNS name for its use as a server. Whetherthe address stays fixed or changes has little privacy implicationsince the DNS name remains constant and serves as a constantidentifier. When acting as a client (e.g., initiatingcommunication), however, such a machine may want to vary theaddresses it uses. In such environments, one may need multipleaddresses: a "public" (i.e., non-secret) server address, registeredin the DNS, that is used to accept incoming connection requests from other machines, and a "temporary" address used to shield the identity of the client when it initiates communication. These two cases areroughly analogous to telephone numbers and caller ID, where a usermay list their telephone number in the public phone book, but disable the display of its number via caller ID when initiating calls.To make it difficult to make educated guesses as to whether twodifferent interface identifiers belong to the same node, thealgorithm for generating alternate identifiers must include inputthat has an unpredictable component from the perspective of theoutside entities that are collecting information. Pickingidentifiers from a pseudo-random sequence suffices, so long as thespecific sequence cannot be determined by an outsider examining Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]information that is readily available or easily determinable (e.g.,by examining packet contents). This document proposes the generation of a pseudo-random sequence of interface identifiers via an MD5 hash. Periodically, the next interface identifier in the sequence isgenerated, a new set of temporary addresses is created, and theprevious temporary addresses are deprecated to discourage theirfurther use. The precise pseudo-random sequence depends on both arandom component and the globally unique interface identifier (whenavailable), to increase the likelihood that different nodes generate different sequences.3. Protocol DescriptionThe goal of this section is to define procedures that:1. Do not result in any changes to the basic behavior of addressesgenerated via stateless address autoconfiguration [ADDRCONF].2. Create additional addresses based on a random interfaceidentifier for the purpose of initiating outgoing sessions.These "random" or temporary addresses would be used for a shortperiod of time (hours to days) and would then be deprecated.Deprecated address can continue to be used for alreadyestablished connections, but are not used to initiate newconnections. New temporary addresses are generated periodically to replace temporary addresses that expire, with the exact timebetween address generation a matter of local policy.3. Produce a sequence of temporary global scope addresses from asequence of interface identifiers that appear to be random in the sense that it is difficult for an outside observer to predict afuture address (or identifier) based on a current one, and it is difficult to determine previous addresses (or identifiers)knowing only the present one.4. By default, generate a set of addresses from the same(randomized) interface identifier, one address for each prefixfor which a global address has been generated via statelessaddress autoconfiguration. Using the same interface identifierto generate a set of temporary addresses reduces the number of IP multicast groups a host must join. Nodes join the solicited-node multicast address for each unicast address they support, andsolicited-node addresses are dependent only on the low-order bits of the corresponding address. This default behavior was made to address the concern that a node that joins a large number ofmulticast groups may be required to put its interface intopromiscuous mode, resulting in possible reduced performance. Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]A node highly concerned about privacy MAY use different interface identifiers on different prefixes, resulting in a set of globaladdresses that cannot be easily tied to each other. For example a node MAY create different interface identifiers I1, I2, and I3 for use with different prefixes P1, P2, and P3 on the sameinterface.3.1. AssumptionsThe following algorithm assumes that each interface maintains anassociated randomized interface identifier. When temporary addresses are generated, the current value of the associated randomizedinterface identifier is used. While the same identifier can be used to create more than one temporary address, the value SHOULD changeover time as described in Section 3.5.The algorithm also assumes that, for a given temporary address, animplementation can determine the prefix from which it was generated. When a temporary address is deprecated, a new temporary address isgenerated. The specific valid and preferred lifetimes for the newaddress are dependent on the corresponding lifetime values set forthe prefix from which it was generated.Finally, this document assumes that when a node initiates outgoingcommunication, temporary addresses can be given preference overpublic addresses when the device is configured to do so.[ADDR_SELECT] mandates implementations to provide a mechanism, which allows an application to configure its preference for temporaryaddresses over public addresses. It also allows for animplementation to prefer temporary addresses by default, so that the connections initiated by the node can use temporary addresses without requiring application-specific enablement. This document alsoassumes that an API will exist that allows individual applications to indicate whether they prefer to use temporary or public addresses and override the system defaults.3.2. Generation of Randomized Interface IdentifiersWe describe two approaches for the generation and maintenance of the randomized interface identifier. The first assumes the presence ofstable storage that can be used to record state history for use asinput into the next iteration of the algorithm across systemrestarts. A second approach addresses the case where stable storage is unavailable and there is a need to generate randomized interfaceidentifiers without previous state.Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]The random interface identifier generation algorithm, as described in this document, uses MD5 as the hash algorithm. The node MAY useanother algorithm instead of MD5 to produce the random interfaceidentifier.3.2.1. When Stable Storage Is PresentThe following algorithm assumes the presence of a 64-bit "historyvalue" that is used as input in generating a randomized interfaceidentifier. The very first time the system boots (i.e., out-of-the- box), a random value SHOULD be generated using techniques that helpensure the initial value is hard to guess [RANDOM]. Whenever a newinterface identifier is generated, a value generated by thecomputation is saved in the history value for the next iteration ofthe algorithm.A randomized interface identifier is created as follows:1. Take the history value from the previous iteration of thisalgorithm (or a random value if there is no previous value) andappend to it the interface identifier generated as described in[ADDRARCH].2. Compute the MD5 message digest [MD5] over the quantity created in the previous step.3. Take the leftmost 64-bits of the MD5 digest and set bit 6 (theleftmost bit is numbered 0) to zero. This creates an interfaceidentifier with the universal/local bit indicating localsignificance only.4. Compare the generated identifier against a list of reservedinterface identifiers and to those already assigned to an address on the local device. In the event that an unacceptableidentifier has been generated, the node MUST restart the process at step 1 above, using the rightmost 64 bits of the MD5 digestobtained in step 2 in place of the history value in step 1.5. Save the generated identifier as the associated randomizedinterface identifier.6. Take the rightmost 64-bits of the MD5 digest computed in step 2) and save them in stable storage as the history value to be usedin the next iteration of the algorithm.Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]MD5 was chosen for convenience, and because its particular properties were adequate to produce the desired level of randomization. Thenode MAY use another algorithm instead of MD5 to produce the randominterface identifierIn theory, generating successive randomized interface identifiersusing a history scheme as above has no advantages over generatingthem at random. In practice, however, generating truly randomnumbers can be tricky. Use of a history value is intended to avoidthe particular scenario where two nodes generate the same randomized interface identifier, both detect the situation via DAD, but thenproceed to generate identical randomized interface identifiers viathe same (flawed) random number generation algorithm. The abovealgorithm avoids this problem by having the interface identifier(which will often be globally unique) used in the calculation thatgenerates subsequent randomized interface identifiers. Thus, if two nodes happen to generate the same randomized interface identifier,they should generate different ones on the follow-up attempt.3.2.2. In The Absence of Stable StorageIn the absence of stable storage, no history value will be available across system restarts to generate a pseudo-random sequence ofinterface identifiers. Consequently, the initial history value used above SHOULD be generated at random. A number of techniques might be appropriate. Consult [RANDOM] for suggestions on good sources forobtaining random numbers. Note that even though machines may nothave stable storage for storing a history value, they will in manycases have configuration information that differs from one machine to another (e.g., user identity, security keys, serial numbers, etc.).One approach to generating a random initial history value in suchcases is to use the configuration information to generate some databits (which may remain constant for the life of the machine, but will vary from one machine to another), append some random data, andcompute the MD5 digest as before.3.2.3. Alternate ApproachesNote that there are other approaches to generate random interfaceidentifiers, albeit with different goals and applicability. One such approach is Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) [CGA], which generate a random interface identifier based on the public key of the node. The goal of CGAs is to prove ownership of an address and toprevent spoofing and stealing of existing IPv6 addresses. They areused for securing neighbor discovery using [SEND]. The CGA randominterface identifier generation algorithm may not be suitable forprivacy addresses because of the following properties:Narten, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]。
中国电信“我的e家”技术规范―e家终端(e8)Technical standard for China Telecom “One Home” Service- Home Gateway (e8)(V3.0)2009-XX-XX发布2009-XX-XX实施目录前言 (IVIV)1 范围 (55)2 规范性引用文件 (55)3 缩略语 (77)4 设备总体定义 (88)4.1 设备在网络中的位置 (88)4.2 接口定义 (88)4.3 设备形态 (99)5 物理接口要求 (99)5.1 网络侧接口要求 (99)5.2 用户侧接口要求 (99)6 功能要求 (1010)6.1 网络协议及数据转发功能要求 (1010)6.2 WLAN AP功能要求 (1313)6.3 设备发现功能要求 (1515)6.4 业务发现和控制功能要求 (1515)6.5 VoIP语音功能处理要求 (1616)7 安全要求 (2323)7.1 网络访问的安全性 (2323)7.2 用户侧接口安全性 (2424)7.3 登录安全性 (2424)7.4 设备安全性 (2525)8 管理和维护要求............................ 错误!未定义书签。
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IXIA网络测试仪使用说明(仅供内部使用)格林耐特技术有限公司GreenNet Technologies Co., Ltd.版权所有侵权必究All rights reservedIXIA网络测试仪操作规程目录1. IXIA网络测试仪操作规程 ..................................................................... (3)2. IXIA网络测试仪使用说明 ..................................................................... (4)2.1. IXIA测试仪简介 ..................................................................... .......................................................4 2.2. 测试原理 ..................................................................... . (4)2.3. 硬件安装和配置 ..................................................................... . (5)2.3.1. 检查包装...................................................................... .. (5)2.3.2. 硬件连接...................................................................... .. (5)2.3.3. 配置TCP/IP协议 ..................................................................... ...........................................6 2.4. 软件安装 ..................................................................... . (7)2.5. 测试操作 ..................................................................... . (8)2.5.1. 1.测试注意事项...................................................................... ..............................................83. IxExplorer使用说明 ..................................................................... . (9)4. ScriptMate使用说明 ..................................................................... .. (11)4.1. RFC2544测试 ..................................................................... . (13)4.2. RFC2285测试 ..................................................................... . (14)4.2.1. RFC2285测试配置参数一览表 ..................................................................... ...................14 4.3. Advanced Tcl Script Suite(ATSS) ................................................................. .. (17)版权所有侵权必究 All Rights Reserved. Page 2 of 17IXIA网络测试仪操作规程1. IXIA网络测试仪操作规程为加强IXIA测试仪的使用管理,保障设备运行安全,提高设备的完好率和使用率,特制定本规程。
Network Working Group G. Bossert Request for Comments: 2084 S. Cooper Category: Informational Silicon Graphics Inc. W. Drummond IEEE, Inc. January 1997 Considerations for Web Transaction SecurityStatus of this MemoThis memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution ofthis memo is unlimited.AbstractThis document specifies the requirements for the provision ofsecurity services to the HyperText Transport Protocol. Theseservices include confidentiality, integrity, user authentication, and authentication of servers/services, including proxied or gatewayedservices. Such services may be provided as extensions to HTTP, or as an encapsulating security protocol. Secondary requirements includeease of integration and support of multiple mechanisms for providing these services.1. IntroductionThe use of the HyperText Transport Protocol [1] to providespecialized or commercial services and personal or private datanecessitates the development of secure versions that include privacy and authentication services. Such services may be provided asextensions to HTTP, or as encapsulating security protocols; for thepurposes of this document, all such enhancements will be referred to as WTS.In this document, we specify the requirements for WTS, with theintent of codifying perceived Internet-wide needs, along withexisting practice, in a way that aids in the evaluation anddevelopment of such protocols.Bossert, et. al. Informational [Page 1]WTS is an enhancement to an object transport protocol. As such, itdoes not provide independent certification of documents or other data objects outside of the scope of the transfer of said objects. Inaddition, security at the WTS layer is independent of and orthogonal to security services provided at underlying network layers. It isenvisioned that WTS may coexist in a single transaction with suchmechanisms, each providing security services at the appropriatelevel, with at worst some redundancy of service.1.1 TerminologyThis following terms have specific meaning in the context of thisdocument. The HTTP specification [1] defines additional usefulterms.Transaction:A complete HTTP action, consisting of a request from theclient and a response from the server.Gatewayed Service:A service accessed, via HTTP or an alternate protocol, by theHTTP server on behalf of the client.Mechanism:An specific implementation of a protocol or related subset offeatures of a protocol.2. General RequirementsWTS must define the following services. These services must beprovided independently of each other and support the needs of proxies and intermediarieso Confidentiality of the HTTP request and/or response.o Data origin authentication and data integrity of the HTTP request and/or response.o Non-repudiability of origin for the request and/or response.o Transmission freshness of request and/or response.o Ease of integration with other features of HTTP.o Support of multiple mechanisms for the above services.3. ConfidentialityWTS must be able to provide confidentiality for both requests andresponses. Note: because the identity of the object being requested is potentially sensitive, the URI of the request should beconfidential; this is particularly critical in the common case ofform data or other user input being passed in the URI.Bossert, et. al. Informational [Page 2]4. Service AuthenticationWTS should support the authentication of gatewayed services to theclient.WTS should support the authentication of the origin HTTP server orgatewayed services regardless of intermediary proxy or cachingservers.To allow user privacy, WTS must support service authentication withuser anonymity.Because the identity of the object being requested is potentiallysensitive, service authentication should occur before any part of the request, including the URI of the requested object, is passed. Incases where the authentication process depends on the URI (or otherheader data) of the request, such as gatewayed services, the minimum necessary information to identify the entity to be authenticatedshould be passed.5. User AuthenticationWTS must support the authentication of the client to the server.WTS should support the authentication of the client to gatewayedservices.WTS should support the authentication of the client to the originHTTP server regardless of intermediary proxy servers.6. IntegrityWTS must provide assurance of the integrity of the HTTP transaction, including the HTTP headers and data objects of both client requestsand server responses.7. IntegrationIn order to support integration with current and future versions ofHTTP, and to provide extendibility and independence of development,the secure services provided by WTS must be orthogonal to andindependent of other services provided by HTTP.Bossert, et. al. Informational [Page 3]In accordance with the layered model of network protocols, WTS mustbe:o independent of the content or nature of data objects beingtransported although special attention to reference integrity ofhyperlinked objects may be appropriateo implementable over a variety of connection schemes andunderlying transport protocols8. Multiple MechanismsWTS must be compatible with multiple mechanisms for authenticationand encryption. Support for multiple mechanisms is required for anumber of reasons:o Accommodation of variations in site policies, including thosedue to external restrictions on the availability ofcryptographic technologies.o Support for a variety of applications and gatewayed services.o Support for parallel implementations within and acrossadministrative domains.o Accomodation of application-specific performance/securitytradeoffs.To allow interoperability across domains, and to support thetransition to new/upgraded mechanisms, WTS should provide negotiation of authentication and encryption mechanisms.Bossert, et. al. Informational [Page 4]References[1] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and H. Frystyk Nielsen,"Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0", RFC 1945,May 1996.[2] G. Bossert, S. Cooper, W. Drummond. "Requirements of SecureObject Transfer Protocols", Work in Progress<URL:/www-security/draft/draft-rutgers-sotp-requirements-00.txt>, March 1995.The revision history of this document can be located at<URL:/csp/wts-wg/wts-documents.html> AcknowledgmentsThis document is a product of the IETF WTS working group. Theworking group uses the wts-wg@ mailing list fordiscussion. The subscription address is wts-wg-request@.Eric Rescorla of Terisa <ekr@> provided valuable commentson an early draft of a document called "Requirements of Secure Object Transfer" [2], a principal influence on this document.Security ConsiderationsAs noted above.Bossert, et. al. Informational [Page 5]Authors’ AddressesGreg BossertSilicon Graphics, Inc. MS 15-72011 North Shoreline Blvd.Mountain View, CA 94043-1389USAEMail: bossert@Simon CooperSilicon Graphics, Inc. MS 15-72011 North Shoreline Blvd.Mountain View, CA 94043-1389USAEMail: sc@Walt DrummondInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.445 Hoes LanePiscataway, NJ 08855-1331USAPhone: 908-562-6545Fax: 908-562-1727EMail: drummond@Bossert, et. al. Informational [Page 6]。