分众传媒FMCN研究
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浑水公司做空案例研究研究背景:近期国内媒体对浑水公司做空中概股的事件频频报道,特别是国内知名的楼宇媒体运营商分众传媒在11月也遭浑水狙击后,在媒体的渲染下,浑水俨然成为了一个蒙着神秘面纱的“中概股杀手”。
在成熟的美国资本市场,做空机构是整个资本市场生态系统中不可或缺的一部分,他们发挥了价值纠错的功能。
而我们信托公司作为专业的财富管理机构,除了要有一双价值发现的“慧眼”,更需要有一双价值纠错的“火眼”,从而避免普通投资者容易陷入的价值陷阱。
因此,我们希望从财务的角度,以普通的常识和逻辑去撩开浑水这张神秘的面纱,为我们的业务提供具有一定价值的线索。
1. 概览我们研读了浑水公司对ONP(orient paper inc. 东方纸业)、RINO(绿诺环保)、CCME(中国高速频道)TRE(嘉汉林业)以及FMCN(分众传媒)的调查报告并且就这些报告中提到的问题对公司财报、网站以及个别信息在网络上按正常的逻辑初步求证,认为浑水做空的公司分为三类:第一类是类似安然的庞氏骗局公司,如嘉汉林业;第二类是有一定经营实体但恶意造假的垃圾公司,如东方纸业、绿诺环保及中国高速频道;第三类是投资行为和财务报表存在一定疑问和疏漏,或者盈利模式、财税制度存在被误读的正常经营的公司,如分众传媒、展讯通信以及被香橼(CITRON)负面评级的奇虎360。
2. 浑水做空纪录2010年6月28日,浑水公司的香港办事处于九龙尖沙咀柯士甸道122号丽斯广场19层D室登记注册。
2010年6月28日,该机构发布了一份有关东方纸业的报告,明确指出东方纸业存在严重的欺诈行为。
2010年11月10日,浑水公司发布了一份研究报告,公开质疑绿诺科技存在欺诈行为。
2010年12月3日,大连绿诺环境工程科技有限公司收到美国纳斯达克市场的退市通知。
2011年2月3日,浑水公司发布做空中国高速频道的报告。
2011年4月4日,浑水公司发布多元环球水务的做空报告。
2011年4月21日,多元环球水务被纽约股票交易所停盘。
分众传媒分析报告1. 背景介绍分众传媒是一家中国领先的户外传媒公司,成立于2003年。
公司主要从事户外广告牌、公交车广告、电梯广告等传媒形式的销售和推广。
该公司在中国市场占据了重要地位,并且在海外也有一定的业务拓展。
本文将对分众传媒进行详细的分析,以深入了解该公司的业务模式、竞争优势和未来发展前景。
2. 业务模式分析分众传媒通过与房地产开发商、交通运输公司以及其他广告客户的合作,将广告牌、公交车广告等媒体资源出租或销售给客户。
该公司的主要收入来源是广告销售和租赁。
分众传媒通过自有媒体资源和与其他媒体资源提供商的合作,形成了庞大的户外媒体网络,为广告客户提供了广告展示的渠道。
3. 竞争优势分析分众传媒在中国的广告市场拥有一定的竞争优势。
其主要竞争优势包括: - 广告资源优势:分众传媒在全国范围内拥有大量的广告资源,包括广告牌、公交车广告等。
这些广告资源的分布广泛,能够覆盖到不同地区的潜在消费者。
- 客户合作关系:分众传媒与众多房地产开发商、交通运输公司以及其他广告客户建立了长期稳定的合作关系。
这些合作关系在一定程度上保证了公司的收入稳定性。
- 团队专业素质:分众传媒拥有一支经验丰富、专业素质高的团队。
他们具有市场调研、广告策划和销售等方面的专业知识和技能,能够为客户提供全方位的广告解决方案。
4. 市场前景展望分众传媒作为中国领先的户外传媒公司,未来的市场前景十分广阔。
以下是未来发展的几个趋势和机遇: - 数字化转型:随着科技的发展,传统户外广告正在逐渐数字化。
分众传媒可以通过数字化转型,为客户提供更加精准的广告投放和数据分析服务。
- 地理扩张:分众传媒在海外市场也有一定的业务拓展。
未来,公司可以继续在国内外市场扩大业务规模,进一步提高市场份额。
- 创新广告形式:随着人们对广告的接受度下降,创新广告形式将成为未来的发展趋势。
分众传媒可以通过开发新的广告形式,吸引更多广告客户并获得竞争优势。
5. 风险与挑战在市场发展过程中,分众传媒也面临一些风险和挑战: - 竞争加剧:随着市场的发展,竞争对手不断增多,市场竞争压力也越来越大。
分众传媒深度调研报告分众传媒深度调研报告分众传媒作为中国领先的户外媒体公司,一直以来受到市场的关注。
本文基于对分众传媒的深度调研,总结出以下几点结论。
首先,分众传媒拥有广泛的媒体资源。
通过收购和合作,分众传媒已经建立了较为完善的户外媒体网络,涵盖了全国多个城市的公交车站、地铁站、商业区等热门场所,为广告主提供了广泛的覆盖面。
而且,分众传媒还积极拓展数字媒体业务,通过线上渠道吸引了更多有潜力的广告主。
这使得分众传媒在市场竞争中具备一定的优势。
其次,分众传媒有着良好的品牌形象和口碑。
通过持续的品牌建设和市场推广,分众传媒在行业内享有较高的知名度和美誉度。
广告主普遍认可分众传媒的专业能力和服务质量,愿意选择与其合作。
这种良好的品牌形象和口碑为分众传媒吸引了更多的广告资源,进一步增强了其市场竞争力。
第三,分众传媒致力于创新和技术升级。
随着科技发展,媒体行业变革已成为不可逆转的趋势。
分众传媒深入洞察市场需求,不断引入最新的技术和创新的媒体形式,提升媒体传播效果。
例如,分众传媒推出的智能互动广告牌以及人脸识别技术的应用,极大地提高了广告的曝光率和投放的精准度。
这种积极的创新和技术升级为分众传媒赢得了更多的市场份额。
最后,分众传媒重视社会责任和可持续发展。
作为一家社会企业,分众传媒不仅致力于为广告主提供有效的推广平台,也积极关注环境保护和公益事业。
分众传媒参与了多个公益项目,通过将公益广告纳入媒体资源,为社会传递正能量。
这种注重社会责任和可持续发展的理念,不仅对分众传媒自身形象有益,也为其赢得了更多的社会支持。
综上所述,分众传媒在市场竞争中凭借广泛的媒体资源、良好的品牌形象和口碑、创新的技术和持续的社会责任,取得了一定的竞争优势。
然而,随着市场的不断变化和竞争的加剧,分众传媒也需要不断提升自己的服务质量和创新能力,以应对日益激烈的市场竞争。
i美股投资研报--分众传媒(2010二季度版)一、分众传媒概况分众传媒2003年5月由江南春在上海创立,2005年7月通过ADR方式在美国纳斯达克上市。
上市每股ADS发行价17美元,1ADS=5普通股。
分众历史最高股价出现在2007年11月,达到65美元;最低股价出现在2008年10月,仅为4.8美元。
当前股价徘徊在20美元左右,市值为29.5亿美元。
分众传媒是中国户外视频广告的最早试水者,目前也是中国户外电子屏广告市场最大占有者,2009年市场份额为30%。
其核心业务包括商业楼宇联播网(包括影院广告网络)、电梯海报框架网络与卖场终端联播网;非核心业务为传统户外大牌(包括LED等)。
2009年全年财报显示,江南春通过全资拥有的JJ媒体投资控股有限公司(JJ Media Investment Holding Limited)拥有分众传媒19.33%股份。
不过介于2010年9月9日江南春同意出售810万股分众传媒ADS,其占有股份将下降到13.8%。
分众传媒在英属开曼群岛注册,全资拥有在港注册的分众中国及Hua Kuang广告公司,其中分众中国直接管理诸多在中国开展业务的子公司和关联公司,其结构框架如下:(图片来源:SEC文件)2005年上市之后,分众传媒通过对框架传媒与聚众传媒两起并购,迅速占领中国电梯与楼宇广告市场,市场份额均超过90%。
随后通过系列并购进入手机、互联网广告市场,市值与股价随之一路飙涨。
不过随着2008年金融危机到来,分众遭遇重挫,总体业绩呈下滑趋势,并连续5季度亏损。
截止目前,分众已停止手机业务,并将互联网业务(好耶)出售给SilverLake,全面回归三大核心业务。
二、分众传媒文化1.江南春治下分众从事广告出身的江南春是分众创始人,也是其灵魂人物。
在分众发展过程中,江南春以其狂飙突进的风格将分众打造成一家“市场营销驱动型公司”,并通过系统化培训组织起强势营销团队。
这支团队在随后分众扩张中快速攻城略地,占领商务楼宇等行业细分市场大片空白,并直接促成其在美上市。
分众传媒境内借壳上市的经验与启示作者:姚永红来源:《现代经济信息》 2018年第10期姚永红广东财经大学华商学院摘要: 2015 年 12 月 28 日,分众传媒顺利借壳七喜控股,成功登陆深圳证券交易所中小板,成为了首家成功完成境外退市和中国境内借壳上市的中概股企业。
分众传媒成功回归 A 股的案例,无疑是对众多已经完成私有化进程并在境外退市正准备回归中国 A 股的中概股们起到了极大的鼓舞作用。
本文通过对分众传媒借壳上市的案例进行深入分析,总结得出分众传媒此次借壳七喜控股的成功上市的几点经验与启示。
关键词:中国概念股;借壳上市;经验中图分类号:F271 文献识别码:A 文章编号: 1001-828X(2018)015-0039-02一、案例背景介绍( 一 ) 分众传媒介绍分众传媒信息技术股份有限公司 ( 简称为“分众传媒”) 成立于 2003 年 5 月,是面向都市主流消费人群而成立的数字化媒体平台,是中国领先的数字化媒体集团。
2005 年 7 月 13 日,分众传戴着中国海外上市的纯广告传媒第一股的光环登陆美国纳斯达克,其股票代码为FMCN,且以 1.72 亿美元的募资额创造了当时中国企业在境外 IPO 的记录。
分众传媒登录美国纳斯达克后,凭借着宏厚的资本优势,先后收购了框架媒介、聚众传媒、北京凯威点告公司、动力传媒和好耶公司等。
在经过多年的苦心经营后,通过整合资源,逐步形成了拥有商业楼宇视频媒体、公寓电梯媒体 ( 框架媒体 )、户外大型 LED 彩屏媒体等多个针对目标受众的有机整合媒体平台。
( 二 ) 分众传媒借壳上市事件回顾2012 年 8 月 13 日,分众传媒对外正式宣布,已收到江南春等发起的私有化要约,价值预计总金额达 35 亿美元。
2013 年 5 月 25 日,分众传媒对外再次宣布,公司正式完成私有化,成为了私人持股公司。
2015 年 6 月 2 日,宏达新材发布重大资产重组预案。
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分众传媒战略分析
2005年7月,分众传媒控股有限公司,中国最大的户外视频广告运营商,正式在美国纳斯达克市场挂牌交易,代码为FMCN.。
以下就是对分众传媒战略分析的详细介绍。
分众传媒战略分析
2005年7月,分众传媒控股有限公司,中国最大的户外视频广告运营商,正式在美国纳斯达克市场挂牌交易,代码为FMCN.。
分众传媒因此成为首家登陆美国纳斯达克市场的中国纯广告传媒股票。
分众传媒仅仅用了两年半的时间,就打造出一个遍布国内40多个城市,20000栋楼宇,日覆盖3000万中高收入阶层的楼宇电视广告网络,月营收超过4000万元,成为十几年来中国新媒体市场的传奇。
据招股书披露,这次融资最高额度可达1亿美元。
根据招股书每股14美元到16美元的定价,分众的市值有望达到6亿美元。
分众传媒在行业内的竞争优势是什么?在分众传奇的背后,我们找到了支撑这个传奇的竞争战略。
定位战略
这几年,中国社会的最大改变就是城市中产阶层(月收入3000~10000元)迅速形成和崛起,财富阶层(月收入10000元以上)正迅速扩大化和年轻化。
阶层的划分由此带来这
1。
广告之分众传媒报告广告之分众传媒报告1.宏观层面:渠道和时长分流减弱,梯媒广告需求有望复苏本章探讨影响分众的中长期因素,经济波动影响广告主预算总量,零售渠道建设和用户时长分配决定广告主预算配比。
分众处于梯媒的细分赛道,品牌性受益于线上线下零售渠道构建进入成熟期,以及商务时长的独立性,因此在预算分配的竞争上挤压因素放缓,作为品牌广告的重要阵地之一的梯媒需求有望复苏。
品牌性特征:零售渠道构建成熟下,品牌广告有望回升,对比中美两国历史广告强度波动,我们发现渠道建设同样会对广告投入形成替代效应,线上零售渠道快速发展期,效果广告可视为渠道投入,因此对品牌广告形成抑制。
当前线上零售渠道构建成熟下,品牌广告在预算集中的价值得到提升。
娱乐和商务时长相对独立:互联网用户时长实际上更多从娱乐时长对该广告主预算侵占,传媒电视等娱乐媒体收到的冲击较大,而分众作为商务时长主要驱动力来自城镇化和商务活动的增加,可以看到公司的点位价值,已经实现显著提升。
综上,预算分配中关键的渠道竞争和时长竞争要素的负面影响已经减弱,宏观经济波动对分众收入的影响可以进一步通过中观产业的跟踪进行预判。
1.1渠道构建:零售渠道变革或是被忽视的重要变量我们尝试从美国1919年以来的数据和国内1990年以来的数据进行回溯,探讨广告强度的影响变量。
宏观经济波动、线下零售渠道的建设以及品牌广告媒介形式都对广告强度产生了影响。
从国内的发展阶段来看,电商作为2012年以后的重要零售渠道,增加了以效果广告形式为核心的广告投入,品牌广告的比例或反映线上零售渠道快速建设期的特征。
站在当前时点,我们认为线上+线下零售渠道已经成熟,渠道投入稳定下,边际上品牌投放受到的挤压将减弱,后期品牌投入有望加强。
1.1.1对比中美两国:渠道快速建设期都抑制品牌广告需求通过对美国1919年以来广告行业数据回溯,我们发现宏观经济、零售渠道的变革以及品牌媒介的形式对品牌广告的投入强调影响显著,其中零售渠道快速构建的时期我们都看到广告市场占宏观GDP比例的下降,反映渠道建设与广告投入的竞争关系。
对外经济贸易大学硕士学位论文论分众传媒经营战略的成功姓名:赵欣申请学位级别:硕士专业:高级管理人员工商管理指导教师:刘子安20070401序言分众传媒在短短四年时间里,不仅谱写了一个传媒业界的神话,而且创造了一个中国民营企业发展史上的奇迹。
作为分众传媒在北京的总代理,四年多来我亲身经历了分众创业、发展、扩张的整个过程,并参与了其中的一些重要决策的制定和执行。
在对外经贸大学国际商学院的学习,使我有机会借助理论的指导系统总结、梳理这几年经营、发展的心得。
通过剖析分众传媒四年的发展历程中经营战略的运用,探求其创业的成功战略,进行逐一的分析与归纳,可以发现分众传媒成功的经验,以对中国民营广告企业的发展有所启迪。
通过分析分众传媒发展过程中的问题,寻求解决的方法,可以促进分众传媒进一步规范发展。
通过对分众传媒发展趋势的探讨、预测,可以研究、思考分众传媒这一个案对广告营销理论和实践的影响,对传媒业划时代发展的重要价值,对中国民营企业发展的典型意义。
由于本人理论功底的薄弱以及实践经验的不足,本文的写作肯定会有一些值得商榷的地方,中国民营企业发展本身就是在争议中前行的。
因此,希望各位老师和同仁不吝赐教,多多提出批评指导意见,这不仅有利于我学术论文的完善,很多意见和建议也将会指导我的企业以及分众传媒今后的发展!中文提要市场经济条件下的企业要参与竞争,就要在竞争中讲究方略,企业竞争的方略就是企业战略。
本文以分众传媒的历史发展为基础,重点分析探讨分众传媒的企业成功战略及其对中国广告业和民营企业发展的影响与启示,并提出一些自己个人的认识和具体建议。
本文写作的目的就是希望通过应用所学理论研究实践、通过对分众发展的回顾与总结,一方面从中抽象企业发展经营的成功战略,另一方面也用以指导自己今后企业的战略经营。
自2003年创始以来,分众传媒已成为中国最大的户外视频广告运营商,除此之外,它还将触角延伸到了新业务手机广告领域,形成了拥有商业楼宇视频媒体,卖场终端视频媒体、公寓电梯平面媒体框架媒介、户外大型LED彩屏媒体、手机无线广告媒体、分众直销商务嗍媒体及数据库营销渠道等多个针对特征受众、并可以相互有机整合的媒体网络。
分众传媒研究报告
分众传媒(Focus Media)是中国领先的房地产电梯媒体运营
公司,成立于2003年。
该公司以电梯媒体广告为核心业务,
通过在全国各大城市高档住宅小区和商业办公大楼的电梯内设置广告屏幕,向目标受众传递广告信息。
分众传媒的研究报告主要包括以下几个方面的内容:
1.公司概况:介绍分众传媒的发展历程、组织结构、经营模式
等基本信息,为投资者提供全面的了解;同时还可以包括公司的财务状况、市场地位等信息。
2.行业分析:分析电梯媒体行业的发展趋势、竞争格局和市场
规模等,为投资者提供行业背景和市场机会的参考。
3.运营情况:分析分众传媒的运营情况,包括广告屏幕的布局、投放范围和频次等,以及广告资源和客户结构等信息,给投资者提供关于公司运营模式和盈利能力的评估。
4.市场前景:对未来几年电梯媒体行业的发展趋势进行预测,
包括市场规模的预测和市场份额的分析等,为投资者提供对该行业前景的判断。
5.风险提示:对分众传媒面临的风险进行分析和评估,包括市
场竞争风险、政策风险和经营风险等,为投资者提供风险控制的建议。
6.投资建议:根据对公司运营情况和市场前景的分析,给出投资建议,包括买入、持有或卖出等,以及目标股价和投资时机等。
总之,分众传媒的研究报告应该全面、客观、准确地反映公司的运营情况和市场前景,帮助投资者做出明智的投资决策。
分众传媒再掀退市风?作者:刘夏雨来源:《中国经济周刊》2012年第34期8月13日,中国最大的数字媒体集团分众传媒(FMCN.NQ)宣布,已收到包括董事会主席江南春在内的联合体发起的无约束性私有化要约。
分众传媒此次私有化交易规模预计达35亿美元,若交易成功,分众传媒将成为继阿里巴巴和盛大之后,最大一起中国概念股私有化交易。
此次私有化要约的价格为每股美国存托股(ADS)27美元。
截至记者8月22日发稿前,分众传媒股价在纳斯达克市场报25.22美元,较前一交易日上涨0.2%。
被低估、水土不服2005年7月13日,仅成立两年、以商业楼宇广告起家的分众传媒登陆纳斯达克,以1.72亿美元募资额创造了当时的IPO纪录。
连续收购60余家公司等一系列资本运作,分众传媒股价持续上涨。
2007年,分众传媒的股价由每股17美元的发行价一度冲高至每股65美元。
2005—2007年,分众传媒实现了由6.6亿美元到60亿美元的9倍市值增长。
2008年下半年,受金融危机影响,分众传媒股价最低跌到4.8美元,市值仅12亿美元左右。
2011年11月,美国做空机构浑水(MuddyWaters)接连针对分众传媒发出5份研究报告,认为分众传媒在数码液晶屏幕统计上存在夸大,为收购支付过高对价,并给出“强烈卖出”评级。
受此影响,分众传媒股价一度跌至9美元,跌幅超过60%。
此次私有化是否跟浑水做空有关?分众传媒方面予以否认:“在宣布私有化之前,分众传媒的股价已经回到了做空前的25美元,和浑水做空没有关系。
”“分众传媒选择私有化,我并不惊讶,目前分众传媒的市盈率(PE)在10倍左右,这么低的市盈率,价值明显被低估。
”一位外资投行的高管表示。
分众传媒目前的PE为10.32倍,相比A股市场近40倍PE的传媒股,现在总市值在35亿美元(约222亿元人民币)的分众传媒,如果在A股上市,市值很有可能达到600亿~800亿元人民币。
“美国没有分众传媒这种楼宇广告商业模式,所以美股投资者不理解分众传媒的运营。
《市场时机、海外上市与中概股回归——基于分众传媒的案例研究》篇一一、引言随着中国经济的快速发展,资本市场日益成为企业发展的重要舞台。
市场时机的把握、海外上市以及中概股的回归,都是企业发展的重要策略。
本文以分众传媒为例,深入探讨这些策略的实践与影响。
二、市场时机的把握分众传媒作为一家中国领先的广告传媒公司,其成功在很大程度上归因于对市场时机的精准把握。
在广告市场持续繁荣的背景下,分众传媒通过深入了解市场需求,创新广告模式,实现了快速发展。
同时,公司也积极关注政策环境变化,以便在合适的时机进行战略调整。
三、海外上市的决策与实施为了扩大企业规模、提升品牌影响力并获取更多资金支持,分众传媒选择了海外上市。
这一决策的背后,是对全球资本市场环境的深刻理解和准确判断。
公司通过精心准备,成功在海外资本市场上市,吸引了大量国际资本的关注和投资。
海外上市不仅为分众传媒带来了资金支持,还提高了公司的国际知名度。
同时,海外资本市场严格的监管环境也促使公司提升治理水平,增强透明度。
四、中概股回归的考虑与策略随着中国资本市场的日益成熟和开放,分众传媒开始考虑中概股回归的策略。
回归国内资本市场,可以更好地服务中国市场,获取更多政策支持和资源整合机会。
同时,回归也有助于提升公司在中国投资者心中的形象和信任度。
分众传媒在回归过程中,采取了多种策略。
首先,公司积极与政府、监管机构沟通,了解政策动向和市场需求。
其次,公司加强了与国内投资者的沟通,提升品牌影响力。
最后,公司还通过并购、合作等方式,整合资源,提升竞争力。
五、案例分析分众传媒的成功实践表明,企业要实现快速发展和壮大,需要关注以下几个方面:1. 精准把握市场时机:企业应时刻关注市场需求和政策环境变化,以便在合适的时机进行战略调整。
2. 海外上市的机遇与挑战:企业应根据自身情况和全球资本市场环境,审慎选择海外上市的时机和地点。
同时,要应对海外市场的文化和法律差异带来的挑战。
3. 中概股回归的考虑与策略:企业应关注国内资本市场的发展趋势和政策动向,制定合理的回归策略。
Note: You should assume we have a short position in FMCN as of this report – prior to reading this reportsee important disclaimer on the last page (page 9).FMCN: Reiterating Strong SellMuddy Waters, LLCFebruary 9, 2012 Muddy Waters was Right about FMCN’s LCD Network Overstatement;Independent Verification Counted Cardboard Posters Instead of LCDsWeak Attempt at Jedi Mind Trick ExposedIn our November 21, 2011 report on FMCN, we accused management of fraudulently overstating the size of its LCD Network. FMCN had previously defined the LCD Network as a “network of flat-panel television displays.” FMCN first vehemently denied our charges that it overstated the LCD Network size, and then independently “verified” that its previously reported number of 185,174 LCD Network displays was correct. However, over 30,500 of those “verified” displays are not LCD televisions at all – rather, they are mere cardboard posters. Not only does this mean that FMCN management was brazenly lying to investors in the wake of our report, but the lies sharply call into question the veracity of FMCN’s reported financials. We estimate that each LCD television generates monthly revenue seven times that of a cardboard poster. Separately, on November 29, 2011 we pointed out that FMCN had previously grossly lied about the size of its movie theater advertising network. FMCN’s recent attempt to explain away that lie is almost as ridiculous as its conflation of cardboard with LCDs. The implication for investors is that if the inputs to the financials (network sizes) are lies, then why wouldn’t the outputs (revenue and profit) also be lies? As the old saying goes, “garbage in, garbage out.”Muddy Waters was Right All AlongIndependent “verification” proves Muddy Waters was correct when we concluded FMCN lied about the size of its LCD Commercial Display Network. In order for FMCN to meet its disclosed numbers, it had to include approximately 30,500 cardboard posters in its LCD display network count. In other words, per FMCN’s own verified data, over 15% of FMCN’s LCD network consists not of LCDs – but of cardboard.FMCN’s prior disclosures on its network make no allowance for cardboard displays. FMCN wrote the following in its 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 20-Fs:“Our L CD d isplay n etwork, w hich r efers t o o ur n etwork o f f lat-‐paneltelevision d isplays p laced…”11 2010 20-F pp. 38-9, 2009 20-F p. 36, 2008 20-F p. 35, 2007 20-F p.33.FMCN has made it unambiguous that “LCD” means Liquid Crystal – not Light Cardboard – Display. At least that was the case before Muddy Waters exposed FMCN’s fraud.(Based on strong evidence Muddy Waters still believes FMCN separately double counted another 32,500 Digital 2.0 displays from the poster frame segment as “LCD 2.0 Digital Picture Screens” under the LCD Network segment in order to get to its “verified” number.)We reiterate. In order to rebut Muddy Waters’s conclusion that FMCN overstated the size of its LCD Commercial Display Network, FMCN had to include 30,500 of the cardboard objects shown in the below picture (from FMCN’s website):Therefore, even putting aside the issue of whether FMCN double-counted some (actual) LCDs, FMCN overstated the size of its LCD Commercial Display Network. Muddy Waters was correct from the beginning.FMCN attempted to pull a Jedi mind trick by referring to the roughly 30,500 cardboard posters as “LCD 1.0 picture frame devices.” It strikes us that only a management with a significant degree of contempt for its shareholders would attempt to pass off a piece of cardboard as an LCD television. However, this is the same management that: •told investors its movie theater network was 17.6x the number of movie theatersin existence in China. (We discuss management’s almost-as-ridiculousjustification for this lie infra.)•traded in and out of Allyes, causing substantial losses to shareholders while generating tens of millions in profit for insiders and their friends (explaining that such insider gains were necessary to incentivize management, including soon-to-join members).• claimed to have acquired six SMS advertising companies that it in fact did not.2•Took Olympus style acquisition write downs of $1.1 billion on $1.6 billion in acquisitions.FMCN’s management either believes that investors are stupid, or that its Jedi powers are overwhelming.Muddy Waters was 100% correct that FMCN deliberately overstated the size of its LCD network. In FMCN’s responses to our reports, FMCN management has purposely deceived shareholders and analysts by including cardboard posters in the LCD count. We intend to bring this outrage to the attention of the SEC, but in the meantime we suggest FMCN now describe this network in its filings and communications as the “LCD and Cardboard Display Network.”Hidden in Plain Sight – How FMCN Used Cardboard Posters to Make its LCD NumberRemember when we asked whether independent verification in China is better than toilet paper?3 FMCN has provided its own resounding response of “NO!”On January 6th, 2012 FMCN announced that Ipsos Marketing Company completed a full count of FMCN’s LCD display network, and that FMCN currently has 185,174 displays in the network.4The problem is that 30,542 of these LCD displays aren’t LCDs at all – they’re just simple cardboard posters. FMCN ludicrously labeled these posters “LCD 1.0 picture frame devices” in five of its responses to our first report.5 In addition to cardboard having no meaningful characteristics in common with an LCD,6 a cardboard poster can hardly be called a “device.”2 FMCN claimed to have acquired parties to VIE agreements with these handset advertisers, but for numerous reasons outlined in our November 21st report, this explanation does not hold water.3 MW December 9, 2011 report reiterating Strong Sell on FMCN.4 /phoenix.zhtml?c=190067&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1645519&highlight=5 2011: November 22 & 29, December 14 & 22; January 6, 2012.6 It’s arguably noteworthy that both contain carbon atoms.“When I use a word’” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather ascornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean –neither more nor less.”7On January 6, 2012, FMCN filed the 2nd amendment to its 2010 20-F. In the amendment, FMCN discusses the inclusion of the “LCD 1.0 picture frame devices” in its LCD network size count. FMCN then tells us in the amended 20-F that these are really just cardboard posters. There are numerous references to this surprising fact throughout the filing, but the most telling is:Advertisements on our poster frame network and LCD 1.0 picture frame deviceson our LCD display network consist of full-color glossy advertising postersdesigned and provided by our advertising clients.8Note that in the above disclosure, FMCN is stating that the “LCD display network” contains cardboard posters. In other words, FMCN has valmorphanized9 cardboard into LCD. Who does that???!!!FMCN’s excuse for why it gets to call cardboard by the name “LCD” is similarly laughable. FMCN claims it used the cardboard posters instead of LCDs in these 30,500 locations because adequate power to run LCD televisions was unavailable.10 (Interestingly this problem only occurs in the well-developed Tier 2 cities of Tianjin,7 Humpty Dumpty quote and illustration from Carroll, Lewis Through the Looking Glass (1872).8 2nd Amended 2010 20-F, filed January 20, 2012, p. 46.9 /define.php?term=valmorification10 2nd Amended 2010 20-F, filed January 20, 2012, p. 42, and see FMCN November 29, 2011 press releaseKunming, and Shijiazhuang,11 which have a combined population of 29.4 million12) Because these posters were installed by the LCD division, which really, really wanted to put TVs in there but (goshdarnit!) wasn’t able to, FMCN think it’s justifiable to label the posters “LCD 1.0” “devices” and include them in the LCD network count.FMCN missed its opportunity to make clear that it had cardboard posters in its LCD count prior to:•calling Muddy Waters’s conclusion that FMCN overstates its LCD Network size “unfounded”,13•spending shareholder money on two “verifications” of its LCD network size when management knew that at least 30,500 of the “LCDs” were really cardboard, and thus contradicted FMCN’s own well-established definition of “LCD”, and •threatening to sue Muddy Waters.14Putting the above behavior aside, FMCN’s purported reason for installing cardboard posters instead of LCD TVs (lack of adequate power) is obviously yet another lie.A 17-inch LCD consumes peak power of approximately 20 watts.15 A typical elevator will draw upward of 50,000 watts during operation.16 (20 watts is 0.04% of 50,000 watts.) Moreover, even a tiny elevator (5’ x 5’) would require a 40-watt light bulb to light its interior.17How on God’s great earth could FMCN not find adequate power for an LCD television in either the elevator or elevator lobby? Are these posters in mine shafts?It is unreasonable to believe that FMCN’s LCD division, with its expertise honed from installing and maintaining over 100,000 real LCDs, could not find power sources for 30,500 LCDs in three Tier 2 cities. The real reason FMCN counted 30,500 cardboard posters in the LCD network is that Muddy Waters caught the company with its pants down, and management is now trying to lie its way out of trouble.So yes, when an independent report (supposedly) verifying the size of a flat-panel television network includes over 30,500 cardboard posters in its count, the report’s contents are as valueless as non-commercial excrement. Excrement, along with a study concluding FMCN didn’t overstate its network size, is better contained in soft colorless toilet paper.11 /phoenix.zhtml?c=190067&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1634311&highlight=12 13 /phoenix.zhtml?c=190067&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1632858&highlight=14 See FMCN’s January 6th and 9th press releases explaining that its acquisition of a ginseng farm was nothing more than a (dodgy) tax shelter.15 /en_US/product-and-parts/detail.page?&LegacyDocID=MIGR-7193016 /downloads/10KTechGuide.pdf17 Assuming a lighting requirement of 15 lumens / sq. ft. (375 lumens), one would need a General Electric A15 incandescent 40-watt light bulb, which produces 415 lumens.We believe that the post-MW report conflation of cardboard with LCD amounts to securities fraud and a violation of GAAP segment reporting principles (carried over from SFAS 131) – we see no Humpty Dumpty defense available under 10(b)-5. In any event, those points are for Deloitte, the SEC, and courts hearing investor class actions to ultimately decide.Movie Theater Count – A Coverup Almost as RidiculousOn November 29, 2011, we showed that FMCN in 2007 and 2008 20-F filings claimed to have 27,164 movie theaters in its network when the potential size of the market (per government statistics) was only 1,545 theaters. In other words, FMCN claimed to have market share of 1,758.2%.Here is how FMCN worded (emphasis added) its obviously false movie theater count disclosure in 2008:The cost of revenue for our movie theater and traditional outdoor billboardnetwork increased 101% from $28.5 million in 2007 to $57.3 million in 2008. The increase is primarily attributable to:…3) increased leasing costs associated withtime we rent on movie theater screens as a result of an increase in the number oftheaters we lease in our network from 10,930 in 2007 to 27,164 in 2008. Following our exposure of this lie, here is management’s tortured attempt to explain it away:Prior to 2009, we calculated the size of its movie theater network by calculatingthe number of screens on which each of its advertisers had purchased advertising and then summing the screen count for each advertiser to produce an aggregatenumber of screens. 18Per this revisionist definition, management wants investors to believe that FMCN previously defined “theater” as Σ(customers x screens purchased).19 Oh but there would be so many questions unanswered if this were true! For instance, would there be a new “theater” each time a customer re-purchased time on the same screen; or, is each “theater” all customer-buys on that screen, and if so, over what period?Management offered this explanation because they twice assumed investors are stupid – first when FMCN claimed to have 27,164 theaters, and then when management thought it could redefine the plain English meaning of “theater.” Chairman Jiang, investors aren’t that stupid – if you occasionally took some buy-side investors’ questions on the earnings worship calls, you’d probably know that.2018 2nd Amended 2010 20-F, filed January 20, 2012, p. 43.19 We’re not 100% sure we understand how FMCN purports to have calculated “theaters” – trying to figure the equation out is a bit like trying to determine the GPS coordinates for Narnia.20 As we pointed out on p. 18 of our November 21, 2011 report, FMCN has not taken any buy-side questions since its Q1 2007 call.What These Lies Mean for Investors’ MoneySince our initial report, we’ve heard some investors and analysts downplay the significance of these lies,21 and instead dissemble by focusing on the great numbers FMCN is reporting. However, because the lies about the number of LCD televisions and movie theaters in the network were used to support growth in reported revenues and profits, one has to wonder whether reported numbers are real. This is particularly true because we estimate that the average LCD television generates monthly revenue seven times that of a cardboard poster. Why would FMCN lie about the inputs to the numbers without also lying about the outputs?Our concern about whether FMCN’s core business numbers are accurate is most acute because FMCN’s LCD and cardboard display network business is opaque in the two areas that matter most – advertisement ASPs and location lease costs.FMCN’s LCD and cardboard display network business model is highly opaque on the revenue side. FMCN’s rate card is irrelevant to the revenues that FMCN generates because most customers receive a substantial discount from the rate card. The problem is that it is impossible to independently determine the discount levels.In the course of our research, we determined that the minimum discount offered to customers for Tier 1 advertisements is approximately 65% off the rate card. We believe that there are customers that receive Tier 1 ad discounts of more than 90% off the rate card. Further, we found that the discounts on Tier 2 ads are greater than those of Tier 1. We also found that most Tier 3 and 4 ads are usually free.There is no way to independently determine the weighted average discount by tier. It is therefore impossible to independently determine FMCN’s ASP. You have to take management at its word. We don’t.The screen location lease costs vary widely, and it is impossible to independently verify FMCN’s reporting of these numbers. In our research of location costs in Shanghai Class A office buildings, we found that FMCN pays anywhere from approximately $50 (RMB 300) per screen per month to $1,500 (RMB 10,000) per screen per month. Presumably the screens in residential buildings cost less, but we found it difficult to develop a reliable blended estimate. Because screen location lease costs can vary by orders of magnitude between similar locations, they cannot be independently verified. Thus, you have to take management at its word. Again, we don’t.21 We heard one second hand account of a conversation between an investor and an analyst with a major bank. We were told that during the conversation, the analyst claimed to have previously noted that the theater count was implausible, yet the analyst never became concerned about FMCN as a result.This management has demonstrated time and again that it should not be taken at its word. Further, the over the top nature of these lies paints the picture of a management who views its investors and analysts as gullible and worthy of contempt. We believe that the opacity of FMCN’s business model offers far too great of an opportunity for this management, with its demonstrated track record of lying and self-dealing, to play games with the numbers.AcknowledgementWhile we were satisfied that FMCN was double-counting the LCD 2.0 Digital Picture Screens to make its reported LCD network screen count, we had not caught FMCN’s admission that it needed to count over 30,500 cardboard posters in order to make its number. (The key information was largely buried in the recently filed 2nd amendment to FMCN’s 2010 20-F.)The credit for this observation belongs to published author and Seeking Alpha contributor Matt Berry. (Interestingly, Mr. Berry’s book is a guide to righteous behavior. We have expressed a copy of Mr. Berry’s book to Chairman Jiang.)22In an article published on February 6th, Mr. Berry called FMCN out on the LCD screens and the ridiculous explanation the company offered for its movie theater lie. We were impressed by both Mr. Berry’s analysis and use of sarcasm – particularly in equating FMCN’s conflation of cardboard and LCDs to conflating Ferraris and bicycles. Mr. Berry, our hat is off to you.WARNING: A printout of this Report is not a CRT Display22 Mr. Berry authored The Mechanics of Virtue: A Cynic’s Guide to Righteous Behavior, CreateSpace (Dec. 2009).DisclaimerUse of Muddy Waters LLC’s research is at your own risk. You should do your own research and due diligence before making any investment decision with respect to securities covered herein. 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