当前位置:文档之家› 魔鬼经济学(英文版)

魔鬼经济学(英文版)

魔鬼经济学(英文版)
魔鬼经济学(英文版)

Freakonomics

bySteven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner

INTRODUCTION:The Hidden Side of Everything

5

Anyone living in the United States in the early 1990s and paying even a whisper of attention to the nightly news or a daily paper could be forgiven for having been scared

out of his skin.

The culprit was crime. It had been rising relentlessly—a graph plotting the crime rate in any American city over recent decades looked like a ski slope in profile—and it seemed

10

now to herald the end of the world as we knew it. Death by gunfire, intentional and

otherwise, had become commonplace. So too had carjacking and crack dealing, robbery

and rape. Violent crime was a gruesome, constant companion. And things were about to

get even worse. Much worse. All the experts were saying so.

15

The cause was the so-called superpredator. For a time, he was everywhere. Glowering from the cover of newsweeklies. Swaggering his way through foot-thick government

reports. He was a scrawny, big-city teenager with a cheap gun in his hand and nothing in

his heart but ruthlessness. There were thousands out there just like him, we were told, a

generation of killers about to hurl the country into deepest chaos.

20

In 1995 the criminologist James Alan Fox wrote a report for the U.S. attorney general that grimly detailed the coming spike in murders by teenagers. Fox proposed optimistic

and pessimistic scenarios. In the optimistic scenario, he believed, the rate of teen

homicides would rise another 15 percent over the next decade; in the pessimistic

scenario, it would more than double. “The next crime wave will get so bad,” he said,

“that it will make 1995 look like the good old days.”

25

Other criminologists, political scientists, and similarly learned forecasters laid out the same horrible future, as did President Clinton. “We know we’ve got about six years to

turn this juvenile crime thing around,” Clinton said, “or our country is going to be living

with chaos. And my successors will not be giving speeches about the wonderful

30

opportunities of the global economy; they’ll be trying to keep body and soul together for

people on the streets of these cities.” The smart money was plainly on the criminals.

And then, instead of going up and up and up, crime began to fall. And fall and fall and fall some more. The crime drop was startling in several respects. It was ubiquitous, with

every category of crime falling in every part of the country. It was persistent, with

incremental decreases year after year. And it was entirely unanticipated—especially by

35

the very experts who had been predicting the opposite.

The magnitude of the reversal was astounding. The teenage murder rate, instead of rising 100 percent or even 15 percent as James Alan Fox had warned, fell more than 50 percent

within five years. By 2000 the overall murder rate in the United States had dropped to its

40

lowest level in thirty-five years. So had the rate of just about every other sort of crime,

from assault to car theft.

Even though the experts had failed to anticipate the crime drop—which was in fact well under way even as they made their horrifying predictions—they now hurried to explain it.

Most of their theories sounded perfectly logical. It was the roaring 1990s economy, they

45

said, that helped turn back crime. It was the proliferation of gun control laws, they said. It

was the sort of innovative policing strategies put into place in New York City, where

murders would fall from 2,245 in 1990 to 596 in 2003.

These theories were not only logical; they were also encouraging, for they attributed the crime drop to specific and recent human initiatives. If it was gun control and clever police

50

strategies and better-paying jobs that quelled crime—well then, the power to stop

criminals had been within our reach all along. As it would be the next time, God forbid,

that crime got so bad.

These theories made their way, seemingly without question, from the experts’ mouths to journalists’ ears to the public’s mind. In short course, they became conventional wisdom.

55

There was only one problem: they weren’t true.

There was another factor, meanwhile, that had greatly contributed to the massive crime drop of the 1990s. It had taken shape more than twenty years earlier and concerned a

young woman in Dallas named Norma McCorvey.

Like the proverbial butterfly that flaps its wings on one continent and eventually causes a hurricane on another, Norma McCorvey dramatically altered the course of events without

60

intending to. All she had wanted was an abortion. She was a poor, uneducated, unskilled,

alcoholic, drug-using twenty-one-year-old woman who had already given up two children

for adoption and now, in 1970, found herself pregnant again. But in Texas, as in all but a

few states at that time, abortion was illegal. McCorve y’s cause came to be adopted by

65

people far more powerful than she. They made her the lead plaintiff in a class-action

lawsuit seeking to legalize abortion. The defendant was Henry Wade, the Dallas County

district attorney. The case ultimately made it to the U.S. Supreme Court, by which time

McCorvey’s name had been disguised as Jane Roe. On January 22, 1973, the court ruled

in favor of Ms. Roe, allowing legalized abortion throughout the country. By this time, of

70

course, it was far too late for Ms. McCorvey/Roe to have her abortion. She had given

birth and put the child up for adoption. (Years later she would renounce her allegiance to

legalized abortion and become a pro-life activist.)

So how did Roe v. Wade help trigger, a generation later, the greatest crime drop in recorded history?

75

As far as crime is concerned, it turns out that not all children are born equal. Not even close. Decades of studies have shown that a child born into an adverse family

environment is far more likely than other children to become a criminal. And the millions

of women most likely to have an abortion in the wake of Roe v. Wade—poor, unmarried,

and teenage mothers for whom illegal abortions had been too expensive or too hard to

80

get—were often models of adversity. They were the very women whose children, if born,

would have been much more likely than average to become criminals. But because of

Roe v. Wade, these children weren’t being born. This powerful cause would have a

drastic, distant effect: years later, just as these unborn children would have entered their

criminal primes, the rate of crime began to plummet.

85

It wasn’t gun control or a strong economy or new police strategies that finally blunted the American crime wave. It was, among other factors, the reality that the pool o f potential

criminals had dramatically shrunk.

Now, as the crime-drop experts (the former crime doomsayers) spun their theories to the media, how many times did they cite legalized abortion as a cause?

90

Zero.

It is the quintessential blend of commerce and camaraderie: you hire a real-estate agent to sell your home.

95

She sizes up its charms, snaps some pictures, sets the price, writes a seductive ad, shows the house aggressively, negotiates the offers, and sees the deal through to its end. Sure,

it’s a lot of work, but she’s getting a nice cut. On the sale of a $300,000 house, a typical 6

percent agent fee yields $18,000. Eighteen thousand dollars, you say to yourself: that’s a

lot of money. But you also tell yourself that you never could have sold the house for

100

$300,000 on your own. The agent knew how to—what’s that phrase she used?—

“maximize the house’s value.” She got you top dollar, right?

Right?

A real-estate agent is a different breed of expert than a criminolo-gist, but she is every bit

the expert. That is, she knows her field far better than the layman on whose behalf she is

105

acting. She is better informed about the house’s value, the state of the housing market,

even the buyer’s frame of mind. You depend on her for this information. That, in fact, is

why you hired an expert.

As the world has grown more specialized, countless such experts have made themselves similarly indispensable. Doctors, lawyers, contractors, stockbrokers, auto mechanics,

mortgage brokers, financial planners: they all enjoy a gigantic informational advantage.

110

And they use that advantage to help you, the person who hired them, get exactly what

you want for the best price.

Right?

It would be lovely to think so. But experts are human, and humans respond to incentives. 115

How any given exp ert treats you, therefore, will depend on how that expert’s incentives

are set up. Sometimes his incentives may work in your favor. For instance: a study of

California auto mechanics found they often passed up a small repair bill by letting failing

cars pass emissions inspections—the reason being that lenient mechanics are rewarded

with repeat business. But in a different case, an expert’s incentives may work against

120

you. In a medical study, it turned out that obstetricians in areas with declining birth rates

are much more likely to perform cesarean-section deliveries than obstetricians in growing

areas—suggesting that, when business is tough, doctors try to ring up more expensive

procedures.

It is one thing to muse about experts’ abusing their position and another to prove it. The 125

best way to do so would be to measure how an expert treats you versus how he performs

the same service for himself. Unfortunately a surgeon doesn’t operate on himself. Nor is

his medical file a matter of public record; neither is a n auto mechanic’s repair log for his

own car.

Real-estate sales, however, are a matter of public record. And real-estate agents often do 130

sell their own homes. A recent set of data covering the sale of nearly 100,000 houses in

suburban Chicago shows that more than 3,000 of those houses were owned by the agents

themselves.

Before plunging into the data, it helps to ask a question: what is the real-estate agent’s incentive when she is selling her own home? Simple: to make the best deal possible.

135

Presumably this is also your incentive when you are selling your home. And so your

incentive and the real-estate agent’s incentive would seem to be nicely aligned. Her

commission, after all, is based on the sale price.

But as incentives go, commissions are tricky. First of all, a 6 percent real-estate commission is typically split between the seller’s agent and the buyer’s. Each agent then

140

kicks back half of her take to the agency. Which means that only 1.5 percent of the

purchase price goes directly into your agent’s pocket.

So on the sale of your $300,000 house, her personal take of the $18,000 commission is $4,500. Still not bad, you say. But what if the house was actually worth more than

$300,000? What if, with a little more effort and patience and a few more newsp aper ads,

145

she could have sold it for $310,000? After the commission, that puts an additional $9,400

in your pocket. But the agent’s additional share—her personal 1.5 percent of the extra

$10,000—is a mere $150. If you earn $9,400 while she earns only $150, maybe your

incentives aren’t aligned after all. (Especially when she’s the one paying for the ads and

doing all the work.) Is the agent willing to put out all that extra time, money, and energy

150

for just $150?

There’s one way to find out: measure the diffe rence between the sales data for houses that belong to real-estate agents themselves and the houses they sold on behalf of clients.

Using the data from the sales of those 100,000 Chicago homes, and controlling for any

number of variables—location, age and quality of the house, aesthetics, and so on—it

155

turns out that a real-estate agent keeps her own home on the market an average of ten

days longer and sells it for an extra 3-plus percent, or $10,000 on a $300,000 house.

When she sells her own house, an agent holds out for the best offer; when she sells yours,

she pushes you to take the first decent offer that comes along. Like a stockbroker

churning commissions, she wants to make deals and make them fast. Why not? Her share 160

of a better offer—$150—is too puny an incentive to encourage her to do otherwise.

Of all the truisms about politics, one is held to be truer than the rest: money buys elections. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Michael Bloomberg, Jon Corzine—these are but a

165

few recent, dramatic examples of the truism at work. (Disregard for a moment the

contrary examples of Howard Dean, Steve Forbes, Michael Huffington, and especially

Thomas Golisano, who over the course of three gubernatorial elections in New York

spent $93 million of his own money and won 4 percent, 8 percent, and 14 percent,

respectively, of the vote.) Most people would agree that money has an undue influence on 170

elections and that far too much money is spent on political campaigns.

Indeed, election data show it is true that the candidate who spends more money in a campaign usually wins. But is money the cause of the victory?

It might seem logical to think so, much as it might have seemed logical that a booming 1990s economy helped reduce crime. But just because two things are correlated does not 175

mean that one causes the other. A correlation simply means that a relationship exists

between two factors—let’s call them X and Y—but it tells you nothing about the

direction of that relationship. It’s possible that X causes Y; it’s also possible that Y

causes X; and it may be that X and Y are both being caused by some other factor, Z.

Think about this correlation: cities with a lot of murders also tend to have a lot of police 180

officers. Consider now the police/murder correlation in a pair of real cities. Denver and

Washington, D.C., have about the same population—but Washington has nearly three

times as many police as Denver, and it also has eight times the number of murders.

Unless you have more information, however, it’s hard to say what’s causing what.

Someone who didn’t know better might contemplate these figures and conclude that it is

185

all those extra police in Washington who are causing the extra murders. Such wayward

thinking, which has a long history, generally provokes a wayward response. Consider the

folktale of the czar who learned that the most disease-ridden province in his empire was

also the province with the most doctors. His solution? He promptly ordered all the

doctors shot dead.

190

Now, returning to the issue of campaign spending: in order to figure out the relationship between money and elections, it helps to consider the incentives at play in campaign

finance. Let’s say you are the kind of person who might contribute $1,000 to a candidate.

Chances are you’ll give the money in one of two situations: a close race, in which you

think the money will influence the outcome; or a campaign in which one candidate is a

195

sure winner and you would like to bask in reflected glory or receive some future in-kind

consideration. The one candidate you won’t contribute to is a sure loser. (Just ask any

presidential hopeful who bombs in Iowa and New Hampshire.) So front-runners and

incumbents raise a lot more money than long shots. And what about spending that

money? Incumbents and front-runners obviously have more cash, but they only spend a

200

lot of it when they stand a legitimate chance of losing; otherwise, why dip into a war

chest that might be more useful later on, when a more formidable opponent appears?

Now picture two candidates, one intrinsically appealing and the other not so. The appealing candidate raises much more money and wins easily. But was it the money that

won him the votes, or was it his appeal that won the votes and the money?

205

That’s a crucial question but a very hard one to answer. Voter appeal, after all, isn’t easy to quantify. How can it be measured?

It can’t, really—except in one special case. The key is to measure a candidate against…himself. That is, Candidate A today is likely to be similar to Candidate A two o r

four years hence. The same could be said for Candidate B. If only Candidate A ran

against Candidate B in two consecutive elections but in each case spent different amounts 210

of money. Then, with the candidates’ appeal more or less constant, we could measure the

money’s impact.

As it turns out, the same two candidates run against each other in consecutive elections all the time—indeed, in nearly a thousand U.S. congressional races since 1972. What do

the numbers have to say about such cases?

215

Here’s the surprise: the amount of money spent by the candidates hardly matters at all. A winning candidate can cut his spending in half and lose only 1 percent of the vote.

Meanwhile, a losing candidate who doubles his spending can expect to shift the vote in his favor by only that same 1 percent. What really matters for a political candidate is not

220

how much you spend; what matters is who you are. (The same could be said—and will be

said, in chapter 5—about parents.) Some politicians are inherently attractive to voters and

others simply aren’t, and no amount of money can do much about it. (Messrs. Dean,

Forbes, Huffington, and Golisano already know this, of course.)

And what about the other half of the election truism—that the amount of money spent on campaign finance is obscenely huge? In a typical election period that includes campaigns

225

for the presidency, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, about $1 billion is spent

per year—which sounds like a lot of money, unless you care to measure it against

something seemingly less important than democratic elections.

It is the same amount, for instance, that Americans spend every year on chewing gum. 230

This isn’t a book about the cost of chewin g gum versus campaign spending per se, or about disingenuous real-estate agents, or the impact of legalized abortion on crime. It will

certainly address these scenarios and dozens more, from the art of parenting to the

235

mechanics of cheating, from the inner workings of the Ku Klux Klan to racial

discrimination on The Weakest Link. What this book is about is stripping a layer or two

from the surface of modern life and seeing what is happening underneath. We will ask a

lot of questions, some frivolous and some about life-and-death issues. The answers may

often seem odd but, after the fact, also rather obvious. We will seek out these answers in

the data—whether those data come in the form of schoolchildren’s test scores or N ew

240

York City’s crime statistics or a crack dealer’s financial records. (Often we will take

advantage of patterns in the data that were incidentally left behind, like an airplane’s

sharp contrail in a high sky.) It is well and good to opine or theorize about a subject, as

humankind is wont to do, but when moral posturing is replaced by an honest assessment

245

of the data, the result is often a new, surprising insight.

Morality, it could be argued, represents the way that people would like the world to work—whereas economics represents how it actually does work. Economics is above all

a science of measurement. It comprises an extraordinarily powerful and flexible set of

tools that can reliably assess a thicket of information to determine the effect of any one

250

fac tor, or even the whole effect. That’s what “the economy” is, after all: a thicket of

information about jobs and real estate and banking and investment. But the tools of

economics can be just as easily applied to subjects that are more—well, more interesting.

This book, then, has been written from a very specific worldview, based on a few fundamental ideas:

255

Incentives are the cornerstone of modern life. And understanding them—or, often, ferreting them out—is the key to solving just about any riddle, from violent crime to

sports cheating to online dating.

The conventional wisdom is often wrong.Crime didn’t keep soaring in the 1990s, money alone doesn’t win elections, and—surprise—drinking eight glasses of water a day has

260

never actually been shown to do a thing for your health. Conventional wisdom is often

shoddily formed and devilishly difficult to see through, but it can be done.

Dramatic effects often have distant, even subtle, causes. The answer to a given riddle is not always right in front of you. Norma McCorvey had a far greater impact on crime than

did the combined forces of gun control, a strong economy, and innovative police

265

strategies. So did, as we shall see, a man named Oscar Danilo Blandon, aka the Johnny

Appleseed of Crack.

“Experts”—from criminologists to real-estate agents—use their informational advantage to serve their own agenda. However, they can be beat at their own game. And in the face

of the Internet, their informational advantage is shrinking every day—as evidenced by,

270

among other things, the falling price of coffins and life-insurance premiums.

Knowing what to measure and how to measure it makes a complicated world much less so. If you learn how to look at data in the right way, you can explain riddles that

otherwise might have seemed impossible. Because there is nothing like the sheer power

of numbers to scrub away layers of confusion and contradiction.

275

So the aim of this book is to explore the hidden side of…everything. This may occasionally be a frustrating exercise. It may sometimes feel as if we are peering at the

world through a straw or even staring into a funhouse mirror; but the idea is to look at

many different scenarios and examine them in a way they have rarely been examined. In

some regards, this is a strange concept for a book. Most books put forth a single theme,

280

crisply expressed in a sentence or two, and then tell the entire story of that theme: the

history of salt; the fragility of democracy; the use and misuse of punctuation. This book

boasts no such unifying theme. We did consider, for about six minutes, writing a book

that would revolve around a single theme—the theory and practice of applied

microeconomics, anyone?—but opted instead for a sort of treasure-hunt approach. Yes,

285

this approach employs the best analytical tools that economics can offer, but it also

allows us to follow whatever freakish curiosities may occur to us. Thus our invented field

of study: Freakonomics. The sort of stories told in this book are not often covered in

Econ. 101, but that may change. Since the science of economics is primarily a set of

tools, as opposed to a subject matter, then no subject, however offbeat, need be beyond

290

its reach.

It is worth remembering that Adam Smith, the founder of classical economics, was first and foremost a philosopher. He strove to be a moralist and, in doing so, became an

economist. When he published The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759, modern

capitalism was just getting under way. Smith was entranced by the sweeping changes

295

wrought by this n ew force, but it wasn’t only the numbers that interested him. It was the

human effect, the fact that economic forces were vastly changing the way a person

thought and behaved in a given situation. What might lead one person to cheat or steal

while another didn’t? How would one person’s seemingly innocuous choice, good or bad,

affect a great number of people down the line? In Smith’s era, cause and effect had begun

300

to wildly accelerate; incentives were magnified tenfold. The gravity and shock of these

changes were as overwhelming to the citizens of his time as the gravity and shock of

modern life seem to us today.

Smith’s true subject was the friction between individual desire and societal norms. The economic historian Robert Heilbroner, writing in The Worldly Philosophers, wondered

305

how Smith was able to separate the doings of man, a creature of self-interest, from the

greater moral plane in which man operated. “Smith held that the answer lay in our ability

to put ourselves in the position of a third person, a n impartial observer,” Heilbroner

wrote, “and in this way to form a notion of the objective…merits of a case.”

Consider yourself, then, in the company of a third person—or, if you will, a pair of third 310

people—eager to explore the objective merits of interesting cases. These explorations

generally begin with the asking of a simple unasked question. Such as: what do

schoolteachers and sumo wrestlers have in common?

超爆魔鬼经济学读后感

<超爆魔鬼经济学>读后感 很早以前,就在亚马逊和当当网的畅销书排行榜上看到了<魔鬼经济学>一书,但一直没有时间认真品读.真正空闲下来之后,<魔鬼经济学>的续篇<超爆魔鬼经济学>却在不经意间深深的吸引了我.的确,仅凭这是比尔-盖茨新建的个人网站上重点推荐阅读的唯一一本书,也足以说明这本书的与众不同之处. 在迫不及待的读完全书之后,可以用八个字来形容我对全书的感受:构思新颖,妙趣横生.可谓处处闪现着智慧的光芒.作为一个刚刚接触经济学两年时间左右的大学生, <超爆魔鬼经济学>对我的思维方式的冲击是颠覆性的.完全改变了自己以往所认识的经济学,体会到了经济学除了貌似高深的理论和复杂的数学推导之外,竟然可以如此的精彩,竟然和我们的生活是如此的息息相关.它不仅让我认识到了自己思维中的很多缺陷,同时也让我知道了独立思考和用打破常规思维的方式去解决问题的重要性. 一.首先介绍一下整本书的主要内容: 全书可分为序言和五个章节: (1)在序言中,作者主要提到了以下几个话题: 话题一:酒后步行比酒后驾车危险。 话题二:电视提高了印度女性的人权平等意识。 话题三:从环境污染和危险性上看,马车的危害大大超过汽车。 话题四:鲨鱼并不像人们想象的那么致命。 序言以看似简单的四个问题的提出及回答,奠定了全书的写作模式.即在每章开篇时提出一个令人震惊或古怪的论断,乍看之下,似乎有违情理.随后,随着文章内容的展开,作者就会给读者提供很多基础统计数据,使得作者先前提出的论断显得合情合理. 通过四个问题,作者想告诉我们:一、不要完全相信一直在培养你常识的媒体; 二、在大部分问题上,统计学的数字并不能说明问题,要具体问题具体分析;三、主观臆断往往是不准确的,尤其是当你试图比较两种因时间或空间的原因而无法同时存在的事物时;四、要学会发现事物的相互联系(印度妇女通过电视接触到了国外的自由思想)。 (2)第一章:这一章的题目很长,而且还颇具吸引力:“遏制气候变暖:火山爆发?用烟囱捅破天?还是架一根18英里长的管子?” 从题目就可以看出本章讨论的问题和作者将要提出的超出常规的解决方法了.首先,认识了一个很牛的人--内森梅尔沃德.这个孩子被火山和地壳的各种神奇现象点燃后,14岁高中毕业,经过一阵子学习后进入普林斯顿大学深造,23岁时拿了一个学士学位和两个硕士学位,之后又晃悠到剑桥去从事量子力学研究。在普林斯顿读研究生时,圣海伦火山(位于华盛顿附近)爆发了,由于威力巨大,使得3000英里外的他的大学宿舍窗子上都有火山灰,于是这个家伙开始迷恋上了地球工程学,并从此在心中埋下了要玩转地球的种子。之后,虽然他很长一段时间在微软当CEO,不过等到赚够了钱以后(上了《福布斯》富豪榜),他终于退出微软,自己捣鼓起自己儿时的梦想来。 于是,我了解到一个公司:由Nathan Myhrvold创办的名叫“高智发明”的公司。这个公司很牛,不仅是因为有一个牛老板,而且其成员个个是异想天开又

超爆魔鬼经济学读后感

<超爆魔鬼经济学>读后感 很早以前,就在亚马逊和当当网的畅销书排行榜上看到了<魔鬼经济学>一书, 但一直没有时间认真品读.真正空闲下来之后,<魔鬼经济学>的续篇<超爆魔鬼经济学>却在不经意间深深的吸引了我.的确,仅凭这是比尔-盖茨新建的个人网站上重点推荐阅读的唯一一本书, 也足以说明这本书的与众不同之处. 在迫不及待的读完全书之后, 可以用八个字来形容我对全书的感受: 构思新颖,妙趣横生.可谓处处闪现着智慧的光芒.作为一个刚刚接触经济学两年时间左右的大学生, <超爆魔鬼经济学>对我的思维方式的冲击是颠覆性的. 完全改变了自己以往所认识的经济学, 体会到了经济学除了貌似高深的理论和复杂的数学推导之外,竟然可以如此的精彩,竟然和我们的生活是如此的息息相关. 它不仅让我认识到了自己思维中的很多缺陷, 同时也让我知道了独立思考和用打破常规思维的方式去解决问题的重要性. 一.首先介绍一下整本书的主要内容: 全书可分为序言和五个章节: (1)在序言中,作者主要提到了以下几个话题: 话题一:酒后步行比酒后驾车危险。 话题二:电视提高了印度女性的人权平等意识。话题三:从环境污染和危险性上看,马车的危害大大超过汽车。话题四:鲨鱼并不像人们想象的那么致命。 序言以看似简单的四个问题的提出及回答, 奠定了全书的写作模式. 即在每章开篇时提出一个令人震惊或古怪的论断,乍看之下,似乎有违情理.随后,随着文章内容的展开, 作者就会给读者提供很多基础统计数据,使得作者先前提出的论断显得合情合理. 通过四个问题,作者想告诉我们:一、不要完全相信一直在培养你常识的媒体; 二、在大部分问题上,统计学的数字并不能说明问题,要具体问题具体分析;三、主观臆断往往是不准确的,尤其是当你试图比较两种因时间或空间的原因而无法同时存在的事物时;四、要学会发现事物的相互联系(印度妇女通过电视接触到了国外的自由思想)。 (2)第一章: 这一章的题目很长,而且还颇具吸引力:“遏制气候变暖:火山爆发?用烟囱捅破天?还是架一根18 英里长的管子?” 从题目就可以看出本章讨论的问题和作者将要提出的超出常规的解决方法了. 首先,认识了一个很牛的人-- 内森梅尔沃德.这个孩子被火山和地壳的各种神奇现象点燃后,14 岁高中毕业,经过一阵子学习后进入普林斯顿大学深造,23 岁时拿了一个学士学位和两个硕士学位,之后又晃悠到剑桥去从事量子力学研究。在普林斯顿读研究生时,圣海伦火山(位于华盛顿附近)爆发了,由于威力巨大,使得3000 英里外的他的大学宿舍窗子上都有火山灰,于是这个家伙开始迷恋上了地球工程学, 并从此在心中埋下了要玩转地球的种子。之后,虽然他很长一段时间在微软当CEO,不过等到赚够了钱以后(上了《福布斯》富豪榜),他终于退出微软,自己捣鼓起自己儿时的梦想来。 于是,我了解到一个公司:由Nathan Myhrvold 创办的名叫“高智发明”的公司。这个公司很牛,不仅是因为有一个牛老板,而且其成员个个是异想天开又富于实践精神的。激光射蚊子、温控海洋阻止飓风形成、送人造卫星上天以及帮国家搞国防都不在话下。现在,这么个很牛的公司盯上了二十一世纪最牛的环境问题——气候变暖上。于是,才有了本章后面那些奇思妙想。 第一章起始,作者并未开门见山,而是爆料:20世纪70年代中期,人们关心的反而是全球变冷问题。从这一信息入手,文章逐渐过渡到正轨。作者此时引用了一个经济

《魔鬼经济学》读书笔记

《魔鬼经济学》读书笔记 《魔鬼经济学》(Freakonomics),史蒂芬·列维特&史蒂芬·都伯纳著。 第一章:学校老师跟相扑运动员之间有何共同之处 1、欺骗是一种经济行为:更小的成本,更大的收益。 2、行为的动机:经济动机、社会动机和道德动机。不同的机制会导致人们按照不同的动机行事。案例:以小额罚款来遏制幼儿园家长迟到问题,实际上将取得相反的效果。因为之前人们尽量不迟到是基于一种社会和道德动机,但是有罚款制度之后,人们将用罚款来“购买迟到的权利”,行为将尊崇经济动机。(I:这是行为经济学中典型的锚定问题) 3、可以通过数据分析等数学方法来发现欺骗行为的存在。相扑运动也存在欺骗行为(比赛放水)。 4、一个自觉付款购买甜饼的案例,说明欺骗行为是广泛存在的,同时也证明了“人类内在的诚信问题”:“无论一个人有多么自私,他都会坚守一些原则,去维护别人的利益,让别人感到幸福,虽然他可能并不会从中获得什么(亚当·斯密《道德情操论》)。”甜饼付款的数据表明,当一个人知道自己的所作所为不会被人察觉的时候,他仍有87%的概率控制住自己不去做邪恶的事情。(I:未必,如果考虑风险,可能很多人不作恶,只是因为他们觉得从期望上来说,偷一个甜饼的收益是负的。如果不是甜饼,而是钻石,可能这个不作恶的概率会极大下降,因为收益期望极大提高了) 第二章:三K党跟房地产经纪人之间有何共同之处 本章主要讨论了信息不对称的问题:拥有更多的信息就拥有更多的主动权,比如对价格的制定。博弈论的一些基本知识,无新意。 案例1:戴维森·肯尼迪通过公布3K党的“秘密信息”,有效打击了3K党。 案例2:由于有网站将各家保险公司在定期寿险的价格做了详细的搜集和对比,导致了这一项目的价格出现了大幅下滑,因为在这种情况下,为了争得客户,除了降价别无他法。 案例3:地产广告问题,说明:从信息传播的角度,比较具体而直接的广告语会更加促进消费。 案例4:针对大型约会网站上个人资料的分析:大部分人喜欢吹牛,夸大自己的实际情况,比如相貌和经济收入。自称金发的女性远超出美国的平均水平(大多数人只是染的而已)。 第三章:为什么毒品贩子仍然跟自己的妈妈住在一起 本章实际上讨论了两个主题。 主题一:“传统智慧”——人们经常会把那些便利的,以及与我们的个人利益联系在一起的事物认定为真理,并努力拒绝那些让我们感到不适或跟我们的生活常识格格不入的东西。另一方面,我们又总是会接受那些有助于提升我们自尊的东西(约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯John Kenneth Galbraith)。实际上这个概念类似于“信息制造真像”、“知识制造真理”这样的表述,以及培根所说的“族类、洞穴和剧场假象”的综合体。 案例1:美国上世纪80年代一位名叫米奇·斯尼戴尔(Mitch Snyder)的人为美国无家可归者奔走,为此他不惜信口开河地捏造了非常夸张的数据,获得了公众的关注。 案例2:亚特拉大警察在90年代前半期也曾经隐瞒大量的犯罪报道,因为他们要改变城市的暴力形象。 案例3:警察通常会制造这样一种假象:警察与之毒贩的对抗难以取得决定性的胜利,是因为毒贩经济优越,设备精良。 主题二:关于毒贩的真实经济情况。贩毒网络基本上和资本主义企业没大区别,甚至和“麦当劳”非常类似。真正高收入的只是金字塔结构顶层的犯罪分子,而小罗罗们的收入,甚至低于美国法定的最低收入标准。这也解释了为什么很多毒品贩子仍然跟自己的妈妈住一起,因为他们非常穷困。

强烈推荐近期值得一读的书

强烈推荐近期值得一读的书来源:周伯通的日志 新年以来,短短三个月已经在市场上出现了好多值得一看的书。对经济学(包括金融学)专业学生以及研究者来说,下面的几本堪称精品。我个人认为最好能有时间的时候都能读上一读,不仅能提高自己的专业能力,而且还能品位这些高手驾驭经济学的艺术。 1、《理解金融危机》,富兰克林·艾伦(Franklin Allen)、道格拉斯·盖尔(Douglas Gale)、张健康、臧旭恒中国人民大学出版社(2010-01出版) 短评:艾伦和盖尔是超级牛人之间合作的典范,艾伦来自沃顿,盖尔来自NU,一个擅长金融分析,一个擅长微观建模。于是当他们相遇的时候,关于金融系统的一系列问题也就有了坚实可靠的微观模型。这本书采取一贯的信息不对称模型的构造方法,从微观企业和银行行为出发,论证了金融危机发生微观机制。阅读这本书的时候,最好结合早期人大版他们的另一部作品《比较金融系统》,这本书可以说是《比较金融系统》有关章节的扩展。系统研读这本书,至少可以懂得如何科学地看待金融危机,以及如何建立精巧的微观模型来探讨宏观问题。这是一门艺术。 2、《理解资本主义:竞争、统制与变革(第3版)》,塞缪尔·鲍尔斯(Samuel Bowles)、理查德·爱德华兹(Richard Edwards)、弗兰克·罗斯福(Frank Roosevelt)、孟捷中国人民大学出版社(2010-01出版) 短评:鲍尔斯是西方马克思主义的代表人物之一,也是一个天才型的研究者。在这本书中,鲍尔斯通过一种不同寻常的视角和研究方法来看待资本主义制度的方方面面。在阅读这本书的时候,你几乎很难分清楚这是一部马克思主义的著作,还是一部西方经济学著作,假如我们非要这么区分的话。事实上,西方马克思主义的研究是非常严谨科学的,它和我们通常讲的西方经济学的差别仅仅在于建模是基于个人还是基于一个群体或者集体或者阶级而已。如果想进一步了解鲍尔斯天才的思想,可以进一步阅读我组织翻译的《微观经济学:行为、制度和演化》,人大版。这本书几乎可以预示未来微观经济学的一个新方向。

超爆魔鬼经济学 读书笔记

超爆魔鬼经济学 请把那本《超爆魔鬼经济学》递给我一下——对对,就是中信出版社2010年4月出版的那本、英文名叫《Super Freakonomics》,由列维特和都伯纳写的《超爆魔鬼经济学》,封面有个大大的、在此灼热难耐的夏天诱人至极的、被打爆开的苹果的那本《超爆魔鬼经济学》! 好吧,这个暑假,猥琐猪要远离推理、远离小说、远离文学……那么何不看看这本书呢?抛开那封面、封底、书腰……甚至连扉页都不放过的各种好评之词不说,光听这有点叛逆的书名和那令人垂涎欲滴的苹果(我承认动机不良……),也得见识见识书里有些什么可“超”可“爆”的内容。 翻开书发现,前三十几页全是“专家推荐”,一共有五篇文章,分别来自比尔盖茨、梁小民、王则柯、王福重以及陈晓民。这五篇文章加上类似于“第二版出版前言”的“写在前面”一文一起组成了本书的第一大块(当然,这里可没有算上最前面的那个小测试),可以合称为“前言”。不过,本应是出版社苦心设计排版的这几十页,我却只看了比尔盖茨的推荐和“写在前面”。 我想,前言的目的基本有三:一、挑逗读者兴趣;二、介绍章节分布;三、为文章定性或定义。对于第一点,既然我都买了这本书,那么兴趣固然有了,再看你N多个专家指手划脚苦口婆心唠唠叨叨地给我说书的好处岂不多余?之所以看看比尔大叔的推荐文,一是因为他的排在第一个,翻页不费力;二是他的文章最短,一口气可以拿下。读后感是:盖茨有些自说自话,与其说是在对没读过原文的读者介绍内容大意,更像在和作者交流其中问题,还不如放在后记里。 “写在前面”算是真正的“前言”,其中作者就大致定义了一下何谓“魔鬼经济学”。首先,这是一个作者自己发明的词汇(freakonomic),目的是为了给本书阐述的内容用一个术语来进行界定,正因为在字典里找不到这么个贴切的词可以用来概括本书所设事物的集合,作者自己就拼凑出“魔鬼经济学”一词。第二,既然有了这个词,那么它所要包含的集合是什么呢?据猥琐猪理解,大概是以下一句话:本书所要阐述的,是一些与经济学既相关又不相关、对人们日常生活既必要又不必要的的知识领域。与经济学相关意指:作者在写作这本书时,主要是从经济学的角度出发,采用了经济学上处理数据的方法、评价事物的原则和证实观点的手段,本书涉及的问题都与经济学息息相关;与经济学不相关是指:本书不是经济学教材或辅导书,而是一本老少咸宜、普及知识的书,所以书中很少引用专门的经济学术语,尽管涉及了很多经济学的知识点。必要是指:这本书中涉及的问题都是当前非常热门的话题,至少能扩充你的视野和思路;不必要则指:好吧,你即使不买这本书,也不会有多少损失。你可能会问:那么为什么要在freakonomic前面再加上super呢?——因为之前作者已经出了一本叫《魔鬼经济学》,所以为了不把这本的标题变得向天朝的课本一样中规中矩,就用了super freakonomics这标题。 以上就是整个“前言”部分的内容。接下来的两百五十来页才是重头戏:正文部分。今天先看到这里,之后持续更新~ 这两天,我以迅雷不及掩耳盗铃儿响叮当之势开始了对《超爆魔鬼经济学》正文部分的攻略。正文分七部分,结构如下:导言+第一章~第七章+结语。目前我看完了导言和第一章。 导言,对作者而言是抛砖引玉,对读者而言是热身运动。除了再次强调一下“写在前面”里提到的东西外,导言的大部分篇幅由4个作者自认为能起到颠覆读者常识的话题组成,并在这些话题后分别给出了一些论证。 话题一:酒后步行比酒后驾车危险。

电子商务专业学生参考阅读书目

电子商务专业学生参考阅读书目 本书目是教材之外的参考书,涉及面广,但是量相对较少,同学们可以凭这个思路继续找自己感兴趣的书来读。但是好书是必须的,否则浪费时间。 电子商务专业书(教材之外的必读书,宜精不宜泛) 1、《电子商务管理视角》第五版,Efraim Turban埃弗雷姆·特班,机械工业出版社。(最好更新到最新的第七版Electronic Commerce 2012: Managerial and Social Networks Perspectives (7th Edition)) 2、《电子商务:商业、技术和社会》(第5版),劳顿,特拉弗,清华大学出版社。(最好更新到最新的第九版E-commerce 2013:Business Technology Society,(9th Edition)) 课外阅读 1、专业类报纸期刊 《IT经理世界》、《电子商务世界》、《中国电子商务》、《财经》、《财新杂志》、《新财富》、《商业周刊》、《环球企业家》、《中国企业家》、《哈佛商业评论》、《北大商业评论》、《21世纪经济报道》、 2、各种专业相关书籍 经济管理类:《市场的逻辑》,张维迎;《魔鬼经济学》、《超爆魔鬼经济学》斯蒂夫·列维特,斯蒂芬都伯纳;克里斯·安德森;《信息规则》,卡尔?夏皮罗,哈尔?瓦里安; 管理类:《创新与企业家精神》,德鲁克;《旁观者:管理大师德鲁克回忆录》,德鲁克;《管理》,德鲁克,马恰列洛;《远见,:用变革理论预测产业未来》,克里斯滕森,安东尼,罗恩;IT及前瞻类:《第三次浪潮》,托夫勒;《大趋势》,约翰·奈斯比特;《科技想要什么》,凯文凯利;《失控》,凯文凯利;《长尾理论》,克里斯·安德森;《维基经济学》,泰普斯科特;《众包》,杰夫·豪;《创客》,安德森;《大数据时代:生活、工作与思维的大变革》,迈尔-舍恩伯格,库克耶; 营销广告、公共关系类:《网络公关》,菲利普斯。(最好能找到最新版Online Public Relations: A Practical Guide to Developing an Online Strategy in the World of Social Media (PR in Practice),2009);《70天分销联盟实战:网络广告赚钱秘诀》,伊维根.基诺.帕拉斯科夫;《搜索引擎广告——网络营销的成功之路(第2版)》,李,思达; 计算机技能型阅读与练习: 1、建站与开发:PHP或是ASP或是JS,自行选择(完全不懂技术称不上是电商专业毕业的) 2、数据分析:简单的EXCEL数据分析与作图(含金量高,要强于很多劳保部的破证书);R 语言的数据分析(进阶的同学必须的,电商大数据时代必备的工具,统计学是基础)《谁说菜鸟不会数据分析(工具篇+入门篇)》 3、Word排版 职业考证阅读: 电子商务专业没有什么有含金量的证书可考,电子商务师、电子商务经理之类的都毫无价值,没有必要去考。因为电子商务技术在各个工作环节的渗透力,你可以关注金融类、财务类、贸易类、管理类等业界事实上的标准认证证书。 考研书目(立志考研的同学必读)

《魔鬼经济学》读后感

揭开真实世界的伪装 ——《魔鬼经济学》读后感当我看完了一下出版编辑们对此书的推荐语时,我想我是选对了书。同时也非常同意这些编辑们对这位拥有美国史上最有趣头脑的伟人所写的这本经济学书籍的评价。《克科斯评论》说:“本书让你从一种最为有趣的角度理解我们周围的世界;一定会让你大开眼界!”在本书中,列维特和都伯纳取材日常生活,以经济学的方式来探索日常事物背后的世界:念书给婴儿听会不会使他日后成为一个好学生?游泳池比枪支还危险?贩毒集团的结构其实和麦当劳的组织很像,而且基层员工和小弟都没赚头,钱都进了总裁和大哥的口袋;父母教养方式的差异对孩子影响不大等。 《魔鬼经济学》中确立了一个有悖于传统智慧的观点:如果说伦理道德代表了我们心目中理想的社会运行模式的话,那么经济学就是在向我们描述这个社会到底是如何运行的。著名的书评人兰兹〃伯格把《魔鬼经济学》比喻成一部侦探小说,说自己在阅读读书的过程中一直都“屏住呼吸”,生怕一呼一吸之间,吹跑书中的那股灵气。在他看来,《魔鬼经济学》的每一个章节都包含了一本一流侦探小说的所有元素。只不过列维特所要侦破的最终目标不是“找到凶手”,而是“揭开真实世界的伪装”。《魔鬼经济学》书中的几乎每一个字都是对传统智慧的颠覆,他的许多发现被认为是惊世骇俗的,有些甚至会为他引来杀身之祸。不论从哪个角度来说,这都是一本会让人眼界一新的书。 本书主要探讨日常生活中经常会碰到的五个问题:(1)欺骗;(2)掌握信息力量的可怕;(3)比如贩毒之类高风险的职业吸引人的原因;(4)后天教育和先天遗传在孩子成长过程中的不同作用;(5)名字的演变。

列维特在这五个方面列出与传统智慧不一致的结论却能让人觉得可信的原因在于其用大量的调查数据说话,通过对这写数据进行分析,作者发现,如果一项政策能够很好的激发人们的经济动机、社会动机和道德动机,便能够很好的抑止人们进行欺骗,在这种情况下,人民要表现的比想象中的诚实。另外列维特还给我们描述了3K党和房地产商之间的共同点都在于其掌握了一班人所不容易掌握的信息,从而使得人人惧怕3K党,普通人被房地产商忽悠;因此诸位要买房子的同志们大家应该联合起来,打破房地产商所拥有的信息优势,这样才能在与其打交道的过程中占据优势,这个和买卖东西时候讨价还价是一个道理,得让他们觉得你是内行才好,当然这点得需要大多数同志的一致努力,一个人努力没啥用,毕竟卖方市场啊。同样通过数据发现,普通的贩毒分子拿到到的收入根本不如想象中的那么高,至少和自己所要承担的风险想必是如此,可为什么那么多人同志还热衷此道,原因就在于尽管普通贩毒分子待遇不是那么好,但一旦混到了小头目,那可就不一样,白花花的银子啊,而且还不用自己去冒生命危险,因此人人都想着有朝一日自己能到那种程度,可惜大多数人永远也到不了,这就是诱惑的力量。非法传销和此类似。孩子的成长则对每个人父母来说,非常重要,可惜列维特通过对数据分析的结果告诉我们,孩子的成功与否,孩子的聪明程度和父母正相关,而且后天培养的效果及其有限。下面就把书中的例子给列举出来。 本书中的第三章:为什么毒品贩子仍然跟自己的妈妈住在一起。 本章探讨传统智慧是如何被捏造的。为什么专家们经常虚报统计数据?——因为记者需要它他们来制造新闻,制造传统智慧。每年在游泳池溺死的孩子比受到枪击的孩子多很多倍,然而枪击事件会大肆报道,而溺死由于太平常而不被报道,所以,其实,你家后院的游泳池比你抽屉里的手枪要危险数十倍;每年出车

魔鬼经济学读后感

《魔鬼经济学》读后感 《魔鬼经济学》这本书中,列维特和史蒂芬·都伯纳取材日常生活,以经济学的方式来探索日常事物背后的世界。比如念书给婴儿听会不会使他日后成为一个好学生游泳池比枪支还危险父母教养方式的差异对孩子影响不大等。这让我们耳目一新,很有兴趣读完这本看似很复杂高深的书。 这本书主要探讨日常生活中经常会碰到的五个问题:欺骗;掌握信息力量的可怕;比如贩毒之类高风险的职业吸引人的原因;后天教育和先天遗传在孩子成长过程中的不同作用;名字的演变。 列维特在这五个方面的出与传统智慧不一致的结论却能让人觉得可信的原因在于其用大量的调查数据说话,通过对这写数据进行分析,老列发现,如果一项政策能够很好的激发人们的经济动机、社会动机和道德动机,便能够很好的抑止人们进行欺骗,在这种情况下,人民要表现的比想象中的诚实。 本以为经济学的书应该是枯燥无味、堆砌数字和符号的,但是,这本书却让我认识到其实经济学与其说是一门具体的学科还不如说是一种哲学,这个学科的价值能普遍存在于现在的社会生活的各方面,对于每个人、每个家庭、每个组织、每个经济实体、甚至于每个国家都有着非凡的意义和价值。 比如说,列维特还给我们描述了3K党和房地产商之间的共同点都在于其掌握了一班人所不容易掌握的信息,从而使得人人惧怕3K党,普通人被房地产商忽悠;因此诸位要买房子的同志们大家应该联合起来,打破房地产商所拥有的信息优势,这样才能在与其打交道的过程中占据优势,这个和买卖东西时候讨价还价是一个道理,得让他们觉得你是内行才好,当然这点得需要大多数同志的一致努力,一个人努力没啥用,毕竟卖方市场。这使得文章很有深度。 我对书中的一句话感触很深,那就是”人们总会不自觉地选择在付出较少代价,以取得更多的利益”。这句话轻易解释出为何现在我们吃的肉是那么不新鲜充满激素,为什么到处充斥着打假,为什么会被不公平对待,这也能用来解释为什么近年来我国的食品问题频频发生。理由就是人们在巨大经济利益的驱动下,早已丢弃了良知,被利益蒙蔽了双眼。 这本书还有一个好的地方就是以数据说话,让读者信服。书中分析问题都有数据和事实为基础,这也是经济学本身对经济学家最基本的要求。要养成凡事以数据作为分析问题和得出结论的基石。知易行难,比如现在生活中很多问题很难直接拿出数据分析,从而现在有些所谓的“传统智慧”就非常值得质疑,如书中所说,“金钱并不能帮助人赢得选举”,“每天喝8杯水不能对健康有帮助”,“一根香烟折寿11分钟”。 《魔鬼经济学》中确立了一个有悖于传统智慧的观点:如果说伦理道德代表了我们心目中理想的社会运行模式的话,那么经济学就是在向我们描述这个社会到底是如何运行的。 当然了,这本书最吸引我的,还是它的思维范式,它理解世界的角度,而不是人和我具体的结论。具体的结论,会应为条件、约束、环境和前提的变化

最新魔鬼经济学读书笔记资料

读书笔记 书名:《魔鬼经济学》 作者:史蒂芬?列维特史蒂芬?萧伯纳第一章学校老师跟相扑运动员有何相同之处第一章提出了一个很简单的道理,人们做任何事情都有动机,人们会想尽各种方法实现自己的目的。甚至不惜欺骗他人。从社会道德价值来评判欺骗是可耻,但欺骗也是一门高深的经济学,其中蕴含着许多经济现象与知识。 学校的老师与相扑运动员有何共同之处呢?如果不深入思考,我们是不会从这两个毫不相干的职业当中找到相同之处的。但是如果我们从经济学的角度思考,你会发现老师与相扑运动员都会因竞争的激烈与奖金的诱惑做一些违反行业的事情。学校老师的工资通常是由老师的教学成绩来评定的,什么反映出老师的教学成绩呢?那当然是学生的考试成绩啦!由此会在改卷子时故意提高班上的平均成绩。相扑这个职业中也同样蕴含着相同的道理,由于相扑运动员的工资是由排名来决定的,所以一些运动员会用一些违禁药品或者是贿赂与自己比赛的对方。以让自己获得较高的排名,从而得到较高的工资与荣誉。 从老师与相扑运动员的共同之处,我得出一个比较粗糙的结论,人类社会的经济活动几乎是由人类的动机所驱动的,某一项经济活动的利益越大,人们就会越狂热的追逐这项经济活动,(假说动机的大小动机程度决定),也就是说人们的动机程度越强烈,人们就越

有可能采取欺骗的行为去从经济活动中获得利益,而不顾及他人的感受。 我从以上结论做了一个粗糙的模型:因素有1:动机程度 2:人类经济活动 3:利益 4:欺骗行为 从图中可以看出 (利益越大,人们的动机程度就越大,经济活动就越活跃。但人们的欺骗行为,是到有一定利益大小的时候才会出现的,因为欺骗要付出自己的诚信代价;然而到利益足够大时人们又会去考虑自己去欺

big data《大数据时代》读书笔记——精华观点和核心语句

big data《大数据时代》 精华观点和核心语句 不再追求精确度,不再追求因果关系,而是承认混杂性,探索相关关系。 如同工业革命要开放物质交易、流通一样,开放、流通的数据是时代趋势的要求。开放所带来的改变远远大于拥有权和隐私性保护所带来的问题。 要全体不要抽样,要效率不要绝对精确,要相关不要因果。 作者认为相关关系比因果关系重要,译者表示反对,认为放弃因果等于放弃人类的智力优势,是末日之始。导致相关关系比因果关系重要的原因在于,我们机器学习和以结果为导向的研究思路误导人类。 公共医疗:Google通过分析03到08的流感相关搜索词条,将45中词条组合输入一个数学模型之后,得到的流感预测数据和官方统计数据有97%吻合。09年判断准确,及时预报流感。 商业:farecast利用十万亿条飞机票价记录,预测飞机票价准确度高达75%,利用farecast购买机票的旅客平均每张机票节省50美元。 不再需要一致性的数据库和僵化的层次结构,不再需要结构化查询语言sql,最新的数据库为非关系型数据库nosql。 美国股市每天成交量高达70亿股,其中三分之二都是由数学模型和算法之上的计算机程序自动完成的,这些程序利用海量数据来预测利益和降低风险。 数据爆炸式增长,绝大部分为数字信息,极少部分为模拟数据。数据每三年多翻一番。数据规模的量变产生质变,就比如万有引力对生物体大小的关系,纳米技术对现实生活物质的性质有所改变一样,空气阻力和重量和形状关系一样。 大数据的核心在于预测,把数学算法运用到海量数据中来预测事情发生的可能性。 不再依赖于随机采样,不在热衷于追求精确度。并非完全放弃精确度,只是不再沉迷于此。不在热衷于寻找因果关系,而是寻找事物之间的相关性。 数据化意味着从一切事物中汲取数据,甚至包括我们以前认为和“信息”搭不上边的事情。比方说,一个人所在的位置、引擎的振动、桥梁的承重等等。 如同电影《点石成金》中,棒球球探们在统计学家面前相形见绌——直觉的判断被迫让位于精准的数据分析。 正文: 第一章:样本=全体 统计学家证明,采样分析的精确性随着采样随机性的增加而大幅度提高,但与样本数量的增加关系不大。随机采样取得了巨大的成功,但是他的成功利亚与采样的绝对随机性,实现采样的随机性非常困难,一旦采样过程中存在任何偏见,分析结果就会相去甚远。搜集的数据越来越多,分析和预测结果就会越来越准确,并发现一些细节和微乎其微的重要问题。 有些情况下,异常值才是重要的信息,大数据的处理方法就不会错过这个异常值。商务是即时的,因此数据分析也应该是即时的。 《魔鬼经济学》 大数据是指不用随机分析法这样的捷径,而是通过采用所有数据的方法。数据量不一定很大,但需要全部,包含了所有的信息。

人类利他性

有关人类利他性的调查 《超爆魔鬼经济学》的第三章讨论了人类利他性的问题,其中提到了“通牒博弈”,即被试A 是否将实验金愿意捐赠给B。这个行为学实验引起了我更深的思考,事实上利他行为背后隐含着更深层次的“利益”所在。事实上,在捐助灾民或施舍乞丐的行为中,很显然我们放弃的一元钱对于受赠者的边际利益往往远大于一元,也就是说两者的整体利益是提高的。因此,在这个经济学小调查中,我试图将人类利他行为的定义更改为:基于考虑到整体利益的提高而愿意选择损害自己利益帮助别人的行为。 为了验证这种新定义下的利他行为是否存在,我设计了这样一个行为实验,在实验的四个问题中,A分别拥有10元和100元的本金,并且一旦他愿意放弃x元,B便可以获得2x或50x的美元的奖励,也就是模仿现实生活中边际利益更大的效果。(详情请见附录)这份问卷共收到了114份答卷,年龄段从在校学生到已参与工作的成人不等。下面我将简述我的实验结果以及我的推断: ①从整体情况而言,四个问题的答案平均值都在4元到6元左右,这也就证明了无论如何人类是具有一定程度的利他性的。需要特别注意的第一个特点:在被试B获得2X的情况下A分别平均愿意捐出5.4和48.6元,低于50X情况下的6.4和59.2,提高了18.5%和21.8%,这表明在边际利益差距变大的情况下,人们更愿意实施利他行为。这是否暗示着,媒体可以适当的夸大需要捐赠人的糟糕境况,这样人们就会判断出捐给他的边际利益更大,从而更可能愿意进行捐赠。调查问卷显示出第二个特点:实验对象基本分为了三种人,四种情况均全部捐献型,占28.9%;均捐献三分之一者占34.2%,均不捐赠者占14%。有趣的是占比例最大的第二类人,在被试B获得2X元的实验版本中,捐献三分之一的本金可以刚好使自己和B获得同样多的金钱,我认为这代表,人类虽然具有很大的利他性,但同时也存在与生俱来的自我防御感或是嫉妒心理:大多数人不愿意被捐赠人的情况好于自己,这样的思维很可能体现在“要援助灾民,可要给灾民分三套房发五十万的体恤金,那他的情况岂不是比我还好了,这怎么行!”。 ②在本实验中我还进行了性别,消费水平和职业的分类。首先比较男女性的区别。65名男性回答中,四个问题的平均值均高于女性(虽然差距仅在10%以内),这可能暗示着男性普遍比女性更大方。有关男女性差别的一个有趣的现象是,有41.5%的男性选择捐赠全部实验金,而且所有男性实验者要么捐献一半以下,要么就捐献全部;相比之下,女性实验者有51%的选择捐赠一半以上,只有30.6%选择捐赠全部。这暗示着一旦决定做出大方的决定,就会毫不犹豫的捐赠出全部,而女性出于许多其他考虑和因素,回答的数据十分平均的分散。 ③其次基于消费水平的分类。鉴于有些区间的实验对象太少可能导致偏差,仅选择最具有代表性的500至900元区间48人与1500元以上27人(分别代表典型的学生阶层和工作者阶层),已工作者的每一问都平均比学生的数据低25%左右,而且是所有花费阶层中捐赠意愿最低的。这可能是因为大学生至今为止收到更多的是学校环境的熏陶,而学校环境普遍培养爱心和公益心,因此会更有捐赠的意愿。 当然,这个调查没有考虑到选择性偏差和密切观察行为的影响因素,同时这也仅仅是网络上的问卷调查,而非真实的行为实验,因此所作出的结论难免有些偏差。但我想这是对于这是验证利他行为新定义的一次很好的尝试,今后如果能有机会,我想继续对这个问题进行研究,并得到更完善的结论。

《魔鬼经济学》读后感

周末,天一直闷着,阴阴的,周六下了一夜的雨。这样的天气躲在家中偷看《魔鬼经济学》是再惬意不过了。 先讲讲书的结构内容: 第一章学校老师跟相扑运动员之间有何共同之处 动机,只要有动机,什么人都会欺骗、作弊; 由献血做引子 动机分三种:社会动机、道德动机、经济动机 无偿献血的动机是社会动机和道德动机驱使的,然而如果变为有偿献血,有一定经济补偿,那么社会动机和道德动机受到了“污染”,献血的人一定会减少。然而,如果经济利益巨大,那么会出现作弊的人,利用红色墨水或者猪血等等手段进行欺骗,这就是经济动机导致的结果。 通过甜饼经济学家的实验证实,人类比我们想象得更诚实,同时,也具备很多有趣的特点,比如,当节日临近,人们会产生焦虑的情绪,从而作弊行为更多等等;高职位的人更不诚实,但同时,也许是因为不诚实才能使他获得高职位。 第二章三K党跟房地产经纪人之间有何共同之处 信息的力量 信息被滥用导致三K党的衰败,信息不对称导致医生、房产经纪人、汽车销售员。。。。这些“专家”们在欺骗着我们、吓唬着我们。 网络交友中,展示的不同信息会导致别人对你感兴趣的强烈程度大不相同 我们都在利用着信息不对称或多或少地进行着欺骗........ 第三章为什么毒品贩子仍然跟自己的妈妈住在一起 本章探讨传统智慧是如何被捏造的 为什么专家们经常虚报统计数据?----因为记者需要它们来制造新闻,制造传统智慧每年在游泳池溺死的孩子比受到枪击的孩子多很多倍,然而枪击事件会大肆报道,而溺死由于太平常而不被报道,所以,其实,你家后院的游泳池比你抽屉里的手枪要危险数十倍; 每年出车祸死亡的人数比飞机事故死亡人数多很多倍,但飞机事故会被大肆报道,人们也觉得飞机更危险,因为他们能控制汽车而不能控制飞机;然而事实是,我们在汽车里呆的时间同样会比在飞机里呆的时间长很多,因此计算出事故的概率,飞机和汽车实际上是相当的。 为什么妓女的收入比建筑师高? 薪资水平是由以下几个因素决定的: 职位的竞争者的多少;技能高低;舒服程度;工作本身要求从业人员的付出水平 为什么毒品贩子仍然跟自己的妈妈住在一起,难道他们没有像传统智慧所说的那样,拥有巨大财富吗? 显然由于他们的职业与影视圈有着共同之处:出人头地的概率低,但回报高;竞争者多;因此他们中的大多数人注定贫穷。 第四章犯罪分子都到哪里去了 犯罪率是如何降低的? 不是因为警察多了,不是因为实行了宵禁;而是-----堕胎合法化 一个小小的事件会对后来的事情有深远的影响

大学专业课外阅读推荐书目

专业课外阅读推荐书目 一、市场营销、物流管理、工商管理专业必读书目 一、西方经济学名著 1、《国富论》亚当.斯密商务印书馆1972年版 2、《关于财富的形成和分配的考察》杜尔哥商务印书馆1961年版 3、《经济分析的基础》萨缪尔森商务印书馆1967年版 4、《通向奴役的道路》哈耶克商务印书馆1969年版 5、《资本主义、社会主义和民主主义》熊彼特商务印书馆1979年版 6、《经济学原理》马歇尔商务印书馆1904年版 7、《人口原理》马尔萨斯商务印书馆1961年版 8、《就业利息和货币通论》凯恩斯商务印书馆1904年版 9、《资本论》马克思人民出版社1975年版 二、西方管理学名著 I、《组织效能评价标准》西肖尔中国社会科学出版社1982年版 2、《管理决策的新科学》西蒙中国社会科学出版社1982年版 3、《工业文明的社会问题》梅奥中国社会科学出版社1982年版 4、《人类动机理论》马斯洛华夏出版社1987年版 5、《渴求成功》麦克利兰中国社科出版社1982年版 6、《企业中人的方面》麦格雷戈中国社科出版社1982年版 7、《组织结构与设计》杰伊·洛希中国社科出版社1982年版 8、《管理思想的演变》雷思中国社科出版社1982年版 9、《管理的新模式》利克特中国社科出版社1995年版 10、《经理工作的性质》明茨伯格团结出版社1999年版 1l、《组织与管理一系统与权变的观点》卡斯特中国社科出版社1988年 12、《管理决策新论》弗鲁姆中国社科出版社1988年版 13、《管理:任务、责任、实践》德鲁克机械工业出版社1999年版 14、《z理论》大内中国社科出版社1984年版 15、《经理人员的职能》巴纳德中国社科出版社1997年版 16、《工业管理和一般管理》法约尔中国社科出版社1982年版 17、其他名著: 01《君主论》马基雅维里; 02《科学管理原理》W.泰罗; 03《处理人际关系的艺术》戴尔.卡耐基; 04《个人与组织:互相协调的几个问题》克里斯.阿吉里斯;

读这些帮你提高SAT阅读

读这些帮你提高SAT阅读 对于刚接触SAT阅读的同学来说,备考SAT阅读是提高阅读速度是首要的第一位。下面三立小编为你带来读这些帮你提高SAT阅读,让你学到技巧,减少分数的丢失,希望对你有所帮助,更多资讯请访问三立在线教育,专业老师为你在线解答相关疑问。 1. 文学相关Literature selections (contemporary literature around the world) To Kill a Mockingbird《杀死一只知更鸟》 1984 《1984》 Frankenstein 《科学怪人》 The Age of Innocence 《纯真年代》 The Great Gatsby 《了不起的盖茨比》 Sherlock Holmes 《福尔摩斯探案集》 Bleak House 《荒凉山庄》 Great Expectation 《远大前程》 The Tale of Two Cities 《双城记》 The Scarlet Letter 《红字》 Complete Tales and Poems 《爱伦坡短篇小说诗歌集》 The Western Canon《西方正典》 Ten Novels and Their Authors《巨匠与杰作》 Why Read the Classics《为什么读经典》 Into the Wild (Jon Krakauer) 《荒野生存》

Walden (Henry David Thoreau) 《瓦尔登湖》 衍生阅读: 《当我谈跑步时我谈些什么》(中文) 《博尔赫斯的面孔》(中文) 《文学回忆录》(中文) 2. 历史部分History (US based founding documents or relevant documents/ speeches about civic or political life) The Declaration of Independence (1776) 《独立宣言》 The Articles of Confederation (1777)《美国联邦条例》 The Federalist Papers (1787-1788)《联邦党人文集》 The Constitution of the United States (1787)《美国宪法》 The Bill of Rights (1791)《权利法案》 Emancipation Proclamation (1863)《解放黑奴宣言》 The Mayflower Compact 《五月花号公约》 The Letter from Birmingham Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr.) 《来自伯明翰监狱的信》 The Gettesburg Speech《哥提斯堡讲演》 背景阅读: Common Sense《常识》 The American Pageant (Bailey et al.) American History: A Survey (Brinkley) 《民主的细节》刘瑜(中文)

牛奶咖啡经济学

学院商学院姓名亓义强班级 2012级8班科目政治经济学 读《牛奶可乐经济学》有感 《牛奶可乐经济学》是一本充满趣味的书,书中并没有太多晦涩难懂的经济学原理。相反,作者美国教授罗伯特将生活中的一些很普通的事物与经济学的原理相联系,用以小见大的方式生动活泼地向读者阐述其中所包含的经济学原理,读后让人感觉妙趣横生、回味无穷,可以说整部书就是个妙趣横生的经济学课堂。 现实生活中经常会遇到的一些问题。罗伯特教授用经济学的眼光加以分析,并在不同的环境下巧妙地应用经济学原理,根据这些具体事例理解这些原理,让我轻松地掌握它,并且体验到经济学的美妙之处在经济学被广为诟病的当下,这本《牛奶可乐经济学》读后没有沉闷感觉,反而让我们感觉其实经济学也没什么了不起。正如同弗兰克教授所说,其实经济学的基础并不那么高深晦涩,每个人都可以理解并将这种思维运用到自己的生活之中。通过这本妙趣横生的书,我惊喜地看到了生活更深的层面,一个经济学视角中的社会,仿佛灰色高墙后面是一片烂漫的春野。无论是饕餮盛宴还是可爱的小点心,只要能够人们引发更深的思考,指导人们更好地认识、改造世界,那么这便是研究与前进的目的。 是的,经济学也可以是优雅的、睿智的、快乐的,相信越来越多的人会认识到这一点,越来越多的人会重视这一点。在追求所没有的东西之前,应该先认清已经拥有的是什么,我们的购买力和竞争力更多的来自于自我认知而不是他人的煽动,这是经济学中最宝贵的冷静。读完这本书,我同时也有一点启发:其一,主题与角度很重要。虽然都是生活中简单的例子,虽然解释起来也不见得有什么高明之处,但本书胜在接近性,和我们日常生活的接近,此外就是以博物经济学来总括所有的案例,确定书籍的范围。其二,我们往往在进入一个新领域的时候,总想学习得快些,但却忽略了一些基本的概念,而这些概念往往却是一个学科成立的基础。 书中用极为简洁生动的例子来向我们揭示出了日常生活中的我们不经意间略过的经济学原理比如:为什么某企业奖励员工一辆豪华轿车,而不是等值的现

善于以经济学的思维思考问题

《趣味经济学》 课程论文 标题善于从经济学的思维思考问题学院医学院 专业班级健管132 学号2013212130 姓名蒋坤 任课教师赵奉军

善于以经济学的思维思考问题 摘要:经济学的思维方式能改变你对很多社会现象的看法。可能很多被我们认为常识性的东西可能根本上就是错误的,很多公论性的观点也未必就是真相,这需要我们拥有独特的思维去思考,去质疑,去发现,原来这个世界,好多都是假的,只有靠自己,才能发现真理!这种思维方式同时在生活中也可以避免很多不必要的问题的发生。 关键词:经济学原理春节火车票囚徒困境犯罪率和孕妇 引言:相信仔细研究过三国的人都知道,一个人的思维方式决定了他的行为和 说出的话,而这些都决定了自己在那个时代的命运的走向。曹操就是因为在和袁绍袁术等人同事时看清了这些人的思维,从而在与刘备煮酒论英雄时才说道“天下英雄唯使君与操耳”。这不是曹操在说大话,而是再观察众人的思维方式而得出的结论。由此可见,一个人的思维方式决定了他的明命运,当今社会,我们要立足发展,必须具备经济学的思维方式。 正文: 一掌握清晰的经济学原理 一个优秀的机械师能看出来你的车毛病在哪里,因为他们知道你的车在没出毛病的时候知道他是肿么运转的。许多人觉得经济学的问题令人困惑,是因为他们对于一个正常运行的经济学系统没有一个清晰的概念。 经济学的十大原理:1.人们面临权衡取舍 2.某种东西的成本是为了得到它而放弃的东西3.理性人考虑边际量: “边际量”是指某个经济变量在一定的影响因素下发生的变动量。经济学家用边际变动这个术语来描述对现有行动计划的微小增量调整,边际变动是围绕你所做的事的边缘的调整。个人和企业通过考虑边际量,将会做出更好的决策。而且,只有一种行动的边际利益大于边际成本,一个理性决策者才会采取这项行动。4.人们会对激励作出反应:懂得激励别人的是是领导人才5.贸易能使每个人状况更好:通过与其他人交易,人们可以按较低的成本获得各种各样的物品与劳务。6.市场通常是组织经济活动的一种好方法:2014年之前大部分曾经是中央计划经济的国家已经放弃了这种制度,并努力发展市场经济。在一个市场经济中,中央计划者的决策被千百万企业和家庭的决策所取代。这些企业和家庭在市场上相互交易,价格和个人利益引导着他们的决策。7.政府有时可以改善市场结果:为什么我们需要政府呢?一种回答是,看不见的手需要政府来保护它。只有产权得到保障,市场才能运行。但是,还有另一种回答。政府干预经济的原因有两类:促进效率和促进平等。尽管看不见的手通常会使市场有效地配置资源,但情况并不总是这样。经济学家用市场失灵这个术语来指市场本身不能有效配置资源的情况。我们说政府有时可以改善市场结果并不意味着它总能这样。学习经济学的目的之一就是帮助你判断什么时候一项政府政策适用于促进效率与公正。8.一国的生活水平取决于它生产物品与劳务的能力:生产率与生活水平之间的关系对公共政策也有深远的含义。在考虑任何一项政策如何影响生活水平时,关键问题是这项政策如何影响我们生产物品与劳务的能力。9.当政府发行了过多货币时,物价上升:什么引起了通货膨胀?在大多数严重或持续的通货膨胀情况下,罪魁祸首总是相同的———货币量的

相关主题
文本预览
相关文档 最新文档