JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH The Pricing of Embedded Options in Real Estate

real estate investing quickstart guide英文原版Real estate investing can be a lucrative and rewarding endeavor but it is also a complex and multifaceted field that requires careful planning and execution. Whether you are a first-time investor or an experienced real estate professional, having a solid understanding of the fundamentals of real estate investing is crucial to your success. In this guide, we will provide you with a comprehensive overview of the key concepts and strategies you need to know to get started in real estate investing.The first step in any real estate investment journey is to define your investment goals. What are you hoping to achieve through real estate investing? Are you looking to generate passive income, build long-term wealth, or achieve a specific financial target? Clearly defining your goals will help you to develop a focused investment strategy and make more informed decisions throughout the process.Once you have established your investment goals, the next step is toassess your financial situation and determine how much capital you have available to invest. Real estate investing can be a capital-intensive endeavor, and it is important to have a clear understanding of your financial resources and borrowing capacity. This will help you to identify the types of investment properties that are within your reach and develop a realistic investment plan.Another important consideration in real estate investing is the location of the property. The location of the property can have a significant impact on its value, rental potential, and overall investment performance. When evaluating potential investment properties, it is important to consider factors such as the local job market, population growth, infrastructure development, and the overall economic outlook of the area.One of the key strategies in real estate investing is to diversify your portfolio. By investing in a range of different property types and locations, you can mitigate the risks associated with real estate investing and potentially enhance your overall returns. This might involve investing in a mix of residential, commercial, and industrial properties, or spreading your investments across different geographic regions.Another important aspect of real estate investing is property management. Effective property management is crucial to thesuccess of any real estate investment, as it involves tasks such as tenant screening, rent collection, maintenance, and repairs. If you do not have the time or expertise to manage your properties yourself, you may want to consider hiring a professional property management company to handle these responsibilities on your behalf.In addition to property management, it is also important to have a solid understanding of the legal and regulatory framework that governs real estate investing. This includes understanding local zoning laws, building codes, landlord-tenant laws, and tax regulations. Failing to comply with these regulations can result in significant legal and financial consequences, so it is important to stay informed and seek professional advice when necessary.One of the most important tools in the real estate investor's toolkit is market research. By conducting thorough market research, you can identify emerging trends, identify undervalued properties, and make more informed investment decisions. This might involve analyzing data on property prices, rental rates, vacancy rates, and demographic trends, as well as conducting on-the-ground research in the local market.Finally, it is important to have a well-developed exit strategy for your real estate investments. This might involve selling the property at alater date, refinancing to access the equity in the property, or transitioning the property to a different use or investment strategy. By having a clear exit strategy in place, you can maximize the return on your investment and mitigate the risks associated with real estate investing.In conclusion, real estate investing can be a powerful and rewarding investment strategy, but it requires a significant amount of planning, research, and execution. By following the key principles and strategies outlined in this guide, you can increase your chances of success and build a portfolio of real estate investments that can provide you with a steady stream of passive income and long-term wealth.。

物业管理国外文献综述1。

物业管理体系研究Alice Christudason对新加坡住宅区物业管理体系的选择进行研究，通过对内部管理组织和代理公司两种物业管理体系对比研究发现，如果考虑高效和实用，最好选择专业代理人，如果管理委员会由具有足够驱动力、忠诚度、知识水平且愿将时间付出给小区的成员构成，则可以选择内部管理组织，管理委员会就可以直接运行和控制小区的日常和长期工作［1］。

C Y Yiu等首次从制度经济学的角度对物业管理的制度安排提出了一个分析框架［2]。

Alice Christudason研究显示，虽然多层次的系统可以缓解单层管理公司系统一些现有的为题,但是可能会出现其他问题，包括运营成本的增加，为多层管理公司找到足够的志愿者和冲突可能性的增加［3］。

2. 物业管理与政府治理研究Steve R Doe研究并提出政府应当利用中介服务机构，充分发挥它们在社区管理中的作用［4]；Altrichte从政府的角度上指出，政府应当采用潜在的社区管理措施，并且通过这些措施来改善对社区的管理［5］。

Beate Klingenberg经过建模研究认为租金管制不仅对业主,而且对资产管理者和承租人都具有预想不到的负面后果,从而提出应重新探讨和审查租金管制政策［6].3．物业管理的溢出效应研究物业管理与房地产价格间有一个重要的和积极的关系。

人们愿意分别为ISO9001认证和HKMAQA的物业管理公司管理的资产多支付4.92%和2.84％［7]。

Eddie Chi—man Hui通过研究物业管理对房地产价格的影响发现，ISO14001认证对资产价值的影响小于ISO9001和香港管理协会质量认证两个管理标准［8].Jinhuan Li 提出一种新的评价方法,以确定物业管理服务对香港私人住宅价值的重要性，结果表明，物业管理资产增加价值,尤其是年长和危房特性的资产［9]。

但是Roland Füss研究表明，超额收益的来源和资产特性有关,物业资产管理并不能成为主要驱动力，特别是资产的年限和规模可控的情况下，其作用更为有限［10］.4. 物业管理转化路径研究Alan Phelps研究提出组织意志,战略重点，投资的智慧和创业文化是决定物业管理向资产管理转化的四个关键因素［11］。

经济学顶级期刊介绍国内经济学核心期刊目录（CSSCI）1 经济研究2 改革3 会计研究4 经济社会体制比较5 中国工业经济6 国际经济评论7 经济学家8 经济学动态9 经济科学10 农业经济问题11 国际贸易问题12 中国农村经济13 金融研究14 世界经济15 中国农村观察16 财贸经济17 财政研究18 经济理论与经济管理19 世界经济研究20 数量经济技术经济研究21 财经研究22 当代经济研究（中国"资本论"研究会会刊）23 中国经济问题24 中国土地科学25 中国社会经济史研究26 中国经济史研究27 国际金融研究28 世界经济与政治29 南开经济研究30 国际贸易31 消费经济32 财经问题研究33 宏观经济研究34 当代经济科学35 当代财经36 经济评论37 投资研究38 国际经济合作39 经济问题40 税务研究41 上海经济研究42 城市发展研究43 中南财经大学学报44 亚太经济45 中国国情国力46 林业经济47 经济纵横48 世界经济文汇49 中国技术经济科学50 经济与管理研究51 生态经济52 国际经贸研究（现改名：南开管理评论）53 财经科学54 农业技术经济55 上海金融56 中国物价57 保险研究58 中国流通经济59 中国资产评估60 生产力研究61 金融科学62 中国投资与建设（改名：中国投资）63 港澳新经济64 对外经贸实务65 国际商务研究（上海对外贸易学院学报）66 经济问题探索67 审计研究68 经济与信息69 现代日本经济70 中央财经大学学报。

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHPercentage Leases and the Advantages of Regional MallsPeter F.Colwell* Henry J.Munneke**Abstract.The differences in the ownership structures of downtown retail districts and shopping centers may give rise to varying space allocations and rental contracts found in these markets.This article specifically examines the value-enhancing aspects of percentage leases and explores the mechanisms of tenant mix,risk sharing and rent discrimination through which this value is created.The use of percentage leases may lead to superior returns by allowing a rent structure that approaches perfect price discrimination.Risk sharing through the use of percentage leases may also create value for the property owner and lead to lower rents for tenants.IntroductionIn what important dimensions are shopping centers superior to downtown retail districts?It is fairly obvious that they are located differently and the shopping center location may be superior in providing access for shoppers using contemporary modes of transport.Access may relate to attributes such as proximity to circumferential highways or the adequacy or price of parking.What probably is less obvious,but arguably no less important,is that downtown retail shops have many owners(i.e.,are owned atomistically),whereas shopping centers are collections of stores owned by a single entity.This ownership difference gives rise to differences in space allocation and rental contracts.Shopping centers,especially regional malls,provide a context in which it is possible to use percentage lease contracts in which rent is a percentage of the tenant’s gross income.This article shows that percentage leases,in the jargon of real estate practice,create value.Three mechanisms by which percentage leases create value are diversification,risk sharing and rent discrimination.The methodology in this article is theoretical,based on a series of graphical presentations.The techniques are well established,for example using measures of expected utility and the analysis of the benefits of trade through Edgeworth boxes. These techniques have not before been applied in a systematic explanation of the value-enhancing aspects of percentage leases:tenant mix,risk sharing and rent discrimination.Recent work by Lee(1988),Vandell and Carter(1993)and Eppli and Benjamin(1994)provide extensive overviews of the general literature concerning retail research.1*University of Illinois,Urbana,IL61821or pcolwell@.**University of Georgia,Athens,GA30602-6255or hmunneke@.239240JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH VOLUME 15,NUMBER 3,1998The theory presented provides insight into the practical use of percentage leases and their possible role in urban spatial organization.The inclusion of percentage rents within a property’s rent structure can lead to superior returns over a uniform rent structure and can also lead to possible benefits to the tenant via lower rents.Even though the use of percentage leases may create value ,the ownership structure of downtown retail districts is not conducive to the use of percentage leases.Thus,the benefit associated with percentage leases varies spatially,affecting the spatial organization of shopping.This article is divided into five parts,the first three are devoted to diversification,risk sharing and rent discrimination,respectively.In the final two sections,we offer practical applications and our conclusions.DiversificationA landlord acting in much the same way as an insurance company may add value to a portfolio of leases by bringing together tenants with different income prospects,if the incomes of the tenants are not perfectly positively correlated.The tenants are attracted by the risk reduction associated with percentage leases when compared to flat rent contracts.Consider the case of a landlord with a portfolio of two leases.Further,consider an extreme case in which the tenants have one of two gross incomes,low income or high income.Still further,assume that the incomes of these tenants are perfectly negatively correlated,when one experiences the low income the other experiences the high income.Under these conditions,the principles relating to diversification can be shown by the use of an Edgeworth box diagram (see Exhibit 1).The sides of the Edgeworth box represent a tenant’s income prospects net of all costs except rent.The longer horizontal sides represent high income net of non-rent costs and the shorter vertical sides represent low income net of non-rent costs.It is assumed that non-rent costs are proportional to income,so the slope of the diagonal line connecting the opposite corners of the box is the ratio of the two gross incomes.The tenant’s rents are measured from the upper right-hand corner,with the remaining portion of income net of non-rent cost referred to as net income is defined here as gross income minus the non-rent costs of operation (income net of non-rent cost)minus rent.Note that the tenant’s net income could be measured from the lower left-hand corner.Flat rent contracts,equal rent in either state of income,are found along a 45Њline from the upper right-hand corner of the box.This line will be referred to as the tenants’flat rent line.All contracts falling along a line perpendicular to the tenants flat rent line (45Њline)produce equal receipts for the landlord (recall the covariance of the two tenants’incomes).Thus,these lines will be denoted as equal-expected-rent (EER)lines.For example in Exhibit 1,contract a represents a particular flat rent contract and all contracts that produce receipts for the landlord equal to those of contact a are found along EER 1.Under a percentage rent contract,rents are proportional to income and therefore,the ratio of the rents is equal to the ratio of the gross incomes.Thus,PERCENTAGE LEASES AND THE ADV ANTAGES OF REGIONAL MALLS241Exhibit1Value Created through Tenant Diversificationpercentage rent contracts fall upon the diagonal connecting the upper right-hand corner with the opposite corner of the box.Contract b is the percentage rent contract that produces rent equivalent to theflat rent contract a.Contract c is a contract in which the percentage of rent for the high income exceeds the percentage for the low income.In contrast to the landlord,each tenant faces uncertain prospects,so it is not sufficient to focus on the tenant’s expected net income as an indicator of welfare.Rather,it is necessary to understand that tenants’expected utility is affected by lease contracts.In an Edgeworth box diagram,this is done by utilizing indifference curves that we will refer to as equal-expected-utility(EEU)curves.The slope of an EEU curve,often called the marginal rate of substitution,is the negative of the ratio of the marginal utility at high net income to the marginal utility at low net income(i.e.,probabilities are not involved because the probabilities of the two incomes are equal).If a tenant faces zero risk,net income in the high and low state are equal,and the marginal utilities must also be equal.Therefore,along a45Њline out of the lower left-hand corner,the slope of the EEU curve or marginal rate of substitution isϪ1,the same as the landlord’s equal expected rent line.Elsewhere,the tenant’s EEU curve is242JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH VOLUME 15,NUMBER 3,1998convex,because the tenants are risk averse.As high net income increases and low net income decreases along an EEU curve,the marginal utility increases if income is low and the marginal utility decreases if income is high.Therefore,the ratio of marginal low net income to marginal high net income increases and the slope of the EEU curve becomes steeper.To focus on the benefits of diversification as distinct from the benefits of risk sharing,the advantage to the tenant of a percentage rent contract verses a flat rent contract will be examined holding the landlord’s aggregate revenue constant (i.e.,the landlord will assume no additional risk by using percentage rents in place of flat rents).Thus,risk is not introduced into the landlord’s portfolio.If the landlord’s position is to remain unchanged,then the resulting improvement in net income for the tenant with low income must equal the resulting decline in net income when income is high.The advantage to the tenant of a percentage rent contract in contrast to a flat rent contract can be found by comparing the flat rent contract a to the percentage contract b .Both contracts fall on the same EER line,thus providing the landlord with equivalent aggregate rent.The EEU curve that passes through contract a ,EEU 1,falls below contract b (i.e.,a EEU curve higher than EEU 1goes through point b ),thus the tenant prefers the percentage contract b to the flat rent contract a .This unequivocally demonstrates that the tenants are better off under the percentage lease than they were under the flat lease,holding the landlord at the same level of revenue.It cannot be argued that the percentage rent contract maximizes tenant welfare while holding aggregate rent constant,only that it offers an improvement over a flat rent contract.Actually,contract c maximizes tenant welfare in this context.The EEU curve associated with contract c would have a slope of Ϫ1at point c ,therefore the EEU curve would be tangent with EER 1at point c .Another way to look at the problem is to hold the tenants’welfare constant and identify the premium they would be willing to pay in return for the reduced risk they face as a result of the percentage lease.The landlord’s rent receipts will increase by the amount that the tenants’expected income declines.In Exhibit 1,the percentage contract d ,provides the tenant with an equivalent level of utility to that of the flat rent contract a .The premium paid to the landlord is the difference between the increase in rent under high income and the rent decline under low income.The premium associated with contract d when compared to contract a can be represented as the difference in the levels of rent associated with each contract’s EER line,as shown in Exhibit 1.The percentage rent does not represent the optimal contract in the sense of maximizing aggregate rent while holding tenant utility constant.The optimal contract would be at point e ,where the EER curve is tangent to the EEU 1curve.Although the percentage rent contract is not optimal in the sense of maximizing aggregate rent while holding tenant utility constant,it does provide a premium over a flat rent contract.While percentage rent contracts have been shown to be superior to flat rent contracts,it appears that even more extreme rent contracts are superior to percentage leases.PERCENTAGE LEASES AND THE ADV ANTAGES OF REGIONAL MALLS243 This appearance results from artificially constraining of the landlord to a riskless position.On the other hand,this constraint is useful in distinguishing the benefits of diversification from the benefits of risk sharing.Risk Sharing2To focus on the value creation associated with risk sharing alone,the gains associated with diversification from altering the rent contingencies in the lease must be removed. This can be accomplished by assuming a landlord with a single tenant(i.e.,atomistic ownership).As before,assume that the tenant has uncertain income in that income could be either high or low.The different levels of income are assumed to occur with equal probability.The question is whether moving away from a contract withflat rent could benefit one party(i.e.,the tenant or the landlord)without injuring the other.If so,it should be a simple matter to redistribute the gains so both would be made better off by the change. Of course,aflat rent contract produces a certain outcome for the landlord while requiring the tenant to bear all of the risk.We wouldfirst like to show that holding the tenant’s expected utility constant,but decreasing his risk,will cause the landlord to share risk and may cause the landlord’s expected utility to increase.The proposition that risk sharing necessarily creates value actually can be proven using an Edgeworth box diagram(see Exhibit2).When the landlord faces uncertain prospects,we must use indifference curves to judge landlord welfare.The landlord’s equal-expected-utility(eeu)curves have the same direction of curvature relative to the upper right-hand corner of the box as the tenant’s EEU curves do relative to the lower left-hand corner.Both the tenant and landlord are risk averse.The landlord’s eeu curves have a slope ofϪ1at their intersection with the tenant’sflat rent line.At points along the tenant’sflat rent line there is certainty for the landlord(i.e.,regardless of the state of income,rents are equal),thus the numerator and denominator of the marginal rate of substitution are equal.Beginning withflat rent contract a,and holding the tenant’s expected utility constant leads us to percentage rent contract d.The landlord is better off with contract d than with contract a;contract d is associated with a higher level of expected utility than contract a.This demonstrates conclusively that risk sharing via percentage rents is superior to aflat rent contract.Note however that the landlord’s utility would bemaximized at an even more extreme contract f,the tangency point of eeu2and EEU1.The landlord receives an increase in expected rent to overcome the increase in risk of moving from a certainflat rent to a contract in which rent is related to the tenant’s income.In Exhibit2,the increase in expected rent could be illustrated as the differencebetween the EER line which is tangent to eeu1at point a and the higher EER throughpoint g.The tenant,in order to maintain a constant level of satisfaction,must enjoy an offsetting decline in the variation of net income.The decline in variation of net income can be seen as the relatively large change in rents for high income when244JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHVOLUME 15,NUMBER 3,1998Exhibit 2Value Created through Risk Sharingcompared to the change in rents for low income when moving from a flat rent contract a to the percentage contract g .The decline in the difference between the high and low outcomes is exactly equal to the new variation in rent received by the landlord.Another way of looking at the problem would be to hold landlord expected utility constant.Again,starting with contract a ,the percentage rent contract g makes the tenant better off but not as well off as contract h ,found at the tangency point of eeu 1and EEU 2.Once again,we see that risk sharing by the use of percentage rents is superior to a flat rent contract.The final percentage rent contract would be negotiated somewhere between contracts d and g depending on the bargaining power of the two parties.While the percentage lease may not be optimal,it approximates an optimal contract under the various conditions specified.Risk sharing always creates value if the parties to the contract are risk averse.Rent DiscriminationDoes a competent manager of a mall rent a vacant store to the highest bidder?This is the competitive result that should be found in downtown’s with atomistic ownership,PERCENTAGE LEASES AND THE ADV ANTAGES OF REGIONAL MALLS245246JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHVOLUME15,NUMBER3,1998PERCENTAGE LEASES AND THE ADV ANTAGES OF REGIONAL MALLS 247equal to the area under the marginal revenue curve up to allocation x (i.e.,the area of ⌬adR x equals the area of ⌬bdf ).If the landlord requires a contract contingency where each type A tenant is charged a different rent per square foot,thereby extracting all surplus,then the marginal revenue from imposing perfect price discrimination would be higher at each allocation.The surplus at allocation x is shown by the darkly shaded triangle (⌬bR x c );the total revenue is the area of the shaded trapezoid.The area of the trapezoid is equal to the area under the curve labeled marginal revenue with perfect discrimination.A landlord may use percentage rent contracts to create a contingent contract that calls for a different rent from every tenant.For example,a landlord that charges type A tenants a base rent of R x per square foot with a contingency that if income rises above R x /r ,the tenants must pay 100r %of their income as rent;a contingent contract that potentially calls for a different rent from every tenant.If a tenant’s willingness to pay is based roughly on income,then percentage leases approximate perfect rent discrimination.Suppose that type B tenants are anchor tenants and get little or no positive externalities from type A tenants.The willingness to pay without externalities is then the same as that with externalities and the same as the marginal revenue with perfect price discrimination.Furthermore,anchor tenants are likely to have much flatter demand curves because their opportunities include many close substitutes (e.g.,freestanding stores outside of the mall’s ring road).Exhibit 5illustrates an extreme case in which type B tenants have a perfectly elastic demand curve.In this case,type B tenants have marginal curves that are identical to their average curve,the flat demand curve.If retail space is leased to the highest bidder (i.e.,if the landlord were playing a competitive/downtown game),then the landlord’s portfolio of leases would move toward the situation illustrated in Exhibit 5with all rents equal at the amount that the marginal tenants are willing to pay;R 1A and R 1B for type A and B tenants,respectively.Under this scenario,a majority of space,x 1,would be allocated to type A tenants and T Ϫx 1to type B tenants.The landlord’s revenue would equal the area of the rectangle with the darkest shading (rectangle 0R 1A R 1B T ).Suppose,on the other hand,that space is leased so as to maximize revenue and that it is possible to rent discriminate across tenant types.That is,it is not possible for a tenant to rent space as a shoe store and then switch merchandise to become a jewelry store.In this case of simple rent discrimination,the allocation of space would be at x 2with a majority of the space now being allocated to type B tenants,with much less allocated to type A tenants.Rent per square foot for type A tenants would be R 2A and R 1B for type B tenants.Under simple rent discrimination,the landlord’s revenue is greater than if leased to the highest bidder by the area the triangle with the lightest shading (⌬bjR 1A ).Finally,imagine that the landlord possesses contract attributes,perhaps percentage leases,that allow him to engage in perfect rent discrimination.Not only can different248JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHVOLUME15,NUMBER3,1998discriminator would choose the allocation x2with no vacancy.This allocation is thatwhich equates the perfect price discriminating marginal revenue for each type of tenant.Recall that for tenant type C,the demand curve and the perfect rent discriminating marginal revenue curve are one and the same.The base rents chargedtype A and type C tenants are R2A and R2C,respectively.The relative rents reversewhen simple and perfect rent discrimination are compared.Type A tenants are charged more base rent than type C with perfect rent discrimination,but type A tenants are charged less rent than type C with simple rent discrimination.As a side issue,note that the relative allocations are very different in Exhibits5and 6.In Exhibit5,the perfect rent discrimination produces an allocation between those of simple rent discrimination and competition.In Exhibit6,the competitive allocation (i.e.,where the demand curves cross)is between the extremes of simple and perfect rent discrimination.ImplicationsThe practical applications of the theory in this article are to alert property managers, urban economists and urban planners to the source of a new view of urban spatial organization.First,property managers should take from this article a new appreciation of the importance of charging different rents to different tenants.They can achieve superior returns by traditional price discrimination(i.e.,charging higher rents to less rent sensitive tenants),but may push the envelope further by recognizing that percentage rents may move the rent structure toward perfect price discrimination. Property managers and tenants should begin to recognize the gains both sides of the lease contract may get from the risk sharing aspects of percentage leases.Tenants may share in any benefits that appear to accrue to landlords via lower rents.Tenants should be drawn to the insurance features of percentage leases.Of course,shoppers may be advantaged by lower prices emerging from the benefits of tenants.Finally, this article alerts urban economists and urban planners to an alternative view of the decline of downtown shopping associated with the rise of suburban malls.To some extent,this change in the spatial organization of shopping may be due to the fact that the downtown ownership structure does not facilitate the use of percentage leases and the benefits that accrue from these leases.In the most down-to-earth terms possible, property managers in some areas of real estate should not develop uniform rent policies,neither should they necessarily rent to the highest bidder.Planners,on the other hand,should not think that physical changes to the downtown,such as creating ‘‘malls’’by closing streets,will be sufficient to return downtowns to their previous dominance in shopping.Rather,the property-rights/ownership-structure may be an impediment to the return of downtown shopping as a result of limiting the nature of leases.ConclusionThree mechanisms are important in explaining the usefulness of percentage leases. These are diversification,risk sharing and rent discrimination.These mechanisms,viaVOLUME15,NUMBER3,1998percentage leases,provide a landlord with a portfolio of leases an opportunity for gains overflat rent contracts.Whether this opportunity exists or not depends on the diversity of the tenants’income prospects.In general,it pays to share risk if the parties to a contract are each risk averse.This is as true in the context of retail leases as any other.Rent discrimination influences the allocation of space and the aggregate rent that can be generated.Atomistic downtown storeowners do not have the ability to benefit from diversification and rent discrimination,but mall owners do.Either atomistic or mall landlords may benefit from risk sharing,but the confidence a landlord has in tenants’gross incomefigures and thus the opportunity to risk share, may be closely associated with national tenants and regional malls.While this article outlines three of the mechanisms that make percentage leases create value,it does not exhaust all of the possibilities.For example,as noted in Miceli and Sirmans(1992),percentage leases may resolve what would otherwise be an agency problem.If,for example,the levels of mall advertising,maintenance and security are influenced by manager effort and if these levels affect the incomes of the tenants,it may be desirable to involve the landlord in the businesses of the tenants via percentage leases.The presence of this incentive will induce the landlord to provide an appropriate level of effort.Note that underflat rent contracts,if the landlord’s effort has no influence on the level rent collected,then he maximizes profits by setting the level of effort to zero(see Miceli and Sirmans,1992).Of course,the use of net leases (i.e.,charging tenants for operating expenses)substantially diminishes the impact of this agency problem since the landlord can pass the costs on to the tenant.A percentage lease with a base can also be thought of as a call option.While this article is concerned with the advantages of percentage leases,there are contexts in which percentage leases are inappropriate.A landlord must have confidence in the gross incomefigures provided by the tenant before the use of a percentage lease can be justifindlords may take some comfort in the fact that the tenant must report the samefigures to the sales and income tax authorities so the landlord can free-ride on their monitoring programs.However,such comfort may be placing too much weight on a very thin reed(i.e.,governmental monitoring).There may be some incentives not to cheat beyond the sanctions imposed by the tax authorities and landlord.These incentives may include the desire to establish an accurate sales record that can be revealed for an anticipated sale of the business,as well as ethical and religious proscriptions against lying.Nevertheless,a retail establishment may have some tendency to skim(i.e.,close the cash register at some point during the day),thereby cheating both the tax authorities and the landlord who uses percentage lease contracts.If the landlord believes that some tenant attribute is associated with skimming but that the amounts skimmed are somewhat proportional to actual gross income,the landlord would tend to raise the percentage for tenants with that attribute.This is a‘‘lemons problem’’and would force all such tenants to skim.The opposite effect might be found for traditional money laundering stores(e.g., arcade games).These stores would tend to report more income than they produce possibly causing landlords to charge them lower percentages.There is an important exception to this propensity to lie.National tenants tend to provide honestfiguresbecause they must report to the home office,as well as to the tax authorities and the landlord.Thus regional malls,that exclusively,or nearly exclusively,lease to national tenants,are the prime candidates for the use of percentage leases.Notes1For readers interested in studies exploring the determinants of shopping center rents,see Benjamin,Boyle and Sirmans(1990),Gatzlaff,Sirmans and Guidry(1993)and Sirmans and Diskin(1994).2Inspired by Brueckner(1993)and by conversations with Jan K.Brueckner.ReferencesBenjamin,J.D.,G.W.Boyle and C.F.Sirmans,Retail Leasing:The Determinants of Shopping Center Rents,Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association,1990, 18,302–12.——,Price Discrimination in Shopping Center Leases,Journal of Urban Economics,1992,32, 299–17.Brueckner,J.K.,Inter-Store Externalities and Space Allocation in Shopping Centers,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,1993,7,5–16.Eppli,M.J.and J.D.Benjamin,The Evolution of Shopping Center Research:A Review and Analysis,Journal of Real Estate Research,1994,9,5–32.Gatzlaff,D,H.,G.S.Sirmans and B.A.Diskin,The Effect of Anchor Tenant Loss on Shopping Center Rents,Journal of Real Estate Research,1994,9,99–110.Lee,K.,The Economics of Shopping Centers:A Literature Survey,Working Paper,University of Illinois,1988.Miceli,T.J.and C.F.Sirmans,Contracting With Spatial Externalities and Agency Problems: The Case of Shopping Center Leases,Working Paper,The University of Connecticut,1992. Sirmans,C.F.and K.A.Guidry,The Determinants of Shopping Center Rents,Journal of Real Estate Research,1993,8,107–16.Vandell,K.D.and C.C.Carter,Retail Store Location and Market Analysis:A Review of the Research,Journal of Real Estate Literature,1993,1,13–45.VOLUME15,NUMBER3,1998。

清华金融硕士生导师郦金梁简介郦金梁金融系副教授清华大学经济管理学院副院长办公室伟伦楼258个人简介研究成果研究项目为金融硕士项目、清华大学-香港中文大学金融财务MBA项目、清华国际（INSEAD）EMBA 项目讲授金融学课程并曾担任项目学术主任。

为香港科技大学-纽约大学Stern商学院环球金融硕士项目讲授风险管理课程并指导其清华课程模块。

为国资委监事会主席班讲授金融市场。

教学经历包括美国纽约州锡拉丘兹大学、美国马萨诸塞州东北大学。

1997年获清华经管学院学士学位；2001年获美国锡拉丘兹大学金融学博士学位；2003年起持有特许金融分析师（CFA）证书。

主要研究领域为市场结构与管治、投资行为与策略、风险管理。

在JournalofBusiness、JournalofFuturesMarkets、FinancialAnalystsJournal、《金融研究》等国际、国内期刊上发表论文二十余篇；在国际学术会议宣讲论文四十余篇次。

担任FinancialAnalystsJournal编委；曾任JournalofEntrepreneurialFinance&BusinessVentures副主编、客座主编。

曾为十六家国际期刊审稿；参加十四个国际学术（年度）会议程序委员会。

担任美国CFA协会从业标准委员会委员、亚太投资年会顾问；曾任考试标准制定人。

兼任中国人民银行和证监会专家顾问。

曾任美国道富银行学术顾问；美联储波士顿银行访问学者。

应邀在多国商会为高层管理人员专场讲授中国经济发展：法国商会（香港、上海、北京）、香港英国商会、成都欧盟商会、北京澳大利亚商会。

为花旗集团、美国运通、宝马汽车、道达尔、诺华等大型企业高管讲授中国经济发展与风险管理。

曾同年获清华大学一等奖学金和清华经管学院一等奖学金；获锡拉丘兹大学研究生奖学金、最佳博士毕业生奖；获东北大学J.G.Reisman讲席研究教授头衔和奖励；获清华经管学院教学优秀奖(2007)、清华EMBA优秀教师奖(2010、2011)、先进工作者称号(2011)。

mBI¡B1.¨L B a s B M2002¡A u x W a H U Bs v A m x W g a u Z n A T Q E A157-171¡C2.«2002¡A u Taiwan – REITs o B i s v A m zP N Q n A26-42¡C3.«A2002¡A u p v A m z PN Q n A105-122¡C4.±i B w1992¡A u P a o s v A m F v jn A64A345-414¡C5.±i B B N2002¡A u i s-»D R v A m z P N Q n A1-25¡C6.³N2002¡A u s H U i a P vT v A m x W u Z n A T G A37-60¡C7.ÁB2002¡A u O W t M I v A m x Wu Z n A T G A1-21¡CII¡B s i1.§y2003¡A m-²z P-¡n A A O G Z Uq C2.ªL v(1995)¡A u O W g a J s v A O W g ae U C3.±i2003¡A m a P R n A A O¥G CH6A pp.155-261¡C4.±i B w1999¡A m n A T A O G M C5.±2002¡A m P g s P O W F qn A O G H C6.²s1998¡A u i s v A vP p C7.³F B A B w2002¡A m G z P n A A O GC8.»N j1999¡A m n A A O G C9.ÁB F (2003)¡A m G k P B n A A O GC10.Á2002¡A m P p n A A O G x WV CIII¡B h1.¤1990¡A u s v i R v A j v P p e s h C2.¤T H1998¡A u s v A j k s hC3.¥w1980¡A u P a o s v A j ps h C4.¦v q2002¡A u H U W g s v A jt h C5.§d d1996¡A u O W o i s v A O W j sh C6.§f g R1998¡A u k s - ¥H O v A O W j k s h C7.§1996¡A u P a o G K a ov A j s h C8.§v2002¡A u b v A z ks h C9.§2001¡A u I Q v A O W js h C10.©P A o2001¡A u g i R--²z Qv A H j D z h h C11.ªL C T2001¡A u x W s v A zz s h C12.ªL2000¡A u H U k s v A j k sh C13.ªL I a2002¡A u g a o s v A H jD z h h C14.ªL y2001¡A u x W U v s v A H jt h C15.ªL1997¡A u s v A F j z s h C16.ª2002¡A u e v(NPL)¤B z s v AO W j s h C17.«2001¡A u j J w s BOTi v A O W j s h C18.¬x q2001¡A u O H U P b i s v As j z t s h C19.-P2002¡A u p k D R v A x j kt h C20.®L w2002¡A u v T-¤k gB R v A O W j v P m s h C21.¯2003¡A u i s v A F v j a F sh C22.°s2001¡A u U V c P g Z s—¥H x W vv v A O W j s h C23.Òq1993¡A u H U s v A F d j k sh C24.±i q g2002¡A u H k v A F v jz s h C25.±t2003¡A u s G H u vv A F v j k t s h C26.³A2002¡A u P p B z s v A x j ps h C27.³D1999¡A u u v U e M v P O v A js h C28.³1997¡A u B s s v A jp e s h C29.³F2002¡A u k s---v Aj k s h C30.³1999¡A u g a H U P s H U v A O Wj s h C31.³L2002¡A u H v o i P i s v A H jT t h b M Z h C32.³1995¡A u D v A F v j F s hC33.³W2002¡A u x B p o i s v A H jD z h h C34.³2002¡A u s v A j k s h C35.³1991¡A u z F s v A jz s h C36.´L1998¡A u O W H U z s v A H j/°th C37.·M1999¡A u x W i s v A a z g zs h C38.·q1990¡A u H t U B P DA s v A j g a z s h C39.¸M1999¡A u s H U P H U v AO W j s h C40.¸a1997¡A u C O v(CMOs)--µc P I s v Aj t h C41.¾G f1997¡A u U v s v A j ks h C42.¾G a N2001¡A u s v A x jP z s h C43.ÃC m1997¡A u H U I n t g Q v A O Wj s h C44.ÃC s k2000¡A u z q(AMC)³i v Ts v A s j z t s h C45.Ä2001¡A u v I-¤v Aj t h CIV¡B1. Q A F g e D A91.3.14¡C2. 2002A j D A91.6.28¡C3. m z P N Q n A v D A91.9.28¡C4. H U o i Q A O W V D A92.8.7¡C5. k P A H U P D A92.9.15¡CV¡B l1.ÄT(2002,12)¡A w s H U- s Y CapitaMall Trust A C K.tw/market/20021203.phpG BI¡B Agency and management1.Ambrose, B., and Peter Linneman¡2001¡, “REIT organizational structure and operational characteristics,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol. 21, No. 3,141-162.2.Campell, D. Robert (2002), “Shareholder Wealth Effects in Equity REIT Restructuring transactions: Sell-Offs, Mergers and Joint Ventures,” Journal of Real Estate Literature, V ol.10, No.2, 205-222.3.Campell, D. Robert, Milena Petrova and C. F. Sirmans (2003), “Wealth Effects of Diversification and Financial Deal Structuring: Evidence from REIT Property Portfolio Acquisitions,” Real Estate Economics, V ol. 31, No.3, 347-366.4.Cannon, Ethridge Susanne and Stephen C. V ogt (1995), “REITS and Their Management: An Analysis of Organizational Structure, Performance and management Compensation,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol.10, No. 3, 297-317.5.Capozza, Dennis R. and Paul J.Seguin q2000¡r,¡Debt, Agency, and Management Contracts in REITs: The External Advisor Puzzle,¡ The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 91-6.Fu, Yuming and Lilian K Ng. (2001), “Market efficiency and return statistics: Evidence from real-estate and stock markets using a present-value approach,” Real Estate Economics, V ol. 29, Iss. 2, p. 227 (24 pages)7.Graff, A. Richard (2001), “Economic analysis suggests that REIT investment characteristics are not as advertised,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio management, V ol.7, No.2, 99-124.8.Howton, D. Shawn and Shelly W Howton (2001),”The wealth effects of REIT straight debt offerings,“ Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management ,V ol. 7,Iss. 2, p. 151 (7 pages)9.Mueller, R. Glenn (1998),”REIT size and earnings growth: Is bigger better, or a new challenge?” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 4, Iss.2, p. 149 (9 pages)10.Yang, S. 2001¡, “Is bigger better: a reexamination of the scale economies ofREITs,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 7, No. 1, 67-77II¡B Risk and Return1.Anderson, I. Randy and Youguo Liang(2001), “Mature and yet imperfect: Real estate capital market arbitrage ,” Journal of Real Estate PortfolioManagement,V ol. 7, Iss. 3, p. 281 (8 pages)2.Benjamin, D. John, G Stacy Sirmans and Emily N Zietz(2001), ”Returns and risk on real estate and other investments: More evidence,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management , V ol. 7, Iss. 3, p. 183 (32 pages)3.Bond, A. Shaun, G. Andrew Karolyi and Anthony B. Sanders (2003), “International Real Estate Returns: A Multifactor, Multicountry Approach,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 481-.4.Capozza, Dennis R. and Paul J.Seguin (2003), “Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin’s q-ratios: Evidence from REITs,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 367-404.5.Chui, C. W. Andy, Sheridan Titman and K. C. John Wei (2003), “The Cross Sectionof Expected REIT Returns,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 451-480.6.Cooper, Michael, David H. Downs, and Gary A. Patterson (2000), “Asymmetric information and the predictability of Real Estate returns,” The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 225-.7.Downs, H. David.q2000¡r,¡Assessing the Real Estate Pricing Puzzle: A Diagnostic Application of the Stochastic Discounting Factor to the Distribution of REIT Returns,¡The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 155- 8.Glasock, John L., Chiuling Lu, and Raymond W. So q2000¡r,¡Further Evidence on the Integration of REIT, Bond, and Stock Returns,¡ The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 177-9.Han, Jun and Youguo Liang (1995), “The Historical Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol. 10, No.3, 235-262. 10.Li, Yuming and ko Wang (1995), “The Predictability of REIT Returns and MarketSegmentation,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.4, 471-482.11.Liang, Youguo , Willard Mcintosh and James R. Web (1995), “IntertemporalChanges in the Riskiness of REITS” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol10.No.4, 427-443.12.Ling, David C., Andy Naranjo, and Michael D. Ryngaert q2000r,ThePredictability of Equity REIT Returns: Time Variation and Economic Significance,¡The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 117-.13.Ling, David and Andy Naranjo (2003), “The Dynamics of REIT Capital Flows andReturns,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 405-434.14.Liow, Kim-Hiang (2002), “Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investment,”Journal of Property Investment & Finance, V ol. 20, Iss. 3, p. 304 (3 pages)15.Mueller, R. Glenn and Randy I Anderson (2002), “The growth and performance ofinternational public real estate markets,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol.8, Iss. 4, p. 128 (12 pages)16.Sahin, F. Olgun(2003),” Investing in REITs: Real Estate InvestmentTrusts-Revised & Updated Edition,” Journal of Real Estate Literature, V ol. 11, Iss.2, p. 22117.Seiler, J. Michael, Arjun Chatrath, James R Webb (2001), “Real asset ownershipand the risk and return to stockholders,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol.22, Iss. 1/2, p. 199 (14 pages)18.Stevenson, Simon (2002), “Momentum effects and mean reversion in real estatesecurities,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol. 23, Iss. 1, p. 47 (18 pages)19.Yamazaki, Ritsuko (2001), “ Empirical testing of real option pricing models usingland price index in Japan,” Journal of Property Investment & Finance, V ol. 19, Iss.1, p. 53 (20 pages)III¡B Pricing ,valuation1.Anderson, I. Randy, Thomas M Springer (2003), “REIT selection and portfolio construction: Using operating efficiency as an indicator of performance”, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 9, Iss. 1, p. 17.2.Capozza, R. Dennis, and Sohan Lee (1995), “Property type, size and REIT value,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol. 10, No. 4,363-380.3.Clayton, Jim, Greg MacKinnon (2001), ”The time-varying nature of the link between REIT, real estate and financial asset returns”, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 7, Iss. 1, p. 43. (12 pages)4.DeWeese, Gary S.¡1998¡, “The Role of the Professional Appraiser in REIT Valuations,” The Appraisal journal, July, 236-241.5.Falzon, Robert ¡2002¡, ”Stock Market Rotations and REIT Valuation,” Prudential Real Estate Investors, November.6.Graham, M. Carol and John R. Knight 2000¡, “Cash Flows vs. Earnings in the valuation of Equity REITs,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 6, No. 1, 17-25.7.He, T. Ling (2000), “Causal Relationships Between Apartment REIT Stock Returns and Unsecuritized Residential Real Estate,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol.6, No.4, 365-372.8.Kallberg, G. Jarl, Crocker H. Liu and Anand Srinivasan (2003), “Dividend Pricing Models and REITs,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 435-450.9.Kuhle, L. James and Jaime R. Alvayay (2000), “The Efficiency of Equity REIT Prices,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio management, V ol.6, No.4, 349-354.10.Liang, Youguo and James R. Web (1995), ”Pricing Interest-Rate Risk for MortgageREITs,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.4, 461-469.11.Ling, C. David,Andy Naranjo (1999), “The integration of commercial real estatemarkets and stock markets”, Real Estate Economics, V ol. 27, Iss. 3, p. 483 (33 pages)12.Pagliari, Jr. L. Joseph and James R. Webb (1995), “ A Fundamental Examination ofSecuritized and Unsecuritized Real Estate,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.4, 381-426.IV¡B law1. Campbell, D. Robert, C F Sirmans (2002), “Policy implications of structural options in the development of real estate investment trusts in Europe,” Journal of Property Investment & Finance, V ol. 20, Iss. 4, p. 388 (18 pages)2. Ott, L. Richard, Robert A Van Ness (2002), “An analysis of the impact of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 on the valuation of REITs and the adverse selection component of the bid/ask spread,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 8, Iss. 1, p. 55 (9 pages)V¡B Hedge1.Bond, T. Michael and James R. Webb (1995), “Real Estate versus Financial Asset Returns and Inflation: Can a P* Trading Strategy Improve REIT Investment Performance?” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.3, 327-334.2.Liang, Youguo, Arjun Chatrath, and James R. Webb (1996), “Hedged REIT Indices,” Journal of Real Estate Literature, V ol 4, 175-184.3.Liang, Youguo, Michael J Seiler, Arjun Chatrath (1998), “Are REIT returns hedgeable?” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol.16, Iss.1; p. 87 (11 pages)4.Seiler, J. Michael, James R. Webb and F.C.Neil Myer (1999), “Diversification issues in real estate investment,” Journal of Real Estate Literature, V ol.7, No.2, 163-179.5.Sing, Tien-Foo, Low, Yvonne Swee-Hiang (2000), “The inflation-hedging characteristics of real estate and financial assets in Singapore,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 6, Iss. 4, p. 373 (13 pages)6.Lu, Chiuling, So, W. Raymond (2001), ”The Relationship Between REITs Returns and Inflation: A Vector Error Correction Approach,” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, V ol. 16, Iss. 2, p. 1037.Yobaccio, Elizabeth, Jack H. Rubens and David C. Ketcham (1995), “ The Inflation-Hedging Properties of Risk Assets: The Case of REITS,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.3, 279-296.VI¡B Tax1. Goolsbee, Austan, Edward Maydew (2002),”Taxes and organizational form: The case of REIT spin-offs,” National Tax Journal, V ol. 55, Iss. 3, p. 441 (16 pages)VII¡B Others1.Below, D. Scott, Joseph K. Kiely and Willard Mcintosh (1995), “An Examination of Informed Traders and the Market Microstructure of Real Estate Investment Trusts”, The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.3, 335-361.2.Brown, T. David and Timothy J. Riddiough (2003), “Financing Choice and Liability Structure of real Estate Investment Trusts,” Real Estate Economics, V ol. 31, No.3, 313-346.3.Capozza, Dennis R. and Paul J.Seguin (2003), “Special Issue: Real Estate Investment Trusts Goreword from the Guest Editors,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 305-312.4.Chan, Su Han, John Erickson and Ko Wang (2001), “Are Real Estate IPOs a Different Species? Evidence from Hong Kong IPOs,” JRER, V ol.21, No.3, 201-220.5.Chopin C. Marc, Ross N. Dickens and Roger M. Shelor (1995), “ An Empirical Examination of Compensation of REIT Managers,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol.10 No.3, 263-276.6.Corgel, J. B., W. McIntosh and S. H. Ott. (1995), “Real Estate Investment Trusts: AReview of the Financial Economics Literature,” Journal of Real Estate Literature, V ol.3, No. 1, 13-437.Gentry, M. William, Deen Kemsley and Christopher J. Mayer 2003¡, “Dividend Taxes and Share Prices: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts,” The journal of Finance, V ol. L¢, No.1, 261-282.8.Ghosh, Chinmoy, Raja Nag, and C.F. Sirmans¡q2000¡r,¡ A Test of the Signaling Value of IPO Underpricing with REIT IPO-SEO Pairs,¡ The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 137-9.Glasock, John L. and Chinmoy Ghosh ¡q2000¡r,¡Introduction to the Special Issue: The Maturation of a Developing Industry¢w REITs in the 1990s,¡The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 87-10.Hughes, William T., and Susan M. Wachter¡q2000¡r,¡REIT Economics of Scale:Fact or Fiction? Brent W. Ambrose. Steven R. Ehrlich,¡ The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 213-11.McDonald, Cynthia G., Terry D. Nixon, and V. Carlos Slawson Jr¡q2000¡r,¡TheChanging Asymmetric Information Component of REIT Spreads: A Study of Anticipates Announcements, The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 195-12.Mueller, R. Glenn and Keith R. Pauley (1995), “ The Effect of Interest-Ratemovements on Real Estate Investment Trusts,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.3, 319-325.13.Terris, D. Darcey and F. C. Neil Myer (1995), “The Relationship betweenHealthcare REITS and Healthcare Stocks, The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.4, 483-494.14.Wang, Ko, John Erickson and Su Han Chan (1995), “Does the REIT Stock MarketResemble the General Stock Market?” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol10.No.4, 445-460.15.Young, S. Michael (2000), “REIT Property-Type Sector Integration,” Journal ofReal Estate Research, V ol 19.No.1, 3-21.VIII¡B Books1.Chan, Su Han, John Erickson and Ko Wang 2003¡, Real Estate Investment trust:Structure, Performance, and Investment Opportunities,1st edition,Oxford University Press, N.Y., N.Y.2.Davidson, Andrew, Anthony Sanders, Lan-Ling Wolff and Anne Cuing (2003),Securitizzation Structuring and Investment Analysis, CH 24 “The Role of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).3..Imperiale, Richard¡2002¡,J.K. Lasser Pro Real Estate Investment Trusts : newstrategies for portfolio management, 1st edition, John Wiley and Sons, N.Y., N.Y. 4.Lizieri, Colin and Charles Ward, Return Distribution in Finance, CH3 “Thedistribution of commercial real estate returns”, 47-74.T B1.ªH2001¡A m k n A A F Gg s D CBT-¤.tw/ k W i .tw/H U-«H U k W .tw/4laws.phpREIT /home.cfmJ-REIT http://www.tse.or.jp/english/cash/reit/qa.htmlx W V u A.tw/tw/se/revise.aspB Rating Agencies:FitchIBCA /Moody's S & P /。

房地产市场营销英文参考文献With the ever-increasing competition in the real estate market, effective marketing strategies have become crucial for developers and agents. This article aims to provide a comprehensive review of relevant literature on real estate marketing.1. Chen, Y., & Lin, T. (2017). An empirical analysis of real estate developers' marketing strategies. Journal of Real Estate Research, 39(2), 229-256.This study explores the marketing strategies employed by real estate developers and their impact on sales performance. The authors use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze survey data from developers across different regions. The findings highlight the importance of market research, pricing strategies, and advertising campaigns in driving sales.2. Krizek, K. J., & El-Geneidy, A. (2019). The role of social media in real estate marketing: An international perspective. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 34(1), 135-152.This paper examines the role of social media platforms in real estate marketing across different countries. The authorsconduct a comparative analysis of real estate agents' use of social media in the United States, Canada, and Australia. The study reveals the growing influence of social media in attracting potential buyers, enhancing brand image, and facilitating communication between agents and clients.3. Ong, S. E., & Ang, B. W. (2018). The impact of green marketing on real estate sales: A systematic review. Building and Environment, 141, 181-189.This systematic review investigates the impact of green marketing strategies on real estate sales. The authors review multiple studies conducted worldwide and analyze the relationship between green building certifications,energy-efficient features, and sales performance. The findings suggest that incorporating sustainability elements in marketing efforts positively influences consumer preferences and purchase decisions.4. Huang, Y., Li, Q., & Liu, C. (2019). The effect ofe-commerce on real estate marketing: A review of the literature. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, 76, 101471.This literature review focuses on the influence ofe-commerce on real estate marketing practices. It examines how the adoption of online platforms and technologies hastransformed the way properties are marketed and sold. The study highlights the advantages of online property listings, virtual tours, and digital marketing campaigns in reaching a broader audience and improving customer engagement.5. Wong, S. L., & Yau, S. S. (2016). Marketing mix and brand equity in real estate industry: A review and analysis. International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis, 9(3), 314-334.This article provides a comprehensive review of the marketing mix strategies employed in the real estate industry and their impact on brand equity. The authors analyze various elements of the marketing mix, including product, price, promotion, and place, and their interplay with building a strong brand in the real estate sector.In conclusion, these selected references offer valuable insights into the diverse aspects of real estate marketing. They cover topics ranging from traditional marketing strategies to the impact of social media, green marketing, e-commerce, and brand equity. Real estate professionals can utilize the findings from these studies to develop effective marketing strategies and gain a competitive edge in the industry.。

房地产期刊目录《地产》杂志隶属于中国证券市场研究设计中心旗下的财讯传媒集团（中国证券市场研究设计中心，前身为中国证券市场联合办公室，简称“联办”，成立于1989年，早期主要负责筹备中国上海及深圳证券交易所），是中国证券市场的先行者。

《地产》是中国目前惟一达到全国发行的房地产刊系，被公认为房地产杂志中的权威行业杂志。

新地产创立五年以来，就影响力、发行量、资讯量、内容品质等方面而言，已成为国内仅见的权威房地产综合性杂志。

北京市发报刊局月刊单价:20元总价:220元《成都楼市》杂志是“中国房地产协会”发起成立的“中国房地产杂志联盟”常务理事单位，位列目前国内房地产杂志综合竞争力排名前四强（2009年度），被国内外传媒同行及各房地产开发企业高度关注。

目前的《成都楼市》杂志是中国中西部地区房地产专业杂志的第一品牌。

成都楼市继续在新政余波的影响下呈现出了更为健康以及稳健的发展态势，为了更有利地应对市场，诸多开发商均调整了销售步伐与策略，保利、华润、龙湖、万科、蓝光、合景泰富、佳兆业、绿地等依然逆势热销，创造了一个又一个的销售奇迹。

市场的良好反馈表明，优质的产品和良好的口碑是品牌开发商麾下住宅作品逆市制胜的不二法宝。

《成都楼市》是成都市房产管理局房地产信息发布媒体，是整合成都市房产管理局数据资源，面向广大购房者的客观、权威、实用的购房资讯大全，是购房者必备的专业指导工具书。

《成都楼市》秉承客观、公正、专业的服务原则，结合成都市房地产交易中心交易数据分析，为购房者提供最新的楼市行情报道。

并以全方位的楼盘检索、全景式购房地图、客观专业的楼盘点评和超大篇幅的楼盘个案信息帮助购房者轻松完成购房初选。

半月刊单价2元总价48元《地产商》是一本以房地产业为核心的城市精英杂志，致力于打造成为中国地产杂志的旗帜，与时俱进的楼市百科全书。

在“专业性、前瞻性”的宗旨下，将以超强的策划能力，资源整合能力和优质服务，成就一个地产与传媒结合的强大平台。

清华经管王洪副教授简介王洪金融系副教授办公室伟伦楼340个人简介研究成果研究项目王洪，自2002至今，任清华大学经济管理学院副教授。

曾就读于美国麻省理工学院和清华大学、分别取得房地产理学硕士和建筑设计工学硕士，以及天津大学、获得建筑学工学学士。

曾任职于新加坡国立大学，欧美等国金融机构、顾问咨询机构及跨国公司。

英国剑桥大学访问学者，英国皇家特许测量师学会会士及杰出会员，美国城市土地学会会员，中华房地产投资开发商会高级顾问，中国房地产估价师与经纪人学会专家组成员，欧美同学会麻省理工学院北京校友会副会长并若干公司独立董事等。

王洪教授的主要研究领域包括：房地产金融与投资，房地产开发，城市经济与房地产市场，房地产公司发展战略与管理模式，房地产经纪，房地产法规，资产证券化，投资银行业务，国际资本市场，城市新区及开发区发展规划，互联网有关应用。

他近年承担的研究项目包括：“嘉化工业园五年(2011至2015)发展规划”，“滨海新区中心商务商业区的城市功能定位、建筑规模及发展模式研究”，“大型房地产集团发展战略及管理模式研究”，“国外房地产经纪行业现状和发展趋势研究”等。

王洪教授近年发表的中英文期刊论文包括："我国保险资金投资不动产的现状与问题",中国金融,1期,2010；"SpecialConsiderationsforDesigningPilotREITsinChina"<<房地产投资与金融学报>>(英)2009(V ol27:2)；"TestsofCommonRealEstateRiskPremiainaTime-VaryingExpectedReturnFramework",<<房地产投资与金融学报>>(英)2007(V ol25:4)；"国内外BOT项目融资方法比较",特区经济,2006年第5期；"试论我国房地产投资基金的发展",中国房地产,2003年第2期；"日本房地产泡沫的成因分析及对我国的经验借鉴",中国房地产金融,2003年第3期；"是谁吹起了日本房地产泡沫",中国投资,2001年第12期.会议论文包括："中国未来发展趋势与房地产长期潜在需求",上海中国房地产投资国际峰会英文主题报告，2006.12；"MarketSegmentationandStructuralMismatch:AffordabilityIssuesofHousinginBeijing,China",AsR ESTokyoConference,August2001；"ComparingMarketRiskPremiumforPropertyInvestments:SingaporevsBeijing",AsRESBeijingconf erence,July2000,获论文一等奖.编著译著包括：《专业技术人员创新案例读本》，中国传媒大学出版社，2010；"美国房地产交易及其资金安排",<<全国房地产行业发展峰会优秀论文集>>中国电力出版社,2008年7月；<<银行资本管理:资本配置和绩效测评>>译著,华章公司/机械工业出版社,2004年1月；<<应用公司理财>>译著(审校),及<<投资管理>>译著(审校),华章公司/机械工业出版社,2002年9月.王洪教授目前在清华讲授的课程主要包括：房地产开发与投资案例分析，房地产金融，房地产基础知识及热点问题研讨，公司理财，投资银行业务。

基于前景理论视角的房地产定价感知风险分析徐丽;简迎辉【摘要】房地产定价过程中的风险来源有很多，作为一种风险决策行为，主要的决策依据就是感知风险。

因此尝试从前景理论视角分析房地产定价过程中的感知风险，希望为房地产开发商制定价格策略提供帮助。

首先划分了房地产定价过程中的感知风险维度，然后根据前景理论构建了单一维度的感知风险函数，最后确定了房地产项目定价过程中的总体感知风险值，并进行了分析。

%There are many sources of real estate pricing risk.The perceived risk is the main basis of risk decision-making behavior.The perceived risk in the real estate pricing process was analyzed from the perspective of prospect theory, hoping to provide help to real estate developers to make pricing strategies.The dimensions of perceived risk in the real estate projects pri-cing process were divided at first;then a function of single dimension perceived risk was built; and finally the overall value of perceived risk in real estate pricing process was figured out and analyzed.【期刊名称】《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》【年(卷),期】2015(000)005【总页数】3页(P659-661)【关键词】房地产定价;感知风险;前景理论【作者】徐丽;简迎辉【作者单位】河海大学商学院，江苏南京 211100;河海大学商学院，江苏南京211100【正文语种】中文【中图分类】F293.3对房地产定价问题的研究十分必要，也取得了大量的研究成果，这些成果主要有张绍良等[1-5]对房地产定价问题进行了研究。

中文文献AB[]白积洋（2011）。

中国房地产市场的非理性繁荣:基于房地产投资特性的非平稳面板计量检验[J]。

北京科技大学学报(社会科学版)，27，3，91—98。

白霜（2008 ）。

房地产价格的决定因素分析—中国31个地区面板数据的实证研究[J]。

财经问题研究，8，107—110。

C陈婕、路静、高鹏，董纪昌（2009）。

人民币汇率波动与我国房价关系的实证分析[J]。

数学的实践与认识，39，73-79.陈章喜、黄准（2010）城市房价与失业率的关联性研究[J]。

南方人口，5，1-6。

蔡风景、李元、王慧敏（2008）。

CPI,REI,PPI和房地产价格传导研究来自上海的实证数据[J]。

南方经济，6,57-63。

崔光灿（2009）.房地产价格与宏观经济互动关系实证研究一基于我国31个省份面板数据分析[J]。

经济理论与经济管理，1，57-62D段忠东、曾令华（2008）.房价冲击、利率波动与货币供求:理论分析与中国的经验研究[J]。

世界经济., (12 ), 14-27.杜敏杰、刘霞辉（2007）。

人民币升值预期与房地产价格变动[J].世界经济，1，81-88.董藩、厉召龙（2011）。

利率政策对房价影响的实证研究:1998-2010 [J}.重庆理工大学学报(社会科学)，1,3-5。

EF丰雷、朱勇、谢经荣（2002）。

中国地产泡沫实证研究[J].管理世界，10，58-75.G高波、毛中根（2006）.汇率冲击与房地产泡沫演化:国际经验及中国的政策取向[J].经济理论与经济管理，7，38-43.高波、王辉龙（2011）。

长三角房地产价格波动与居民消费的实证分析[J]。

产业经济研究，11，1—10。

H黄忠华、吴次芳、杜雪君（2008）。

中国房价、利率与宏观经济互动实证研究[J]。

中国土地科学，7,35—39.胡小平（1995），我国通货膨胀的治理[J]。

金融研究，3，67-81.哈继铭（2005）。

CPI掩盖通胀压力[J]。

Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,21:2,141±152,2000142ALLEN,MADURA AND SPRINGERment strategy warrant the scrutiny of REIT managers in the analysis of their REITs'stock market risk exposure,but we®nd no evidence that interest-rate risk exposure is affected by the asset structure,®nancial leverage,management strategy,or degree of portfolio specialization.2.A brief literature review2.1.Interest rates in asset pricing theoryThe theory of®nancial asset pricing was initiated by Sharpe(1964)and Lintner(1965), who developed the capital asset pricing model(CAPM)to posit that a stock's excess return above the risk-free rate is conditioned on its systematic risk.Numerous related studies have attempted to further develop the theory of stock pricing.These studies can be broadly classi®ed into two categories.The®rst category represents attempts to use pricing models to determine whether the cross-sectional differences in returns of®rms can be explained by observable factors speci®c to the®rm.In particular,Fama and French(1993)developed a three-factor model, whereby a stock portfolio's excess return is a function of the sensitivity to the excess return on the market portfolio,a size factor,and a book value to market value factor.Other notable studies that focused on identifying factors that are systematically related to a ®rm's stock returns include those by Fama et al.(1993),Lakonishok et al.(1994),and Fama and French(1995,1996).While these studies have advanced the theory of asset-pricing,their empirical tests tend to focus on®rms with ordinary common stock and exclude REITs(for example,see Fama and French,1996).Therefore,the inferences that can be drawn about REITs as a result of these studies are limited.Furthermore,the model developed by these studies can not explain the stream of continuous returns experienced by a®rm or a portfolio because changes in the®rm-speci®c characteristics are not continuously observable.The second category of stock pricing studies attempts to explain the time series of continuous returns of a®rm or a portfolio.These studies normally focus on a particular type of®rm whose continuous returns may be driven by multiple external forces.Thus,the single-factor model derived from the CAPM is replaced by a multifactor model.In particular,Stone(1974)developed a two-factor pricing model for explaining stock returns that contained an interest-rate proxy to compliment the market proxy.The inclusion of an interest-rate proxy implies that the effect of an interest rate on the returns of some types of ®rms is not completely captured by the indirect effect(through their impact on the market's returns.)That is,some®rms may be more directly affected by interest-rate movements,and the most ef®cient way to capture those direct effects is to disentangle the market and interest-rate effects.The need for a two-factor model that separately captures interest-rate movements is supported by studies documenting an inverse relationship between in¯ationary expectations and stock returns.If changes in interest rates imply changes in in¯ationary expectations(see Fama,1976),then they should be inversely related to stock returns(see Bae,1990).REIT CHARACTERISTICS143 The two-factor model developed by Stone(1974)is most relevant for assessing the market value of®rms with operating characteristics that can cause a pronounced exposure to interest-rate movements.Various forms of the two-factor model have been applied by Lynge and Zumwalt(1980),Flannery and James(1984),Bae(1990),and others to explain the time series of returns for various types of®nancial institutions.Flannery and James argue that®rms holding®nancial assets should be more sensitive to interest-rate movements,especially when their maturity(and therefore their market pricing structure) of their liabilities differ from that of their®nancial assets.The short-term interest rate is considered as an extramarket factor in two-factor models because it may serve as a proxy for changes in the cost of funds for some®nancial institutions that heavily rely on deposits or other money-market instruments to®nance their assets.The long-term interest rate serves as an alternative extramarket proxy because it contains implied market expectations of interest rates in the future(forward rates),which may also imply a level of anticipated in¯ation.To the extent that the pricing of liabilities or assets of®nancial institutions are conditioned on changes in forward interest rates or anticipated in¯ation,a shift in the long-term interest rate may elicit the repricing of the ®nancial institution's value.While equity and mortgage REITs have their distinct characteristics,each type may be affected by interest-rate movements for the following reasons.First,because investment in real estate relies heavily on borrowed funds,the general value of real estate can be in¯uenced by the cost of®nancing,which affects affordability and demand.Thus,an upward movement in interest rates may result in reduced aggregate demand for real estate and lower valuations.Second,an increase in market-interest rates may also cause a higher cost of debt®nancing.Third,to the extent that real estate investors derive their required return on investments from a risk-free rate and a risk premium,an increase in market interest rates may result in a higher required rate of return by real estate investors,which converts to lower valuations.Fourth,the interest carry associated with the develop of real estate results in higher costs during a cycle of rising interest rates.The relationship between interest rates and equity REITs may be questionable because of the underlying forces that cause interest-rate movements.To the extent that lower interest rates result from weak economic conditions and low in¯ationary expectations,an increase in interest rates may re¯ect stronger economic growth,higher in¯ationary expectations,and upward pressure on real estate prices.These effects may offset the hypothesized inverse relationship between interest-rate movements and real estate values.Mortgage REITs generate a stream of cash¯ows that may be positively related to market interest rates when the®rms'outstanding loans carry¯oating rates.On the other hand,if adjustments in the commercial mortgage rate to the market interest rate is lagged,the present value of the cash-¯ow stream may be reduced due to the higher discount rate that results from an upward movement in market interest rates.In essence,the¯oating-rate mortgages behave like a money-market portfolio,exhibiting some exposure to upward interest rates,although the short duration limits the exposure.144ALLEN,MADURA AND SPRINGER2.2.REIT risk and performanceNumerous studies in the literature have considered REIT risk and performance.Of relevance to this study are previous results relating to the sensitivity of REIT returns to changes in interest rates and the stock market,the stability of REIT betas over time and the relationship between REIT return volatility and REIT characteristics.A recent study by Glascock et al.(2000)explores long-run linkages and causalitites among REIT,bond,and stock returns.They®nd substantive evidence that the REIT market changed in the early1990s.The returns on REITs,in general,and mortgage REITs, in particular,are cointegrated with the bond market prior to1996.Equity REITs are cointegrated with the bond market throughout their entire study period.They also®nd evidence that the returns on REITs and stocks have become more integrated since1992. Liang et al.(1995)consider the variability of REIT risk in a two-factor model and®nd that the market beta for equity REITs is relatively stable over time but that the market beta for mortgage REITs declined substantially over their1973to1989study period.Their results indicate that interest-rate betas tend to be insigni®cant for equity REITs and that mortgage REITs were especially sensitive to interest rates ing data from1972to1993,Mueller and Pauley(1995)®nd that equity REITs are less sensitive to interest-rate movements than stocks in general and conclude that equity REIT price movements are not signi®cantly related to interest-rate changes.Khoo et al.(1993) also®nd that betas of equity REITs change over time.They study14equity REITs from 1970to1989and®nd that equity REIT betas declined sharply over the study period.They show the variation of REIT betas to be the result of lower variability of equity REIT returns and argue that the decrease in the standard deviation of equity REIT returns is due to increased information regarding equity REITs.Various studies have pursued the effect of interest-rate changes on REITs.Chen and Tzang(1988)®nd that over their1973to1985study period,both mortgage and equity REITs are sensitive to interest-rate movements.For the1980to1985subperiod,both types of REITs showed sensitivity to changes in short-and long-term rates.For the1973to1979 subperiod,the REIT sample showed sensitivity only to long-term rates.The source of interest-rate sensitivity for equity REITs was changes in expected in¯ation,not the changes in real interest rates.Mortgage REITs were sensitive to changes in both expected in¯ation and real interest rates.The systematic risk of publicly traded REITs was analyzed by Gyourko and Nelling (1996).They estimate both asset and equity betas and then use these betas as the dependent variable in regressions where the independent variables are descriptive of the REIT's property-type composition and size.Similar regressions are run for geographic dispersion of a REIT's assets.The results show that systematic risk,as measured by asset or equity betas,differs across REITs depending on the type of property that the REIT owns.Khoo et al.(1993)illustrate that the relationship between diversi®cation and both interest rate and market betas differs by individual REITs.The primary conclusion to be drawn from the reviewed literature(and many articles that are not mentioned)is that empirical results regarding the composition of REIT risk varies over time and differs according to REIT characteristics.Individual risk components,suchREIT CHARACTERISTICS145 as market betas and interest-rate betas,will differ according to the estimation methodology,the study period,and the composition of the sample.In general,REIT returns are more sensitive to stock-market conditions than they are to interest-rate changes, and there is evidence that individual REIT characteristics affect REIT riskiness.3.Hypothesized in¯uences on the sensitivity of REIT returnsThis study makes two speci®c contributions to the existing research record.First,we extend the research regarding the sensitivity of REIT returns to stock-market and interest-rate changes to a more recent(1992to1996)time period than considered in earlier studies. As DeLisle(1995)argues,the REIT industry matured signi®cantly in the®rst half of the 1990s.Demand for REIT shares has increased dramatically in response to increased demand for securitized real estate.REITs now serve a``critically important capital formation function''for the real estate market(Decker,1995).REITs in the1992to1996 time period resemble regular operating companies much more than the REITs of earlier periods.Because the most recent published study to examine this issue uses a data series that ends in1993,our study considers the possibility that the sensitivity of REIT returns to stock market and interest-rate changes may have changed as the REIT market has progressed through its recent maturation process.Second,our analysis goes beyond simply testing for a relationship between REIT returns and stock-market and interest-rate changes by testing whether the sensitivity of REIT returns to stock-market and interest-rate changes is in¯uenced by various REIT characteristics.In particular,we consider how sensitivity to stock-market and interest-rate changes may vary across REITs as a function of their asset structure,®nancial leverage, management strategy,and/or the degree of specialization in their investment portfolios. Each of these factors is explained below.3.1.Asset structureWe propose that REITs that invest a larger proportion of their funds as equity investment in real estate are more exposed to general movements in real estate values.Thus,the values of these REITs are in¯uenced by the factors that drive real estate values,which may include stock-market conditions and market interest rates.Conversely,a lower proportion of funds invested in equity real estate implies a higher proportion invested in mortgages. Mortgage values are not expected to be as sensitive to stock-market conditions as equity investments in real estate(see Liang et al.,1995).Also,to the extent that mortgages have variable interest rates,their values are expected to be even less sensitive to interest-rate movements than equity investment in real estate.146ALLEN,MADURA AND SPRINGER3.2.Financial leverageFor REITs that commonly borrow a portion of the funds used to support their investment portfolios,®nancial leverage can magnify the®rms'investment returns when the return on the portfolio is adequately positive.However,leverage can also magnify a negative return on an investment portfolio,creating more pronounced losses.Therefore,the risk of a REIT is expected to be positively related to its degree of®nancial leverage.Mueller and Pauley (1995)suggest the possible relationship between REITs'interest-rate sensitivity and their asset and capital structure.3.3.Management strategyREITs may choose to self-manage their investment portfolios,either directly or through an af®liate,or they may choose to use the services of an independent management®rm. Consistent with previous studies,Capozza and Seguin(2000)®nd that self-managed REITs outperform externally managed REITs on a risk-adjusted basis.1The underperformance is attributed to the use of debt at above-market rates.Finally,as they®nd no differences between asset or business risk,they conclude that the risk differences between self-and externally managed REITs arise from®nancial risk.Whether or not self-or externally managed,REITs are exposed to potential problems arising from the misalignment of the interests of the owners and the management.To the extent that managerial compensation is based on performance,managerial self-interest may lead to strategies that incur more risk in an effort to enhance returns.Also,to the extent that self-managers are stakeholders, internal REIT managers are motivated to make decisions favorable to the REIT,whether through return enhancement or risk reduction.Because of the underlying complexities, there are no prior expectations for the impact of REIT management on REIT risk.3.4.Degree of specializationREITs vary widely as to their degree of specialization in speci®c types of property.A REIT that is heavily concentrated in a speci®c type of property may be able to focus on what it does best and therefore achieve a lower level of risk.A counterargument is that a REIT that does not specialize can diversify its investments across property types and therefore reduce overall risk exposure.The empirical relationship between risk and degree of specialization in the®rm's investment portfolio may in fact depend on whether an individual REIT has suf®cient expertise in the property types it holds and whether diversi®cation across property types generates additional diversi®cation bene®ts beyond those achieved through geographic diversi®cation.2Previous research suggests that efforts to diversify by property type are naive(Gyourko and Nelling,1996)or that the impacts of such diversi®cation bene®ts are speci®c to individual REITs(Khoo et al.,1993).Thus, there is a reasonable expectation that the degree of specialization has no impact on overall REIT risk.REIT CHARACTERISTICS147 4.DataThe data set used in this study consists of information regarding46publicly traded,tax-quali®ed REITs with adequate data over the60-month study period(26equity and20 nonequity REITs).Using NAREIT publications dated1993to1997,we identi®ed a list of publicly traded REITs.Numerous balance-sheet and asset/investment composition variables were collected from NAREIT and Moody's resources.Monthly stock returns covering the period January1992through December1996were obtained from Center for Research in Security Prices(CRSP)®les.In addition to monthly stock returns for each®rm for each month of the sample period, data were obtained from CRSP®les regarding the return on the S&P500Index during the study period.Historical information on two interest-rate variables,the yield on one-year and10-year constant maturity Treasury securities was obtained from Federal Reserve Board publications.5.Empirical analysisThe®rst step in our analysis is to estimate the sensitivity of REIT returns to changes in the market return and interest rates.To address potential differences between equity and nonequity REITs,the following system of equations is used:R E Y t b0 b1R M Y t b2i t u tR N Y t y0 y1R M Y t y2i t v t X 1In this system,R E Y t and R N Y t represent average monthly returns for portfolios of equity and nonequity REITs,respectively,R M Y t represents the market return,i t is the interest-rate index,b and y are the coef®cients to be estimated,and u t and v t are error terms.The seemingly unrelated regression(SUR)framework developed by Zellner(1962)is used to estimate the coef®cients in the system.Although the coef®cient estimates obtained from this technique are identical to equation-by-equation OLS,the technique allows testing of whether the estimated coef®cients differ signi®cantly across equations. Signi®cant differences in the coef®cient pairs would suggest that the returns to equity and nonequity REIT portfolios respond differently to market-return and interest-rate changes.Proxies are needed for each of the independent variables.The S&P500Composite Index is used to estimate stock-market returns.Two different interest-rate proxies are used to represent a long-term and short-term interest rate:the yield on10-year,constant-maturity Treasury securities and the yield on one-year,constants maturity Treasury securities.In anticipation of potential collinearity between the return to the market R m and changes in interest rates i,the model is orthogonalized by regressing the market-return proxy against each of the interest-rate proxies.The residuals from these regressions are used in the system in place of the observed market return.Table1presents results from the orthogonalized SUR model using the long-term interest-rate speci®cation in Panel A and the short-term interest-rate speci®cation in Panel B.The results from estimating both speci®cations of the system of equations suggest a signi®cant and positive relationship between changes in stock-market returns and nonequity REIT returns,and signi®cant and negative relationships between interest-rate changes and both equity and nonequity REIT portfolio returns.The insigni®cant market beta coef®cient for equity REITs is not expected but supports the idea that the REIT market structure has evolved.The signi®cant and positive market beta coef®cient for nonequity REITs is similar in magnitude to those of Liang et al.(1995),suggesting a stability in these betas extending to a more recent time period.Of special interest is the insigni®cant coef®cient for the market beta for equity REITs for both the long-and short-term interest-rate models.This result supports that of previous studies,which conclude there have been fundamental changes to the REIT market over time.Previous research has supported the concept that market betas have been declining. Khoo et al.(1993)show market betas declining substantially over the1970to1990time period.The decline in beta is attributed to an increase in information levels of market participants.Chen and Tzang(1988)show that market betas are lower for the1980to1985Table1.SUR results obtained by regressing REIT returns on changes in the market return and interest rates(t-statistics in parentheses).Panel A:Long-term Interest RatesGroup Intercept Market-ReturnCoef®cientInterest-RateCoef®cient R-squaredEquity REITs0.0140.180À0.43221.0percent(3.691)(1.108)(À4.172)*Nonequity REITsÀ0.0130.551À0.33417.2percent(2.764)(2.806)*(À2.674)*Note.Wald test for difference in interest rate coef®cients:0.6642(insigni®cant).Wald test for difference in market return coef®cients:3.8859(signi®cant at5percent level).Asterisks indicate signi®cance at the1percent level or higher.Panel B:Short-term Interest RatesGroup Intercept Market-ReturnCoef®cientInterest-RateCoef®cient R-squaredEquity REITs0.0160.238À0.23313.0percent(3.935)(1.404)(À3.062)*Nonequity REITs0.0150.532À0.26219.1percent(3.172)(2.756)*(À3.035)*Note.Wald test for difference in interest rate coef®cients:0.1204(insigni®cant).Wald test for difference in market return coef®cients:2.385(insigni®cant).Asterisks indicate signi®cance at the1percent level or higher. 148ALLEN,MADURA AND SPRINGERtime period compared to the 1973to 1979time period.Liang et al.(1995)show generally declining market betas from 1973through 1989.Wald tests con®rm that there is a signi®cant difference in the stock-market coef®cients across the equity and nonequity portfolios but no difference in the interest-rate coef®cients across the portfolios.The lack of a signi®cant difference between the interest-rate betas for equity and nonequity REITs is counter to previous research,which suggests a smaller interest-rate effect for equity REITs.The coef®cients suggest that both equity and nonequity REITs are more sensitive to long-term interest-rate changes than they are to changes in short-term interest rates.The second step in our analysis is to investigate the sensitivity of the returns to individual REITs to changes in stock market returns and interest rates.We ®t the following model to the individual REITs in the sample that have suf®cient data available (41®rms)using ordinary least squares to obtain an estimated coef®cient for both interest rate changes and stock market returns for each REIT:R j Y t b 0 b 1R M Y t b 2i t w t Y2where R j Y t represents the monthly return on the j th REIT,b 1represents the sensitivity of the j th REIT's returns to market returns,b 2represents the sensitivity of the j th REIT's returns to interest rates,and w is the error term.As in the earlier models,we conduct the analysis after orthogonalizing the data,and we consider both long-and short-term interest rates separately.The results from these regressions are not shown but are retained for use in the next step of the analysis.The ®nal step in our analysis is to attempt to measure if and how the risk of REITs is conditioned on various factors under the control of the ing the estimated stock-market and interest-rate coef®cients from the prior step to measure these types of risk for REITs,we estimate the following models for both long-and short-term interest rates.B 1Y j g 0 g 1Assets g 2Leverage g 3Management g 4Specialization w t B 2Y j g 0 g 1Assets g 2Leverage g 3Management g 4Specialization w t X In these equations,the independent variables are Assets ,which refers to the proportion of the REIT invested in equity real estate;Leverage,de®ned as the degree of ®nancial leverage of the REIT,measured as DebtDebt Equity ;Management ,a dummy variable taking the value 1if the REIT self-manages its investment portfolio;and Specialization ,de®ned as the sum of the squared proportions of the REIT's portfolio invested in each property type (close to one for specialized REITs).The dependent variables b 1and b 2are the sensitivities to market returns and interest rates,respectively.The results of our ordinary least-squares estimates for the three equations are shown in Table 2.In the market beta model for both long-and short-term interest rates,the coef®cient on Leverage is positive and signi®cant,supporting the hypothesis that the market risk of REITs is directly related to the ®rms'degree of ®nancial leverage.TheREIT CHARACTERISTICS149coef®cient on the Management variable is negative and signi®cant,suggesting that those REITs that self-manage their portfolios exhibit less market risk than REITs whose assets are externally managed.Both of these results support the ®ndings of Capozza and Seguin (2000),who ®nd that external REIT managers seem to negotiate above-market debt contracts,thus increasing ®nancial risk.The signi®cant coef®cient on Management also supports a conclusion that the interests of owners and management are aligned for self-managed REITs.The coef®cients on the Assets and Specialization variables are insigni®cant.The insigni®cance of Assets is conspicuous,given there are signi®cant differences in the market betas between equity and nonequity REITs.The insigni®cance of Specialization is not unexpected and supports previous research,which argues thatTable 2.OLS results obtained by regressing REITs'sensitivity to stock-market and interest-rate changes on various REIT characteristics (t -statistics in parentheses).Panel A:Long-term Interest RatesB marketB interestrates Constant 0.2290.009(0.501)(0.230)Assets 0.193À0.002(0.680)(À1.215)Leverage 0.843*0.004(2.542)(1.508)Management À0.678*À0.001(À3.167)(À0.058)Specialization À0.0480.002(À0.349)(0.074)R-squared31.6percent 15.0percent F-statistic (4,36)4.16*1.59Panel B:Short-term Interest RatesB marketB interestrates Constant 0.279À0.254(0.711)(À1.314)Assets 0.152À0.020(0.624)(À0.170)Leverage 0.805*À0.180(2.837)(1.282)Management À0.630*0.137(À3.439)(1.517)Specialization À0.0320.027(À0.106)(0.181)R-squared36.1percent 10.1percent F-statistic (4,36)5.08*1.02Note .Asterisks indicated signi®cance at the 5percent level or higher.150ALLEN,MADURA AND SPRINGERREIT CHARACTERISTICS151 diversi®cation across property types is a naive diversi®cation strategy.Overall,the models explain about one-third of the variation in market-risk levels among REITs in this sample. In the interest-rate risk models,none of the hypothesized factors are signi®cantly related to the estimated sensitivity of REIT returns to long-or short-term interest-rate changes. Although our results in the®rst portion of our analysis strongly indicate that REIT returns are related to interest-rate changes,the factors proposed in this study are not statistically signi®cant in explaining the variation in interest-rate sensitivity across our sample of REITs.6.Summary and implicationsOur analysis suggests that while REITs may not be able to completely isolate their performance from external forces such as economic and market conditions,they may be able to affect their exposure to these conditions to in¯uence their degree of market risk.In particular,REITs that minimize®nancial leverage can reduce the sensitivity of their returns to stock-market changes,as can®rms that self-manage their investment portfolios. We®nd strong evidence to suggest that REIT returns are sensitive to long-or short-term interest-rate changes,but we cannot conclude that REITs can affect their exposure to interest-rate changes through asset structure,®nancial leverage,management strategy,or degree of specialization.Although the results model presented in the®rst section of our analysis suggest that equity and nonequity REITs may differ with respect their general market-risk sensitivity,no evidence is found in our later analysis to suggest that asset allocation(equity real estate versus mortgage assets)affects a REITs exposure to stock-market or interest-rate changes.AcknowledgmentsThe authors wish to thank the participants of the1998ARES Meeting and an anonymous reviewer for their useful comments on earlier versions of this article.Notes1.Howe and Shilling(1990)found,over the1973to1987study period,that externally managed REITs had negative abnormal returns.Hsieh and Sirmans(1991)found,over a1968to1986study period,that noncaptive REITs outperformed captive REITs.Capozza and Seguin(2000)supports the results of both of these earlier studies.2.Ambrose et al.(2000)recently study a sample of41multifamily REITs and con®rm Gyourko and Nelling's (1996)result showing no signi®cant bene®t to geographic specialization.Bers and Springer(1997)using a traditional method to study potential economies of scale in the REIT industry®nd signi®cant evidence for scale economies and that controlling for differences in geographical concentration between REITs does not affect the measured scale economies.Geographic concentration/diversi®cation measures are not used in the present study.。

可以免费阅览的国外经济学杂志网址美国经济学联合会的（JEL）Journal of Economic Literature http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/aeajeclit/（JEP）Journal of Economic Perspectives http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/aeajecper/（AER）American Economic Review http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/aeaaecrev/芝加哥大学的（JB）Journal of Business http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/ucpjnlbus/（JLE）Journal of Labor Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/ucpjlabec/（JPE）Journal of Political Economy http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/ucpjpolec/（JB）Journal of Business http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/ucpjnlbus/Blackwell出版社的（JES）Journal of Economic Surveys http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/blajecsur/（JIE）Journal of Industrial Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/blajindec/（OBES）Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statisticshttp://econpapers.hhs.se/article/blaobuest/（RDE）Review of Development Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/blardevec/（RES）Review of Economic Studies http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/blarestud/（RIW）Review of Income and Wealth http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/blarevinw/（RIE）Review of International Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/blareviec/（AEP）Australian Economic Papers http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/blaausecp/牛津大学出版社的（OEP）Oxford Economic Papers http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/oupoxecpp/ Springer Berlin Heidelberg 的（PRS）Papers in Regional Science http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/sprpresci/（JPE）Journal of Population Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/sprjopoec/（RED）Review of Economic Design http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/sprreecde/（ET）Economic Theory http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/sprjoecth/（EE）Empirical Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/sprempeco/（JEE）Journal of Evolutionary Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/sprjoevec/ International Journal of Game Theory http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/sprjogath/MIT出版社的（QJE）The Quarterly Journal of Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/tprqjecon/ The Review of Economics & Statistics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/tprrestat/ Journal of Economics & Management Strategy http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/tprjemstr/RAND集团的RAND Journal of Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/rjerandje/Bell Journal of Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/rjebellje/American Real Estate Society 的Journal of Real Estate Research http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/jreissued/动态经济学会—学术出版社Academic Press for the Society for Economic Dynamics 的Review of Economic Dynamics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/redissued/金融研究学会—牛津大学出版社Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies Review of Financial Studies http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/ouprfinst/John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 的（JAE）Journal of Applied Econometrics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/jaejapmet/Taylor and Francis Journals 的（AE）Applied Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/tafapplec/（AFE）Applied Financial Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/tafapfiec/ International Journal of Finance & Economicshttp://econpapers.hhs.se/article/ijfijfiec/美联储系统高官董事会Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 的（FRB）Federal Reserve Bulletin http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/fipfedgrb/高官报告http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/fipfedgws/美国统计联合会American Statistical Association 的Journal of Business and Economic Statistics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/besjnlbes/加拿大经济学联合会Canadian Economics Association的Canadian Journal of Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/cjeissued/多伦多大学的Canadian Public Policy http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/cppissued/Kluwer Academic Publishers 的Computational Economics http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/kapcompec/数量经济学会Econometric Society的Econometrica http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/ecmemetrp/皇家经济学会Royal Economic Society 的Economic Journal http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/ecjeconjl/伦敦政治经济学院London School of Economics and Political Science 的Economica http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/blaeconom/McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought 的History of Economic Thought Articles http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/hayhetart/IMF的IMF Staff Papers http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/imfimfstp/Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association的International Economic Review http://econpapers.hhs.se/article/ieriecrev/。

SOCIAL SCIENCES CITATION INDEX—BUSINESS, FINANCE–JOURNAL LISTSSCI检索的商业金融类，一共84篇，加下划线的为著名的期刊1.ABACUS-A JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING FINANCE AND BUSINESS STUDIES2.ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH3.ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE4.ACCOUNTING HORIZONS5.ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY英国会计学会发行的会计学术期刊，简称AOS，通常与AR、JAR、JAE、CAR并称为会计五大期刊。

AOS偏好刊登field study类型的研究文章，且内容常常饶富哲学意涵（会计学顶级）6.ACCOUNTING REVIEW美国会计学会（AAA）发行的会计学术期刊，为会计三大期刊之一，简称AR（会计学顶级）-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES9.AUDITING-A JOURNAL OF PRACTICE & THEORYAAA发行的会计学术期刊(AAA审计部门的section journal)，专门刊登以审计相关议题为探讨主题的研究文章（会计学优良）10.AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW11.CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH加拿大会计学会发行的会计学术期刊，已与三大期刊并列first-tier之列，简称CAR （会计学顶级）12.EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW13.EUROPEAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW14.EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT15.EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE16.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS REVIEW17.FINANCE A UVER-CZECH JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE18.FINANCE AND STOCHASTICS19.FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS20.FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL21.FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT22.FINANZARCHIV23.FISCAL STUDIES24.FORBES25.GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE-ISSUES AND PRACTICE26.GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW27.IKTISAT ISLETME VE FINANS28.IMF ECONOMIC REVIEW29.INTERNATIONAL FINANCE30.INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW31.INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CENTRAL BANKING32.INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS33.INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE & ECONOMICS34.INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE35.INVESTMENT ANALYSTS JOURNAL36.JASSA-THE FINSIA JOURNAL OF APPLIED FINANCE37.JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICSRochester大学发行的会计学术期刊，为会计三大期刊之一，简称JAE（会计学顶级）38.JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND PUBLIC POLICY39.JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH （1.1）芝加哥大学发行的会计学术期刊，为会计三大期刊之一，简称JAR（会计学顶级）40.JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE41.JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE42.JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTINGBlackwell发行的财务及会计学术期刊，2005年列入SSCI（会计学不错）43.JOURNAL OF COMPUTATIONAL FINANCE44.JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE45.JOURNAL OF CREDIT RISK46.JOURNAL OF DERIVATIVES47.JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE48.JOURNAL OF FINANCE （2.8）（金融学最顶级）49.JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS50.JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMETRICS51.JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS （1.9）（金融学最顶级）52.JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION53.JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MARKETS54.JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH55.JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY56.JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS57.JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS58.JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT &ACCOUNTING59.JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE60.JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS61.JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING62.JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RISK63.JOURNAL OF PENSION ECONOMICS & FINANCE64.JOURNAL OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT65.JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS66.JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH67.JOURNAL OF RISK68.JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE69.JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY70.JOURNAL OF RISK MODEL VALIDATION71.MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING RESEARCH72.MATHEMATICAL FINANCE73.NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL全美租税学会(NT A)发行的租税学术期刊，专门刊登以政府财政相关议题为探讨主题的研究文章（会计学不错）74.NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE75.PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL76.QUANTITATIVE FINANCE77.REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS78.REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES由南加大发行的新兴会计学术期刊(公元1996年创刊)，以刊登分析性及实验的研究文章为主，已被认可为first-tier之列（会计学顶级）79.REVIEW OF DERIVATIVES RESEARCH80.REVIEW OF FINANCE81.REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES （1.3）（金融学最顶级）82.REVISTA ESPANOLA DE FINANCIACION Y CONTABILIDAD-SPANISHJOURNAL OF FINANCEAND ACCOUNTING83.WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW84.WORLD ECONOMY。

Open Journal of Legal Science 法学, 2023, 11(5), 4015-4020 Published Online September 2023 in Hans. https:///journal/ojls https:///10.12677/ojls.2023.115570房企破产中消费型购房者的权益保护张 艳，景 雪辽宁师范大学法学院，辽宁 大连收稿日期：2023年6月2日；录用日期：2023年6月20日；发布日期：2023年9月12日摘要 房地产企业破产中法律关系错综复杂，涉及到各债权人的利益分配和权衡，其中消费型购房者享有优于工程建设价款优先受偿权及抵押权受偿的权利。

在现房交易合同和期房交易合同下，消费型购房者的权益保护呈现出不同的标准和路径，区分两类合同下消费型购房者的权益保护问题可以更好地指导实践工作。

关键词房地产企业破产，消费型购房者，现房交易，期房交易Protection of the Rights and Interests of Consumer Buyers in the Bankruptcy of Real Estate EnterprisesYan Zhang, Xue JingSchool of Law, Liaoning Normal University, Dalian Liaoning Received: Jun. 2nd , 2023; accepted: Jun. 20th , 2023; published: Sep. 12th , 2023AbstractIn the bankruptcy of real estate enterprises, the legal relationship is complicated, which involves the distribution and balance of the interests of creditors. Among them, consumer buyers enjoy the priority over the project construction price and the right to be compensated by mortgage. Under the existing house transaction contract and the forward house transaction contract, the rights and interests protection of consumer buyers presents different standards and paths, and distinguish-ing the rights and interests protection of consumer buyers under the two types of contracts can better guide the practical work.张艳，景雪KeywordsBankruptcy of Real Estate Enterprises, Consumer Buyers, Existing Home Transactions, Forward House TransactionThis work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY 4.0)./licenses/by/4.0/1. 问题的提出房地产行业关乎国家的经济命脉，作为消费市场与金融衍生品市场交织的特殊市场，房地产行业牵一发而动全身，诸多行业因为房地产开发而受益，其很大程度上依赖于政策支持和市场前景。