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Title: R&D policies, trade and process innovation No. 4784 CEPR
Discussion Paper
Material Source: R&D policies, trade and process innovation
Author: Jan I. Haaland Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration and CEPR
Hans Jarle Kind Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
We set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one of the firms.
This paper has two main purposes. The first is to explore the relationship between trade costs and R&D investments. We show that increased integration (lower trade costs) may increase both private and social incentives to invest in R&D, and may lead firms to sell more both domestically and abroad. The second purpose is to study the effects of policy competition and cooperation in imperfectly competitive international markets, and in particular to show that R&D subsidies may in fact reduce the number of product varieties in the market. This turns out to be true both if the subsidies are set in a policy game between governments maximizing domestic welfare and if the governments set R&D subsidies cooperatively to maximize aggregate welfare.
These results are developed in a simple two-country model with trade costs,
where each country hosts one firm. The firms produce horizontally differentiated goods, and can invest in process-improving R&D to reduce marginal production costs. Freer trade between the countries implies that the size of the market increases, making it profitable to invest more in cost-reducing R&D. Thereby marginal production costs and consumer prices fall. Other things equal, this leads to more export as well as higher sales at home.
The latter implies that the social value of any given R&D investment then increases, due to higher domestic consumer surplus. Trade liberalization thus induces the government to increase the subsidy level. It should be noted that the motive for R&D subsidies is not to promote exports per se; the size of the export market is important only because it matters for the choice of R&D investments and hence for consumer surplus at home.1.
In addition to the consumer-surplus motive for subsidizing R&D, there is also a strategic motive for active R&D policies when firms from different countries produce (imperfect) substitutes. This strategic (‘business stealing’) motive may give rise to policy competition between the countries. Contrary to many previous studies we find that policy competition does not necessarily result in too high subsidies; it may, however, lead to unstableor asymmetric equilibria. The determining factor in our model is the degree of product differentiation. If goods are close substitutes, policy competition may be so fierce that it is impossible for both firms to survive in the market. Depending on the degree of product differentiation in the industry, we may thus have a stable symmetric equilibrium, an unstable symmetric equilibrium, or no symmetric equilibria at all. In the latter two cases there may exist stable asymmetric equilibria where one firmmonopolizes the market (and the other is inactive), even if the countries and the firms at the outset are completely symmetric.
The outcome of the policy game is inoptimal from a global point of view. Hence, there is a need for R&D policy cooperation that takes into account profit and consumer surplus in both countries, and eliminates policy competition. Coordination of R&D policies may be particularly relevant within closely integrated regions where the use of other policy measures to support domestic industry is already regulated. Based on e.g. actual and proposed tax reforms in the EU, a natural approach could be to require that R&D subsidies are harmonized between the countries. If the countries harmonize their R&D subsidies to a common level in our context, the outcome where one firm monopolizes the market is avoided. Somewhat surprisingly, this is not necessarily welfare maximizing. If the two goods are
sufficiently close substitutes, it will not be optimal from society’s point of view to invest in process innovation in both firms. Hence, the optimal cooperative R&D policy for the two countries could be to subsidize R&D in one of the countries, but not in the other. In fact, it may even be optimal to tax R&D in the other country. The intuition is that the consumers do not gain very much from having access to different varieties if the goods are close substitutes. So to avoid duplication of the investment costs, the first-best cooperative policy could be to stimulate R&D in one firm and reduce the R&D incentives in the other.
Little research has been done on the links between trade liberalization and R&D policies, and we are not aware of any other studies showing how trade liberalization may increase private and social incentives to invest in R&D and thus lead firms to sell more both domestically and abroad even in absence of strategic interactions. However, starting with Spencer and Brander (1983), there is a large literature focusing on the business-stealing motive for subsidizing R&D. This focus can partly be explained by the fact that international agreements prohibit the use of, for instance, pure export subsidies. In such settings Neary and Leahy (2000) emphasize the important point that R&D policies may be a second-best option to support domestic firms in international markets. Moreover, Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Brander (1995) and Leahy and Neary (2001) have found that R&D subsidies can be a more robust instrument than export policies. It should be noted, though, that these studies typically abstract from consumer-surplus effects and make the simplifying assumption that all production is exported to a third market. This strand of literature thus argues that policy competition tends to result in excessive R&D.
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) initiated a wave of research that analyzes the consequences of R&D cooperation between firms that compete in the end-user market. Both D’Aspremont and Jacquemin and later studies have found that this kind of cooperation may be welfare improving and increase industry profit.3 However, Salant and Shaffer (1998 and 1999) and Amir and Wooders (1998) point to the fact that these studies presuppose that the firms choose the same level of R&D and sell the same quantities, while the optimal solution may actually be asymmetric.4 In particular, Salant and Shaffer (1999) deal with the fact that it may be optimal to treat ex ante identical agents unequally if there is Cournot competition in the product market. Hence, the symmetric equilibria identified in the literature may not represent optimal outcomes. Leahy and Neary (2004) relate the results from Salant and Shaffer to the question of whether the second-order conditionsfor a
symmetric equilibrium are satisfied, and discuss more generally how to interpret the results regarding symmetric versus asymmetric outcomes. Our analysis relates to this recent line of literature in its emphasis on the possibilities of asymmetric equilibria. However, we focus on competition or cooperation at the policy stage, whereas Leahy and Neary (2004) and most of the other studies look at R&D cooperation between firms and abstract from subsidization issues. Moreover, while most of the previous studies assume Cournot competition with homogeneous products, we introduce product differentiation, and show that the degree of differentiation is, indeed, decisive for the type of equilibrium in the market. Hence, our focus is a different one (policy rather than firms’ behaviour) and our results are more general, in the sense that we show the importance of product differentiation (and hence competition) for the actual equilibrium in the market.
In this paper we have studied optimal industrial R&D investments in an international setting. In a simple model with two countries hosting one firm each, we have looked at the firms’ R&D decisions and the governments’ incentives to influence R&D levels through subsidies. Both non-cooperative policies and coordinated international policies are studied; for national (non-cooperative) policies there are both a public-goods motive and a business-stealing motive for R&D policies. With coordinated policies, the businessstealing motive disappears, while the public-goods motive is reinforced. A number of interesting conclusions come out of the analysis.
First, it is shown that international trade and trade costs are important for the firms’ choice of R&D as well as for the governments’ optimal policies towards R&D. Liberalization implies that the firms find it optimal to increase their cost-reducing R&D investments, since the market becomes bigger. And higher R&D implies lower marginal costs, lowerprices and more sales. The government - realizing that the benefits any given level of R&D support then goes up - finds it optimal to raise the subsidy. Freer international trade thus implies more R&D, higher R&D subsidies and more sales, possibly also in the domestic market. The policy effects do not rely on any business-stealing motive; even for a monopoly it would be the case that optimal R&D subsidies and domestic sales increase when trade costs go down.
Second, we study in some detail policy competition between two governments pursuing national interest. Contrary to most of the literature, we explicitly include the effects for domestic consumers in the analysis. We find that the effects of policy competition depend critically on the characteristics of the market. If the goods are
poor substitutes, competition between the firms is not very strong, and for the governments the public-good motive for subsidies is more important than the business-stealing one. In such industries there will typically be a symmetric outcome, where both governments subsidize R&D in the domestic firm, and where both firms invest in R&D and sell their products in the two markets. When the goods are close substitutes, on the other hand, the business-stealing motive for subsidies dominates, and competition may become so tough that only one firm survives in the market.
Third, we analyze policy cooperation, and look at the optimal R&D policy from a global point of view. Given the potentially harmful effects of policy competition, it is not difficult to see why there is a need for policy coordination. However, contrary to what one might expect, policy cooperation does not necessarily lead to a harmonization of the subsidies to the two firms. In fact, our analysis shows that when goods are fairly close substitutes, an optimal cooperative policy may imply that only one of the firms receives R&D subsidies, and that the other firm ceases to produce. Hence, the surprising result is that both with policy competition and policy coordination we may end up with an asymmetric equilibrium where one firm monopolizes the market.
In the model we have assumed a two-stage game where the firms at the second stage determine R&D and output simultaneously. Many of the contributions to the literature assume three stages, such that the firms at the second stage (i.e. after the subsidies are set) determine the R&D investments, and at the third stage produce and sell the goods.This assumption is not critical for our main results. With a three-stage game, there would be strategic motives for the firms’ R&D decisions in addition to the cost-minimizing ones, but that would not change our results qualitatively. A second assumption to discuss, is the specific cost function for R&D. In the analysis it was shown that the fixed costs of an R&D project could be important for the existence of asymmetric equilibria. The same applies with respect to the convexity of the cost function. In particular, the existence of a stable, symmetric equilibrium is more likely the more convex the cost function (see also Leahy and Neary, 2004). Hence, the exact outcomes that we find may depend on the specific cost function. However, the main conclusions regarding the effects of trade liberalization and the possibilities of asymmetric as well as symmetric equilibria remain valid also with more general R&D functions.
工业设计原著选读 优秀的产品设计 第一个拨号电话1897年由卡罗耳Gantz 第一个拨号电话在1897年被自动电器公司引入，成立于1891年布朗强，一名勘萨斯州承担者。在1889年，相信铃声“中央交换”将转移来电给竞争对手，强发明了被拨号系统控制的自动交换机系统。这个系统在1892年第一次在拉波特完成史端乔系统中被安装。1897年，强的模型电话，然而模型扶轮拨条的位置没有类似于轮齿约170度,以及边缘拨阀瓣。电话，当然是被亚历山大格雷厄姆贝尔（1847—1922）在1876年发明的。第一个商业交换始建于1878（12个使用者），在1879年，多交换机系统由工程师勒罗伊B 菲尔曼发明,使电话取得商业成功,用户在1890年达到250000。 直到1894年，贝尔原批专利过期，贝尔电话公司在市场上有一个虚拟的垄断。他们已经成功侵权投诉反对至少600竞争者。该公司曾在1896年，刚刚在中央交易所推出了电源的“普通电池”制度。在那之前，一个人有手摇电话以提供足够的电力呼叫。一个连接可能仍然只能在给予该人的名义下提出要求达到一个电话接线员。这是强改变的原因。 强很快成为贝尔的强大竞争者。他在1901年引进了一个桌面拨号模型，这个模型在设计方面比贝尔的模型更加清晰。在1902年，他引进了一个带有磁盘拨号的墙面电话，这次与实际指孔，仍然只有170度左右在磁盘周围。到1905年，一个“长距离”手指孔已经被增加了。最后一个强的知名模型是在1907年。强的专利大概过期于1914年，之后他或他的公司再也没有听到过。直到1919年贝尔引进了拨号系统。当他们这样做，在拨号盘的周围手指孔被充分扩展了。 强发明的拨号系统直到1922年进入像纽约一样的大城市才成为主流。但是一旦作为规规范被确立，直到70年代它仍然是主要的电话技术。后按键式拨号在1963年被推出之后，强发明的最初的手指拨号系统作为“旋转的拨号系统”而知名。这是强怎样“让你的手指拨号”的。 埃姆斯椅LCW和DCW 1947 这些带有复合曲线座位，靠背和橡胶防震装置的成型胶合板椅是由查尔斯埃姆斯设计，在赫曼米勒家具公司生产的。 这个原始的概念是被查尔斯埃姆斯（1907—1978）和埃罗沙里宁（1910—1961）在1940年合作构想出来的。在1937年，埃姆斯成为克兰布鲁克学院实验设计部门的领头人，和沙里宁一起工作调查材料和家具。在这些努力下，埃姆斯发明了分成薄片和成型胶合板夹板，被称作埃姆斯夹板，在1941年收到了来自美国海军5000人的订单。查尔斯和他的妻子雷在他们威尼斯，钙的工作室及工厂和埃文斯产品公司的生产厂家一起生产了这批订单。 在1941年现代艺术博物馆，艾略特诺伊斯组织了一场比赛用以发现对现代生活富有想象力的设计师。奖项颁发给了埃姆斯和沙里宁他们的椅子和存储碎片，由包括埃德加考夫曼，大都会艺术博物馆的阿尔弗雷德，艾略特诺伊斯，马尔塞布鲁尔，弗兰克帕里什和建筑师爱德华达雷尔斯通的陪审团裁决。 这些椅子在1946年的现代艺术展览博物馆被展出，查尔斯埃姆斯设计的新的家具。当时，椅子只有三条腿，稳定性问题气馁了大规模生产。 早期的LCW（低木椅）和DWC（就餐木椅）设计有四条木腿在1946年第一次被埃文斯产品公司（埃姆斯的战时雇主）生产出来，被赫曼米勒家具公司分配。这些工具1946年被乔治纳尔逊为赫曼米勒购买，在1949年接手制造权。后来金属脚的愿景在1951年制作，包括LCW（低金属椅）和DWC（就餐金属椅）模型。配套的餐饮和咖啡桌也产生。这条线一直
附录 英文： Casting and Other Forming Processes DeGarmo, E. Paul et al. Materials and Processes in Manufacturintg. John Wiley & Song, 1998. P205-211 Casting Casting is the introduction of molten metal into a cavity or mold where, upon solidification, it becomes an object whose shape is determined by mold configuration. Casting offers several advantages over other method of metal forming: it is adaptable to intricate shapes, to extremely large pieces, and to mass production; it can provide parts with uniform physical and mechanical properties through out and, depending on the particular material being cast, the design of the part, and the quantity being produced, its economic advantages can surpass other processes. Categories Two broad categories of metal-casting processes exist: ingot casting (which includes continuous casting) and casting to shape. Ingot castings are produced by pouring molten metal into a permanent or reusable mold. Following solidification these ingots (or bars, slabs, or billets, as the case may be) are then further processed mechanically into many new shapes. Casting to shape involves pouring molten metal into molds in which the cavity provides the final useful shape, followed only by machining or welding for the specific application. Ingot casting Ingot castings make up the majority of all metal castings and are separated into three categories: static cast ingots, semi-continuous or direct-chill cast ingots, and continuous cast ingots. Static cast ingots Static ingot casting simply involves pouring molten metal into a permanent mold. After solidification, the ingot is withdrawn from
外文翻译 原文 Strategies for distinctive brands Material Source: Journal of Brand Management Author:Judith Lynne Zaichkowsky ABSTRACT Brand identity complements brand equity and it forms an important part of the strategic management of brands. Identity elements include a well-known brand name, logo, font type, symbols, colour, shape, as well as unique product and benefit descriptions. These different elements can contribute to distinct consumer perceptions of various brands in the marketplace and help to differentiate brands from competitors. Brand managers need to start with a vision of what they want their brand to represent and then use the appropriate identity elements to build the brand. Some brand identity components may be influential to choice at the subconscious level of consumers, and therefore the understanding of individual psychological processes of perception and social meaning is required by brand managers. Keywords: brand equity ; brand identity ; logos ; brand names ; packaging INTRODUCTION Much literature in the area of branding has focused on brand equity and its importance to strong brands. Although everyone agrees that understanding and creating brand equity is essential for marketing, very little academic attention is paid to understanding the importance of brand identity and its relation to brand equity and brand management. Brand identity is the visual picture and meaning derived from the visual impact of the brand. For the consumer to identify brands with their respective manufacturers, the brands must be sold with distinctive features supplied by that particular manufacturer. Strong and unique links to one source is what complements and protects brands from being interchangeable in the marketplace. Brand differentiation, or identity, may be achieved through a well-known brand name, logo, typeface, symbol, colour, shape, distinctive design of the package or product, as well as product benefit descriptions known as unique selling points
外文翻译 原文 Firms in International Trade Material Source: https://www.doczj.com/doc/a87765506.html, Author: Andrew B. Bernard For most of its lengthy history the field of international trade largely ignored the role of the firm in mediating the flow of goods and services. Traditional trade theory explained the flow of goods between countries in terms of comparative advantage, that is, variation in the opportunity costs of production across countries and industries. Even the research focusing on differentiated varieties and increasing returns to scale that followed Helpman and Krugman continued to retain the characterization of the representative firm.?However, the assumption of a representative firm, while greatly enhancing the tractability of general equilibrium analysis, is emphatically rejected in the data. My research over the past decade has been an attempt to explore international trade from below: to understand the decisions of heterogeneous firms in shaping international trade and their effects on productivity growth and welfare. Firm Heterogeneity and Trade My early work with J. Bradford Jensen was motivated by a simple question: what do we know about firms that trade? The answer at the time was "very little" and our initial efforts focused on locating firm-level data and describing the world of exporting firms. Our first study compared exporters and non-exporters for the entire U.S. manufacturing sector and established a set of facts about exporting plants and firms.?Two major results stand out. First, only a small fraction of firms are exporters at any given time. Even in sectors where the United States is thought to have comparative advantage, such as Instruments, a majority of firms produce only for the domestic market. Similarly, some firms are exporting even in net import sectors such as Textiles and Apparel. Second, exporters are substantially and significantly different than non-exporters, even in the same industry and region. Exporters are dramatically larger, more productive, pay higher wages, use more skilled workers, and are more technology- and capital-intensive than their non-exporting counterparts. In related
Interaction design Moggridge Bill Interaction design，Page 1-15 USA Art Press, 2008 Interaction design (IxD) is the study of devices with which a user can interact, in particular computer users. The practice typically centers on "embedding information technology into the ambient social complexities of the physical world."[1] It can also apply to other types of non-electronic products and services, and even organizations. Interaction design defines the behavior (the "interaction") of an artifact or system in response to its users. Malcolm McCullough has written, "As a consequence of pervasive computing, interaction design is poised to become one of the main liberal arts of the twenty-first century." Certain basic principles of cognitive psychology provide grounding for interaction design. These include mental models, mapping, interface metaphors, and affordances. Many of these are laid out in Donald Norman's influential book The Psychology of Everyday Things. As technologies are often overly complex for their intended target audience, interaction design aims to minimize the learning curve and to increase accuracy and efficiency of a task without diminishing usefulness. The objective is to reduce frustration and increase user productivity and satisfaction. Interaction design attempts to improve the usability and experience of the product, by first researching and understanding certain users' needs and then designing to meet and exceed them. (Figuring out who needs to use it, and how those people would like to use it.) Only by involving users who will use a product or system on a regular basis will designers be able to properly tailor and maximize usability. Involving real users, designers gain the ability to better understand user goals and experiences. (see also: User-centered design) There are also positive side effects which include enhanced system capability awareness and user ownership. It is important that the user be aware of system capabilities from an early stage so that expectations regarding functionality are both realistic and properly understood. Also, users who have been active participants in a product's development are more likely to feel a sense of ownership, thus increasing overall satisfa. Instructional design is a goal-oriented, user-centric approach to creating training and education software or written materials. Interaction design and instructional design both rely on cognitive psychology theories to focus on how users will interact with software. They both take an in-depth approach to analyzing the user's needs and goals. A needs analysis is often performed in both disciplines. Both, approach the design from the user's perspective. Both, involve gathering feedback from users, and making revisions until the product or service has been found to be effective. (Summative / formative evaluations) In many ways, instructional
附录A 机械制造技术是研究产品设计、生产、加工制造、销售使用、维修服务乃至回收再生的整个过程的工程学科,是以提高质量、效益、竞争力为目标,包含物质流、信息流和能量流的完整的系统工程。随着社会的发展,人们对产品的要求也发生了很大变化,要求品种要多样、更新要快捷、质量要高档、使用要方便、价格要合理、外形要美观、自动化程度要高、售后服务要好、要满足人们越来越高的要求,就必须采用先进的机械制造技术。 1 先进制造技术的特点 1.1面向21世纪的技术 先进制造技术是制造技术的最新发展阶段，是由传统的制造技术发展起来的，既保持了过去制造技术中的有效要素，又要不断吸收各种高新技术成果，并渗透到产品生产的所有领域及其全部过程。先进制造技术与现代高新技术相结合而产生了一个完整的技术群，它是具有明确范畴的新的技术领域，是面向21世纪的技术。 1.2 是面向工业应用的技术 先进制造技术并不限于制造过程本身，它涉及到产品从市场调研、产品开发及工艺设计、生产准备、加工制造、售后服务等产品寿命周期的所有内容，并将它们结合成一个有机的整体。先进制造技术的应用特别注意产生最好的实际效果，其目标是为了提高企业竞争和促进国家经济和综合实力的增长。目的是要提高制造业的综合经济效益和社会效益。 1.3驾驭生产过程的系统工程 先进制造技术特别强调计算机技术、信息技术、传感技术、自动化技术、新材料技术和现代系统管理技术在产品设计、制造和生产组织管理、销售及售后服务等方面的应用。它要不断吸收各种高新技术成果与传统制造技术相结合，使制造技术成为能驾驭生产过程的物质流、能量流和信息流的系统工程。 1.4 面向全球竞争的技术 20世纪 80年代以来，市场的全球化有了进一步的发展，发达国家通过金融、经济、科技手段争夺市场，倾销产品，输出资本。随着全球市场的形成，使得市场竞争变得越来越激烈，先进制造技术正是为适应这种激烈的市场竞争而出
附录 F.1英文参考资料及中文翻译 F. 1 .1international trade documents role General international trade documents (international trade documents) is the international trade of use all the documents, documents and certificates collectively. Usually with international trade documents to deal with in and out of delivery of the goods El, transportation, insurance, inspection and quarantine, customs declaration, the settlement of exchange, etc. Special international trade documents usually refers to the settlement documents, especially the l/c under the way of settlement of documents. International trade documents and the use of import and export trade program closely related, the documents in the import and export enterprise work throughout the export, purchase, transportation, the whole process of the proceeds, the effort is big, timeliness strong, is broad, in addition to import and export enterprise internal between various departments the cooperation with the outside, still must and bank, customs, transportation department, insurance companies, the inspection and quarantine agencies and the relevant administrative authorities happen various contact, linked together, mutual influence, also are conditions. International trade documents for the performance of a contract is necessary means International trade is the transnational goods business, due to the particularity of the multinational business, which is the purchase and sale of the different departments are located in different countries, are remote, in most cases, the goods and payment can't perform simple direct exchange, but only as the medium of exchange with documents means. The international trade of the documents that sales of goods through the documents realization sale, the seller should not only will the actual delivery of goods export shipment, and should submit to the buyer include the title to the goods vouchers, complete documents to show real assignment. The seller/p means that the delivery of the goods, and the buyer payment is get to buy goods on behalf of property rights certificate, the deal is no longer with the goods as the core, but with documents as the core. Documents and payment of the convection principle has become the international trade of general principles of the commodity business. As international trade experts "; m Cardiff in the export trade in his book mentioned: "from a business perspective, can say CIF the purpose of the contract is not the buying and selling of goods itself, but the documents relating to the goods business." What say here "documents" is the international trade of documents. International trade documents many kinds, every kind of documents has its
(文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 中英文翻译原文：
DESIGN and ENVIRONMENT Product design is the principal part and kernel of industrial design. Product design gives uses pleasure. A good design can bring hope and create new lifestyle to human. In spscificity,products are only outcomes of factory such as mechanical and electrical products,costume and so on.In generality,anything,whatever it is tangibile or intangible,that can be provided for a market,can be weighed with value by customers, and can satisfy a need or desire,can be entiled as products. Innovative design has come into human life. It makes product looking brand-new and brings new aesthetic feeling and attraction that are different from traditional products. Enterprose tend to renovate idea of product design because of change of consumer's lifestyle , emphasis on individuation and self-expression,market competition and requirement of individuation of product. Product design includes factors of society ,economy, techology and leterae humaniores. Tasks of product design includes styling, color, face processing and selection of material and optimization of human-machine interface. Design is a kind of thinking of lifestyle.Product and design conception can guide human lifestyle . In reverse , lifestyle also manipulates orientation and development of product from thinking layer.
Shaft Solid shafts. As a machine component a shaft is commonly a cylindrical bar that supports and rotates with devices for receiving and delivering rotary motion and torque .The crankshaft of a reciprocating engine receive its rotary motion from each of the cranks, via the pistons and connecting roads (the slider-crank mechanisms), and delivers it by means of couplings, gears, chains or belts to the transmission, camshaft, pumps, and other devices. The camshafts, driven by a gear or chain from the crankshaft, has only one receiver or input, but each cam on the shaft delivers rotary motion to the valve-actuating mechanisms. An axle is usually defined as a stationary cylindrical member on which wheels and pulleys can rotate, but the rotating shafts that drive the rear wheels of an automobile are also called axles, no doubt a carryover from horse-and-buggy days. It is common practice to speak short shafts on machines as spindles, especially tool-carrying or work-carrying shafts on machine tools. In the days when all machines in a shop were driven by one large electric motor or prime mover, it was necessary to have long line shafts running length of the shop and supplying power, by belt, to shorter couter shafts, jack shafts, or head shafts. These line shafts were assembled form separate lengths of shafting clampled together by rigid couplings. Although it is usually more convenient to drive each machine with a separate electric motor, and the present-day trend is in this direction, there are still some oil engine receives its rotary motion from each of the cranks, via the pistons and connecting roads (the slider-crank mechanisms) , and delivers it by means of couplings, gears, chains or belts to the transmission, camshaft, pumps, and other devices. The camshafts, driven by a gear or chain from the crankshaft, has only one receiver or input, but each cam on the shaft delivers rotary motion to the valve-actuating mechanisms. An axle is usually defined as a stationary cylindrical member on which wheels and pulleys can rotate, but the rotating shafts that drive the rear wheels of an automobile are also called axles, no doubt a carryover from horse-and-buggy days. It is common practice to speak short shafts on machines as spindles, especially tool-carrying or work-carrying shafts on machine tools. In the days when all machines in a shop were driven by one large electric motor or prime mover, it was necessary to have long line shafts running length of the shop and supplying power, by belt, to shorter coutershafts, jackshafts, or headshafts. These line shafts were assembled form separate
品牌营销外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译) 译文： 品牌 消费者总有关于产品可用性、质量和可供选择的价格的不完全信息。这样的“不完美的信息”导致他们依靠那些减轻获取产品信息的费用的品牌。由于依靠名牌和伴生的公司名誉，每次购买时，消费者没有搜寻或调查产品就能做出合理的购买。 许多经济学家惊叹这样一个事实：消费者在名牌上投入了如此的信赖。问题是，如同这些经济学家看见的，消费者的信赖给了公司建立超出他们能收取的价格的品牌“市场力量”。因为这些经济学家宣称要“真实地”辨别产品，当公司以独特的名牌、相关的广告和积极的竞争来“区分”他们的产品，他们能够比其他人得到更多。名牌引导消费
者在不同的产品之间进行那些经济学家认为的人为的分别。公司因为品牌而受到尊敬，因此，名牌能使企业在提高价格的情况下而不会失去重大的销售额。 品牌导致消费者经常根据现实世界和“完美的”信息世界之间的比较而付出不必要的多余地的高价，那里同一个行业内的每个公司都承担出售相同的、没有品牌的“同类”产品。这些是在“完善的竞争模型，”作的假定，及有时供经济学家使用的简化的构建。虽然不完美信息是完全自然的和不可避免的。许多经济学家认为完善的竞争的绝佳状态是衡量政策是否理想的评判标准。那是因为在完善的竞争之下公司没有任何力量抬高交易价格。如果公司提高了他们的产品的价格甚至只比市场价格高一分，它都将什么也卖不出去。因此，在完全竞争情况下，消费者不会支付更高一分的价格购买在其他任何地方以更低的价格能买到的相同的产品。毫不奇怪，假定同类产品是理想的，导致以品牌区分产品而减少消费者福利的不正确涵义。那么，反过来，导致由哈佛经济学家爱德华·H 1956年主张的政策——商标不应该被强制执行。 但是，越来越多的经济行业认识到了假定产品是相同的存在着问题。你无法理解由没有下降的品牌效应为其服务的经济目的假定，我们居住在消费者都知晓的完全信息的世界。实际上，消费者没有充分的掌握信息，并且他们也知道他们并没有掌握完全的信息。因此，他们重视公司的名誉——并且他们愿意支付更多在那些一直供应高质量产品、拥有良好声誉的生产商的产品上。通过这种做法，消费者不会不合理行动。他们简单地设法保护自己没有必须用许多时间去学习获得关于各个公