PBN201109

国家发展改革委、财政部、商务部关于发布鼓励进口技术和产品目录(2011年版)的通知
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•【制定机关】商务部,财政部
•【公布日期】2011.04.29
•【文号】发改产业[2011]937号
•【施行日期】2011.04.29
•【效力等级】部门规范性文件
•【时效性】失效
•【主题分类】进出口贸易,通关
正文
国家发展改革委、财政部、商务部关于发布鼓励进口技术和
产品目录（2011年版）的通知
（发改产业[2011]937号）
各省、自治区、直辖市及计划单列市发展改革委、财政厅（局）、商务主管部门，新疆生产建设兵团发展改革委、财务局、商务局：
为积极扩大先进技术、关键零部件、国内短缺资源和节能环保产品进口，更好的发挥进口贴息政策对促进自主创新和结构调整的积极作用，现修订印发《鼓励进口技术和产品目录（2011年版）》，自发布之日起实施。

国家发展改革委、财政部、商务部《关于发布鼓励进口技术和产品目录（2009年版）的通知》（发改产业〔2009〕1926号）所附《鼓励进口技术和产品目录（2009年版）》同时废止。

国家发展改革委会同财政部、商务部将根据情况需要，适时对目录进行调整。

附件：鼓励进口技术和产品目录（2011年版）
国家发展改革委
财政部
商务部
二○一一年四月二十九日鼓励进口技术和产品目录（2011年版）。

全线产品定制方案爱普生出击2009国际金融展
佚名
【期刊名称】《计算机与网络》
【年(卷),期】2009()10
【摘要】2009年9月2日，中国国际金融（银行）技术暨设备展览会在北京展览馆正式拉开帷幕，爱普生以“绿色科技助力金融”为主题，携针工打印机，微型打印机，喷墨打印一体机，
【总页数】1页(P73-73)
【正文语种】中文
【中图分类】TP334.83;F832.1
【相关文献】
1.深信服高调出击2009年中国国际金融展 [J], 孙彤
2.纵横布局全线出击——爱普生强势发布13款投影机新品 [J], 牟艳娜
3.柯达强势出击国际金融展全线产品力挺中国"绿色金融" [J],
4.柯达强势出击金融展全线产品力挺中国“绿色金融” [J], 萧燕
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Estimation of common cause failure parameters for essential service water system pump using the CAFE-PSADae Il Kang *,Mee Jeong Hwang,Sang Hoon HanIntegrated Risk Assessment Division,Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute,P.O.Box 105,Yusong-Gu,Daejeon,305-600,Republic of Koreaa r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:Received 15April 2010Accepted 16September 2010Keywords:PSACommon cause failure Alpha factor methodEssential service water systema b s t r a c tThis paper presents the estimation results of the common cause failure (CCF)parameters of essential service water system (ESWS)pump failure to run for KX nuclear power plant (NPP)in Korea.Until now,the generic values of the CCF parameters have been mainly used in most probabilistic safety assessment (PSA)projects for the Korean NPPs.The PSA results for KX NPP showed that the CCF events of ESWS pump failure to run was identi fied as one of dominant contributors to its internal event core damage frequency (CDF).Thus,we performed the plant speci fic detailed CCF analysis to estimate CCF parameters of ESWS pump failure to run for KX NPP with the CAFE-PSA,a program to analyze CCF events in the ICDE database.Reasonable values of CCF parameters were obtained through performing plant speci fic detailed CCF analysis.The estimated Alpha Factor with three out of three failure criterion was about one half of that for recent US NRC CCF parameters.The re-quanti fication results on the CDF of KX NPP with the new estimated Alpha Factor showed that originally estimated CDF with generic Alpha Factor decreased by 16.84%and the contribution of the sum of cutsets for the CCF events of ESWS pump failure to run to internal event CDF decreased from 20%to 3.29%.Ó2010Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.1.IntroductionCommon cause failure (CCF)events have been recognized as the dominant contributors to the results of a system reliability analysis and a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA).They are de fined as a subset of dependent failures in which two or more component fault states exist at the same time,or in a short time interval,and thus they are direct failures resulting from a shared cause (OECD/NEA,2004;Marshall et al.,1998).As CCF events rarely occur,parameter estimation for a CCF analysis generally needs the data for CCF events of other nuclear power plants (Mosleh et al.,1988,1994,1998;Wierman et al.,2007).The OECD/NEA initiated the international common cause failure data exchange (ICDE)Project to collect and to analyze CCF events (NEA,2004).De finitions and coding schemes for a qualitative and quantitative analysis of CCF events mainly rely on NUREG/CR-6268(Wierman et al.,2007).Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI)has participated in the ICDE Project since 2002.Actual data exchange works between Korea and the ICDE member countries started from 2004.In 2009,KAERI received 407CCF events for emergency diesel generators,centrifugal pumps,check valves,motor operated valves,and breakers (ICDE,2009).Until now,the generic values (Marshall et al.,1998)of the CCF parameters have been mainly used in most PSA projects for the Korean nuclear power plants (NPPs).The PSA results for one of NPPs in Korea,called KX NPP,showed that CCF events of essential service water system (ESWS)pump failure to run were identi fied as one of dominant contributors to its internal event core damage frequency (CDF).The sum of cutsets including the CCF events of ESWS pump failure to run contributed about 20%of its internal event CDF (Park et al.,2009).Plant speci fic detailed CCF event analysis is needed to reasonably estimate CCF parameters to incorporate the design,environmental,and operating characteris-tics of KX NPP.However,there was no computerized tool available for an estimation of the CCF parameters with the ICDE CCF data.Many studies (Jo,2002,2005;Mosleh et al.,1994,1998;Weston,2008)on the detailed analysis of CCF events for system fault tree analysis have been performed.They are mainly based on the US NRC CCF data.Furthermore,a symmetry assumption that the probabilities of CCF events involving similar components are the same was used for the parameter estimation of CCF events for parametric models such as the Alpha Factor and Multiple Greek Letter (MGL)methods (Mosleh et al.,1988,1998).However,many components in NPPs have asymmetrical characteristics for their failures.The asymmetries of CCF events involving similar compo-nents can come from differences in the design,operation,envi-ronment,etc.,among components within the same common cause*Corresponding author.Tel.:þ82428688639.E-mail address:dikang@kaeri.re.kr (D.I.Kang).Contents lists available at ScienceDirectProgress in Nuclear Energyjournal ho me page:www.elsevier.co m/locate/pnucene0149-1970/$e see front matter Ó2010Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.pnucene.2010.09.009Progress in Nuclear Energy 53(2011)24e 31component group(CCCG).A CCCG is a set of components that are considered to have a high potential for a failure due to a common cause(with several different common causes being possible)(NEA, 2004).Recently,methods for addressing the asymmetrical CCF events were proposed by Jo(2005)and Kang et al.(2009a).Through the comparative studies on the system unavailability of emergency diesel generator,Kang et al.(2009a)showed that their suggested method was more reasonable than Jo’s method(Jo,2005).With background mentioned above,we developed a CCF analysis program,so called CAFE-PSA(common CAuse Failure Event analysis program for PSA)(Kang et al.,2009b,2010)to analyze CCF events in the ICDE database.The CAFE-PSA mainly consists of three sub-programs:‘ICDE DB’,‘Qualitative Analysis’,and‘Quantitative Anal-ysis’.With the CAFE-PSA,we estimated CCF parameters of ESWS pump failure to run for KX NPP through a plant specific CCF parameter estimation process.The ESWS of KX NPP consists of three motor pumps.For a comparison,we estimated CCF parameters using the conventional method and the decomposition method.We also quantified the system unavailability of ESWS pumps and calculated the CDF of KX NPP.The conventional method is based on the symmetry assumption that the probabilities of CCF events involving similar components are the same.The decomposition method(Kang et al.,2009a)assumes that the total failure events of a component including the CCF events were divided into their symmetrical and asymmetrical parts.In the process of estimating CCF parameters,the base case and the detailed case were consid-ered.The base case is the case where the applicability factors of all CCF events are estimated at one.The base case assumes that there are no physical,operational,and environmental differences between the ESWS pumps in ICDE CCF events and those of KX NPP. The detailed case is the case where the applicability factors of the selected CCF events are estimated at0.01and those of the other CCF events are estimated at1.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.Section2 presents the description of CAFE-PSA focused on its estimation procedure of CCF parameters.Section3presents the application results of the CAFE-PSA to three ESWS pumps.Finally,Section4 presents the concluding remarks.2.Development of a common cause failure event analysis programIn this section,the description of CAFE-PSA is presented focusing on its estimation procedure of CCF parameters(Kang et al., 2010).In thefirst subsection,a parametric representation of a CCF probability by using the basic parameter method and the Alpha Factor method is described.In the second subsection,the overall procedure for the estimations of the impact vectors and Alpha Factors by using the CAFE-PSA is described.The CAFE-PSA mainly consists of three sub-programs:‘ICDE DB’,‘Qualitative Analysis’,and‘Quantitative Analysis’.It was programmed by Microsoft Visual Basic.In the‘ICDE DB,’the CCF data can be searched and reviewed.Its data base structure is almost the same as the data base program of the ICDE CCF events(ICDE,2009).In the ‘Qualitative Analysis’,the root causes,shared causes,corrective actions,and detection methods for the stored CCF events can be qualitatively analyzed according to component types,sub-component types,or countries.In the‘Quantitative Analysis’,applicability factors of each CCF event,Alpha Factors,CCF factors,and MGL parameters can be F parameters can also be estimated for each component type,system type,or country.The CCF factors and MGL parameters are calculated from the estimated Alpha Factors.The D.I.Kang et al./Progress in Nuclear Energy53(2011)24e3125estimation procedure of the Alpha Factor used in the CAFE-PSA follows the approach of the NUREG/CR-6268(Wierman et al.,2007).2.1.Parametric representations of a CCF probabilityThe probability of a CCF event involving k speci fic components (1 k m )in a CCCG of size ‘m ’for a staggered testing scheme,Q ðm Þk ,is calculated by using the following equation (Mosleh et al.,1998;Wierman et al.,2007):Q ðm Þk¼a ðm Þk=m À1C k À1Q T ¼CCF ðm Þk Q T (1)Q ðm Þkof Eq.(1)is based on a symmetry assumption that theprobabilities of CCF events involving similar components are thesame.In this equation,the events Q ðm Þkand Q ðm Þj are mutually exclusive for all k and j .A staggered testing scheme is that components are tested separately with an equal time interval in a single test period (Mosleh et al.,1988,1998;Wierman et al.,2007).In Eq.(1),Q T ,a ðm Þk ,and CCF ðm Þk are represented as:Q T ¼X m k ¼1m À1C k À1Q ðm Þk(2)a ðm Þk¼n k =0@X m j ¼1n j 1A(3)CCF ðm Þk¼a ðm Þk=m À1C k À1(4)From Eq.(3),n 1is the sum of the first element of the impact vector for the CCF events and the adjusted independent events.An impact vector is a numerical representation of a CCF event.It is used to classify the generic CCF events according to the level of impact of the events and the associated uncertainties in numerical terms (Mosleh et al.,1988,1998;Wierman et al.,2007).CCF factors were introduced to easily estimate the prob-abilities of CCF events in PSA software such as AIMS (Han et al.,2008).From Eq.(1),CCF k can be de fined as a multiplier for Q T to represent the probability of a CCF event involving k speci fic components.For the case of a non-staggered testing scheme,the following formula is used (Mosleh et al.,1998):Q ðm Þk¼ðk =m À1C k À1Þða k =a T ÞQ T ¼ðm =m C k Þða k =a T ÞQ ðm ÞT(5)a t ¼X m k ¼1½k a k(6)The mean value of the Alpha Factors is calculated by using thefollowing equation (Mosleh et al.,1998;Kang et al.,2010):mean ða k Þ¼A k =A T ¼a =ða þb Þ(7)where,A T ¼P mk ¼1A ka ¼A k ,b ¼A T ÀA k ,k ¼1,2,3,4,..A k ¼P k þL k ,k ¼1,2,3,4,..L K ¼L 0K ,P K ¼P 0K ,k ¼2,3,4,.L 1¼L 01þIN L ,P 1¼P 01þIN P ,k ¼1.L 0K ¼number of CCF events involving k speci fic components e likelihood.P 0K ¼number of CCF events involving k speci fic components e prior.IN L ¼number of independent events e likelihood.IN p ¼number of independent events e prior.CCF factors are calculated by using Eq.(4).MGL parameters (Mosleh et al.,1988;Kang et al.,2010)can be estimated from Alpha Factors as follows:r K ¼X mi ¼k a i. X mi ¼k À1a i:(8)r 1¼1,r 2¼b ,r 3¼g ,r 4¼d ,r 5¼3,r 6¼m ,r 7¼y ,r 8¼k ,For the case of non-staggered testing,CCF factors are de fined as ðk =m À1C k À1Þða ðm Þk =a ðm Þt Þ,and MGL parameters are estimated from the alpha parameters as below:r K ¼X mi ¼k i a i. X mi ¼k À1i a i(9)2.2.Quanti fication procedure of a CCF probabilityThe method for an estimation of the impact vectors and AlphaFactors is similar to NUREG/CR-5485(Mosleh et al.,1998)and NUREG/CR-6268(Wierman et al.,2007).Details on the procedure for a parameter estimation of the impact vectors and Alpha Factors are presented in the references (Kang and Han,2006;Kang et al.,2009a,2010).The procedure for a parameter estimation of the impact vectors and Alpha Factors is brie fly presented in this section.Fig.1shows overall estimation procedure of CCF parameters.First,qualitative and quantitative information for the CCF analysis was identi fied by reviewing the ICDE database.It includes the component type,testing strategies,the size of a CCCG,CCF event descriptions,number of independent events,impact vectors,CCF event types (lethal and non-lethal),etc.Each CCF event in the database was represented by impact factors to classify events according to the level of impact of CCF events (NEA,2004).It has three impact vectors:component impairment factors,shared cause factors,and time factors.Second,CCCG components of the target plant were determined and their defenses for the previous CCF events of the original plant in the ICDE database were identi fied.Third,generic impact vectors of the CCF event were calculated by considering three impact vectors mentioned above.For the case where the component impairment status of the CCF event in the ICDE database was identi fied as ‘complete ’and the shared cause and time delay factors for them were ‘high ’,the CCF events were assumed to be lethal shock CCF events.The other CCF events were to be non-lethal CCF events.In the ICDE database,the quantitative scales of the component impairment status are represented from ‘No ’to ‘complete ’,and those of the shared cause and time delay factors are represented from ‘No ’to ‘high ’(NEA,2004).A lethal shock results in the failure of all the redundant components present within a common cause group and a non-lethal shock only affects a subset of the entire components within a common causegroupFig.1.Estimation procedure of CCF parameters with the CAFE-PSA.D.I.Kang et al./Progress in Nuclear Energy 53(2011)24e 3126(Mosleh et al.,1988,1998;Wierman et al.,2007).Fourth,the qualitative and quantitative differences between the original system and the target systems were adjusted by multiplying the generic impact vector by an event applicability factor and by mapping the original to the target system,respectively.Fifth,the number of events in each impact category was calculated by adding the corresponding elements of the impact vector.Sixth,the likeli-hoods and priors of the Alpha Factor priors were estimated.As there were no Alpha Factor priors in the ICDE CCF database,the CAFE-PSA used the same values employed in the process of CCF parameter estimations for the components for NPPs in USA(US NRC,2008).Next,Bayesian updating for the estimation of the Alpha Factors was performed.Finally,CCF factors and MGL parameters were calculated with the estimated Alpha Factors.3.Applications of CAFE-PSA to essential service water system pumpIn this section,the procedure for the estimation of the Alpha Factors and CCF factors for the three ESWS pump are presented.First subsection describes ESWS of KX NPP as a target system.Second subsection describes the estimation approach to Alpha Factors of CCF events for ESWS pump running failure by using the decomposition method(Kang et al.,2009a).Third subsection presents the review results of the ICDE database for ESWS pump.In the fourth subsection, estimation results of the Alpha Factors for the three ESWS pumps, quantification results of the ESWS unavailability,and discussions are presented.3.1.Description of ESWS for KX NPPThe ESWS provides cooling water to the component cooling water system,chilled water generation and distribution system, and boron thermal regeneration system to transfer the plant heat loads from those systems to the East Sea(KHNP,1981).The system also serves as a backup,long term,safety related source of water for the auxiliary feedwater system.It is an open loop cooling system in which water from an intake structure on the East Sea is pumped through the heat exchangers or components to be cooled and returned to the sea through a discharge line.The system basically consists of two independent loops.Each loop provides cooling water to one component cooling heat exchanger and one chilled water chiller.Three ESWS pumps are provided.One pump is connected to each loop;third pump is a spare that can be aligned to either loop through cross connections to maintain operability of both loops while one pump is out of operation for maintenance purposes.Valves are provided in the cross connections for maintaining isolation between loops.The intake structure incorporates redundant inlets and channels for supplying seawater to the pumps.Each channel includes a trash rack with a stationary trash rake followed by a traveling water screen. Water for the traveling screen wash systems is supplied from the essential service water loops through self-cleaning strainers to hori-zontal,centrifugal pumps that then deliver it to the traveling screen spray systems.Operation of the essential service water loops can be initiated either automatically or by manual operator action.A loop becomes operational with the startup of the pump aligned with that loop. One loop is in operation at all times.The second loop is started automatically following a loss of offsite power or an accident resulting in a safety injection signal.It is designed for operation with any water level varying from the original sea level ofÀ0.496m,to a maximumflood level of5.038m. The temperature of the sea water is considered to be a maximum 27.8 C and a minimum of10 C.The essential service water piping between the intake structure and component cooling building,and the discharge structure and component cooling building,is routed underground.The piping is buried2m below the plant grade elevation of100m.This locates the pipe below the frost line and provides sufficient earth coverage for protection from surface loads.3.2.Estimation approach to alpha factors for ESWS pump running failureKang et al.(2009a)suggested approximate formulas for treating asymmetrical common cause failure events.The total failure events of a component including the CCF events were divided into their symmetry part and their asymmetrical part.Based on the assumptionTable1Description of CCF events for ESWS pump failure to run.CCF Event ID Description of CCF events Root cause code Affect all?3001Pump shaft coupling fails due to foreign materials A All3002Pump impeller shaft fails due to mechanical wear I Partially3007Packing leak No change lube water due to failed check valves C All3019Insufficient suction source due to ESWST(Elevated Water Storage Tank)unavailable D All3025Pump wear out due to the sand of the river water I Partially3046Cooling hose worn out due to normal wear caused by corrosive/erosive properties of the ESWS I Partially3054Impeller loosened and damaged due to specification of differing tighteningtorques in the assembly instructionsP All3058Pump failure due to mechanical wear caused by river debris I Partially3062High vibration due to accelerated wear excessive abrasive particles I Partially3074Air inlet caused by operation of hand valves P All3075Pump fails due to foreign material in suction path A All3092Insufficient suction source caused by tester C All3101Lubrication problems caused by design D All3105Loosened screw connection caused by design D All3107Suction line blocked by ice A All3128Loss of lubricating water due to human error H All3134Migration of the aluminum for pump impeller alloy D All3135Blocked seal lube lines due to wear caused by foreign material I Partially3138Bearing lubrication problem due to unknown cause U All15498Excessive pump shaft seal leakage due to inappropriate material D All15515Air bound due to inappropriate procedure P All15521Air bound due to inappropriate procedure P All15927Damage of a bearing and the corrosion of a sleeve due to foreign material A PartiallyD.I.Kang et al./Progress in Nuclear Energy53(2011)24e3127that the CCF events of each divided part were the symmetrical events within them,the Alpha Factor method and the basic parameter method were employed for a derivation of the approximate formulas for modeling the asymmetrical CCF events and estimating their parameters.The remaining part of this section was adopted from reference (Kang et al.,2009a ).Suppose a system consisting of similar ‘M ’components.They are assumed to be classi fied into two component groups,primary components and secondary components,according to the differ-ences in their operational environments,design characteristics,etc.The number of primary components is ‘m ’.The number of secondary components is ‘n ’.‘M ’is the sum of ‘m ’and ‘n ’.‘m ’is generally equal to,or greater than ‘n ’.For the case where the CCF data can be classi fied into symmetrical and asymmetrical events,the total failure probability of any component for the primary and the secondary components can be expressed as the following equations,respectively.Q ðm ÞT ðprimary components Þ¼Q cT þQ pT(10)Q ðm ÞTðsecondary components Þ¼Q c T þQ s T(11)Eq.(10)and Eq.(11)can be represented as follows:Q ðm ÞT ðprimarycomponents Þ¼Q cT þQ p T z Q ðm þn Þ1þQ c ðm þn ÞTþQ p ðm ÞTð12ÞQ ðm ÞTðsecondary components Þ¼Q c T þQ sT z Q ðm þn Þ1þQ c ðm þn ÞTþQ s ðn ÞTð13ÞWhere,Q c ðm þn ÞT,Q p ðm ÞT,and Q s ðn ÞTis represented as the followingequations:Q c ðm þn ÞTzX m þn k ¼2m þn À1C k À1Q c ðm þn Þk(14)Q p ðm ÞTzX m k ¼2m À1C k À1Q p ðm Þk(15)Q s ðn ÞT zX n k ¼2n À1C k À1Q s ðn Þk(16)As mentioned in subSection 3.1,one ESWS pump is in operation at all times,another pump is in standby state,and the third pump is spare.If the running pump fails,the loss of offsite power event occurs,or safety injection signal is generated,the standby pump is automatically started.KX NPP operator says that,during normal operation of KX NPP,two pumps are alternatively operating.Operation of the third pump is required only for the case where both pumps are unavailable.Therefore,the primary components are assumed to be ESWS pump A and B,and the secondary component is assumed to be ESWS pump C.Then,we can assume that ‘M ’is 3,‘m ’is 2,and ‘n ’is 1.By using Eqs.(12)e (16),the failure probabilities of ESWS pump A,B,and C,and their related param-eters can be represented as follows:Q T ðESWS pump A Þ¼Q T ðESWS pump B Þz Q ð3Þ1þQ c T þQ p Tz Q ð3Þ1þ2Q c ð3Þ2þQ c ð3Þ3þQ p ð2Þ2(17)Q T ðESWSpumpC Þz Q ð3Þ1þQ c T þQ sT z Q ð3Þ1þ2Q c ð3Þ2þQ c ð3Þ3(18)Q c ð3Þ2¼ n c ð3Þ2=n ð3Þ2 a ð3Þ2=2Q T(19)Q c ð3Þ3¼n c ð3Þ3=n ð3Þ3a ð3Þ3Q T(20)Q p ð2Þ2¼ð3=2Þn p ð2Þ2=n ð3Þ2 a ð3Þ2Q T(21)3.3.Review results of ICDE ESWS pump CCF eventsFrom the ICDE database,it was identi fied that total number of CCF events for the ESWS pump failure to run was 23and that of the independent failure events was 188.5(ICDE,2009).Among the CCF events,four events were identi fied as lethal shock CCF events and nineteen events were identi fied as non-lethal shock CCF events.Table 1presents CCF event IDs,brief descriptions of the cause,and root cause codes of CCF events for ESWS pumps.Meaning of the root cause code is described in Table 2.For an example,CCF Event ID 3001in Table 1has occurred due to pump shaft coupling failure caused by foreign materials.Its root cause is abnormal environ-mental stress.Table 1also shows that a CCF event of Table 1could affect all ESWS pumps of KX NPP or not.The criterion for deter-mination of a CCF event whether it affects all or partially pumpsTable 2Description of root cause code.A (Abnormal environmental stress)C (State of other component(s))D (Design,manufacture or construction inadequacy)H (Human actions,plant staff)I (Internal to component,piece part)P (Procedure inadequacy)U (Unknown)Table 3Applicability factors of CCF events for the ESWS pump of KX F Event ID Description of CCF eventsApplicability factors Reasons3019Insuf ficient suction source due to Elevated Water Storage Tank unavailable0.01Different design/environment,3074Air inlet caused by operation of hand valves 0.01Different design3107Suction line blocked by ice0.01All pipes are buried below 2m ground level/main concern of KX NPP is high sea temperature15515Air bound due to inappropriate procedure 0.01Different design/no possibility of valve opening for safety injection logic test 15521Air bound due to inappropriate procedure0.01Different design/no possibility of valve opening for safety injection logic testTable 4Estimated impact vectors by using the conventional method e base case.Average Impact VectorsCCCG ¼2CCCG ¼3Adjusted Independent Events:n 1Àindep 103.704155.556n 1ÀCCF 9.617211.52n 2 5.15812.9061n 34.1894D.I.Kang et al./Progress in Nuclear Energy 53(2011)24e 3128was mechanical wear.It was expected that the CCF events due to mechanical wear could be occurred at components under the same operational environments.As mentioned in subSection3.2,CCF events of pump due to mechanical wear were determined to be applicable to ESWS pumps A and B of KX NPP.They were not applied to the ESWS pump C because it was not in service except for both pumps A and B unavailable.Based on the characteristics of design,operation,and environ-ments of the ESWS pumps of KX NPP,and references(Jo,2002; Mosleh et al.,1988;Wierman et al.,2007),the applicability factors forfive CCF events in Table3were assessed as0.01.Because ESWS pumps of KX NPP were determined to have almost complete defense against root causes and coupling factors offive CCF events.3.4.Results and discussionsBy using the CAFE-PSA,we estimated the impact vectors,Alpha Factors,and CCF factors for ESWS pump failure to run.Approaches for estimating them are presented in this section.First,we esti-mated Alpha Factors and CCF Factors by using the conventional method.It is based on the symmetry assumption that the proba-bilities of CCF events involving similar components are the same. Second,we estimated them by using the decomposition method (Kang et al.,2009a)that the total failure events of a component including the CCF events were divided into their symmetrical and asymmetrical parts.In the process of estimating CCF parameters by using the conventional and decomposition methods,two cases,the base case and the detailed case,were considered.In this paper,the base case is the case where the applicability factors of all CCF events are estimated at1.In other words,it is assumed that there are no physical,operational,and environmental differences between the ESWS pumps in ICDE CCF events and those of KX NPP.The detailed case is the case where the applicability factors of the selected CCF events in Table3are estimated at0.01and those of the other historical CCF events are estimated at1.Third,we quantified the ESWS unavailability for the cases previously mentioned.Fourth,we estimated CCF factors with the consideration of applications of the applicability factors to the independent failure events for plants whose the applicability factors of CCF events were estimated at 0.01.Fifth,we re-quantified the CDF of KX NPP with the new esti-mated CCF Factors.3.4.1.Estimation of CCF parameters by using the conventional methodFor the base case by using the conventional method,the impact vectors of the CCF events applicable to the three ESWS pumps A,B,and C were estimated as shown in Table4.In this case,the opera-tion history differences of the three ESWS pumps were not addressed.Calculation of the independent failure events was per-formed by adding an adjusted independent event n1Àindep to n1ÀCCF. From Impact vectors in Table4,Alpha Factor likelihoods were calculated.As mentioned in subSection2.2,Alpha Factor priors employed for the estimation of US NRC CCF parameters(US NRC, 2008)were used as Alpha Factor priors for this study shown in Table5.By using Eqs.(3)and(7),Alpha Factors were estimated as shown in Table6.The estimated a3for the base case is about six times of that for US NRC CCF parameters(US NRC,2008).Tables7 and8present the impact vectors and Alpha Factors of the CCF events for the detailed case.The estimated a3for the detailed case is about one half of that for US NRC CCF parameters(US NRC,2008). As presented in Eq.(1),the Alpha Factors are dependent on not only the number of CCF events but also the number of independent cause failure events.In the estimation of Alpha Factors for the detailed case,the number of the corresponding independent failure events was to be modified in accordance with the applications of applicability factors smaller than one to the CCF events as shown in Table3.However,ICDE data did not provide information on the failure causes of the independent failure events.Therefore,Alpha Factors and CCF factors for detailed case were estimated without the consideration of applicability factors for independent failure events.From Eq.(4),CCF factors for the base and detailed cases were estimated as shown in Table9.The value of CF3for the detailed case in Table9is under one tenth of that of the base case.3.4.2.Estimation of CCF Factors by using the decomposition methodAs discussed in subSection3.3,the partially affecting CCF events of Table1are applicable to only ESWS pumps A and B.Therefore, they are assumed to be asymmetrical CCF events.By using the decomposition method,the impact vectors of the theses asym-metrical CCF events were estimated as presented in Table10.The same approach used in the previous paragraph was employed for the estimation of the Alpha Factors.By using Eqs.(17)e(21),CCF factors for base and detailed cases were calculated as shown in Table11.The value of CF3for the detailed case in Table11is under one half of that for the base case.3.4.3.Quantification results of the ESWS unavailabilityThe total probabilities,Q T,of the failure events of‘fails to run’for the ESWS pumps were estimated at2.4EÀ4(Park et al.,2009).We quantified the ESWS system unavailability with the one out of three success criterion except for the events of the supporting systems for pumps and of the other components.The quantified system unavailability for each case is shown in Table12.The estimated system unavailability for the detailed cases is smaller than oneTable5Prior distribution of Alpha Factors.Alpha Factors Mean a bCCCG¼2a10.9742690 1.7418Eþ01 4.6002EÀ01 a2 2.57EÀ02 4.6002EÀ01 1.7418Eþ01 CCCG¼3a10.9755060 4.5105Eþ01 1.1325Eþ00 a2 1.87EÀ028.6476EÀ01 4.5372Eþ01 a3 5.79EÀ03 2.6676EÀ01 4.5969Eþ01Table6Estimated Alpha Factors by using the conventional method e base case.Alpha factors(a k)CCCG¼2CCCG¼3ICDE US NRC ICDE US NRCa19.588EÀ019.87436EÀ019.6267EÀ019.87436EÀ1 a2 4.1201EÀ02 1.26EÀ2 1.7108EÀ02 1.01EÀ2a3 2.0222EÀ02 3.36EÀ3Table7Estimated impact vectors by using the conventional method e detailed case. Average impact vectors CCCG¼2CCCG¼3Adjusted independent events:n1Àindep103.704155.556 n1ÀCCF9.12211.15n20.9506 2.5348 n30.1056Table8Estimated Alpha Factors by using the conventional method e detailed case. Alpha factors(a k)CCCG¼2CCCG¼3ICDE US NRC ICDE US NRCa19.8929EÀ019.87436EÀ019.825EÀ019.87436EÀ1 a2 1.0174EÀ02 1.26EÀ2 1.5769EÀ02 1.01EÀ2a3 1.7320EÀ03 3.36EÀ3D.I.Kang et al./Progress in Nuclear Energy53(2011)24e3129。

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